Haqqani Network

Introduction

The Haqqani network is an Afghan Islamic fundamentalist group that has participated in multiple conflicts in Afghanistan, and they have also been implicated in providing support to terror networks in Pakistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. The organisation was established in the 1970s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, from whom the group gets its name. Haqqani was an ethnic Pashtun belonging to a wealthy family of the Zadran tribe based in Loya Paktia, which is made up of the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. (Yol et al, 2024, p559)

Map of Loya Paktia, shown in yellow – [image source]

The group has an extensive military history. It participated in the mujahideen resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war, the subsequent Afghan civil wars and the insurgency resulting from the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. It is considered a “semi-autonomous” group within the Taliban, united under their brand but operating independently (Peters, 2012, p10). Members of the Haqqani family have participated in both the current and previous Taliban governments, and the group has strong links to al-Qaeda and Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI (ABC News, 2021).

History & Foundations

The Haqqani network has its roots in the 1970s, when Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew the Afghan monarchy led by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Daoud suppressed Islamists who opposed his regime due to the dismantling of the previous multi-party system in favour of a one-party state (Barfield, 2010, p170). Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had previously studied at Dar‐ul‐Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akhora Khattak, Pakistan, an institution notorious for producing jihadists, fled to Pakistan with other Islamists to train to overthrow Daoud’s regime with support from the ISI (Peters, 2012, p14). These militants then took part in the failed 1975 Panjshir Valley Uprising, with Jalaluddin leading an attack that resulted in the deaths of twelve members of Daoud’s administration. This attack helped to cement his reputation as a jihadist leader (Rutting, 2009, p64-65). By 1979, Jalaluddin had become a trusted commander within Hezb-i Islami Khalis, a mujahideen resistance group. He and his network of supporters were granted operational independence in southeastern Afghanistan (Edwards, 2002, p275).  

Jalaluddin Haqqani – [image source]

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), it marked a watershed moment for the Haqqani network. Afghanistan became a focal point for both Islamists and global powers involved in the Cold War. Billions of dollars of support funds were covertly funnelled by the ISI, CIA and Gulf States into Afghanistan to be sent to mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet occupation (Galster, 2001). Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group participated in the resistance, receiving millions of dollars of support both in terms of weapons, training and funds, and innovated the nature of jihadism by recruiting foreign fighters – something other mujahideen factions did not consistently do (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p60). This innovation was a precursor to what is now infamously known as ‘Global Jihadism’ (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p20). Jalaluddin’s appeal for foreign fighters was first recorded four years before Abdullah Azzam’s declaration, which is usually credited for birthing global jihad; Jalaluddin gave an interview in which he spoke of

“the Muslim duty to offer himself for the jihad” (Haqqani, 1980).

Many training camps for Islamic militants were established throughout Haqqani-controlled Loya Paktia (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p66).

The geographic positioning of the Haqqani network’s power base, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, aided the funnelling of aid and foreign fighters into the group. The Brigadier General of the ISI at the time, Mohammad Yousaf, acknowledged that 60% of their supplies were routed through the Haqqani network stronghold of Loya Paktia, with a third going directly through Haqqani’s headquarters in Zhawara (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p9). Khost Province was of particular strategic importance, as it contained many smuggling routes into Pakistan and other parts of Afghanistan.

The influx of foreign aid and foreign fighters enabled the Haqqani network to consolidate its power and influence. They helped provide Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group with the tools to effectively fight against the Soviet forces, most famously this included Stinger missiles, which were used to contest Soviet air superiority (Snow, 2013). He became a favoured commander for the CIA to support and a “militant folk hero” for many Islamist activists (Coll, 2004, p124-165).

Jalaluddin’s influence and geographic location meant he became a key intermediary for sending resources to other mujahideen fighters, aiding the development of close relations between his group and various actors (EFSAS, 2022). It was during this time that the Haqqani network started to foster close relationships with Osama Bin Laden, who later co-founded al-Qaeda. Additionally, Haqqani developed ties to Kashmiri jihadists during this period, who utilised the safe haven provided by Haqqani-controlled territory to establish training camps. It was reported that fighters from Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, a Kashmiri jihadist group, were running camps in Khost province as early as the 1980s, and in 1991 Jalaluddin admitted to providing the militants with training (Ruttig, 2009, p87-88).

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the communist government led by the PDPA quickly collapsed to the mujahideen fighters. The first city to fall was Khost in 1991, in an operation spearheaded by Jalaluddin and his group (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p82). Jalaluddin was later appointed Justice Minister of the newly established Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992. After the breakdown of the newly established state and the outbreak of the Second Afghan Civil War, Jalaluddin’s group refrained from attempting to seize overall power, opting instead to consolidate their regional power. In a 1994 letter sent by al-Qaeda member Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi (1994), he refers to

“the governor of Khost, who is from the Haqqani organisation”

This is the first recorded instance that the Haqqani network is referred to as an autonomous organisation and provides evidence of the group cementing its power in the Loya Paktia region.

The group later defected to the Taliban in 1995 after Jalaluddin pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omar, and they assisted them in their takeover of the country (Ruttig, 2009, p70). The new relationship between the Haqqani network and the Taliban meant that they preserved their regional autonomy while simultaneously recognising Taliban authority over Afghanistan. Under the Taliban’s newly established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin was appointed Minister for Tribal and Frontier Affairs in 1998. This position was largely symbolic, as Jalaluddin and his group still maintained their autonomy from the Taliban, evident in the inability of the Taliban to fulfil Pakistani extradition requests of fugitives training in Haqqani-run camps (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p107).

After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings by al-Qaeda, Haqqani-run training camps in Loya Paktia were hit by U.S. strikes for harbouring foreign jihadists, particularly members of al-Qaeda (FBIS, 2004, p150). The strikes caused tensions between elements of the mainstream Taliban, who opposed al-Qaeda and global jihadism, and the Haqqanis, who provided a haven for foreign jihadists. During this time, they grew closer to al-Qaeda, acting as a “nexus” between the group and the mainstream Taliban.

Following the September 11 attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the U.S.-led coalition, the Haqqani network joined the Taliban insurgency against the coalition and grew even closer to al-Qaeda. The group was implicated in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency lasting from 2001 until 2021, such as the 2008 Serena Hotel attack and the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul (Sarkar, 2025). Another notable attack involving the Haqqani network was the May 2017 Kabul bombing, the deadliest attack to take place in the city, which resulted in the deaths of over 150 people (Westcott, 2017). The group was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. in 2012.

During the post-9/11 period, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s son, gradually took over the group due to his father’s illness; he officially became its leader in 2018 after years of speculation about his father’s death (Sayed et Clarke, 2021). Sirajuddin was also appointed deputy leader of the Taliban in 2015, a position he still holds today (Kumar Sen, 2015).

Sirajuddin Haqqani – [image source]

The withdrawal of coalition forces in August 2021 allowed the Taliban to regain power and re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Haqqani network was reportedly given control over security operations in Kabul the day they took power (Dettmer, 2021). As deputy leader of the Taliban, Sirajuddin subsequently became the second most powerful figure in Afghanistan, and he was appointed to the country’s interior ministry as the Interior Minister (BBC, 2021). Presently, the Haqqani network has continued to assist the Taliban in governing Afghanistan, and in August 2025, it was announced that the U.S. had lifted bounties placed on Sirajuddin and his relatives, Abdul Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani (Associated Press, 2025).

Objectives & Ideology

Similar to the mainstream Taliban, the Haqqani network adheres to Salafist principles. Salafism is an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam that advocates for a return to the traditions of the earliest generations of Muslims; as a result, the group advocates for the strict implementation of Sharia law in territory under its control. The Haqqani network, as well as the mainstream Taliban, also follow the Deobandi school of thought (Lurie, 2020, p2). The Deobandi school grew out of South Asia in 1867, originating in the Dar ul-Ulum madrasa in Deoband, India. According to Deobandi thought, Muslim societies have experienced stunted development due to their deviation from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and have been corrupted by Western influences. Consequently, the Haqqani network’s objectives have been primarily focused on driving foreign influence out of Afghanistan, first the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan war and later the Americans in the post-9/11 period.

The Haqqani network has also at times displayed sympathy for global jihadist ideologies, similar to those of groups like al-Qaeda. This is demonstrated in the group’s closeness to al-Qaeda and its ex-leader Osama Bin Laden, and their willingness to provide sanctuary to them (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p42). However, this affinity can be attributed to pragmatism rather than being ideology, as unlike al-Qaeda, which pursues global objectives, the Haqqani network has a regional focus, reflected in its roots in tribal networks (Mapping Militants Project, 2018).

Military & Political Abilities

Militarily, the Haqqani network is a formidable force in Afghanistan, being described by U.S. military commanders as “the most resilient enemy network” fighting against coalition forces (Partlow, 2011). A 2020 estimate of the Haqqani network’s strength concluded that the group comprises around 10,000 militants, accounting for roughly 20% of the Taliban’s forces overall (Ahmad, 2020). The significant military strength of the Haqqani network is evident in its involvement in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency against coalition forces, such as the December 2009 bombing against the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman, which resulted in the deaths of seven intelligence officers and was described as “one of the most lethal strikes against the agency in decades” (Lurie, 2020, p5).

The threat posed by the Haqqani network in the post-9/11 period is heightened by its extreme violence relative to other militant organisations operating in the region, most notably through their use of indiscriminate suicide bombings. While the specific types of weaponry the group has access to are unknown, data on Haqqani-attributed incidents between 1970 and 2013 show that 64% of attacks involved explosives, 29% involved firearms, 1% involved chemicals, and the remaining 6% are of unknown origin (Romaniuk et Webb, 2016, p181).

The capabilities of the group are aided by the network of local tribes and transnational jihadist supporters it has cultivated. By developing relationships with other actors, such as al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan’s ISI, the group has been able to extend its operational outreach beyond its traditional strongholds in Loya Paktia (Mapping Militants Project, 2018).

Additionally, the Haqqani network has developed significant streams of income to finance their operations. Historically, the group was financed by donations from foreign actors, particularly the CIA, the Gulf states, and Pakistan. While Pakistan remains a sponsor of the group, they have also developed independent sources of income through a wide range of licit and illicit activities, leading some to describe it as a “mafia-type network” (Peters, 2012, p39-51). These activities range from legal front companies, particularly in construction and import-export, to extortion and smuggling of precursor chemicals used in heroin production.

Approach to Resistance

The Haqqani network’s approach to resistance can be defined by two key strategies, the first being their adoption of suicide bombings to carry out attacks. The group is credited with being the pioneers of suicide bombings in Afghanistan, and the use of foreign bombers has been a key feature of this strategy (Mapping Militants Project, 2018). Haqqani network bombings are often orchestrated against high-profile targets that maximise casualties. This strategy can be seen in numerous attacks attributed to the group, for instance, the 2008 Indian embassy bombing.

The second key strategy utilised by the Haqqani network is its flexibility in collaborating with a wide range of different actors. In addition to extending its operational outreach, as mentioned in the previous section, this strategy has allowed the group to build its power by creating new opportunities for recruitment and procurement.

International Relations & Alliances

The Haqqani network has cultivated a wide range of relationships and alliances throughout its history, most notably its integration into the Taliban, as described in earlier sections. However, the group’s relationships with other actors go far beyond just the Taliban, and Pakistan’s ISI has also been a crucial partner. For decades, Pakistan has faced allegations of funding and coordinating the Haqqani network’s activities, and in 2011, they were described by U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen as a “veritable arm” of the ISI (BBC, 2011). The relationship between the ISI and the Haqqani network has been a mutually beneficial one. From the perspective of the Haqqani network, they receive large amounts of money and weapons from the ISI, which also provides the group with training, intelligence, and sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Waldman, 2010). From Pakistan’s perspective, its relationship with the Haqqani network has allowed them to project their influence in the region. The 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, carried out by the Haqqani network, is one example of the group acting in the interest of the ISI. Additionally, the Haqqani network has historically provided material and ideological support to militants fighting against India in the Kashmir region, such as by hosting them in their training camps, which is another way the Haqqani network has operated in favour of Pakistani interests (Kaura, 2021).

The Haqqani network has also developed close relationships with other jihadist networks, such as al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The relationship between the Haqqani network and numerous other jihadist networks is historical, going back to the 1980s when training camps for foreign fighters were established in Haqqani territory. For the Haqqani network, this is an important relationship; it has helped “diversify the resource mobilisation networks” that it has access to (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p47). By developing these relationships, it has provided the group with a new source of militants from which it can draw its power, reducing its dependence on other actors. For groups such as al-Qaeda and the TTP, the relationship is beneficial as they are provided with sanctuary in Haqqani territory, where they can train and plan.

Ultimately, the relationships and alliances the Haqqani network has developed are of the utmost importance to building its power. These relationships have placed the group into a “nexus position”, allowing it to gain leverage over other actors (Brown et Rassler, 2011). For example, the group’s relationship with the TTP, which is engaged in a small-scale insurgency against the Pakistani state, has allowed them to gain influence with the ISI.

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