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Insurgency Overview The Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) is the name given to the Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group that has been affiliated with the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province (ISCAP) since 2019, but has been active in Mozambique since 2017. The group is also known more commonly as Ahl al-Sunnah wa al Jamma’ah (ASWJ) and Al-Shabab, and has been active primarily in northern Mozambique in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and recently, Nampula (1). Estimates suggest the group possesses approximately 1000 fighters or less, mostly young, local, and radical Muslim men (2). The group's high profile attacks have led to international notoriety but pushed the South African Development Community (SADC) and the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) to intervene in 2021 to assist Mozambican security forces in conducting counterinsurgency operations, which rolled back some of their gains. History & Foundations There have been long standing tensions in Northern Mozambique between the coastal Muslim Mwani and inland Makonde Christians, who have closer ties to the central government in the south. Though the region, especially the Cabo Delgado province, is rich in natural resources such as minerals, timber, and natural gas, much of the wealth and resource extraction has been concentrated among foreign companies and the Makonde elite who are connected to the central government (3). Low levels of economic opportunity and decades of perceived political marginalization and neglect locally and by the national government have created a vulnerable and disenchanted generation of Muslim youth. Sects began to appear around 2007 that broke away from the existing Wahaabist community and began calling for the implementation of Shari’a law, as well as the rejection of the secular government and the state-backed Islamic Council of Mozambique (4). While it is unclear on the exact date of the formation of ASWJ/Al-Shabab, reports indicate they were recruiting young, impoverished men in at least four districts of Cabo Delgado in 2016, all while setting up training camps in the north of the province as early as 2015 (5)(6). Following a series of escalations and a decline in the relations between the group, mainstream Muslim establishment, and civil authorities, they shifted to militancy in October 2017 with attacks against police in Mocimboa de Praia (7). Through 2017 and 2018, the group continued to carry out small-scale attacks against unprotected villages and small police outposts, growing and gathering strength and building networks. By February 2020, the insurgency had spread to 9 of Cabo Delgado’s 16 districts (8). A signal of the group's strength and growing influence was their brief captures of Mocimba da Praia in August 2020, and then the port town of Palma in March 2021, which forced the French gas company Total to withdraw and suspend their $20 billion investment in the province (9). These successes for the group triggered the SADC and RDF interventions in the summer of 2021. Attacks and raiding continued throughout 2022, although the group has had to adjust its tactics as it has felt the pressure of recent counterinsurgency operations. While the group’s internal structure is unclear, it is believed that its leader is Abu Yasir Hassan, a Tanzanian, who has allegedly led the group since 2017 (10). Another individual named Abu Sulayfa Muhammad, more commonly known as Ibn Omar or Abu Suraca, is purported to lead the Military and External Affairs department for IS-Mozambique and is the senior commander for all attacks in North Mozambique. Additional intel suggests that Abu Sulayfa Muhammad is also the lead facilitator and conduit for communications within the group (11). The distinction between the two leaders’ roles and responsibilities is unclear, but both have been individually sanctioned by the U.S. Department of State. Objectives & Ideology The group originated from an Islamist sect whose initial aim was to establish a parallel society that was ruled exclusively by Shari’a (12). Since the shift to armed jihadism in 2017 though, their ultimate goals have become somewhat unclear and seem to be generally opposed to the secular nature of the state. Essentially, the group seeks to establish Shari’a locally and regionally. In the near term, their objectives appear to be to undermine the Mozambican government and security forces' authority and influence, build local support and networks, and combat foreign interests in the province (13). The group's primary grievances are domestic, and are centered around issues within Cabo Delgado. This is reflected in the group being composed primarily of locals from the province and some surrounding provinces. Tanzanians have crossed the border to work in the mines, while there exists an ethnic and linguistic bond between the Mwani populations on both sides of the border, which hence gives credence to reports that suggest that Tanzanians comprise a sizable minority of the group (14). Additionally, individuals from Somalia, South Africa and Uganda, and possibly even the Middle East and South Asia have been reported as being present during some of the group's attacks (15). The group's pledge to the IS may have led to an influx of foreign fighters starting in 2019, but this is largely unconfirmed (16). Approach to Resistance Throughout 2017 and 2018, the group carried out small-scale, intermittent attacks but they began to become more numerous and violent throughout 2018 and 2019 (17). Their operations initially consisted of raids and attacks against undefended villages and small contingents of government forces. The group began to gain momentum in 2020, and the complexity and scale of its operations increased, while reports also indicated the group had begun abducting women and children and had spread to 9 of Cabo Delgado’s 16 districts (18). Evidence of the group's increasing capabilities was manifested in their internationally noted seizure of the port town Mocimboa da Praia in August of 2020, as well as by videos and photos showing that the group had gained access to AK-47s, light, medium, and heavy machine guns, RPGs, and mortars captured largely from military stores (19)(20). This showed a rapid advance in their ability to gather manpower and conduct bold, coordinated attacks with advanced tactics. In March of 2021, the group launched an attack on and captured Palma. The attack appeared to have specific targets such as the town's airfield, military barracks, banks, and food warehouses. It resulted in the group seizing more than $1 million in recently-arrived military pay and food aid from local banks and warehouses (21). This indicated that the group may have timed their attack based on intelligence regarding the money and food's arrival, indicating their ability to conduct complex operations in urban environments and to gather and exploit intelligence. The group has been noted for its brutality in its attacks with survivors attesting to beheadings, maiming, torture, burning of homes, crops, and other property, as well as kidnapping and theft as common tactics (22). Their attacks have also resulted in tens of thousands being displaced and fleeing their homes. In response to the deployment of Rwandan and South African troops in 2021, the group has demobilized many of its fighters, ordering them to go back to their homes and mix into the civilian population, bide time and recruit new youth (23). During the same period, they launched several attacks across the border into Tanzania. In an attempt to adapt to counterinsurgent pressure, the group began to expand into the Niassa province, with a series of attacks being launched during the last half of 2021 but fizzling out by December (24). These attacks were allegedly led by a former local civil servant turned Al-Shabab cadre named Maulana Ali Cassimo. These allegations may confirm the theory that the group is attempting to send members recruited outside of Cabo Delgado back to their home provinces to spread the insurgency (25). In 2022, attacks occurred in Cabo Delgados' southern provinces of Quissange, Ancuabe, Chiure, and Mecufi, and in Nampula Province, which previously hadn’t seen any attacks from the group (26). These areas have seen extensive recruiting efforts from the group in the past, with high poverty rates and Salafi activism in Nampula making it ripe for exploitation. These attacks appear to indicate that Al-Shabab has been attempting to expand southward, conducting raids and attacks with small units, likely as a result of continued counterinsurgent pressure. Based on the speed of the attacks, size of the units, and the distance they cover, the units conducting the attacks likely were relying on sleeper agents and networks of supporters in the region (27). Foreign troops have begun to notice the group has increasingly begun using rudimentary IEDs on roads, which could grow in sophistication if the group establishes ties with East African IS networks (28). Alliances and International Connections Though the group known as ASWJ and Al-Shabab pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2019 and was considered until recently part of ISCAP, the extent of their cooperation and coordination is relatively opaque. The group was designated as an independent wilaya in May of 2022, though this may be purely semantical as IS Central wants to appear to be expanding (29). IS’s Amaq News agency has posted videos and pictures from the group, though inconsistently, and the IS has through social media claimed many attacks conducted by the group, beginning in June of 2019 (30). Nonetheless, there isn’t significant evidence of material or technological support or exchange between the two groups. As of now, a virtual link positively exists, the insurgents have oft flown the flag of the IS, and there is some communication between the groups (31). Every other aspect of their alliance, however, remains largely speculative, and the group has remained insulated from the fortunes of ISCAP and IS central. Ties between the Ugandan Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which is the first component of ISCAP, and IS-M, have been suggested. Some sources say some fighters from IS-M have trained with the ADF in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and some Ugandans have been arrested in Cabo Delgado in connection with terrorism charges (32). It must be noted, nevertheless, that these ties are also somewhat ambiguous and difficult to confirm with upmost confidence. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Hasm Movement, also known as Harakat Sawa’d Misr, Arms of Egypt Movement, and Harikat Souaid Misr (Pompeo, 2021) is an Egyptian Islamist militant organisation. Operating throughout most of Egypt, the group has been responsible for several attacks, including the Myanmar embassy bombing which they committed in retaliation for the nation's crackdown on Rohingya Muslims (Reuters Staff, 2017). The group has suspected ties to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood organisation, an accusation which has been reaffirmed in 2016 with the uncovering of an aborted plot to assassinate Ali Gomaa, former Grand Mufti of Egypt. The assassination attempt was set to occur on August 14th, 2016, on the third anniversary of the Rabaa massacre; an event where over a thousand supporters of the ousted Egyptian president Morsi were killed as security forces, led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, dispersed a number of sit-ins across the nation (Human Rights Watch, 2014). Due to the fact that many of the victims were supporters of the ousted Egyptian president Morsi, this “heightened speculation that Hasm could be affiliated to the banned political movement” (Cummings, 2017). History & Foundations Emerging in the Summer of 2016, the group has focused upon attacking and killing elements of the Egyptian government and security personnel in Cairo (BBC News Middle East, 2017). They were accused of being responsible for the attempted assassination of the former Grand Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa in 2016 and this was used as a link to the banned Muslim Brotherhood organisation, which the Muslim Brotherhood denied (Qabanni and Muhammed, 2016). On the 4th of November 2016, the Hasm Movement claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt by car bombing of Ahmed Aboul Fotouh. Fotouh was one of three judges who found former president Morsi guilty of inciting violence which led to the deaths of 10 people in 2012 (Reuters Staff, 2016). They have also claimed responsibility for several other attacks, including one near the Giza pyramid complex in 2016 which killed 6 security officers (Dearden, 2016). The group was accused of being responsible for the 2019 Cairo bombing, where a car drove into several other parked stationary cars and caused a subsequent explosion in which 20 people were killed outside of Cairo’s main cancer hospital (Reuters Staff, 2019). The interior minister of Egypt, Mahmoud Tawfik, accused the Hasm Movement of being guilty of perpetrating the attack, although the group denied the allegations (Khalil El-Sayed and El Wardany, 2019). As of 2017, the Hasm Movement and another egyptian jihadist group, Liwaa el-Thawra, have been designated as terrorist organisations by the UK government which, according to a statement released by the British embassy in Egypt, will allow the British to increase their “capacity to disrupt the activities of these terrorist organisations” (Al Arabiya, 2017). Similarly, the USA has also designated the Hasm Movement as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDGT) group in a press release from 2018 which – according to the then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – will allow the USA to deny these groups the “resources they need to plan and carry out their terrorist activities” (State Department, 2018). Objectives & Ideology The Hasm Movement is highly unique in its region as it has not announced an official overarching ideological position. However, the group's views may be tied to a national agenda, perhaps due to its attacks against Egypt’s security wings (Johnson, 2017) and the country’s political leadership. The aims of the group seem to run in opposition to the goals of other groups present within the country, such as the Islamic States affiliate organisation in the Sinai (IS-SP), who would seek to create an Islamic caliphate. However, the usage of Quranic quotes and nasheeds in promotional propaganda pieces published by the Hasm Movement would seem to suggest at least a somewhat religious basis behind their ideology (Caillet, 2017). The targeting of judges and other members of the judiciary further support the idea that the group is seeking revenge against members of the Egyptian government and the justice system for their role in the removal of President Morsi. The group released a statement claiming that they were a “resistance movement [and] not a terrorist one” in response to a statement released by the US Embassy in Cairo warning of possible Hasm Movement activity (TIMEP, 2017). Military & Political Abilities The group has limited capabilities to carry out large-scale attacks and territorial holdings and they are therefore limited to carrying out attacks using small numbers of fighters. This is done by ambushing security forces or by pre-planting bombs (Middle East Monitor, 2018). Although limited to small arms and improvised explosive attacks, they have made use of these by killing and injuring large numbers of the Egyptian police and military forces. For instance, a 2017 raid on a Hasm Movement hideout left more than 50 policemen dead (Associated Press, 2017). Membership numbers of the Hasm Movement are estimated to be less than 100, although claims by the Egyptian government of shootouts involving the deaths of Hasm Movement members have increased year on year. This may indicate that the group has a substantially larger membership in order to engage the Egyptian military and security forces regularly (Horton, 2017). However, accusations that the Egyptian government exaggerate the amount of militants and jihadists being killed by the security forces has led to the suggestion that the Hasm Movement may be so extensive that it has become ‘self-healing’ (Horton, 2017) and this may indicate an increase in support from the group amongst the local population. This relates to the suggestion that, as mentioned previously, due to the group’s potential basing of its ideas within an Egyptian nationalist framework, this may lead to an increase in local-Egyptian recruiting. This would notably be the case as the violent counter-terrorism approach by the Egyptian government may create “an ideal operational space for insurgent organisations like the Hasm Movement” (Horton, 2017). Approach to Resistance The group is relatively violent and uses terrorist attacks in order to advance its interests in Egypt. This includes the assassinations of judicial staff members as well as members of the security forces. This can include car bombs (Middle East Monitor, 2018) and also assassination attempts via small arms which are their most common route of attack. The usage of these more covert forms of violence (as opposed to other regional groups using more overt forms such as territorial control) may indicate the limited influence that the Hasm Movement has over the wider Egyptian society. However, as the group is identifying itself as the armed resistance of the Egyptian people against what they view as an increasingly repressive government, this may lead to the group adopting more offensive tactics including the pursuit of territorial holdings. International Relations & Potential Alliances Due to the group's rather clandestine and non-public activities both within Egypt and abroad, there is relatively little which is known about the group's connections or even its potential alliances. In contrast, there is more information available about the group’s clashes and opposition, notably after the group has not released statements endorsing IS’ attacks on the Coptic Christian community in Egypt. This lack of support led to hostilities between the two organisations, and even to the IS accusing the Hasm Movement of pursuing self-interested nationalist goals rather than the ‘purer’ jihad which ISIS claims to push for (Sehmer, 2017). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Redneck Revolt is an armed left-wing organization that has come to prominence in their opposition towards the alt-right. Founded in Kansas in 2016, Redneck Revolt now operates predominantly in rural working-class areas across the USA. Members ascribe to a range of anti-capitalist, anti-fascist, pro-gun rights, and libertarian socialist views. The group’s activities consist of protests, firearms training, and mutual aid. Redneck Revolt is an offshoot and a sister organization of the John Brown Gun Club (JBGC). Members train with and openly carry firearms. History & Foundations Redneck Revolt formed in 2016 as an offshoot of the JBGC. The JBGC itself was founded around 2004 and holds similar positions to Redneck Revolt. It was active in anti-government protests throughout the early 2000s as an alternative to the right-wing militias arising at the time, such as the Minutemen (1). Its namesake, John Brown, was a 19th century abolitionist who took up arms to prevent Kansas from becoming a slave state and attempted to start an armed slave revolt, for which he was arrested and executed (2). JBGC chapters remain active across the USA and John Brown remains a large ideological influence on both Redneck Revolt and the JBGC. In 2016, after a hiatus, the JBGC reformed nationally and Redneck Revolt was established as a sister organisation. The group set its sights on the growing alt-right, and it began counter-protesting various right-wing events, such as the Unite the Right and numerous Donald Trump rallies, as well as groups like the Klu Klux Klan and other white supremacist organizations (3). Redneck Revolt has come into major legal trouble several times because of its choice to openly carry firearms. It was named in a 2017 lawsuit brought against militant groups involved in the Unite the Right rally, for which it had to sign a decree banning them from organizing in Charlottesville (4). Objectives and Ideology Redneck Revolt holds various far-left, socialist, libertarian, pro-gun rights, and anti-fascist views. Its primary goals are to fight white supremacists, provide mutual aid, and organize armed resistance. It believes that direct action and armed resistance is necessary to achieve its objectives. The organization is not ideologically strict, as it chooses to outline only a broad set of principles and members hold a variety of leftist beliefs (5). However, Redneck Revolt defines itself culturally instead -- it argues that America’s white working class has been exploited by capitalism and the state, and thus has more in common with other oppressed groups than white elites. The group’s use of “redneck” refers to this background; the phrase having originated from the sunburns on the backs of poor white southern farmers’ necks from work. It also seeks to reclaim a word which they perceive has been used to demean working-class whites and turn it into a term of cultural pride. During the Coal Wars, a series of late 19th and early 20th century labour conflicts, striking workers came to be known as ‘rednecks’. Members wear red bandanas like those worn by workers during the Battle of Blair Mountain, a strike-turned-battle during the Coal Wars (5). Redneck Revolt takes political inspiration from such labour movements, along with groups like the Black Panthers and the Young Patriots (3). Although the group is primarily focused on organizing in rural white areas, it holds anti-racist positions and many members are people of colour (5). Capabilities & Approach to Resistance The group advocates for gun ownership as a means of personal defence. Firearms training programs are organized by the group and members are armed during demonstrations. However, it does not actively call for or engage in insurrectionary violence, nor does it have a plan for revolution. Its arms training centers on defense and safety, as firearms serve a largely symbolic purpose (3). Besides direct action, the group organizes mutual aid programs for local communities, like food and clothing drives, first aid training, and harm reduction services (6). Despite their ideological, structural, and strategic similarities, Redneck Revolt distinguishes itself from many anti-fascist groups in its choice not to cover their faces. The group claims that remaining anonymous would go against its goals. It also chooses to organize in many typically right-wing spaces, such as gun shows, county fairs and rodeos, motorsports events, and country concerts (8). Since Redneck Revolt and the JBGC are decentralized, it is unclear exactly how many chapters exist. However, as of 2018, there were approximately 45 active chapters in the United States (6). The group is horizontally organized and has no leaders. It does not actively organize revolutionary activities and focuses instead on what it perceives to be more immediate issues, such as poverty and racism (5). Because the group unites on a regional cultural identity, it has not and is unlikely to expand internationally. Alliances & Relations Redneck Revolt has demonstrated alongside a wide range of groups, including anti-fascists, Black Lives Matter, and even Juggalos (3). Its libertarian ethos and working-class background has given the group an appeal to right-wing individuals and members include former republicans and 3 Percenters (7). Because of its unique identity and ideology, the group has attracted plenty of media attention. During the presidency of Donald Trump, Redneck Revolt often found itself caught in the media crossfire while counter-protesting at right-wing rallies, such as in Charlottesville. It has chosen to be generally open towards the media and offer interviews in order to spread their message. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Oath Keepers is a loosely organized collection of American anti-government extremists and part of the wider anti-government ‘Patriot’ movement in the United States, which includes militia, Three Percenter groups, sovereign citizens, tax protesters and others. The Oath Keepers are unique in that they specifically aim to recruit current and former members of the military, police and fire service. While the group accepts anyone into its ranks, they focus recruitment on these sectors. The Oath Keepers were founded in 2009 by Elmer ‘Stewart’ Rhodes, a Montana Attorney and army veteran who now acts as the group’s main spokesperson. The Oath Keepers claim to have tens of thousands of members, but it seems clear that they don’t have anywhere near this many – they do however seem to have at least a couple of thousand members, making them one of the largest anti-government extremist groups in the US. (1) The ideology of the Oath Keepers resembles that of the militia movement; they claim the US is collaborating with a one-world tyrannical conspiracy called the 'New World Order' to strip Americans of their rights. The first right supposedly being targeted is the right to bear arms. The theory states that once stripped of this right and others, the American people will be enslaved by the New World Order. There is overlap between the Oath Keepers and the more loosely organized Three Percenter movement, which is another anti-government movement whose followers view themselves as standing up to the federal government in the same way as American revolutionaries once opposed the British government. There is also overlap between the Oath Keepers and various militia groups across the US. As the group’s focus on the right to bear arms would suggest, many Oath Keeper members are armed, and some, such as member Adam Kokesh, are also gun rights activists (1).The Oath Keepers were present at the January 6 Capitol building attack in the US, and some prominent members were convicted in late 2022 for actions related to the riot. (2) History & Foundations The Oath Keepers were officially launched with a rally held on April 19, 2009 in Lexington, Massachusetts. This rally was held by Rhodes in the wake of Barack Obama being elected as the first black president of the US. Today, the group is registered as a non-profit in the state of Nevada, and has developed into a loosely organized, militaristic organization that aims to recruit mostly, though not exclusively, current and former members of the army, law enforcement, and emergency first responder professions. The Oath Keepers seek to capitalize on the skills these people have acquired through their training and experience; the group’s recruitment of these people is international, and not confined to the US. The Oath Keepers’ name stems from the center of their ideology, which is that their members vow to uphold the oath they took as law enforcement or military personnel, to “support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic”. Therefore, the Oath Keepers urge their members to obey the Constitution as they see it, even if their interpretation of the document goes against that of current US lawmakers and judges. As well as the group’s inaugural rally, they traveled to Quartzsite, Arizona, in August 2011 to join a protest in support of local residents who refused to leave a town council meeting when ejected for speaking beyond the allotted time. In a further development in 2013, the Oath Keepers announced the formation of “Citizen Preservation Teams” (CPTs). CPTs are armed community teams, or militias, that are supposed to prepare for scenarios such as natural disasters or other conflicts, and defend Americans against the New World Order. However, it is thought that their real purpose is to revitalize the American militia movement under the guise of a self-sufficient neighborhood watch, as well as to stoke existing fears in local communities. (3) Ideology & Objectives The Oathkeepers believe that the American government is tyrannical and will use law enforcement and military personnel against the American people, and that their 'Constitutional Republic' is being taken over and destroyed by evil forces. A former spokesman of the group, Jason Van Tatenhove, says that although they claim to be defending the Constitution, the Oath Keepers are in fact “selling the revolution” (3). Court documents from the trial of some Oath Keeper members for January 6 describe how they “believe that the federal government has been coopted by a cabal of elites actively trying to strip American citizens of their rights.” (4) These elites are thought to be the New World Order, a commonly believed source of leftist evil amongst far-right militia movements across America. The Oath Keepers believe that an impending natural disaster, pandemic or terrorist attack will give the US government an excuse to impose martial law on the country, and part of this will be door-to-door confiscation of firearms. Some believe that the US government may stage a terrorist attack in order to cause an emergency requiring martial law. They also believe that interstate travel will be banned, and the government will enact concentration camp-like detainment of its citizens. Rhodes often illustrates this theory by using as examples the World War II internment of Japanese Americans and previous confiscation of guns by the police and military during the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. A federal court later ordered the New Orleans authorities to return all these guns to their owners. (1) The Oath Keepers are also anti-UN, believing it to be a tool of the New World Order designed to undermine American sovereignty. For instance, many Oath Keepers think that a voluntary UN sustainable development programme known as Agenda 21 is in fact a scheme to take away private property and civil liberties in the name of sustainability. The group is also opposed to any new gun legislation in the US, viewing all firearms control as an attack on the Second Amendment; they therefore also call for the nullification of any existing gun legislation as well as opposing any further laws in this area. Furthermore, the Oath Keepers believe that the US government views survivalists, otherwise known as ‘Preppers’, as future military opponents. In contrast, the Oath Keepers see Preppers as people who are awake and aware, who take responsibility for themselves and their families. They maintain that the government fears them because they might resist the state. According to Oath Keeper theories, these people will be locked away in concentration camps by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Oath Keepers’ pledge details 10 'orders', or things they 'refuse', which include disarming the American people, conducting warrantless searches of the American people, imposing martial law, and confiscating property. This pledge is designed to echo the one taken by the armed forces or other personnel to defend the US Constitution, as referenced by the Oath Keepers’ name. (1) Approach to Resistance The Oath Keepers use a variety of tactics to both recruit people, and to put their ideology into practice. These tactics include setting up CPTs, originally called “civilization preservation cells”. Rhodes has claimed these teams are necessary due to the impending – and possibly government-created – collapse of the US. CPTs are organized in a similar way to the US Special Forces, further illustrating the Oath Keepers’ place within the wider American militia movement. They hold militia-like training sessions on topics including use of weapons, patrolling techniques, first aid, and emergency communications. (1) Many Oath Keepers participated in the January 6 attack on the US Capitol building, and five have been convicted for their involvement. This attack was a riot that occurred on this date in 2021 after a protest against the 2020 election of Joe Biden as the next American president. Those protesting viewed Biden as an illegitimate president, and sought to overturn the November 2020 election result to reinstate Donald Trump as president and allow him to complete a second term. The protest was held on January 6 at the Capitol building in Washington, DC as the vote-counting ceremony was taking place inside – a ceremony that is traditional, but does not have any legal standing on whether an American president can begin their term. After the encouragement of Trump – who stated about the election, “we’re just not going to let that happen” – many rioters breached the Capitol building, leading to the death of one rioter on the day, and the arrest of more than 725 during the year after the riot. (5) In total, five Oath Keepers were convicted on the 29th of November, 2022 for their actions on January 6. Rhodes (the founder) and Meggs (leader of the Florida chapter) were convicted of seditious conspiracy and other charges, while three other members (Kenneth Harrelson, Jessica Watkins and Thomas Caldwell) were convicted of related felonies. The Department of Justice (DoJ) stated that following the 2020 US election, “Rhodes, Meggs, and others began plotting to oppose by force the lawful transfer of presidential power”. The DoJ also stated that the Oath Keepers, “employed a variety of manners and means, including: organizing into teams that were prepared and willing to use force and to transport firearms and ammunition”, as well as “recruiting members and affiliates; organizing trainings to reach and learn paramilitary combat tactics; bringing and contributing paramilitary gear, weapons, and supplies – including knives, batons, camouflage combat uniforms, tactical vests with plates, helmets, eye protection, and radio equipment – to the Capitol grounds” (6). In order for the conviction to go ahead, the prosecution had to prove that the Oath Keeper members on trial had been planning their actions at the Capitol, including the use of force. (2). The verdict came after a high profile trial that garnered extensive media coverage as a part of the US Justice Department’s ongoing investigation into the involvement of right-wing extremist groups in the January 6 riots. Prior to the Oathkeeper trials, the US had not tried anyone on charges of seditious conspiracy since 2010, and federal prosecutors had not won a conviction on these charges since 1995. (7) Other notable Oath Keeper activities include: armed patrols, armed guarding of US military recruitment centers, acting as armed security during land disputes, advocacy for the Constitutional Sheriff and Peace Officers Association (a far-right group that believes local Sheriffs don’t need to adhere to federal law), and participation in Alex Jones’ talk show, on which Rhodes was a regular guest prior to his conviction. Oath Keepers have also attempted to infiltrate the Tea Party movement, and their recruitment tactics include promotional billboards and providing care packages to military personnel. Members of the Oath Keeper movement have also been involved in criminal incidents since the group’s founding in 2009, including various firearms possession charges (1). Relations & Alliances The Oath Keepers fall within the larger umbrella anti-government movement within the US. Other groups under this umbrella include the American Patriots, Three Percenters, 111% United Patriots, American Patriots Three Percent, 111%ers, and the State of Jefferson Formation. The Intelligence Project at the Southern Poverty Law Center has identified 488 extreme anti-government groups that were active in the US during 2021, down from 566 in 2020. 92 of these groups were militias, 75 sovereign citizens, three Constitutional sheriffs, 52 conspiracy militias, and 52 conspiracy propagandist groups. Anti-government groups were linked up with other far-right groups in 2021, and all these often targeted the same marginalized communities and engaged in actual or threats of political violence. The January 6 attack was the most public moment in the history of US anti-government movements since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. Of over 725 people charged for actions related to January 6, at least 25 have been identified as members of anti-government organizations. After January 6 many anti-government groups were faced with increased scrutiny or deplatforming, leading to some to reorganizing, dispersal amongst communities, and a focus on localized activities, which has long been a staple of anti-government groups in America (8). The Oath Keepers were also documented providing armed security for a 2017 ‘Patriot’s Free Speech Rally’ organized by Rich Black, founder of Liberty Alliance and March4Trump (both far-right groups). Nathan Damigo, leader of white supremacist group Identity Evropa, was also present at the event and was placed under investigation after footage appeared to show him punching a woman in the face at the rally – although he was not charged (9).The Oath Keepers provided security along with far-right organization the Proud Boys, protecting the protesters from anti-fascist counter-protesters (10). The ideology of the Oath Keepers also has much in common with a 1990s group named Police Against the New World Order, started by retired police officer Jack McLamb. (1) Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Generation Identity (GI) is a far-right pan-European nationalist youth movement, part of the wider Identitarian movement. The group originated in France under the name ‘Génération Identitaire’, where it held a strong presence until its ban in 2021. The GI holds branches across most of Europe with strongholds in Austria, Germany and Italy, but also numerous other countries including Switzerland, Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark. The ideological foundations behind Generation Identity are heavily rooted in intellectual European far-right history, notably from the French Nouvelle Droite (the New Right). Generation Identity is highly influenced by thinkers of the Nouvelle Droite such as Guillaume Faye and Renaud Camus, promoting ideas such as The Great Replacement theory, ethnopluralism and remigration. The movement describes itself as a metapolitic organization, not wishing to directly impact policy, but more so wishing to push the public narrative on areas such as immigration, globalization, family and traditions towards a more critical perception, with the result of long-term societal changes (1). History & Foundations While the Identitarian movement is neither a new idea nor movement, as it has been promoted by thinkers of the Nouvelle Droite for years, the organized Generation Identity first started to find a foothold in 2012 after serving as a collection of various youth political movements in France. After the release of a video gone viral entitled “Declaration of War” (Déclaration de Guerre), showing French activists of Generation Identity describing what they see as the downfall of France caused by multiculturalism and immigration, the group started to find sympathy across Europe (2). Establishing a stronghold in France and Austria in 2012 with de facto leader and former neo-Nazi Martin Sellner in front of the Austrian branch, Identitäre Bewegung Österreich, the movement found widespread traction in the years to come and started spreading to more countries. The movement does not hold any centralized umbrella organization, and branches are expected to organize and locally create their own variation (3). The movement found media notoriety after the ‘Defend Europe’ campaign in 2017, organized by a clique of far-right individuals in Europe and North America, all with support for the Identitarian movement and with Martin Sellner acting as spokesperson for the operation (4). Chartering a 130-meter ship equipped with banners containing Identitarian slogans centered in the waters off Libya, a hotspot for migrants, the mission was to defend Europe from migrants crossing waters and seeking asylum in Europe, intercepting and preventing non-governmental organizations from rescuing migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Not long after this, multiple fractions started popping up across Europe and North America. Objectives & Ideology Generation Identity can be ideologically defined through their opposition of globalization, multiculturalism, Islam and migration. Among others, the movement follows and operates out of the thought behind the Great Replacement theory, a theory building on the thesis that Europeans will eventually be a minority on their own continent, substantiating it with decreasing fertility rates for Europeans, increasing fertility rates for immigrants and mass immigration (primarily from North Africa and The Middle East). GI generally holds a strong belief in ethnopluralism and ethnoculturalism, believing in the preservation of the European identity and that all Europeans hold separate cultures, but at the same time a common European identity which is under attack from multiculturalism. The preservation of European identity is often synonymous with ‘reconquista’ - reconquering - a term dating back to the period from 700 to 1400 where Spanish Christians recaptured the Muslim controlled Iberian Peninsula. GI operates with the synonymous term ‘remigration’, essentially advocating for the forced or promoted return of Muslims to their respective homelands (5). Generation Identity doesn’t align with any political ideology and only operates out of a ‘meta political’ thought inspired by Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, meaning they wish to push public perspective on politics, not wishing to influence policy making directly or seeking electoral results (6). However, political scientists have often labeled GI as a fascist group, or at least as being an offspring from a fascist, racist, nationalist or far-right tradition. GI itself generally renounces the labels, believing that members are not bound upon a single ideology and are free to believe in whatever they want. The organization declares itself to be a patriotic movement, claiming non-violence and non-racism. Identitarianism differs from other far-right, pro-European causes in its focus on cultural and ethnic identity, rather than solely political and economic ideology. Additionally, the Nouvelle Droite has also been described as having a more intellectual and culturally oriented approach to far-right politics, compared to more populist or street-level far-right movements. Inspired by Nouvelle Droite, GI is generally promoted by its spokespersons as a more well-rounded and intellectual movement than other far-right movements. Generation Identity holds a long vetting process, only taking in members that hold corresponding views and who are not ‘fanatics’ or extremist in rhetoric. An important note for GI is to hold a respectable outlook by dressing nice, being well educated and prioritizing the intellectual. By this definition, GI has often been called “hipster fascists” (7). Approach to Resistance, Relations & Alliances With the movement’s alignment to metapolitics, GI often aims at organizing public events that will result in big media attention, hoping to influence culture and public perception on topics such as globalization, multiculturalism, immigration and Islam, shifting the Overton window. Generation Identity usually engages in its political struggle by arranging public gatherings, some of which adopt a satirical approach. In Denmark, for instance, one event involved a ‘Ghetto lottery’ and tombola with the prize being Islamism, increased crime rates and gang wars (8). Larger gatherings with less satirical elements have also been orchestrated by the organization, notably including the ‘Defend Europe’ mission and the occupation of a mosque. The group also employs banner actions, as well as sticker and leaflet distributions as a part of their repertoire. Generation Identity holds a strong contact with the branches in between and can often be seen organizing multinational get-togethers, practicing combat training and discussing tactics, also collaborating at demonstrations with branches sending contingents. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Artsakh Defense Army (ADA) is the military of the unrecognized Armenian breakaway Republic of Artsakh, also known as Nagorno-Karabakh, located within the borders of Azerbaijan. Created during the First Karabakh War (1988-1994), the Artsakh Defense Army has seen both victory and defeat. Its primary goal is to protect the region’s Armenian population from Azerbaijan and Turkey and eventually to obtain international recognition. History & Foundations Situated between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the southern Caucasus, Karabakh, including the majority-Armenian sub-region of Nagorno-Karabakh, has been contested for over a century. In the aftermath of World War I, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought bitterly for control of the territory. After both republics were subsumed by the Soviet Union, the final say went to Moscow and Joseph Stalin, then Commissar on Nationalities. Stalin decided the entire region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, would belong to Azerbaijan (1). Soviet officials later turned Nagorno-Karabakh into a nominally autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan, but the issue was not formally settled. In the late 1980s, Artsakh began pushing to join Armenia. In fury over calls for secession, Azerbaijanis committed several pogroms against Armenians. Soviet authorities objected to Armenian calls for independence, cooperating with local Azerbaijani forces to deport Armenians from the region in what was known as Operation Ring. The different Armenian armed units which began fighting back would eventually evolve into the Artsakh Defense Army (2). The collapse of the Soviet Union followed in 1991, with Artsakh voting to secede and Azerbaijan immediately laying siege to the area. Artsakh eventually turned the tide and achieved victory in 1994, with Russia brokering a ceasefire. However, the Armenian victory did not come with international recognition; diplomatic efforts failed to resolve the region’s status, paving the way for a four-day war in 2016 and the 44-day conflict in 2020. Armed with Israeli and Turkish drones and with the aid of Syrian mercenaries, Azerbaijan launched an offensive in September 2020, recapturing large swaths of Nagorno-Karabakh. A Moscow-brokered ceasefire once again ended the conflict, this time with Baku (Azerbaijan) victorious. Artsakh, now reduced to an area smaller than the original Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, has been patrolled by Russian peacekeepers since (3). Ideology & Objectives The ADA’s primary goal remains the defense of Artsakh. Debate on how to settle the territory’s status is split among its population. In one survey, 46 percent of Artsakh residents viewed an independent state as the best option, followed by 24 percent seeking to join Russia, and 23 percent wanting to join Armenia. Virtually no respondents accepted a scenario where the territory was under Azerbaijani control (4). Instances of torture, mutilation, and execution of Armenian soldiers and civilians committed by Azerbaijani forces makes any sort of union with Baku a non-starter for Artsakh’s residents (5). Azeri President Ilham Aliyev’s words that Armenia is “not even worthy of being a servant” only compound Armenians’ apprehensions that they are facing another genocide. The mass killing of an estimated 1.5 million Armenians from 1915-1923 by the Ottoman Empire continues to linger in the mind of Armenians and fuels the sentiment they express today. Approach to Resistance The ADA has itself been accused of war crimes. In the first war, Armenian forces pushed beyond Nagorno-Karabakh, occupying seven adjacent territories and displacing hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis and many Kurds in the process. These territories were recaptured by Azerbaijan in 2020. In 1992, at least 200 Azerbaijani civilians were killed by Armenian troops in the city of Khojaly (6). Though it started as a group of poorly armed volunteers, the ADA has evolved into a relatively conventional army. Its success in the first war is credited to the experience of Armenians from the Red Army (7) as well as good leadership from the likes of Monte Melkonian (8). Given the presence of Russian peacekeepers and the disproportionate military power enjoyed by Baku, the ADA is currently forced into a defensive posture. Military & Political Capabilities Following its defeat in 2020, the ADA now numbers around 12,000 soldiers - half its number when comparing it to before the war. Armed mostly with upgraded Soviet equipment provided by the Armenian Army, the ADA’s arsenal consists of light arms, heavy artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles. The Armenian army also has short-range ballistic missiles, including SCUDs and the Russian Iskander. Armenia, with its smaller GDP, faces difficulties upgrading its military compared to Azerbaijan. With the Azerbaijani area of Nakhchivan and Turkey to the west, Armenia cannot fully focus its forces towards Artsakh, and is hesitant to deploy its small air force to the fight (9). Politically, Artsakh’s greatest tool is the Armenian diaspora. Motivated and vocal, Armenians across the globe pressure governments over their support for Azerbaijan and have raised millions in financial support for Artsakh (10). International Relations In 2022, Armenia signed a document with Azerbaijan pledging to respect each other’s territorial integrity. What this means for Artsakh is hard to discern, particularly because abandoning the region would be deeply unpopular domestically (11). Struggling with the war in Ukraine and needing Azerbaijan’s oil market, Russia seems unlikely to come to Artsakh or Armenia’s rescue. Despite Armenia being a member of the Russian-backed CSTO military alliance, Russia did not support Yerevan when Azerbaijani forces invaded Southern Armenia in September 2022. Both Paris and Washington attempted to take advantage of Russia's deteriorated standing in the region (12). This has not yet resulted in military support for Armenia nor a push by other governments to give Artsakh a more formal status. Turkey, a staunch supporter and supplier of Azerbaijan, also sees an opportunity as Russia focuses its attention on Ukraine and away from the Caucasus. It has held meetings with the Armenian government to normalize relations, a move Armenia hopes would deter another military attack. The meetings have so far yielded nothing concrete, except perhaps greater Turkish influence in the region. Turkey, which seeks the creation of the Zangezur corridor, connecting themselves with the rest of the Turkic world, has political reason to support Azerbaijan’s maximum demands (13). Help for Artsakh could come from India (who sells weapons to Armenia due to Pakistan’s ties with Azerbaijan) or Iran. Iran fears Azerbaijani expansionism due to its own Azeri minority population and the economic influence it would lose from the Zangezur corridor. As one Armenian put it, “if we have to choose between annihilation as a nation or sanctions from America (from cooperating with Iran), I prefer the latter.” (14) Azerbaijan began a blockade of the road connecting Artsakh and Armenia in December 2022. So far, international powers seem unable or unwilling to do anything to resolve the situation (15). With basic supplies in the area running low and with the threat of military escalation ever present, Armenians may have no one to turn to but themselves. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is an ISIS affiliate organisation which operates in the Sahel region (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) and consists of around 400 to 1000 fighters (United Nations Security Council, 2022). ISGS formed on the 13th of May 2015 when the group’s leader, Adnan Abu Walid al Sahrawi, swore allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) and its emir at the time -- Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (VOA, 2019). This occured after internal disagreements with a former al-Qaeda (AQ) aligned group, al-Mourabitoun. Increasing tensions within the leadership of the latter led to the splintering of the organisation as al Sahrawi was declared by another senior founder within al-Mourabitoun, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, as not having enough experience (Lyammouri, 2015). Sahrawi released an audio statement in May of 2015 declaring his, and al-Mourabitoun’s, allegiance to IS (Joscelyn, 2015). However, this was rejected by Belmokhtar, and Sahrawi consequently left al-Mourabitoun and founded the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). ISGS and Belmokhtar-loyalists fought following this splitting of allegiance, and assassination attempts on Sahrawi were frequent. In October of 2016, the main IS organisation acknowledged the ISGS as an affiliate within West Africa (RFI, 2016). Following a French airstrike in Mali in 2021, al-Sahrawi was killed (Ataman and Vandoorne, 2021) and a successor has yet to be named by IS. History & Foundations Created due to internal differences between the leaders of a former Islamic organisation, al-Mourabitoun, the ISGS is now affiliated with the wider IS role of spreading Salafi Jihadism globally. It also began preying upon previously disunited ethnic groups which have suffered discrimination against themselves by varying regional national governments. This has come in the form of the recruitment of marginalised people (Carayol, 2016) from diverse groups across the Sahel including the Fulani. The group has launched various attacks on military and civilian targets within the Sahel region, such as an attack which occurred in Intangom, Mali, which killed four soldiers and several civilians (Kishi and Nsaibia, 2018). The group is also more famously responsible for the attack on a joint US-Nigerien task force in Niger which left four US SPEC-OP soldiers dead after being ambushed by around 100 ISGS militants (Friend, 2018). The group was incorporated into ISWAP (Islamic State West Africa Province) in 2019 and announced as a part of that group's Central African province (Perkins, 2020). However, in March of 2022, the Islamic State declared ISGS an autonomous province and it has subsequently been renamed as Islamic State Sahel Province (Chesnutt and Zimmerman, 2022). Ideology & Objectives As an organisation, the ISGS shares many of its strategic directions and ideological goals with the wider goals of its ‘parent’ organisation. This comes as ISGS has pledged allegiance to IS and its leader in order to ‘restore’ the Islamic caliphate. In a video published in 2015, al Sahrawi, the former leader of ISGS, swore bay’ah (an oath of allegiance) to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi and within another video published shortly thereafter, Sahrawi refers to Abu Bakr as “Emir il-Mu’minin” (Emir of the faithful) (Joscelyn, 2016) which could indicate that ISGS/Sahrawi perceived Abu Bakr's leadership as legitimate. Also present within ISGS ideological basing is the idea that they are fighting against the ‘Crusaders’ (Le Monde Afrique, 2018a). This shows a similarity to many jihadist groups in that they are claiming to be fighting against foreign armies or even the armies of the nations in which they are present, such as in Mali or Burkina Faso, as they are ‘foreign invaders’ in which the countries' Christian populations are seen as a threat to the existence of these groups (Roche, 2017). Military & Political Abilities ISGS has extensive military abilities and follows similar tactics to those used by other regionally present militant organisations such as its former parent group, al Mourabitoun. This may include attacks such as suicide bombings and also the murder of regional leaders who the group may oppose (Le Monde Afrique, 2018b). The group has had its abilities bolstered militarily by the joining of a group of formerly JNIM-aligned (Jama’ah Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) militants known as Katiba Salaheddine. Another group of militants which is primarily composed of Toleebe Fulani people who were also previously part of JNIM’s Katiba Macina (a group closely linked to JNIM) also joined with ISGS bolstering its ranks (Berger, 2020a). Although ISGS is one of two IS affiliate organisations in this region (the other being Boko Haram), it is unknown how much support IS gives its affiliate and this has led to suspicions that its affiliation is in name only (Campbell, 2018). Images of the group which are released through various local news networks (when attacks are claimed) have been shown to include varying forms of small arms including, AK-47s and rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). ISGS may have been able to recover the weapons from the Niger ambush, as a propaganda video which features the execution of ‘traitors’ features a US-made M4 rifle being carried, likely as a trophy piece (Hassan, 2019). Approach to Resistance The group has frequently targeted the military and police forces of the countries in which it operates and also has attacked intervention forces from countries such as France, the USA (previously mentioned attack against US SPEC-OP convoy) and also MINUSMA forces as a part of the UN stabilisation mission within Mali (Nsaibia, 2018). This indicates a violent predication to their actions and a willingness to use suicide attacks, as with the suicide-car bombing of a French military convoy in 2018 (Le Monde Afrique, 2018c). They have also frequently targeted civilians through executions, and this has led to the degradation in the organisation's relationship with villagers in the Sahel region and especially within Burkina Faso (Human Rights Watch, 2018). International Relations & Alliances The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara is the second IS affiliate within West Africa (as previously mentioned) after the founder of ISGS pledged allegiance to IS in May of 2015; however, it is uncertain as to why the main IS group took over a year to recognise ISGS’s pledge of allegiance until October 2016. Furthermore, the group was not recognised as an official wilayah (province) of IS and it was only in 2019 that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared in a video praising al-Sahrawi and ISGS (Postings, 2019). As aforementioned, the group has also received fighters from both Toleebe Fulani militants and Katiba Salaheddine, a militant jihadist group which was loosely associated with JNIM. A meeting which took place in September of 2019 between the leadership of ISGS and JNIM was intended to demarcate territorial boundaries and to also declare peace between the two groups as they worked towards a similar goal. Nonetheless, they did not come to an agreement and further clashes have occurred (Berger, 2020b). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) is a Salafi-Jihadist insurgent group that has acted as a subsidiary of the Islamic State (IS) within the Sahel since 2015. The ISWAP distinctly split from Boko Haram in 2016 and has become a rival for resources and territory, though it has since surpassed it in size and capabilities. The group operates primarily within Nigeria (in the forests of the Borno and Yobe states and on the Nigeria-Cameroon border), although it has also occasionally appeared within Cameroon, and around Lake Chad. The group is estimated to have between 3000-5000 fighters (1). The ISWAP has distinguished itself from Boko Haram by limiting its attacks to Christians and state targets, all while avoiding indiscriminate violence against Muslim civilians and by providing basic state-like services to the communities within its control. History & Foundations In 2015, the Islamic State’s successes in the Middle East and internal tensions within Boko Haram put pressure on Abubakar Shekau, the successor to the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, to publicly pledge allegiance and formalize ties with the group (2). Shekau faced internal criticism, which turned into a challenge for leadership in late 2015, for his heavy-handed and autocratic leadership, particularly from Mamman Nur (one of the highest-ranked lieutenants of Yusuf, and from Yusuf's son Abu Musab al-Barnawi) (3). Nur and Barnawi asked IS’ leadership to mediate the leadership dispute, resulting in Barnawi being declared the group’s leader in August of 2016. After Shekau refused to accept this change in leadership, the group split and two distinct insurgencies were formed – ISWAP and Boko Haram, with Shekau continuing to lead the latter (4). The groups clashed following the split in 2016 but the fighting subsided quickly (5). Most clashes since have been verbal, with ISWAP continuing to criticize Shekau’s leadership. Essentially, both have continuously attempted to undermine each other's credibility and build up their own by releasing publications that draw on Islamic theology and jurisprudence (6). ISWAP has continuously attacked Nigerian troops and military bases, focusing primarily on military targets in the area. The ISWAP absorbed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara in 2019, the same year that Ba Idrisa became the ISWAP leader and was named governor of the province by IS central, though he would be purged and executed in 2020, and al-Barnawi was demoted to the shura council (7). Al-Barnawi was the wali of the province as recently as March 2019, but was replaced by Abu Abdullah ibn Umar al-Barnawi by IS leadership [8]. However, a quick succession of leaders occurred in 2021 and 2022, and this has made it unclear who the current leader of the group is. This is because of the successful targeting and killing of the most recent known leaders of the ISWAP, Bako Gorgore and Abu Ibrahim, by the Nigerian Air Force in 2022. Objectives & Ideology The objective of the ISWAP is to establish a province as part of a broader Islamic caliphate, governed based on a literal interpretation of Shari’a, and rooted in Wahhabism and Salafism. Their immediate goals, though, appear to be to consolidate their power, gather resources and extend existing networks (9). Many of the leaders of the ISWAP are former senior members of Boko Haram and so share a similar desire to remove Western influence and to promote monotheism within their territory. They and IS Central found Shekau to be too extreme and henceforth disagree with him on several doctrinal matters. This is part of what has distinguished the ISWAP from Boko Haram, as a result of the influence that these views have had on each group's respective tactics (10). The leadership is composed primarily of ethnic Kanuri, who historically have been Muslim, although the group has recruited heavily from the ethnic Buduma. This recruitment strategy has led to complications within the group’s internal dynamics, as the various ethnic groups compete for resources locally (11). Approach to Resistance ISWAP is divided between the shura, which is a consultative assembly made up of senior members, the leader of whom manages the group’s governorates, and Amir al-Jaeesh who is in charge of military operations. Contemporarily, it is unclear whether there is a wali who has overall command (12). The ISWAP has distinguished itself by attempting to establish a parallel government within the territory it controls, collecting taxes, providing health services, providing a school curriculum, facilitating trade, buying goods from local farmers and merchants, providing loans, resolving disputes, fighting crime and meting out justice in a way which is seen as preferable to the local government, and which didn’t exist as public services prior to their arrival (13). This, combined with their restrictive targeting, has allowed them to build relationships with the local communities that give them access to resources, recruits, and safe haven (14). Initially targeting small military camps and bases, notably after failed raids on larger targets in 2016 and 2017, the group obtained access to weapons and supplies and garnered experience and spoils for its fighters (15). It conducted raids throughout 2018 on significant military bases, sometimes with as many as several hundreds of fighters, which showed the group had gained the capability to gather intelligence, coordinate troop movements and actions, and to conduct sophisticated operations with a variety of types of weaponry and vehicles, which recently have included tanks and armored vehicles (16). These were limited guerrilla actions, though, and the group exfiltrated after looting the camps. Nonetheless, they were able to take and hold the towns of Baga and Doro Gowon in late 2018, forcing the Nigerian army to withdraw and regroup (17). The group has also attacked churches and infrastructure in order to weaken the legitimacy of the federal government, while using propaganda, similar to IS central, rather than just coercion, to sway the local community’s opinion by showing the quality of life of the people they govern (18). The group still primarily relies on raiding, assassinations, and guerrilla style attacks, though it is growing in strength and has gained new members through Boko Haram defections. These defections have primarily occurred since the death of Shekau in an attack launched by the ISWAP, based on intelligence received from within Boko Haram in 2021 (19). It has recently expanded operations to central and southern (primarily Christian) Nigeria, evidence of its growing capabilities. Alliances & International Connections IS Central has featured the ISWAP in most recent propaganda messages and the ISWAP’s leadership has been recently elevated to the global shura council of the IS, while the group is also the most active affiliate, behind only IS central in number of attacks (20). The ISWAP has also attracted former Boko Haram fighters who had fled to Libya, but who are returning now to join the ISWAP, while the IS central has facilitated networks and routes to move fighters through the Sahel from Libya to the ISWAP’s territory, and the group has fighters from Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Libya and elsewhere (21). The IS sees the ISWAP as an alternative group to direct foreign, African-based fighters, especially as it faces increasing pressure in Iraq and Syria. A transfer of tactics from the IS central to the ISWAP may be occurring, as the ISWAP began using up-armored SVBIED’s 2018, which is a common tactic used by the IS, and the sophistication of some of their raids resembles tactics and techniques used by the IS (22). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The New Irish Republican Army (New IRA), or simply Irish Republican Army in the group's own publications, is an Irish Republican paramilitary organisation predominantly active in Northern Ireland. The group formed in July 2012 after successful negotiations between the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) and various other small unaligned radical Republican groups (1). The New IRA claims to be pursuing the "ideals and principles enshrined in the Proclamation of 1916” (2), referring to the “Proclamation of the Republic” issued by the organisers of the 1916 Easter Rising. The group’s main stated goal is the removal of any British military presence and “political interference” from Ireland. However the New IRA has also been critical of the Catholic church, the Republic of Ireland, and mainstream Republican leadership (specifically Sinn Féin). History & Foundations The New IRA emerged in 2012 in the wake of successful negotiations between a number of unaligned radical Republican groups, the largest of which being the RIRA and RAAD. The RIRA had emerged as a splinter from the Provisional IRA, disagreeing with the latter’s decision to enter peace talks (3). This split was cemented in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, which formed a unionist/nationalist power-sharing government in Northern Ireland and resulted in most mainstream Republican and Loyalist groups laying down their arms. RAAD, on the other hand, emerged as an anti-drug vigilante group sometime in the late 2000’s in Derry, targeting drug dealers operating within nationalist communities. No individual event is considered to be the catalyst of these negotiations, rather it’s thought that they were brought about by growing dissatisfaction with mainstream Republican groups such as Sinn Féin, who were viewed as making little progress towards either Irish reunification or improving the economic and social situation of nationalist communities since entering government. The New IRA hoped to take advantage of this dissatisfaction in order to provide a viable alternative to mainstream Republicanism. Cooperation was spurred by the approaching centenary of the 1916 rising, with Republican groups hoping to show a “united front” during a period of renewed interest in Republican politics (4). Notably the Continuity IRA -- the other main dissident Republican group active at the time -- did not join the New IRA, although the two groups have allegedly remained in close contact and discussed the possibility of joint attacks (5). Objectives & Ideology The New IRA views itself as the continuation of earlier Republican groups, in particular the leadership of the 1916 rising, and therefore the holders of a historical mandate lost by less radical groups (6). To this end, the group’s main goal is to bring about the “removal of British military presence” in Northern Ireland and the reunification of Ireland as a socialist republic (7). The group distinguishes itself from older Republican groups through its criticism of the peace process in Northern Ireland, having maintained their position in opposition to the Good Friday Agreement from the original Provisional-Real IRA split (8). This includes specific criticism of mainstream Republican leadership, including Sinn Féin (the political wing of the Provisional IRA), which they have accused of having abandoned traditional Republican values. This criticism also involves the argument that Sinn Féin have evolved as collaborators with the British state (9), consequently leading to attacks against high-ranking members of the former (10). As such the group views itself as the “true” continuation of radical Republican politics, reflected in their predecessor group’s “Real” title. Much of the New IRA’s ideological development is believed to occur within the Republican prisoner community, which is viewed with a certain level of reverence given their “sacrifice”, per se, to the Republican cause. This also ties into the group’s attempt to paint itself as the successors of the 1981 hunger strikers, such as Bobby Sands. Such figures are still viewed with a great deal of reverence within the contemporary Republican movement (11). Approach to Resistance While membership of the New IRA exists on both sides of the border, the group is predominantly active within Northern Ireland (12). The New IRA has tended to continue applying methods used by previous iterations of the IRA, including parcel and car bombings against perceived "agents of the British State" (13). Many of these attacks have targeted prison officers and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). In fact, this includes the first attack officially claimed by the New IRA, which involved the killing of prison officer David Black in November 2012 (14). The New IRA has also continued to maintain a large focus on “community defence” from drugs and organised crime from RAAD, illustrated in the punishment shootings and killings of several individuals alleged to be part of the illegal drug trade (15). This focus on community protection finds its roots in the group’s ideology, which does not recognise the legitimacy of the PSNI within nationalist communities (16). The New IRA is also believed to have been the driving force behind several large-scale riots within nationalist communities (17). The group's most high-profile attack remains the accidental killing of journalist Lyra McKee on the 18th of April 2019. McKee was shot while observing rioting in the Creggan area of Derry, with the New IRA subsequently claiming responsibility for the killing and stating that the intended targets had been PSNI officers (18). The New IRA has henceforth continued its campaign under relatively significant levels of criticism against it. At the time of writing, the group's latest activity involved a bomb attack against a PSNI patrol vehicle in November 2022 (19). Relations & Alliances Similar to previous iterations of the IRA, the New IRA continues to maintain a relationship with Palestinian insurgent groups. This relationship emerged in the 1970’s due to the perceived similarity between the Republican and Palestinian struggles, in addition to the mutual relationship with Libyan dictator Muammar Ghaddafi, who provided both groups with arms and training (20). While this relationship is thought to have waned in the 1980’s due to the growing links between the PLO and the Irish government (21), the New IRA continues to vocalise support for the Palestinian struggle and is believed to have met with representatives of the Palestinian community as recently as 2021 (22). While several small shipments of arms into Northern Ireland have occurred in recent years, it’s believed that the New IRA continues to rely on weapon supplies from the Troubles, the majority of which were provided by Muammar Gaddafi (23). The organisation is known to have reached out to Middle Eastern insurgent groups in search of weapons and financing, most notably forging an alliance with the Lebanon-based group Hezbollah for this purpose (24). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Islamic State in Libya (IS in Libya - ISL) is an extension of the Islamist militant organisation in Syria (ISIS) which formed in 2014. The group is present in three Libyan provinces and groups in Barqa (East), Fezzan (South) and Tripolitania (West) have pledged their allegiance to ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Reuters, 2014). In a video from 2014, al-Baghdadi acknowledged the allegiance of these militant groups and declared them as wilayahs (administrative provinces) in Libya and they were given the authority to govern the territory that they held like a state, very similarly to the IS' branch in Syria (Watts, 2016). Operating from the 13th of November 2014 (date of allegiance) to the present day, they have been accused of a variety of human rights abuses including the mass murder of 21 Coptic Christians who had been kidnapped in Sirte (Al Jazeera, 2015). However, in 2016, following 2 years of attacks by Libyan Forces and United States airstrikes, the group suffered severe defeats and was eventually pushed out of several areas including Derna, Benghazi, and Sirte (Amara, 2016a). History & Foundations In the immediate aftermath of the 2011 Libyan Civil War, many rebel fighters who had previously been fighting against Colonel Muammar Gaddafi left to fight with rebel organisations in Syria who were opposed to Bashar al-Assad and his government loyalists in the Syrian Civil War (BBC News Africa, 2014). One of these groups of Libyan fighters would in 2015 establish themselves as Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi, also known as the Battar Brigade (Wehrey and Alrababa’h, 2015). This group would go on to pledge their allegiance and subsequently go on to fight for ISIS in Iraq and Syria (Hummel, 2017). In early 2014 the aforementioned Battar Brigade returned to Libya and in particular the city of Derna where they formed a new faction called the Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC). They began fighting for influence with another militant group known as the Abu Salem Brigade and they eventually declared all out war on any opposing groups in Derna (Cruickshank et al., 2014). The IYSC eventually took control of the city of Derna and by pledging allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, they aligned themselves with ISIS and began establishing training camps surrounding the city and extending their influence along the coast (Michael, 2014). Objectives & Ideology The group follows the same ideological foundations as many ISIS offshoots found in the region and abroad, which is radical Salafism. They aim to develop the establishment of a global caliphate through armed Jihad and the replacement of democratic principles. Due to their scale as a local organisation, they follow similar objectives as other ISIS offshoots and the main organisation which they stem from. For instance, the group attempts to take over and control the region which they are present in, either by preying on already-existing instabilities (such as the Libyan civil war) or by preying on ethnic instability (such as in the Sahel or the Horn of Africa). Following their establishment in December of 2014, Islamic State recruiters instructed the Libyan branches of IS to focus on domestic attacks in order to take over more territory, and consequently complete their objectives within Libya (Bradley, 2015). Military & Political Abilities The group has extensive and similar military abilities to other ISIS offshoots, such as ISGS (ISIS Greater Sahara Province) and as such they have been able to establish themselves relatively assertively within Libya. These aforementioned capabilities include the use of small arms such as Ak-47s and HMG’s, such as the DShK HMG, which are often mounted on top of vehicles. Both of these are frequently spotted in images of the group. The group also makes use of suicide bombings in their course of action and this has demonstrated to be extremely effective. One example of this tactic in use is the suicide car bombing which killed five soldiers and two civilians at an army checkpoint in Benghazi (al-Warfalli, 2015). The group has also made use of extensive executions to establish its rule, such as the aforementioned execution of 21 Egyptian Copts in 2015. However, following clashes between the IS faction in Derna and their local rivals, the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Derna (DMSC) -- who were supported by the Libyan Air Force -- the Islamic State in Libya has begun to suffer setbacks. The group was eventually forced out of the city and into the countryside following intense fighting in the port city (BBC News Africa, 2016b). This has resulted in the group having to utilise its military capabilities in a different way to which they originally did, and they have resorted to more acts of terrorism, including the raiding and the attacking of checkpoints (Amara, 2016b). Approach to Resistance The group is extremely violent and has been accused of a variety of war crimes and human rights abuses in and around the territories which they controlled. When the port city of Derna was fully under their control, the football stadium in the city was used for public executions (Amnesty International UK, 2014). The group has a varied and extensive list of alleged violent attacks which they have claimed responsibility for, including the execution of two Tunisian journalists who had been kidnapped (Banco, 2015) as well as the suicide car bombing of a checkpoint in the southern Libyan city of Sebha in 2021 (Reuters, 2021). The group had also implemented Sharia law in the cities and provinces in which they were present within Libya, and this includes “imprisonment, amputations, public crucifixions and beheadings” as punishments for the ‘offences’ that the group believes people may of have committed (BBC News Africa, 2016a). International Relations & Potential Alliances Although it has limited relations with other groups within Libya in terms of alliances and agreements, the Islamic State in Libya receives quite substantial support from the central IS organisation. This comes in the form of the recognition which the group(s) achieved following the pledging of allegiance in 2014 and subsequently the IS in Libya have been described as one of its “locations with the most promise” (Zelin, 2015). Due to the Mediterranean migrant crisis and the extensive willingness by IS to use these migrants as weapons to overwhelm the Mediterranean governments (The Malta Independent, 2015), this has spurred action by national governments in the region into combatting IS in Libya directly. For instance, Italy and the United States use airstrikes and special operation forces to weaken and attack IS forces, notably killing the leader of the organisation in Libya during a US airstrike in November of 2015 (Associated Press, 2015). Additional Resources

Note: A different logo is usually found on the internet, but after the merger with the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire, the FAI decided to use a variation of the CCF logo. This image is from the letter sent to the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera by Alfredo Cospito and Nicola Gai of the Olga nuclei/FAI in which they claim the responsibility for the Roberto Adinolfi knecapping. Insurgency Overview The Informal Anarchist Federation (also known as Federazione Anarchica Informale – FAI) (1) is an insurrectionary anarchist network composed of various and independent groups, extremely fluid and devoid of hierarchies and roles, operating through a plurality of ‘lone-wolf’ militants. The organisation was born in December 2003, after it claimed the responsibility – by sending an open letter to an Italian newspaper (2) – for two rudimentary bombs placed in Bologna, Italy, near the house of the then President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi. The FAI, which in 2011 became known as FAI/IRF (International Revolutionary Front), declares the necessity of the revolutionary armed struggle against nation-states and “The Fortress Europe” (3). It underlines the concept of propaganda of the deed and direct action. The cells of its organisation are against nationalism, capitalism, and Marxism, all concepts they consider to be modern forms of exploitation. History & Foundations The Informal Anarchist Federation officially appeared in December 2003 with the attack against Romano Prodi, the then President of the European Commission – which started the FAI’s Operation Santa Claus, a letter bomb campaign carried out against European Union representatives, officials, and institutions. Besides Prodi, they targeted the president of the European Central Bank, Europol, Eurojust, the European People’s Party and a British member of the European Parliament (4). In its early days, the network was composed of four known Italian cells: Cooperative of Hand-Made Fire and Related Items, July 20 Brigade, Five C’s, and International Solidarity. Some of them were already active in the late 1990s (5). After nine years of activity, in 2012 for the first time a cell affiliated with the FAI – called Olga Nuclei, in honour of the Greek anarchist Olga Ikonomidou (6) – shot a person. On May 12, 2012, two masked men kneecapped Roberto Adinolfi, the chief executive of Ansaldo Nucleare. The latter is an Italian nuclear power company controlled by the aerospace and defence conglomerate, Finmeccanica (7). Following the attack, two suspects were captured and convicted – Nicola Gai and Alfredo Cospito. Both attackers declared they acted alone. Cospito is currently held in a prison in Sassari, Sardinia (Italy), at the regime of 41bis, a detention measure of isolation usually used for mafia bosses (8). Since its foundation, the group’s composition has varied, but its network has grown in numbers and has spread through cells around the world – even after the imprisonment of some of its members. Objectives & Ideology This insurrectionary anarchist movement combines different nihilist radical causes, including anti-authoritarianism, anti-capitalism, anti-militarism, anti-clericalism, anti-Marxism, the harsh critics against the prison system and the judiciary, and even radical environmentalism. They are anti-democratic and focused both on international, national, and local issues. The fight against the State, in their views, would also correspond to a struggle for equality and their beliefs can be traced back to the views of some classical individual-anarchist ideologies, such as those of Max Stirner, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and Henry David Thoreau. One of the most influential ideological components of contemporary insurrectionary anarchism can be traced back to the Italian activist Alfredo Maria Bonanno. Bonanno is best known for his essay The Armed Joy (La gioia armata), an incendiary pamphlet written in Italy in 1977 during the so-called “Years of Lead” marked by left-wing and right-wing terrorism. In the early 1990s, Bonanno proposed the coordination between Mediterranean insurrectionary anarchists, especially from Italy, Greece and Spain (9). The FAI emerged from this tradition with a similar project, extending the objective of affiliation to the rest of the world and emphasizing the practice of revolutionary insurrection through illegal and violent direct action. The main motivation of the FAI to establish its network is “to go beyond the limits of single projects and experiment the potentialities of informal organization” (10). The ultimate goal is to have an organization reflecting the view of the anarchist society that they struggle to create. Both a method of action and an objective are the mutual support between members and revolutionary solidarity (11). Military & Political Ability Since 2003, the FAI has claimed responsibility for around sixty international activities, which include threatening actions, bombs and letter bombs against political and economic institutions, diplomatic offices, military bases, police stations, corporations, banks, tax collection agencies, newspaper offices, universities, immigration centres and more ‘capitalist institutions’ (12). The members of the FAI/IRF communicate mainly through their actions or informal channels (13). The FAI/IRF and its constituent groups’ attacks include sabotage, arson, bombings, assaults and kneecappings, and their tactics are relatively simple and inexpensive, involve low risk, but can cause significant damage. In its numerous communiques, group members encourage their followers/comrades to conduct decentralized attacks. The network has yet to cause any death. Approach to Resistance The organization practises armed struggle but has no base, regular or irregular members. Conversely, it has a horizontal structure, composed by a loose network of individuals and small temporary affinity groups based on personal relationships. This is a core tactic of the FAI/IRF as it is an attempt to prevent being infiltrated by informants and the authorities. They mainly act against the symbols of the state, banks and international organizations and high-profile targets. The networks aim at the "destruction of the State and capital" by targeting the structures of "domination”. For this purpose, they “recruit” sympathizers by using propaganda which highlights such narratives (14) and by sharing its motivations through open letters and claims, even from prison if members become incarcerated. They underline revolutionary solidarity between each group, to be shown to comrades arrested with armed action; revolutionary campaigns with different methods and time to be implemented after a group takes the action and claim the responsibility; informal communication between groups carried out through the channels of the movement without knowing one another directly (15). International Relations & Potential Alliances Since its formation as a federation in Italy, other groups across the world claimed to be affiliated with FAI/IRF by using its brand name to take the responsibility for their actions. According to a FAI letter dated January 2004, they have affiliates in Spain, Greece, the UK, Russia, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Indonesia and other countries (16). The most prominent and active of the network was the Greek Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF), an anarcho-individualist group that emerged in 2008 (17). Since the alliance between FAI and CCF, the informal anarchist movement recognizes itself under the acronym of the FAI/IRF (International Revolutionary Front) (18), by which they underline and promote international coordination. Contemporary insurrectionary anarchists have been critical of other nonviolent anarchists, who they accuse of being weak in waiting for utopian freedom. Considering the loose nature of the organization, individuals and small cells can easily become “members” of it. Nevertheless, the nature of the FAI is constantly transforming in its numbers and members. One of the latest emerging cells is the Carlo Giuliani Revenge Nuclei, who claimed responsibility for the December 2022 arson attack against two cars of the First Counselor of the Italian Embassy in Athens Susanna Schlein, in solidarity with FAI’s imprisoned member Alfredo Cospito (19). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) is one of the oldest political parties in Myanmar which remain active to this day, and through its military wing, the People’s Liberation Army, can be considered one of the oldest, still active militant groups in the world. The party has played a pivotal role in the relatively unstable history of Myanmar (known as ‘Burma’ until 1989). After the 2021 Burmese coup d’état and the re-establishment of a military dictatorship in the country, the CPB once again took up arms. History & Foundations The CPB was founded on August 15th 1939 by a group of young intellectuals, in the context of social upheaval in Burma in the preceding decades, as well as the threat of war which was looming over East Asia (1). During the Pacific War, Burma was invaded by Japanese troops supported by Burmese nationalists, who repelled British colonial authorities. Burma was then granted independence by Japanese authorities (2). It was during the latter part of the war that the CPB experienced an increase in its membership numbers and its organizational efficiency. Amidst the 1945 Japanese defeat and the re-establishment of British rule, a fierce anti-colonial struggle was kickstarted in 1946, after a wave of strikes organized by the CPB and its trade unions hit the British-appointed Burmese government (3). The CPB then went underground as a consequence of both military and political pressure from the Burmese government, and initiated an armed insurgency in 1948, effectively starting the Burmese civil war which, after over 70 years, is still ongoing. In the following years, the CPB managed to raise an army of 25,000 partisans (15,000 according to more conservative estimates) (4), but the “Upper Burma campaign” launched jointly with Karen insurgents resulted in strategic defeat, since the rebel forces’ advances prompted India to start massively supporting the central government in Rangoon (5). This failure led the CPB to reorganize their strategy along more classic Maoist lines, which essentially entailed establishing control in rural areas rather than in cities (6). This also enabled the implementation of Marxist-Leninist Maoist ideology in these areas, which also involved the confiscation and redistribution of land to peasants (7). In 1953 the party was outlawed. In 1958, the demoralized remnants of the CPB guerrillas (around 1000 fighters) were repelled from their positions by government forces and had to take cover in the Pegu Yoma mountain range. The 1962 coup d’état and the military dictatorship, however, destabilized the country once again. Ethnic rebellions flared up and the CPB began receiving open support from China and many young volunteers from Burmese cities who wanted to take up arms against the regime (8). In 1968, the situation was deemed mature for a new offensive. Areas and towns located in the Shan State along the Sino-Burmese border were overrun (also with the help of thousands of Chinese “volunteers” from across the border) (9). These conquered areas were divided in four “war zones”, from which attacks and incursions were launched. Soon after, the CPB and its forces controlled more than 20,000 square kilometers spread around the Sino-Burmese frontier (10). Starting in 1970, government forces managed to eliminate weaker CPB holdouts in the Irrawaddy Delta and in the Pinlebu area (11). In 1978, Chinese support was drastically reduced, and “volunteers” were recalled (12). The following year, a major offensive was launched by government forces, who despite heavy casualties regained control of a significant swathe of territory (13). In 1981, a CPB delegation to the Burmese government demanded autonomy for its controlled territory, and recognition of the CPB as a legal party and of the People’s Liberation Army was immediately rejected (14). During this period, the People’s Liberation Army substantially decreased in numbers; while in 1977 it could hold about 23,000 regulars, by 1987 only about 10,000 remained, augmented by conscripted peasants who were hardly motivated to fight (15). At the same time, the People’s Republic of China reduced the financial aid it was providing to the CPB, and the central committee consequently decided to start trafficking opium to support party operations (16). In 1987, again, government troops launched a major operation and removed the PCB/People’s Liberation Army from a 60-kilometer border area, and thus re-established their control over trade and border operations with China (17). By 1989, tensions inside the party’s leadership reached their breaking point as a result of the CPB failing to join the then-ongoing wave of popular unrest in Burma. A mutiny of the People’s Liberation Army spread across CPB-held territory, forcing the entirety of the cadre into taking refuge in China, while some were executed by mutineers (18). Mutinied troops and officers, who were primarily ethnically Wa, went on to found the United Wa State Army. In 2021, in the context of the popular uprising against the military junta ruling Myanmar, the Communist Party of Burma – People’s Liberation Army was re-established (19). Reportedly, some of the party’s cadre crossed back in Myanmar through the Sino-Burmese border in March 2021 (20). Ideology & Objectives The CPB was founded as a Marxist-Leninist party. After Stalinism was repudiated in 1956, the CPB reorganized itself as a maoist, anti-revisionist party and purged its cadres in the 1960s, removing any elements critical of Maoism or deemed unreliable (21). After the 2021 re-founding, CPB spokesmen have ruled out any compromise or negotiation with the Burmese military junta (22), with armed struggle being their only perceived way to destroy the ruling regime. The CPB-PLA remains fully committed to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (Maoism) (23). In a 2003 statement released through the CPB’s website, the party published a basic political programme, stressing the importance of an independent and self-reliant Myanmar, of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and of economic development as their vision for the country (24). More recent statements have especially criticized the dire economic predicament of Myanmar, inequality, and the forced emigration of Burmese people (25). Their attempts to radicalize anti-junta youth have partially failed on accounts of their strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (26). Political & Military Abilities The CPB established a well-functioning bureaucratic machine in the territories under its control, which allowed them to operate as a proto-state, operating even schools and medical clinics, until their administration started to deteriorate during the 1980s (27). During this time, the CPB effectively ceased to function as a civil organization, and in reality only existed as the People’s Liberation Army – a militia which was also involved in tax collection and drug trafficking within its controlled territory (28). Their military tactics mainly centered around the Maoist interpretation of rural guerrilla warfare (29). In essence, Maoist warfare dictates that urban centres should be avoided as both military and political targets. Instead, a powerbase should be built up in rural areas, from which military operations against more peripheral targets should be launched, essentially striking the enemy before they can react with full force. After the 2021 re-founding, little has emerged about the current activities of the CPB-PLA other than military training for its members. International Relations & Alliances As aforementioned, the CPB cooperated with Karen rebels during the “Upper Burma campaign” (30). Additionally, CPB forces feuded and fought a separate war against Kachin forces between 1968 and 1976, when a ceasefire was signed between the two factions (31). After 1975 and the decision to re-organise the party cadre, new alliances were forged with the Shan State Army, and also with Pa-O, Kayan and Karenni rebels (32). Deals with these groups typically involved the CPB shipping them arms in exchange for free passage in the territories they held. The scheme, however, did not last long and relations soon collapsed (33). After 1987, the CPB collaborated with Kuomintang forces in Burma led by infamous warlord and drug kingpin Khun Sha (34). Its single most important partner remains the Chinese Communist Party, especially owing to both parties' long historical relationship. However, after 1989, it is believed that the United Wa State Party became the most important Myanmar ally for the CCP (35), while formal relations with the military junta continue (36). At the same time, images depicting CPB-PLA fighters during training have shown them armed primarily with weapons manufactured by the United Wa State Army (37) and the Kachin Independence Army (38), thus suggesting these to be its main current partners. Additional Resources