Introduction

On May 12, 2025, after more than four decades of armed struggle, the PKK - the Kurdistan Workers' Party - announced its dissolution, closing a tumultuous chapter in the fight for Kurdish rights and shaking the foundations of a conflict that has shaped a region. The collapse of the group marks a historic decision. No other issue has shaped the Turkish state’s identity and sense of security, or influenced its domestic and foreign policies, as deeply as the Kurdish question. (1) 

The group’s dramatic announcement follows the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a turning point that President Erdoğan is now exploiting to target the Kurdish forces he views as vulnerable. Erdoğan seeks to capitalise on what he views as a rare strategic opening, with Kurdish militias in northern Syria weakened in the aftermath of Assad’s downfall to Turkish-backed rebels in December. (2)

Questions remain about whether Ankara will offer democratic concessions to the Kurds, end its military operations in Iraq, and how the PKK’s disbandment could affect Kurdish factions in Syria. It’s the latest shift in a complicated geopolitical saga, rooted in decades of conflict, nationalist aspirations, and the unresolved Kurdish question, one in which the PKK has played a central and deeply contested role. (3)

Historical Background

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a Kurdish political and paramilitary organization, best known for waging decades of guerrilla war against the Turkish state. The PKK was formed in an effort to establish linguistic, cultural, and political rights for Turkey's Kurdish minority. It operates primarily in southeastern Turkey's mountainous, majority-Kurdish regions, northern Iraq, and northeast Syria. It was formed in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party committed to forming an independent socialist Kurdish republic. (4) (5)

In its early years (1978 - 1984), the PKK tried to mobilize Kurdish support through attacks on institutions of the Turkish state and distributing political propaganda. Some of its earlier tactics included ambushes, sabotage, riots and mass demonstrations, all aimed at destabilizing the Turkish government and provoking Kurdish resistance. It was a period of mass political violence across Turkey, with the PKK leading the growing unrest. (6)

The ideological foundation of the organization was Kurdish nationalism combined with revolutionary socialism. Over time, however, the objectives of the PKK evolved. During the early 2000s, the agenda was no longer simple independence but rather calls for greater Kurdish autonomy, cultural rights, and civil rights within the existing borders of Turkey. (7)

Since it began its armed struggle in 1984, the PKK has followed a guerrilla-style insurgency that has played out in rural and urban theaters of conflict. The group's history has been characterized by fits of violent fighting and attempts at peace talks, a reflection on the chronic complexity of the Kurdish cause in Turkey and the broader Middle East. For most of its history, the PKK has been labelled a terrorist group by Turkey, the European Union and the United States. It fought for Kurdish autonomy for years, a fight that has been declared over now. (7)

Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK

Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of PKK, was born on April 4, 1948, into a poor Kurdish farming family in Ömerli, a Turkish village in the Kurdish southeastern province of Şanlıurfa. He subsequently relocated to Ankara to study political science at university, where he became politically active, motivated by the profound sense of marginalization felt by Kurds within Turkey. (8)

By the mid-1970s, he was advocating for Kurdish nationalism and went on to found the PKK in 1978. Led by Öcalan, the PKK initiated its armed struggle against the Turkish state in 1984. Öcalan controlled the PKK with absolute authority, suppressing dissident Kurdish groups and claiming the Kurdish independence cause as his sole domain. Kurds in Turkey were subsequently subjected to severe cultural repression: speaking Kurdish, giving their children Kurdish names, or expressing any Kurdish identity was forbidden to them. (9)

Despite his autocratic leadership image, however, Öcalan's charisma and reputation as an uncompromising champion of Kurdish rights gained for him immense sympathy among Turkish Kurds. He was affectionately called "Appo" - Uncle - as a symbol of hope and resistance among many in the Kurdish community. (10)

Öcalan’s imprisonment 

Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Kenya in 1999 and deported to Turkey, where he was tried and sentenced to death for treason and sedition. His sentencing prompted mass demonstrations and protests by Kurdish groups both in Turkey and in several European countries. Öcalan thus appealed for mercy, declared a ceasefire, and commanded PKK fighters to depart Turkish territory. In February 2002, the PKK officially ended its 15 year- armed struggle and expressed its intention to pursue a peaceful political path. (10)

Later in that year, in October 2002, Öcalan's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment when Turkey abolished the death penalty as part of its overall trend toward fulfilling European Union accession criteria. In 2003, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Öcalan's 1999 trial had been unfair due to strict limitations on his legal defense. Although Turkey appealed, the court upheld its ruling in 2005 and demanded a retrial, a demand Ankara eventually rejected. (11)

Many had believed that Öcalan's imprisonment would mean the end of the PKK. However, the group restarted armed actions in 2004, ending the ceasefire. Secret peace talks between Turkish officials and PKK leaders began in 2009 but collapsed in 2011. Not deterred, in late 2012, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared a restart of talks with Öcalan. In March 2013, Öcalan again declared a ceasefire, and PKK militants began a phased withdrawal from Turkey. (11)

The peace process ultimately broke down, and the ceasefire disintegrated in July 2015. Öcalan has nevertheless continued to appeal for a peaceful, negotiated settlement on the basis of Kurdish autonomy within the Turkish state. (12)

The 2015 Collapse: From ISIS Bombing to Ceasefire Breakdown

Turkey’s struggle with Kurdish militant organizations has grown exponentially since 2015, from sporadic fighting to a complicated, multi-front conflict across Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. The fighting has claimed thousands of lives, created widespread displacement and raised international alarm over the last decade. (13)

Fighting escalated again in June 2015 when the Syrian Kurdish principal militia - the People's Protection Units (YPG) - and Turkey's pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), blamed Ankara for permitting Islamic State (ISIS) militants to travel from Turkey and assault the Kurdish-held Syrian town of Kobanî. (14)

The situation deteriorated sharply following the Suruç bombing on the 20th of July 2015,which targeted a group of leftist youth activists carried out by ISIS. The Turkish military retaliated with Operation Martyr Yalçın on July 24 - 25, by launching airstrikes on PKK camps in Iraq and PYD (Democratic Union Party) positions in Syria's Kurdish region. The operation also de facto terminated the Turkey - PKK ceasefire, which had recently been under increasing strain. (15)

Turkey defended itself by stating that two of its police officers were killed in the town of Ceylanpınar, which the PKK said was not their doing. Turkish fighter jets even bombed YPG bases in Syria, infuriating Kurdish factions and foreign observers. (16)

The Cross-Border Operations in Syria and Iraq and the Failed Hostage Rescue

In January 2018, Turkey, assisted by the Free Syrian Army and Sham Legion, invaded Afrin, executing a ground assault against the YPG that had aligned with the U.S. In March 2018, Turkey also restarted operations against PKK bases in northern Iraq, though these did not dislodge Kurdish insurgent activity. (17) (18)

In October 2019, a fresh offensive - Operation Peace Spring - was initiated against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led alliance. The offensive displaced thousands of people and was condemned by the international community. (19)

Turkey launched a botched rescue attempt in February 2021 in northern Iraq to save 13 security forces hostages of the PKK since 2015 and 2016. Turkish officials said the hostages were executed by the PKK, while the PKK claimed they died in the Turkish bombing. The Turkish Human Rights Association said offers of mediation were rejected by Ankara. Families of the victims condemned the state for its handling of the crisis. (20)

The Dissolution of the PKK 

After 41 years of armed insurgency against the Turkish state, the Kurdistan Workers' Party has announced that it will disband. The historic PKK decision is the culmination of a reconciliation process launched in October 2024 by Devlet Bahceli, head of the Nationalist Movement Party and an ally of the ruling Justice and Development Party. As part of the initiative, various Kurdish delegations were allowed to meet with Abdullah Ocalan, the founding leader of the PKK, in prison, among them leaders from the People’s Democratic Party, a Kurdish party closely linked to the banned group. The ensuing dialogue prompted Ocalan to issue an appeal in late February calling on the PKK to disband, arguing that the struggle for Kurdish rights in Turkey would be better continued through civil and democratic means. (21)

The action has been cautiously greeted by Ankara, in which Turkish leaders qualified it as a "critical opportunity" for national unity. The president likely hopes this opening will boost both his and his party’s popularity, while also securing DEM Party support in parliament for a potential re-election bid. (22)

The breakup might signal a new era of Kurdish political engagement and reduce violence in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq, according to analysts. However, questions remain over the future of affiliated groups like the YPG in Syria, and whether Ankara will respond with meaningful reforms addressing Kurdish rights. As decades of conflicts open a new path to politics, the next several months will see the test of peace's durability and the sincerity of efforts at reconciliation across the board. (22) (23)

How could Turkish politics change?

The dissolution of the PKK can be a game-changer in Turkish politics, but much will depend on how the peace process unfolds. Over the coming three years, two matters are likely to overshadow the political landscape: the path of peace with the PKK and the fate of Istanbul's jailed mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu.

İmamoğlu, the popular oppositional mayor, was detained in March at the early stages of the peace negotiations. His party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), has increasingly become the Erdoğan administration's primary political target, replacing the pro-Kurdish movement that for years was the state's top priority.

Many Kurdish politicians remain behind bars, including Selahattin Demirtaş, the former co-leader of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, who has been imprisoned since 2016 on allegations widely viewed as being politically motivated. Now that the PKK has disbanded, there is cautious optimism in Kurdish circles that some of the political prisoners will be released in the near future, even if their ultimate destiny remains uncertain.

Equally uncertain is the disarmament process itself: when it will commence, in what manner, and who will be in control. There are reports that plans are underway, possibly under international oversight, but whether the disarmament will be thorough and enforceable or merely symbolic remains to be seen.

There is also reported to be internal resistance to the disbandment of the PKK on the part of some long-standing leaders, and a question mark hangs over the future role of the broader Kurdish organizational structure, the Kurdistan Democratic Communities Union (KCK). There has been speculation that a new group would be formed in place of the PKK, further increasing the already delicate transition. (24) (25). 

However, these uncertainties extend beyond Turkey itself. The collapse of the PKK could have repercussions across the wider Kurdish geopolitical world, particularly in Iraq and Syria, where allied armed groups and political parties have traditionally worked with or been influenced by the PKK.

In Syria, the People's Defense Units (YPG), a controlling component of the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has ideological and operational ties to the PKK. Though the SDF has distanced itself from overt alignment in recent years, any fragmentation or leadership void created by the collapse of the PKK could unsettle command structures in northeast Syria. Turkish officials can also use the dismantling of the PKK to put new pressure on the international community, and especially the U.S., to cut ties with the SDF, still regarded by Ankara as a terrorist affiliate. (26)

In Iraq, the Kurdistan Workers' Party maintains bases in the Qandil Mountains on the Iran-Iraq border. Should hardline fractions of the PKK not disband, Iraq's northern mountains can become a sanctuary area for those fighters who will not lay down their arms. This will be directly confrontational not just with Turkey, long carrying out cross-border raids in the region, but with the KRG, which is trying to keep Ankara and these disparate Kurdish forces on improved terms. However, as a spokesperson for Turkey’s ruling AK Party stated, the handover of weapons by the PKK in Iraq should be completed in a few months. A timeline that, if met, could either reinforce the credibility of the peace process or, if delayed, risk reigniting tensions in one of the region’s most volatile frontiers. (27)

Nevertheless, the moves against the PKK can accelerate a strategic transformation among Kurdish political forces - from guerrilla rebellion to institutional participation - or just as likely, cause splintering that brings back localized rebellions with new labels. A lot will depend on whether disbanding leads to actual reintegration, or merely geographical and organizational displacement. (28)

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1. Chatham House. “The Dissolution of the PKK Could Transform Turkey’s Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy.” Chatham House, May 2025. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/dissolution-pkk-could-transform-turkeys-domestic-politics-and-foreign-policy 

2. Reuters. “Kurdish PKK Dissolves after Decades-Long Struggle with Turkey.” Reuters, May 12, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/kurdish-pkk-dissolves-after-decades-struggle-with-turkey-news-agency-close-2025-05-12 

3. Council on Foreign Relations. “Conflict Between Turkey and Armed Kurdish Groups.” Global Conflict Tracker, accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-turkey-and-armed-kurdish-groups 

4. Britannica. “Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kurdistan-Workers-Party 

5. Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: NYU Press, 2007. https://books.google.it/books?id=G06BDAAAQBAJ&redir_esc=y 

6. The Kurdish Project. “PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” Accessed June 24, 2025. https://thekurdishproject.org/history-and-culture/kurdish-nationalism/pkk-kurdistan-workers-party 

7. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Examining Extremism: Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).” CSIS, accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-kurdistan-workers-party-pkk 

8. Reuters. “Factbox: Who Is PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan?” Reuters, accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/article/economy/factbox-who-is-pkk-leader-abdullah-ocalan-idUSLO94519 

9. Al Jazeera. “Kurdish Leader Öcalan Told the PKK to Disband. It Did. Here’s What to Know.” Al Jazeera, May 13, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/13/kurdish-leader-ocalan-told-the-pkk-to-disband-it-did-heres-what-to-know 

10. Turkish Minute. “Justice Minister Rules Out Öcalan’s Release from Prison amid PKK Disbandment Announcement.” Turkish Minute, May 14, 2025. https://www.turkishminute.com/2025/05/14/justice-minister-rules-out-ocalans-release-from-prison-amid-pkk-disbandment-announcement 

11. Britannica. “Abdullah Öcalan.” Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Abdullah-Ocalan 

12. The Guardian. “PKK Leader Calls on Kurdish Militant Group to Disarm, Signalling Start of Fragile Peace with Turkey.” The Guardian, February 27, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/27/pkk-leader-calls-on-kurdish-militant-group-to-disarm-signalling-start-of-fragile-peace-with-turkey 

13. The Telegraph. “Turkey Accused of Allowing Islamic State Fighters to Cross Its Border in Kobane Attack.” The Telegraph, June 26, 2015. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11699969/Turkey-accused-of-alowing-Islamic-State-fighters-to-cross-its-border-in-Kobane-attack.html 

14. Fox News. “Turkish Jets Target Kurds in Iraq, Islamic State Militants in Syria.” Fox News, accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.foxnews.com/world/turkish-jets-target-kurds-in-iraq-islamic-state-militants-in-syria 

15. Hürriyet Daily News. “We Really Can’t Succeed against ISIL without Turkey: US.” Hürriyet Daily News, accessed June 24, 2025. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/we-really-cant-succeed-against-isil-without-turkey-us-86993 

16. Wall Street Journal. “Turkey Opens New Front Against Kurds in Syria.” WSJ, October 27, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/turkey-opens-new-front-against-kurds-in-syria-1445968338 

17. Al Jazeera. “Erdogan: Operation in Syria’s Afrin Has Begun.” Al Jazeera, January 21, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/1/21/erdogan-operation-in-syrias-afrin-has-begun 

18. Reuters. “Turkey Will ‘Drain Terror Swamp’ in Iraq’s Qandil, Erdogan Says.” Reuters, June 11, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-turkey/turkey-will-drain-terror-swamp-in-iraqs-qandil-erdogan-says-idUSKBN1J71CJ 

19. CBS News. “Trump on Turkey Syria Incursion: If ISIS Prisoners Escape, It’s Europe’s Problem.” CBS News, October 10, 2019. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-turkey-syria-incursion-targeting-kurds-if-isis-prisoners-escape-europe-problem-2019-10-10 

20. Reuters. “Turkey Says It Finds Bodies of 13 Killed by Militants in Iraq.” Reuters, February 14, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-iraq-security/turkey-says-finds-bodies-of-13-killed-by-militants-in-iraq-idUSKBN2AE050 

21. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. “Dissolution of the PKK: Strengthening Turkey Internally and Externally.” Al Jazeera Studies, accessed June 24, 2025. https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/policy-briefs/dissolution-pkk-strengthening-turkey-internally-and-externally.

22. International Crisis Group. “PKK’s Decision to Disband May Offer Historic Chance for Peace.” Crisis Group, May 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkiye/pkks-decision-disband-may-offer-historic-chance-peace. 

23. CNN. “Turkey: PKK Militia Dissolves.” CNN, May 12, 2025. https://edition.cnn.com/2025/05/12/middleeast/turkey-pkk-militia-dissolves-intl-hnk 

24. EUNews. “PKK Disbands: EU Urges Turkey to Seize the Moment for a Political Solution to the Kurdish Issue.” EUNews, May 13, 2025. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/13/pkk-disbands-eu-urges-turkey-to-seize-the-moment-for-a-political-solution-to-the-kurdish-issue 

25. Deutsche Welle. “What Does the End of the PKK Mean for Turkey?” DW, May 2025. https://www.dw.com/en/what-does-the-end-of-the-pkk-mean-for-turkey/a-72546682.

26. Aydın-Düzgit, Senem, and Aslı Aydıntaşbaş. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2021. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2021/09/how-syria-changed-turkeys-foreign-policy?lang=en.

27. Reuters. “PKK Disarmament to Take Few Months in Iraq, Turkey Ruling Party Says.” Reuters, July 10, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/business/media-telecom/pkk-disarmament-take-few-months-iraq-turkey-ruling-party-says-2025-07-10/.

28. Al-Monitor. “Turkey’s Erdogan Risks Alienating Voters as PKK Peace Advances.” Al-Monitor, July 2025. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/07/turkeys-erdogan-risks-alienating-voters-pkk-peace-advances.