Popular Mobilization in Senegal’s 2024 Political Crisis
27 July 2024
Senegal’s democracy under threat
On March 24, 2024, Senegal voted to elect its fifth president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye. Faye was elected after just nine days of campaigning following his release from prison amidst a hotly contested election season that witnessed widespread protests against incumbent Macky Sall (Booty, 2024; Popoviciu, 2024). Critics accused Sall of attempting to illegally extend his mandate through what some have called a “constitutional coup” (Townsend, 2024a). Though a confluence of factors saved Senegal’s democracy from the threat of backsliding, one of the most influential was the wave of pro-democracy protests and mobilizations that shook Senegal for months before the election (Riedl and Ndiaye, 2024).
Bassirou Diomaye Faye during the visit of Charles Michel, President of the European Council to Senegal on 22 April 2024. - [Image source]
For decades, Senegal has been regarded as one of Africa’s few bastions of relatively stable and functional democracy (Koigi, 2024). This West African republic has maintained a tradition of peaceful transitions of power since its independence from France in 1960. Unlike its neighbors – with the sole exception of Cape Verde – Senegal has never seen the endemic military coups and autocratic regimes that characterize the region (Brooke-Holland, 2023).
However, Senegal’s recent 2024 election threatened to overturn the country’s longstanding democratic tradition as former President Macky Sall sought to suppress the opposition, delay the election until the end of the year, and engineer the ascent of a handpicked successor (Human Rights Watch, 2024; Kane, 2024; Valdespino, 2024). Critics accused Sall of attempting to extend his mandate past Senegal’s two-term presidential limit—one that he himself implemented through the 2016 Senegalese constitutional referendum (Aikins, 2024). This occurred in the context of increasing democratic fragility throughout Africa (Townsend, 2024b).
Macky Sall, former President of Senegal from 2012-2024. - [Image source]
A new challenger emerges
The roots of this year’s political crisis go back to 2021 when Macky Sall’s government levied sexual assault charges against left-wing populist opposition leader Ousmane Sonko of the Patriots of Senegal party (PASTEF). Since his emergence as a presidential candidate in 2019, Sonko has enjoyed widespread support among youth and working-class demographics—sizable contingents in Senegal’s generally young and low-income population (Felix and Crowe, 2024; Irwin and Dione, 2023; Maclean and Camara, 2021; Princewill and Busari, 2024).
Analysts credit Sonko’s popularity to his firebrand image in the eyes of demographics who have not benefitted from the economic boom witnessed under former President Macky Sall (Yates, 2024). Sonko is also notable for his pan-Africanist and anti-French positions, as opposed to Sall’s economically liberal policies that saw Senegal seek closer ties with its former colonial master. In recent years, the rise of anti-French rhetoric has coincided with attacks on French-owned property in protests across Senegal (Thomas-Johnson, 2021).
Sonko’s anti-French sentiment has echoed that of governments installed by coups in neighboring countries in the 2020s, namely in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali (Tharoor, 2024). This stance aligns Sonko with other young leaders in a region of increasing international tension, pitting regional unity bloc ECOWAS against the three breakaway states (Melly, 2024). A devout Muslim, Sonko is also in favor of harsher anti-LGBT laws in Senegal, rejecting Western concerns for gay rights in the country (Banchereau, 2024).
On May 31, 2023, following a protracted legal battle, Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison for “corrupting youth,” though he was acquitted of charges of rape and issuing death threats (Lu, 2023). Sonko simultaneously faced charges of libel, for which he was also found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison and a hefty fine (Muia, 2024). Separate charges accusing Sonko of fomenting insurrection coincided with the government’s dissolution of PASTEF (Allegrozzi, 2023).
Sonko and his supporters considered the charges politically motivated, as these legal processes prevented Sonko from running as a presidential candidate in 2024 (“Presidential race setback,” 2024). Other opposition candidates, like Sonko’s ally President Faye, faced similar legal challenges and prison sentences—as did journalists who investigated such affairs, generating concerns over press freedom under President Sall (Négoce and Aradi, 2024; Peltier, 2023). Sall also drew criticism for repeatedly cutting internet access in a bid to limit dissent (Dione, 2024).
Taking to the streets
Consequently, widespread protests swept the country in support of Sonko and Senegal’s wider democratic opposition movement. The protests that erupted following Sall’s attempt to postpone the February election to December were only the latest and most momentous in a long series of mobilizations dating back to the beginning of Sonko’s legal saga in 2021 (Dione and Inveen, 2024; Négoce, 2024). In repeated clashes between protesters and the police, state use of force has resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. In addition to uniformed police forces, protesters have also accused the state of employing armed civilians called “nervis,” or “thugs,” to suppress protesters (Mednick, 2023).
Amid the heavy-handed police response, a joint investigation between Al Jazeera and porCausa Foundation found that a special counterterrorism unit funded, supplied, and trained by the EU and intended for border security was instead deployed against protesters (Popovicui and Bautista, 2024). Despite the numerous deaths during protests in 2021, 2023, and 2024—reportedly at least 60 overall as of February 2024—no one has yet been prosecuted for the violence. Additionally, over 500 protesters had been detained as of June 2023 (Dione, Christensen, and Ba, 2023).
Makeshift barricades, burning tires, and tear gas canisters became a common sight on the streets of Dakar, Senegal’s capital, for months before the election (“Senegal riot police,” 2024; Dione and Inveen, 2024). Protests also struck other major cities, such as Ziguinchor, where Sonko served as mayor between 2022 and 2024. Ziguinchor is the largest city of Senegal’s Casamance region, where a low-intensity secessionist insurgency has simmered for decades (Brimbal, 2022; Gerth-Niculescu, 2024).
Analysts have argued that the state’s deployment of the justice system as a retaliatory weapon against “subversives,” from protesters to journalists and opposition leaders, only fueled the public perception of the Senegalese government under Macky Sall as repressive, corrupt, and prone to democratic backsliding (Dione, 2019; Ndiaye, 2023).
Despite the violence of the state’s response to the long-running protests, the mass mobilization of the Senegalese public did encourage progressive change (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The protest movement succeeded in mobilizing large sectors of the Senegalese population, from disenfranchised youths to civil society groups, imams, and trade unions (Chemam, 2024; Eblotié, 2024; Hammerschlag, 2023). In response, Sall offered to hold a “dialogue” with opposition groups concerned about the election delay (“Senegal Opposition Rejects,” 2024). One collective of 40 opposition groups dubbing itself Aar Sunu Election, or “Protect Our Election” and mobilizing thousands of protesters rejected Sall’s dialogue offer as an “attempt at a diversion” (“Senegalese Protest,” 2024).
Subsequently, Sall pledged to stand down on April 2, the formal end of his presidential mandate—and not part of his original plan (“Senegal Civil Society,” 2024). Senegal’s Constitutional Council also annulled Sall’s unconstitutional plan to delay the election, recommending an expedited voting date in June (“Open Society,” 2024). Unsatisfied with the ambiguity surrounding Senegal’s democratic procedures in the case of a two-month gap between Sall leaving office and the election taking place, Aar Sunu Election and other opposition groups renewed their organizing efforts. Sall finally capitulated and released leading opposition candidates Sonko and Faye just 10 days before the final voting date of March 24. Following Faye’s victory, Sonko was named Senegal’s new prime minister.
Safeguarding democracy: lessons from Senegal
Though a variety of factors influenced the favorable outcome of Senegal’s democratic crisis—from international pressure to government infighting—what is clear is that Senegal’s democracy was saved largely by the widespread mobilization of large sectors of the Senegalese population. Senegal’s tumultuous election season and the moments of popular outburst surrounding it point to the central role played by popular mobilization and protest movements in promoting democratic resilience at the grassroots level. The experience of Senegal in 2024 therefore bears relevance to the analysis of protest movements and their implications for democratic flexibility in diverse regional contexts.
Popular mobilization, in both nonviolent and violent forms, has a long history as a means of defending democratic institutions in situations of backsliding. This is especially true where legitimate political channels fail to keep autocratization in check, as in countries where dictators first assumed power by legal means before moving to consolidate it; examples include Putin’s Russia, Erdoğan’s Turkey, and Orbán’s Hungary, among others. In these situations, popular mobilization may serve to prevent or reverse further backsliding (Stahl and Popp-Madsen, 2022). Senegal’s protest movement surrounding the 2024 presidential election is a case in point, halting the democratic backsliding experienced under Macky Sall and maintaining Senegal’s reputation as a bastion of democracy in the region.
Popular mobilization can likewise be a powerful force for democratization in authoritarian contexts, as demonstrated at least partially by popular protest movements such as the color revolutions of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, or Tunisia during the Arab Spring (Teorell, 2012). To varying degrees, even if not always with total or lasting success, these movements succeeded in diminishing authoritarian power through a counterpolitics of mass mobilization (Hellmeier and Bernhard, 2023). Analysis has also demonstrated that following a coup, outcomes favorable to democratization are more likely if the coup is accompanied by popular mobilization; conversely, coups occurring in the absence of mass mobilization are likely to result in autocratization (Dalh and Gleditsch, 2023).
Though Senegal is among the few countries in Africa to never suffer a coup, West Africa has been rife with coups throughout the 2020s, generally occurring without accompanying popular mobilization and resulting in autocratization (Brooke-Holland, 2023). While Senegal’s peaceful transfer of power saved the country from the trauma of experiencing a coup, it also suggests that if a coup should ever occur, a populace experienced in direct action and mass mobilization will be poised to steer the aftermath in democratically productive directions.
There is no telling what the future holds for Senegal, where the same flawed institutions and populist impulses that led to former President Macky Sall’s attempt to consolidate power may yet recur in current or future administrations. Indeed, populism of the sort that brought Bassirou Diomaye Faye and Ousmane Sonko to power through electoral means may still pose threats to the country’s democratic integrity, and it is worth noting that Sonko has offered rhetorical support to the coup-installed military juntas currently in power in neighboring countries (Souaré and Toupane, 2024). Senegal’s democracy is neither flawless nor invulnerable. However, the role played by popular mobilization in safeguarding the country’s legacy of peaceful transitions of power demonstrates that for the moment at least, it remains flexible and resilient.
Works cited (Chicago author-date)
Aikins, Enoch Randy. 2024. “Defending democracy, the Senegalese way.” ISS Today, April 29. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/defending-democracy-the-senegalese-way.
Allegrozzi, Ilaria. 2023. “Senegalese Government Dissolves Opposition Party, Cuts Internet.” Human Rights Watch, August 1. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/01/senegalese-government-dissolves-opposition-party-cuts-internet.
Banchereau, Mark. 2024. “Senegal’s new prime minister criticizes French military presence in the West African country.” AP News, May 17. https://apnews.com/article/senegal-french-soldiers-sonko-5c22fbb00379a2b4b9a84b68e42a3849.
Booty, Natasha. 2024. “Senegal election result: Bassirou Diomaye Faye to become Africa's youngest elected president.” BBC, March 25. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68656967.
Brimbal, Antoine. 2022. “Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC).” The Modern Insurgent, August 10. https://www.moderninsurgent.org/post/movement-of-democratic-forces-of-casamance-mfdc.
Brooke-Holland, Louisa. 2023. “Coups and political stability in West Africa.” Research briefing, UK Parliament House of Commons Library, September 18. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9861/.
Chemam, Melissa. 2024. “Senegal: Civil society, opposition step up protests to break political deadlock.” RFI, February 24. https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20240224-senegal-civil-society-opposition-step-up-protests-to-break-political-deadlock.
Dahl, Marianne and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2023. “Clouds with silver linings: how mobilization shapes the impact of coups on democratization.” European Journal of International Relations 29 (4): 1017–1040.
Dione, Maurice Soudieck. 2019. “Senegal’s president uses political tools to mask authoritarian tactics.” The Africa Report, October 29. https://www.theafricareport.com/19421/senegals-president-uses-political-tools-to-mask-authoritarian-tactics/.
Dione, Ngouda. 2024. “Senegal cuts internet again amid widening crackdown on dissent.” Reuters, February 13. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ahead-planned-march-over-vote-delay-senegal-suspends-internet-access-2024-02-13/.
Dione, Ngouda and Cooper Inveen. 2024. “Senegal battles first major wave of unrest over vote delay.” Reuters, February 9. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegal-election-delay-was-legal-despite-backlash-says-minister-2024-02-09/.
Dione, Ngouda, Sofia Christensen, and Diadie Ba. 2023. “Fresh protests rock Senegal as death toll climbs.” Reuters, June 3. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegals-protest-hit-capital-left-with-looted-shops-debris-2023-06-03/.
Eblotié, Guy Aimé. 2024. “Religious leaders in Senegal concerned over presidential election postponement.” La Croix, February 5. https://international.la-croix.com/news/politics/religious-leaders-in-senegal-concerned-over-presidential-election-postponement/19126.
Felix, Bate and Portia Crowe. 2024. “Senegal's new prime minister is political firebrand Ousmane Sonko.” Reuters, April 4. https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/senegalese-firebrand-ousmane-sonko-head-new-government-2024-04-03/.
Gerth-Niculescu, Maria. 2024. “Senegal's restless Casamance region sees deadly protests.” DW News, February 14. https://www.dw.com/en/senegals-restless-casamance-region-sees-deadly-protests/a-68255913.
Hammerschlag, Annika. 2023. “‘The youth will fight’: why children have joined Senegal protests.” The Guardian, June 20. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/20/youth-fight-children-senegal-protests-youth-unemployment-corruption.
Hellmeier, Sebastian and Michael Bernhard. 2023. “Regime Transformation From Below: Mobilization for Democracy and Autocracy From 1900 to 2021.” Comparative Political Studies 56 (12): 1858–1890.
Human Rights Watch. 2023. “Senegal: Violent Crackdown On Opposition, Dissent.” Human Rights Watch, June 5. https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/06/05/senegal-violent-crackdown-opposition-dissent.
———. 2024. “Senegal: Pre-Election Crackdown.” Human Rights Watch, January 22. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/01/22/senegal-pre-election-crackdown.
Irwin, Zane and Babacar Dione. 2023. “Senegal dissolves opposition party, restricts internet ahead of next year’s presidential election.” AP News, July 31. https://apnews.com/article/senegal-sonko-party-dissolved-internet-restricted-be56dffadf4c649e309123bd2e4bfe99.
Kane, Coumba. 2024. “Senegal's presidential election: Amadou Ba, the governing coalition's candidate by force.” Le Monde, March 24. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2024/03/24/senegal-s-presidential-election-amadou-ba-the-majority-s-candidate-by-force_6648725_124.html.
Koigi, Bob. 2024. “How Senegal Became Africa’s Beacon of Democracy.” Fair Planet, April 8. https://www.fairplanet.org/editors-pick/senegal-africas-beacon-of-democracy/.
Lu, Christina. 2023. “Senegal’s Controversial Trial.” Foreign Policy, June 1. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/01/senegal-ousmane-sonko-trial-conviction-protests-macky-sall-election/.
Maclean, Ruth and Mady Camara. 2021. “Senegal Erupts in Protests, With a Rape Charge Only the Spark.” New York Times, March 5. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/05/world/africa/senegal-protests-rape-charge.html.
Mednick, Sam. 2023. “Protesters in Senegal accuse police of using armed civilians to quell unrest.” AP News, June 16. https://apnews.com/article/senegal-opposition-leader-sonko-protests-police-sall-3c6268b7dc057b74f199258b295561d4.
Melly, Paul. 2024. “Ecowas in crisis: Why West Africa's united front is in tatters.” BBC, February 9. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68255833.
Muia, Wycliffe. 2024. “Ousmane Sonko: Senegal courts hit opposition leader's presidential hopes.” BBC, January 6. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67889561.
Négoce, Nicolas. 2024. “Senegal election crisis: 'We feel betrayed by President Macky Sall.’” BBC, February 12. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68253255.
Ndiaye, Bamba. 2023. “Gatsa-Gatsa: Ousmane Sonko and Senegal’s politics of retaliation.” African Arguments, May 15. https://africanarguments.org/2023/05/gatsa-gatsa-ousmane-sonko-and-senegals-politics-of-retaliation/.
Négoce, Nicolas and Gloria Aradi. 2024. “Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye: Senegal opposition leaders freed days before election.” BBC, March 15. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-68562465.
“Open Society Welcomes Senegal’s Constitutional Council Decision.” 2024. Open Society Foundations, February 19. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/newsroom/open-society-welcomes-senegal-s-constitutional-council-decision.
Peltier, Elian. 2023. “Detained Journalist’s Hunger Strike Highlights Press Freedom Woes in Senegal.” New York Times, January 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/07/world/africa/senegal-journalist-hunger-strike.html.
Popoviciu, Andrei. 2024. “After 12 years in power, Senegal’s Macky Sall leaves a fragile democracy.” Al Jazeera, March 19. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/3/19/after-12-years-in-power-senegals-macky-sall-leaves-a-fragile-democracy.
Popovicui, Andrei and José Bautista. 2024. “How an EU-funded security force helped Senegal crush democracy protests.” Al
Jazeera, February 29. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2024/2/29/how-an-eu-funded-security-force-helped-senegal-crush-democracy-protests?traffic_source=KeepReading.
“Presidential race setback for Senegal opposition leader after court rulings.” 2024. Al Jazeera, January 5. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/5/senegal-top-court-rejects-opposition-leader-sonkos-appeal-in-libel-case.
Princewill, Nimi and Stephanie Busari. 2024. “Senegal faces political crisis as President Macky Sall delays polls.” CNN, February 5. https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/05/africa/senegal-parliament-debates-extending-presidents-mandate-intl/index.html.
Riedl, Rachel Beatty and Bamba Ndiaye. 2023. “Senegal: behind the protests is a fight for democratic freedoms.” The Conversation, July 3. https://theconversation.com/senegal-behind-the-protests-is-a-fight-for-democratic-freedoms-208612.
“Senegal Civil Society, Opposition Unite For Vote Before April 2.” 2024. Barron’s, February 29. https://www.barrons.com/news/senegal-president-says-will-leave-on-april-2-as-crisis-lingers-afb901fc.
“Senegal Opposition Rejects President's Dialogue Offer.” 2024. Voice of America, February 24. https://www.voaafrica.com/a/senegal-opposition-rejects-president-s-dialogue-offer-/7500792.html.
“Senegalese Protest For and Against President Macky Sall.” 2024. Voice of America, February 25. https://www.voaafrica.com/a/senegalese-protest-for-and-against-president-mackey-sall/7501774.html.
“Senegal riot police fire teargas to break up protests over postponed election.” 2024. The Guardian, February 5. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/feb/05/senegal-restricts-mobile-internet-amid-protests-postponed-election.
Souaré, Issaka K. and Paulin Maurice Toupane. 2024. “Could Senegal help mediate tensions between ECOWAS and AES states?” ISS Today, June 12. https://issafrica.org/iss-today/could-senegal-help-mediate-tensions-between-ecowas-and-aes-states.
Stalh, Rune Møller and Benjamin Ask Popp-Madsen. 2022. “Defending democracy: Militant and popular models of democratic self-defense.” Constellations 29 (3): 310–328.
Teorell, Jan. 2012. Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972–2006. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tharoor, Ishaan. 2023. “Amid a wave of West African coups, France faces a reckoning.” Washington Post, September 1. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/09/01/france-africa-coup-reckoning-colonial-history/.
Thomas-Johnson, Amandla. 2021. “Senegal: Anti-French sentiment on the rise as protests continue.” Al Jazeera, March 12. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/12/senegal-anti-french-sentiments-on-the-rise-amid-ongoing-protests.
Townsend, Mark. 2024a. “‘Democracy has been thrown out the window’: paranoia stalks the streets of Dakar after ‘constitutional coup.’” The Guardian, February 9. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/09/senegal-dakar-macky-sall-postponed-election-constitutional-coup.
———. 2024b. “Is democracy dying in Africa? Senegal’s slide into chaos bodes ill in a year of key elections.” The Guardian, February 25. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/25/democracy-africa-senegal-macky-sall-coups-key-elections-south-africa.
Valdespino, Gregory. 2024. “Senegal’s Elites Wanted to Trash Democracy. Voters Didn’t.” Jacobin, March 23. https://jacobin.com/2024/03/macky-sall-senegal-elections-democracy.
Yates, Douglas. 2024. “Senegal: Macky Sall’s reputation is dented, but the former president did a lot at home and abroad.” The Conversation, March 25. https://theconversation.com/senegal-macky-salls-reputation-is-dented-but-the-former-president-did-a-lot-at-home-and-abroad-226201.