Search Results

Insurgency Overview The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) is an armed, far-right paramilitary organization fighting against the Russian state. Based in Ukraine, the group recently gained attention by launching raids into the Bryansk and Belgorod regions of Russia. Founded by Denis Nikitin in 2022, the group claims to be part of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, however this is disputed by Ukraine itself. Its goal is the toppling of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the replacement of the Russian Federation with a Russian ethno-state. History & Foundations Denis Nikitin (real last name Kasputin) was born in Russia but spent much of his childhood in Cologne, Germany. There he joined up with a group of football hooligans and regularly participated in fights and forced immigrants and minorities out of the gang. Nikitin eventually returned to Russia and joined a group of ultras who supported the CSKA soccer club, though the game was not what the young Russian was interested in; he loved the thrill of combat. He even used funds from his white nationalist apparel company White Rex to help pay fines or bails for jailed far-right activists across Europe.[1] The fusion of politics and fighting was just getting started for Nikitin. Years later, he would begin organizing amateur mixed martial arts tournaments across European far-right communities to help grow his brand and to involve more people in politics. Germany, Russia, Ukraine, Italy, and more were stages for these events, which even attracted members of the Rise Against Movement (RAM), an American neo-Nazi organization. One group that Nikitin became affiliated with through this process was the Azov Battalion and its political wing, the National Corps. Azov is a far-right militant group that arose following the 2014 Euromaidan and war in Donbas. Nikitin allied himself with many members of the group and helped introduce National Corps members to other far-right parties in Europe. In 2019, Nikitin began operating on a lower profile.[2] The reasons for this are unclear, though possibly it has something to do with his ban from entering EU countries for his ideas.[3] However, the Russia-Ukraine War would provide a new space for Nikitin to operate. Nikitin founded the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) in August 2022 along with veterans of the Azov Battalion.[4] In March of 2023, they claimed to have launched a raid from Ukraine against the Bryansk Oblast of Russia and in May 2023, launched a larger one into the Belgorod region. The second attack propelled the group to a level of notoriety previously unseen in its short history. Ideology & Objectives RDK is often labelled a neo-Nazi group, however Nikitin himself rejects the label. In one message in the group’s Telegram channel, they “adhere to right-wing conservative political views and traditionalist beliefs. Other members of RDK are open believers in Nazism, including the likes of Alexi Levkin. Levkin, a former member of the far-right Ukrainian nationalist group Azov Battalion, describes himself as the “hammer of national-socialism.[5]” However the individual members of RDK prefer to label themselves, it is clear the group detests immigration and the idea of multiculturalism. Their writings often touch on demographic change in Russia, especially on the influx of Muslims. They loathe the concept of a “worldly Russia” which they see as duplicating the Soviet conception of nationality. Based on essays published by the group in their Telegram channel, their ultimate goal seems to be the destruction of the Russian Federation and its replacement with a Russian ethno-state. One essay stated that “Russians need an "ethnic" idea of ​​a nation and political power that defends the interests of Russian people by origin. Without multinational cuckoldism, without situational change of shoes to appease the diasporas, and without sticking to territories where there are practically no Russians left.” Political & Military Abilities RDK, along with the Russian Legion, used American-made military equipment in its raid on Belgorod, making use of “at least two M1224 MaxxPro armoured vehicles and several Humvees.” Ukraine responded by saying they keep American provided arms tightly secured, indicating cooperation from the UAF on some level for the raid (though they attempted to obfuscate their role and denied handing over the equipment).[6] Apart from the vehicles used in the Belgorod raid, RDK seems to be reliant on donations for acquiring transportation and other weaponry. The group has requested funds from supporters in the past for vehicles and a Nemesis UAV which can be used for reconnaissance. The number of fighters RVC boasts is currently unknown. Approach to Resistance RVC are militant and willing to carry out bold attacks inside Russia. In the March 2023 Bryansk raid, “Russian authorities claimed the raid left two civilians dead and a child injured. Nikitin, in his first interview since the incursion, said a shootout occurred in one of the two villages his men had raided but was unaware of the casualties.” Nikitin aimed to show the vulnerability of Russia and inspire more to join his ranks.[7] The Belgorod attack was more ambitious. Using Humvees and armoured vehicles, the RVC, working alongside the Freedom of Russia Legion, stormed the Belgorod region, taking control of some border outposts and even claiming control over some towns. In a press conference following the raid’s end, Nikitin claimed that their forces had reached 42-kilometers inside Russia before being forced to withdraw. The amount of casualties RVC and Russian Legion took are disputed, with Russia claiming 70+killed and RVC claiming only two.[8] International Relations & Potential Alliances As seen in Belgorod, RDK cooperates with the Russian Legion, but most of its international contacts are among the right. In addition to Azov, Nikitin has had contacts with other European fascist movements, including the Italian CasaPound Party and National Democratic Party of Germany.[9] The RDK claims to be part of the Ukrainian Foreign Legion, but Ukraine denies this. At some level, there appears to be cooperation between the RDK and Ukrainian state, but what level remains a mystery.[10] The Russian Volunteer Corps is only getting started. If it manages more attacks like the one seen in Belgorod, it could find its way gaining further support. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Jewish Defence League (JDL) is a far-right Zionist organization founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane in 1968 to combat antisemitism by any means necessary. In 2001, the FBI declared the JDL a right-wing terrorist group due to its violent methods and ideological foundation (1). The league had been linked with numerous bombings, armed assaults, acts of racketeering, and infrastructure attacks targeting what they consider to be enemies of the Jewish people (2). Those said enemies range from neo-Nazi, Arab, or even communist groups and individuals. JDL also strongly criticized the Soviet Union’s antisemitic policies throughout the 80s and early 90s (3). This sentiment helped the league evolve from a mere vigilante group into an established organization with 15.000 members at its peak (4). It is difficult to pin down JDL’s activities as, after the death of Meir Kahane, their presence and influence have waned. Despite that, many still share their beliefs while proudly waving the JDL flag. History & Foundations Rabbi Meir Kahane founded the Jewish Defense League in New York City. Kahane’s motivation behind starting the league was rooted in the tense racial climate among American citizens during the 50s and 60s, specifically cases of violence against Jewish people. One of the triggers was the backlash towards New York teachers union strikes in 1968, which highlighted tensions between Jewish teachers and black residents who intended to take over Manhattan’s neighborhood schools (5). Cases like the teachers union strikes and stories of antisemitism in the Jewish media contributed greatly to working-class Jews joining the JDL. Initially, the JDL was known as the Jewish Defense Corps. They aimed to act as a counter-organization against the Black Power activists with their violent methods (6). However, they eventually replaced “Corps” with “League” because of the militant connotations of the former (6). JDL’s overall goal also shifted to fighting antisemitism in general, adopting the “Never Again” slogan as an homage to victims of the Holocaust. From 1968 to 1970, the majority of JDL members were young adults, but the middle-aged members served as chapter leaders (8). At that time, the league’s most prominent chapters were in New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Los Angeles. In 1971, the JDL reorganized the chapter’s organizational structure by giving younger members more leadership opportunities. Despite being a Jewish organization, in the 70s, only 25% of the league’s members were orthodox Jews, 4% non-Jews, and the rest were ethnically Jews but not religious during the 70s (9). After its inception, the JDL immediately gained a negative reputation for violence. Their name became widespread after the New York Times released an article about them in 1969, which displayed a picture of six young Jewish people guarding the Temple Emanu-El in New York City, armed with brass knuckles and baseball bats. Underneath the picture, a text (10) reads the following: “Is this any way for nice Jewish boys to behave? The answer was a barely qualified maybe. Maybe there are times when there is no other way to get across to the extremists that the Jew is not quite the ‘patsy’ some think he is….Maybe—just maybe— nice people build their road to Auschwitz.” Throughout Kahane’s leadership, the JDL carried out protests, threats, extortion, and attacks targeting whoever they perceived as a threat to the Jewish people. This list included Arabs, communists, neo-nazis, and many more. The JDL’s methods and ideology gained them a form of notoriety throughout the U.S. Indeed, they were condemned and vilified by the Jewish community as their actions were seen by other Jews as 'different' from 'typical Jewish behavior'. In 1990, the JDL’s activities caught up with Meir Kahane, as he was assassinated while giving a speech to orthodox Jews in Brooklyn (11). Kahane was shot with a pistol by an Egyptian American named El Sayyid Nosair. After Kahane’s death, the JDL continued its ideological pursuit but experienced a decline in membership and influence. Infighting and fractures within the League did not help their cause either, which eventually led to them being weakened even more. As a result, many of their members got out of the group to seek a more moderate approach to their cause. The main factor behind their diminishing power was their struggle to replace the charismatic leadership of Meir Kahane, which was the driving force for the League’s cohesion and drive. In 2001 the FBI officially labeled the JDL as a far-right terrorist organization. During the 2000s, the group also managed to branch its chapters out to Europe, South Africa, and Canada. Objectives & Ideology Meir Kahane and the JDL have made it clear that their goal is to fight antisemitism by any means necessary. That attitude stems from Kahane’s three justifications for forming a Jewish militant group, which are the following (12): "Antisemitism is on the rise in communists countries, the Middle East, and American urban centers. Government, police, and the Jewish “establishment” shows no tolerance to threats that target Jewish tradition and survival. The Jewish Defense League is necessary to preserve Jewish tradition and be on the front lines of an active resistance to antisemitism of any kind. The League will use force if necessary to ensure peace for Jews everywhere." There are also five principles that JDL members must abide by (13): Ahavat Yisrael - Love Jewry: The JDL was formed to educate Jews on the concept of Ahavat Yisrael. One Jewish people, indivisible and united, which drives love for and the feeling of pain of all Jews. Hadar - Dignity and Pride: Jews need to have pride and knowledge of Jewish tradition, faith, culture, history, and pain. Barzel - Iron: Helping all Jews through sacrifice and all necessary means, including strength, force, and violence as a last resort. Mishmaat - Discipline and Unity: Discipline and Unity will lead Jews to victory and gain triumph. A lack of discipline is what has failed Jewish people in the past. Bitachon - Faith in The Indestructibility of The Jewish People: Jews need to have faith in the indestructibility of their people and traditions. This faith was instilled by God and the incredible story of Jewish history. The JDL also adopted an ideology called Kahanism, coined by Meir Kahane himself. Kahanism pushes the belief that Jews and Arabs cannot coexist peacefully inside the same state (14). This ideology advocates for the establishment of a theocratic Jewish state in Israel, which -- if it was to ever be achieved -- would signify that Arabs living in Israel would be exiled. This is mainly because of the fundamental Kahanist belief that views Arabs as the enemies of Jews, and that non-Jews should have no voting rights (15). Kahane and the JDL also believed that Jews have historically been scapegoats for all of the world's problems. Kahane once said: “when the world is in trouble it is demanded of the Jew that he help because he is human. When the Jew is oppressed humanity is freed from any obligation because it is a Jewish problem” (16). During the 1960s and early 1990s, the JDL also had strong objections toward the living conditions of Jews in Soviet states (17). They felt that the Soviet government had been oppressing Jews with their policies, mainly because of the prosecutions of Jewish students and intellectuals during the Soviet government’s reign (18). Jewish books have also been burned as part of the Soviet’s crackdown operations, and such policies were seen as a threat to Jewish traditions and a potential cultural genocide by the JDL. Approach to Resistance The JDL prides itself in active resistance against any kind of antisemitism. Active resistance comes in many forms. The first is instilling pride in the Jewish youth, by holding speeches and spreading cultural propaganda. The League would often manipulate the media to give the JDL attention. Kahane often organized mass meetings, rallies, and demonstrations. He would express the League’s views through his columns in the Jewish Press. Staged JDL events would also be used to garner attention from reporters (19). The second approach to resistance employed by the JDL is based on violence. The JDL primarily gained its reputation through its vigilante actions rather than through its role as an advocacy group. In fact, the group is armed and has used violent tactics to further its agenda; these tactics are what Kahane would call “creative disorder” which include blackmail, extortion, arson, armed assault, unarmed assault, hostage-taking, hijacking, and bombings (20). One of the big incidents linked with the JDL was the murder of Alex Odeh. Odeh was a Palestinian-American regional director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC). He was killed in 1985 when a bomb exploded in the ADC office in Santa Ana, California. No one was ever convicted, but the FBI heavily suspects the JDL’s involvement. Before Odeh’s death, he denied the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro boat that killed the Jewish American Leon Klinghoffer (21). Irv Rubin, the JDL chairman, reacted to the bombing by stating that Odeh had “got exactly what he deserved. My tears were used up crying for Leon Klinghoffer” (22). The French chapter of the JDL was responsible for their more recent actions. On July 13th, 2014, JDL members clashed with pro-Palestinian protesters outside a synagogue in Paris. At first, the public was outraged by the incident and thought it was an anti-semitic attack by the pro-Palestinian demonstrators (23), but some witnesses testified that the JDL had provoked the incident to a greater extent. A couple of days later, two JDL members were jailed for detonating a homemade bomb under the car of Jonathan Moadab, the co-founder of the “Cercle des Volontaires” (Circle of Volunteers) blog in 2012. After the attack, the letters “LDJ” (Ligue de Défense Juive) and the Star of David were written all over the car. Moadab also said that he received calls that threatened to “Kill you, your mother, your father, and your brothers” (24). This attack was motivated by Moadab’s criticism of the French Zionist nebula in one of his articles. Alliances & Relations One of the JDL’s main strategies is to form partnerships with ethnic organizations, specifically non-Jewish groups that they also deem to be ostracised. For instance, during the early days of the JDL, Kahane allied with the Mafia Chief Joseph Colombo Sr., who ran the Italian Civil Rights League (25). The group failed on numerous accounts to form alliances with other Jewish groups, for these would usually reject any cooperation with the JDL. Despite the League’s political isolation, it has managed to spread outside of the U.S., most notably in Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and South Africa (26). The JDL’s ideology, specifically Kahanism, has influenced contemporary Israeli politics. The Otzma Yehudit party, for example, adopted Kahanist rhetoric and ideology. In 2022, Otzma Yehudit grew to be Israel’s third-largest party and gained six seats in parliament (27). One of the party’s members, Itamar Ben-Gvir, was appointed Minister of National Security in Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration (28). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The National Socialist Movement is a neo-Nazi organization that is grounded in far-right nazi beliefs. It believes in establishing an all-white America. Robert Brannen and Cliff Herrington founded the NSM in 1974 in St. Paul, Minnesota. Both of these men were originally stormtroopers who were a part of the American Nazi Party (ANP) under George Lincoln Rockwell. The NSM was originally named the National Socialist American Workers Freedom Movement but was later renamed to the NSM, once Jeff Schoep assumed leadership of the group. With the decline of similar groups, such as the Aryan Nations and the National Vanguard in the early 2000s, the NSM rose to prominence within the far-right. Burt Colucci is the most recent leader of the NSM after Schoep stepped down in 2019, and the NSM is known as the oldest and most prominent neo-Nazi group which is currently active in the United States (1). History & Foundations The NSM was founded in 1974 by Robert Brannen and Cliff Herrington with the headquarters based in Detroit, Michigan. The organizational structure of the NSM is similar to a paramilitary group, with some members labeled as lieutenants and sergeants. Its chapters are scattered throughout the U.S. but are most prominent in the Northeast (1). The NSM started to regain prominence in 2004 after the deaths of infamous Neo-Nazi leaders Richard Butler and William Pierce. It was not long until the NSM was back to being one of the most prominent Neo-Nazi groups in the U.S. Jeff Schoep took control of the NSM in 1994 at 21 years old. In 2006, Cliff Herrington was removed from the organisation due to his wife's affiliation with Satanists. She was outed as the “High Priestess” of the Joy of Satan's Ministry. Schoep’s age allowed the NSM to reach a broader, younger audience, and under Schoep, youth organisations were set up to recruit young teens into the NSM. "Viking Youth Corps" was one of these organisations that the NSM utilised to recruit young teenagers. The NSM created a variety of media outputs to reach new audiences who might be interested. These include a music label (NSM88 Records) as well as a website named New Saxon to meet other like-minded individuals. (2) Jeff Schoep led the NSM for two and a half decades. However, once Schoep started facing legal trouble due to his involvement in the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, he started to denounce his past actions. There is much debate about whether or not he is fully sincere with this, and he has stated that he has stepped down from the NSM and even describes himself as a "peace advocate". On the 23rd of November 2021, the Virginia Federal Court found Jeff Schoep and the NSM liable for civil conspiracy. Jeff Schoep was fined $500,000 in punitive damages, and the NSM (under Burt Colucci) was fined $1,000,000.(2) Although the current leader of the NSM is Burt Colucci (and he was indicted on January 4th, as well as charged with two counts of misdemeanour disorderly conduct and one count of felony disorderly conduct), the leadership of the NSM has been relatively contested. James Stern was a black Baptist minister who convinced Jeff Schoep to hand over control of the NSM leadership, by assuring him that doing this would help Schoep avoid lawsuits due to his participation in the Charlottesville riots. The two had shared phone calls from December 2018 through to February 2019, and Schoep’s position was precarious as the NSM and other groups were held accountable for the death of Heather Hayer during the Charlottesville riot in 2017. Eventually, Schoep turned over the leadership to Stern in order to get rid of the lawsuits. However, Stern had plans to undermine the NSM from within. His first action as leader was to ask the Virginia federal court to issue a judgement against the NSM prior to their trial. He also stated that he wanted to transform the group’s website into a place to teach NSM members about the Holocaust. He died on October 11, 2019 (5). Ideology & Objectives The NSM acts openly as a neo-Nazi group. They are very open about their worship and support of Adolf Hitler and far-right ideas. They spread antisemitic conspiracy theories with posters and flyers including titles such as “Every single aspect of 9/11 is Jewish”, and “Every single aspect of mass immigration is Jewish”. They believe in “defending White European values” and upholding a strictly white-exclusive nation. The NSM has a 25-demand list named The 25-Point Plan. It is a list of the demands that the NSM would implement in the United States in the event that they came to power. Some of the demands include the banning of non-whites' citizenship as well as the banning of further non-white immigration. The NSM believes that the American constitution and Germanic law would act as a framework for the legal aspects of their rule. They subscribe to the belief that a court could sentence a guilty party to serve as a slave to the person that was wronged. Approach to Resistance The marches and protests that the group carried out are what drew public attention to the NSM. They carry out these marches in full Nazi-style uniforms with swastikas adorned on their ‘uniforms’. They also have a history of marching through black neighborhoods (3). The NSM's public gatherings are often met with strong opposition and counter-protesters such as antifascist protesters in Charlottesville in 2017. The NSM has also targeted immigrants and has called on its members to attack immigrants when they are vulnerable (3). The group does not act as an armed resistance in that it doesn't fight or organize itself using tactics that are typically associated with other right-wing paramilitary organizations. They act mainly as a political organization and carry out marches and protests, as aforementioned. Even though members might individually own firearms, they do not have a structured military wing that carries out attacks. Alliances & Relations A large component which contributes to the NSM's popularity within the far-right is its open membership. Many members from different neo-Nazi organizations, as well as Ku Klux Klan members, would join and attend NSM rallies and other gatherings. Some rallies would deliberately mix different far-right/Neo-Nazi groups to try to combat division. However, recent membership numbers of the NSM have been on the decline, mainly due to the consequences of the Charlottesville “Unite the Right’' rally on the group's image. Some of their rallies have barely been able to have attendances of over 15 people. Nonetheless, struggles within the leadership of the organization over the last few years have damaged the internal structure and cohesion of the group, also contributing to its decline (4). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Al-Qaeda in Kurdistan, also known as the Kurdistan Brigades, is a militant Islamist organisation which is primarily active on the Iran/Iraq border region, in the area known as Iraqi Kurdistan. Formed in response to “the Kurdish collaborators who sold themselves [...] who abandoned the Islamic faith and are carrying out their masters orders day and night", they have been active in targeting and attacking Kurdish forces and civilians (Khalil, 2007). The Kurdistan Brigades first emerged in 2007 and they have since primarily targeted the Kurdistan regional government - the AANES. Affiliated with Al-Qaeda, they are a Salafist, Kurdish Militia aimed at combating what they deem to be a secular Kurdish government which has ‘betrayed’ Islamic values (Khalil, 2007). History & Foundations There are several competing theories exploring the group's motivations for having formed into an organised insurgency. One of these theories esteems that the Kurdish Brigades formed in response to the surge of US forces in 2007 (Duffy, 2008) and the need for Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to establish a new foothold in Iraqi Kurdistan. Another competing theory about the founding of the group is that it followed the Kirkuk status referendum in 2007, which was held in order to decide whether or not Kirkuk in Northern Iraq should become a part of the Kurdistan Region. However, varying groups -- including both Turkmen (UNPO, 2007) and Shi’ite Arabic groups -- were trying to gain support in the Northern Iraq region in order to thwart a vote which would have given the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) control over a resource-rich area (Cole, 2007) (UNPO, 2007). From 2007 to 2010, the AQKB committed a series of attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan, and they targeted secular Kurdish groups and political parties within the KRG, with one of their largest attacks being a VBIED attack on the Kurdish ministers of the interior and security building which killed 19 people (Radio Free Europe, 2012). Post 2010, there has been very little available information about the group, although in 2014 Al Qaeda in Kurdistan released a statement in which they said they would “fight against ISIS if needed” (Roggio, 2014). Objectives & Ideology The Kurdistan Brigades share their parent organisation's ideology and goals. The group is a Sunni, Salafist, and Jihadist organisation which seeks to implement Sharia Law and to also establish an Islamic Caliphate in the Middle East. Nevertheless, its unique characteristic is that it seeks to recruit its members from the Kurdish community in Iraq, which has been historically targeted by varying Islamic groups -- including Al Qaeda itself. As a result of this violence against the Kurdish population, Kurdish forces have responded by inflicting “a high number of casualties” (BBC Middle East, 2013). This has further fuelled the turmoil between Al-Qaeda in Kurdistan and regional Kurdish militias. Military & Political Abilities The group has severely limited political and military abilities, mainly due to the group's low membership numbers. Nevertheless, the Kurdistan Brigades have claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, with one of their deadliest operations being the aforementioned VBIED attack on the Kurdish ministers of the Interior and Security building (in which 19 people were killed when a truck laden with explosives was detonated outside the building). They have also killed border guards and security force members; in September of 2010, two police officers were injured during a foiled AQKB suicide attack which was targeting security office members in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq (Office of the Spokesperson, 2012). Approach to Resistance Despite the group's violent nature, AQKB has only carried out a small number of attacks since 2007. Most of its actions have involved suicide bombings and car bombs. There is evidence, however, that the AQKB intended to use chemical weapons attacks and dispatched a number of its members to Afghanistan and Pakistan to undergo chemical weapons training (Khalil, 2007). The organisation allegedly wanted to carry out chemical assaults and explode the Qaragul Bridge in the Sulaymaniyah province using an unmanned aircraft. The AQKB also intended to wipe the handles of the vehicles used to transport Kurdish politicians with fatal chemicals. Nonetheless, there is no proof that AQKB has ever realised its plans to use chemical weapons (Khalil, 2007). International Relations & Potential Alliances Although it has no recorded political activities within Iraqi Kurdistan, the group has been listed as a foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. State Department (US State Department, 2017) and also as a terrorist organisation by the Canadian government (Public Safety Canada, 2014). AQKB’s extreme Islamist ideology has made the group deeply unpopular with Iraq’s Kurdish population, who are both largely secular and nationalist in nature (Khalil, 2007). As AQKB is an affiliate organisation of Al-Qaeda, it has sworn allegiance to Ayman Mohammad Rabie al-Zawahiri (the former leader of al-Qaeda) prior to his death in 2022. Following the split between al-Qaeda and ISIS within Syria in which the former leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, attempted to subsume Al-Nusrah (another AQ-aligned faction), they began to clash. This indicates that AQKB is also targeting and fighting against ISIS in Iraq (Roggio, 2014). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order (Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia, JRTN) is an Iraqi insurgent group that has been active since 2006. While the group ostensibly follows the doctrine of the Islamic Sufi order of the Naqshbandi, these religious beliefs are also eclectically mixed with elements of Neo-Baathist ideology. The explicit aim with which the JRTN was founded was the expulsion of Coalition forces from Iraq and the re-establishment of a Baathist state (1). History & Foundations The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order was founded in 2006, in response to the execution of former Iraqi dictator and leader of the Iraqi branch of the Baath party, Saddam Hussein (2). Hussein’s former right-hand man Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri became the leader of JRTN and had also joined the Naqshbandi order during his long record of service under Saddam Hussein. This is after he had allowed them to prosper in Baathist Iraq, while also becoming a sheikh of the order himself (3). Several Iraqi military families joined as well (4). In the 1990s, the Baathist regime initiated a so-called “Faith campaign”, which intended to publicly Islamize the regime to bolster its domestic support. Al-Douri had already been tasked with religious propaganda in the 1980s, and his role further increased with the new policy of the regime (5). Henceforth, he started to publicly speak in favour of Sufi Islam and its values (6). In part, Sufi Islam was seen by the regime as the perfect ‘middle way’ to increase the legitimacy of Baathist Iraq as an Islamic country, while also fighting religious extremists (such as Salafists) (7). Amid the increasing threat of foreign aggression, in 2003 one of Saddam Hussein’s last top secret orders included guidelines to prepare the country for an anti-American insurgency, which listed as priorities the destruction of fundamental infrastructure, as well as the association of insurgents with Islamic parties and values and the elimination of hostile or non-cooperating Islamic scholars and imams (8). Al-Douri, who went underground amid the collapse of the Baathist regime in 2003 following the US-led invasion of the country, exploited Saddam’s hanging to publicly announce the formation of the JRTN in 2006 (9). The former Republican Guard cadre assumed most command positions of the JRTN and imprinted the group with military discipline and operational procedures (10). As such, the group became a unique mix of Baathist military and political figures, and of Sufi Islamic militants. JRTN has their powerbase in northern Iraq, and it is possible that al-Douri, who was never apprehended after he went underground and reportedly passed away in 2020, may have remained hidden precisely in that area (11). In 2003, insurgent cells that would go on to found JRTN masterminded and carried out a series of bombings, including an attack in Baghdad’s Green Zone while the then-US deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was present (12). In the last few years, however, the group has not engaged in any notable action, and the group is currently believed to be dormant, or inactive (13). Nevertheless, it seems that propaganda articles, videos, and images of JRTN continue to circulate and be uploaded on the internet, which may hint at underground activity or perhaps an ideological survival. This video here is an example of the JRTN's online propaganda campaign: Ideology & Objectives The Naqshbandi Order is one of the major Sufi orders of Sunni Islam, which itself is a doctrine which emphasizes the exoteric and esoteric teachings to receive God’s grace in this life. The Naqshbandi, in particular, trace back their origin through the prophet Mahomet and emphasize eleven principles to live life in accordance to what they perceive to be ‘divine will’. JRTN was founded as an Arab nationalist and Sunni-oriented group, even if the allegiance to the Naqshbandi order is at times disputed, insofar as its opponents claim that Sufism is inherently pacifistic (14). The peculiar relationship between Iraqi Baathism and Islam has long been a matter of interest in academic studies, especially focussing on the so-called “Faith campaign”, which led to a renewed repression of Salafist and Wahabi elements in Iraq (15). After Coalition forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, the focus shifted to overthrowing the Iraqi government and state, believing that “unbelievers-occupiers” must be eliminated (16). The predominant role of Shia Iraqis in the current Iraqi government is believed to be an aggravating factor that may have influenced this shift (17). JRTN publications claim that no political process in Iraq is valid and legal due to the country’s occupation (18). Political & Military Abilities The group has been variously estimated to consist of between 1500 and 5000 fighters, though, more modern figures are not available (19). Their earlier publications, while discussing Sufi doctrine, also included precise analyses of the situation of the Iraqi insurgency and specifics of an effective guerrilla war (20). The JRTN has repeatedly attacked Coalition and US forces using asymmetric warfare techniques, such as hit-and-run attacks, IED explosions, and ambushes (21). Furthermore, the JRTN leadership was often the mastermind of attacks on Coalition forces and coordinated attacks carried out by other militant groups as well, namely those united under the “General Military Council of for Iraq’s Revolutionaries” umbrella group (22). In general, JRTN is also most popular amongst Iraqi Sunnis, due to their evident reclaiming of Arab nationalist, Neo-Baathist, and anti-Shia rhetoric (23). International Relations & Alliances JRTN had a troubled relationship with the Islamic State, at times cooperating with them but finally declaring them “barbarians” by 2014 (24). The two groups further clashed in 2015, after which the JRTN leadership denounced the IS and condemned their indiscriminate attacks against Yazidis and the deportation of Christians (25). Additional Resources The piece below is another example of a propaganda documentary circulated online by the JRTN. Viewer discretion is advised.

Insurgency Overview The Ulster Defence Association (UDA) is a loyalist paramilitary group which is based in Northern Ireland. The group was founded in 1971 during the The Troubles in Northern Ireland where loyalists who wanted NI to remain a part of Great Britain fought a conflict against republicans militias and groups such as the IRA (Irish Republican Army) who wanted to unify with The Republic of Ireland. The group was set up in order to counteract Irish Republican Army operations and to defend loyalist neighbourhoods from republican paramilitaries. History & Foundations The group was initially formed as a coalition of multiple community defence groups which had originated in the predominantly protestant loyalist neighbourhoods in Belfast after the outbreak of violence in 1969. The UDA originally patrolled their areas and attempted to remove IRA informants from within their neighbourhoods but it was not long before membership numbers began to increase and they began training their members in paramilitary tactics such as arms training as well as setting up roadblocks and community patrols in their areas. The UDA had now begun operating with the intent of countering IRA operations. It is estimated that at their peak they had 40,000 members.(1) The UDA were originally a legal community defence organisation which was sanctioned by the British state, who would carry out attacks under the alias of the “Ulster Freedom Fighters” in order to avoid the UDA being banned. In July 1972 the UDA built barricades in the Springfield area of Belfast in order to separate themselves from neighbouring catholic estates – 250 British troops were sent to confront them but ended up backing down due to the sheer number of armed UDA militants who were prepared to fight them.(1) The UDA began carrying out attacks on republican areas and republican figures with one notable attack being that of SDLP politician Paddy Wilson in 1973. In 1974 the UDA showed its influence amongst working class loyalists by organising The Ulster Workers Council Strike. This was a Strike in protest to a proposed peace agreement which would have, in their view, given republicans way too much power. This was a general strike within loyalist communities organised by a number of loyalist paramilitaries including The UDA and also the Ulster Volunteer Force. No trade unions supported the strike and The UDA used intimidation to ensure that people adhered to it. Roadblocks were set up all over the country by loyalist paramilitaries to enforce this too. The strike lasted two weeks before it was called off after the loyalists had achieved their demands. The power sharing agreement collapsed. During the strike The UDA ramped up their violence and killed 39 people over the course of the two weeks and injured hundreds.(2) In 1988 the group committed one of its most infamous attacks when one of its members, Michael Stone, showed up to an IRA funeral in Belfast and indiscriminately began throwing grenades into the crowd. 3 were killed and dozens were injured in the attack. In 1993 the UDA members entered a restaurant in Derry where people were celebrating Halloween and opened fire, indiscriminately killing 8 people. In 1994 the UDA announced an official ceasefire to coincide with the IRAs ceasefire and in 2005 it officially ended its armed campaign. The UDA signed up to the Good Friday Agreement and ended their armed campaign but have retained a strong membership, which is estimated to stand today at around 12,000 members. In 2021 The UDA pulled out of The Good Friday agreement following controversy surrounding the implementation of a sea border between Ireland and mainland Britain during the Brexit negotiations. Though the UDA are no longer signatories to the Good Friday agreement, they have not resumed their armed campaign.(3) Objectives & ideology The UDAs primary objective is to keep Northern Ireland as a protestant state. Contrary to other loyalist groups whose sole objective is to remain a part of Great Britain, The UDA were originally supportive of the idea of an independent Northern Ireland so long as it was run as a protestant state. Since its inception, the UDA has subscribed to the ideology of Unionism, maintaining the belief that if the Protestant populations in Northern Ireland were to be assimilated into a predominantly Catholic Irish Republic, they would be subjected to discrimination and oppression. In recent years, the group has faced accusations of engaging in various criminal activities such as extortion, robbery, and murder, commonly associated with gangland operations. An MI5 assessment conducted in 2021 stated that the South East Antrim UDA possesses "arms access" and is significantly involved in the illicit drug trade, community coercion, intimidation, and other forms of criminal behaviour. Presently, the UDA claims to prioritize "community development," yet numerous individuals residing in regions influenced by the UDA experience profound fear. In these communities, especially in East Antrim, the UDA exercises extensive control and surveillance, ensuring strict adherence to their rules, with severe consequences for those who dare to deviate. The most common forms of punishment are beatings or kneecappings (a common practice amongst paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland in which a person has their kneecaps shot as a form of punishment). Often people will also be warned to leave the community. (3) Killings nowadays are rare but will still happen occasionally, the last person known to be shot to death by The UDA occurred in 2017 when James Colin Horner was murdered due to an internal feud within the organisation. In 2020 Glenn Quinn was beaten to death by the group as a punishment for getting into a fight with a UDA man earlier that day. Approach to Resistance The UDA would target civilians to a much higher extent than their republican counterparts in the IRA. It is estimated that the UDA were responsible for around 400 deaths during the conflict – 220 of these were civilians and 37 of them were members of other loyalist paramilitaries. In 1994 the UDA released a document which called for the ethnic cleansing/removal of Irish Catholics and any non-white or non-protestant communities in Northern Ireland. The UDA's war seemed to be one against the general Catholic population of Northern Ireland whereas the IRA had more coherent political goals which were removing the British army from Ireland and also creating a united Ireland. The UDA stated that if the IRA laid down their arms then they would do the same unless there was a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, in which case they would act as an “IRA in reverse”.(3) International Alliances In the wake of the Northern Irish conflict (The Troubles) which ended in 1999, many documents emerged which confirmed that the UDA had been colluding with the British army and intelligence services during The Troubles. The British army and the UDA had been sharing information such as the names and locations of republicans. It was later discovered in an MI5 report that around 85% of the UDA's target information was given to them by British intelligence. The British army also helped The UDA carry out assassinations. One of the most notable incidents of collusion was The Miami Showband Massacre when one of Ireland's most popular showbands was on tour in Northern Ireland and were stopped at a checkpoint which had appeared to be a British Army checkpoint. The ‘soldiers’ who were manning the checkpoint were wearing British army uniforms and whilst they were checking the car, they planted an explosive device which detonated prematurely. 5 people were killed including two of the British soldiers. It is believed that the British army and UDA had colluded in order to make the band look like IRA explosive smugglers, thus meaning they could increase security checks on the border. (4) There was also a general hands off approach to the UDA, crimes often were not investigated and British intelligence often failed to let republicans know if they were targets for assassination by the UDA and other loyalist groups. This however, ceased in 1992 when the British Government officially recognised them as a terrorist organisation. The British army had colluded with The UDA in order to take down the IRA but the number of civilian deaths and the British army' involvement was driving more republicans towards the IRA.(3) The group also had strong connections with British Neo Nazi organisation Combat 18 who helped them smuggle in weapons from the mainland. Most notably former UDA leader Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair used to regularly travel back and forth between Northern Ireland and England to attend Combat 18 events and meetings. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Real Ulster Freedom Fighters or Real UFF are a loyalist paramilitary group based in Northern Ireland. Believed to be formed from former members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the group has been involved in several bomb and gun attacks, mainly against Nationalist and Catholic targets, although the group has also targeted various unionist and loyalist figures. History & Foundations The Real UFF’s name originates from the 1970’s which saw the organisation of armed loyalist paramilitary groups under the umbrella organisation of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA)(1). Originally these groups were formed to act as a defensive measure for Unionist areas against Republican military activity although elements within the organisation began carrying out attacks against republican and nationalist target’s, claiming responsibility under the title of the “Ulster Freedom Fighters”, despite no such organisation officially existing. The Real UFF announced its existence in 2007 and is believed to be a splinter group from the UVF, formed from those who disagreed with the St Andrews Agreement. This was an agreement between Ireland, the UK, and various Northern Irish political parties and groups, resulting in the restoration of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing executive. In particular, the group is thought to be founded by supporters of Garry “Smickers” Smith and the Shoukri brothers (2), notable figures within the loyalist movement and former allies of Johnny Adair, a major figure within the UDA responsible for many of the attacks credited to the UFF (3). More recent reporting has claimed that the group is currently led by Adrian Price, another former UDA figure, although it is unclear whether this is the same Real UFF that emerged in 2007, or another group operating under the same name (4). Objectives & Ideology The Real UFF continue to uphold the Ulster loyalist ideology of their parent organisation, the UVF. Ulster loyalism in general refers to the more extreme elements within the Ulster Unionist community, which believe in the use of violence to maintain Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and protect “British identity” within Ulster (5). However the organisation can also be understood to represent a more radical offshoot of loyalist ideology, having formed as a response to the perceived “softening” of the loyalist position due to the acceptance of power-sharing negotiations in 2006. This radicalism is illustrated not just by the continuation of violent acts by the group, but also by their choice of targets, with the group having stated its intention to assassinate various high-profile loyalist figures such as the previously mentioned Johnny Adair (6). The group has also made a point to target drug dealers operating within loyalist communities. This has parallels to Republican anti-drug groups operating in Northern Ireland such as RAAD (now part of the New IRA) who also make anti-drug violence a core part of their actions and messaging (7). It is likely that the Real UFF have taken this position for similar reasons as the aforementioned Republican groups, as it allows the Real UFF to ingratiate itself within Loyalist communities while also granting an element of legitimacy through providing community protection where the state has failed (8). However despite this messaging it should be noted that the currently active Real UFF and other paramilitary groups also have heavy involvement in the Northern-Irish drug trade (9). Approach to Resistance Since its inception in 2007, the Real UFF have been involved in several small-scale bomb and gun attacks in Northern Ireland. Many of these attacks have taken the form of pipe-bomb attacks against nationalist individuals and communities, including an attempted pipe-bomb attack against an Antrim GAA club in 2010 claimed by the Real UFF (10). The group have almost targeted non-nationalists including an attempted pipe-bombing at the home of a Polish family in 2011, thought to have been motivated by anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiment (11). The most recent attack claimed by the group as of the writing of this article was the pipe-bombing of a home in 2013, although other loyalist groups are also suspected of having carried out this attack (12,13). Beyond attacks, the Real UFF has also made death threats against various public figures. This includes major nationalist political figures including Belfast MLA Gerry Kelly (14) and former Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams (15). As recently as this year, the group have also made threats against prominent loyalist figures such as loyalist activist Jamie Bryson (16). In addition to political activities, the Real UFF has also become heavily involved in the drug trade in Northern Ireland, similar to other paramilitaries active in the region, since at least early 2023 (17). This trade tends to remain within loyalist communities. In addition to being one of the main sources of funding for groups the drug trade also provides an opportunity for recruitment, by placing disadvantaged youths in drug debt, and offering membership as an alternative to punishment beatings for failure to pay (18). This involvement in the drug trade has created tension with the wider Unionist community, leading to denouncement by Unionist politicians and protests against their activities (19). Relations & Alliances Historically, loyalist groups have not maintained many alliances outside of their community. One exception to this would be their connections to the British far-right, including groups such as the British Nationalist Party and Combat 18 in the 1970’s (20). That said, these groups do not appear to have provided significant material support to the loyalist cause (21), and factions within the loyalist community have rejected further attempts to build alliances (22). It is currently unknown whether the Real UFF has continued any of these relationships or forged new ones, however it appears unlikely given the group has failed to maintain friendly relationships even within the loyalist community. Currently, the Real UFF is known to be feuding with elements of the UDA in the North Down area over control of the drug trade, however as previously stated it is unknown whether this group is a continuation of the Real UFF which emerged in 2007, or a distinct group having taken the name for themselves (23). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a Kurdish militant and political organization founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan. Operating primarily in Turkey, the PKK consists of Kurdish nationalists who strive to improve the autonomy of the Kurdish population. Initially, their objective was to establish an independent Kurdish state in the Kurdistan region, situated between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. However, their current focus is on advocating for the rights, cultural identity, and self-determination of the Kurdish people within the respective states they inhabit (1). Over time, the PKK has embraced a range of left-wing and Marxist ideologies, adapted to the specific circumstances of the Kurdish people. This ideology, known as democratic confederalism, was formulated by Öcalan during his ongoing imprisonment in Turkey (2). The PKK employs a combination of militant, social, and political means to pursue its goals. Through the extensive Kurdish diaspora, the organization and Öcalan have exerted considerable international influence in the Middle East and abroad, shaping other Kurdish nationalist groups such as the People's Defense Units (YPG) in Syria. Öcalan's principles are implemented in the governance of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), also referred to as Rojava (3). Since the early 1980s, the PKK has been involved in several armed conflicts, most notably against the Turkish government. The Kurds have long been a persecuted minority, where in Turkey they have endured the suppression of their language and culture, persecution by the state, and even ethnic cleansing. Using guerrilla tactics, the PKK has taken up arms in a protracted, on-and-off struggle against Turkey. Over the course of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict some 40,000 people have died, most of whom being Kurdish civilians. Designations of terrorist organization have been applied to the PKK by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union. In recent years, the PKK has shifted its approach, adopting a more political stance and seeking peaceful negotiations to resolve the conflict with Turkey. However, sporadic clashes between the PKK and the Turkish government still occur (4). History and Foundations The Kurdistan Workers' Party came to be during a period of economic and political instability in Turkey. The worsening conditions in the 1960s gave rise to mass strikes and heightened radicalization, with various left-wing, nationalist, and Islamist groups gaining traction and fighting amongst each other in the streets. In response to the government's inability to control the situation, the Turkish military carried out a coup in 1971. Left-wing groups faced persecution, and martial law was imposed in many Kurdish villages (5). The official policy of the Turkish government, then and now, is to deny the existence of the Kurdish people. This denial led to oppressive measures such as the suppression of the Kurdish language and culture that continue today (6), which persist to this day. Non-violent Kurdish cultural groups, like the Revolutionary Cultural Eastern Hearths, were targeted for promoting Kurdish culture (7). Additionally, Kurds became victims of violence perpetrated by nationalist groups like the Grey Wolves (5). Despite the government's efforts to regain control through increased authoritarianism after the 1971 coup, the problems from the previous decade persisted. Political violence escalated, resulting in thousands of deaths in clashes between Marxist and nationalist factions (5). In the midst of this instability, Abdullah Öcalan founded the Kurdistan Workers' Party in 1978 to safeguard the diminishing rights of Kurds. While initially seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state, the party's objectives have since evolved. During its early years, the PKK carried out small-scale attacks against the Turkish government while also participating in demonstrations (8). Towards the latter half of the decade, the Turkish government once again lost control, culminating in its collapse in 1979 and another military coup in 1980. Martial law was declared nationwide, the constitution was suspended, and parliament was dissolved. The military regime ruled for the next three years, cracking down on freedoms and adopting an even more nationalist stance. Political parties, trade unions, and student organizations were banned, and thousands of individuals, including politicians, activists, and intellectuals, were arrested. The military enforced strict media censorship and violently quelled all forms of dissent (5). The military regime governed Turkey until 1983 when democracy was restored. However, the military retained significant power in Turkish politics, continued to influence politics (5). But rather than curbing extremism, the coup inadvertently pushed more people towards radical ideologies. During the period of military rule, the PKK faced severe crackdowns, with members being imprisoned and executed. Many fled and found refuge in Syria, as well as with various groups in Palestine and Iraq (1). The PKK regrouped and became increasingly militant after the 1983 elections. The organization established its paramilitary wing the following year and initiated its first major insurgency against the Turkish state. Operating from bases in Syria with support from the Syrian government, the PKK targeted not only the military and government, but the citizenry and its political enemies as well (9). Schools were burnt down and teachers murdered. Öcalan and the PKK argued that this was justified as these institutions were tools of assimilation employed by the Turkish state (4). The Serhildan, or people's uprising, began in 1990 when Turkish police attacked a gathering of 5,000 mourners attending the funeral of a young PKK soldier. This incident triggered mass demonstrations across Turkish Kurdistan. Since then, protests have been held annually on the day of Abdullah Öcalan's capture and during the banned Kurdish New Year celebration known as Newroz. While these demonstrations have been met with violence and suppression by the Turkish state, they have also compelled significant concessions from the government (9). Although it began as a secular Marxist-Leninist group, Öcalan and the PKK fleshed out their own unique ideology of democratic confederalism in the early 1990s. During this time, they also incorporated Islamic principles and messaging to broaden their popular appeal (6). In 1993, a ceasefire agreement was reached, but the peace process ended when president Turgut Ozal, who himself was part Kurdish, died (9). After this point, the violence escalated on both sides. The new government showed no interest in continuing the peace process and instead embarked on the destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages (9). In response to the increasingly aggressive tactics of the Turkish army, the PKK employed acts of terrorism such as assassinations, kidnappings, and hostage-taking, including the use of women as suicide bombers starting in 1996 (10). Syria and Iraq withdrew their support for the group. The PKK announced a ceasefire in 1995 in an effort to establish a diplomatic channel with the Turkish government, but their peace overtures were not reciprocated, and fighting resumed the following year (9). The late 1990s marked a series of setbacks for the PKK. Turkey achieved military success in campaigns against PKK camps in Northern Iraq. In 1999, Öcalan was captured by the Turkish authorities with assistance from the United States and Israel after he was forced to leave Syria. Initially sentenced to death, his sentence was later commuted as part of Turkey's efforts to join the European Union (8). He remains imprisoned, and protests are held annually on the anniversary of his arrest. While his capture ended a ceasefire that was declared in 1998, the PKK were forced to declare another ceasefire in 1999, which lasted until 2004. During this period, the PKK underwent a transformation into a political organization. They withdrew from Turkey and relocated to northern Iraq, declaring an end to the war in 2000. However, the Turkish government rejected their diplomatic overtures, accusing them of continuing terrorist activities. The PKK reformed twice in the early 2000s, first as the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and later as the Kongra-Gel (KGK) (8). However, there were dissenting voices within the organization who were dissatisfied with its new direction. Splinter groups like the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK) emerged, leading to a power struggle between those advocating for reform and those favoring a return to insurgency (11). The latter won out, resulting in purges of the reformist camp and the resumption of fighting in 2004. The organization reverted to its original name, PKK, a year later (8). Due to its diminished capacity, the PKK shifted its tactics, relying on asymmetrical warfare and conducting quick, small-scale attacks on Turkish forces. Meanwhile, the TAK escalated its violence, criticizing the PKK for its perceived "pacifism" and launching attacks on civilian targets. The PKK condemned such attacks, although there were allegations that the PKK utilized the TAK to maintain plausible deniability and retained control over the organization (11). In 2009, the Erdogan government initiated another peace process with the PKK after the organization declared its sixth ceasefire. Bans on Kurdish cultural practices began to be lifted, and Kurdish refugees had their citizenship restored. However, the peace process faced obstacles when the government cracked down on Kurdish parties, provoking widespread outrage (8). Fighting resumed between 2010 and 2012, coinciding with the Syrian Civil War. Kurdish rebels managed to establish the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), also known as Rojava, with support from PKK forces. The People's Protection Units (YPG), the major Kurdish rebel group, is heavily influenced by Öcalan and the PKK's ideology. Presently, Rojava remains under attack from Turkey, Syria, and the Islamic State (3). In 2014, many Kurds protested against the Turkish government's support of ISIS, which perpetrated a genocide against Kurds. The protests were met with violence from the Turkish state (12). Turkey's increased involvement in the Syrian Civil War and its targeting of PKK and SDF/YPG forces led to another breakdown of the ceasefire, and fighting continues to this day. Objectives & Ideology The goals of the PKK have undergone drastic changes throughout its existence. Initially, its focus was on creating a sovereign Kurdish state spanning the Kurdish-populated areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. However, in recent years, the PKK has shifted towards advocating for greater rights and recognition for the Kurdish people within the countries they inhabit. This includes demanding increased cultural autonomy, language rights, and political representation (1). While the group still seeks to overthrow the Turkish government and other nation-states occupying Kurdistan, it no longer aims to establish its own Kurdish nation. Instead, it envisions replacing the existing system with a decentralized cooperative government, similar to the model found in the AANES (13). Today, the PKK espouses a distinct synthesis of Kurdish nationalism and libertarian socialism known as democratic confederalism. While spending his time in prison studying the ancient history of the region, works of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, and ideas of contemporary thinkers like Murray Bookchin, Öcalan became determined to develop an alternative to the Soviet model. Democratic confederalism, the solution to his problem, advocates for decentralization, direct democracy, and social and environmental justice. It seeks to create a system of local self-governance where communities and labour are democratically organized. Rather than a single head of state, society is to be governed by councils with equal representation regardless of culture or gender. It is unique insofar that it rejects statist models for liberation while still incorporating nationalist elements. In the past, the organization adhered to Marxist-Leninist and communist beliefs until Öcalan developed his own theory (2). Öcalan also developed a form of feminism called jineology, or “women’s science”. Jineology seeks to challenge traditional patriarchal structures and promote gender equality within Kurdish society and beyond. The ideology emphasizes the role of women in revolutionary struggle and argues that true liberation for all people can only be achieved through the empowerment of women (2). According to Öcalan, jineology is grounded in a materialist analysis of social relations, which seeks to uncover the ways in which gender oppression is intertwined with other forms of oppression, such as class, race, and imperialism. Jineology has been implemented in the PKK with practices of equal gender representation with the group’s organizational structure. Along with self-determination for the Kurdish people and the decentralization of the state, women’s rights have become one of the PKK’s main priorities (14). Approach to Resistance and Capabilities The PKK has engaged in armed attacks targeting Turkish military and police forces, bombings of government buildings and public spaces, as well as assassinations and kidnappings of Turkish officials and civilians. Employing guerrilla tactics like hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers, the PKK operates predominantly from the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. The rugged terrain provides them with strategic advantages and poses logistical challenges for the Turkish military (1). Although he is unable to directly run the organization, Öcalan remains the PKK’s leader despite his imprisonment and continues to influence its ideology and practices. He has written several books while in prison. The organization is currently co-ran by Besê Hozat and Cemîl Bayik. Many positions in the PKK have equivalents for men and women to ensure gender equality within the organization. Its paramilitary wing, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), is led by Murat Karayılan who was one of the organization’s founders alongside Öcalan. Karayılan was the acting head of the PKK from Öcalan’s arrest until Hozat and Bayik were instated in 2013 (15). The PKK also maintains a women’s armed unit, the Free Women’s Units (YJA-STAR). Both the HPG and YJA-STAR have seen action against ISIS in Rojava. Today, the PKK has around 5,000 core members (16). The Turkish government has long been hostile towards pro-Kurdish organizations of any kind, stripping the PKK and other such groups of a chance to gain legitimate political representation. However, several parties in the Turkish parliament sympathize with the PKK despite the government’s ban on it, the largest of which being the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). The HDP shares many of the PKK’s left-wing and pro-Kurdish tendencies but takes a much less hardline stance (8). Pro-Kurdish politicians such as Leyla Zana have been jailed for allegedly supporting the PKK. Zana, a Kurdish member of the Turkish parliament, was a member of the Democracy Party before joining the HDP. Her party was banned in 1994 after Zana said the last sentence of her oath of office in Kurdish and she was subsequently sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of being a member of the PKK. However, she was released after ten years of imprisonment due to pressures from the European Court of Human Rights (15). Because of their mass displacement due to war and terror, there is a large Kurdish population in countries like Germany, where there are over a million Kurds. The Kurdish diaspora in Europe has had the freedom to form political and cultural groups unlike in their home countries. Some of these, such as student groups like the Association of Students from Kurdistan and bands like Koma Berxwedan, have ties to the PKK and work to spread their message internationally (17) (18). Relations and Alliances The role of the PKK and Öcalan in the conflict with Turkey has been heavily disputed. In recent years they have distanced themselves from terrorist activities and adapted to a more diplomatic model. The PKK and other such underground groups have also been one of the few vehicles for Kurdish political action, since legal parties have been frequently banned. Despite the fact that the Kurds have been deprived of any political tools but violence, the PKK has often reached out in attempts to make peace with the Turkish government to no avail. In the early 2000s, the PKK attempted to legitimize itself but remained persecuted by Turkey. The Turkish government doubled back on peace processes in 1999 and 2009, only after the PKK began to disarm. Much of the fraught peace process and their hostility towards the Kurds can be attributed to the larger problems of democracy and political violence in Turkey (1). The Syrian Assad regime once backed the PKK and allowed the organization to base its operations in the country, but their support ended in 1999 after threats of a Turkish invasion to eliminate PKK strongholds. This forced Öcalan to flee Syria, leading to his arrest (1). The PKK has been involved in the Syrian Civil War since the beginning of conflict in 2011, supporting the YPG and the other members of the SDF. Turkey labels the YPG as a terrorist organization due to its links with the PKK and has launched numerous military operations against the group in Syria. The PKK has backed the SDF in its fight against ISIS, who the SDF has played a key role in regulating the advancement of in the region (3). The PKK has had a presence in the Kurdish region of Iraq since the 1980s, where it established bases in the mountainous regions of the north. The group has occasionally clashed with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq, which has sought to maintain good relations with Turkey (19). However, the PKK has also cooperated with Iraqi forces in the fight against ISIS. In Iran, the PKK's presence is much smaller than in Turkey, Syria, or Iraq. However, the group has occasionally carried out attacks against Iranian security forces in the Kurdish areas of western Iran (1). The state of Israel, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netenyahu, has expressed support for the Kurdish cause. While Israel has officially condemned the PKK, their pro-Kurdish stance may be inspired by Turkey’s support of Hamas. However, the PKK is staunchly anti-Israel and it has supported the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Moreover, Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency participated in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 (20). Besides Turkey, the United States, Canada, the European Union, Australia, and the United Kingdom all classify the PKK as a terrorist group. However, this designation is controversial, as the PKK’s supporters argue that it is a legitimate political organization and that the Turkish government has labeled them terrorists to justify further persecution of the Kurds. The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled twice against the EU’s classification (21). The PKK is a member of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and the Peoples' United Revolutionary Movement (HBDH), both alliances of various pro-Kurdish and/or left-wing groups with common goals. The KCK, founded in 2005, is a coalition of four Kurdish political organizations, one from each country within Kurdistan, with the aim of promoting Kurdish rights and autonomy across the region. Besides the PKK, the KCK consists of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, the Iraqi Kurdistan Free Life Party, and the Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (8). Meanwhile, the HBDH brings together a number of far-left parties in Turkey with the goal of overthrowing the ruling AKP government and President Recep Erdoğan. Some members are Kurdish nationalists, whereas others are various strands of Marxists (13). The PKK has also frequently clashed with the Grey Wolves, a Turkish ultra-nationalist paramilitary organization. Because of the militant nature of both groups, tensions have frequently erupted into violence. The Grey Wolves have targeted Kurdish civilians and political enemies, using support for the PKK as a pretext for violence. This has resulted in the deaths of some 6,000 Kurds since the 1970s. They have also attacked left-wing political opponents, such as the HDP, because of their alleged support of the PKK. Some claim that the Turkish government provides impunity to the Grey Wolves because of their mutual goals and political connections within the government (22). The conflict between the two groups has served as a focal point for larger issues in Turkey, as they both play key roles within the country’s political climate and hold extremist positions on opposite ends of the spectrum. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Anarcho-Communist Combat Organization (BOAK) is a group of far-left activists currently engaged in anti-war activities against the Russian and Belarussian states. Though its exact date of origin is unclear, BOAK has gained attention since the March 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine for its role in attacking recruitment offices, sabotaging railways, and spreading anti-Putin rhetoric. Additionally, BOAK advocates for the end of capitalism and state rule, with the aim of creating a decentralized democratic system in its place. Though nobody knows their exact strength or numbers, it is clear by their ability to carry out and inspire attacks in Russia and Belarus that they are well organized and capable of standing in the way of what they perceive as Putin’s expansionist ambitions. History & Foundations Russia and Eastern Europe have an anarchist political current dating back the middle of the 19th century. The Russian theorist Mikhail Bakunin is considered one of the founders and most influential activists in the anarchist movement. It is this anarchist tradition that BOAK embodies today. By some accounts, BOAK has existed for at least ten years. During most of this time, it was busy organizing, gaining material, and trying to spread its message (1). Finally, with the Russian invasion of U kraine in February 2022, they decided it was the time to increase their visibility to gain support for the anti-war movement and organize attacks against elements critical to the war effort. As one BOAK partisan said, “if not now, then when?” (2). As the war began to rage, the group escalated violence against the war effort both in Belarus and Russia, with attacks reported from Vladivostok in the east to Rostov-on-Don in the west. BOAK’s claimed attacks include the sabotage of a railway line in November 2022 and the burning of an FSB (the Russian secret police) office in April 2023, among many others. The actions help to demonstrate that there are Russians who do not support the war in Ukraine and are willing to take drastic action to demonstrate this. (3) Ideology & Objectives As their name states, BOAK adheres to anarcho-communism. As opposed to the state-centered, top-down communism implemented in the former Soviet Union and other states, anarcho-communism seeks a highly decentralized, stateless system, where hierarchies are abolished, people rule via direct democracy, and goods are communally owned and distributed (4). This puts them at odds with the Russian Communist Party, which embraces Stalinism and has largely been supportive of the invasion. (5) Worried that a victory for Russia in Ukraine would be a triumph for reactionary elements in their home countries, BOAK is willing to work with other, ideologically different groups to bring down the governments of Putin and Lukashenko. One BOAK activist hopes that “maybe the libertarian idea of confederation can gain some grounds, since the bloody horror we experience now is a direct result of oppressive and unjust social models of the Empire and the Nation State.” (6) Military & Political Capabilities BOAK operates within the suffocating political environment of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Long prison sentences and torture are not uncommon for arrested dissenters. Many, including former President Dimitry Medvedev, have called for the death penalty for those caught committing acts of sabotage. (7) Despite this, BOAK is undeterred. They continue to spread their message using various social media platforms and pages. Most commonly, they use Telegram to spread videos of their attacks and methods of sabotage, hoping to inspire and aid others in acts of resistance. BOAK manages to be a thorn in Moscow’s side using rudimentary methods of sabotage and simple tools. To derail and delay trains vital to the Russian war effort, the activists claim to only have used tools available at any hardware store. Arson attacks are frequently carried out using Molotov cocktails or other easily homemade bombs. Members of the group have also stated that they are unafraid of using firearms. (8) The group is composed of many cells of varying size and name, but the central cell helps plan movements and distribute funds. BOAK follows a “horizontal command structure,” with decisions being made democratically.(9) Approach to Resistance BOAK see themselves as descendants of the Belarusian partisan movement. Inspired by those who took to the woods to combat invading fascist armies, BOAK carried out acts of violence in support of the Ukrainian war effort. At the beginning of the invasion, BOAK claimed responsibility for attacks against cell towers near the border. BOAK plays a significant role in the rail war, damaging train tracks near Russian military bases. Other videos show them lighting recruitment offices and vehicles marked with “Z” (a symbol used on many Russian military vehicles which has become symbol for supporting Putin’s actions) on fire across the country. (10) Several hundred attacks have been reported since the Russian invasion began, though how many can be contributed to BOAK and its associates is unknown. The group utilizes Wikimapia, an open-source tool that includes more in-depth descriptions and labels of locations than general mapping applications to select targets. (11) International Relations & Potential Alliances While it supports Ukraine in its war against Russia, it is unknown whether BOAK receives funds or training from any elements within the Ukrainian state. The group rebuffs claims that they are supported by the CIA, with one member stating that they would be using much more sophisticated methods and weapons if they were. Forming ties with various governments could prove difficult, given BOAK’s anti-state ideology, but members have commented that they are in contact with other anarchist cells within Europe. (12) Though the group does not have any known links to organizations outside of eastern Europe, they have carried out attacks in solidarity with movements globally. In 2019, BOAK claimed responsibility for attacking a cellphone tower owned by a Turkish company in response to Turkey’s offensive against the Kurdish region of Syria known as Rojava. (13) In one interview, a BOAK activist affirmed their support of “all fellow anarchist and other anti-authoritarian revolutionaries, struggling for freedom and justice worldwide. (14) Regardless of international support, BOAK will most likely continue to carry out acts of resistance. Many of them could face torture, or worse, death if apprehended. For them, the risk is worth it in order to achieve the revolution they claim is necessary. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Conspiracy of the Cells of Fire Nuclei (CCF), known in Greece as Synomosía Pyrínon tis Fotiás (Συνωμοσία Πυρήνων της Φωτιάς) (SPF) is an anarcho-nihilist urban guerilla group of Greek origin that has grown into a worldwide network of anarchist cells. (1) With operatives laying claim to attacks in Germany, Chile and Indonesia, the network is shrouded in secrecy, resulting in a terrorist entity designation by the US Department of State. In a 2012 statement, Europol also claimed that the “[CCF are] the pioneers of urban conflict and coordinators of armed anarchist groups in many countries worldwide.”(2) (3) (4) The CCF became operative on January 21st 2008 through a series of coordinated firebomb attacks on Athenian banks and luxury car dealerships, in solidarity with imprisoned “anti-authoritarian conscience brigade” anarchist Vangelis Botzatzis. Despite its origins in anarchist ideology, the CCF does not sympathise with the working class and instead focuses on the importance of the ‘individual urban guerilla’ to spark a revolution against consumer society, the military-police complex, mass media, and modern power structures. (5) The CCF’s lack of an organisational hierarchy and the fluidity of its communiqués has enabled the group and its splinter cells to stay largely in the shadows since the arrests and imprisonments of its founding or ‘first phase’ members between 2010 and 2013. (6) Nevertheless, recent attacks tracing back to 2017 highlight that the group is far from dormant. (7) History & Foundations Greece has long been a bastion of anarchist activity. For instance, the Second World War saw divisions of the Greek Communist Party, the National Liberation Front (EAM) and the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELA), spearhead an urban militancy against Greece’s Nazi/Fascist Occupiers. (8) However, the seeds of contemporary Greek anarchy had been sown under the administrations of Anti-Communist Junta leader Colonel George Papadopoulos (1967-1973) and later Prime Minister-turned-President Konstantinos Karamanlis (1974-1995). Political modernization, or ‘metapolitefsi’ – the loosening of restrictions on leftist literature – introduced Greece’s affluent and educated youth to radical and leftist concepts which had once been outlawed under Colonel Papadopoulos’ junta. (9) Furthermore, the excessive use of force by Greek Government forces on protesting students only amplified the youth's discontent with their nation’s leadership. (10) By the mid to late 2000s, economic downturn and political crises had once again thrown Greece into social turmoil. The Conspiracy of the Fire Cells' first attack came at midnight on the 21st of January 2008, when a series of firebombs struck various banks, power company vehicles, and luxury car dealerships within a 30-minute window. (11) After the initial fire-bombing spree, CCF claimed one arson attack per month. (12) Furthermore, the killing of 15-year-old Athens Polytechnic student Alexis Grigoropoulos by a Greek police officer on December 6th 2008 not only led to massive protests in Athens and the surrounding areas but also triggered the CCF to ramp up its militancy. (13) Between 2009 and 2017, the CCF targeted the homes and offices of Greek politicians, EU officials, and various embassies with parcel bombs or arson attacks. (14) Objectives & Ideology Often referred to as ‘anarcho-nihilists’, the absolute ideology of the CCF is unclear as each communiqué (often posted through their platform, Athens.Indymedia.org) is penned by a different member of the organisation. (15) This results in a fluid ideology that touches on what they perceive as the failings of the ‘apathetic masses’, the crimes of the capitalist state, and most importantly, the need to facilitate revolution, arm in arm with the ‘Informal Anarchist Federation’. (16) The CCF is also known as ‘The Conspiracy of the Fire Cells Nuclei’ because it sees itself as the nucleus of an autonomous cell network and aims to rouse these various cells to action through its publications, such as ‘The Sun Still Rises” and “The Black International”. (17) The CCF’s disregard for hierarchical organisational structure has proven relatively effective, with arson attacks occurring against ATMs in Indonesia, a Greek diplomat's car in Germany, as well as a parcel bomb attack on a Subway in Chile. (18) Essentially, this structure (which is a structural manifestation of its core ideology) has enabled its values and intentions to spread internationally. Military/Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance As Anarcho-Nihilists, CCF members do not believe in discourse with ‘the enemy’ and thus rely on ‘hit and run’ attacks. (19) As aforementioned, improvised explosive/incendiary devices are the methods most often used by the group. However, members have also taken part in armed robberies. (20) Additionally, after a raid on a CCF safe house in Halandria, a large arsenal of small arms, explosives, phones and cash was seized, including 50 kilos of ANFO explosive, 3 Scorpion submachine guns, an RPG and three HEAT warheads. (21) (22) In 2017, a letterbomb was intercepted before it was received by Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble. Later that year, another letterbomb addressed to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) European representative, Jeffery Franks, detonated in the IMF’s Paris office. Again, in May 2017, Former Greek Prime Minister Lucas Papademos and two members of his security detail were wounded after a letterbomb exploded in his vehicle. (23) All three attacks were claimed by the Conspiracy of the Fire Cells, which brings to light the fact that, despite the imprisonment of CCF’s founding members between 2010 and 2013, the group has not only expanded its reach but also seemingly been able to avoid police detection. International Relations & Potential Alliances The Conspiracy of the Fire Cells is often thought to occasionally work in conjunction with “The Sect of Revolutionaries” another Greek anarchist group active in the early to mid-2010s. (24) Additionally, CCF's decentralised nature makes it increasingly difficult to identify the size of its forces and how far its global reach is. Nonetheless, it is clear that there is some civilian support for the group in Greece (most likely due to the fact that CCF does not target civilians), particularly in the Athens neighbourhood of Exarcheia, as the former home to the EAM and ELA during the Second World War it is often described as Greece’s “anarchist bastion”. (25) It must also be noted that the CCF has allied directly with the Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI) in Italy. Both groups have adopted a wider name – the ‘International Revolutionary Front’ – by which they underline and promote their international coordination. They often claim each other’s attacks in a symbol of unity, to show that they act together. Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag of the Niger Delta Avengers, but rather a reproduction containing the flag of Biafra (as this separatist cause overlaps with the ideology of the NDA). Insurgency Overview The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is a militant organization operating in the Niger Delta Region since 2016. The NDA’s goal is to reallocate control of the region’s vast oil blocks to the Niger Delta people by crippling Multinational Oil Company (OMNC) infrastructure, notably in the hopes of bringing the Nigerian government to the negotiation table. Deeming the control of these oil blocks to be a crucial step towards obtaining autonomy and self-determination for the region, the NDA has adopted an array of violent tactics to hamper OMNC operations (1). Although a majority of the group’s operations are violent, the NDA claims they do not intend to harm any personnel (civilian or military) (2). History & Foundations The Niger Delta (ND) region has been an area of contention since the discovery of oil in the 1950s during the country’s transition into an independent state. As the Niger Delta region constitutes a minority of the nation's population while being responsible for a majority of its economic growth, disputes over oil reserve ownership have led to the outbreak of conflicts and wars. Quickly, insurgent groups began to sprout up throughout the decades. In 1966, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) demanded independence for the ND region and called for negotiations between the NDVF and OMNCs while neglecting to involve the Nigerian government. The NDVF fell apart shortly after its inception when leaders of the movement were imprisoned and sentenced to death by Niger Security Forces, although they would later be released during the outbreak of the Biafra War. Despite the Biafra War having ended in the 1970s, this breaking point would plunge the country into a period of continuous conflict. In the mid-2000s, another group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) would once again propose an independent Niger Delta. The MEND insurgency set the doctrinal foundation for modern insurgent groups fighting for the ND region’s independence. Although the MEND never officially ceased its operations, the group has not been reported to carry out operations since 2013. The reason for the lack of MEND operations can be attributed to the creation of the Nigerian government’s Joint Task Force (JTF) formed to combat insurgency in the ND region and the implementation of the Presidential Amnesty Program, which was designed to reintegrate surrendered militants into the working class with no consequences for their involvement with insurgent groups such as MEND (3). While the JTF and Amnesty program may have helped limit the actions of insurgent groups in the ND region, they did little to fix the economic issues for the people living in the area. In response to the continuing disenfranchisement of the ND region, the NDA formed to follow in the footsteps of MEND in January 2016 (4). Objectives & Ideology Seeing control of the vast oil blocks in the Niger Delta region as the population’s only way to escape poverty and oppression, the NDA has taken it upon themselves to rid the area of OMNC influence by force. Not wanting to harm any individuals in their fight for self-determination, the NDA only targets oil manufacturing infrastructure in the hopes of crippling the Nigerian economy. This comes from the belief that the Nigerian government will be forced to negotiate with the NDA if the economy becomes unstable enough. The NDA hopes that these negotiations will result in the people of the Niger Delta getting a share of the profits generated from oil production (5). Military Capabilities & Approach to Resistance While the NDA may not be as extensive as previous ND region insurgent groups such as the MEND, the group has still conducted successful operations throughout the 14,000 square-mile region. This is primarily due to the NDA’s implementation of small teams of up to ten militants, which they label ‘strike teams’. While it is unclear how many strike teams are under NDA command, seven strike teams have reportedly conducted operations around the ND region. These strike teams are specially trained and equipped to perform sabotage operations against OMNC infrastructure using small arms and explosives to disrupt oil production and transportation. A majority of these sabotage operations only focus on a single target, such as a section of pipeline used to transport oil, and only require one strike team to carry out the operation. However, on operations that require several targets to be hit simultaneously, multiple strike teams may be dispatched to the area (6). Over the span of 2016, the NDA carried out around forty separate attacks. Despite the NDA’s attempts to prevent harming personnel, small skirmishes have broken out during their guerilla-style hit-and-run attacks and JTF attacks on NDA strongholds, reportedly claiming the lives of at least thirty-six individuals, including civilians and Nigerian government personnel (7). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Syriac Union Party (ܓܒܐ ܕܚܘܝܕܐ ܣܘܪܝܝܐ - SUP) is an Assyrian/Syriac political organisation and political party which represents the Assyrian population of Syria. The SUP's political position is generally described as being left-wing, notably through the ideological movement also known as Dawronoye (Drott, 2015). Dawronoye is a secular, leftist, national liberation movement which is characterised by its progressive ideals and socialist themes. Since the start of the Syrian civil war, it has aligned itself with the socialist and federalist forces present in Rojava as they have similar aims to the Syriac Union Party. Founded on the 1st of October 2005, the SUP has been heavily repressed by the Assad-led Syrian government and multiple members have been kidnapped and allegedly tortured by government security forces (Illarietti, 2014). History & Foundations The party was created in order to represent the interests of the Assyrian population in Syria in October of 2005. The SUP set up the Syriac Military Council (ܡܘܬܒܐ ܦܘܠܚܝܐ ܣܘܪܝܝܐ - MFS) in January of 2013, which has the stated goal of standing up for the national rights of and to protect Assyrians in Syria (Khalel and Vickery, 2015). The SUP has also set up the Sutoro police force in an attempt to protect the wider Assyrian communities which are present within their settlements in Northeastern Syria. This police force has been integrated within the general Asayish police forces of the Jazira Region (Drott, 2013). Since its inception, the SUP has been heavily persecuted by the Assad government. Several members of the group have been arrested and imprisoned, including SUP Vice-president Said Malki Cosar who was detained in Qamishli after a visit from Switzerland. Following these events, he has not been tried in court and contact with him has been lost (Suroye News, 2014). His family was presented with a death certificate which states that he died of a cardiac arrest in Damascus, although the validity of this declaration is being disputed, for they have not been presented with his body (European Syriac Union, 2013). Objectives & Ideology The party has several stated objectives and ideological positions, including protecting and advancing the interests of Assyrian/Syriac people, the aforementioned Dawronoye ideological movement, and also Syrian federalism. The SUP's goal of advancing Assyrian/Syriac interests comes from the fact that they have been historically discriminated against in Syrian politics and in the wider Syrian Society. In essence, the involvement of the SUP in the Rojavan political system is an attempt to gain access to a previously shut off political sphere. Through their involvement with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Syrian Democratic Council (which is the SDF's political wing) in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), they have been able to advance their interests and they currently hold 3 of the 43 seats available within the Democratic Council (Syrian Democratic Council). Dawronoye is another ideological position which the SUP has adopted. It is a secular, leftist, national liberation movement which is widely popular amongst the Assyrian people. The roots of this ideology can be traced back to the late 1980s (Drott, 2015), although its more recent materialisation is controversial due to its ties to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The SUP has been criticised for aiding the PYD and its military forces in the Rojava area by essentially backing up the ethnocentric policies which Rojavan politics is centred on, as well as allowing themselves to effectively be utilised as propaganda pieces to show the ‘ethnically-inclusive’ nature of Rojavan/Kurdish politics (Joseph and Isaac, 2018). Military & Political Abilities Due to its status as a political party, the Syriac Union Party has little to no military capabilities and instead has been peaceful in its operations. The SUP, however, has set up the Syriac Military Council (MFS) -- an Assyrian/Syriac military organisation which is a part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Estimated to have a membership of over 2000 fighters, they have suffered few casualties in the fight against the Islamic State and other enemy combatant groups, especially due to their high level of training which they received from the YPG and also former Swiss officer Johan Cosar (Hackensberger, 2015). Cosar was arrested and has been found guilty of undermining Switzerland's neutrality and security by joining a foreign army and was given a three month suspended sentence and a fine (Foulkes, 2019). The MFS operates primarily in areas which are heavily populated by the Assyrian people, such as the Al-Hasakah Governorate, and has taken part in numerous operations, including the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani and the Manbij offensive, both of which aimed to cut off the Islamic State from its external supply lines in Turkey (de Jong, 2016). Approach to Resistance The SUP is not a violent organisation and is aimed rather at establishing a legitimate political presence within the AANES and by extension, Syrian politics as a whole. Although it has established the Syriac Military Council and the Sutoro police force in order to assist the SDF and the YPG in their military operations, the SUP is not capable of military operations due to its inception as a political party. However and as seen by their presence on Facebook (seen here), the SUP regularly hosts discussion panels, expert debates, and other social events. This is the main way through which the SUP raises awareness on its political struggle. International Relations & Potential Alliances The SUP has international links due to an extensive diaspora network established during the founding of the Dawronoye ideology in the late 1980s. Evidence of this includes the protest by members of the SUP in Sweden in 2012 in which they stormed the Syrian embassy and were subsequently arrested after calling for democracy in Syria (Malcolm, 2012). The SUP has also met with and held talks with members of the Assyrian Democratic Party in Syria regarding how important it is that close cooperation between members of the AANES occurs, especially in regards to the Assyrian/Syriac people (Syriac Union Party, 2023). The SUP has extensive national (Syrian) links and alliances to the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and by extension its armed wing (the YPG) due to its close military cooperation through the Syriac Military Council's membership of the SDF. The group also has connective links to the PYD, as it is a member of the Syrian Democratic Council which is a constituent party of the AANES (Al Jazeera, 2015). Additional Resources