The Enigmatic Philosopher of Russia: Alexander Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism
24 December 2024
Introduction
The Neo-Eurasian Movement, led by Alexander Dugin, is primarily an intellectual movement rather than a militant organization, but its influence on global geopolitics is significant. Dugin's philosophy, often called Neo-Eurasianism, advocates for a strong sovereign state and the preservation of Russian and Eurasian cultural identities (Morozova, 2011). It positions itself as a counterbalance to the dominance of the United States and the Global West.
Dugin is widely known for his alleged influence on Russian President Vladimir Putin (Zabala & Gallo, 2022), and some critics label him a fascist ideologue (Miletic, 2022). His ideas have resonated not only with politicians but also with militants, insurgents, and extremist groups, further underscoring the far-reaching impact of the neo-Eurasian Movement on global political dynamics.
Historical Overview
Before Alexander Dugin introduced "neo-Eurasianism" in connection with his movement, the origins of Eurasianism as a philosophical doctrine can be traced back to the early 20th century. It emerged among Russian émigrés in the aftermath of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution (Riasanovsky, 1998). Initially, they were strongly anti-Bolshevik, but over time, Eurasianism evolved to align more closely with aspects of the Soviet model, particularly Marxism, while retaining a strong emphasis on nationalism (Shlapentokh, 1997).
The main tenets of Eurasianism included the unity of the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of the USSR (Shlapentokh, 1997). The political ideology of Eurasianism presupposes the importance of Russian and Eurasian civilization, reflecting its dominance within global political actors. Central to its objective is to propagate a strong Russian sovereignty and the preservation of a distinct Russian cultural and political identity.
Over the years, Eurasianism experienced a resurgence, particularly in the 1980s, as a hardline conservative response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberal domestic and foreign policy reforms (Akgül, 2005). The revival of Eurasianism was driven by intellectuals who criticized Gorbachev's policies, which they deemed as a threat to Russian sovereignty and traditional values, renewing their interest in Eurasianist ideas as a counterbalance to the perceived Westernization of Russian society. By 1991, Alexander Dugin redefined and expanded the philosophy, creating what he termed "neo-Eurasianism" (Shlapentokh, 2007). Dugin (2014) sought to shape this second wave of Eurasianism, drawing inspiration from the German Conservative Revolution, whose prominent figures included Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, and Oswald Spengler. These thinkers, while fascinated by modern technology and its societal impact, rejected the Enlightenment's core values and institutions, such as liberal democracy, individualism, egalitarianism, and parliamentary governance (Herf, 1986).
Much like Dugin's movement, the German Conservative Revolution was largely an intellectual project, one that embraced modern tools to reinforce a conservative and revolutionary philosophy. Dugin adopted these values into neo-Eurasianism, positioning it as a rejection of modern liberal ideals in favor of a traditionalist, conservative worldview (Dugin, 2014).
Dugin’s earlier involvement with the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) in the 1990s, a group infamously known online as "Nazbols," blended Left-wing ideology with elements of Eurasianism. He later emphasized that neo-Eurasianism became the ideological foundation for the rise of today’s patriotic, nationalistic, and anti-liberal movements. According to Dugin, these movements trace their origins to the early 1990s, during Boris Yeltsin's leadership of the Russian Federation. Dugin states,
“After that, the Eurasianists became the core of the National Bolshevist movement. It wasn’t until the late 1990s that an independent neo-Eurasianist movement, with its own political program, was formed. It based itself not only on older sources but also on new elements taken from Western anti-modern sources, including some from the school of postmodernism. In early 2000 it gained some level of social recognition and received its first positive responses from within the political circles around Vladimir Putin.” (2014, pg. 19-20)
Dugin’s intellectual movement is deeply multifaceted, inspired by numerous theoretical works. The neo-Eurasian Movement upholds a discipline to rejuvenate traditional values in Russia. It also attempts to reject Western Liberalism and Unipolarity in the global sphere by introducing Multipolarity.
Moreover, Dugin’s journey in developing the neo-Eurasian Movement has deep roots in his involvement with the NBP. His recognition dates back to working alongside Eduard Limonov, a Russian writer and poet. In addition, Egor Letov, a Russian punk rock singer would be the core founder of the NBP, alongside Dugin and Limonov (Rogatchevski, 2007) (Figure1). Their movement was a critical response to the wave of liberalization in Russia, condemning Yeltin’s brutal crackdown on pro-Soviet and nationalist demonstrators from the 1993 Russian Constitutional Crisis, better known as the Black October.
![N&A Dugin Figure 1.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_59c77dff092141f0b67f811e264be846~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_425,h_285,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/N%26A%20Dugin%20Figure%201.png)
Figure 1: Limonov (left), Letov (center), and Dugin (right) hold a conference representing their movement, with the NBP flag displayed in the background.
The NBP’s objective was to overthrow the Russian government and propagate radical change. Their group was diverse, with members ranging from intellectuals who criticized Yeltsin’s regime, to the more mundane individuals and hooligans. However, by the late 90s, Yeltsin adopted a policy that strengthened Russian sovereignty which directed the country with nationalism and authoritarianism.
In turn, this would lead to the split of the NBP with Dugin and Limov’s political differences and disagreements (Shlapentokh, 2007, pg. 217). Dugin on the one hand advocated ideals to cooperate with the state. He believed this approach promised to fulfill his philosophy by evolving his country to become more openly authoritarian and nationalistic. Though, Limonov would still hold his values in the absolute overthrow of the government.
The breakdown of the NBP was a significant moment for Dugin that would alter his life’s path. By abandoning the party, Dugin started to construct his theories on neo-Eurasianism by taking advantage by actively disseminating his ideas through a multi-media approach (Umland, 2017), working as a university professor for political science and military schools, and investing surmountable time for his new organization and ideological movement, the neo-Eurasian Movement, International Eurasian Movement, also known as the Eurasia Party or the Fourth Political Theory.
The Neo-Eurasian Mission
Neo-Eurasianism’s core belief centers on restoring Russia as a dominant power within a multipolar world order. While Dugin’s direct influence on the Kremlin has been widely debated, his ideas have undeniably shaped discussions within Russian political circles. Rather than distancing his movement from pro-Putin entities, Dugin aligns himself with elements of the presidential administration that support a more assertive geopolitical stance (Kipp, 2002, p. 92). In post-Yeltsin Russia, Dugin shifted his approach from revolutionary rhetoric to political pragmatism. He advocated for a "gradual and mild shift of the Russian political elite to Eurasian positions" (Kipp, 2002, p. 100), recognizing that evolutionary change, rather than radical resistance, would better serve his vision. His strategy focused on moving the Kremlin away from Yeltsin’s pro-Western stance toward a distinctly Eurasian one. Thus, a key goal of the neo-Eurasian movement is to influence Russia's political leadership, redirecting its policies toward a Eurasianist framework.
Dugin’s influence is far-reaching, shaping both Russian military strategies and policy decisions, particularly in framing the "Atlantic" world led by the Unipolar United States as Russia's enemy (Burbank, 2022). His ideological footprint was especially evident in the early stages of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, where his role in hybrid warfare helped sow dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian government and reinforced the pro-Russian separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (Shekhovtsov, 2017).
Dugin's involvement dates back to the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, where he maintained contact with insurgent groups like the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) (Fitzpatrick, 2014). He also played a key role in organizing volunteers from Russia to support the DPR which helped to build a network of influence in the region (Lauruelle, 2014). Notably, Dugin even guided separatist leaders, including Ekaterina Gubareva, wife of Pavel Gubarev, the former head of the DPR, during a Skype call, reassuring them of the Kremlin’s backing for their cause (Shynkarenko, 2014).
Dugin is deeply committed to the project of creating a "New Russia/Novorossiya," as seen by his support for both the DPR and LPR and the current war. He has consistently criticized the Ukrainian government, which he portrays as being influenced by Nazi ideology while rejecting Western hegemony and praising Putin’s defiance of Kyiv and Washington.
Moreover, Dugin employs a multimedia approach to disseminate his ideas. From appearances on Russian television to interviews with figures like Tucker Carlson, he has cultivated a significant presence both in traditional media and online platforms. He is also reportedly the director of Geopolitika, a Russian journal that vehemently criticizes Western political institutions (Lister & Pennington, 2022).
Dugin's intellectual approach to geopolitics ties his philosophy of neo-Eurasianism and integrates it into his movement. He combines elements from Heidegger's philosophy, traditionalism, and various sociological theories. Notably, Dugin frames Eurasianism not merely as a political philosophy but as an episteme, an intellectual knowledge. He believes that Eurasian episteme serves as a cultural symbol, or logo, rooted in a counter position to Western ideologies, ultimately rejecting universal truths (Millerman, 2022). This perspective underscores the overall ideology of neo-Eurasianism, a critical perspective of Western values, including conventional notions of democracy, human rights, and individualism. He attempts to embody a worldview that acknowledges the diverse developmental trajectories of all societies, civilizations, and cultures.
Dugin penetrates an idea by persuading his audiences that the Global West exerts substantial influence over international politics (Dugin, 2023). He perceives the West's trajectory as inherently dangerous to diverse cultures and their customs, harboring anxieties that Western impositions will undermine the identities of other groups (Składanowski & Borzęcki, 2018). Dugin is deeply inspired by figures like the Italian philosopher Julius Evola and French intellectual René Guénon, a key figure in the traditionalist school of thought. Both thinkers emphasize esotericism, spirituality, and a staunch critique of modernity, which deeply informs Dugin’s worldview (Shekhovtsov, 2015).
One important aspect of Dugin's adoption of the traditionalist school is the critique of how liberal societies often view history as a linear progression. He sees countries like the United States tend to interpret the world in a binary way, where civilization supremacy is seen with contemporary norms compared to a past characterized as a hideous reality no one wishes to revisit. Philosophers like Guénon, Evola, Dugin, and the earlier mentioned German Conservatives challenge this notion of history, expressing extreme skepticism towards Enlightenment ideals and rationalism while embracing a more relativistic world perspective.
Moreover, neo-Eurasianism embodies thoughts from traditionalism and applies them to his geopolitical advice to political circles and his broader audiences. His advocacy for multipolarity, voiced also by figures like President Putin and China’s leader, Xi Jingping , is evident in his notable work, The Fourth Political Theory (2012), which attempts to chart a course that rejects liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. He does not affiliate himself with any of these political ideologies, which he considers products of modernity. Instead, Dugin positions himself as a representative of traditionalism, advocating for a world that honors diversity in culture, religion, spiritualism, and collectivism. Neo-Eurasianism aims to resist the pressures to conform imposed by dominant powers, particularly criticizing the United States and Western Europe as a threat to global stability, reflecting a dangerous omnipresence of unipolar political actors.
Dugin’s Influence
The perception of Alexander Dugin as a fascist stems from his reputation as an ultra-nationalist, which is reinforced by his inflammatory rhetoric that reflects an alignment with extreme nationalist sentiments.
For instance, Dugin expressed controversial views on the Russian social media platform VKontakte, stating, “Ukraine needs to be eliminated from idiots. The genocide of idiots is evident to anyone. Ukraine needs to be cleansed of idiots. Evil cretins, close to the voice of Logos, are mortally dangerous and… at the same time incredibly stupid. I do not believe that these are Ukrainians. Ukrainians are a wonderful Slavic people. They are some kind of bastards that appeared from the sewer manholes.” (Figure 2)
![Screenshot 2024-12-24 at 18.08.35.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_5922dfe694744a8cb53b0e74b38c054f~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_600,h_271,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/Screenshot%202024-12-24%20at%2018_08_35.png)
Figure 2: Dugin’s comments on certain Ukrainians deserving of genocide. Source: https://vk.com/wall18631635_3911
These remarks illustrate Dugin’s broader perspective, where he frames contemporary Ukraine as a corrupted entity unworthy of its Slavic heritage. In the wake of the 2014 conflict, he propagates a narrative that calls for the eradication of what he perceives as ‘pseudo-Ukrainians,’ whom he accuses of being influenced by neo-Nazi ideologies and betraying their ancestral roots. This troubling stance underscores the dangerous intersection of nationalism and dehumanization in Dugin's thought, revealing the potential implications for his political influence in the region - especially with the separatist fighters in Ukraine.
Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism movement in Ukraine traces back to 2008, when the Eurasian Youth Movement, its youth wing, emerged in reaction to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Dugin played a pivotal role in shaping the group, fostering anti-Western sentiments, and blaming the Global West for influencing Ukraine and promoting color revolutions. The Eurasian Youth Movement was predominantly made up of pro-Kremlin supporters, with a strong emphasis on instilling patriotism in its members. This mission closely aligned with Dugin’s broader ideological goals, including the international spread of his neo-Eurasianist vision.
Furthermore, The Eurasian Youth Movement is widely believed to have been funded by Russian authorities (Atsungur, 2013). This financial support was instrumental in fueling the movement’s anti-liberal and anti-Western stance, reinforcing resistance to the growing influence of Westernization in Ukraine. From Dugin’s perspective, this shift was seen as a form of "Nazification" and a dangerous departure from Russian influence.
The Eurasian Youth Movement played a key role in solidifying resistance in Eastern Ukraine, including groups like the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Notably, some of the DPR’s significant leaders attended Eurasian Youth Movement camps in Russia in the early 2000s (Figures 3, 4, & 5). These camps also served as a recruiting ground for individuals tasked with disrupting key events, such as the 2014 Ukrainian presidential elections, when groups were mobilized to besiege the Ukrainian parliament (Kijev ostromához…, 2014). One of the key figures behind these efforts, Bakhtiyarov, has been a close associate of Dugin since the 1990s.
![Screenshot 2024-12-24 at 18.10.11.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_456cd593f7d943269d8f8e7b5d71d109~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_271,h_361,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/Screenshot%202024-12-24%20at%2018_10_11.png)
Figure 3: ESM summer camp with leading figures of the Donetsk uprising, Andriy Purgin, Oleg Frolov, Oleg Bakhtiyarov, and Kostyantyn Knyrik.
![Screenshot 2024-12-24 at 18.11.07.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_311576e7ac2a424893452ea87f0a4bbd~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_419,h_313,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/Screenshot%202024-12-24%20at%2018_11_07.png)
Figure 4: A member of the summer camp poses with an assault rifle in front of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) flag. Source: https://ua-ru.info/news/22715-smi-vooruzhennyy-zahvat-vlasti-gotovili-v-donecke-esche-s-2009-goda.html
![Screenshot 2024-12-24 at 18.12.06.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_aa409dd6b47442aca8bc125b68454665~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_391,h_291,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/Screenshot%202024-12-24%20at%2018_12_06.png)
Figure 5: Students at the Eurasian Youth Union summer camp in Russia engaged in training on the use of conventional weapons. Source: https://ua-ru.info/news/22715-smi-vooruzhennyy-zahvat-vlasti-gotovili-v-donecke-esche-s-2009-goda.html
![Screenshot 2024-12-24 at 18.13.14.png](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/c24061_175018544c0341109662718556b19b4a~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_399,h_300,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/Screenshot%202024-12-24%20at%2018_13_14.png)
Figure 6: Purgin, a prominent leader of the Donetsk People's Republic, gathers at a rally displaying support for the neo-Eurasian Movement flag. Source: https://vdmironov.livejournal.com/114179.html
Is Dugin Putin's Brain?
Dugin's connections with influential political figures from Eastern Ukraine and the support he has received from Russian authorities reflect his strong rapport with the Kremlin. However, it is worth noting that Dugin's advisory role to President Putin is indirect. As an illustration, at the founding congress of Eurasia, Dugin expressed considerable appreciation for the Kremlin's administrative leadership (Dunlop, 2001). He also extended his support to institutions such as the Moscow Patriarchate and the Central Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia, along with other prominent organizations. It was also reported that General Igor Rodionov, affiliated with the General Staff Academy and serving as defense minister then, spoke highly of Dugin (p. 94). During this period, Dugin published Foundations of Geopolitics (1997), a controversial work advocating for annexing territories and alliances aimed at rebuilding Russia. This book has been used as a textbook in Russian military academies (Clover, 2016). The timing is significant, as Rodionov’s tenure as defense minister coincided with the introduction of Foundations of Geopolitics to these academies, highlighting a unique alignment of perspectives.
Dugin has also established close ties with influential Russian advisors to the Kremlin, including Gleb Pavlovsky, who was an associate of Vladimir Putin from 1996 to 2011 (Kipp, 2002; Gaddy, 2013). While there is no direct evidence of Dugin's involvement with the Kremlin, it is crucial to emphasize that figures like Pavlovsky played an important role in promoting Dugin's rise to fame. They facilitated his networking opportunities, such as helping him to appear on popular television programs and engage with various influential figures, including former KGB operatives and Chechen criminal leaders like Akhmed Nukhanov, who helped him establish the Eurasia Party (Rutland, 2016).
To this day, Dugin's relationship with Putin is widely debated and complicated. Despite his perceived pro-Putin stance in Western media, it is misleading to characterize him as a close ally of the president. Dugin has openly criticized Putin's policies, particularly regarding the intervention in Crimea, and the ongoing war in Ukraine since 2022. His criticism often focuses on what he perceives as Putin's overly cautious approach, advocating often more radical and aggressive measures to strengthen Russia. Ultimately, labeling Dugin as "Putin's brain" is a flawed simplification, as he does not share a close personal relationship with the president. However, his influence should not be underestimated. Dugin's neo-Eurasian philosophy has had a notable impact on the Kremlin, as evidenced by his eerie predictions regarding the annexation of Crimea, and the escalation of conflict in Ukraine. These insights have shaped the logistical and foundational rationale behind the Kremlin's recent actions.
Conclusion
Alexander Dugin has solidified his influence by embedding his political philosophy into Russian state ideology. His ties to influential Russian elites and hardliners have significantly shaped their worldview, fostering a logic of supremacy in Russia's geopolitical positioning within global politics. Dugin's strong admiration for Orthodox Christianity and traditionalism underscores his right-wing persona, while also funneling a staunch opposition to Western influence and liberalism (or what he might call the "Atlantic mentality").
The core ideology of Dugin is neo-Eurasianism, a vision of a Eurasian empire harking back to Soviet territories, including his controversial support to dismantle Georgia, and annex Ukraine. He argues that Ukraine poses a substantial threat to Eurasian stability (Clover, 2016), and his stance has reinforced nationalistic circles, impacting Russian military strategy as a robust countermeasure to NATO and U.S. policies. His ideas deeply reflect Russian political discourse, especially among those who seek Russian dominance in Eurasia.
Notably, Dugin's influence has also begun to spread in the West. He has appeared on numerous media such as Tucker Carlson's show, and on popular radical circles, such as the left-wing Infrared movement, which resonates with younger audiences. He has engaged with notable journalists, including Pepe Escobar, and in the past, interviewed figures like Matteo Salvini. Given Dugin's rising profile and the rising traction of his philosophy, his approach is finding broader appeal. The Kremlin's influence from his ideas reflects a deeper reinforcement of these views in both Russian international and domestic policy.
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