Starting in 1991, an Italian ambassador was continually threatened by the Falange Armata after he was promoted to director of the CESIS, the authority which controlled Italian secret services, and he decided to investigate the organization using his connections to security service. He came across a list of 15 or 16 names, almost all of which belonged to the XVII division of the SISMI, the Italian military intelligence service (43). These individuals were noted as possessing extraordinary qualities and skills that made them precious assets for Italian covert operations and hybrid warfare (known in Italy as Guerra non ortodossa, “unorthodox warfare”), and were expert in handling explosives, infiltrating enemy lines, and special operations (44). These agents were organized in the OSSI, (Operatori Speciali Servizio Italiano, “Special operators (of the) Italian Service”), and were integrated into what became known as Gladio, the stay-behind secret organization that was intended to counter a communist takeover of Western countries (45). They were also used to protect Italian ministers when they would travel abroad (46).

These individuals therefore possessed the full array of technical tools to attack targets in an unconventional fashion, while also likely possessing extraordinary abilities that had them selected as special operators. Amongst others, the capacity to lead effective cyberattacks was more than exceptional in the 1990s, especially if the targets were institutions such as the Bank of Italy; effective tampering with telecommunications to misdirect investigations also implies the highest degree of technical knowledge but also a deep understanding of investigative techniques and magistrates’ cognitive maps. It has also been noted that speech and technical terms used in communiques were highly specific to security services and people involved in military special operations (47). 

The members of the OSSI were never investigated in relation to the Falange Armata. Some have suggested that the Falange Armata actually emerged from the Nuclei per la Sicurezza dello Stato (“Nuclei for State Security”), another stay-behind organization similar to Gladio and that likewise employed selected personnel (48). The purported connection to the White Uno gang could also hint to the involvement of low ranking rogue police officers. Yet, the blurring of lines (in the typical fashion of hybrid warfare) renders these kinds of links possible and unlikely at the same time – and thus, the misdirection and cognitive effects of hybridity are fully realized.

The Falange Armata’s capacity to access classified or inaccessible information related to the activity of high-ranking state officials could be interpreted as a testament to the Falange’s capacity to infiltrate and operate within state institutions. It is possible that Falange operatives were “sheep-dipped” – a term that indicates the habit of some intelligence agencies to formally remove or release from service their personnel while retaining them in practice and assigning them to ‘black ops’ (49). Although this practice has not been documented in Italy, Italian security services are believed to operate unscrupulously in a much more informal structure than other comparable agencies, and agents are recruited from any walk of life without any formal transfer to the intelligence services (50).

When Gladio was uncovered, in 1990, a list of 600 “gladiators” was made public, alongside a list of 1200 “negatives”; people who were approached and introduced to the organization, but for unknown reasons did not end up joining (51). This reveals the high likelihood of the ‘sheep-dipping’ practice, for it is heavily unconvention to keep a list of “non-agents”, especially if this concerns a top secret organization of strategic relevance and of dubious (if not outright unconstitutional) legal nature.
 

Without devoting too much attention to the organizational structure of Italian secret services and the relevance of Gladio, we have to briefly consider a few further issues. One is the tendency of Italian secret services to spawn a “Matryoshka-like” structure used to cover sub-organizations that could then act relatively independently. As an example, later control of Gladio units was assigned to Office ‘R’ of the secret services, which itself created a training section (SAD), which managed a saboteurs’ training section (CAG). Additionally, operational structures included 40 nuclei and 5 rapid deployment units (52). The OSSI may have been one of the latter.

It is thus easy to imagine that such a cell-like structure, once set up and covered in a shroud of secrecy (53) – even within the conventional security apparatus of the state – may well have left leeway for operatives such as the OSSI to “go rogue”.

Furthermore, the stated aim of Gladio was to create a network of reliable fighters who would resist foreign invasion. However, a meager list of 600 members of the organization was made public amid various parliamentary inquiries, which would put into serious question the ability of such a small network to have any significant influence in a hypothetical guerrilla war involving a communist invasion. This is particularly the case in Italy, where almost half of the population voted for communist and socialist parties throughout the Cold War). A more thorough examination of the organization’s internal documents (revealed after 1990) indicates that Gladio was indeed tasked with combating ‘internal subversion’ as well. This double function, which can be metaphorically described as anti-Soviet externally and anti-PCI (Italian Communist Party) internally, is actually quite aptly exemplified by Gladio's homonymous symbol, a double-edged Roman dagger (54). In a context of a hybrid warfare situation, 600 operatives represent a sizable contingent (55).
 

As a final thought, one also has to consider that entire parallel structures of Italian secret services have been uncovered throughout the years, often in connection with the planned and attempted coups d'état (56). Some of these rogue structures have been identified as the Anello, the Supersismi, and the Parallel SID (57)(58)(59). The various attempts at reforming secret services in Italy (which included disbanding them repeatedly) are a testament to just how difficult these structures are to control for elected officials (60).

The involvement of high-ranking officers and leading officials of the Italian secret services in establishing or hijacking legitimate structures for parallel security services raises serious questions. The possibility that field operatives such as the OSSI may have "gone rogue" cannot be easily dismissed. They may, in fact, have been operating within these parallel structures, maintaining a hierarchical relationship mirroring that of their legally sanctioned counterparts, namely the legitimate secret services.

This situation presents a sort of dual identity, where in one instance, these entities are acting within the confines of the law, and in another, they operate outside and even against it. Notably, there appears to be a significant overlap in the operational structure of these two sides. These alternate identities suggest a complex interplay between legality and covert operations, which warrants a deeper investigation into the nature and actions of such entities.