Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK)

Introduction & Overview

The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) is a far-right volunteer unit fighting on the Ukrainian side of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite their siding with Ukraine, the unit largely specialises in the recruitment, training, and deployment of Russian nationals who disagree with the current Putin regime in their homeland. 

Gaining notoriety for their incursions into Russian territory in the Spring of 2023, the RDK has developed from a small group of volunteer fighters to a well-armed and motivated fighting force, possibly having been incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition to front-line fighting, the RDK also make use of guerrilla/clandestine operations on Russian soil, encouraging arson attacks and the disruption of logistical railways.  

Ideologically, the RDK ascribe to general far-right "traditionalist" attitudes, often encompassing homophobia, white supremacism, and neo-nazism. Said attitudes are frequently promoted through the group's telegram channel, as well as through the "White Rex" clothing line owned by the group's founder, notorious white supremacist and ex-MMA fighter Denis Nikitin. 

Denis Nikitin alongside RDK fighters - [Image source]

History & Foundations

Whilst the RDK was officially founded in August of 2022 (Satanovskii, 2023), many fighters who would end up fighting under the group had been participating in the Donbas war since 2014 (Talmazan, 2023). Initially, the unit had just 5 members (Dettmer, 2024); however, it was only a short time before RDK's recruitment efforts reaped their rewards. Amongst these new recruits were some interesting characters, one such example being Alexei Levkin. Creator of the Neo-Nazi community Wotanjugend (Meduza, 2023) and the lead singer of national socialist black metal group M8l8th (DOXA, 2023), Levkin is held in high regard in the Eastern European far-right scene and has expressed support for neo-Nazi mass killer Anders Breivik (Meduza, 2023). 

RDK's leader, Denis Kaputsin, is an equally interesting individual. Operating under the pseudonym Denis "WhiteRex" Nikitin (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023), Kaputsin is in his 30s and originally hails from Moscow (Claus, 2017). In 2001, Nikitin moved to Germany with his family, quickly becoming involved in the local Neo-Nazi scene (DOXA, 2023). As with many militant far-right individuals/groups, Nikitin also had extensive involvement in football hooliganism (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023), and such activity, in combination with his Neo-Nazi ties, led to the revocation of Nikitin's German residence permit (DOXA, 2023). 

A keen MMA practitioner (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023), Nikitin used his newfound exile as an opportunity to travel and become involved in the European far-right "active club" scene (Claus, 2017). Through his involvement in this network of active clubs, Nikitin began his own lifestyle/MMA brand, "WhiteRex". Nikitin then used this brand to hold events for far-right community members, as well as producing Neo-Nazi influenced merchandise (Claus, 2017). These events allowed Nikitin to generate a reputation and gain respect from leaders in the scene, quickly developing an extensive network of contacts across Europe (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023), even being asked to attend a far-right training camp in the UK as a coach (Claus, 2017). 

Now, despite these ties to Neo-Nazism, Nikitin strangely denies following such beliefs (Hewson, 2023). However, the reasons behind such claims become clear with a little digging. Ironically, Nikitin's family originally moved to Germany as Jewish contingent refugees, with the family being treated as a special case due to their Jewish origin (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023). Regardless of this inherent contradiction, Nikitin moved to Ukraine in 2017 in order to begin his participation in the Donbas conflict (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023).

Shortly after the initial foundation of RDK and its opening activity in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the group quickly gained support from other units with a similarly largely Russian composition (Хвиля, 2022). On the 31st of August, 2022, the former deputy of the Russian Federation and leader of the Freedom of Russia Legion (Mallinder, 2023), Ilya Ponomarev, made an announcement on social media stating that a declaration of cooperation between the "Russian Volunteer Corps", the Legion "Freedom of Russia" and the "National Republican Army" (Facebook). Supposedly signed in the Kyiv region, the declaration called for the coordination of forces between the groups, and the adoption of a new symbol alongside the foundation of a political centre to best represent the group's new joint objectives/ideological stance (Гречаная, 2022). 

Despite this statement, RDK ardently denied signing any such declaration (https://t.me/russvolcorps/118). According to the group's telegram channel, RDK attended the event, but were unaware that they would be asked to sign any declaration, and refused to do so, expecting a press conference with the military associations of the Russian people. Nikitin has stated that ideological differences led to rifts between the groups, primarily due to efforts to convince RDK to accept black/trans volunteers (Dettmer, 2024). 

Whilst the RDK had been involved in military activity from early 2022, such as being used to guard Snake Island following its recapture (https://t.me/russvolcorps/313), the group's real activity began in 2023. On the second of March, RDK conducted an incursion into the Russian border city of Bryansk (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). Russian media responded to the incident with accusations of attacks against civilians, alleging that two adults were killed and an 11-year-old boy was injured; however, such accusations were later denied by civilians in the area (Meduza, 2023 1). Whilst misconceptions around this attack are rife (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023), geolocatable videos from RDK confirm that the incursion did in fact take place (https://t.me/milinfolive/97542 / https://t.me/russvolcorps/424), with some believing that the attack was in fact a false flag designed to generate justification for the Russian invasion (Blann, 2023). 

This operation, in combination with a foiled plot orchestrated by Nikitin to kill Orthodox media magnate Konstantin Malofeyev (The Moscow Times, 2023), led to Nikitin being added to the interior ministry's wanted list on the 26th of March (https://t.me/tass_agency/185764). Again, it is worth noting that there is no real proof of any such plot existing, and it could very well be an attempt to discourage Russians, who often follow orthodox Christianity, from joining the RDK following the incursion on the 2nd of March. 

RDK's activity in Russian territory continued in May. On the 24th, RDK began shelling positions in the Russian region of Belgorod (Satanovskii, 2023). Collaborating with the Freedom of Russia Legion, RDK claims to have then manoeuvred to take control of a 40km strip along the Russian-Ukrainian border (Perelman, 2023). Despite efforts to hold this territory, the Ukrainian forces were pushed back to the border after a few days of fighting; however, the groups continued their periodic raids into the region (Hewson, 2023). Again, Russia responded to these operations with allegations of attacks on civilians, claiming that 12 people were wounded (Al Jazeera, 2023). 

The RDK Logo/Flag - [Image source]

These periodic raids continued into June, primarily being conducted in the Shekino (https://t.me/rvc_army/581) and Novaya Tavolzhanka (https://t.me/rvc_army/573) areas. These areas were held for at least a week (https://t.me/rvc_army/591) but were again eventually abandoned. Despite this eventual retreat, the RDK had sent their message, forcing Russia to secure its borders in the area. On the 11th of November 2023, the RDK was designated as a terror organisation by the FSB (FSB, 2024). 

Judging by the RDK's social media channels, the group seems to have continued its participation with military operations in the east of Ukraine, refraining from further incursions until 2024. On the 12th of March, RDK, alongside the Freedom of Russia Legion and Siberian Battalion, launched the largest yet cross-border attack into Kursk and Belgorod (Dettmer, 2024). 

Nikitin, alongside various RDK fighters - [Image source]

Objectives & Ideology

Unlike most nationalist groups participating in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the RDK are both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. The RDK's core objective is to create a Russia that can live in peace with its surrounding countries, whilst respecting Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty (Satanovskii, 2023). NIkitin has openly described himself as a "Russian nationalist", although he feels that Russian nationalism has taken a wrong turn somewhere in the past (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). 

A key component of this proposed "wrong turn" is Putin himself. The Russian president is a regular target of criticism amongst RDK circles (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). In the eyes of RDK, Putin is a traitor waging a fraternal war to please his oligarch babysitters (Dettmer, 2024). This fraternal war, in combination with increased immigration rates caused by imperialistic attitudes in the Kremlin, is supposedly leading to the loss/muddying of ethnic Russian blood (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). 

RDK seeks to address these "concerns" through the creation of a Russian ethnostate consisting of regions that were a part of the 1991 Russian Federation (DOXA, 2023). Should this solution be implemented, the RDK has stated that it is content with any additional regions leaving the federation and gaining independence (Satanovskii, 2023). These views are an escalation from the far-right/traditionalist views that the group commonly promotes (Hewson, 2023) and into the territory of neo-Nazi conspiracy theories such as "The Great Replacement" (https://t.me/rvc_army/554). 

Such extremist ideologies can also be found in the group's stockastic anti-Semitism, with Nikitin criticising Zelensky or being a jew who promotes "the worst of liberal values" (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) whilst also stating that he has no problem with jews (Hewson, 2023). Further examples can be found in Nikitin's clothing brand "White Rex", which commonly sells designs featuring black sun symbols (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023), or even through fighters on the front line, with some conducting Hitler salutes during combat (https://t.me/rvc_army/81). Despite these more militant elements of the RDK, there is a surprising amount of diversity amongst their ranks. Some volunteers identify as liberal or left-wing, turning a blind eye to secure a chance to fight against Putin (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). Similarly, some fighters may not fully align themselves with RDK's overarching objectives, but are short on options due to the few units on the Ukrainian side accepting Russians (DOXA, 2023). 

Military/Political Abilities

Whilst not a huge force, the RDK is the largest of the Russian volunteer units, including the Freedom of Russia legion, with claims of around 2000 fighters being involved in the March 2024 raids into Russian territory (Dettmer, 2024). However, the veracity of such numbers is dubious, with fighters in 2023 claiming that RDK numbered between 150 (Satanovskii, 2023) and 200 (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) fighters. 

Despite the RDK's numerical ambiguity, their equipment is rather impressive for a volunteer group. By 2024, RDK had gained access to its own vehicles, mortars, artillery, HMGS and small arms, even founding a base of operations and clear-cut recruitment process (Dettmer, 2024). Whilst many volunteer groups have access to such equipment, the quality/age of such equipment is often questionable. RDK, on the other hand, has managed to equip at least some of its fighters with thermal sights (https://t.me/rvc_army/97) and has even posted on social media implying that they are either in possession of or have access to an M142 HIMARS (https://t.me/rvc_army/268). 

Additionally, the RDK make use of armoured vehicles such as Maxx Pro MRAPs (https://t.me/rvc_army/527) and even scavenged enemy vehicles, such as a BTR-82A that was captured during the group's raids in the Belgorod region (https://t.me/rvc_army/518). Whilst initially damaged, eventually the vehicle was repaired using monetary donations generated through the group's social media channels (https://t.me/rvc_army/552). 

RDK fighters alongside a captured BTR82-A, with one soldier equipped with some form of thermal/night vision scope. - [Image source]

RDK's connection/collaboration with the Ukrainian Armed Forces is unclear, with UA officials being purposefully vague about how the two forces interact (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023). According to Nikitin, the RDK's formation was encouraged by the UAF, but was not sponsored through equipment or financial support (Al Jazeera, 2023). It is largely the opinion of the UAF that the RDK is independent of Ukraine, but also has every right to take up arms against a tyrant/dictator (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). 

However, the ties between the RDK and the UAF seem to have grown closer. Once fighters enter Ukraine, they are put through a polygraph test by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine before they are authorised to join the RDK (Hewson, 2023). This assistance with recruitment can also be found in accusations that Ukrainian military members worked with the Civil Council in Poland (a political recruitment body assisting the RDK) to prepare papers and contracts for foreign fighters (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). Similarly, fighters have claimed that they receive a wage directly from the UAF (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023), and in 2024, it was claimed that the UAF vets the RDK's operational plans and provides logistical support for the group's activities (Dettmer, 2024). 

Despite this increasing closeness, the UAF openly disavow RDK's operations within Russian territory. Initially, the UAF outright condemned the activities of the RDK on Russian soil, stating that they were an independent body from Ukrainian forces (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). However, as the conflict in Ukraine has developed, the RDK has stated that whilst they now officially fight as a component of UA forces, once they enter Russian territory, they are simply Russian citizens who have taken up arms (Dettmer, 2024). 

Approach to Resistance

Whilst RDK has fought in a standard battleline capacity for the majority of the war in Ukraine, its notable actions have largely taken on a diversionary/sabotage capacity (https://t.me/rvc_army/680). For example, the primary aim of RDK's March 2023 incursion into Russian territory was stated to be diversionary, drawing Russian troops away from the frontlines in the east (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). In addition to frustrating Russia's efforts to fight on one front in the East, these attacks also demonstrate to Russian civilians the government's failure to secure its own borders, despite Putin's posturing to indicate otherwise (Pigni, 2023).

These attitudes of diversion/sabotage are also encouraged outside of the frontlines. Russian nationals who wish to join RDK are instructed to first participate in disruptive activities on Russian soil (https://t.me/rvc_army/194).  These activities are primarily suggested to be the use of Molotov cocktails in arson attacks, and the disruption of logistical railway lines in an attempt to sabotage the Russian military industrial complex (https://t.me/rvc_army/186). 

Generally, operations on Russian soil aim to whip up anger against Putin and support for RDK's activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023), often using graffiti as a promotional tool (https://t.me/rvc_army/211), in order to collapse the Russian state from within (Hewson, 2023). Due to these objectives, RDK's existence is at odds with the existence of the current Russian state (DOXA, 2023), and therefore, the group views its fight as existential and civil war as inevitable (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023). Due to this, violent resistance is seen as the primary tool with which RDK can fight the Russian state (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023).

RDK seems to take its role/fight seriously, operating in a fairly organised and structured capacity, with clear efforts made to generate a supporting logistical network for its activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023). Within the RDK, there are numerous units/roles, including medics and drone operators, with all recruits receiving 2 months of basic training (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). The group even has a "Free Cossack" detachment made of Cossacks from the Kuban and Don regions (Bondarenko, 2024) and a unit dedicated to the use of OSINT in an attempt to track Russian activity (https://t.me/rvc_army/377). 

The flag of the “Free Cossacks” RDK Unit - [Image source]

In terms of recruitment efforts, the RDK seems to have generated its own pipeline (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023). First, potential recruits become involved in the active club/hooligan/NSBM in their area. Eventually, the individual may come across the White Rex MMA brand, or the NSBM band M8L8TH, and through their connections to the group, the individual would eventually learn of RDK. Finally, if the individual is already predisposed to such activities, the RDK will radicalise the recruit and offer them a chance to fight on the front lines should they show such potential. This pipeline seems highly effective at recruiting ideologically driven and dedicated fighters, with RDK membership seeming far more "hardcore" than those fighting with similar groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion (Talmazan, 2023). ​

International Relations & Alliances

The RDK's ties to the Azov Brigade are relatively unclear. Whilst the RDK was formed outside of Azov, many of its initial members were existing fighters under the Azov Brigade, and had been fighting in the Donbas since 2013 (Pigni, 2023). Interestingly, the RDK's first post on their Telegram channel is in fact a memorandum to an Azov fighter (https://t.me/rvc_army/42). 

These initial ties seem to have been continued, with the RDK working alongside Azov units on the front lines, as can be seen through extensive videos posted by he group on their Telegram channel. The following video, depicting international recruits being welcomed into the RDK, also hints towards continued connections between the two factions (https://t.me/rvc_army/661). In the video, as recruits get onto their transport, they shake hands with their instructor. The handshake, where both individuals grip each other's forearms, is largely associated with Azov fighters. 

As noted earlier, the RDK also has links to the Polish political party "Civic Council". Founded in Warsaw and led by Anastasia Sergeyeva (ex-head of the Poland-based "For a Free Russia" association), the Civic Council is a centre-right party which works internationally to provide support to similarly driven groups (Satanovskii, 2023). The Civic Council, of which the RDK was an official component (Satanovskii, 2023), operated to actively funnel volunteers to the RDK (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023). However, on the 6th of June 2023, due to unspecified ideological differences, the Civic Council announced that it would be cutting ties with the RDK (https://t.me/civiccouncil/245).

 Works Cited

(1) - Al Jazeera (2023). Leader of anti-Putin force says expect more Russian border raids. [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/russian-leader-of-anti-putin-force-says-expect-more-border-raids 

(2) - Blann. (2023). Russia claims Ukraine crossborder sabotage raid; Kyiv denies. [online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-apartment-building-d2b8fc376956d2bedc44d3a0d711f260.

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