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Note: This is not the official flag of the Shabiha, but rather a reproduction containing the flag of Syria (as this is the country they are active in). Introduction & Overview The Shabiha are loosely associated militias with criminal characteristics which have operated on the pro-Assad side during the Syrian Civil War. Drawing on a history of mafia-like criminal enterprise, the Shabiha proved to be fundamental for the pro-Assad Syrian government, especially during the early phases of the war, as it struggled to maintain support in many regions. These criminal elements therefore evolved from a crime syndicate in the 1960s into militias that keep the populace in line. History & Foundations The term Shabiha is of controversial origin. Some ascribe it to Shabah (ghost), others to Shabaha (the act of ripping something apart) (1). Regardless, their members were originally smugglers and gangsters based in the coastal and mountainous areas of Syria, particularly around Latakia (2). These individuals generally belonged to the Alawite minority, which has historically been discriminated against both socially and politically. Up until the 1960s, they had little opportunities other than joining the military or engaging in criminal activities (3). In 1963, the Syrian Baath Party came to power through a coup, which was followed by a series of conflicts and further coups against opposing factions inside the new regime. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad and his faction in the Syrian military were able to oust opponents and gained power unopposed. Under the new leadership, the role of ethnic Alawites in key posts in the Syrian state gradually grew. The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) was an extremely lucrative affair for the Shabiha, since they made a regular business out of the need to smuggle wares, weapons, and people across the Syrian-Lebanese border (4). During this time, their influence on popular culture increased, when the term Shabah came to indicate the Shabiha’s favourite vehicle, a Mercedes S-600 (5). Between 1979 and 1982, the Shabiha were deployed by the Assads against the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist insurgency. It was during this time that the Shabiha participated in brutal operations, such as the Tadmor Prison massacre in 1980, and the massacre of Hama in 1982 (6). It is especially notable that by this time, Rifaat al-Assad, Syria’s leader Hafez al-Assad’s brother, was considered a major leader of the Shabiha, and his private militia (the “Defence Brigades”) may have been composed of many Shabiha members (7). When Rifaat fell in disgrace following an attempted coup in 1984, the Shabiha lost some of their power. During the 1990s, the Syrian government started cracking down on the Shabiha, with a major push for the repression coming from Bassel al-Assad. (8)(9) For instance, the 1999 Latakia incident is generally understood to be a final showdown between Rifaat’s remaining power base and the rest of the Assad family (10). After Bassel’s death, Bashar and Maher al-Assad continued the repression of the Shabiha throughout the 2000s, forcing them to return to clandestine, criminal activity after they had lost their political power (11). The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 plunged the country into chaos. This situation contributed to the partial disintegration of the Syrian Arab Army, and at the same time, the proliferation of informal or self-organized armed groups on the side of the regime, such as the Popular Committees (12). During this phase, the Shabiha were reorganized with the support of the Mukhabarat (Syrian security services), and they swiftly started their brutal retaliation against opponents of the regime (13). As the war continued, the Shabiha were able to receive increasing levels support from the Syrian state, and some of their members also went on to join the National Defence Forces, another state-sponsored militia which was created in order to rein in the Shabiha. (14)(15) The new wartime role of the Shabiha did not mean that common criminal activity and racketeering has ceased, and this has even led to confrontations between the Shabiha, the regular army and the Mukhabarat. Ideology & Objectives The Shabiha have little ideological connotations, other than a tribalistic loyalty to the Assad family and, more loosely, to Alawite areas as their powerbase. Originating from organized crime and racketeering, they are mainly motivated by the predatory opportunities of the Syrian Civil War, and they do not hesitate in inflicting any sort of atrocity on the populace, whether this is ordered by the Syrian regime or not. The Shabiha are known to loot and ransack areas which have been recently (re-)taken by the Syrian Arab Army (17). They also take possession of abandoned housing and apartments, often kicking out even legitimate tenants (18). Prostitution is another business where the Shabiha are often active (19). Political/Military Abilities & Alliances They are usually employed by the regime in rear guard and repression activities in the areas where the population is deemed unreliable (20). If required to join offensive operations, they are theoretically bound to the Syrian military hierarchy, but in reality, each Shabiha detachment only answers to their own commander (21). Moreover, their armament is not standardized and can vary. The Shabiha are a borderline entity, and exist at the intersection of security services, military, and organized crime (22). They are able to thrive in the institutional and military chaos that is immanent in Syria, and act within the regime’s mandate and against it alike, according to their own local interests (23). The Shabiha are known to entertain relations with Hezbollah, which provides them with regular and specialized military training (24). Iran also has ties to some Shabiha groups (25). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Abu Sayyaf, also known as the Islamic State - East Asia Province, is a jihadist separatist insurgency operating in the southern Philippine islands of Jolo, Mindanao, and Basilan. Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani founded the group in 1989 to spread the Wahhabi doctrine and establish an independent Moro Province (1). Abu Sayyaf is notorious for its terrorist acts including bombings, kidnapping, assassinations, and extortion. Despite being based in the Philippines, Abu Sayyaf has managed to spread its influence on neighboring countries in Southeast Asia, living up to its name as the east Asian province of the Islamic State. History & Foundations The genesis of Abu Sayyaf can be traced all the way back to the 80s, when Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) members fought against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan alongside the International Islamic Brigade. After the conflict with the Soviets ended, Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani formed an unnamed group in 1988. In 1989, Janjalani named the group Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) while breaking away from MNLF in the process (2). However, the group was eventually renamed into 'Abu Sayyaf' as an homage to the Afghan resistance leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, meaning “Father of the Swordsman”. Under his leadership, Janjalani aimed to make Abu Sayyaf an organized and hierarchical jihadist organization in the Southern Philipines. The plan was to have a military arm called Mujahideen Al-Sharifullah with three armed divisions to execute terrorist attacks (3). Those three groups consist of a demolition unit, a mobile force team, and a propaganda team (4). Though in the 90s Abu Sayyaf successfully carried out attacks, Janjalani’s plan never fully came to fruition due to his death. Janjalani’s death marks a turning point for Abu Sayyaf as the insurgency's members then shifted their methods from traditional bombings and attacks to kidnappings, murders, robberies, and drug dealing. Despite the unanimous consensus that Abdurajak Janjalani founded Abu Sayyaf, the group’s genesis has been disputed by many. One of the theories that sprouted during the 90s was that the military allegedly formed Abu Sayyaf to infiltrate the group’s ranks, in order to act as a puppet for the Armed Forces of the Philipines (5). Other sources, nonetheless, allege that the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) was the main source of Abu Sayyaf’s establishment with the support of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (6). All institutions said to be involved in Abu Sayyaf's formation have denied all allegations. Objectives & Ideology During the leadership of Abdurajak Janjalani, Abu Sayyaf focused on establishing an independent Moro Province while spreading Wahhabism in the process. Though still maintaining its religious ideology, the group experienced a shift in methods and goals after the death of Abdurajik Janjalani. When his brother Khadaffy Janjalani took over the reins, Abu Sayyaf started implementing tactics such as kidnappings and ransoms, signaling that their goals were more focused on financial profit (7). With this presumed shift in motivation, in the 21st century, Abu Sayyaf has been portrayed more as a criminal organization rather than an insurgency with political motives. In 2014, the group published a video pledging its allegiance to the Islamic State and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (8). They have officially established themselves as the East Asia province of the Islamic State. Military Abilities & Approach to Resistance Abu Sayyaf is considered to be one of the most violent terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. Their tactics include bombings, kidnappings, drive-by shootings, and even drug trafficking. In regard to recruitment, the group utilizes money, fame, and protection against other ethnic groups as its primary recruiting tool (9). During the leadership of Abdurajik Janjalani, the group regularly organized large-scale attacks and bombings. Most notably in 1995, Janjalani led Abu Sayyaf into the Ipil Massacre. Abu Sayyaf militants arrived in the municipality of Ipil on the 4th of April 1995 by boat and bus and, once they arrived, around 200 gunmen open fired on locals, strafed residential areas, robbed banks, held 30 people hostage, and burned the city center to the ground (10). The militants fled to the mountains, pursued by military commandos while looting farms and using civilians as human shields (11). In the aftermath, more than 100 people were killed, including the Ipil Police chief, and around one billion pesos were looted from eight banks (12). Abu Sayyaf is also responsible for one of the worst terrorist attacks in the Philipines, having bombed the MV Superferry 14 in 2004 after it was perpetrated by a suicide bomber, killing 116 people including children (13). The attack was a form of protest against what the group perceived as the discrimination of Muslim communities in the Philippines. One of the group’s more ideologically-driven operations took place in 2019 when they bombed a Roman Catholic cathedral in Jolo, Southern Philipines. The attacks were allegedly a response to the Armed Forces operations against the group and also the establishment of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (14). This attack prompted the President at the time, Rodrigo Duterte, to declare all-out war on Abu Sayyaf. A recent operation that the group executed was the kidnapping of four Indonesian citizens for ransom. The victims were kidnapped in Tambisan Lahad Datu, Malaysia, on the 16th of January 2020 and held hostage until being rescued on March 18th, 2021 (15). These kinds of tactics have been one of the main sources of the group’s income. What they get out of it can range from $650,000 USD to $16,000,000 USD, giving it their needed funding for weapons, drugs, and resources for future endeavors. International Relations and Alliances Since Abu Sayyaf’s genesis, the group has been establishing local coalitions in Jolo’s numerous districts. Specifically, the group has received support from the municipalities of Patikul, Talipao, and Indanan. Abu Sayyaf also has ties with Jemaah Islamiyah, the Indonesian terrorist organization responsible for the Bali bombings. The two groups share the same jihadist ideology despite having completely different approaches to resistance. The two groups' cooperation comes in the form of arms trading, money, logistical support, and the provision of safe havens for each other’s members (16). According to international terrorism expert Professor Rohan Gunarathna, Abu Sayyaf has collaborated with Jemaah Islamiyah on many operations. He even claims that Jemaah Islamiyah taught Abu Sayyaf members how to make bombs (17). In recent years, as aforementioned, Abu Sayyaf has also pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State (declaring themselves as the Islamic State East Asia Province in 2014). Since then, the group’s kidnappings and attacks have been in the name of the Islamic State. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Defend the Atlanta Forest, also known as Atlanta Forest Defenders, (DTF) is part of a decentralized social movement to fight against the militarization of local police forces and the expanding film industry in South Atlanta, Georgia. DTF seeks to maintain the Weelaunee Forest’s current footprint through eco-activism and the occupation of proposed construction sites (1). The DTF’s ‘occupiers’ began their operations in late 2021 when they conducted marches to protest the proposed construction of the emergency services training facility nicknamed “Cop City” (2). After city council members voted to proceed with construction, small cells of protestors made tree stands, roadblocks, and outposts inside the forest. Occupiers use themselves to block construction equipment from entering the site and recon for police patrols in the area (3). DTF has also established a supply chain to bring logistics, such as food, camping equipment, and medical supplies, from supporters to the occupiers (4). On a few occasions, DTF has used violent force in retaliation to police activity inside the proposed construction site (5). History & Foundations The Muscogee People, a confederation of several Native American tribes, originally inhabited the land that the Weelaunee Forest sits on today. After the American Revolution, settlers began to migrate to the area, causing a rise in hostility between all parties that inhabited the land. These hostilities would eventually lead to a breaking point after a war between federal troops and the tribes who resisted assimilation into American society. This conflict resulted in the founding of DeKalb county. During the 1900s, the land was transformed into a prison farm where primarily minority prisoners worked to grow crops for the greater Atlanta area (6). After international protests broke out over the death of George Floyd in the summer of 2020, Atlanta City officials advocated for the construction of a 300-acre tactical emergency services training facility in the Weelaunee Forest. Once construction plans were publicly announced, activists participating in the 2020 Protests organized again to vocalize their concerns through marches. These marches would later create the foundations of the DTF movement (7). Despite public backlash and a lack of proper permits, the Reeves Young Construction Company (the company contracted with the project) started using heavy machinery to clear trees from the proposed site (8). Now working under the name DTF, eco-activists, anarchists, and anti-police advocates occupied tree stands in the area. Intending to prevent further equipment from being brought in by the Reeves Young contractors, activists began using themselves to block equipment from entering the forest. Eventually, they would use torched construction company vehicles and other means to establish permanent roadblocks leading to the site (9). This escalation in DTF actions led the local sheriff’s office to close off the park for public access and increase the number of officers tasked with patrolling the forest, escorting construction workers to the site, and raiding occupied tree stands. Despite the park being closed by officials, DTF members cleared the barricades to open it back up to the community and announced that the park would now be renamed the Weelaunee People’s Park (10). Police presence increased as a result. During one of the construction escorts, officers claimed to have been attacked with Molotov cocktails and pelted with rocks, causing police officials to announce later that they would “shoot to kill” if met with deadly force. Almost two years later, these claims would become a reality when Atlanta State Troopers – who were conducting a raid to dismantle DTF tree stands in the area – shot and killed activist Manuel Esteban Paez Terán nicknamed Tortuguita, whom Atlanta officials claimed opened fire on officers. However, no evidence has come out due to Georgia State police not being required to use body cameras during duty (11). Tortuguita’s death sparked national outrage, causing vigils to be held nationwide and leading to a protest breaking out in Downtown Atlanta. This protest in the heart of Atlanta resulted in offices associated with the construction of the training facility to be vandalized, a cop car being set ablaze and 1,000 Georgian National Guard soldiers to be put on standby (12). Vigil held in honor of Tortuguita. Photo by Liam Coyle, @coyle_mi on Instagram Objectives & Ideology DTF operates as a decentralized movement of individuals with various ideological views, ranging from anarchists and anti-fascists to eco-activists. Despite this range of different views, all DTF members believe that cop city will introduce a new age of militarized policing to suppress resistance to current power structures leading the world into an ecological disaster. Wanting to fight against this threat of authoritarian control, anarchists have become a prevalent part of the fight against the training facility (13). As told on the DTF website, “Defend the Atlanta Forest is a fight for the future of the Atlanta forest. DTF is a social movement, not an organization or group of people. As such, it has a changing and diverse participation from grassroots groups and individuals dedicated to fighting the creeping dystopia of police militarization and ecological ruin. As a slogan Defend the Atlanta Forest is a declaration of opposition to the destruction of South River/Weelaunee Forest and the construction of both the Cop City training compound and Blackhall Studios’s Soundstage Complex.” (14) Military & Political Abilities Due to DTF’s decentralized nature and despite being labeled as a domestic terrorist organization, they have been able to achieve a wide array of different attributes, such as the ability to establish logistical support, compile open source intelligence to detect police activity around the forest, organize protests, provide medical support, and most importantly maintain sufficient manpower consisting of individuals for all around the country to occupy a large area of forest (15). DTF also continue their efforts past DeKland county borders with national outreach tours, the vandalization of any company facilities associated with the construction of Cop City, and an accumulation of around 69,000 followers across their social media channels (16). Due to these efforts, the slogans of DTF can be seen worldwide in the form of protest signs, banners, and graffiti. Stop Cop City Sticker in Zürich, Switzerland. Photo by Liam Coyle, @coyle_mi on Instagram Approach to Resistance DTF’s approach to resistance has changed throughout the years. They initially focused on political activism, such as petitions and call campaigns, to voice their concerns to officials related to the project. However, due to the lack of concrete results, DTF has transitioned into primarily focusing on direct action tactics (17). These direct action tactics include the occupation of the proposed construction site, attendance to protests in order to show presence/activity in the area, the construction of roadblocks to prevent construction equipment from reaching the site, the establishment of community outreach events in the Weelaunee People’s Park, and the tracking of police activity in the area. Due to DTF being decentralized with no clear leadership, individuals linked to the DTF movement also participate in the vandalization of company facilities that are involved in the construction of Cop City. Members have also reportedly set fire to construction equipment in the forest, despite DTF media platforms not officially calling for nor instigating these actions (18). Potential Alliances While DTF lacks any official alliances, primarily due to its decentralized structure, they have a large number of groups and individuals who organize actions in solidarity with DTF’s efforts. One of the most prominent groups is the Atlanta-based organization named Community Movement Builders (CMB). CMB describes itself as a Black-member-based collective of community residents and activists serving the black working-class and poor black communities. They respond to threats to lower-income black communities in Atlanta, such as gentrification, displacement, and over-policing, which they believe Cop City would only worsen (19). CMB works together and in solidarity with DTF to organize community outreach events, petitions, and rallies within the Atlanta area (20). DTF has also received support from out-of-state groups and collectives. Firestorm Books in Asheville, North Carolina, has established supply drive events which are used to get donations from the community to help occupiers maintain a presence in the Weelaunee Forest (21). Besides pre-established organizations, individuals working in solidarity with DTF have sent communiques claiming to be responsible for arson and vandalism attacks on companies associated with the training facility (22). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Azov Regiment ‘Полк Азов’ (formally Battalion) is a Special Purpose Regiment of the Ukrainian National Guard. Comprised solely of volunteers, the Battalion was founded on May 5th 2014, by Andriy Biletsky, the ‘Vasyl’kiv Terrorists’ Serhiy Bevz, Ihor Mosiychuk, Volodymyr Shpara, and Oleh Odnorozhenko, in Berdyan’sk, near Ukraine's Azov sea – from which the group derives its name (1). As self-proclaimed Ukrainian nationalists, the group formed as a response to the Ukrainian military’s inability to effectively counter Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region of the nation (2). Azov gained infamy due to the far-right leanings of its commander Andriy Biletsky, and its use of far-right symbolism such as the inverted wolfsangel (utilised by the SS Panzer Division ‘Das Reich’), as well as the Schwarze Sonne – a design commissioned by Heinrich Himmler, and which decorated the floor of the SS’s Wewelslburg Castle (3)(4). In light of this, in Azov’s early stages, it was primarily bankrolled by Jewish Oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskyi (5). In the present day, Azov has morphed and divided into a military, paramilitary, and political system. The incorporation of the Azov regiment into the regular Ukrainian armed forces means that it is distinct from the wider ‘Azov Movement’ which includes the political party National Corps, headed by Andriy Biletsky, and the Centuria group (formally National Militia), a paramilitary street patrol (6). Due to its use of far-right symbolism, various political commentators have marked the regiment and wider movement as neo-Nazi (7). Furthermore, Azov has become a key target of Russian propaganda in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian information war, with Azov being labelled a principal ‘casus belli’ for Russia's special ‘de-Nazification’ operation in Ukraine, since which, the group has operated in Mariupol, Kharkiv, Bakmut and Kyiv (8)(9)(10). History & Foundations The birth of Azov is found in the closing weeks of the Euromaidan protests (2013-2014), a period of civil unrest which resulted in the ousting of the nation's Russia-friendly President Viktor Yanukovych (11). In the aftermath, draft bill 4271 “On the Granting of Amnesty in Ukraine” was passed through the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) (12). The bill exonerated political prisoners – including Andriy Biletsky, Oleh Odnorozhenko and the ‘Vasyl’kiv Terorrists’ Serhiy Bevz, Ihor Mosiychuk, and Volodymyr Shpara – who had been charged with plotting to blow up a statue of Vladimir Lenin in the town of Boryspil’ (13). Biletsky, who had in 2005 and 2008 created the far-right, ultra-nationalist Patriot of Ukraine and Social Nationalist Assembly political parties (which also utilised the wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne symbols), alongside far-right football ultras ‘Sect 82’ and ‘Dynamo Kyiv’ created the ‘Black Corps’, a street patrolling militia based in Kharkiv (14)(15)(16). Later, in April 2014, the nation's interior minister issued a decree enabling the creation of volunteer paramilitary units as the military became increasingly unable to deal with Russia’s covert operation in Crimea and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas (17). On May 5th 2014, Azov officially became a volunteer battalion (18). Not long after, on June 13th, the Battalion recaptured Mariupol, a strategically important port city, which connects the Donbas to Crimea, from insurgents of the newly-created Donetsk people’s Republic (19). The success of this offensive earned Azov its initial credibility and subsequent infamy as images released after the battle illustrated the battalion's persistent use of far-right and Nazi symbolism (20). In September, the Battalion formally became a Regiment and came under the command of the Ukrainian National Guard in November 2014 (21)(22). Objectives & Ideology The Azov Battalion’s (now Regiment) overarching objective since its conception has been the defence of Ukrainian territory from first, Russian-backed separatists with the onset of the war in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Donbas in 2014, and continues to the present, with the onset of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the objectives and ideology of the wider ‘Azov Movement’ which includes a political party, the ‘National corps’ and a paramilitary structure, ‘Centuria’ are murkier (23). Andriy Biletsky’s direct influence on the Regiment dissipated with his entry into Politics in October 2014, although many veterans of the first and second sieges of Mariupol still view Biletsky as the Azov movement's de-facto ideological leader. Initially, the Battalion's ideology came from a convergence of the far-right leanings of the Sect 82 and Dynamo Kyiv football ultras, as well as the ultranationalist, white supremacist rhetoric of the Patriot of Ukraine and Social-National Assembly. In the current period, the Azov Movement has referred to the works of Dmytro Donstov (an advocate of militant nationalism), Ernest Junger (referred to frequently by the Azov Movements spokeswoman Olena Semenyaka) and Dominique Venner of France’s 1960s ‘Nouvelle Droite’ movement (24). The Regiment, however, has distanced itself from the Azov movement on paper, and as a unit of the Ukrainian military cannot be politically aligned (25). Furthermore, after the surrender of a vast majority of the Azov regiment following the capture of the Azovstal iron and steel works by Russian forces on May 20, 2022, the creation of a new ‘Azov Kyiv’ territorial defence unit was announced (26). The new unit, which forms part of a Special Operations Force ‘Azov SSO Regiment,’ has dropped the Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne symbolism completely, in favour of the ‘Tryzub’ (Ukrainian Three Tridents) (27). The original Azov Regiment, however, retains the Wolfsangel and Schwarze Sonne Symbols (28). Military & Political Abilities Since its integration into the Ukrainian National Guard, Azov has existed as a regularly armed unit. However, since 2018, the United States in its annual defence appropriations budget has banned Material support from reaching the Regiment (29). Despite this, since 2019, the regiment has incorporated a T-64 tank company, two motorised infantry battalions as well as surveillance and drone reconnaissance squads, sniper teams, canine units, as well as engineering, logistics and research teams (30). Furthermore, its fierce fighting tactics (such as dipping bullets in pig fat to be used against Muslim Chechen fighters) have somewhat mythologised the Regiment and its off-branches (31). Formally, the Azov regiment is no longer aligned with the Azov movement nor its political party the National Corps, which was referred to as a nationalist hate group by the US Department of State in 2018 (32). Additionally, National Corps is an advocate of the ‘Intermarium Project’, a politico-military alliance which advocates the creation of a union of states from nations west-east of the Baltic and Black seas to nations north-south from the arctic ocean to the Mediterranean sea (33). However, National Corps has continuously struggled to garner wide support due to its hardline ideology, with the party gaining less than 3% of votes in Ukraine's 2019 parliamentary election (34). Approach to Resistance Prior to Azov's conception, its soon-to-be members played a crucial role in the Euromaidan protests, as their knowledge of street fighting proved invaluable to the wider pushback against President Yanukovych and his Berkut (Ukrainian riot police) (35)(36). With Azov’s materialisation into a lightly armed volunteer Battalion and later a fully armed Regiment, it has faced various accusations of human rights abuses regarding its frontline actions, from arbitrary detentions, abuse, torture and weapons trafficking (37). Following the capture of the majority of the Azov Regiment at Mariupol’s Azovstal iron and steel works in May 2022, the Regiment's remaining members regrouped and are currently training under the guidance of American private security company ‘Mozart Group’ (38). Furthermore, during the early stages of the Russian invasion, a special sabotage unit ‘Kraken’, consisting of Azov veterans and Azov movement members, has been operating alongside Ukraine’s main intelligence Directorate (HUR) (39). In addition, the Azov movement uses various campaigns to attract new members as well as garner support for the Regiment. International Relations & Alliances Since its incorporation into the Ukrainian armed forces, the Azov regiment has released many of its foreign fighters and distanced itself from the far-right organizations which originally formed its ideological and cultural foundation. Prior to the Regiment’s incorporation however, the Azov Battalion housed various foreign fighters such as Swedish white nationalist and sniper, Mikael Skillt (now commander of the Ukrainian SSO), as well as a former Greek army serviceman and French Foreign Legion veteran, nicknamed “the Greek” (40). Furthermore, the various articles pushed by both Western and Russian news channels have increased Azov’s visibility in the international realm. This is seen through the deportation of two American ‘Atomwaffen’ members who sought to join the regiment in 2020 (41). In addition, some Azov members have been seen at various Mixed Martial Arts tournaments with members of ‘Ouest Casual’ (a French nationalist group) and ‘Zouaves Paris’ (a French neo-nazi militant group which has now disbanded) (42)(43). The Azov Movement also utilises music festivals such as ‘Asgardei’, through which fans of National Socialist Black Metal gather in Kyiv (44). Formally based in Russia and founded by Neo-nazi Alexey Levkin, the festival draws in metal heads and members of far-right organizations from all over Europe (45). Thus, while the abilities of the Azov Regiment to interact and recruit from inside the Ukrainian and wider European far-right scene have diminished, those of the Azov Movement have not. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The FLNC (Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale Corsu, Corsican National Liberation Front) was founded in 1976 as a merger of a few Corsican militant groups opposing French rule. In the following decades, the group remained one of the most active terrorist groups in Europe, with thousands of bombings and shootings to its name. The group declared the cessation of armed struggle in 2014, but they withheld their arsenal. In 2016, the FLNC threatened retaliation against ISIS for any activity in Corsica. Since then, FNLC splinter groups seem to have reorganised. History & Foundations Corsica has had a troubled history, but one of the most significant turning points was the French occupation in 1768, which erased the Pasquale Paoli’s Corsican Republic’s sovereignty after years of Genoese rule. In the following centuries, Corsica remained a peripheral territory of the French state. The FLNC was founded in 1976 as the united organization of some Corsican militant groups. After a sit-in at a French-owned vineyard was repressed with 1200 riot policemen, helicopters and armored cars (1) in August 1975, and after the ARC was banned and some of its members charged (2), militant groups such as Ghjustizia Paolina (“Paoli’s Justice”), Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (“Rural Corsican Liberation Front”) and Azzione per a Rinascita Corsa (“Action for Corsican Rebirth”, ARC)(3) decided a new phase of armed struggle was necessary and formed the FLNC. In the following years, FLNC attacks reached such intensity and frequency that the group easily became the most active and dangerous militant group in Europe at the time. In 1979, the FLNC struck 22 targets in Paris in one night (4). Throughout the 1980s, the FLNC carried out between 600 and 700 bombing attacks per year (5). By that time, the modus operandi of the FLNC was well-established, with most attacks targeting property and symbols of the French state and its “colonial” presence, such as military bases, police stations, and tribunals (6). Another typical target is property owned by Frenchmen. This culminated with the highest profile killing perpetrated by the FLNC to date, i.e. the assassination of French prefect (state official) Claude Érignac in February 1998, which was carried out in public with three shots to the victim’s head (7). The alleged perpetrator, Yvan Colonna, was only arrested in 2003. Colonna was assaulted in prison in unclear circumstances in 2022, which unleashed a wave of protests and riots in Corsica (8). In 1990, the FLNC divided into two factions (named “channels”), the FLNC historique (“historical”), and the FLNC habituel (“usual”) (9). During the 1990s, the FLNC suffered a number of splits, which generated other armed groups fighting for Corsican independence, such as Fronte Ribellu (“Rebel Front”, 1995-1999), Fronte Patriotu Corsu (“Corsican Patriotic Front”, 1999), Clandestinu (“Clandestine”, 1997-1999), Armata Corsa (“Corsican Army”, 1999-2001) (10), Resistenza (“Resistance”, 1990-1996?) (11). In 1999, most splinter groups joined the FLNC habituel to form the FLNC-UC (“Union of combatants”) (12). During the 1990s, a long string of feuds and killings amongst former and current FLNC members led to tens of deaths (13), although it is at times difficult to establish which were political homicides and which ones were tied to criminal cartels (14). A major example was the killing of Jean-Michel Rossi in 2000, one of the most notable former FLNC members and leader of the Armata Corsa splinter group. The timing of his assassination (which took place during a temporary FLNC ceasefire) has led some to believe it may have been carried out by either local drug dealing gangs, or French security services, or a combination of both (15). The death of François Santoni in 2001, another prominent Armata Corsa member, has led to similar speculation (16). The FLNC-UC suffered a major blow when Charles Pieri, whom French security services considered the head of the group, was arrested and indicted for racketeering, which served to finance both militant activity and his own extravagant lifestyle (17). The FLNC-UC continued its armed campaign until 2014, when it announced a cessation of clandestine activity (18). Other splinter groups emerged in 2002, with the formation of the FLNC-October 22 (FLNC-22) (19), and in 2004, with the emergence of L’Armata di U Populu Corsu (“Army of the Corsican people”) (20). Some, though not all, of these splinter groups appropriated the FLNC brand for legitimacy reason, even if they are at times not directly connected to the original FLNC. By the early 2000s, FLNC attacks had subsided somewhat, counting between 100 and 200 attacks or attempts per year (21). In 2015, the FLNC-22 declared it was starting to decommission arms (which is not equal to disarming) (22). The following year, the FLNC-22 threatened the Islamist terrorist group ISIS (Daesh), declaring that any Islamist activity in Corsica would be met with retaliation (23). In 2019, a group which identified simply as FLNC emerged and announced propaganda actions in the future, while also releasing a political manifesto (24). In 2021, a new FLNC splinter group emerged, called FLNC Maghju 21 (“May 21”) (25) which announced its “tactical redeployment”, a thinly veiled locution which most likely indicates renewed armed struggle (26), while also denouncing “electoralism” (27). A month later, in June 2021, the FLNC-UC and the FLNC-22 released a joint statement for the first time ever, in which they similarly denounced purely electoral politics while also reaffirming that they remain the only credible FLNC militant groups (28), thus implicitly delegitimizing the FLNC Maghju 21. In 2022, the FLNC-22 released a statement prior to the visit of the French ministry of interior to the island, which took place in the context of the riots and demonstrations in support of Yvan Colonna. In the statement, other than hailing Yvan Colonna, they declared their support for the Corsican youth and their role in the protest (29). A few months later, the FLNC-22 released another statement claiming responsibility for 16 attacks, mostly against property but also including two against police vehicles (30). Ideology & Objectives The FLNC is rooted in a wider history of an anti-French sentiment in Corsica. Grievances in Corsica mainly stemmed from the economic backwardness of the island and the perceived inaction of the French government in countering the situation (31). In 1957, the French government created two agencies to develop Corsican agriculture and tourism, but by the end of the 1960s, most of the expansion in these sectors resulted from non-Corsican capital (32). At the same time, most agricultural land was acquired by the pied noirs (“black feet”) (33), ethnic French who emigrated from Algeria, which exacerbated the perception of colonial exploitation of the island while tens of thousands of Corsicans were forced to emigrate to find jobs (34). On the 5th of May 1976, the newly-founded FLNC released its manifesto, which identified five key objectives (35): → The recognition of Corsican national rights. → The destruction of the instruments of French colonialism, i.e. armed forces, state apparatus, and settlers. → The establishment of Corsican national popular democratic sovereignty. → Land (Agrarian) reform. → Independence. Through its affiliated newspaper, U Ribombu (“The booming echo”), the FLNC has also repeatedly denounced capitalist and imperialist exploitation of Corsica (36), and it also declared its opposition to EEC/EU integration as a project driven by similar exploitative interests (37). The FLNC also criticized the Single European Act (which established the European Economic Community) as instrumental in accelerating Corsican economic, cultural and social decline (38). The FLNC’s hard euroscepticism has continued through the 1990s into the 2000s, in opposition to the majority of legal Corsican autonomist/nationalist parties (39). Through U Ribombu, the FLNC also declared that "the chain which attaches Bastia and Ajaccio [in Corsica] to Paris is the same as that which attaches Hanoi or Algiers to the French capital" (40), therefore rooting its rhetoric in those of other anti-colonial movements in French colonies. In 2019, a new manifesto was released during the press conference announcing the creation of a new FLNC splinter group. In it, some specific political objectives were listed (41), including: → Asset forfeiture and expropriation for real estate owned by non-Corsicans, as well as a prohibiting them from purchasing and selling real estate. → ‘Corsicanisation’ of labour and of the Returnees’ Office (dedicated to the Corsican diaspora). → Tourism quotas and taxes. → Prohibition of further construction work for big business and fairer wages. → Nationalisation of transportation companies. → Mandatory teaching of the Corsican language in schools. Additionally, the document included a critique of autonomist (i.e. non-separatist) Corsican parties, while also denouncing all leftwing and rightwing political parties which are regarded as compliant with the French (nationalist) and EU establishment (42). The document also specifies that the FLNC has always opposed both fascism and Islamism (43). While this document has been produced autonomously by a FLNC splinter group, other FLNC-affiliated cells have not disputed nor criticised it. The specific economic and cultural demands of this document, is coherent with the anticapitalist localist politics of the original FLNC, and can thus be extended as fairly applicable to all FLNC groups. The FLNC could therefore be fairly accurately described as a leftwing nationalist militant group. Political & Military Abilities The FLNC has conducted thousands of attacks during its long history, but only between 200 and 300 deaths have been recorded (44), which some attribute to the specific intention of avoiding civilian casualties to avoid losing support amongst the populace (45). The FLNC has also been able to operate in Corsica thanks to the traditional clan-like social structure typical of the island, which however has led some segments of the FLNC to get involved in activities more akin to organized crime than to revolutionary praxis (46). In 1983, a man was shot in Corte for refusing to pay the FLNC a “revolutionary tax” to fund the group’s activity (47). Some notable members of the FLNC, such as Charles Pieri and Alain Orsoni, were charged with racketeering and embezzlement. In the past, the FLNC has been able to produce a number of publications, and it has also established ties with different political parties according to contingency and divisions inside the FLNC. It was also able to forge ties with legitimate businesses to launder “dirty” money and it has even set up some legal trade unions (48). Regarding its violent activities, the FLNC has always been highly skilled in destroying and damaging property, but in its early years it was also able to conduct fast actions against military and police targets, such as in 1978, when FLNC operatives stormed a French military base in Solenzara, neutralizing French soldiers and planting explosives which destroyed high-tech radar equipment (49). Other notable attacks include the 1983 killing of viceprefect Pierre-Jean Massimi (50), a 1990 attack, when 60 FLNC gunmen stormed a nudist camp and held beachgoers (mainly Germans) hostage as they blew up holiday homes (51); a 1999 bank robbery, which was carried out while police were busy defusing a car bomb (52), a 1999 bombing of a tax office in Paris despite tight security due the visit of Iran’s president (53). The FLNC has always a high level of skill and tactical capacity in planning and coordinating attacks, often against multiple targets at the same time. International Relations & Alliances The FLNC and other Corsican independentist movements are known to have cordial relations with similar groups in Catalonia, Scotland, and the Basque country (54). In 1982, the FLNC even organized the “International Conference of national liberation organisations and movements” (55). The FLNC also fought against anti-independence terrorist groups in Corsica, such as Action Corse Française (“French-Corsican Action”) and FRANCIA, which bombed and attacked autonomist newspapers and activities (56). These organisations have been linked to French security services and effectively served as a front for anti-separatist paramilitary and terrorist activity (57). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Ahrar al- Sharqiya, also known as Tajammu Ahrar al-Sharqiya is an armed Syrian rebel group active in the Aleppo Governorate. It was formed in 2016 by former al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham members who were displaced following fighting in the Deir ez-Zor Governorate in eastern Syria between ISIL, YPG units and the Syrian government. This establishment also followed an announcement from a senior Shura Council Member, Abu Maria al-Qahtani, who was also a part of al-Nusra. This caused internal strife within al-Nusra due to his hard-line stance against IS (Puxton, 2018). His links with the group, Ahrar al-Sharqiya, are strenuous, as there is no solid evidence as to whether or not he was involved with the group following the announcement of its formation in 2016 (Puxton, 2018) and despite these tensions, there are reports that the group is involved with smuggling ISIL members from areas of Eastern Syria to places such as Idlib for rates of up to $50,000 per person (Browne, 2018). History & Foundations The group was originally a unit under Ahrar al-Sham in the Deir ez-Zor area in eastern Syria, which took part in battles against the Syrian government and their allies up until 2016 when it split from Ahrar al-Sham to take part in Operation Euphrates Shield (Baladi, 2018). As aforementioned, Shura Council member Abu Maria al-Qahtani announced the formation of the group in 2016 following accusations of causing internal strife within al-Nusra which he was later dismissed from the group. However, the extent of his involvement with Ahrar al-Sharqiya is unknown and there are speculations that his involvement has been little to none (Puxton, 2018). As a component member of the Syrian National Army, the group took part in the 2016 Operation Euphrates shield, and it was their first known joint operation with the Turkish Armed Forces, in which they took control of the city of Jarabulus from ISIL (Perry, 2016). Objectives & Ideology The group's ideology is almost entirely dedicated to fighting against the government of Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian government which stems from its original unit as it was a part of Ahrar al-Sham. This opposition to Bashar al-Assad's government has shaped the group's actions in eastern and northern Syria where it is active, and the group has also taken part in combat engagements against the Syrian Armed forces and their allies, as well as the SDF and also the Islamic State. The group’s ideology is actively rooted in an anti-Western sentiment and the group as a whole has confronted and blocked American forces who were embedded within the Syrian pentagon-backed Liwa al-Mu'tasim rebel group (Weiss, 2016). The group has also been accused of integrating former IS members into its ranks with a former IS commander, Abu al-Baraa al-Ansari, being one of these reported commanders (Rojava Information Centre, 2019). Military & Political Abilities The group has extensive military abilities which range from being able to take part in large-scale combat such as the aforementioned operation Euphrates Shield and also operation Olive Branch. In Operation Olive Branch, the group fought alongside and was backed up by the Turkish Armed Forces against the YPG (People's Protection Units – Yekîneyên Parastina Gel) (Al-Khalidi, 2018). This operation included Turkish air assets and artillery, and this could indicate a larger capability for Ahrar al-Sharqiya to conduct more lethal military operations since many of their operations are conducted with the tactical and logistic support of the Turkish army and air force (Al Jazeera, 2018). Photographs of the group – which they publish on their Twitter account – regularly feature images of both light and heavy weaponry including RPGs (Rocket Propelled grenades), as well as sniper rifles and HMGs (heavy machine guns) (Ahrar al-Sharqiya, 2021). Approach to Resistance The group is extremely violent and has been accused of many war crimes, as well as the murder of multiple civilian and political figures. For instance, the group was accused of targeting and murdering Kurdish activist and politician Havrin Khalaf in north-eastern Syria in 2019, in which her armoured vehicle was fired upon by Turkish-backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya fighters. The group published photographs of the attack, as well as videos in which they executed two unidentified prisoners. This has been described as a war crime by several Kurdish activists as well as Genevieve Zingg who is a Legal Fellow at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre (Stocker, 2019). International Relations & Potential Alliances Ahrar al-Sharqiya has an entrenched international link to Turkey, which is its main supporter outside of Syria. The Turkish military has not only provided logistical support but also direct military support to the group and this has only enabled the growth of its lethality (Ajjoub, 2022). The group has also come into combat against several other groups including other Turkish-backed mercenary groups, such as al-Jabha al-Shamiya and also Ahrar al-Sham, over property which they had stolen from civilians (ANF News, 2018). Even though the group has been in opposition and has directly fought against the Islamic State on multiple occasions in northern and north-eastern Syria, this comes in contrast to reports that the group has integrated multiple former IS fighters (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 2019) as well as a former IS commander (Rojava Information Centre, 2019). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) is a militant Marxist group which is based in Turkey and seeks to establish a socialist state through a campaign of armed struggle. The significance of the DHKP-C’s “party-front” structure can be explained by its dual approach; whilst its “Party” represents the group politically, the “Front” stands for the group's militant actions. Since its establishment in 1978, it has conducted an insurgency against the Turkish government and has since been designated as a terrorist organisation. The DHKP-C is predominantly based in Istanbul and mostly recruits its members from the working class of the city (1). History & Foundations The group was formed in 1978, originally under the name Devrimci Sol ('Revolutionary Left'), until it adopted its current name, DHKP-C, in 1994. This name change came about after a split in an originally-larger group called Dev-Yol ('Revolutionary Path') who – whilst not exactly being a peaceful organisation – did not class themselves as militants. The few attacks committed by Dev-Yol generally targeted Turkish nationalist groups such as the “Grey Wolves'', as opposed to attacking the apparatus of the Turkish state such as the military/police or the judiciary/government. This is what eventually caused the split (3). The DHKP-C began recruiting from schools and colleges within Istanbul’s working class neighbourhoods. Still under the name Devrimci Sol, its first assassination was carried out on the 27th of May 1980 against Turkish nationalist politician Gün Sazak. That same year they assassinated former Turkish prime minister Nihat Erim (6). The DHKP-C’s tactics have changed and included more targets over the years. Initially, the DHKP-C earned notoriety through its assassinations in the 1980s, in which high-profile members of the former Turkish military and government were killed. Throughout the 1980s, attacks were carried out against US and NATO targets in Turkey. DHKP-C claimed responsibility for bombings to protest the allied involvement in the Gulf War, claiming it as “western imperialism” (3). Objectives & Ideology The primary objective of the DHKP-C is to overthrow the Turkish government and to form a Turkish socialist state. Its other objectives or targets include attacks on NATO and US forces, fighting against the gentrification of urban working class neighbourhoods, and fighting against drug gangs. The group is also fighting for extensive Turkish prison reform – in particular against a special type of high security prison used in Turkey known as “F-Type prisons”, in which inmates are held in complete isolation for prolonged periods of time (5). From the 1990s onwards, the DHKP-C has also adopted a staunchly Anti-NATO and Anti-US ideology. They have expanded their objectives to fighting foreign interests in Turkey and they subsequently began carrying out assassinations of US officials. In a statement from their news bulletin, they stated "We repudiate all agreements that strengthen imperialism. We stand against the whole economic, political and military presence of imperialism in our country. We want the US and NATO bases to be closed and all the bilateral agreements to be annulled" (3). Approach to Resistance The DHKP-C uses a range of tactics, ranging from hunger strikes, assassinations, or even suicide bombings to achieve their aims. Throughout the early 1980s, it carried out a number of assassinations, usually on retired or former military and government staff. Former Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim, for example, was assassinated by a DHKP-C attack in 1980 (4). Due to the Turkish military coup in 1980, many of the group's members have either been killed, arrested or have fled to Western Europe. This meant that the group was relatively inactive throughout the mid to late 1980s. In October 1989, two of its leaders – Dursun Karatas and Bedri Yagan – escaped from prison and the group began to get noticeably more active in the following months. In the 1990s, the group began attacking the US military, its diplomatic personnel, and its facilities in what they perceived as methods of American imperialism during the Gulf War in which they viewed their country as being used as a US puppet to aid capitalist imperialism. In addition, more than 20 US and NATO facilities within Turkey were bombed in the 1990s (3). The group is also known for using sophisticated surveillance and counter-intelligence techniques which made it difficult for law enforcement and Turkish authorities to arrest its members. Due to their extensive support networks in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, they are able to move members easily in and out of Turkey and Western Europe to evade capture. The group often uses forged documents and elaborate disguises such as when three members of the DHKP-C walked into the offices of a US business based in Istanbul dressed as policemen and asked to speak to a manager – they then brought him into an office and shot him (3). In the 2000s, the group began using hunger strikes to protest in favour of a prison reform. The Turkish state had brought in what it called F-Type Prisons, which were high security prisons in which prisoners were completely isolated from each other. To protest these new penitentiaries, the DHKP-C initiated multiple hunger strikes over the years, in which more than 60 people have died. In 2001, the group started integrating suicide bombings within their approach to armed struggle. A DHKP-C suicide bomber killed 3 people (including a Turkish police officer) in Istanbul that same year. Multiple more suicide bombings have occurred over the years, including one outside the US Embassy in Ankara that killed the bomber and a security guard (2). After the DHKP-C attacked the US consulate in Istanbul in 2015, one of the attackers – Hatice Asik – was captured. This attack was coordinated alongside three other simultaneous operations; while two of them targeted police stations, one targeted a military helicopter. A couple of hours later, a gunman opened fire on Turkish police officers, killing one and injuring ten. Two DHKP-C men were also killed. (7) Relations & Alliances The DHKP-C is recognised as a terrorist organisation by the European Union, the United States, and Turkey. Despite claims made by the Turkish Government, they have no confirmed links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish Marxist guerilla group which has been running an insurgency against Turkey since 1978. The DHKP-C is funded primarily through fundraising campaigns that it organises within its own communities. It is believed that they also earn funds through extortion and robberies, although the group denies these allegations and instead claims that other unaffiliated actors use their name when engaging in these acts (3). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Formed in 1968 as a paramilitary wing of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Grey Wolves are a fascist grassroots organization that continues to promote far-right political and cultural values (9). Under the leadership of Colonel Alparslan Türkes, the youth-group quickly became a key weapon against left-wing militants during the political unrest of the 1970s (15). The group is well-known for their denial of the Armenian Genocide and their anti-Kurdish rhetoric. In order to finance their political and military operations, the Grey Wolves engage in the drug trade, as well as both human and weapons trafficking (2). After the fall of the Soviet Union, the group expanded to the newly independent states in Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia, and established chapters in Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, China and Syria (16). Aside from their involvement with the MHP, the Grey Wolves have documented ties to both the CIA and NATO’s former anti-communist organization Operation Gladio (11). History & Foundations Started by Colonel Aparslan Türkes in the late 1960s, the group was designed to act as an armed extension of the MHP and engaged in political violence that targeted leftists across Turkey (15). The group would then go on to open over a hundred training and education camps that focused on preparing the youth for their role in fighting for the MHP (3). During the social unrest in the late 1970s, the group became the first line of defense against leftist political dissidents, and engaged in street warfare in an attempt to push them out of the region (15). It is believed that Grey Wolves members accounted for almost 700 murders of left-wing and progressive activists during this time period (6). The most significant example of the violence employed by the group is the Maraş Massacre, which saw the killing of over 100 Alevis, a regional Islamic group from central Turkey (14). While it has never been formally proven, the Grey Wolves are also alleged to be behind the 1977 Taksim Square Massacre that resulted in over 40 deaths. During this period of extensive violence, the group operated with the support and protection of the Turkish Army’s Special Warfare Department (21). With the Turkish military behind them, the Grey Wolves began acting as a de facto death-squad that was able to operate without legal constraints or oversight. By the 1980s, the warring between left wing groups and the Grey Wolves had become too intense, and as a result the Turkish military intervened and eventually oversaw a coup d'état (22). Following the military takeover, the Grey Wolves were banned in Turkey, and remained underground until their resurgence a decade later. After years of inaction, the Grey Wolves reemerged with a focus on Turkish Kurds and Armenians, taking a particularly strong position against both ethnic minorities. As a result of their anti-Kurdish belief system, the Grey Wolves were a major part of the Kurdish-Turkish Conflict of the 1990s. This conflict was the result of Kurdish nationalists attempting to declare independence from Turkey and create a separate Kurdish state (18). The Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) led the fight for the Kurds, and was the primary combatant against the Grey Wolves. Because of the PKK’s tendency to recruit members through local universities, the Grey Wolves began attacking college students and leftist organizers around college campuses. Aside from the PKK, the group also heavily targets ethnic Armenians and are strong advocates for Armenian genocide denial (19). Today, the group continues to have an active role on college campuses and have managed to spread into Asia and Western Europe. Objectives & Ideology The Grey Wolves are a pan-Turkish political and paramilitary group that believe all Turkic nations should unite as one. This includes the people of the Russian region of Kazan, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (12). They seek to do this through spreading political messaging in these regions and abroad, as they look to influence the social and political landscapes of the areas they are present in (1). They also act as the de facto armed wing of the MHP, and often employ violence in the fight for their beliefs. Apart from being a far-right, fascist organization, the Grey Wolves support a particular brand of Turkish ultranationalism, with a unique Islamic flavor that plays a major role in their belief systems and politics. Despite being a primarily Sunni Muslim group, some members shirk the religious identity and take a more secular approach to chauvinism (12). They believe that the Turkish race is superior to all others, and believe in the need for an ideal Turkish nation built upon Sunni Islam and monoethnicity (17). The group remains committed to their anti-communist beliefs, and advocates against Western ideals. Political & Military Capabilities Because of their unique relationship to the Turkish government and particularly the MHP, the Grey Wolves have enjoyed considerable political power. As the MHP’s unofficial militant wing, the Grey Wolves have worked in tandem with the CIA and NATO as enforcers of the latter’s former anti-communist plan, Operation Gladio (11). After President Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in 2018, the Grey Wolves and MHP created a working alliance with the AKP which allowed the group to operate unobstructed from legal restraints in the country (11). As a result of this alliance, Grey Wolves members were placed in high positions within the security apparatus, which granted the group even greater political power (11). With members inside the highest levels of the Turkish government, the group also became a tool for the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to commit clandestine political murders with immunity (13). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Grey Wolves began forming chapters around Eurasia, which have tremendously increased the influence they have on global politics. The group focuses on areas that have large populations of ethnic Turks, most notably France, Germany, China and Syria (16). Despite being banned in many of these countries, they have still been able to operate undercover in an effort to continue infiltrating the international political sphere. The Grey Wolves have been responsible for multiple bombings and attacks abroad, most notably the bombing of a French Armenian Genocide memorial in 1984, and their involvement in the violence against Greek Cypriots in 1996. It was also revealed that the would-be assassin of Pope John Paul II, Mehmet Ali Ağca, was a Grey Wolves member that was involved in other acts of political violence in support of the group (10). Despite having been legally limited in their military and political capabilities internationally, the Grey Wolves have repeatedly demonstrated the considerable power that they still manage to wield. Approach to Resistance With their unique position in both the Turkish government and police force, the Grey Wolves have taken a dual edged strategy aimed at spreading their message. Employing violence and political prowess, the group has been somewhat successful at exerting control both at home and throughout Eurasia. A common theme in the group’s violence is their use of bombings in order to create fear and to advance their own belief systems of anti-Armenian and anti-Kurdish sentiment. The group relies heavily on Turkic ultra-nationalism in order to garner strong support for their cause (4). In the regions they are present in, the Grey Wolves are also known for organizing civil demonstrations, such as protesting the creation of Armenian Genocide memorials and staging large prayer groups at the Hagia Sofia in protest of the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (7). International Alliances One of the primary ways that the Grey Wolves have been able to withstand repeatedly being banned is through their ability to cooperate with similarly minded groups across the globe. While the group has a close relationship with the Turkish governing body, they have also made tremendous inroads at partnering with political groups in Russia, Syria Greece and other Western European countries (16). Relying on their shared Muslim identity, the group has allied with the pro-Chechen group, the Great Unity Party, where they have worked together to organize events at mosques (8). Certain Syrian rebel groups such as the Syrian Turkmen Assembly have welcomed Grey Wolves members onto the front lines and received direct funding from the group in order to continue to fight against the Syrian government (5). As Azerbaijanis are considered members of the Turkic ethnic group, the Grey Wolves started an organization in the country under the same name. The group has participated in coup attempts and other forms of political violence within the country (20). Despite legal constraints that prevent the Grey Wolves from actively participating in much of the EU, they have still managed to cultivate a strong presence in the region through their partnerships with like minded groups. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSCEJ – for ease of reading – the group does not use this abbreviation) is an armed Jihadist group with extensive links to al-Qaeda (Joscelyn, 2012). Although it was active in large sections of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula as well as within the Gaza strip, its current activity in these regions is somewhat ambiguous. The group was formed in 2012 in order to coordinate the activities of the Salafi jihadist groups which are present in Gaza. MSCEJ carries out attacks against varying targets, including Israeli civilians and the military, and it has been described as being radically antisemitic. It was placed under the command of al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula in August of 2012 (Roggio, 2012a). History & Foundations The group was created in 2012 in order to improve the coordination between the activities of Jihadist groups operating in Gaza under al-Qaeda. It has taken responsibility for carrying out attacks against both the Israeli Army and civilians within Israel and Egypt since its emergence in the Arab Spring (Roggio, 2012a). The group claimed responsibility for an attack on the 18th of June 2012 in which an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) was detonated near the Egyptian-Israeli border. During this attack, an Israeli construction worker, Saeed Fashafshe, was killed (Haaretz, 2012). The MSCEJ released a video nine days later on the 27th of June in which they called the attack a “gift to our brothers in Qaedat al Jihad (al-Qaeda) and Sheikh Zawahiri”. They also claimed that the attack was an act of revenge for the death of Osama Bin Laden (Roggio, 2012b). The leader of the organisation, Hisham Al-Saedni, who founded the group in 2012, was killed in an Israeli airstrike within Gaza on the 14th of October 2012 (BBC News Middle East, 2012). In 2014, the group declared its support and allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) after severing ties with al-Qaeda due to an “unfair view towards ISIS and its emir [...] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi” (Al-Monitor, 2014). On the 19th of August 2014, the group received a terrorist organisation designation by the US State Department which was done with the aim of freezing any ‘financial’ and ‘material’ support the group may receive from abroad (State Department, 2014). However, due to perceived inactivity by the group in Israel, the group was delisted by the US State Department in 2022 and is no longer considered operationally active. Nevertheless, the individual groups which compose the group remain relatively active (Truzman, 2022). Objectives & Ideology The group is composed of several Jihadist terrorist organisations which are present in Gaza and its stated aim and objective is to coordinate the attacks committed by these groups. It has claimed numerous attacks on Israel since its foundation in 2012 and this is directly related to the group's Salafi Jihadist ideological background. Salafi Jihadism is a hybrid religious-political ideology which advocates for military-style jihad and to return to what is believed by its adherents to be the “true Islam” (French, 2020). This directly relates to the declaration of support for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Al-Monitor, 2014) and their actions have proven a willingness to ‘re-establish’ the Islamic Caliphate through jihadist activities. Approach to Resistance & Military/Political Abilities The group is not believed to have had extensive military capabilities, notably as it was known primarily for its small-scale rocket attacks on Israeli territory. One of the component groups of MSCEJ was responsible for the death of a Thai worker in 2010 when they launched a rocket into Israeli territory (which they later claimed responsibility for) (Al Jazeera, 2010). During its peak activity, the group was relatively violent, although this violence was constrained to the aforementioned small-scale rocket attacks. Due to a small member base of around several hundred fighters (US State Department, 2017), this has limited how the MSCEJ approaches its resistance tactics as they do not have significant enough numbers to launch attacks similar to those carried out by groups such as AQSP (al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula). Similarly, due to its delisting as a terrorist organisation by the United States State Department in 2014 – which followed its inactivity as a group – this further provides evidence to the lack of action in its current pathway to resistance (Truzman, 2022). International Relations & Potential Alliances There is little to no evidence of the group receiving external funding or support from a support network of similarly-aligned organisations or from a support base. However, the group originally pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2012 (Joscelyn, 2012), and this suggests a potential alliance. Instead, it seems the MSCEJ has more enemies than allies, as it has also been in conflict with Hamas. This conflict sparked after the latter organisation has cracked down on Salafi jihadist organisations which are present within Gaza in effort to stop them firing rockets into Israeli territory (Barnett, 2013b). The MSCEJ has accused Hamas of collaborating with IDF intelligence units to target members of its organisations with a senior figure within the MSCEJ, Hithem Ziad Ibrahim Masshal, being killed in a supposedly Hamas-intelligence-provided airstrike by Israeli forces in 2013 (Barnett, 2013a).

Insurgency Overview The American Indian Movement (AIM) is a political organization advocating for the rights and interests of Native Americans including economic independence, revitalization of traditional culture, protection of legal rights, autonomy over tribal land, restoration of stolen land, and the sovereignty of Native American tribes. The organization's highly publicized occupation of Alcatraz in 1969 and Wounded Knee in 1973 granted AIM infamy in the eyes of the non-Indian public. However, over the years, the group has transformed its image from an insurgent militia that acted as a harbinger of the Native American warrior culture, to a diplomatic organization that has become a crucial aspect of American and international politics. Started in 1968, AIM was built off the philosophies of Native American spiritual traditions within their culture, language, and history. Although the group's strategies have changed over the years, AIM's goal has always been to ensure the fulfillment of treaties made between the United States and various Native American tribes and to improve the lives of Native Americans (1). History & Foundations The American Indian Movement officially started in August 1968 after a meeting held by Clyde Bellecourt, Vernon Bellecourt, Dennis Banks, and George Mitchell, who were all members of the Ojibwe Tribe in Southern Canada and northern parts of the US Midwest (2). This meeting gathered around 200 local native Americans to discuss issues facing the community such as police discrimination, poverty, unemployment, and a lack of political representation, resulting in the subsequent creation of the American Indian Movement Patrol (AIM Patrol). These patrols, which consisted primarily of Native Americans living in urban centers, would observe police interactions with native people and offer mediators that would assist community members with various issues (3). While these patrols helped limit negative police interactions within the community, they did little to improve how Native Americans were treated on the national stage. Objectives & Ideology As AIM developed into a larger, national organization, its goals evolved to encompass broader issues. In November of 1972, a caravan of Native Nation representatives arrived in Washington, DC, to set forth their demands in front of the US Department of Interior and the US president. Their list of 20 demands included numerous requests, including the restoration of treaty making (ended by Congress in 1871), the establishment of a treaty commission to make new treaties (with sovereign Native Nations), or even the restoration of 110 million acres of land taken away from Native Nations by the United States. Most of these requests were based on rights that the AIM esteemed were taken away from Native Americans illegally. The full list of demands can be found in footnote 4. Approach to Resistance & Military/Political Abilities Before AIM brought their demands directly to Washington DC, they took part in several high-profile demonstrations across the United States. Starting with the 1968 occupation of Alcatraz, the most notable type of demonstrations AIM participated in involved the takeover of several active (as well as decommissioned) government facilities in an attempt to spread awareness for their cause, pressure the US government to return the land to tribes that once lived there, and to expose improper Bureau of Indian Affairs policies (5). One of the largest of these takeovers was the 1973 Occupation of Wounded Knee, in which around 200 AIM supporters faced off against US Marshals. Occupying a small town within the Pine Ridge Indian Reserve of South Dakota, AIM members armed primarily with sporting rifles barricaded the area and were besieged by militaristic police with access to armored personnel carriers, helicopters, and fighter jet aircraft. Lasting for 71 days and resulting in the death of four individuals (two occupiers and two FBI agents), this occupation caused public outrage, notably as AIM supporters suggested that the US government’s reaction highlighted their willingness to use deadly force to suppress AIM's ideological goals (6). After the events at Wounded Knee, AIM continued its fight in a far more diplomatic fashion with support from the United Nations, such as the creation of the Federation of Survival Schools, the MIGIZI communication organization, the International Indian Treaty Council, and the adoption of the American Indian Language and Culture Legislation (7). AIM is still active in the Modern political sphere, focusing more on community development and grassroots events organizing. For instance, AIM members want to ensure that reservations have access to proper necessities and commodities, as well as help Native Americans gain access to higher education. AIM continues to play a significant part in political activism by participating in demonstrations, most recently in protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline, which threatened the Sioux tribe. Although AIM has members across the United States, AIM is not a monolithic entity; different chapters may implement different strategies and focuses. International Relations & Potential Alliances While members of the Ojibwe Tribe primarily created AIM, it would later go on to encompass a wide variety of individuals from tribes across the United States, notably as the organization formed bonds with fellow Indian rights groups such as the United Indians of All Tribes, with whom they occupied Alcatraz, as well as African-American civil rights activists (8). Internationally, AIM received support from United Nations members during the 1977 UN Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, resulting in the US government and other American Governments recognizing native populations' unique status (9). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Myanmar People’s Defence Force (PDF) is a citizen militia formed to combat the military dictatorship which came to power in Myanmar after the 2021 coup d’etat and overthrew the previously democratic-leaning government, the NDL (National League for Democracy) (1). Feeling the need to protect the people of Myanmar following the violent suppression of otherwise peaceful protests, several armed resistance groups rose to combat the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) and the new oppressive government, one of which was the PDF. Working in conjunction with other resistance groups, the PDF conducts various attacks on what they call the military junta and holds defensive positions across Myanmar to protect liberated territory. With little international support besides sanctions against the government and humanitarian aid, the PDF has relied on resources they can capture or source from civilian supporters. The PDF has also manufactured supplies by themselves using methods such as 3D printing (2). History & Foundations Myanmar has had a long and troubled history with political revolution, dating back to the late 1940s. Starting with rebel groups such as the Burmese Communist Party-White Flag (BCP-WF), Communist Party of Burma-Red Flag (CPB-RF), and The People’s Volunteer Organization-White Band (PVO-WB), the people of Myanmar have proven that an armed citizen’s militia is an effective but violent form of resistance. Over the years, Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, has experienced multiple instances of regime change, transitioning from dictatorship to democracy (and vice-versa). Starting in April 2011, the Burmese government had been ruled by the National League for Democracy and the people of Myanmar lived under a relatively unstable democracy. However, this relatively democratic regime was overthrown in a coup d’etat conducted by the Myanmar Armed Forces – called the Tatmadaw – which began on February 1st, 2021 (3). Within a matter of days, the Tatmadaw cut off the Burmese people from internet and telecommunications, shut down the national stock market, imprisoned elected officials, issued a state of emergency, and established the State Administration Council (SAC) as the governing force of Myanmar. The Tatmadaw claimed that these actions and SAC’s control of the government were due to the NLD’s landslide victory in the election, which the Tatmadaw believed was obtained illegally. By February 5th, pro-democracy protests had erupted throughout Myanmar. Although these protests were peaceful, they were met with extreme violence from the Tatmadaw. Tatmadaw security forces would indiscriminately fire on anti-coup demonstrations, intimidate the population with armored vehicles, and illegally detain protestors. Within the first few months of the coup, over 800 civilians had been killed by the Tatmadaw. Despite the immense loss of life and violent military suppression, protests continued. However, they did not keep the same peaceful mentality of the original demonstrations, as anti-coup protestors began fighting back against the Tatmadaw, leading to a revolution that seemed more and more like an all-out civil war as the months went on (4). With the people of Myanmar feeling that they had no military force working to protect them, an exiled political party called NUG (National Unity Government) formed the People’s Defence Force on 5th of May 5th 2021 (5). Objectives & Ideology According to NUG press releases, the PDF’s main objective is to defend and protect the lives, properties, and livelihoods of the people of the Federal Union of Myanmar. The PDF believes that it is their duty to collaborate with other allied forces to safeguard the security of the people, overthrow the military dictatorship by waging what they perceive as a just war, organize defense zones throughout Myanmar, and carry out evacuation procedures for natural disaster-driven incidents. The PDF regard their civilian-controlled structure and democratic focus as the prime factors of their organization (6). Approach to Resistance Following the examples set by previous resistance groups in Myanmar, the PDF believes the only way to combat the Tatmadaw’s violent rule is through armed resistance. The PDF attempt to oppose Tatmadaw forces in any way possible. However, due to their lack of equipment, they primarily conduct guerilla-style attacks such as Ambushes akin to drive-by shootings and IED strikes (7). In villages that support the PDF’s cause and near their training camps, rebel fighters construct defensive jungle outposts to hinder Tatmadaw attacks (8). However, Tatmadaw airstrikes and artillery barrages still wreak havoc on these liberated locations (9). To increase their ability to fight, PDF fighters construct small arms via methods such as 3D printing and metalworking with makeshift materials. Most notably, the PDF has been seen using the FGC-9, a 3D printable 9mm carbine, which became widely circulated throughout the internet after files were published in 2020 (10). Besides armed resistance, PDF soldiers with backgrounds in the medical field also act as nurses for civilian villages (11). International Relations & Potential Alliances Besides sanctions placed on the Myanmar government primarily by western nations, the PDF has received no support from international organizations. The PDF instead rely heavily on ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to help them in their fight against the Tatmadaw. EAOs, such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), have been fighting the Myanmar military for decades and resemble an organized paramilitary group. With training camps and outposts throughout Myanmar, these EAOs have welcomed PDF fighters to bolster their numbers. Working in conjunction, EAOs and the PDF carry out attacks on Tatmadaw assets, train newly recruited fighters, and occupy defensive positions throughout the jungles of Myanmar (12). Additional Resources

Insurgency & Overview The Naxalites (नक्सली आंदोलन) are an Indian Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political-military movement, which combines various groups and parties, among which stand out the Maoist Communist Party of India (CPI Maoist) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) (5). The movement is named after the village of Naxalbari, where a series of armed peasant uprisings broke out in 1967. In 2006, the Indian PM, Manmohan Singh, defined the Maoist guerrilla war as "the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by [India]". At the time, the territories controlled by the guerrilla forces comprised about 20% of the entire country’s population (5). Nowadays, Naxalites are active in almost all states of the country, with various forms and intensities. The ultimate goal of the Maoist organisation is the overthrow of state power, regarded as an imperialist and feudal force, and the subsequent establishment of socialist popular democracy. History & Foundations The Naxalite movement is named after a remote village in northern West Bengal, called Naxalbari. Here, in 1967, a group of peasants and fighters, in open opposition to the main communist party, launched a series of armed protests against local landowners. The insurgents demanded a fair redistribution of land and justice for exploited peasants and labourers. In this first phase, the movement was led by Charu Mazumdar, whose leadership lasted until 1972, when he died in police custody (6). In the 1980s, the Naxalites intensified their armed struggle against the state and encouraged mass mobilization, establishing themselves massively in the most underdeveloped and impoverished Indian states. In this vast sphere of influence, the so-called Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) -- also called the Red Corridor -- was established (3). Naxalites draw strength from the weakness and flaws of the governmental mechanism, which fails to be present in rural and tribal areas of the country, where wealth is poorly distributed, and exploitation is rife (3). The main Naxalite political body, the CPI (Maoist) with PLGA, was founded in 2004 following the merger of the Maoist Communist Centre of India and the People’s War (PW) and their armed vanguards (6). Both organizations are defined as illegal terrorist groups by the Indian state. The reorganization around the CPI (Maoist) and its armed wing gave a new breath to the movement, allowing better coordination in the country. This led to a consequent increase in attacks against police forces, which have become more intense, frequent, and precise (6). As their military skills improved, there was a desire among the Naxalist militants to transform the PLGA, the movement’s main armed wing, into a 'real People’s Army'. This step would involve numerous organizational and structural reforms, ranging from a continuous supply of modern weapons and ammunition to the need for better political-military training (4). After the activities’ peak during 2008 and 2009, the Naxalites’ presence in the Indian peninsula has undergone a considerable reduction over a decade, passing from almost 200 districts among 20 states to 106 districts among 10 states (1). In recent years, Indian PM Narendra Modi, the undisputed leader of the Hindutva far-right, has accentuated the fight against the Naxalites, expressing the will to eradicate every "Naxalist with gun or pen" (8), denouncing an unconfirmed diffusion of Maoist thought even in urban and intellectual environments. The increase in repression, in the pursuit of “law and order”, is not in line with the desire of various actors, such as the Indian Supreme Court, who want to start a peace negotiation following international examples, such as Nepalese and Colombian cases (2). Objectives & Ideology Following Mao Zedong’s thought, who defined guerrilla warfare as "the art of sapping the enemy with thousands of pinpricks", Indian Maoists for decades have religiously implemented the Protracted People’s War, an armed struggle without a time limit with continuous guerrilla actions against the Indian state. Although the popular struggle is a fundamental part of the Naxalites’ ideology, the violence of the Maoist revolts is also linked with the actions of the Indian state; police forces have predominantly resorted to indiscriminate violence and fierce repression in order to counter the insurgents, fueling their perceived raison d'être of armed struggle (6). According to the Maoists, military confrontation becomes the main tool to fight the Indian state, which -- in their view -- is a country in a semi-colonial and semi-feudal system, influenced by imperialist forces (6). From a Naxalist perspective, the direct task of the CPI (Maoist) is to organize the armed struggle of landless workers, poor peasants and various other exploited peoples against their oppressors (4). This results in the physical elimination of any supposed enemy of the peasant class and quells the numerous bloodsheds suffered by them. The Naxalite movement, faithful to its rural origins, prefers an idea of an agrarian revolution, having as a reference isolated rural areas compared to the various urban centres (6). The main objective of the movement is the abolition of landlordism through deep agrarian reforms and the improvement of living conditions in rural areas, traditionally abandoned to themselves. This desire is historically present, in a less radical way, also in other more moderate political forces, such as the Congress Party and the Marxist Indian Communist Party (6). Despite its intense military activity, the Naxalite movement cannot be reduced only to an armed group. Over the years, the Naxalites’ political activity has emphasized topics usually ignored by Indian politics, such as a redistribution of farmlands, fair wages, women’s rights and the elimination of the deepest regional inequalities. Especially in the mid-1990s, the Maoist movement developed a large repertoire of non-violent activities addressed to low-income people, such as popular clinics, irrigation systems for farmland, and school facilities (6). Military Capabilities The movement has a well-defined hierarchical structure, with the Central Committee and the Politburo at the top. The organization is then developed regionally through regional and state bureaus, with Special Committees for the Red Corridor’s areas. Over the years, the joint guerrilla warfare with Nepalese Maoists has led to the establishment of a Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) or the Red Corridor, a vast territory conquered by Naxalite forces. Following the original project, the CRZ should have included the areas from the Nepalese border to the region of Kerala (3). The CRZ includes some of the territories considered the Maoist political-military guerrilla’s strongholds, such as the state areas of Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Jharkhand (1). At the village-level, there are units called "Sanghams", including local activists (3). Several sources calculate the capacity of the Naxalites at around 25,000 units, 10,000 of these which belong to the PLGA, divided into heavily armed platoons, companies, and special forces, plus about 50,000 village-level members (7). It can be said that the main source of weapons and equipment for the Nazalite Movement is the Indian state itself -- over the years, the Naxalites have made up for the need for armaments by exploiting the weakness of the police forces, stealing a large amount of military equipment. In 2008 in Nayagarh, in the Orissa region, more than 1,000 weapons of all kinds were stolen during a PLGA raid, while, in 2010 in Dantewada, a 76-man-company of a Central Reserve Police Force was ambushed and killed by Maoists, who stole all the equipment (2). Actions and ambushes against police are carefully planned and carried out only if they have a high chance of success (4). By rough estimation, the Maoists generate about 500 to 700 crores of rupees annually, corresponding to about 60 to 85 million USD, which are then invested in the Protracted War (3). In the Indian states under Maoist influence, the Naxalites hold the monopoly of a wide range of illicit activities and bank robberies, and a widespread system of 'taxation' and extortion, especially for industrialists, businesses, political leaders, and landowners. Kidnappings are also an important weapon: seizing prominent political or military figures has been used as an effective strategy to obtain the release of political prisoners or to obtain a ransom. In addition, Maoist groups produce and smuggle opium and other natural products (3). Approach to Resistance For decades, Maoists have been religiously implementing the Protracted People’s War, an unlimited armed struggle with continuous guerrilla actions against the Indian state. Raids towards strategic targets are a common practice in Maoist warfare and are not only intended to hit opponents but also to take possession or damage their equipment (4). When actions are carried out, they have to be precisely planned for months and conducted by a large number of fighters. For instance, in the 2009 attack against the mines of Panchpatmali in Odisha state, there were several hundreds of fighters who were employed and placed on 'standby'. Although the PLGA troops have access to modern and heavy weaponry, they are unable to operate with military precision. Nevertheless, the Maoists continue to learn from every incident or mistake, through reports of their military actions (4). Ambushes are another key component of the Maoist repertoire. Either conducted individually or in conjunction with raids, these ambushes are exemplifications of the movement's objectives to have the dual purpose of hitting the enemy both militarily and psychologically (4). Much of the Naxalites’ paramilitary repertoire is closely related to the use of IEDs. Over the decades, Maoists have become experts in handling explosives, causing severe losses to Indian security forces (4). International Relations & Alliances Over the years, the Indian Maoists’ military activity has seen collaboration with their Nepalese counterparts. Numerous reports testify to the ideological and strategic alliance between the Naxalites and the Nepalese Maoist Communist Party (CPN-M), consolidated through common training and joint actions in Indian territory (5). Both organizations are part of the "Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia" (CCOMPOSA), an umbrella organization comprising various Maoist-inspired movements and parties in South Asia (5). It is believed that in the mid-2000s, the Naxalites received logistical training on creating and using IEDs from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a nationalist group once active in Sri Lanka (5). In addition, according to the Indian government, the Maoists are also in contact with organizations responsible for insurrections in other regions of the country, such as in the Northern territories of Kashmir and the Eastern territories of Assam, given the common goal of overthrowing the Indian Central Government (5). Additional Resources