DShRG Rusich
- William Jukes-Bennett
- May 24
- 15 min read
Updated: May 31
Introduction & Overview
Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group Rusich, abbreviated to DShRG Rusich, is a Russian neo-Nazi imperialist paramilitary group. Having participated in both the Donbas War and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as operating in Libya, Syria, and CAR, Rusich is a well-armed, trained, and organised unit of around 100 operators. Rusich aims to perpetuate Neo-Nazi and imperialist ideology through the creation of a network of similarly ideologically driven individuals and groups and the training and recruitment of further personnel to fight in various conflicts. Rusich has primarily concentrated its efforts in Ukraine, actively fighting in the Donbas with some fluctuations, since 2014.
In addition to these more traditional fascist views, Rusich has a particular taste for paganism and the idea of becoming modern Vikings. This outlook is presented through the use of various nordic runes also commonly associated with nazism and excessively violent treatment of both dead and captured enemy personnel. Rusich's tactics can be described as 'in-field terrorism', with the group having a habit of posting images/videos of their activities, especially in the cases of the execution of war crimes and brutality.
History & Foundations
The origins of DShRG Rusich can be traced back to 2011, when its founders, Alexey Milchakov and Yan Petrovsky, met in St Petersburg (Meduza, 2017 and Pigni, 2017). Bonding over their love for weaponry, and similar nationalistic political affiliations, the two become close friends (Meduza, 2017). However, before their collaborative activities in the form of Rusich, both Milchakov and Petrovsky had independently developed infamous reputations. Milchakov was originally, and is supposedly still, a member of the VDV (a key feeder branch for Wagner recruits) (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022), specifically the Pskov Airborne Division (Smid and Smidova, 2021).
In 2012, Milchakov gained internet fame after cutting the head off of a puppy and eating it, all whilst nazi flags hung in the background. Milchakov posted the video of the act himself, adding to his existing social media gallery of fascist symbols and quotations (Verny, 2014). Petrovsky, on the other hand, whilst a Russian national from Ikrustk, moved to Norway in his teens. Whilst there, he developed a keen interest in nationalism and the idea that the Norwegian and Russian people had close genetic ties which were being muddied by Liberalism and uncontrolled immigration (Meduza, 2017).
After finishing university, Petrovsky began working in a Norwegian tattoo studio. However, this was not just any normal studio. The studio, True Metal Tattoo studio in Oslo, is a known meeting place for eastern European Neo-nazis, and during a police raid in 2010, military equipment, fake documents, and weapons were found leading to the arrest of its employees (Meduza, 2017). Petrovsky was found to be innocent of involvement in the procurement of said illicit material. Unfortunately, this incident seems to have acted as a catalyst for some very real extremist activity, leading to his return to Russia.
Following their development of a close friendship, Milchakov and Petrovsky became deeply involved in the nationalist scene in St Petersburg [[Pigni, 2017]]. Following the beginning of the Donbas war, the pair decided to mobilise. Together, they participated in the "Partizan" paramilitary training camp run by the Russian Imperial Movement (Potter, 2022). Both of them then volunteered as part of a 'humanitarian convoy' organised by the Aid Coordination Center of Novorossiya (KTsPN), an offshoot of the Imperial Legion (Russian Imperial Movement's paramilitary arm), in June 2014 (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich).
The objective of this convoy was to run military equipment into Luhansk to support the LPR forces fighting in the area (Meduza, 2017). These supplies were specifically delivered to Alexander Bednov's "Batman" battalion and Alexey Mozgovoy's "Prizrak" Brigade (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)). Once in Ukraine, Milchakov and Petrovsky officially founded Diversionary Guerilla Reconnaissance Group Rusich under Bednov's "Batman" battalion (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). The group quickly began recruiting from the underground nationalist scene across numerous Russian cities, primarily St Petersburg and Moscow (Galeotti, 2022).
With Rusich officially founded, the group got to work. Operating as a sabotage and assault reconnaissance unit Rusich acted as members of the Union of Donbas Volunteers through the application of regular and irregular tactics to support both the LPR and DPR forces in theatre (Kozhurin, 2022). In Luhansk, Rusich worked as a sabotage group behind enemy lines and in Donetsk the unit fought in a more conventional capacity as part of the positional battle between Belokamenka and Novolaspa (Pigni, 2017). A notable incident involving Rusich was the ambush of the Aidar 24th separate assault battalion, gaining notoriety due to gory photos of the aftermath being posted online. On the 5th of September 2014, Rusich managed to ambush the Ukrainian Aidar battalion near Schastya, Luhansk, killing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers in the process and leaving their vehicles destroyed (Kozhurin, 2022).
On the 1st of January, 2015, Bednov was killed in an ambush rumoured to have been carried out by Russian forces in response to his decreased willingness to remain under Kremlin control (Sheldon, 2021). Occurring near the city of Lutugino, the ambush also led to the death of a few escort fighters attributed to Rusich, with the ambush itself seemingly organised by contingents of the Wagner group (Korotkov, 2017). Following this, Rusich briefly reorganised under the Prizrak brigade from March 2015 onwards (Smid and Smidova, 2021). However, by September 2015, angered by the death of Bednov, Rusich withdrew from the Donbas entirely, claiming they couldn't continue fighting as they weren't sure whose interests they were presenting (Pigni, 2017).
Following their departure from the Donbas theatre, Rusich redeployed across numerous countries under the pretence of private military contracting as a component of the Wagner group's web of sub-contractors. Shortly after their retreat from Luhansk, Rusich took part in the Russian offensive against ISIS to retake the Syrian city of Palmyra, however, their social media posts demonstrate a wider footprint spreading from Palmyra to Al Kawm (Sheldon, 2021). Their involvement in Syria seems to have been sustained up until 2021 (Kozhurin, 2022). More specifically, their social media indicates a primary objective consisting of the capture and defence of the al-Shaer gas fields, the same gas fields where Wagner-linked Russian security forces recorded themselves torturing and killing Hamdi Bouta in April 2017 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). These gas fields are of heavy interest to the Kremlin, with a large amount of Russian-financed oil and gas infrastructure having been set up in the Palmyra area (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). It seems that Rusich's activity in the area is simply a continuation of the long-standing Russian backing of the Syrian regime to sustain control of these resources [[Kozhurin, 2022]]. Simultaneously, posts from Rusich's telegram evidence activity in the Central African Republic https://t.me/dshrg2/3065 and Libya https://t.me/dshrg2/3054.
Rusich then returned to Ukraine as a part of Russia's invasion in 2022. Operating as a part of the Union of Donbas Volunteers, the Rusich group headed for Kharkiv in an irregular capacity (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)). Whilst a German intelligence report posits that Rusich was in Ukraine from April 2022 (Kozhurin, 2022), an analysis of their social media from the time shows that the group had plans to be in Kharkiv from October 2021 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)). In fact, images posted by the Rusich Instagram account show the group participating in training exercises on armoured vehicles as early as January 5th, 2021 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). The comments on these posts indicate that, even at this early stage, the group knew that it was going to be targeting Kharkiv. With this in mind, it seems that Rusich was used in a vanguard capacity to attack enemy forces behind their lines, similar to their operations during the Donbas war.
Objectives & Ideology
A key component of Rusich's identity is ardent neo-nazism (Kozhurin, 2022). The group's social media is a veritable smorgasbord of nazi symbolism such as tyr runes and the number 88 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)), however, of particular prevalence are the Valknut and kolovrat/'black sun' runes (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025). Appearing in both primary variations of their logo/symbol, these runes are a continuation of the groups seeming obsession with Nordic symbology, a common trend amongst neo-nazi circles (Smid and Smidova, 2021). This infatuation with Nordic culture seems to be an attempt to present the group as modern Vikings (Galeotti, 2022). This has led to the use of the Icelandic/nordic language during social media posts https://t.me/dshrg2/2820, the posting of ancient Norse poems (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022), and fighters pretending to be Nordic volunteer fighters through posing for photos with Norwegian flags or claiming to be Norwegian, Swedish, or Icelandic in interviews (Sheldon, 2021).
Amongst these more esoteric references to neo-nazi culture, more blatant displays of white nationalist fascism can be found throughout the group's social media postings. Rusich regularly posts photos of its members conducting Roman salutes https://t.me/dshrg2/2895 as well as making references to the KKK, white power, and racial holy war movements https://t.me/dshrg2/2579. Additionally, in a video published in 2022, Milchakov openly admitted to being a nazi, stating, “I'm not going to go deep and say, I’m a nationalist, a patriot, an imperialist, and so forth. I’ll say it outright: I’m a Nazi” (Kozhurin, 2022).
Rusich's particular brand of neo-nazism is also more imperialistic than that traditionally seen in extremist groups (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)). The group regularly makes references to historical/imperial Russia, even down to the group's name. "Rusich" could very well be a reference to the mythic Medieval fortress, or "sich", of "Rus". Rus is a term for the pre-imperial confederation of Norse peoples who hailed originally from Sweden and settled the territory that lies between the Baltic and the Black Sea (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). This works closely with Petrovsky's outspoken view that Russian and Norwegian people have close genetic ties, ties which not all individuals can realise and which must be defended (Meduza, 2017). Rusich also seems to have a particular hatred for post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, for separating from wider Russia and, in the eyes of Rusich, dividing the population and muddying its gene pool (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025). In the words of Petrovsky,
"Our ideology unites, we are fighting for the reunification of the Slavs, the reunification of Northern Europe."
(BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)).
Rusich's 'real world' activity also impresses an idea of neo-nazi Russian imperialism. During a training camp for young Russians at the Svarog centre, Milchakov was pictured holding the flag of Imperial Russia https://t.me/dshrg2/2039. This flag is also featured in the group's primary emblem (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025). Even the very foundations of the group, whilst largely composed of nationalistic motivations, hinged on participation within a group promoting the idea of 'Novorossiya', the name used for the Russian empire towards the end of its era (Laruelle, 2015). Rusich's hatred for Ukrainians and the idea that the country should reintegrate into the Russian Federation can also be seen through the group's treatment of enemy wounded. Following their ambush against the Aidar battalion, a wounded Ukrainian soldier was forced to speak Russian whilst being interrogated, all whilst being further brutalised (Aseev, at al., 2018).
Whilst Rusich is an active participant in armed conflicts across numerous states, the group's social media output presents a clear objective in of itself. Milchakov has claimed that Rusich is far from just a combat team but instead a group of friends united by a common idea (Korotkov, 2017). This idea is clearly articulated through the group's utilisation of its substantial social media following to garner support for individuals and groups who follow similar nationalistic ideologies (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025). In this sense, Rusich has created a digital network of neo-nazi, imperialist, and nationalist individuals/groups which it supports both ideologically and monetarily through the sale of various forms of branded merchandise.
Military/Political Abilities
The Rusich group's political and military ties/abilities are rather peculiar and often contradictory. Despite being an independent private/voluntary group, Rusich very clearly has at least some form of government backing. Through social media analysis, it's clear Rusich has had clear access to government facilities, vehicles, and aircraft for training and staging operations (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). Additionally, Milchakov seems to be more valuable to the Kremlin than other private contractors. Milchakov was one of the few Wagner/Private contractors not to be arrested upon their return from Syria following the exposure of the war crimes carried out by Russian forces in the area (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)).
Interestingly, despite this clear government support, Rusich is simultaneously unafraid of openly criticising or encouraging the opposition of, government decisions. Through their social media channels, Rusich has called for the execution of prisoners and told its followers to lie about the number of captured/wounded in order to get away with doing so, despite explicit orders from the Kremlin to capture surrendering enemy troops (Townsend, 2022). Rusich has also openly insulted the Russian command personnel for both their decisions on the battlefield https://t.me/dshrg2/3071 and for their apparent character https://t.me/dshrg2/2529. Of course, all of these incidents must be considered in the context that Rusich actively retreated from the Donbas theatre due to feelings of betrayal by their own government following the death of Bednov at the hands of Russian troops (Meduza, 2017).
In terms of military ability, Rusich may be a small unit, but it's capabilities are substantial. Utilising irregular tactics, Rusich leverages its membership of around 100 fighters (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) to carry out special operations-style missions to disrupt enemy activity. These operations are further facilitated by the wide range of arms available to the group. From extensive access to standard Russian/Soviet small arms, to the use of more specialised equipment such as precision rifles and even advanced UAVs such as Lancet loitering munitions, the Rusich group telegram channel presents a broad catalogue of the group's weaponry and equipment (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025). Through the use of extensive training activities, (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025), the group also seems to have developed advanced tactics, weaponising niche/advanced technology/equipment such as cell signal jammers during their operations https://t.me/dshrg2/2996.
These findings combine to paint the picture of a well-trained, ideological, highly driven, well-backed/equipped, and militarily/politically active group specialising in special operations style manoeuvres.
Approach to Action
The Rusich group works in a primarily irregular capacity, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and ambushes against enemy troops, often behind enemy lines. These tactics were leveraged extensively by the group during the Donbas war (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022). Of particular note is the ambush on the Aidar battalion (Rudenko, 2015). The specific choice to execute the ambush on the day when the conflict's ceasefire was supposed to be implemented and the use of Ukrainian flags by Rusich to lull the enemy into a false sense of security demonstrates an underhanded and outright criminal approach to warfare (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)).
Complimenting this irregular approach to operations is Rusich's armoury of unconventional/specialist equipment. From cellular jammers https://t.me/dshrg2/3015 to RPG-distributed mines https://t.me/dshrg2/2714, Rusich makes use of a wide range of equipment in order to carry out specialist operations and to widen its spectrum of capabilities. Additionally, the Rusich group is able to modify equipment in order to further develop their capabilities https://t.me/dshrg2/3015.
Whilst irregular warfare is the broad bracket under which Rusich's operations would fall, their activities can only be described more specifically as "in-field terrorism". The group's brutal treatment of captured or wounded enemies, in combination with their habit of posting intimate details of said treatment on social media, operates to strike fear into the enemy/local population and to garner the group a rather formidable reputation as ardent war criminals (Gonta, 2015). Examples of such behaviour include the beheading of enemy bodies (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)), the mutilation of captured enemy soldiers (Gonta, 2015), and the torture of prisoners and additional extortion of their families in exchange for their release (Townsend, 2022). In response to Bellingcat's accusations of warcrimes against the group, Rusich responded;
“the acts depicted do not constitute a war crime because a) we’re not military and b) we were happy to do it.”.
International Relations & Alliances
Due to Rusich's apparent objective of creating a network of similarly ideologically motivated individuals/groups, its ties to said individuals/groups are extensive, to say the least. Petrovsky himself has close ties with Soldiers of Odin, a far-right anti-immigration group originally founded in Finland, having participated in their street patrols to 'maintain law and order' around Norway in 2016 (Meduza, 2017). Rusich, on the whole, regularly provides promotion and raises support for Russian anti-immigration activists through its telegram channel (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025).
Militarily, the Rusich group have a range of ties with both government and volunteer/private units. In the context of private bodies, Rusich has close links to Wagner, seemingly operating as a sub-contracting unit in Syria and Ukraine (Sheldon, 2021 and Kozhurin, 2022), as well as ENOT group, having fought alongside the PMC during the Donbas war (NewsRU, 2017). In 2016, ENOT and Rusich held a collaborative youth camp which trained Belarusian children in military skills [[Sheldon, 2021]], with this same camp used again in 2022 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)). Rusich has also held youth camps with the support of the private tactical medicine centre known as "Svarog Center", taking photographs with the young men there holding imperialist flags https://t.me/dshrg2/2039.
Outside of these private forces, many Rusich fighters are either active or ex-members of the VDV (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) and GROM (Gonta, 2015). Milchakov spent time in early 2014 training sabotage detachments of the Pskov airborne division (Gonta, 2015), most likely to assist Rusich's own guerilla warfare efforts in the Donbas war. These specialised arms of the Russian military seemingly provide a steady stream of highly trained and nationalistic/ideologically dedicated operatives ready for Rusich's recruitment efforts. There also seem to be strangely close ties between Rusich and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), with the group having regularly used their firing range during training (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022).
Rusich also has extensive experience collaborating with other volunteer groups. Rusich's collaboration with the Batman Brigade was a key component of the unit's contribution to Russian efforts in the Donbas (Korotkov, 2017). In the early days of the Donbas war, Rusich also fought alongside the ultra-nationalist group known as the Sparta Battalion (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)). These examples are, in fact, simply the larger 'players' of a much wider network known as the Union of Donbas Volunteers, or SDD. The organisation consists of groups of veterans of the Donbas War, with close ties to Putin's United Russia party [[Verny, 2014]].
Works Cited
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