top of page

PASSIVE AIR DEFENCE

17 February 2025

Introduction & Details

A vast majority of modern conflicts have seen under-equipped insurgent organizations fighting against a larger and more technically advanced military force. From the Viet Cong in the Mekong Delta to Jihadists in the Panjshir Valley, modern military aircrafts arguably have been the greatest threat to insurgent operations. Without access to large stockpiles of anti-aircraft weaponry, alternative measures of limiting an aircraft’s ability to threaten insurgent forces have been adapted. These alternative measures are considered passive air defense. To help describe passive air defense, its counterpart, active air defense, must be discussed prior. Active air defense is the deterrence of enemy aircraft via direct actions such as downing or jamming the aircraft. Active air defense may take the form of surface-to-air missile platforms, anti-aircraft autocannons, or small arms. (1) On the contrary, passive air defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile air threats. These measures include camouflage concealment, deception, dispersion, detection/warning systems, and protective construction. (2)

Purpose of Use

As previously stated, passive air defense is all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the effectiveness of hostile aircraft. While both insurgent and professional organizations employ passive air defense tactics, it may be the insurgent’s only means of countering aerial threats. Passive air defense tactics, especially when employed by insurgent forces, may play more than just a role in determining a force’s survivability. Whether or not to engage an aircraft can be affected by several factors, such as the presence of a civilian populace or the goal of waiting for enemy forces to enter a compromising position. As stated in captured Viet Cong documentation, forces were not permitted to engage aircraft flying over densely populated areas to prevent retaliation, which civilians may become victim to (3). By attempting to prevent civilians from being targeted by enemy attacks, the populace is far more likely to continue cooperating. In terms of offensive benefits, waiting for a helicopter to land and deploy troops would place the enemy in a far more compromising position than if active air defense measures were employed as soon as the aircraft is detected in the air space.  

​

Before discussing the historical uses of passive air defense in combat, individual measures and their subcategories must be defined. Passive air defense techniques can be divided into two main categories: attack avoidance and damage mitigation. These categories determine how a force will react when presented with an aerial threat and may be favored over the other depending on factors such as the size of a force, type of equipment, mission, or terrain features.

 

Attack Avoidance

​​

Attack avoidance refers to measures taken to minimize visible signatures that hinder an aircraft’s ability to locate a target. The three main measures include concealment, discipline, and construction. Concealment is the practice of selecting the most advantageous position to hide a man, an object, or an activity. Depending on the environment, these positions can be buildings, heavily wooded areas with a dense tree canopy, locations covered with thick foliage, or underground structures such as caves.

 

Discipline covers a broad spectrum of habits that strictly maintain proper concealment on individual and group levels. The disciplined maintenance of concealed positions limits oddities in the environment that may tip off a threat to the group’s position. These oddities can be as simple as an abundance of concentrated waste, such as used ration packs or vehicle tracks ending abruptly in a location that does not make sense for a vehicle to be under normal circumstances. To prevent revealing a position due to these oddities, a group may blend waste with debris that is already present or bury it. If vehicles have been used at the position, dusting away left behind tracks, following natural lines in the environment, or leading tracks away from the position will help prevent aircraft from quickly determining where the vehicle has stopped.  

 

There are two aspects to construction that, along with the previously mentioned measures, help reduce the visible signature of a location. Blending is the first aspect and the most likely to be used by an under-equipped insurgent group. Blending is the use of natural materials to blend with the surrounding terrain. Objects such as local fauna or camouflage with similar color tones to the environment may be applied to equipment and uniforms to help blend silhouettes with the surroundings. Disguising, the second aspect of construction is usually only implemented by larger forces and professional militaries. Disguising refers to the use of simulated vehicles or buildings meant to draw enemy fire away from actual positions. Equipment such as decoy inflatable tanks or empty tents are a couple of examples that may be used. 


Damage Mitigation

 

Damage mitigation refers to measures taken either during or prior to an attack meant to limit any damages an aircraft can inflict if a target is located. Damage mitigation measures are ideally implemented as a last line of defense if attack avoidance measures have not been successful in hiding a position from an aerial threat. Both measures can be taken prior to and after an air attack has commenced. 

 

Referred to as protective construction, this measure uses natural or manmade cover to shield a unit from incoming fire. Protective construction may be established during the construction of a position, such as a bunker, or it may be sought out during the attack, such as a natural defilade. The use of smoke to hinder an aircraft’s visual of a unit also falls under protective construction. 

Arguably, the more important measure is dispersion. Dispersion is the act of creating space between troops/equipment in order to limit potential damage from a single attack. Not only does practicing dispersion ensure that a unit will not be completely eliminated after an attack, but it also creates smaller targets, hindering target acquisition capabilities of an aircraft. (4)

Past Uses

Since the first use of aircraft in warfare, passive air defense has been employed, whether knowingly or not. While the trenches and underground structures of the First World War did not do much in hiding a position, they did continue protecting soldiers from enemy fire despite being fired from aircraft. As the war went on and the use of aircraft for bombing raids became more prolific, France began constructing a mock city meant to draw bombers away from the capital. (5) Although the project to build a faux Paris had only just begun when the war ended, the idea of mock equipment was used during the Second World War, the Kosovo War, the Battle of Mosul, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. (6)

 

One of the most studied and successfully implemented uses of passive air defense measures was by the Viet Cong during the US-Vietnam War. The Ho Chi Minh Trail, which was used as a logistical route by North Vietnamese forces, contained sections of thick jungle canopy that concealed the movement of equipment from aircraft above. The route ensured supplies from the North could be discreetly transported south to fight ARVN and US forces. (7) Although the US knew about the route, the thick jungle only allowed for mass bombing campaigns that indiscriminately covered the area instead of precise strikes against visually identified targets. Despite dropping around two million tons on the Laos portion of the trail alone, these bombing campaigns had minimal effect on the Vietnamese ability to transport supplies via the route. (8) As for concealment during combat, the Viet Cong had been seen attaching branches of local fauna to uniforms to break their silhouettes and blend into the environment. (9)

 

Along with the Viet Cong’s mastery of concealment, their patience when deciding to engage an enemy had devastating effects on South Vietnamese forces, which was proven during The Battle of Ap Bac in January of 1963. During the US and ARVN forces’s preparation for the battle, Viet Cong units determined that an attack on the area was inevitable. Before the attack, Viet Cong forces reinforced the area and set up firing positions in the tree lines around locations the US could use as landing areas. Once the battle had commenced, fifteen US helicopters landed to deploy troops in a rice field near one of the Viet Cong-held hamlets. Instead of opening fire as soon as the helicopters were in sight, the Viet Cong waited for them to land and then engaged. Unable to quickly take off again, the US helicopters were stuck in the field, peppered by enemy fire, and five of them were destroyed. The Viet Cong’s ability to conceal positions from air reconnaissance using the jungle canopy and waiting for the right moment to reveal their position led to their first significant victory of the war. (10)

Countermeasures

Over the years, methods of countering an enemy’s use of passive air defense measures have grown more powerful and sophisticated. Despite these advancements, some of the earliest methods of countering passive air defense, such as ground patrols, observation posts, and spies, are still implemented in modern combat. However, the following list will primarily focus on technology developed to reveal or destroy units under the cover of passive air defense. 

 

  • Agent Orange - A chemical herbicide and defoliant used by the US military during the Vietnam War. Agent Orange was usually sprayed by low-flying aircraft on areas with dense jungle foliage to kill plant life that Vietnamese forces could use as concealment.

 

  • BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” - A 15,000-pound explosive used by the US military during the Vietnam War. Dropped from cargo aircraft, this explosive had a massive blast radius of around 300 to 900 feet and was primarily used to clear vast areas of jungle for use as helicopter landing areas. However, during Operation Lam Son 719, 25 BLU-82s were used against NVA positions. The BLU-82 continued to see use during US involvement in Afghanistan as an anti-personnel weapon.

 

  • GBU-43/B MOAB - Standing for “Massive Ordnance Air Blast” the GBU-43 is designed to be used against soft to medium targets spread out over an extended area or targets contained within a confined space such as a cave system. The system was first used in 2017 against an Islamic State cave system in Afghanistan. Similar to the BLU-82 it replaced, the GBU-43 is dropped from cargo aircraft. 

 

  • FLIR Sensor - Forward Looking Infrared Sensors are typically employed by aircraft to transform thermal radiation from a heat source into an image for video output. The Lockheed Martin Sniper Advanced Target Pod is the latest version of these aircraft-mounted systems, allowing a jet to gain a clear picture of an area from an altitude where engine noise can not be heard by enemies on the ground.

 

  • Counter Battery Radar - A radar system employed to detect incoming artillery projectiles. Using the trajectory of incoming projectiles, these systems can calculate the firing position of enemy artillery or mortar units that may be concealed from observation aircraft. 

Future Technologies

Despite the rudimentary nature of most passive air defense measures, advanced countermeasures such as the aforementioned FLIR sensor have sparked the development of new technologies meant to limit the effectiveness of non-visible light and heat-detecting sensors. Early versions of these technologies include the US Military's Desert Night Camouflage pattern. Using a two-tone grid pattern, this camouflage was designed to aid in concealing the wearer from early Soviet night vision devices. (11) Although the pattern was obsolete when it was issued to active duty units, implementing infrared reflective properties into camouflage patterns has become widespread. Patterns such as the Swedish M90K Desert camouflage have been shown to stand out significantly less than other patterns when viewed with infrared detecting devices. However, these patterns and camouflages do not protect the wearer from thermal detecting sensors. The National Graphene Institute and Graphene Engineering and Innovation Centre are currently testing prototypes of thermal camouflage jackets. These jackets are composed of graphene patches that hide the thermal radiation emitted by the wearer. These patches can also be programmed to produce a specified amount of heat to match the jacket's thermal signature with the surrounding environment. (12)

Continuing Developments

Like all warfare doctrines, passive air defense is constantly evolving to counter new threats on the battlefield. However, with the use of drones dramatically increasing over the past few years, passive air defense has experienced a significant boost in development. In past conflicts, aerial observation and targeting was mainly conducted at the company or battalion level. Now, there is a high chance that every squad will have their own dedicated aerial platform, making encountering a drone on the battlefield a common occurrence. While all previously discussed passive air defense tactics are still relevant against drones in the modern battlefield, two, in particular, have seen significant development and widespread implementation. 

 

The first of these tactics being counter FPV drone shells built onto vehicles. Commonly referred to as turtle tanks, these shells can be grouped under the broader protective construction tactic. The shells can be characterized by their makeshift construction, which in most cases covers the entirety of the vehicle with a usually metal structure, leaving only the driver viewing area and weapon system exposed. While similar tactics have been used for ages to up armor vehicles, these particular shells are theorized to be specifically designed to withstand strikes from drone threats. Although simple, these early examples of FPV shells have proven to be rather effective at protecting the vehicle. (13)

 

The second tactic that is increasingly important is light discipline. This refers to limiting light sources that increase the visible signature of an individual. Although light discipline has always been a significant part of passive air defense, two main factors work in tandem to increase that significance. These factors include the increased adoption of drones and the common smartphone. Firstly, it is becoming more common for commercial drones to be equipped with night vision capabilities. These night vision sensors can amplify visible light or use infrared light, allowing the user to detect something as small as the light on a smartphone screen with ease. On top of this, features such as FaceID, which is used to unlock a phone, use infrared light, which creates a beacon that can quickly draw the attention of a drone with an infrared sensor. Recently, while reporting in Ukraine, the Modern Insurgent team interviewed a soldier who told a story about being repeatedly targeted by artillery due to fellow soldiers checking their phones while being watched by drones.

Open-Source Intelligence & Field Examples

Screenshot 2025-02-17 at 16.48.01.png

Taliban in Pirkowti, East Paktika Province using concealment to avoid detection from US Army AH-64 Apache attack Helicopter. (14)

Screenshot 2025-02-17 at 16.56.40.png

Two destroyed US Military CH-21 helicopters in a rice field during the Battle of Ap Bac. (15)

Works Cited

[1] Partridge, Earle E. “Active Air Defense.” Ordnance 43, no. 231 (1958): 386–88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45361707.

 

[2] Department of the Army, ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense § (2016).

 

[3] Anderson, Mary, Michael Arnsten, and Harvey Averch. Insurgent organization and operations: A case study of the viet cong in the Delta, 1964-1966, 1967. https://doi.org/10.7249/rm5239-1.

​

[4] Department of the Army, ATP 3-01.8 Techniques for Combined Arms for Air Defense § (2016).

 

[5] Anido, Julien. “The Fakee 1918: Un Jour de plus à Paris.” Un jour de plus à Paris | L’incontournable des visites culturelles et touristiques à Paris. Balades, visites guidées, découvertes insolites... Visitez Paris autrement !, July 28, 2020. https://www.unjourdeplusaparis.com/en/paris-insolite/faux-paris-1918.

 

[6] “DAVID GROSSMAN Reports on the Claims That American and British Bombing Is Very Carefully Targeted and That Modern Weapons Technology Means the Minimum of Innocent Lives Will Be Lost. How Much Should We Believe of What We Are Being Told?” Broadcast. BBC On The Record. BBC, October 28, 2001.

 

[7] DESCRIPTION OF THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, September 13, 2013. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA389095.pdf.

​

[8] “Targeting Ho Chi Minh Trail: Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability | We hold that it is possible to build peace, create security, and restore sustainability for all people in our time., June 25, 2013. https://nautilus.org/essentially-annihilated/essentially-annihilated-targeting-ho-chi-minh-trail/#:~:text=Mu%20Gia%20and%20other%20strategic,it%20physically%20hard%20to%20bomb.

 

[9] Pavnbattle.jpg. n.d. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pavnbattle.jpg.

 

[10] P., Elliott David W. The Vietnamese War: Revolution and social change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2007.

​

[11] Infrared Reflective Camouflage: An Introduction. S2 Underground. Youtube, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M4nmuJ2G6As&t=843s.

 

[12] “Thermal Camouflage.” Vollebak. Accessed September 2, 2023. https://vollebak.com/pages/thermal#:~:text=The%20Thermal%20Camouflage%20Jacket%20is,controlled%20individually%20just%20like%20pixels.

​

[13] https://t.me/The_life_of_Predova/2241

​

[14] Video from a dead Taliban. YouTube. YouTube, 2013. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_2o3SlllPTg.

​

[15] US Army Transportation Museum. Downed Choppers at Ap Bac. n.d. https://transportation.army.mil/museum/.

Follow us on our social platforms

  • alt.text.label.Instagram
  • Our Twitter Account
  • alt.text.label.YouTube

Copyright © The Modern Insurgent (European Directive 2019/790 and Directive 2001/29/EC on Copyrights)

The content of this page is copyright protected. Its reproduction, in whole or in part, is prohibited without the author's permission.

bottom of page