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Note: This is not the official flag of the Arrow Boys, but rather a reproduction containing the flag of South Sudan (as this is the country they are active in). Insurgency Overview The Arrow Boys are a South Sudanese-based militia known for their usage of traditional bow and arrow weaponry. Originally formed in the mid-2000s (Schomerus, 2017, p7), the term ‘Arrow Boys' is used to designate community-based-protection militias based in the Western Equatoria region of South Sudan. They are a self-defence militia formed in response to the ongoing Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in South Sudan and the wider Congo border area (Schomerus, 2017, p8). These groups are not militarily offensive in nature but rather have been formed in order to repulse attacks on their villages and their farmland by the LRA (UNMIS, 2009). Due to an increase in attacks, several religious leaders from the Great Lakes Region, especially the two bishops of the Yambio Episcopan Church in Sudan (ECS), have successfully campaigned for the Arrow Boys to receive modern arms and official training from the South Sudanese government. This is through the allocation of over 5 million Sudanese Pounds (over USD $2 million) from the government's state budget in order to more effectively fight against the LRA in South Sudan (Ruati, 2010). History & Foundations Originally formed in 2005, the Arrow Boys are a loose grouping of militia organisations from varying villages in the Western Equatoria region of South Sudan. Created in order to combat the abduction of local children by the Lord's Resistance Army, they have fought back using traditional bow and arrow weaponry (and hence their name). They are being utilised as a non-traditional approach to combating the LRA threat in the region by the local government as they are mobile and “they can move at night and go to locations where the soldiers can't go” (UNMIS, 2009). Their style of weaponry is also additionally not inhibited by terrain and provisions as they can replenish their arms in the natural environment, something that the LRA struggles with in the region. Although they have historically used traditional weapons, they are being given modern arms and training (Ruati, 2010). Originally created in Teso in the Eastern Region of Uganda, they were so effective at combating the Lord's Resistance Army led by Joseph Kony, that he was forced to flee and abandon operations in Teso as a whole (Castelein, 2014). Objectives & Ideology Although not subscribing to any particular set of ideologies, the Arrow Boys are instead a self-defence militia aimed at defending villages and farmland. This lack of an overarching ideology has not impeded their fight against the LRA and instead may have allowed them to unify against a common threat. This unification against the LRA threat has provided the Arrow Boys with an objective, which is to simply defend against, and remove the LRA, from areas which they occupy. Military/Political Abilities The group does not follow a traditional military formation or structure. Instead, it is composed of village ‘cells’ which defend against raids and attacks by the LRA, henceforth signifying that their military abilities are somewhat limited by their overreliance and usage of traditional weapons. Their use of the bow and arrow is quite peculiar, for they coat their arrows with a thick black powder which is believed to be poisonous (UNMIS, 2009). The Arrow Boys have also been spotted using clubs as weapons. Despite their lack of structure (compliant with the traditional structure of designated units led by an officer, for example), the Arrow Boys have not suffered from a lack of results. Their success has subsequently led to their utilisation by the local government to great effect. Indeed, their flexible militia-based approach to fighting allows them to “go to locations that soldiers cannot go to” (UNMIS, 2009). Due to their unofficial status they are bound by little to no legal basis and therefore their ability to enter areas is uninhibited by law as the military approach does not “always yield success” (Ikelegbe and Okumu, 2010, p27). As they are a community militia with a ‘lack’ of structure they have not been used as a combatant force by the government and instead are self-reliant and not a part of the government's military structure. This prevents them from being used as a combatant force through official channels, however with the emergence of new security threats and deteriorating security in Sudan they may be integrated into the official state structure in a similar fashion to the RSF (Rapid Support Forces) in Sudan. Approach to Resistance Although the Arrow Boys employ violent tactics, its use of violence is not offensive in nature and instead finds its roots in its self-defence oriented organisation. The group is involved in the tracking of LRA forces and the subsequent removal of them from land near encampments inhabited by villagers (Snapp, 2010). Consisting of mainly farmers from an area that saw “little fighting” in the North-South civil war in Sudan, they are not a formal militia organisation (Heaton, 2010). As such, their approach to resistance has been hindered by a lack of coordination amongst themselves and also through a lack of coordination with the armed forces of South Sudan. In recent years, the group’s responsibilities and operations have expanded beyond solely combatting the LRA. The Arrow Boys have now also taken on the policing of local areas – a change in their objectives which has raised concerns about the potential over-reliance upon them by the South Sudanese government (Heaton, 2010). The willingness to police their own areas has emerged out of a lack of resources for the official police forces who are stretched thinly and may not be able to respond effectively; however there are initiatives in place in order to increase the cooperation between local peoples and the police (UNMISS, 2014). International Relations & Potential Alliances The group has no international relations owing to its formation as a local self-defence militia group. Instead, the group has allied itself to the South Sudanese government in order to secure backing (both capital and kinetic), arms, and training which could help them to defend their local areas even more effectively. The provision of arms to the Arrow Boys has been undertaken by the government and this indicates a widening level of support that the group has been given by the central authorities (Ruati, 2010). However, due to the Arrow Boys’ militia formation and the central government’s overreliance upon them to police local areas, the concern is that they may be exploited by rival powers such as the Khartoum-based Sudanese government. The emergence of a potential civil war in Sudan has effectively sidelined any potential interference within South Sudanese internal politics by the Sudanese government as they are more concerned with dealing with the insurrection threat posed by the RSF. Instead, large amounts of Sudanese refugees have fled into South Sudan which will pose a problem for the country, which already faces large famine and droughts regularly (Reuters, 2023). This aforementioned worry arises out of a concern that, when the LRA threat in South Sudan is reduced to a negligible amount, then the Arrow Boys will no longer be needed and will potentially be disarmed. This could hence potentially lead to exploitable tensions in the region (Heaton, 2010). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Exiled from their homeland following their defeat in the Second Chechen War in 2009, the Jihadist fighters of Ajnad al-Kavkaz (Soldiers of the Caucasus) are willing to fight the Russian Federation and its allies anywhere they go. Formed from the unification of two other Jihadist factions in 2015, Ajnad al-Kavkaz have fought against regime loyalists in Syria and on the side of Ukraine since the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion. The group seeks to expel Russia from Chechnya and to overthrow its current government of Razman Kadyrov. It is led by Rustam Azhiev, who goes by the nom-de-guerre Abdul Hakim al-Shishani. History & Foundations When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, several of the formerly Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics sought greater rights or independence from Russia. Moscow was able to appease most regions, integrating them into the Russian Federation. One holdout was Chechnya, who declared independence as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and held off an invasion by Russian forces between 1994 and 1996 (1). Following a series of bomb blasts (which many believe to be false flags carried out by the FSB) and an invasion of neighboring Dagestan by Chechen Islamists, Russia attempted to recapture the country again in 1999. This time they would be successful, though small-scale fighting continued all the way up to 2009 (2). Today, Chechnya acts as a Russian satellite. Ruled by the pro-Russian dictator Razman Kadyrov, it has participated in the Russian war against Ukraine. Following the defeat of the Ichkerian forces, many of its fighters sought refuge in Turkey and Syria. One such man was Rustam Azhiev, who lost three fingers in the conflict and like others hoped there would be a chance for revenge against Russia (3). When the civil war began in Syria, Azhiev was the leader of Jamaat al-Khilafa al-Qawqazia which merged with Jamaat Jund al-Qawqaz to form Ajnad al-Kavkaz (AK) in 2015. The group participated in fighting against the forces of Bashar al-Assad and Russia, particularly in Latakia and Idlib (4). As the war evolved, Syria would become a less hospitable environment for AK. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the dominant Jihadist faction in northwestern Syria, began consolidating power, leaving little space for other groups to operate. Now at odds with HTS and feeling threatened, Azhiev and others decided to take their fight with Russia elsewhere. In 2022, several AK members arrived in Ukraine to join the foreign legion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (5). While there, Azhiev was appointed deputy commander of the Ichkerian military in exile (6). Ideology & Objectives Ajnad al-Kavkaz follows a Sunni fundamentalist ideology; Azhiev states the group’s goal is to “establish the religion of Allah and live according to the precepts of Allah everywhere." Mainly, this means instituting a strict interpretation of Sharia Law, upholding Islamic principles of morality, and establishing a state that follows and enforces these principles (7). The group was previously allied with other Jihadist groups in Syria such as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly called Jabat al-Nusra, an Al-Qaeda affiliate) and Ahrar al-Sham. This also meant that AK found itself on the opposite side from Shia Islamist groups such as Hezbollah, which supported the Assad regime. Azhiev also voiced complaints that the Islamic State received too much support, lamenting that “Islamic humanitarian organizations accused of supporting jihad don’t help the Chechens." (8) Political & Military Capabilities According to one Idlib-based journalist, the group did not involve itself in political affairs too much in Syria. Even had it wanted to, the group would have been constrained by HTS’ crackdown on other factions in Idlib. Many of its allies have been arrested or been killed by American drones. (9) In 2016, Ajnad al-Kavkaz boasted over 100 members (10). How many members the group currently has and how many members have relocated to Ukraine is unknown. While videos from the group in Syria show mostly the use of small arms, there is a chance they have their hands on a greater range of equipment in Syria. This video taken of Azhiev fighting in Bakhmut, Ukraine shows him firing an AT4 anti-tank launcher, but whether they have trained on more advanced equipment is unknown. Approach to Resistance AK’s main focus is on military confrontation. Azhiev hopes Chechens will be able to return to Chechnya and expel Russia once and for all (11). Despite the group's previous ties with other Jihadist organizations, he has objected to being labeled as a terrorist group, stating “we want to overthrow tyranny. That’s all.” (12) Both the first and second Chechen wars saw heavy fighting over the capital of Grozny before transitioning to longer periods of mountainous fighting. With their experience in the asymmetric conflict in Syria and more conventional war in Ukraine, AK fighters could be quite formidable and likely make up many of the key leadership positions if war renewed in Chechnya itself. International Relations Though members of AK fight in the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ Foreign Legion alongside other Chechen fighters, getting all the various groups to cooperate and gaining further support from international powers could prove difficult (13). Europe and the United States would be hesitant to support a Jihadist organization, even one that rejects targeting civilians as much as AK claims to. Given circumstances in Syria, it seems unlikely its fighters could return to the country and feel the same security to operate as they had previously. For the moment, AK fighters and other non-AK Chechen militants are welcomed in Ukraine. Where they can go if fighting in Ukraine comes to an end, whether they will be allowed to stay, and who would come to their side in the event of an uprising in Chechnya, are all questions that can only be answered with time. But Azhiev allying with Ichkerian Prime Minister in exile, in addition to other figures, and becoming a key military figure demonstrates the continued Chechen resolve for independence (14). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Patani United Liberation Organisation or PULO is a Malay-Muslim separatist movement mainly operating in Southern Thailand. The group was founded by a Patani Malay scholar named Kabir Abdul Rahman in 1968. PULO views the Thai government as colonisers of their land, so they aim to establish an independent Patani and improve the living conditions of Malay Muslims. To achieve that goal, PULO carry out bombings and drive-by shootings that target anyone they think is working or allied with the central government. Since its establishment, PULO has grown into one of the biggest and most influential insurgencies in Southern Thailand (1). History & Foundations After the collapse of the Sultanate of Patani, there has been a growing negative sentiment among Malay Muslims toward the Thai Government due to alleged discrimination and inequality. This sentiment grew Kabir Abdul Rahman’s motivation to improve Malay Muslim’s living conditions and liberate them from the oppression of the Thai Government (2). Thus, Kabir formed the Patani United Liberation Organisation in 1968 based on those principles. Kabir would serve as the group’s leader from its founding till his death in 2008. Despite having Patani in its name, PULO operates in every Southern Thailand province including Yala, Satun, and Narathiwat. The operations in the area are divided into two; the first one is by way of violence and the second is by teaching lessons of the Quran and the history of the ethnic Malay Muslims. PULO acts as an umbrella organisation for the insurgencies in Southern Thailand, acting as a bridge between Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) and the National Liberation Front of Patani (NLFP) (3). The group also does not restrict the number of members and leaders that they have and tend to give its members the freedom to affiliate with groups outside of PULO (4). During the 90s, PULO scattered into two factions which are the PULO Leadership Council, led by Dr. A-rong Muleng, and the PULO Army Command Council under the leadership of Hayihadi Mindosali (5). In 1998, Thai authorities arrested numerous PULO leaders for their terrorist activities in the past. Those arrests led to a drop in morale among its members, with many leaving PULO for good, while some even surrendered to the authorities in order to be granted amnesty (6). This rough period for the group triggered them to rethink their internal relations and recruiting tactics. Following this, terrorist activities in Southern Thailand dropped drastically. Despite being almost crippled during the 90s and early 2000s, PULO would become more violent than ever before between the years 2004-2006 along with other Malay Muslim rebel groups. During that time terrorist attacks in the area averaged 58 per month or two daily attacks, with PULO being responsible for a handful of them (7). This revival of PULO was triggered by the Thai government shutting down an Islamic school named Jihad Wittaya in 2005 (8). It escalated even more when the Thai government began to confiscate the school’s land and assets in 2015. As a result, in 2016, terrorist attacks had a 42% increase (9). Objectives & Ideology Kabir Abdul Rahman perceived inequality and oppression in Southern Thailand to be caused by the Thai government. He also felt that the opposition groups were ineffective in establishing their goals and making a change for the Malay Muslim population. As a result, Kabir created PULO to improve the living conditions of the Malay Muslim people while establishing an independent state called Patani Darussalam (10). PULO does not necessarily have an ideology in a traditional sense. Though they boast their ethnic and religious pride, it does not fall into the category of far-right ultra-nationalists or Islamist extremists either. Rather, they create their own ideology called Ubantapekma which is an abbreviation covering basic principles such as religion, ethnicity, homeland, and humanitarianism (11). These four principles have been the foundation for PULO’s whole operation. More importantly, this ideology resonates with the Malay Muslims in Southern Thailand, regardless of class or status. It has proven to be effective as, at their peak, PULO had managed to garner 350 loyal cadres (12). PULO itself claimed to have been backed by 20,000 cadres (13). Approach to Resistance For PULO, the way to be freed from the “shackles” of the Thai government is through armed struggle and guerilla tactics. They target anyone who is seen as a collaborator of the Thai Government such as schools, public servants, government officials, police stations, military posts, and Buddhist settlers (14). These attacks will mostly come in the form of bombings, drive-by shootings, or arson. Most recently in April 2022, PULO broke the 40-day Ramadhan cease-fire that was initially agreed upon between the BRN and the Thai government. The group carried out two bombings in the Patani district of Sai Buri which killed a villager and injured three police bomb squad (15). The motivation behind the attack was based on dissatisfaction with how PULO was left out of peace talks with the Thai and Malaysian governments. Katsuri Mahkota, the current leader of PULO, told BenarNews that “today’s incidents were carried out by one of our five PULO operation units. It is to say that the Thai peace dialogue panel must negotiate with all groups. Patani doesn’t belong only to the BRN” (16). When the police arrived at the bombsite, they found a flyer with a picture of a black panther that was written “Daulat Tuanku; G5 Askar Di-Raja Patani”, which translates to “Long Live the King; G5 Patani Royal Army”, referencing the sultanate of Patani Darussalam (17). This attack proved to be significant as the PULO had not been active in the last decade. Their last attack was carried out in 2016. PULO is also very active in negotiations with the Thai and Malaysian governments, most notably in the 2013 Kuala Lumpur Talks. That particular event marks the first time the Thai government ever agreed to formally hold peace talks with Southern Thailand’s insurgencies (18). Though BRN was chosen as the representative delegation, members of PULO would attend the talks and even be given two seats at the negotiating table (18). At first, only one of the PULO factions participated in the talks until the National Security Council (NSC) pushed for all three PULO factions to participate in further talks (19), all while emphasising that all Southern Thailand insurgent groups had to be involved in the peace talks. Alliances & Relations Since PULO acts as an umbrella organisation, it is split into different factions that consist of different leaders and serve a variety of roles. During its peak, PULO had 350 loyal cadres under its wing. For example, Dr. A-rong Muleng led the PULO Leadership Council with an armed unit called the Caddan Army (20). Other major factions include the PULO MKP, the current leader’s former faction, which is part of the MARA Pattani coalition that consists of six insurgent groups (21). PULO has allegedly been given a blessing by Parti Islam SeMalaysia, where they are given a safe haven in the northern Malaysian province of Kelantan (22). Since the Ramadhan bombings of 2022, PULO has tainted its relationship with the Thai government and possibly halted any peace talks in the future. However, those bombings also demonstrated that PULO still has the military capability to effectively carry out violent operations. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Sheikh Mansur Battalion (SMB) is a Chechnian volunteer peacekeeping unit fighting for Ukraine since the start of hostilities in the Donbas during the summer of 2014 (1). Named after the Chechnyan military commander and Islamic leader Sheikh Mansur Ushurma, the SMB fights as a part of the Ukrainian Volunteer Corp, claiming that their purpose is to take revenge for ancient grievances that date back to Imperial Russia’s 18th-century conquest of the Caucasus (2). However, due to the nature of the SMB as a volunteer battalion from an Islamic background, fighters with various motives have joined their ranks; these ideologies and backgrounds range from Chechnian War veterans to battle-chasing jihad fighters (3). Despite the SMB’s support throughout the 2014 war in the Donbas, the battalion has faced sanctions from the Ukrainian government, and certain members have been subjected to extradition to Russia (4). History & Foundations After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian hostilities toward the breakaway state of Chechnya turned the Caucasus region into a breeding ground for anti-Russian insurgencies and left countless civilians labeled as refugees. Although Russian media claims that the insurgent actions in Chechnya have died down since 2015, almost weekly attacks, murders, and bombings still continue to occur (5). Intending to unite insurgent groups fighting in the North Caucasus, the emir of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria formed the Caucasus Emirate (CE) in 2006 while Russian presence in the area was at an all time high (6). This Sunni nationalist organization, primarily made up of political refugees from the First and Second Chechnya war, recognized that the situation in Ukraine (during the outbreak of conflict in the Donbas in 2014) was similar to what the CE faced in Chechnya in the early 2000s. Feeling the need to repay a debt to the people of Ukraine who fought to protect Chechnya during their conflict, the CE formed the Dudayev battalion in Denmark in 2014 to fight alongside the Ukrainian military in the Donbas (7). However, the Dudayev battalion would later split to create the SMB to fight on multiple fronts (8). While fighting as part of the Ukrainian Volunteer Force, the SMB opened a pathway for Ukrainian forces to secure the town of Mariupol by retaking the village of Shyrokyne in 2015 (9). As the conflict began to reach a stalemate in 2018, members of the SMB began to face extradition to the Russian Federation, as well as endure sanctions by the Ukrainian government due to their lack of official jurisdiction. The members of the SMB were later accused of criminal actions by Ukrainian media (10). These accusations would lead the SMB to turn in their weapons in 2019, after one of their members, Timur Tumgoev, was extradited to Russian secret service custody and faced a 18-year prison sentence (11). Despite these sanctions and fear of extradition, the SMB would return to the frontlines of Ukraine after the start of Russia’s invasion in 2021, fighting once again as part of the Ukrainian Volunteer Force against Russian aggression (12). Objectives & Ideology Although the SMB’s parent organization, the Caucasus Emirate, has a primary goal of establishing an independent North Caucasus region ruled under Shariah (the organization is committed to the global Jihad movement). While the CE seeks to take back lands beyond the Caucasus that were historically inhabited my Muslim majorities, the SMB’s current goal is solely to support the Ukrainian people in their fight against Russian occupiers, hoping to prevent another former Soviet country from falling under Russian control (13). The SMB’s key motivation in the conflict is to undermine Russia and strengthen ties with their Ukrainian allies. However, the SMB claims that it does not matter if the conflict is in Ukraine or Afghanistan; they will take up arms against Russia wherever they may be (14). Approach to Resistance The SMB maintains a primarily paramilitary structure, allowing them to embark on operations similar to those conducted by other insurgencies in the North Caucasus region, such as mining operations, sabotage missions, partisan warfare, and ambushes (15). Despite the SMB’s relatively low manpower, which is estimated to be made up of more than 100 men, they have still played a key role in bolstering the Ukrainian armed forces’ numbers and level of experience. During the beginning of Russia’s 2022 invasion, the SMB was stationed in Mariupol, taking part in some of the fiercest frontline combat, but would later go to Kyiv to help defend the capital, which they saw as a higher priority (16). After securing the capital during the battle of Kyiv, the SMB continued to push Russian forces back into the Sumy region (17). Eventually, they would return to the Donbas and Luhansk regions to participate in some of the most consequential fights of the war, such as the Battle of Severodonetsk, the Battle of Bakhmut, Battle of Mariupol and the Battle of Soledar (18). International Relations & Alliances Within Ukraine’s Volunteer Force, there are multiple ethnic Muslim battalions with which the SMB shares common goals and historical roots. The vast majority of these battalions are Ukrainian Tatars and Turks who lost their homes in Crimea after the 2014 annexation, such as the Noman Çelebicihan Taburu Battalion and the Devlet Giray Yedek Taqimi (19). The SMB is also working alongside anti-regime fighters from the Syrian group Ajnad al-Kavkaz, who have come to fight in Ukraine due to Russia’s involvement in Syrian conflicts (20). While many Western nations associate Islamophobic ideologies with far-right groups, the SMB has allied with the right-wing paramilitary group Right Sector during their involvement in the 2014 conflict in the Donbas. Another unlikely alliance was formed between the SMB and the Ukrainian Azov Battalion (now Regiment), which most western countries associate with the neo-Nazi movement (21). All in all, it seems that uncommon alliances have been formed in the war in Ukraine, often under the traditional notion that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Hóngkè Union of China (中国红客)(HUC) is a Chinese nationalist hacker group most famously known for defacing the White House website after the Hainan Island Incident in 2001 (1). Their name means “red guest” and is a play on words for the word ‘hacker’, which is a “black guest” – a reference to the English term ‘black hat’, which symbolizes a hacker that violates the law. The color red, moreover, is a reference to the main color of the Chinese Communist Party. Like many hacker groups, such as Anonymous, the HUC is more of a united collective than a hierarchical group. While there is some form of meritocracy within the group, including a master-and-apprentice relationship whereby more experienced hackers guide newcomers forward, there is no unitary command structure (2). In fact, some of the different cells even directly compete with one another (3). At its peak level of activity, there were over 80,000 hackers associated with the HUC, but that number has most likely dropped significantly in modern times (4). History & Foundations The Hóngkè Union’s origins can be traced back to the nationalist Chinese hacker boards that popped up online during the aftermath of the accidental 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Yugoslav Wars, as well as anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia in 1998 (2). The HUC was founded by someone who is only known by a screen name, “Li0n” (4). Their first major action was to take part in what is sometimes referred to as a ‘hacker war’ between China and the US. This was a series of website defacements by nationalist hackers from both countries that took place after 2001’s Hainan Island incident, where an American spy plane and a Chinese interceptor collided over the South China Sea (5)(6)(7). During this so-called hacker war, the HUC famously did a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack on the White House website, where they overwhelmed the site’s servers with access requests so legitimate users could not log onto it. In addition, they took down other U.S. government sites and replaced them with images of Chinese flags and messages such as, “CHINA HACK!” and “Beat down Imperialism of American [sic]! Attack anti-Chinese arrogance!”. Altogether, the HUC (in addition to other, non-affiliated Chinese hackers) hacked over 1,000 American sites (3)(8). The cyber war marked the brief high point of the HUC. This coordinated attack on what was seen as American imperialism helped bring together hackers in one shared goal. Following it, however, disagreements began and the group began to splinter apart. In 2004, just three years after the cyber war, the founder of the HUC, Li0n, announced the group’s disbandment. Many of the hackers involved went on to get legitimate jobs at Chinese corporations (4). Despite the official announcement of disbanding, the HUC still exists in some capacity. In 2012, for example, even though eight years had passed since Li0n’s call for disbanding, 300 Japanese websites were listed as targets on an HUC affiliated website (8). Objectives & Ideology As the Hóngkè Union is a nationalistic group, their ideology matches that of the Chinese Communist Party. Unlike the popular perception of Western hackers, who are often portrayed as individualistic or even anarchic, the HUC is known for its patriotism. One Chinese hacker told the Hong Kong Sunday Morning Post that, “[...] Chinese hackers tend to get more involved with politics because most of them are young, passionate, and patriotic.” (3) As the HUC is a collection of cells and individuals, they do not have a unified objective. Outside observers have even noted that the HUC seems to be very disorganized (3). Still, the fragmentary nature of the HUC is not necessarily a downside when analyzing their capabilities. Instead, this lack of a unified structure can allow the group to be much more reactive, since no one has to wait for orders from a chain of command (2). It also ensures that there will always be HUC forums as long as the idea and motivation are there, as there’s not one central website that can be taken down and disrupt the group. Since the HUC is spread out over dozens of boards and forums, it is also relatively impossible to erase their presence from the web. Approach to Resistance & Hacker/Political Capabilities The HUC’s most notable action was the cyber war conducted against the United States following the Hainan Island incident in 2001. This cyber war showed a large degree of coordination in the HUC, with Liu Qing, a former member, saying, “We were so excited, taking shifts and working 24/7 [to keep up the attacks].” In the months following this cyber war, over 80,000 people joined the HUC, making it China's largest known hacker group to date (4). Their capabilities seem to be rudimentary, as the majority of their notable attacks are fairly simple website defacements or DDoS attacks, neither of which requires a particularly advanced hacking skill set. DDoS attacks in particular are just about the most rudimentary type of cyber attack, and don’t require any knowledge of coding or infosec. In fact, it's possible to unintentionally commit something similar to a DDoS attack simply by having a small website trend on social media. The large uptick in traffic will shut down the site, as the servers are not prepared for such an amount of visitation. This is also known as the Slashdot effect or the Reddit Hug of Death (9)(10). Just like Anonymous, the backbone of HUC’s attacks follow the proverb ‘quantity over quality’, of which the aforementioned DDoS is the perfect example of. Also similarly to Anonymous, HUC’s greatest capability lies in its reactionary and decentralized nature. This nature means that when political tensions are high, such as in the aftermath of the Hainan Island incident, HUC has thousands of hackers who will coordinate attacks on perceived enemies. On the other side of the coin, when tensions simmer down, the group, much like Anonymous, splinters and falls into disarray (2)(11). Being a group of hackers, the Hóngkè Union has never taken part in any physical acts of violence. Relations & Alliances As the Hóngkè Union lacks coherent central leadership, there are no formal alliances. Keeping in mind that a hóngkè is any patriotic Chinese hacker, there are many other hóngkè groups that share ideological connections. Groups that emerged pre-2010 include the China Eagle Union and the Chinese Red Hacker Alliance (中国红客联盟). More recent groups include 1937CN, which hacked the check-in systems at major Vietnamese airports in July 2016 (8)(12). The precursor to almost all of these groups is the Green Army (绿盟), one of China’s first hacker groups, and the genesis of nationalist Chinese hacking. Led by a hacker who went by the screen name Goodwell, the Green Army participated in hacks against Indonesia after the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots. They also were involved with the Red Hacker Alliance in hacks against Taiwan and Japan (13). Gallery & Photo(s) Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK) has acted as a subsidiary of the Islamic State (IS) within Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2015. The group formed due to defections from the Taliban, al-Qaeda (AQ), and Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) in 2014 (1). The group has operated primarily within Afghanistan and Pakistan and has regularly come into conflict with local and more established groups such as the Taliban, and security forces of the former Afghan government as well as with coalition troops, as it has attempted to expand and take control of territory. ISK is estimated to be comprised of between 1500-2200 fighters based primarily in Kunar and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan, but their activity has spanned every province of Afghanistan and Pakistan (2). Despite significant losses of personnel and territory from 2016-2020, the group has experienced a resurgence. Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan and the international coalition pulled out, ISK has had increased freedom to recruit, build its capabilities, and conduct operations, and now conducts guerrilla operations against both government and civilian targets. History & Foundations ISK formed officially in January of 2015 with a statement released from the Islamic State Central (IS), but defections of TTP, AQ and Taliban members and commanders, along with discussions with IS emissaries, had been ongoing since 2014 (3). Hafiz Khan Saeed, a senior TTP commander formerly responsible for TTP operations in Orakazi in Pakistan’s FATA, was appointed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the emir of ISK around the same time (4). He would later be killed in a US drone strike in 2016. ISK, though active all over the region, has its roots in the Nangarhar province, which borders both Kabul and Pakistan. Most of ISK’s original members in the province came from Pakistani militants who had sought refuge there from Pakistani military operations in the FATA and had gradually began shifting their allegiance from TTP to IS for a myriad of reasons including infighting in the TTP and increasing tension due to ideological and political differences between the Pakistani militants and the Afghan Taliban (5). The Taliban initially attempted to negotiate with IS Central and with ISK in an effort to protect and consolidate their dominant position, but failed and was forced to retreat from 8 districts in Nangarhar as ISK grew, by June 2015 (6). ISK continued to expand until 2016, when increased fighting between them, the Taliban, and government security forces backed by U.S. airstrikes, began to check, and eat away at their territory and growth. ISK attacks peaked initially in 2017 and began to fall off until 2019 as its opponents intensified their efforts to counter it (7). These efforts severely degraded ISK’s manpower and resources, and from 2015-2018 over 10,000 of the group’s members in Afghanistan and Pakistan were captured, killed, or surrendered, including more than 500 of its leaders (8)(9). By 2020, ISK had ceased to maintain any territorial holdings, and its’ remnants dispersed or retreated North to Kunar Province (10). After these setbacks, ISK underwent internal changes, including the appointment of a new leader by IS Central in June 2020, Shahab al-Muhajir, a former member of a Taliban faction linked to the Haqqani Network, following the capture of his predecessor Aslam Farooqi (11). Muhajir, whose real name is Sanaullah Ghafari, is the current governor and leader of ISK (12). Muhajir is both a Salafist and a lifelong jihadist who is experienced in urban warfare and is reported to have an extensive network within Kabul (13). Attacks continued and increased through 2020 and 2021 as negotiations ensued between the Taliban and U.S., which worked to cause chaos across the country. Following the Taliban takeover in 2021, ISK has been focusing its efforts squarely on undermining the new Taliban government and its legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Objectives & Ideology ISK adheres to IS Centrals goal of eliminating national boundaries in the pursuit of a global Islamic caliphate and has aggressively targeted government forces and infrastructure within Afghanistan and Pakistan in an aim to undermine their legitimacy. ISK adheres to a stricter interpretation of Islam than the Afghan Taliban, with ISK criticizing the Taliban in 2014 and 2015 for its seemingly lenient attitude towards the Afghan government, its failure to declare the government and its employees’ apostates, and its relationship with Pakistani intelligence, all of which worked to drive the rift in Nangarhar that would eventually lead to conflict (14). They also subscribe to the concept of tawhid al-hakimiyyah which calls for a single Muslim leader who rules using the entirety of Shari’a, which has led them to refuse to compromise with other Islamic organizations such as the Taliban. Additionally, a significant amount of the ISK leadership is comprised of Afghani Salafi scholars. The Taliban has had a complex and tense relationship with Afghani Salafi’s since the 1990’s has turned ISK into a magnet for Afghani Salafi’s (15). ISK has been able to frame the conflict as a religious struggle between the ideologically corrupt Taliban and morally superior Salafist’s of ISK and utilize this as a recruiting tool (16). ISK criticized the Taliban for their willingness to compromise and negotiate with the U.S. and sees the Taliban as a nationalistic group that appeals to a narrow base (17). ISK has also targeted religious minorities such as the Hazaras, signaling its emphasis on Sunni, and likely more specifically, Salafi, primacy in the region. In the short term though their objectives appear to be to continue to undermine the legitimacy of the Taliban government, gain access to resources and personnel, build resilient networks, and gain strength steadily while waging a, primarily urban, guerrilla campaign. Despite the complex environment in which ISK operates, which see a mix of tribal, national and regional interests and relationships competing against each other, ISK’s long-term goals remain transnational and aligned with IS Central. Approach to Resistance Throughout 2014-2018, most of ISK’s attacks were concentrated in Nangarhar and Kabul Provinces in Afghanistan, and Balochistan and KPK in Pakistan (18). In Kabul and Balochistan, ISK’s attacks were disproportionately lethal as a result of an intensive suicide attack campaign which was enabled by the high population density of Kabul and the porous borders, permissive operating environment, and density of appealing targets such as religious minorities in Balochistan (19). In Nangarhar, ISK fighters used cached weapons, possibly at least partially composed of captured weapons from the Pakistani army, to launch ambushes on local Taliban leadership in late 2014, triggering a response from the Taliban and a start to negotiations between the groups. Once negotiations failed, clashes continued and a vicious turf war ensued, with ISK and the Taliban both using brutal tactics to suppress resistance such as burning houses, forcing families of enemy fighters to flee, and publicly executing captured fighters (20). In some villages in 2015, ISK fighters went underground and waited for an opportunity to rise up suddenly and catch the local Taliban by surprise (21). By 2016, ISK was in conflict with the Taliban and Afghan government, engaging them in skirmishes and overrunning, but not occupying some government positions. The group was attempting to hold territory until 2018 and 2019 when it was forced to disperse due to increased pressure from multiple groups. As the U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan in 2020 and 2021 a security vacuum appeared, and ISK began working to undermine Taliban influence by concentrating almost 60% of its attacks in Nangarhar (22). The group began focusing on targeting Taliban checkpoints, energy infrastructure, convoys, members of the media, activists, local elders, schools, mosques, and Salafi ideologues who criticize them in Nangarhar and elsewhere (23). The group demonstrated it maintained the capability to conduct tactically and operationally complex operations during its 2020 prison break operation in Jalalabad, which led to the release of 280 ISK inmates (24). It gained international attention for its suicide attack against U.S. forces and fleeing Afghan civilians at HKIA in August of 2021. Al-Muhajir has adopted a new strategy of guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism, focusing on conducting prison breaks, reintegrating former members who had surrendered to the government, and attempting to widen its recruiting net, all while conducting attacks to destabilize and delegitimize the Taliban’s hold on power (25). ISK has a Shura Advisory Council that serves as a decision-making body, led by an emir, and a bureaucracy that supports it in various areas such as intelligence, logistics, finances, religious matters, recruitment, media and others, with commanders at the provincial level (26). ISK is reported to have been generating income from extortion as early as 2014 and from participation in the illegal mining and export of talc in Nangarhar as early as 2018 (27). They’re also assessed to receive income via extortion, donations and possibly from IS Central, and to possess modest financial reserves (28). Alliances & International Connections During the Taliban takeover over 400 ISK fighters from 14 countries escaped from government prisons, confirming the growing presence of foreign fighters within the organization (29). ISK has a close relationship with IS Central and captured documents indicate an attempt to mimic the organizations and structures that have worked for and been used by IS Central (30). IS Central also appeared to be attempting to play a role in shaping ISK’s development by providing them generic guidance on a variety of matters such as arbitrating disputes, distributing propaganda, and dealing with inappropriate forms of media (31). IS Central also requested reports from ISK on battlefield performance, and has featured them heavily in their propaganda, especially following the Jalalabad prison break and suicide attack at HKIA (32). Overall IS Central and ISK are connected, potentially financially, and ISK is dedicated to the cause of the IS, though the extent of their cooperation now is unclear. In May 2019, IS Central announced the formation of IS-Pakistan and IS-India, which may shift responsibility from ISK and enable them to focus their efforts (33). ISK began in a crowded operating environment, competing against the TTP, Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other groups. They grew increasingly confrontational against all groups, as they see themselves as the sole legitimate group for waging jihad in the region and thus have aimed to coopt instead of cooperate with local groups. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Islamic State (IS), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and also the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) – after having adopted the name in 2013 post-Syrian expansion – is one of the most violent militant Islamist groups globally. After having expanded into Syria in 2013, it adopted the name ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām and this has been translated into various titles due to the association of al-Sham as a region with both the Levant and also Greater Syria (Irshaid, 2015). The group began using the name Islamic State or الدولة الإسلامية (ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah) in June of 2014 in order to express its expansionist ambitions and it has also been known as Daesh or Da’ish (Saxena, 2014). This name especially has been widely used within the Arabic speaking world as a pejorative name for the group and the group considers this a derogatory term as it resembles the Arabic word ‘Daes’, which stands for “one who crushes” and also Dāhis, which stands for ‘one who sows discord’ (US Department of State, 2014). This ‘derogatory’ name (in the eyes of the group) has resulted in the punishment of its usage in the form of 70 lashes within IS controlled territory (Abouzeid, 2014). As a former state-like entity, the IS controlled vast amounts of territory across large portions of northern and eastern Syria as well as north western Iraq. Founded in 1999 by a Jordanian Salafi Jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, it was originally known as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and this group underwent several transformations between 2004 and 2014 until it was known as Islamic State (Reuters, 2014). Due to its self-proclaimed leadership of the worldwide caliphate it claims religious, political and military authority of all Muslims worldwide (Mortada, 2014). Its main objectives include the establishment of a Sunni Islamic state (Caliphate) under the control of a caliph. A German journalist who was embedded within the group stated that the ISIL/ISIS fighters expressed a belief that “all religions who agree with democracy have to die” (Withnall, 2014). History & Foundations Founded in 1999 under the name Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) by Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, it had the stated intention of overthrowing the Kingdom of Jordan which he considered to be an “apostate” regime (Aaron and Zelin, 2014). Following an injury he received to his leg, he was in Baghdad receiving treatment from May until late November 2002 and US intelligence reports state that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had unsuccessfully attempted to locate and capture al-Zarqawi (Select Committee on Intelligence, 2006). Following the US Invasion of Iraq, Jama’at became a decentralised militant network which fought against the US-led coalition and – on the 17th of October 2004 – al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and it became known as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qaeda in Iraq - AQI) (Pool, 2004). In June of 2006, al-Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike and the leadership of the group was assumed by Egyptian militant Abu Ayyub al-Masri (BBC News, 2006). On the 13th of October 2006, the Mujahideen Shura Council (an umbrella organisation created to unify Sunni insurgents within Iraq) established the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in which a Mujahideen Shura Council leader stated that “God willing we will set the law of Sharia here and we will fight the Americans” (Karouny, 2007). Al-Masri and ISI leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi were both killed in a joint Iraq-US military operation on 18th April 2010 (United States Forces - Iraq, 2010) and they were both succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Abu Suleiman al-Naser, who was later also killed (Yahya, 2011). The group has also seen overwhelmingly high levels of unpopularity amongst the global Islamic population with the highest amount of ‘favourable’ support coming from Nigeria with only 14% saying that they viewed the group favourably. Lebanon and Israel have the least favourable views of ISIS, standing at 100% unfavourable opinions amongst those surveyed in Lebanon and 98% in Israel (Lipka, 2017). This global unpopularity has significantly contributed to the decline in the group's downfall as a solidified organisation. This is due to the fact that the local populations of the countries which it may infiltrate will not support the group or its offshoots such as ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria which is shown in the fact that 68% of the Nigerian population are very concerned about Islamic extremism and are much less likely to support it (Lipka, 2017). As aforementioned, the group adopted the name d-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-ʿIrāq wa-sh-Shām following its expansion into Syria in 2013. This has been translated into various titles due to the association of the word al-Sham as a region within both the Levant and Greater Syria (Irshaid, 2015). The group's name was therefore translated to both ISIS and ISIL (Tharoor, 2014). Post-Syrian expansion, the group made large territorial gains encompassing an area of 110,000 km2 in 2014, roughly the size of England (Jones et al., 2017). However due to the group’s unpopularity and the military action against it, the territory which the group controlled eventually declined by 96% and in 2019 it was only made up of the 4000km2 Syrian Desert pocket (The Syrian Observatory For Human Rights, 2019). Following the battle of Baghuz Fawqani in March of 2019 (which was an offensive by the Syrian Democratic Forces as a part of Operation Inherent Resolve), the SDF officially declared final victory over the Islamic State and this therefore marked the end of IS-controlled territories in Syria (BBC News Middle East, 2019). Objectives & Ideology Due to the several iterations and titles that the group has gone under, its goals have shifted ever so slightly. Its original conception under the name of Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) was concerned mainly with the overthrowing of the ‘apostate’ Kingdom of Jordan which they had considered to be un-Islamic (Aaron and Zelin, 2014). Its targets included Shi’ite mosques and civilians as well as Iraqi government institutions and the US-led Multi-National Force in Iraq (Coalition Forces). The then-leader of JTJ, Al-Zarqawi, had an extreme interpretation of Islamic takfir, which is the process of excommunication of one muslim from Islam by another, and this had reportedly caused friction between him and Osama Bin Laden (Aaron and Zelin, 2014), with whom in his first meeting with he exclaimed that “Shiites should be executed” (Weaver, 2006). In 2005, the group (under the name al-Qaeda in Iraq) had several stated goals, such as the removal of the US and allied coalition forces from Iraq, the conversion of Iraq into a Sunni Islamic state or caliphate, and the extension of this caliphate into other neighbouring countries and the wider Islamic world. These goals continued to be the goals of IS when AQI became the Islamic State of Iraq (Londoño, 2009). Ideologically, the IS is/was a theocratic proto-state and a salafi jihadist group and its ideology has been described as a hybrid blend of Takfirism (as aforementioned), Salafism and Sunni Islamist Fundamentalism (Manne, 2017). Due to its self-representation as the reincarnation of the caliphate of early Islam, the IS utilises the black battle flag of Muhammad with the associated seal and the phrase “there is no god but Allah” above it (the shahada). This symbolises the group's belief that it represents the aforementioned restoration of the caliphate and this brings in all the associated political and religious ramifications that this association would imply (Speckhard, 2014). Military & Political Abilities The group has extensive military abilities and this ranges from large numbers of fighters, both foreign and domestic (Syrian/Iraqi) to also an extensive armoury and range of tactics which the group employs. Estimates of the number of combatants who fought on behalf of ISIS ranged from tens of thousands (Top Channel, 2015) to over 200,000 militants with claims by Kurdish military leaders that the number has been severely underestimated by Western intelligence (Cockburn, 2014). Due to ISIS’ widespread propaganda machine and its effective usage of the internet in order to attract foreign recruits, they have large numbers of foreign fighters which range into the tens of thousands. In fact, a United Nations report from 2014 estimated that there were over 20,000 foreign recruits within the organisation (Ackerman, 2014) and in September 2015, the CIA estimated that over 30,000 foreign fighters had joined ISIS (Iraqinews, 2015). ISIS also has an extensive armoury consisting of both conventional and non-conventional weaponry. Major sources of conventional weapons such as AK-47s and hand grenades, as well as other small arms, come from various sources including Saddam Hussein's stockpiles from the 2003-2011 Iraqi insurgency (Ismay, 2013). These weapons and equipment have also come from other sources, including the weaponry from surrendered or captured government forces, or even opposition forces who were provided with weapons by the US who sold them or surrendered them following the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq (Cohen, 2015). The group is also reported to have captured US-made TOW anti-tank missiles supplied to the Free Syrian Army by both the USA and Saudi Arabia and they have used these extremely effective anti-tank weapons against their opponents forces (Weiss, 2015). It is estimated that up to 90% of the group's small arms are reported to have originated in China, Russia or Eastern Europe (Ex-Soviet Union army equipment) (Crawford, 2017). The group has also used non-conventional weapons such as IEDs (improvised explosive devices) as well as car bombs and more infamously, suicide bombers. Moreover, they are reported to have captured nuclear materials from Mosul University in 2014, although it is believed that they lack the expertise or the equipment to convert them into usable weapons grade materials (Cowell, 2014). Approach to Resistance ISIS as an entity is extremely violent and uses heavy repression methods, along both ethnic/racial and religious lines in order to enforce its own laws on the populations it controls. The group was responsible for the genocide of Yazidis in the Sinjar area of Northern Iraq from 2014 to 2017 which resulted in over 9,900 men, women and children being killed or captured and sold into sex slavery (Taylor, 2017). Due to a Yazidi religious belief in a benevolent peacock-angel, ISIL/ISIS has viewed the population as worshippers of Lucifer or Shaitan, and they henceforth consider Yazidis ‘devil worshippers’. Consequently, Yazidi women and children have often been subjected to widespread rape and slavery by IS forces (Callimachi, 2015). ISIS is also responsible for widespread mass murder, rape and discrimination against Christians in the territories which it had controlled with the persecution of Christian minorities in these areas being recognised as genocide by the United States, the European Union and also Great Britain in 2016 (Stone, 2016). During conflict the group has been known to use suicide bombers as young as 12 in order to inflict damage, both physical and psychological, upon its opponent forces (Chulov, 2015). The group has also conducted extensive terror campaigns abroad using several tactics such as bombings, suicide bombings and also gun and knife attacks. The group carried out several infamous attacks globally which have only reinforced its image as a terror organisation. This includes the Metrojet Flight 9268 bombing which killed all 224 on board (Gadher and Amoore, 2015), as well as the 2019 Sri Lanka Easter celebration bombings which killed 269 people and injured over 500 (BBC Asia, 2020). These attacks are amongst many which the group has conducted all over the globe and have been repeatedly backed up by even further extreme attacks in the regions which they inhabit. The beheading of prisoners has also been used by ISIS to instil fear and to also recruit followers into their organisations. The execution of American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff was carried out by ISIS in 2014 in response to the bombings carried out by America weeks prior and to stop the US air campaign in the Middle East entirely (Beauchamp, 2018). The beheading videos are also used by ISIS (and other groups) to recruit more members into their organisations either through fear or inspiration (Mosendz, 2014). The atrocities committed by this group have highlighted just how far reaching they are and this has been reflected in the response to ISIS by militaries of varying countries. Directly after the aforementioned beheading of James Foley for example US opinions actually supported further actions against the group and paved the way for then-President Barack Obama to utilise the American military to carry out further attacks (Beauchamp, 2018). International Relations & Potential Alliances The group has received widespread amounts of support from varying Islamist terrorist organisations and groups all over the globe (Mohammed, 2014). These groups include Abu Sayyaf and also the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem, amongst many others. Foreign fighters have made up large amounts of the support that the group has received with numbers of these foreign fighters, with a UN report from May 2015 showing that 25,000 “foreign terrorist fighters” from 100 countries had joined ISIS or allied Islamist groups (Burke, 2015). Multiple countries, including the United Kingdom and also the Netherlands, have instituted laws which strip their citizenship from people who have travelled to fight for ISIS (Press Association, 2017) (The Straits Times, 2016). There have been allegations of cooperation or outright support by Turkey and its armed forces with ISIS (Guiton, 2014). According to an intelligence advisor, a “highly classified assessment” carried out by the Joints Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency in 2013 concluded that Turkey had effectively transformed and subverted secret US arms programs in support of rebel organisations in Syria which no longer existed, in order to supply technical and logistical support to ISIL and another Islamist terror organisation known as al-Nusra Front (Hersh, 2016). Qatar has also been accused of acting as a support conduit for money which has flowed through the country into ISIS accounts. Despite the lack of outright evidence that the Qatari government has been involved in this transfer of funds, they have been frequently criticised for not doing enough to stem the flow of funds and money sent by private donors (Boghardt, “Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach”, 2014) and – according to US officials – the largest portion of private donations linked to ISIS and al-Qaeda groups comes from Qatar rather than Saudi Arabia (Boghardt, “Qatar Is a U.S. Ally. They Also Knowingly Abet Terrorism. What’s Going On?”, 2014). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Atlanta Resistance Medics (ARM) is a street medic collective of activists, healthcare professionals, and herbalists based out of Atlanta, Georgia. First formed in 2011 as a result of the Occupy Movement, ARM has evolved from an affinity group to a consensus-based collective after a hiatus in 2017. Considering medical knowledge to be a form of self-defense, ARM seeks to promote health in the activist community by hosting training events and actively working on community health projects. Foremost, ARM provides medical support to protests, direct actions, and uprisings to ensure the safety of their fellow activists and community members. Following in the revolutionary footsteps of previous street medic organizations active during the civil rights movement, ARM has taken a strong stance against hierarchy, oppression, capitalism, and law enforcement (1). History & Foundations Street Medicine has a long and varied history. Originating during the 1960s Civil Rights movement, in which the Medical Committee for Civil Rights (MCCR) acted as an affinity group for major demonstrations such as the March on Washington, street medic groups have become an influential part of political movements all over the world. Over time, more street medic groups became involved in a broader range of events. Street medics played a key role in Black Panther community programs and were present during the American Indian Movements occupation of Wounded Knee during the 1970s. During this time, street medic organizations helped pioneer the field of public health through rat abatement programs and community drug prevention/treatment programs. During the 1999 World Trade Organization protests, a new generation of street medics from around the country gathered to provide medical support to demonstrations in Seattle, Washington. Due to the growing national security apparatus, this new generation faced threats never seen before, such as improved tear gas, rubber bullets, flash-bang grenades, and tasers. After the anti-globalization movement subsided, street medics shifted their focus to providing support during natural disasters. In response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, for instance, Native American street medics provided medical aid and mental health support to coastal villages in Thailand. In 2005, moreover, street medics established the first medical clinic in New Orleans to provide care to communities affected by Hurricane Katrina (2). In 2011, protests erupted throughout the US and Europe in response to economic inequality and money’s influence on political decisions. Starting in New York’s financial district, encampments sprouted up throughout the country in support of the Occupy Movement. In Atlanta’s encampment, founding members of the ARM volunteered in a 24/7 medical tent and organized volunteers to provide medical aid at demonstrations. Following in the footsteps of past street medic groups, these volunteers created ARM in order to provide the politically-active Atlanta community with training events, medical support during demonstrations, and community health programs (3). After members of the affinity group moved out of state and became occupied with other projects, ARM went on a hiatus, returning in 2017 with renewed and defined core values they labeled their Points of Unity. Objectives & Ideology ARM claims their goal is to help facilitate the success of liberatory actions by providing care to those participating. As stated in ARM’s Points of Unity, ARM proclaims the failure of capitalism, the state, and their agent’s ability to provide decent and adequate healthcare to the people, simultaneously seeking to liberate healthcare from these institutions through community programs, free clinics, and training events. This is supported by ARM’s aforementioned commitment to resisting hierarchy and oppression of any form, whether it is within their own collective, between medics and those they help, or in the broader community (4). Abilities & Approach Despite ARM’s 2017 hiatus, their collective has only grown in popularity and reach. ARM offers regular training events such as a 20-hour street medic course, affinity group medical training, and healthcare provide bridge training. The collective also offers to travel throughout the southeast United States to help out-of-state groups conduct similar events. Since winter 2021, ARM has also begun hosting a monthly free clinic, (5) during which they provide the community with medical consultation, blood pressure tests, wound care, and mental health support. These clinics also provide the community with hygiene supplies such as tooth care products, vitamin supplements, herbal remedies, and over-the-counter medications (6). The funding for these free clinics comes from community donations and support from the Missouri-based non-profit NCS (Network for Strong Communities). In addition to these community and training programs, ARM provides medical support for activists during demonstrations (7). Besides affinity group medics, a majority of the time, ARM is the sole medical provider for these direct action events. Alliances & Relations ARM’s geographical proximity to the Defend the Atlanta Forest (DTF) social movement, as well as its similar goals of resisting what both parties perceive as oppressive agencies, has resulted in its recurring presence at DTF demonstrations by having medics embedded at the occupied site (8). One of these medics embedded at the site was Manuel Esteban Paez Terán, nicknamed Tortuguita, who was killed during a police raid on DTF encampments (9). In 2020, ARM also had a strong presence at BLM (Black Lives Matter) demonstrations in the Atlanta area. During the BLM movement, ARM not only acted as medical support for protests but also used their website to post safety information and resources for activists (10). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Nation of Islam (NOI) is a religious Black nationalist organization operating in the USA. Wallace Fard Muhammad founded the NOI (often referred to as 'The Nation') in the 1930s in response to the disenfranchisement of African-Americans living in urban centers (19). The Nation is exclusively made up of African-Americans and many members are poor youth or former Christians (11). Its belief system is a distinct and complex combination of Islam, Christianity, historical revisionism, and Black supremacy. The Nation runs social programs, provides religious services, owns businesses, and maintains an armed contingent called the Fruit of Islam (FOI). This unique set of beliefs and practices has made the group difficult to categorize. After Fard Muhammad’s disappearance, Elijah Muhammad took over as leader and began a period of expansion. Famous members including Muhammad Ali and Malcolm X helped Elijah Muhammad bring the Nation to prominence in the 1960s. After Elijah’s son and successor disbanded the group, Louis Farrakhan revived the group and continues to lead it today (7). The NOI has had an immensely controversial but important role in African-American history and culture. History & Foundations Fard Muhammad started preaching to Detroit’s African-American community in 1930. He began to gain a large following, attracting thousands to his services. In Fard Muhammad’s own perspective, Black people are the people of God, making them the ‘Nation of Islam’; this is where the name of the group was birthed. Elijah Poole, who went on to change his name to Elijah Muhammad and become the Nation’s leader, became one of Fard Muhammad’s early disciples in 1931. In 1934, Fard Muhammad disappeared under mysterious circumstances, at which point Elijah Muhammad assumed the leadership of the organization. Fard Muhammad was never found (19). After his disappearance, Elijah Muhammad claimed that Fard Muhammad was a God and he was his prophet. He relocated his headquarters from Detroit to Chicago and spent the rest of the decade traveling across the United States to spread his beliefs, further popularizing the Nation (19). Muhammad and 64 other Nation of Islam members were arrested and imprisoned for refusing the draft during the Second World War. His incarceration led to a drop in membership for the NOI, although they soon regained their status with the rise of the civil rights and Black power movements in the 1950s and 60s. He also began to draw more ideologically from Sunni Islam during this time (11). Under Elijah Muhammad’s leadership, Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali helped raise the Nation’s profile in the public eye. Malcolm was introduced to the NOI during his time in prison and became a minister in Harlem after his release. Ali began his involvement in the Nation during the 1960s and became Malcolm’s personal friend and protégé (15). Both Malcolm and Ali, born Malcolm Little and Cassius Clay respectively, changed their names as a way of rejecting their “slave names”, as is common practice for new NOI members (15). Malcolm eventually became disillusioned with the Nation, particularly because of Elijah Muhammad’s infidelity and disagreements he had with the core doctrine, and left to convert to Sunni Islam in 1964 (15). Despite Malcolm unsuccessfully attempting to persuade Ali to follow him, Ali would later convert after Malcolm’s death and stated that betraying Malcolm was his worst regret in life (1). Malcolm was killed by three NOI members in 1965, which damaged the Nation’s image and led to a decline in membership (7). In 1975, Elijah Muhammad died. He was succeeded by his son Wallace Muhammad. Like Malcolm X and Ali, Wallace Muhammad did not agree with many of his father’s practices and sought to steer the group away from its idiosyncratic teachings to what he perceived as a more acceptable form of Sunni Islam. He abolished the FOI, permitted White members, and did away with much of the Nation’s more obscure beliefs, such as that Wallace Fard Muhammad was the reincarnation of Allah. Wallace renamed the NOI twice in the 1970s and eventually disbanded it in 1985 (7). However, Louis Farrakhan, a NOI minister and one of Wallace’s detractors, reestablished the Nation and led it to a resurgence in popularity (13). Farrakhan, who embraced Elijah’s more extreme views over his son’s reforms, expanded the Nation’s international and cultural influence. Farrakhan claims that in 1985, he was brought to a spaceship known as the Mother Plane and was instructed to lead the Nation (5). He established diplomatic ties to world leaders such as Muammar Gaddafi and Jerry Rawlings, as well as a connection with the rap community (13). He also took an increased influence from numerology, scientology, and freemasonry (12). Under Farrakhan’s leadership, the NOI organized the Million Man March in 1995 with speeches from civil rights leaders such as Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King III, as well as a speech from Farrakhan himself (5). In 1993, Farrakhan’s national advisor and envoy to Gaddafi Khalid Abdul Muhammad delivered an anti-semetic speech in New Jersey, for which he was subsequently barred from the Nation. He was later shot by a former NOI member. Muhammad went on to form the New Black Panther party, which has been repeatedly denounced by associates and members of the original Black Panthers because of Muhammad’s violent anti-semetic, anti-miscegenistic, and homophobic stances (17). Today, the Nation still has tens of thousands of members (2). Farrakhan and Wallace Muhammad held a meeting and reconciled in 2000 (7). Farrakhan’s controversial anti-Semetic and homophobic comments have landed him in the public eye several times over recent years, causing him to be banned from Facebook in 2019 (4). Objectives & Ideology The Nation of Islam teaches a unique blend of Islam, Christianity, and Black nationalism. Its central belief is that Black People are the original people of the earth and are superior to all other races. This belief is based on the idea that all humans, even those who are not Black, descended from Black men and White people were created to oppress Black people (8). Many of Wallace Fard Muhammad’s original congregation belonged to the Moorish Science Temple of America, an early 20th century Black ethno-religion with similar beliefs to the Nation, and Fard Muhammad drew heavily from it. He also took influence from fraternal organizations such as the Freemasons and the economic and social ideas of Marcus Garvey (8). Another central belief of the Nation is the rejection of traditional Christianity, which they view as a religion created by the White race to control Black people. Instead, the Nation of Islam encourages its followers to embrace traditional Islamic practices, such as prayer and fasting. Members also do not eat pork and women cover their heads. However, there are some traditional Islamic beliefs that the Nation diverges from. For example, they do not believe in an afterlife (8). There is also some Christian influence, as ministers read from both the Qur'an and the Bible during the Nation’s religious services (19). The Nation believes that there is a series of Gods, the most recent of which being Fard Muhammad. Allah, the first God, came down to earth personified as a Black man and created the Black race. Yakub, an evil scientist, is said to have created the White race as a genetic mutation of Black people. Allah allowed them to rule the earth for 6000 years, which had allegedly come to an end in 1915 (5). They teach that racial tensions will lead to an apocalypse, at which point Fard Muhammad will come down from a spaceship known as the Mother Plane and destroy the White race. This unorthodox strain of Islam does not fall under any mainstream Muslim denomination and most other Muslim groups categorize their beliefs as heretical (8). The group also takes stock in a number of miscellaneous conspiratorial beliefs, such as numerology and creationism (5). One of the most important aspects of the Nation's views is the call for Black self-reliance and separatism. The organization promotes the idea that African Americans should separate themselves from the larger American society, which it sees as oppressive, and instead create their own communities and institutions. It operates its own schools, businesses, and mosques. One thing that distinguishes the Nation from other Black nationalist groups, such as the Black Panther Party, is its embrace of capitalism. They espouse a form of economic nationalism influenced by Garveyism that pushes for economic segregation between Black and White people (8). The Nation and its members own many businesses, including restaurants, bakeries, a clothing line, a skincare company, and even a mall (10). Socially, the Nation is conservative. Drug and alcohol use is discouraged, family and religion are held in high regard, and women are expected to dress modestly (8). The Nation’s endorsement of strict patriarchal gender roles has brought accusations of sexism (2). Its conception of race varies dramatically from mainstream views. As opposed to other Black ethno-religious movements such as the Black Hebrew Israelites and Rastafarians, the Nation is not Afrocentric. Instead, they focus on the African diaspora in North America. It doesn’t even see Africa as a homeland, believing Black people to have come from Mecca. The Nation is not concerned with Blackness, as it is commonly thought of, so much as the “Asiatic” lineage from which it claims that Black people descended from. For this reason, it is friendly towards other people of colour, particularly those that have been oppressed by Europeans (19). The Nation’s concept of race can be seen as figurative as well as literal. Race is something that, as the nation sees, can exist physically and spiritually within a person. Whereas Whiteness is representative of evil, Blackness is representative of holiness as Black people are supposed descendants of Allah. White people, as well as Jews, are often referred to as “Satanic” by the Nation (18). Military Capabilities The Fruit of Islam is the Nation’s paramilitary wing, known for their distinctive blue uniforms. Each temple has its own unit who provide security for Nation members and property (8). The NOI is not primarily focused on armed insurrection. It instead exerts influence through its religious and social activities and conducts violence against the organization’s enemies in a covert manner. That being said, the Fruit of Islam is a well-trained and well-organized force. Members undergo strict training in martial arts and military drills as well as religious subjects (11). The FOI has a sister group called Muslim Girls Training (MGT) that trains women in domestic activities (8). The Nation is organized with a centralized hierarchy and an underlying bureaucracy. Local ministers run their own temples and FOI/MGT programs, while the central organization handles national matters such as diplomacy and organizing conferences and other large NOI gatherings (8). There are tens of thousands of members across the USA today, but the Nation has always had a particularly large presence in major urban centers with significant Black populations such as Detroit, Chicago, and New York (2). The NOI also has a chapter in the United Kingdom (16). Approach to Resistance The NOI does not make itself out to be a violent group. Although there is an armed contingent, it primarily positions itself as a religious and social organization. However, the Nation has been responsible for many acts of violence. Malcolm X’s assassination was carried out by three members, but it remains unclear if the killing was a NOI conspiracy (7). In 1973, NOI members broke into the home of a Sunni minister and former NOI member Hamaas Abdul Khaalis who had spoken out against Elijah Muhammad and the NOI. They killed seven people, five of whom were children (6). Besides its security and disciplinary roles for the Nation, the FOI has run community policing initiatives in inner city housing projects. The group also is not necessarily revolutionary in nature. Instead, the group works to build economic and social independence for Black people. They do believe that Fard Muhammad will come back to earth in a spaceship bringing an apocalypse that will kill all White people, however this is to come on its own accord. Meanwhile, the Nation trains its members through the FOI for this event, known as the “Armageddon” (19). Relations and Alliances The Nation has had many splinter groups. The Five Percent Nation, also known as the Nation of Gods and Earths, split off from the NOI’s central organization in 1964 out of Malcolm X’s former temple in Harlem. Founder Clarence 13X’s teachings appealed to New York’s impoverished Black youth, of whom many were associated with gangs as well as the burgeoning hip hop scene. This led to the group being labeled as a gang itself and many rappers becoming Five Percenters, including members of the group Wu Tang Clan (14). The United Nation of Islam, another splinter group, was established in 1978 by Royall Jenkins, who claimed to be Allah himself and had a fundamentalist interpretation of the Nation’s doctrine. Jenkins has been criticized for allegations of sexual abuse and human trafficking (20). Despite their common goals and cause, the Nation frequently conflicted with the Black Panther Party during its existence. Many NOI members felt that the Black Panthers did not respect the NOI’s contributions (11). This led to a number of small clashes between the two groups, such as instances where Black Panthers would attack NOI members selling papers (10). The Nation has been generally hostile towards other Black groups and leaders, however some of this conflict can be attributed to the FBI’s efforts to undermine Black activists with COINTELPRO (9). Law enforcement and the Nation have had a fraught relationship with one another. NOI temples have been frequent targets for police harassment, leading to a dislike and distrust of police within the Nation. In 1972, an officer was shot and killed while responding to a call at an NOI temple (3). Although certain far-right groups like the Fourth Reich Skinheads have conflicted with the Nation, others have collaborated with them. Malcolm X alleged that the Nation held meetings with Ku Klux Klan and American Nazi Party members. The alliance with the far-right became international when the British National Front endorsed the NOI during the 1980s (10). Many of these groups align with the Nation’s segregationist and anti-miscengination positions. Human rights groups such as the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-Defamation League have labeled the NOI as a hate group (2) (21). During the Second World War, the Nation expressed a favorable opinion of Japan on the basis of their opposition to the draft and American militarism (13). At this time, the FBI began to monitor the NOI (8). Under Farrakhan’s leadership, the Nation expanded its international ties. In 1995, Farrakhan visited 23 countries including Iraq, Libya, and Cuba to spread his message. He began to advocate in favour of pan-Africanism, which previous NOI leaders did not concern themselves with. Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi was a friend to the Nation. His Third Internationalist Theory overlapped with the Nation’s beliefs insofar that both are centered on Black self-determination. Gaddafi had helped fund the Nation and Farrakhan as well as Elijah Muhammad have praised his work (13). Farrakhan has also developed a relationship with the Church of Scientology and encourages his followers to practice dianetics, the belief system of Scientology (12). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The National Resistance Forces (NRF), or Joint Forces, is a loose coalition of three separate fighting forces in the Yemeni Civil War. Since 2017, the NRF has fought alongside the Saudi Arabian-led coalition (SLC) against Houthi rebels. History & Foundations Initially, the NRF was a name used to refer to the private army of Tareq Mohammad Saleh, the nephew of the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was ousted from power in the 2011 Revolution (1). In September 2014, when the popular Houthi movement deposed Saleh’s successor, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, and installed a new government, many elements within the Yemeni Army did not interfere. On March 26, 2015, the SLC intervention at the request of Hadi escalated tensions between Houthi and government forces and plunged Yemen into a civil war that is still ongoing (2). For the first three years of the war, Saleh loyalists within the Yemeni Army sided with the Houthis. However, this alliance collapsed in late November 2017. The former president was killed by Houthi rebels on December 4, 2017 during the Battle of Sana’a, resulting in the erstwhile allies quickly turning against each other (3). Most of these hardliners were members of the Republican Guard, an elite formation dedicated to protecting the president. At the time of the revolution, the Republican Guard was under the leadership of Ali’s son, Ahmed Saleh, and had been fiercely loyal to the Saleh regime for decades (4). The United Arab Emirates, a member of the SLC, sought to prevent the complete collapse of this loyalist force and thus encouraged Tareq Saleh to unify the remnants (5). Throughout the spring of 2018, Tareq recruited men from the Republican Guard in addition to the Central Security Forces, a special paramilitary police force also loyal to the Saleh regime, and formed the Guardians of the Republic. Alongside the initial base of military and police loyalists, the two other groups that would eventually form the NRF were the Giants Brigade and the Tihama Resistance (6). The Giants Brigade emerged from the Southern Movement in 2015. They had received Emirati foreign aid since 2015 and were fighting the Houthis prior to their unification into the NRF. The Tihama Resistance had mobilized against the Houthis prior to the SLC intervention. After the Houthis captured Sana’a in 2014, they quickly moved into Al Hudaydah, the principal port city in the Tihama region, in early 2015 (7). In early 2018, the SLC combined these three groups under the banner of the NRF. Although they all retained their own leadership, they participated in SLC offensives and swore loyalty to the Hadi government. Ideology & Objectives Due to its structure as a big-tent coalition, the NRF lacks a specific political ideology. The Guardians of the Republic are effectively Tareq Saleh’s private army and are defined by their unwavering loyalty to the former Saleh regime. Recent developments seem to indicate that they are opposed to the Southern Transitional Council, a separatist movement for Southern Yemen and quasi member of the anti-Houthi coalition. As such, Tareq has been criticized by the southern press (8). The Tihama Resistance is rooted in its local ties to Tihama, the coastal plain region that stretches up the Red Sea. Many Tihama fighters are from Al Hudaydah and its surrounding area, and fight to protect their region (9). While it is unclear whether they aim for independence or heightened autonomy, they aim to remove Houthi control over their lands. There may be sectarian influence as the Houthis are Zaidi while the majority of the Tihama region is Sunni. Zaydism, although a relatively niche sect of Shia Islam, is practiced by roughly a third of Yemenis (10). However, the vast majority of the country is Sunni, and specifically subscribe to the Shafi’i school of thought (11). The Giants Brigade is mainly composed of tribesmen from southern Yemen, mainly the Lahj and Aden regions (12). They are Salafis, a conservative branch of Sunni Islam, so religious differences may partly motivate their antagonism towards the Houthis. Ostensibly, all members of the NRF are loyal to the Hadi government. Despite their independent motivations, they are unified in their anti-Houthi stance. However, the NRF is an alliance of convenience and has seen internal tensions and conflict with other members under the anti-Houthi tent. For example, Giants forces have torn down Republican flags raised by Tareq’s men (13). In March, 2022, the offices of the General People’s Congress, the political party with which Tareq is affiliated, were seized by forces of the Southern Transitional Council (14). Military Abilities According to reports, the combined strength of the NRF includes around 35,000 troops (15). The United Arab Emirates has committed to the provision of extensive financial and materiel support, but the aid is not equally distributed; this is notably because the Giants Brigade comprises the majority of the NRF’s manpower and hence receives most of the aid. It is estimated that the brigade’s leader, Abu Zarra, leads roughly 20,000 troops (16). They have been receiving Emirati aid since 2015, and as such, are very well equipped with weapons and armored vehicles. They also have access to SLC air support in the form of fighter jets and Apache helicopters (17). The Guardians of the Republic is perhaps the strongest contingent within the NRF in terms of its combat efficiency. Although numerically small – reports estimate that Tareq Saleh commands around 4,000 men – most of them are former members of the elite Republican Guard or Central Security Force. Additionally, as former allies to the Houthis, they are seasoned veterans who possess a stronger understanding of their foe compared to other pro-Hadi forces. The Guardians enjoy strong support from the UAE, and a report in 2018 claimed that 5,000 additional forces were being trained at an Emirati base in Eritrea (18). The Tihama Resistance is made up of 4,000 local fighters (19). The force is led by Ahmed al Kawkabani, a former marine, and Abdulrahman Hajri. The SLC appears reluctant to provide the same level of support to the Tihama fighters as they do with the other NRF elements. While they have been given trucks and fuel, their fighting equipment has been limited to heavy machine guns, mortars, and RPGs (20). Approach to Resistance After its formation, the NRF quickly entered combat operations against the Houthis. Their most notable contribution came during the Al Hudayah Offensive, which ran from December, 2017, to mid-June 2018. Supported by Saudi and Emirati troops, the NRF pushed outwards from southern Yemen towards the Red Sea, securing territory along the coastline, managing to secure the western port city of Al Mukha in April, 2018 (21). During Operation Golden Victory, the Saudi-led assault into Al Hudayah, NRF forces were instrumental. Battling an estimated 5,000 to 10,000 defenders, the coalition force of 21,000 men fought bitterly to wrestle the port city from Houthi hands (22). Although the city has been returned to the Houthis, NRF forces were present in the area for roughly three years until their withdrawal in 2021. Al Hudayah remains the largest battle since the SLC intervention into the conflict (23). As internecine fighting within the SLC worsened, specifically between the Hadi government and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council, the fighting in Yemen became increasingly fragmented. In 2019, the UAE withdrew its forces from the war, and adopted a more indirect supportive policy. The Yemen conflict is now heavily reliant on proxies, and the components of the NRF control regions in southeast Yemen and operate independently of the Hadi forces (24). While political violence continues, recently, the civil war has entered a relatively stagnant period. On April 2, 2022, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen negotiated a ceasefire between the Houthis and the Hadi government. For the four-month truce, combat fatalities dropped an estimated 90% to an average of around 300 per month (25). Houthi leadership has prioritized conducting drone strikes in both Emirati and Saudi Arabian territory which has encouraged the SLC to adopt a more rapprochement-focused policy (26). International Recognition As a member within the anti-Houthi camp, the NRF does technically constitute a piece of the internationally-recognized Hadi government. However, given the fragmented nature of Yemeni politics, many regions under NRF control are essentially proto-states. Although the Giants Brigade, Guardians of the Republic, and Tihama Resistance fight under the SLC, they enjoy extensive autonomy within the regions their respective troops occupy in the country’s southwest corner (27). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Following the contentious 2020 Presidential election in Belarus, which saw incumbent Alexander Lukashenko claim victory despite widespread protests and accusations of election fraud, several members of the country’s security forces defected from the government. On October 20, 2020, some of them joined forces to create the Association of Security Forces of Belarus (BYPOL), a dissident group of former law enforcement officers who oppose Lukashenko’s rule and seek to have him toppled (1). Since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the group has claimed participation in partisan activities against Russian forces in Belarus (2). From disrupting rail lines, to firearms training, and even damaging a Russian spy plane with a drone, BYPOL’s capacity to inflict violence on the Belarusian state and its allies has grown. History & Foundations Alexander Lukashenko was first elected President of Belarus in 1994, becoming the ex-Soviet state’s first, and so far only, head of state. Lukashenko’s Belarus has been described as a 'mini version' of the Soviet Union by numerous political scientists, as the former Soviet farm manager has restored "the old Soviet economic system with only marginal market economic elements; gradually increasing political repression; and close political relations with Russia". These elements have been implemented as the main pillars of his leadership position (3). In the 2020 presidential election, political activist Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya challenged Lukashenko for the office. Lukashenko claimed victory, but widespread accusations of election fraud led to country-wide protests. Subsequent acts of repression and violence by state security forces only intensified much of the population’s anger, with many calling for Lukashenko to step down. At this time, a group of law enforcement officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Aliaksandr Azarau began defecting from the state and calling on other security forces to do the same. These officers formed BYPOL (Association of Security Forces of Belarus) to oppose the President (4). Ideology & Objectives BYPOL does not seem to espouse a singular political ideology. In a video published on their YouTube channel, Azarau claims the group seeks “the establishment of rule of law, respect for human rights, and the transition to a free market economy." (5) The group supports Belarussian political activists, including the 2020 election challenger Sviatlana Tshikhanouskaya. It views the defeat of Russia and the toppling of Vladimir Putin as equally crucial to the overthrow of Lukashenko given the two countries union and geopolitical partnership (6). Military & Political Abilities The group claims to have 200,000 members signed up for its Peramoga (Total Victory) plan. According to Azarau, each member is assigned certain tasks to be performed, either actively or as part of an eventual widespread uprising. Tasks to be performed include sabotage, creating roadblocks, organizing protests, or taking control of state functions (7). In videos on its YouTube channel, BYPOL volunteers can be seen doing target practice, throwing molotov cocktails, and doing medical training in either Poland or Ukraine. Several of its members are said to be on the front lines of the war in Ukraine (8). On the 5th of March 2023, BYPOL claimed to have attacked a Russian A-50 spy plane stationed at a runway in Belarus. The group later released video of a drone landing on the plane’s radar dish and Belarusian authorities eventually admitted that the aircraft was damaged in a drone attack. Along with BYPOL’s participation in the Rail War through acts of sabotaging rail lines supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group seems capable of at least some partisan activities in their home country (9). Approach to Resistance BYPOL’s early internet content consisted mostly of investigations of police brutality in Belarus. One investigation saw BYPOL release supposed audio of Belarusian officials creating unsafe conditions for detainees. Naming and shaming officers charged with abuse is a common BYPOL tactic, along with calls for state officials and security service members to defect to their side (10). Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, BYPOL has stepped up its armed activity. In addition to the aforementioned acts of sabotage, the group claims to have several members serving on the frontlines in Ukraine. If and when the group implements its Peramoga plan, it is likely the group will need to step up its armed activity against the state (11). Well familiar with the inner workings of the Belarusian state and security forces, BYPOL members will have many cards up their sleeves and knowledge to work from when they choose to take a more direct approach against Lukashenko. International Relations & Alliances BYPOL is designated a terrorist organization by the Belarusian government (12). Unable to operate openly in their homeland, the group is now based in Warsaw, where Polish authorities have given them refuge. They also remain sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause, considering Russia a joint enemy. Lukashenko claimed the perpetrator of the attack (on the A-50) was arrested along with more than 20 accomplices and that he has ties to Ukrainian security services. However, “both BYPOL and Ukrainian authorities rejected allegations that Kyiv was involved”(13). According to its website, BYPOL has “associates” located in Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, the USA, Sweden, Australia, Belgium, Germany,Georgia, Israel, Ireland, Italy, Canada, Cyprus, Russia, Slovakia, Montenegro (14). The group works closely with some other Belarusian opposition groups, such as the Cyber Partisans. Both have been active in the Rail War, with BYPOL members destroying relays and Cyber Partisans hacking ticket systems. In August of 2022, BYPOL and Azarou joined the United Transitional Council (UTC), led by 2020 Presidential candidate Sviatlana Tshikhanouskaya. The group is not recognized as the legitimate government of Belarus by any international state or entity. Other Belarusian opposition figures have also expressed displeasure with the UTC, stating that nobody elected its members and it is no better than the Belarusian People’s Assembly (15). Despite its short history, BYPOL has shown its willingness to attack elements of the Belarusian state and attract a number of former police and military members to its cause. Whether it can overthrow the Lukashenko government will only be seen when it puts its Peramoga plan into action. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The People's Defense Units (YPG - Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) are a Kurdish militia based in Syria and is the main component force which makes up the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This armed militia was set up in order to protect and defend Kurdish inhabited areas in northern Syria such as Syrian Kurdistan and the Kurdish majority neighbourhood of Sheikh Maqsood in Aleppo. It is the armed wing of the Democratic Union Party in Syria which is a Kurdish left-wing political party established in 2003. In mid-2012, the group faced Syrian government forces in a standoff outside of the city of Kobanî and -- after negotiations between the two forces the government -- troops withdrew and the YPG took control of several areas, including Kobanî, Amuda and Afrin (Abdulmajid, 2012). As a part of the SDF, the YPG has maintained the autonomy of the region in northeastern Syria known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), or Rojava (The New Arab & Agencies, 2016). This autonomous region, although not fully recognised by any state apart from the Catalan parliament (Wilgenburg, 2021), is multiethnic and this is reflected in the membership makeup of the YPG. Although made up of primarily Kurdish members, the YPG has significant numbers of minority groups within its ranks, including Assyrian as well as Armenian Christian members. The group also has a subcomponent unit known as the YPG International, which is made up of foreign fighters who travelled to Syria in order to fight alongside the SDF in an English-speaking unit. It is mostly composed of Western Europeans and Americans. History & Foundations The group was set up as a unified force in early 2011, and the self-defence committees (which were the early progenitor organisation of the YPG) were formed and were known as the YXG or the Self Protection Units (Knapp et al. 2016, p51). Formed as a response to the Syrian Civil war which began in 2011, the YPG (or its predecessor) was set up in order to secure and represent a Kurdish desire for autonomy and protection from Islamist extremist groups such as ISIS. In 2015, the group secured a major victory against Islamic State forces during the siege of Kobanî, in which the YPG received support from the US air force and retook the city after a 3 and a half month siege (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2015) and by mid march (3 months later), the YPG and allied forces had retaken almost all of the villages which had been lost in the Kobanî region (deSyracuse, 2015). The YPG is regarded as the ‘most effective’ fighting force in Syria (BBC Monitoring, 2015). Since 2015 the group has led multiple successful campaigns against ISIS, including leading the operation within the SDF to liberate the city of Raqqa from IS forces. This campaign was successful and the SDF, including more than 25000 YPG fighters (83% of all fighters in the campaign) (BBC Middle East, 2016), recaptured an area of more than 7,400 square kilometres from ISIL during the overall campaign (Department of Defence, 2017). Objectives & Ideology As the official army of the AANES (Rojava), the YPG was set up to protect the values of the people of Rojava and as such it is founded on several ideological principles including ecology, women's liberation, and the protection/development of a democratic society in Rojava (YPG, 2020). Due to its democratic principles and the ideology espoused by the AANES, it is a volunteer army made up of various religions and ethnicities including Arabs, Assyrians, Yazidis, Armenians as well as Turkmen and Kurds (Holmes, 2020). The YPG also had increasing amounts of women joining its ranks due to its feminist liberatory political stance, which is especially unique in the region, and since then it has set up a separate military organisation known as the YPJ (Women's Protection Units) with an estimated membership of 24,000 (Argentieri, 2017) in order to organise the increasing amounts of female recruits (Jan Kalan, 2013). Military & Political Abilities The group has been frequently described as being “one of the most effective forces in the fight against ISIS” (BBC Monitoring, 2015) and this is reflected in their military abilities. Due to its origin as a light infantry force, the YPG has limited amounts of military equipment. As a result, it relies heavily upon snipers and infantry armed with soviet era weaponry which is then backed up by mounted HMGs (Heavy Machine Guns). Officers within the YPG are appointed via internal elections and this is reflected in the self-designation as a people's army and the YPGs ideological background (Ahmad, 2012). The YPG has the least amount of armour available to them in comparison to other major factions in the Syrian conflict such as ISIS and the Syrian army (Nasi, 2017). However the lack of armoured vehicles such as tanks has not hindered the YPG and they have produced what are effectively DIY armoured vehicles, often welding the hulls of abandoned APCs such as the BTR-60 (Armoured Personnel Carriers) to the back of trucks to create improvised AFVs (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) (Mitzer and Oliemans, 2021). The group has also received a large amount of equipment from the United States, including mine-resistant vehicles as well as Humvees and a number of M2 Bradley IFVs. These vehicles were given to the YPG by the US in order to increase their effectiveness in the fight against ISIS. However, due to the latter's diminishing as a battlefield-capable threat, these vehicles will most likely be used to fight against Turkish incursions in northern Syria (Reuters, 2022). Approach to Resistance Although the group is violent, this violence is expressed in a different context when compared to other regional insurgencies such as ISIS or Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). For instance, YPG forces are more defensive of territory which they claim to be theirs and are largely egalitarian. However, accusations of ethnic displacement and cleansing have been reported against the group due to the bulldozing and forced displacement of villages. They have denied these allegations on the grounds that they were demolishing building used by ISIS (Amnesty International, 2015). Due to their democratic socialist ideals, the group's actions are in stark contrast with other groups in the region. This has led to them detaining and imprisoning opposing fighters instead of executing them, and this has since led to the mass-overfilling of their prison systems as they have to decide between protecting these prisons or fending off Turkish incursions and attacks (Berger, 2019). In combat, the group has utilised US-led coalition airstrikes to great effect and this enabled them to take back land which was once controlled by ISIS and other Syria-based opponents such as the SNA (Syrian National Army) (Rosenblatt and Kilcullen,2020). Nevertheless, due to their largest opponents now being the Turkish army, the US and its coalition partners are unable to target Turkish military installations and the Turkish Air Force; the YPG has hence struggled in their fight against Turkey (Al-Jazeera, 2018). International Relations & Potential Alliances The YPG has extensive international links which range from material and combat support provided by the US-led Coalition forces to potential links and cooperation with the Russian Air force (Faulconbridge, 2016). The US has supported the YPG with both equipment and air support, which helped to lead to the deterioration of ISIS control over territories that they had earlier captured (Weaver and Borger, 2015). YPG special forces have also benefited from US support and they have been seen being equipped with US weaponry and equipment in the form of American night vision goggles, American combat helmets and M4 carbines amongst other items. However, the Pentagon has denied officially supplying the YPG with this equipment (Snow, 2017). Allegations of cooperation between the YPG and the Russian Armed forces have been widespread and claims for this have stated that there is “very disturbing evidence of coordination between Syrian Kurdish forces, the Syrian regime and the Russian air force” (Faulconbridge, 2016). This has led to ambiguity regarding the Kurdish role in the overall peace process in Syria, as there is speculation that they may seek to collaborate more closely with the Syrian government and the Russian Federation in order to secure their existence (Ayton, 2020). The withdrawal of American forces from North Eastern Syria in October of 2019 due to a redeployment order by then US President Trump has caused the YPG to reconsider their relationship with America due to further conflicts with Turkey (Tastekin, 2020). This has opened up further negotiations for further collaboration between the YPG and Russia and potentially the Syrian government. Additional Resources