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Introduction and Overview Guacamaya is an environmentalist hacktivist group, presumed to be based in Latin America, that publicly emerged in early 2022. Little is known about the group other than their motivations. Through several manifestos and interviews, members of the group have expressed that their goal is to resist imperialism, colonialism, and oppression in Latin America, with the ultimate goal of preventing environmental degradation in the region. The word ‘Guacamaya’ is the Mayan word for ‘macaw’, a bird native to Central and South America. The group also refers to the region they are fighting for as Abya Yala, which is an indigenous word for the American continent (Richard). In one of their manifestos, Guacamaya specifically refers to Abya Yala as including the land between Mexico and Patagonia (Guacamaya). Due to the language and terminology used by the group, it is assumed that the hackers who make up this collective are of indigenous origins, or at least sympathetic to the various causes of indigenous people in the region, if not a combination of both. Although it is also not known where in Latin America the group is based, it is very possible that the collective is made up of members who are spread across the region. History & Foundations Guacamaya’s history is very young; the group has only been publicly known in its current form since 2022. Their activities were first made public after the group hacked a number of oil and mining companies in Central and South America. During these hacks, Guacamaya released emails sent by the companies they had targeted as well as several governments that had also been breached during the group’s hacking campaign. According to the group, the point of these attacks was to expose the connection between governments in the region and corporations that are exploiting the land for its natural resources (Biccherai). Much of the group's origins and the conditions that led to their formation can be found in their manifestos. In these documents, the group discusses the progression of European colonialism starting in 1492 and continuing to the modern day with a global hegemonic order controlled by the United States. They explain how, from their perspective, the current states of “Abya Yala” are controlled by governments that were either directly put in place by the United States or at the very least are complicit in furthering the world order imposed by the ‘Global North’. In their view, the Global North, led by the United States, exploits the people and resources of the Global South in order to further their capitalistic development. Crucially, however, the group believes that this development is simultaneously destroying the world’s environment – and hence their environmental convictions and objectives (Guacamaya). In this sense, the history and foundations of Guacamaya can be viewed in the broader context of indigenous struggles in Latin America against colonial governments, U.S. imperialism, and the neo-liberal world order. Objectives & Ideology As previously stated, the ideology of Guacamaya falls along anti-imperialist, pro-indigenous, and environmentalist lines. As a result of this, the group’s objectives have taken aim against the entire social order of Latin America. Through their efforts, they hope to disrupt the nation-states that rule over the region and what they view as the oppressive systems and institutions they have created in order to maintain their control. Most recently, this has primarily involved targeting militaries and police forces in the region. The group views these militarised institutions as a key tool used by the state to enforce their will on the people. In an environmental context, this means that the military and police will be used to put down resistance (often from indigenous groups) to projects that degrade the environment. For these reasons, Guacamaya’s objectives can range from small and simple tasks to large and complex initiatives. Some of their relatively smaller objectives include using hacking attacks to expose lies and corruption within Latin American governments. On the other hand, their long-term goals would involve the dismantling of the nation-state system in the region, the overturning of capitalism, and a dismantling of the current world order, all in the furtherance of protecting people and nature. Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance Guacamaya exclusively uses hacking as a means to bring about the political change they desire. When the group first became public, their hacking campaigns primarily targeted corporations that were extracting resources in Latin America, as well as the local governments that allowed this extraction to carry on. Recently, they have begun to increasingly target government entities, specifically military and police organizations throughout the region. Data leaks are the group’s weapon of choice in their political struggle; their hacking campaigns mostly focus on stealing information that they can release to the public and which exposes corruption and oppressive activity within governments. In some of the group’s most recent hacks, a wide range of revelations were brought to light that led to widespread issues and scandals amongst the targeted government organizations. Perhaps most significant were the leaks that came from Mexico, where Guacamaya was able to hack the country’s military databases (specifically SEDENA, the Mexican Ministry of Defense) that brought several troubling issues to light within Mexican society. Among these were acts of corruption, such as the Mexican government’s involvement with organized crime groups in the country. The documents leaked by Guacamaya provided evidence that the Mexican government has been selling weapons to drug cartels that included grenades, tactical equipment, and even sharing information back and forth between cartels and the government (Chaparro). In Mexico, the leaks also revealed much about the government’s surveillance practices. As heavily reported by regional media outlets, leaks revealed the government’s reported use of Pegasus spyware to monitor journalists and human rights activists in the country. → Pegasus is a form of malware that allows the individual who infects a victim’s phone to completely access everything on the device. → This includes all the data stored on it, as well as the ability to turn on the camera, microphone, etc. without the victim knowing. → Pegasus was developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli intelligence company that has come under fire after Pegasus was allegedly used by several repressive governments to carry out illicit acts on their citizens. → Pegasus was supposedly the spyware used by Saudi Arabia to infect Jamal Khashoggi’s phone before he was murdered. → Pegasus utilizes “zero-click” infection, meaning that the malware can infect a victim’s phone simply by being sent to them via iMessage, for example, without the victim even clicking a malicious link or taking any similar form of action on their end (Martin). The leaks also revealed that the Mexican military was surveilling feminist, environmental, and indigenous groups in Mexico. The EZLN, also referred to as the Zapatistas, were among one of the most monitored groups in the country, particularly their activity in opposing a new infrastructure project referred to as “Maya Tran”(Avispa). In addition to these specific revelations, the documents leaked by Guacamaya painted an overall picture of how deeply ingrained the Mexican military is becoming in all aspects of Mexican society, as well as the impacts that trend is having on the citizens of Mexico. Other nations that were impacted by Guacamaya’s leaks were Chile, Colombia, Peru, and El Salvador. In some of these listed countries, the leaks made by Guacamaya have led to organizational changes. In Chile, for instance, General Guillermo Paiva Hernandez resigned as the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Chilean Armed Forces, after the country’s military faced scrutiny over leaks revealing that their intelligence operations focused on internal political organizations and indigenous groups, such as the Mapuche, who have been involved in political struggle against the Chilean government (MercoPress). The government in El Salvador was also found to be using Pegasus spyware to monitor journalists and activists in their country, similarly to the military in Mexico. Guacamaya’s leaks also revealed that the government in El Salvador was engaged in negotiations with the MS-13 criminal organization (Cimpanu). Guacamaya’s hacking campaign revealed similar trends across the region, that governments, militaries, and police forces across Latin America were engaged in corruption, unethical domestic surveillance campaigns, and collaborating with organized crime networks in their respective countries. While the scope of Guacamaya’s hacks have been impressive, the particular hacking methods they utilized to carry out these data leaks were fairly simplistic and more of a reflection on the poor cyber-security practices of their targets than the technical prowess of the hackers. Guacamaya was able to access the email servers of these various organizations through a series of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange that are collectively referred to as ProxyShell (Cimpanu). Relations & Perceptions in the Media Guacamaya has not received widespread media coverage. Whatever the reason, coverage of the group has mostly been in Latin American news sources or cyber-security publications. A further frustration for the group is that their message of environmentalism and anti-imperialism has often been drowned out in favor of talking points surrounding specific revelations of their data leaks. An example would be in Mexico, where much of the coverage of Guacamaya’s data leaks has revolved around the health of the Mexican President, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, after it was revealed that he had several undisclosed health issues (Greig). In addition to this, Guacamaya’s hacking campaign has kick-started a dialogue on cyber-security practices in Latin America. The region has recently received more attention as an easy target for cyber criminals due to the relaxed and outdated security practices implemented by Latin American governments. The Guacamaya leaks were additional validation of this assumption as relatively simple security vulnerabilities allowed these cyber-attacks to be carried out. There is little indication at this time that Guacamaya has contacts outside of their region. Their objectives align very closely with other indigenous resistance groups in Latin America, although there is no sign that these groups have been in contact or in any way worked together thus far. The world of hacktivism and cybercrime is as interconnected as the internet itself, and other hacking collectives with similar ideologies will be watching the activities of Guacamaya. Additional Resources

Introduction The Lion’s Den group, in Arabic ‘Arīn al-Usūd, is a recently-formed militia which is active in Palestine’s West Bank and based in Nablus. Following rising tensions between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinians in the West Bank throughout 2022, the Lion’s Den has galvanised and united public support. The group is unique in that it is composed of members from across the political spectrum: from Jihadist radicals a part of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to Marxist-Leninists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). For this very same reason, however, they have become a ‘thorn’, per se, in the side of the Palestinian Authority (PA), complicating its relationship to the internal anti-occupation struggle as well as its relations with Tel Aviv. With social media, particularly Telegram and TikTok, the Lion’s Den’s growth has been exponentially faster than any other Palestinian militant group before them. As of the 1st January 2023, they have 235,000 subscribers on their Telegram channel (1). History & Foundations Before the Lion’s Den became its own separate entity, some former operatives of Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades began carrying out operations independently of their party. The Lion’s Den is the final form of these cells. In February 2022, three operatives from this cell Muhammad al-Dakheel, Adham Mabrouka, and Abdalhakim Shaheen, were killed by the IDF. These three original founding members (of the Lion’s Den precursor cells) introduced the group’s traditional hit-and-run attacks, which have since become a staple for the Lion’s Den. Before the Lion’s Den was officially formed, they were known as Aqmar Nablus (The Moons of Nablus), based on the activities of the Jenin Brigades further north. The founder of the group was Muhammad al-Azizi (Abu Saleh) along with some friends who were part of the same social circle within the Fatah movement (2). Wadi al-Houh, also a former member of Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades, took command after Al-Azizi’s death in July 2022. Al-Azizi’s brother, Uday Azizi, (former PSF member) is the current Lion’s Den leader following his brother and Wadi al-Houh’s death in an Israeli operation in October 2022 (3). The Lion’s Den first started to appear at its deceased leaders’ funeral procession held on July 24th in Nablus’ Old City – Muhammad al-Azizi (mentioned above) and Abboud Souboh (4) were killed in an Israeli raid on the 24th. Videos of the funeral procession through Nablus went viral on social media, announcing the official arrival of the Lion’s Den as an organised unit. Its apparent figurehead, Ibrahim al-Nabulsi (known as the ‘Lion of Nablus’), was seen at these funerals (5) until he himself was killed in August, aged 18 (6). The official Lion’s Den Telegram channel was set up after al-Nabulsi’s death, spreading its now ubiquitous logo and message. Following the first few months of the Lion’s Den activity, another resident of Nablus’ Old City, Jameel al-Kayyal, was killed by another IDF raid in December. These incursions into Nablus are part of what some experts call the ‘military-settler siege’ (7) that the IDF and surrounding settlers have imposed on the city. IDF attacks carried out in Area A territories – alongside an increase in settler ‘price-tagging’ (8) attacks – have exacerbated this tension, motivating a younger generation of Palestinians with no experience of the previous two intifadas to pick up arms against the IDF. This has helped solidify the Lion’s Den support base. Objectives and Ideology Lion’s Den is a cross-factional organisation. As aforementioned, it is made up of members from the whole spectrum of Palestinian politics: from Fatah and Hamas, to PIJ and the PFLP. In fact, one of its leading members and explosive experts, Tamir Kilani, was a former PFLP member. Kilani was also assassinated in December 2022 (9). According to Younis Tirawi (an independent field reporter from Ramallah), religious undertones have increased significantly since their founding, but they are still not explicitly religious in their ideology. The Lion’s Den’s main objectives are to create an atmosphere of tension in the occupied territories, with a view to eventually trigger wider resistance to the Israeli occupation – they openly state that they do not have a political program and are apolitical (10). Military & Political Abilities The Lion’s Den’s military capabilities are limited to the basics required for hit-and-run attacks; small arms such as M-16 and M-4 rifles and improvised explosive devices (IED) make up the traditional equipment of an LD fighter. Operations are focused on attacking checkpoints and settlements, usually in the form of a hit-and-run attack targeting IDF soldiers (see the October 2022 Shomron attack) (11). Lion’s Den operatives are almost entirely self-funded, with most of the attacks being paid for by the operatives themselves (from weapons to their stolen vehicles). Relations & Alliances The Lion’s Den is not funded by or connected to any state, either by way of military or financial aid. Since they are cross-factional, they command widespread support; it has now become common to see Lion’s Den insignia at PFLP, Hamas, PIJ and Fatah marches and funerals. A key point to watch in the coming months will be how the Palestinian Authority (PA) will change its approach to the Lion’s Den - in the past, the Lion’s Den was offered the chance to be integrated into the Palestinian National Security Forces (12), but this was rejected. There appears to be a tacit approval of Lion’s Den activity, but a desire to keep it limited to its current levels in order to avoid an even more heavy-handed Israeli response (13). It also appears that the PA response has been lenient thus far, with reports of militants being released from detention with their weapons (14). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Islamic State - Caucasus Province (IS-CP) was formed in 2015 when members of the Caucasus Emirate (a Jihadist organisation in the northern Caucasus and Russia) pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi following the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The IS-CP was an umbrella term for several different cells throughout the Northern Caucasus and some based in Syria, whose shared goal was a jihad against ‘the enemies of Islam’. Nowadays, the group has mostly been dismantled by Russian security forces, after the majority of the organisation found itself vastly disintegrated within two years of its formation. Russia’s decision to get involved as heavily as they have in Syria and the Northern Caucasus (notably to suppress radical Islamic ideology) comes from the perceived danger of such a group’s consolidation. History & Foundations The Northern Caucuses have become synonymous with insurgency and separatism, contemporarily “emanating from the suppression of the Chechen independence wars of 1994-96 and 1999-2007 and the suppression of the multi-ethnic jihadi insurgent group the Kavkaz Emirate in Dagestan from 2008-15.” (Williams, B. G., & Souza, R. T.) Historically, however, the peoples of the Northern Caucuses have been fighting against the Russians over a period spanning around 400 years (whether it was against the Imperial, Soviet, or the Modern period of the Russian state). 400 years of insurgency, with an enormous variance in ethnicity and language, puts the Caucuses on the shortlist of places in the world afflicted with a multitude of insurgencies. However, the commencement of the Russian bombing campaign in Syria and the rise of ISIS led to a situation which paved the way for many Caucasian Jihadists. As their historical enemy, per se, had begun attacking Syria, numerous Jihadists in the Northern Caucasus united to fight on behalf of the Islamic State. The vast majority of these Jihadists were members of the Caucasus Emirate and eventually reformed their struggle into a new branch of the Islamic State – the IS-CP – in June of 2015. Two years later in 2017, the group was defeated by the Russian state after various raids on their regional strongholds (Rybina). Nonetheless, the current state of the IS-CP remains ambiguous as – despite their proclaimed dissolution – some lone-wolves have conducted attacks in their name. The validity of these claims, nonetheless, are often unconfirmed; the 2018 Magnitogorsk building collapse, for example, was claimed by the IS yet was later dismissed as a gas leak incident by Russian authorities (Osborn and Tsvetkova). Ideology and Objectives The IS-CP’s ideology was not clear-cut nor was it singular, due to the fact that the organisation was far from being a combined entity. Some of the cells within the IS-CP, such as Omar Al-Shishani and his followers, were heavily integrated within ISIS. Al-Shishani, for instance, had been based in Syria since 2012 and had progressed the ranks in order to become the Northern Commander. He had authority over its military operations and its forces in northern Syria (particularly Aleppo, Raqqa, Latakia, and the Idlib Governorate). Other cells of the IS-CP stayed in Russia with the objective of freeing the Caucuses from what they perceived as Russian domination; this is supposedly what Baghdadi wished for, as seen in a video of his on ISIS’s Furat media demanding that Caucasians fight at home instead of coming to Syria (Stephens, S. J. 2016). Military & Political Abilities As aforementioned, nearly all of the group’s activity has ceased since 2017, after it had been dismantled through airstrikes in Syria (such as the US strikes which killed Al-Shishani) or direct raids in the mountains of Dagestan (such as Russia’s raids which killed Rustam Asildarov, leader of the IS-CP). All that’s remained have been lone-wolf attacks in the Northern Caucasus region. Such attacks have ranged from a sole insurgent attacking two policemen with a knife outside Ramzan Kadyrov’s residence (Joscelyn, T. 2019), to the shooting of a church in Kizlyar, Dagestan which killed five (BBC, 2018). For the most part, these attacks have been relatively unorganised and many have been intercepted by Russian intelligence before they materialised. There is no longer organised group left in the Caucuses that associates with, nor that is formally called, the Islamic State. International Relations & Potential Alliances Due to the fact that the IS-CP’s cells were based in Syria and operated under the overarching leadership of the IS, most of the alliances were dependent on the ‘clearance’ (or approval), per se, of the latter. The Islamic State’s ability to set up various branches around Asia and Africa has dictated its international relations to be constrained on itself. Between the Sahel region, Nigeria, or Somalia, there are numerous groups within Africa that pledge allegiance to the Islamic State. However, many of these groups are sub-branches of the Islamic State, and this hence restricts the extent to which they can truly be called alliances. Other radical Islamist groups such as Al-Qaeda have had direct confrontations with the IS, and it must not be mistaken that all radical Islamist terrorist organisations align with one another. Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag/logo of the Crips, but rather a representation based on the bandanas traditionally worn by its members. Insurgency Overview The Crips are an American street gang founded by Raymond Washington. There are many disputing narratives regarding the exact year of their establishment, with some saying that the organization was founded in 1971 and others claiming it formed in 1969. This ambiguity finds its roots in the number of theories regarding the gang’s initial intentions for its establishment (1). The Crips are present throughout the United States, having gained a reputation for illegal activities such as drug trafficking, murder, extortion, racketeering, and theft. They expand their territorial outreach by establishing alliances or “sets” throughout the country, although not all are connected (2). Crips distinguish themselves from other gangs by representing and wearing the color blue (occasionally purple. As of the time of writing, the Crips have about 800 sets in 221 U.S cities with around 30,000 to 35,000 total members, most prominently being active in Los Angeles, California (3). The Crips’ influence is not only spread by the area which they control, but also by their connections within pop culture. Many established hip-hop artists such as Snoop Dogg, Schoolboy Q, Eazy E, Pop Smoke, Blueface, and Nipsey Hussle have (or have had) strong affiliations with the Crips, brandishing their symbols and colors in songs and videos. History & Foundations Throughout the 60s and 70s, African-Americans suffered significantly from the country's post-World War 2 economic decline and severe racial segregation. This led to the alienation of the black community and deprivation of social programs, thus sprouting the seeds for numerous black nationalist groups. These groups included The Black Panther organization and The Black Power Movement. Inspired by The Black Panthers, Raymond Washington and Stanley “Tookie” Williams founded a grassroots African-American organization called the Cribs in Los Angeles. This organization aimed to combat mass arbitrary arrests and police violence in the black community (4). What started as a political movement to seek justice quickly turned into a violent street gang, notably after one of its main turning points in 1971, where some of the organization’s members assaulted an elderly Japanese woman using a cane (5). The local media picked up the story and referred to the attackers as Crips, mistakenly thinking that their name correlated with the weapons that they chose (6). Since then, the gang has adopted the name and their main goal evolved into financial gain through violence and criminal activity. In 1979, Raymond Washington was murdered. Many suspected that the Crips were behind the killing due to Washington beginning to distance himself from the group because of their criminal actions (7). In the 1980s, the Crips experienced a rise in membership due to a rise in the popularity of ‘gangsta rap’, thus allowing them to spread their influence outside of California. The gang’s negative representation in media also oddly contributed heavily to its membership boom, as more and more young men became attracted to the looting, violence, and drug trafficking that the Crips are notorious for. Ideology & Values In the early years, the Crips were focused on social justice for African-Americans and the wider fight against police brutality, unjust murders, and racial segregation. Now, the Crips are known to be involved in crimes such as drug trafficking, murder, robbery, and racketeering. The Crips are also known for their rivalry with the Bloods, another street gang. Battles between the two gangs have resulted in a large number of deaths and some experts even estimate this number to exceed the death toll of The Troubles in Northern Ireland (8). With the organization’s shift towards criminal activity, it is hard to pinpoint the ideological leanings of the modern-day Crips. The exact politics of the group remain ambiguous, although it is important to note that the group’s foundations are purely political. Approach to Resistance The Crips are amongst the most violent and heavily armed street gangs in the United States. One of the most infamous incidents committed by the Crips involves its co-founder, Stanley ‘Tookie’ Williams. In 1981, Tookie was convicted of murdering four people amidst two robberies (9). He was sentenced to death and executed in 2005 by lethal injection (10). However, this crime only marked the beginning of the Crips’ criminal spree, as shootings perpetrated by the gang continue to happen on a regular basis. Most recently, for instance, nine Crips members were arrested in the Southern Los Angeles neighborhoods of Florence-Firestone and Watts; the nine perpetrators committed six homicides and multiple shootings, along with a string of other crimes (11). Victims of the violent acts include Blood members and an elderly bystander. Additionally,16 people were indicted for drug trafficking and gun charges with ties to the Grape Street Crips, with prosecutions being held from 2020 to 2022 (12). One of the tactics employed by the Crips that is relatively distinct to those of other American street gangs involves ‘drive-by shootings’. A drive-by is a type of assault where the perpetrators shoot at a pedestrian (or a desired target) from the inside of a car and then drive away (13). This approach to an attack is very low-risk because it allows the shooters to neutralize targets relatively rapidly while being somewhat safe (as they are inside of a vehicle and hence have a lower chance of revealing their identity). The most common weapons used by the Crips – notably during drive-by shootings – include the Uzi, the Glock pistol, and the Ruger pistol. Contemporary Crip members mostly focus on gaining profit through illegal means and rivalry with neighboring sets or Bloods. Despite operating in more than 40 states (with more than 30,000 members), Los Angeles remains as the gang’s general ‘hub’ for their ventures. While their main income has been earned through the trade of marijuana and cocaine, auto theft is also practiced on a smaller scale (14). Alliances & Relations Fundamentally, the Crips are an alliance of small gangs or sets that spread throughout the United States. They also have a presence in Belize City due to the deportation of ethnic Belizeans from the United States in the 1980s. After the mass deportation, Crip activity began to increase in Belize City because many of the deportees were Crips members. Crips can also be found in Europe, with England represented by four sets and the Netherlands by seven. In the 80s and 90s, when the group started to get involved in drug trafficking, they were able to form a partnership with Mexican and Colombian cartels (15). FBI agent Charlie Parsons stated that the Crips distributed 400 kilograms of cocaine a month, with a profit of $250,000 (16). Alliances & Relations

Insurgency Overview Boko Haram is a Salafi-Jihadist group which was founded in 2002 and is fighting for the implementation of strict principles of Shari’a law in Nigeria. The group’s name comes from the combination of the Hausa word for book (‘boko’) and the Arabic word for forbidden (‘haram’), essentially leading to its interpreted meaning as “western education is forbidden”. Although it has been informally called Boko Haram by locals, the real name of the group is Jamāʿat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Daʿawah wa al-Jihād (JAS), which means “People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad”. It is mostly active in the Lake Chad basin, Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, conducting military operations and attacks against security forces, Christians, westerners and Muslims considered ‘infidels’. The conflict between Boko Haram and Nigeria’s security forces has killed more than 40,000 people and has affected the security of Chad, Niger and Cameroon (1). History & Foundations The group emerged locally from a radical shift within Nigeria’s Salafist movement - which has been active since the 1970s (2) - and came to prominence in the early 2000s from the historic socioeconomic, political and religious milieu of North-East Nigeria (3). During this period, twelve of the northern Nigerian states established Shari’a law. Nonetheless, parts of the Muslim community were not satisfied due to the simultaneous co-existence of Shari’a and the Nigerian constitution. This discontent stemmed from the latter’s emphasis of the secularity of the Nigerian state, as well as its affirmation of the supremacy of the federal Constitution over “any other law [that] is inconsistent” with it (3) (4). This was something unacceptable for those who wanted Islamic law to regulate all aspects of life. Amongst this angered part of the Muslim community were Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Yusuf – two Muslims influenced by Wahhabism and the Salafi doctrine, as well as inspired by jihadist movements from the Sahel and Middle East. In 2002, Ali and Yusuf founded Boko Haram, recruiting Abubakar Shekau (a former student of the Borno College of Legal and Islamic Studies) and Mamman Nur (the militant who introduced Shekau to Muhammad Yusuf) (5). The group started its militancy in the city of Maiduguri and then expanded its influence by establishing small camps and schools in the Borno and Yobe states between 2002-2005 (6). After years of relatively non-violent activism and recruitment, the group became more radical amidst episodic, regional clashes between Christians and Muslims. These confrontations were exacerbated by the harsh response adopted by the security forces against suspected militants. In 2009, when a police crackdown set off an armed uprising in the Bauchi State that eventually spread in the northeast, government forces killed more than eight hundred people, including suspected Boko Haram members. Following the uprising, Muhammad Yusuf was extrajudicially executed by the police and Abubakar Shekau took his place as the head of the group (7). With Shekau in charge, the group’s approach and its visions became significantly more violent, and the movement evolved into a campaign of terrorism. Objectives & Ideology Since its foundation, the objective of Boko Haram has been to build a Muslim society with a literal interpretation of Shari’a, a redistributionist economic ideology, and the rejection of polytheism and Western influence. Its religious view is a mixture of Wahhabism and Salafism (8), which underline Kanuri identity, as well as the memory and historical narrative of Islamic states and empires from the past (9). Boko Haram has been also inspired by Mohammed Marwa, nicknamed Maitatsine, a preacher born in northern Cameroon who condemned the reading of books other than the Quran. Nevertheless, the group is doctrinally related to the Salafist movement called Yan Izala due to its Wahhabi and anti-Sufi ideology (10). It should also be added that – in a book written for the Islamic State – Yusuf’s sons claim that al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack was one of the major inspirations behind their father’s decision to establish Boko Haram (11). Military & Political Ability In its early stages (2002-2009), the group demonstrated a relatively non-violent campaign and was linked to Nigerian politicians and religious leaders. On the contrary, under Shekau’s leadership (following the death of Yusuf in 2009), Boko Haram escalated its violence by conducting very frequent lethal attacks, primarily within the Borno State. Contemporarily, the organization has a hierarchical structure with a well-defined leader and a Shura Council. Boko Haram acts with battalions, ranging from 300 to 500 men, which are all entitled to make incursions into villages for abductions and into military bases to steal arms and ammunition. The organization has also adopted the use of ungoverned spaces for strategic retreat, regroupings, and high-level criminal activity (robberies, extortion, kidnapping and looting) (11). Moreover, members of the organization have also developed, through the years, the capacity to infiltrate various security services. During the summer of 2014, Boko Haram began seizing control of towns in northeastern Nigeria, by shifting their strategies from hit-and-run tactics to more direct forms of warfare. The current number of Boko Haram militiamen is estimated to lie in the tens of thousands, and at its peak the group held a territory equivalent in size to Belgium (12). Approach to Resistance Under the leadership of Yusuf, Boko Haram's approach to resistance was to create its own enclave by empowering and indoctrinating young Muslims. Yusuf preached against the Nigerian state and other moderate Muslims, which attracted a wide following in the establishment of his sect called Yusufiyya and then what have been called the “Nigerian Taliban” (13). Boko Haram’s approach changed further following the clashes between the group and the government, notably after the Bauchi episode in 2009. In fact, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, the group switched from a fringe religious movement to a terrorist group as it began attacking Nigerian forces, civilians and rival terrorist groups. International Relations & Potential Alliances In 2009, the group requested the support of al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which it eventually acquired for training and financial aid (14). The operational linkages between al-Qaeda and Boko Haram have been confirmed by the presence of Boko Haram fighters in Mali alongside The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (15). Boko Haram’s alliances with other Jihadi groups has produced material, logistical and financial support, as well as capacity-building benefits that elevated the group’s operations and standing. Eventually, the indiscriminate killings of civilians by the group caused internal divisions. In 2012, Ansaru split from Boko Haram to establish its operational bases in the North-West of Nigeria. Then, in 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions: JAS, led by Abubakar Shekau, and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), led by Abu Musab al Barnawi – the son of Yusuf. JAS has been characterized by more violent methods and it is more active in south-central Borno, as well as along the Cameroonian border. This branch also holds bases in the north-western part of Nigeria (16). On May 19th, 2021, JAS’ leader Abubakar Shekau died in a clash with ISWAP in the Sambisa Forest and since then the group has been led by Ibrahim Bakura (17). Additional Resources

Group Overview Patriotic Alternative is a far-right, neo-Nazi group founded in 2019 and focused on what they label as the “demographic decline of native Britons in the United Kingdom, the environmental impact of mass immigration and the indoctrination and political bias taking place in British schools.” (1) Patriotic Alternative is the UK’s largest fascist organisation, with an estimated 200 to 250 core activists, yet with a significantly larger online audience (2). Its founder and current leader is Mark Collett, a British white supremacist and previously a prominent activist, as well as the Director of Publicity in the British National Front (BNP) (3). The organisation has regional groups in every region of the United Kingdom, and is in the process of setting up a group in Northern Ireland (1). There is also a branch of the Patriotic Alternative in Scotland which is led by Kenny Smith, a former BNP activist (4). History & Origins Patriotic Alternative was founded in September 2019 by Mark Collett (1). Collett is a longstanding neo-Nazi militant originally from Rothley, Leicestershire in the East Midlands of England, although he is now based in Pontefract, Yorkshire, in the North of England. Collett began his political career in the National Front, Britain’s oldest fascist party (5), and then transitioned to the British National Party (BNP) after falling out with his National Front colleagues. He became the leader of the BNP youth wing, and later became their director of publicity. Collett was then arrested alongside the BNP leader Nick Griffin for inciting racial hatred following a 2004 BBC documentary in which he described asylum seekers as “cockroaches”. During the leadup to the 2010 general election in the UK, Collett was questioned by police due to Nick Griffin (a British white supremacist) making allegations that Collett was plotting to kill him. He denied the accusations, was released without charge, and left the BNP shortly after. He was then involved with other far-right groups, such as the English Democrats and the now banned National Action. He also ran a pro-Brexit stall in Yorkshire prior to the EU membership referendum in the UK. In 2017, Collett self-published a book outlining his anti-Semitic ideology, and in 2019 he performed as a speaker at the Scandza Forum in Copenhagen, which he cites as the inspiration for Patriotic Alternative. By the time Collett founded Patriotic Alternative, he was already a well-known figure in far-right British politics (6). Patriotic Alternative has since expanded across the UK (1), but the majority of Patriotic Alternative’s leadership is still based in Yorkshire, England (6). Ideology & Goals The Patriotic Alternative is heavily focused on their belief that the ‘indigenous peoples of the United Kingdom’ may eventually become a minority in the country; to this end they aim to pass a ‘Nation State Law’. The group also seeks a complete halt to immigration into the UK, except under what they deem to be exceptional circumstances, such as diplomats, highly-skilled people in urgent demand, and people with a ‘shared ethnic and cultural background who can prove British ancestry.’ (7) Patriotic Alternative’s central ideology is the ‘White Genocide’ conspiracy theory, which alleges that Jews are orchestrating a demographic shift as part of a sustained campaign, in order to weaken ‘indigenous’ British people to better control them. Collett and other members believe that Jewish subversives within British institutions are encouraging immigration and miscegenation, promoting feminism, LBGTQ+ rights and other progressives ideas to cause division in white communities and lower white birth rates (6). Patriotic Alternative’s content and output is carefully constructed to conceal their underlying radical far-right, neo-Nazi ideology and hardline antisemitism, with Collett saying in 2019 that they aim to “package” the message “in a way that will make it saleable” (6), and repeatedly recommending Mein Kampf to his audience (2). Furthermore, many members of Patriotic Alternative are former members of National Action, a Nazi terror group banned under the UK’s 2016 anti-terror legislation (6). Despite having been banned, the latter has continued to function underground (8). Approach to Resistance Patriotic Alternative have adopted a multi-faceted approach to building a far-right community. They use a range of traditional campaigning and online activism, such as leafleting, and running family-friendly events and fitness clubs to cultivate outreach (6). The group also focuses on attracting media attention and has started to try to influence electoral change in British elections: in the 2021 local elections across Britain, Patriotic Alternative set a target to distribute 100k leaflets and grab headlines during the month prior to election day, with the aim of pushing political discourse towards demographic change (9). While the group does not participate in co-ordinated violence, it instead takes part in online harassment campaigns and acts of street protests. Although Patriotic Alternative crafts their public image to be family-friendly, many of their prominent members have been involved in online harassment campaigns against LGBTQ+ people and ethnic minorities. ‘Anglo Josh’, the Patriotic Alternative media officer for the English region of the West Midlands, led a contingent to the Tommy Robinson demonstration in January 2022. Under the pseudonym ‘Skelly’, he also led online harassment campaigns as part of a group of online neo-Nazis, and has created racist and anti-semitic video content (2). Additionally, the leader of Patriotic Alternative Scotland was convicted of firearms charges in 2022 (4). Relations & Alliances Patriotic Alternative contains many former members of the BNP and National Action. The BNP is a far-right fascist political party in the UK, while National Action was a violent far-right organisation that has since been banned. As well as these connections, Patriotic Alternative is linked to a US fascist and white supremacist organisation called the Creativity Movement, which was founded in 1973 (10). The Creativity Movement and Patriotic Alternative do not have an official public alliance, but there are common members amongst the two groups, as well as amongst National Action. Patriotic Alternative also has links to other, smaller far-right organisations in the UK, such as the Scottish Defence League, Pie & Mash Squad, and the British National Socialist Movement (BNSM) (1). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan is a left-wing organization fighting for Kurdish rights and self-determination in Iran. After organizing underground in the late 1960s and 1970s, the group publicly declared its existence on the brink of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Its formation and rise in popularity changed dynamics within the Kurdish movement in Iran. Though it is no longer the force it used to be, it remains one of the most prominent political groups opposing the Islamic Republic. The group has experienced multiple splits over the years, with as many as five factions existing at one point. History & Foundations Initially formed by a group of Kurdish students in 1969, Komala’s arrival indicated a shift in Kurdish politics in Iran. Its focus on class struggle challenged the traditional nationalist discourse popular at the time. Its organization of the Kurdish peasantry and working class helped it gain popular support as the group voiced its opposition to the creation of the Islamic Republic. When the new regime in Tehran proved to be no more friendly to the country's non-Persians than the Shah, Komala used its influence to begin organizing armed opposition to the new government (Hassaniyan, 2018). However, the 1980s would prove to be turbulent for the group. When war broke out between Iran and Iraq, Iran’s government helped fund the Kurdish insurgency against the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein. Baghdad, in return, provided a safe haven and financial support for Komala and other Iranian Kurdish groups.Iran’s support of the Iraqi Kurdish movement was detrimental to Komala. In exchange for support from Iran, the Iraqi Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) agreed to take part in military operations against their Iranian counterparts. Forced to fight against both the KDP and Iranian military, Komala’s insurgency suffered (Hassaniyan, 2018). Challenges would not only come from across the border, but from the other main Iranian Kurdish group at the time. The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), for instance, went to war with Komala from 1983 to 1988, over the latter’s challenge to PDKI’s hegemony and ideological differences. Suffering from its conflicts with other Kurdish groups and the Iranian military, Komala (along with PDKI) was forced into exile by the Islamic Republic by the end of the decade (Hassaniyan, 2018). Though it no longer relied on the Iraqi government for support, Komala did find safe haven in the newly-formed Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, where it settled for political opposition to Iran following its military defeat. Komala has also suffered from many splits over the years due to leadership and ideological disputes. In 1983, Komala – along with two Iranian Communist parties – became a founding member of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI). In 2000, Abdullah Mohtadi, a co-founder and leader of Komala, split from CPI, reclaiming the group’s original banner. The CPI’s branch then rebranded to Komalah (supposedly denoting the Persian pronunciation). In 2007 and 2008, Komala suffered two more splits, with others accusing Mohtadi of undemocratic leadership (Ahmadzadeh, Stansfield 2010). Both of these splinter groups have since rejoined Mohtadi’s Komala (Atlas News, 2022). Ideology & Objectives Komala has a somewhat tumultuous and nebulous ideological history. Having been described as both Marxist-Leninist and Maoist, its focus on workers and peasants was a shift from previous Kurdish politics in Iran. It viewed nationalism as a tool of the bourgeoisie and although this alienated some Kurds, it enabled them to gain popularity with other elements in Kurdish society. It continues to support a policy of autonomy and reform rather than secession and independence (Hassaniyan, 2018). Since Mohtadi’s split in 2000, Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan claims to have adopted social democracy, calling for federalism, secularism, and equal treatment for the Kurds and other minorities in Iran. Military and Political Abilities Komala has an estimated 1000 fighters, less than PJAK and PDKI (Milburn, 2017). Now in exile in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, raids against the Islamic Republic are more difficult but not impossible. The group is a frequent target of Iranian missile attacks, having been struck multiple times since the protests over Jina Amini’s death broke out in September 2022 (Reuters, 2022). According to the website for the Progressive Alliance – an international organization for self-described social democratic parties – Komala is a member. Approach to Resistance In its early years, Komala helped to organize autonomous city councils while using civil disobedience and armed insurrection. Having started in the 1990s with Tehran’s consolidation, Komala’s ability to conduct armed activity in Iran became severely limited. Its lack of presence within Iran, as well as its inability and unwillingness to conduct acts of resistance, contributed to a decline in the group’s popularity (Hassaniyan, Stansfield 2021). Though it gave up violence as a tactic due to its exile after 1990, it readopted armed resistance in 2017, hoping to unite different Iranian Kurdish groups in militancy. It frequently calls for the boycott of Iranian elections and supports strikes and protests in addition to its militant activity (Milburn, 2017). International Relations and Possible Alliances Komala is a registered lobby in the United States. It has pitched to the administration of President Donald Trump for support and met with Republican and Democratic members of congress (Schaffer, 2019). Whether the U.S. would support Komala in any substantial way remains to be seen, as the group’s communist history may work against them. Given that Iran is the only Shia-led country in the Middle East, countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia could conceivably support the group in the future to (Milburn, 2017). The relationship Komala has with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is complex. KRG is controlled by two parties: the KDP and PUK. The KDP is more hostile to Iran but has an interest in keeping the activity of Komala and other Iranian Kurdish groups to limit Iranian interference in the region. PUK is closer to the regime in Tehran and also likes to limit Iranian Kurdish activity for this reason (Hassaniyan, 2018). Komala distrusts PJAK, stating that it’s a proxy serving the interests of the PKK and is too close to the Iranian regime. This has also led to clashes between the two, serving as another example of crossborder Kurdish politics leading to bloodshed (Hassaniyan, 2018). As a group left to the political spectrum, Komala and PJAK could conceivably cooperate, however this would require reconciliation and Komala to break free from the KRG’s watchful eye (Hawez, 2022). Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency overview The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) is a pan-Scandinavian neo-Nazi movement heavily rooted in Scandinavian far-right history and culture. Originally founded in 1997 as the Swedish Resistance Movement, a then-splinter group of the militant neo-Nazi network Vitt Ariskt Motstånd (White Aryan Resistance), their main objective is to replace liberal democracy with a white nationalist pan-Scandinavian government through a nationalist revolution. Throughout its early years, the movement was only active in Sweden and Norway. In 2016, however, branches of the Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland, Iceland and Denmark and Sweden joined forces in order to merge the group’s different branches. This led to the birth of the Nordic Resistance Movement as it is known today. Although there are no official records which disclose how many members are active in the NRM, estimates from 2016 suggest that the group’s size extends to around 250 people. In 2019, the organization was banned in Finland and designated as a terrorist organization (1). History & Foundations Founded in 1997, the Nordic Resistance Movement has been at the epicenter of the rapidly-growing Swedish neo-Nazi culture. Sweden – renowned for its blooming skinhead movement in the 80s and 90s – has been home to some of the most extremist (the most violent, per se) far-right groups seen in Europe post World War II. Out of this movement, prominent figures from the hardline far-right movement in Sweden created the Swedish Resistance Movement. Together with individuals from the neo-Nazi magazine Folktribune (‘People's Tribune’) and Nationell Ungdom (‘National Youth’), a neo-fascist and openly racist organization known for the murder of a Swedish anarchist in the 90s, Klas Lund founded what would later become known as the NRM (2). Despite gaining no significant recognition in their early years, the late 2000s featured an immense spike in popularity for the movement. Following the Swedish branch of the NRM, a Norwegian branch had been founded before another branch in Finland was also formed in 2007. The group’s increasing sphere of influence signified that – by 2009 – its activities more than doubled in frequency compared to previous years (which also implied more public activities). A few years later, a Danish branch of the NRM was also founded, henceforth consolidating the group’s notoriety in the Scandinavian region. The movement found widespread recognition in 2013 when the Expo Foundation documented a steep increase in activities by the movement. The years to come would mark a shift of change for NRM. The movement began consistently calling themselves the Nordic Resistance Movement, now marking a fully-merged and organized pan-Scandinavian, neo-Nazi movement. Simultaneously, Klas Lund stepped down as the leader of the NRM; this structural change paved the way for Simon Lindberg to become the NRM’s leading figure (a role he still occupies since 2014). Lindberg has been ranked as the 17th “most dangerous extremist around the world” by the Counter Extremism Project (3). Objectives and ideology The Nordic Resistance Movement's main objective is to overturn liberal democracy with a pan-Scandinavian Nazi government built upon values such as traditionalism, eco-fascism and biological racism. The movement's ideology is highly built upon classic conspiracy theories such as the anti-semitic Zionist Occupied Government theory, The Great Replacement theory and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The members of the NRM believe that the Nordic Aryan race – which they view as the superior race – is under attack and at the brink of replacement. Therefore (according to their values), a national revolution must take place, and the ‘invaders’ must be ‘pushed back’ (4). The NRM’s worldview is built on the core assumption that the Nordic race and the Nordic countries are being corrupted and poisoned in a war primarily waged by the Jews. According to their perceptions of the modern world, their government and their national institutions are merely being manipulated by Jews in order for them to push their alleged anti-white agenda. A core belief of the NRM is that culture, identity and religion is under attack by an outside, elite Jewish conspiracy. As an example of this, the movement launched a campaign targeting what they call the ‘gay LGBT-lobby’, essentially saying Jews are behind the LGBT-movement in the Western world. Approach to Resistance The Nordic Resistance Movement’s identity is highly militaristic and its members actively practice combat training. Although the movement’s main activities are primarily non-violent, the mindset and ideology of the Nordic Resistance Movement is relatively oriented towards violence. For instance, members are ideologically radicalized through the narrative that a nationalistic revolution is inevitable and that armed struggle is an inalienable component thereof. Moreover, a part of the NRM’s militaristic ideology involves the notion that members must be taught to maximize their capacities and readiness for physical confrontations (5). The movement’s main approach to resistance can be divided into three primary sectors – propaganda distribution, combat-related training, and ideological indoctrination. Other activities such as rallies and marches, publicity stunts and instances of internet activism are also relevant. At marches, the members of the movement are often seen in Nazi-inspired uniforms influenced by visual aesthetics of earlier Nazi-movements. The organization is structured into small, local units that its members refer to as ‘nests’. It is those nests that are responsible for local propaganda distribution. Leaflets can be found in mailboxes, posters on public squares, and banners hanging from highway bridges. Another approach employed by the NRM involves vandalism, and it is often directed towards Jewish infrastructure. Between 2018 and 2019, the Israeli embassy in Finland was vandalised 15 times, having suffered from shattered doors, tagged Swastika iconography, or floods of NRM stickers (6). On the night of November 10th 2019 (the anniversary of the Kristallnacht – a pogrom against Jewish landmarks, business and religious instances conducted by Nazi paramilitaries in 1938 - the NRM coordinated acts of vandalism in Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. During this coordinated attack, Swastikas were sprayed on synagogues, and some members spray-painted and vandalized 84 gravestones at a Jewish cemetery in Denmark. One member was subsequently sentenced to a year in prison (7). Sweden's Security Service assessment is that the Nordic Resistance Movement both has the capacity to commit acts of terrorism, but also the intent to commit crimes against the country’s constitutional order. International Alliances In the winter of 2016 to 2017, a series of bombings in the Swedish city of Gothenburg took place. Following the bombings, three members (individuals with ties to the NRM) were convicted for their actions. One person received life-threatening injuries. However, two of the three individuals convicted – Anton Thulin and Viktor Melin – had undergone paramilitary combat training in Russian camps on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, organized by the Russian Imperial Movement (an ally of the Nordic Resistance Movement) (8). In its own ideological programme – ‘Where is the Nordic Resistance Movement in five years?’ – the NRM states that it has the responsibility to influence any like-minded organizations around the world to shift towards a radical national-socialist direction. In a 2016 report, the Expo Foundation found that a significant proportion of the NRM’s foreign contacts were German extremists. Ties with Germany’s National Democratic Party (NPD) were found, with members of the NRM having visited the youth wing of the NPD in 2000. These members had also participated in a march which honored Rudolf Hess – a leading politician of the German Nazi party – and had additionally sent a delegation to visit the convicted Nazi terrorist Manfred Roeder in 2009. The NRM holds further connections to neo-Nazi movements in the United States, although physical meetings aren’t as common. The Anti Defamation League (ADL) noted in a 2019 report that, while the NRM’s physical presence wasn’t large in the United States, movements are continuously learning from each other and showing support in order to reach new audiences. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is a Syrian nationalist rebel organisation that took part in the Syrian Civil War as part of the militarisation of the Syrian Revolution in 2011. An umbrella organisation, it was composed of a variety of rebel groups from across the country that took on the FSA brand, seeking to be part of a wider armed anti-Regime network (O’Bagy, 2013). History & Foundations The FSA label was first mentioned during the videoed defection of Lieutenant Colonel Hussein Harmoush – one of the leaders of the Free Officers Movement – in June 2011. Subsequently, the central organisation became consolidated as more officers defected from the Syrian Arab Army, such as Colonel Riad al-Asaad who eventually became the group’s first leader (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Essentially, these defections from officers of the Syrian Arab Army were reactions to the Syrian Regime’s heavy-handed approach at suppressing instances of anti-government sentiments and protests. For instance, the regime forces used live ammunition against protesters, and punished them with detention and torture procedures. However, during its early stages, the FSA was plagued by a variety of flawed structural dynamics. The first involved the disunity between itself, the local coordinating committees (LCCs) that sought to govern opposition areas and conduct protests in regime areas, and the political opposition based in Turkey that represented the opposition on the ‘global stage’, per se (Gani, 2022). The second flaw was that the armed opposition landscape in Syria became extremely diverse as the revolution progressed, with thousands of organisations forming (Phillips, 2016). Such organisations ranged from local groups which formed to protect their towns or neighbourhoods, to bigger organisations that were more politically Islamic in their orientation and deliberately rivalled the FSA (Walther & Pedersen, 2020). Thus from an early stage, the FSA was predetermined, in a way, to become an umbrella label and brand. As a brand, it was often abused by those with criminal aims, particularly during the early stages of the insurgency, where small FSA-branded groups conducted lootings and kidnappings (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). Nonetheless, its failed consolidation during its early stages does not define its contemporary form, for its franchising held relevance for much of the war with a variety of important groups. Objectives & Ideology From the outset, overthrowing the Assad regime served as the primary objective of both the centralised FSA and the organisations that took on the franchise brand (that is, small-scale groups which simply proclaimed themselves as members of the FSA). Moreover, the FSA franchise was typically associated with a broadly secular-nationalist ideological orientation, advocating for democratic institutions. Most affiliated groups took up the pre-Ba’athist Syrian flag, which consists of a green-white-black tricolour with three red stars (Walther & Pedersen, 2020). Military & Political Capabilities As aforementioned, by 2012, the centralised FSA failed to properly unify, with a plethora of groups taking up the branding (sometimes ambiguously and groundlessly). Although the exact size of the FSA is consequently difficult to estimate, self-made claims by the FSA declare a size of around 80,000 fighters (Lund, 2013), while other external assessments suggest 50,000 fighters at its peak in 2013 (Sofer & Shaforth, 2013). However, there are notable FSA sub-groups that had extensive military capabilities. This includes Jaysh al-Nasr in Hama and Idlib, and Firqat 13 which solely operated in Idlib (Cafarella & Casagrande, 2016). These two groups were armed with BGM-71 Tow missiles, in conjunction with many others, including those part of the Southern Front coalition in Daraa and Quneitra provinces (O’Farrell & Roche, 2016). Many FSA brigades also operated heavy artillery and tanks. Politically, FSA-branded groups did not often take part in more formal political activity, as they had a primarily armed and military approach towards the revolution. This was notably the case with the LCCs and the exiled opposition, which lead the political revolution within and outside of Syria. However, despite not being involved in formal politics, these groups did have political alignments and hence fought with rival Salafi organisations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (Gade, Hafez & Gabbay, 2019). One FSA-branded brigade that was subordinate to an LCC was the Martyrs of Islam Brigade under the Local Council of Daraya City (Local Council of Daraya City, 2014). Approach to Resistance As the conflict ebbed, the FSA’s approach to resistance changed. During the start of the revolution, the war was constrained to an ‘insurgency phase’, with rebel groups such as those of the FSA engaging in asymmetric warfare (Holliday, 2011). However, this would eventually evolve into conventional warfare as swathes of the country would become liberated, with the Battle of al-Qusayr (2013) being an early example of such warfare between FSA-branded groups, the Syrian Regime, and Hezbollah (Blanford, 2013). The fluidity of the situation in Syria signified that FSA-branded groups partook in most battles, at various points, but not necessarily from beginning to end. This is exemplified in the Battle of Deir Ez-Zor (2012-2017) where FSA groups were routed by the Islamic State who took their place against the regime during 2013-14 (Bakkour, 2022). FSA groups have been accused of recruiting child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2014), as well as executing people linked to, or suspected of being linked to, the regime (Amnesty International, 2013). International Relations & Alliances Whilst its initial command was based in Turkey (thereby receiving Turkish support), many of the FSA’s factions were supported by a variety of international patrons, including Turkey, Qatar, the US, UK, France and Saudi Arabia (Phillips, 2016). Notwithstanding, these relationships have changed as the war evolved. For instance, FSA (and non-FSA) factions in Aleppo are now part of the Syrian National Army (SNA) under the subordination of the Syrian Government in Exile, and thus heavily cooperate with Turkey (Özkizilcik, 2020). This also includes 15 FSA factions of the National Front for Liberation in Idlib. However, there are also FSA factions – such as Jaysh al-Thuwar – that are part of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and thus fight against the SNA (O’Farrell & Roche, 2016). Additionally, in the al-Tanf military base, an FSA faction formerly known as Maghawir al-Thawra works in tandem with US special forces (Combined Special Ops Joint Task Force-Levant, 2022). Furthermore in Daraa, remnants of the Southern Front (of which FSA factions were part of) still operate even under Regime control. These former rebels have gone on to clash with the regime, and were recently involved in killing Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi. Al-Qurayshi was the former leader of ISIS, and he was killed in an offensive aimed at uprooting the organisation from the Daraa province (Lister, 2022). Gallery Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Slovenski Branci (Slovak for “Slovakian Conscripts”) was a militia based in Slovakia which was founded in 2012 as a paramilitary training club. The organization was active in providing basic military training as well as catastrophe relief training to its members. The political background of some of its most prominent members and its international ties to Russian nationalist organizations have stirred controversy in the past few years. Just two months ago in October 2022, the group self-dissolved and publicly declared the cessation of all its activities. History & Foundations The Slovenski Branci were founded in 2012 by Peter Švrček, who also became their leader. Švrček later took part in a military training camp organized by the Russian nationalist organization Narodny Sobor (1). The organization accepted members from different backgrounds, including students, current and former soldiers, policemen, professionals, etc (2). According to their website, Slovenski Branci are “a civic voluntary national militia formed by citizens of all social classes determined to work and act for the common good of our country and for lofty social aspirations through voluntary work, based on principles of national belonging and loyalty” (3). The group started gaining popularity during 2014-2015, as a small group of members traveled to Eastern Ukraine to take part in the initial stages of the wider Ukrainian conflict (4) (after the Maiden revolution). At the time, the Slovensky Branci were not considered to be a source of potential concern, yet Slovak security services started observing the groups’ activities, and have even produced reports on their activity since 2017 (5). In 2018, the Slovak ministry of defense established new regulations which effectively sanctioned any Slovak soldier found to be cooperating with paramilitary entities (6). It had previously emerged that members of the Slovakian armed forces had indeed cooperated with the Slovenski Branci (7). Ideology & Objectives Slovenski Branci always centered their movement around the organization and provision of training for its militiamen, although they also had wider political aspirations. For instance, they also portrayed themselves to be a Slovak nationalist organization, with open anti-NATO (8), Eurosceptic, Russophile and pan-Slavistic leanings (9). A general feeling of distrust in national institutions and into the general trend of corruption and inaction in conventional politics also played a role in producing a certain distrust towards the Slovak state (10). Political & Military Abilities The Slovenski Branci offered a variety of training programmes. These including fitness and topography courses, as well as medical training, engineering training, tactical and firearms training, and even basic CBRN operations (12). They also conducted regular exercises and organized eco-friendly clean-up operations (13). The group was founded on the principles of military hierarchy, with members having defined ranks, and being assigned to units (14). The Slovenski Branci are believed to have owned a very limited amount of light weaponry (pistols and rifles), while most of their training sessions involved gun reproductions or airsoft models (15). The group is believed to have numbered between 200 and 300 members at its peak (16). International Relations & Alliances The organization had friendly relations and cooperated with Russian nationalist organizations, such as Narodny Sobor, Night Wolves (Kremlin-affiliated biker gang), and some of its members also fought on the pro-Russian side in Donbass (17). It has been reported that, starting in 2016, the founder of the Slovenski Branci, Peter Švrček has often traveled to the Balkans, where he has established contacts with former Yugoslav military officers and has allegedly purchased Yugoslav military materials of undisclosed type and quantity (18). The group has had cordial relations with Croatian individuals interested in setting up a similar paramilitary in Croatia, and a Czech chapter was also established at some point (19). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Golden Dawn (GD) was a far-right Greek party and one of the most violent political movements in Europe. The group gained exposure internationally following the electoral conquests during the economic crisis in Greece between 2010 and 2012. Although the name had been circulating in the Greek extreme right circles since the 1980s, it was not until 1985 that GD assumed the structure of a political party, all while being run as a paramilitary organisation. From its origins, the ideological roots of the movement were steeped in Nazi symbolism and were deeply influenced by the ideology of the Third Reich, as well as by the various military dictatorships that Greece had experienced since World War II. The party often conducted attacks against migrants, refugees, the LGBTQ community, Muslim and Jewish citizens, and left-wing militants until its formal disintegration in 2020. History & Foundations The Golden Dawn was founded under the name "People’s Association – Golden Dawn" on the 14th of February 1983 by Nikos Michaloliakos, who led the party until its dissolution (2). Michaloliakos' openly national socialist principles set the embryonic ideology of the group (3), which remained almost politically inactive until the 1990s. After the first congress in 1990, GD began to organise its own militancy and actively participated in the Balkan War on the side of Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian regime. This participation saw the involvement of party officials as volunteers in the Srebrenica massacre and mass mobilisations against the recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (contemporarily North Macedonia) (4). During the early 2000s, GD began structuring itself more formally by shifting its focus to domestic politics, although it remained on the side lines and proved unable to carve out a relevant role for itself in the Greek electoral context. The first electoral success came in 2010, when the party first reached the threshold in the municipal elections of Athens. Nikos Michaloliakos – the leader of the GD party – was given a seat in Athens’ municipal council after having obtained 5.29% of votes in the municipal elections (2). In this instance, issues related to immigration played an important role that would subsequently become a central theme for the following elections. It was only during the Greek debt crisis that Golden Dawn achieved real national political relevance and global renown. The political earthquake caused by the severe economic crisis profoundly delegitimised other parties and offered new political opportunities to the most extreme political forces, towards which a large part of the electorate was moving. In the two 2012 parliamentary elections, the protest-vote practice against Greek political establishment and European austerity became an attractive option for the Greek electorate, and Golden Dawn was one of its main beneficiaries. The political crisis of New Democracy, the main Greek conservative party, and the decline of the radical populists of LAOS offered Golden Dawn an unprecedented electoral performance, obtaining 21 MPs in May and 18 in June. The stabilisation of the Greek political and economic crisis has gradually pushed GD back to the margins of the Greek political world. Additionally, the beginning of a long series of trials for the violent actions conducted by the group’s members – along with the loss of the party’s substantial economic resources – caused a decrease in GD’s ‘soft power’, per se, which was benefiting from the group’s food distributions and blood donations reserved to Greek citizens (5). The turning point came on September 18th, 2013, when two members of Golden Dawn, in contact with the party leadership, stabbed to death Pavlos Fyssas, a left-wing anti-fascist rapper known as Killah P (7). In 2015, the trial began and involved 68 people, including the entire party leadership and the 2012 parliamentary group. It ended in October 2020 with the conviction of all defendants as part of a criminal organisation and 15 members for the murder of Pavlos. Consequently, Golden Dawn was formally dissolved and declared as an illegal entity (7). Objectives & Ideology The GD party always pursued policies guided by a deeply reactionary, conservative and racist vision. The ideology of Golden Dawn is steeped in neo-Nazi, authoritarian, ultra-nationalist and anti-Semitic ideas. Although GD always rejected to be labelled as a neo-Nazi party, Nazi symbolism was omnipresent and references to the Third Reich were evident. On numerous occasions, GD mentioned that the purity of Greek blood was ‘threatened by foreigners’, and many of their paramilitary marches featured exclamations of “blood and honour”; a direct translation from the German motto “Blut und Ehre” once carried by the Nazi SA. Its members also sang “Raise the flags high” (translated from the Nazi stormtroopers’ official hymn “Die Fahne hoch”) during certain marches (8). Following their agenda, Golden Dawn aimed to create a Hellenic ethnostate, speaking out against “the demographic alteration and dissolution of Greek society”, which would be systematically perpetrated by “millions of illegal immigrants” and the “establishment and leftist parties” (2). During the Greek economic crisis, Golden Dawn violently raged against European austerity and traditional parties, inciting protest votes and the exit from the Euro system (2). Military & Political Abilities GD had the political ability to attract many voters during a period of deep political instability in the Greek country. The party in the 2012 elections managed to channel protest votes towards both the so-called establishment parties and the Troika’s Memorandum of Austerity Measures (4). Over the years, through various previously active organisations, Golden Dawn managed to create a strong grassroots militant participation that was particularly active in several right-wing strongholds in downtown Athens (4). The organisation was structured according to a military hierarchy. GD could be considered as a militia-like party – clearly vertically oriented with strong leaders and militarily capable militants (5). Approach to Resistance In 2012, when GD was at its peak level of ability, Human Rights Watch documented a dramatic increase in extreme right-wing political violence; dozens of attacks were conducted against immigrants, the LGBTQ community, and other minorities (6). Militants, candidates, and parliamentarians were prosecuted and convicted for assaults on migrants during so-called ‘vigilance activities’, which allegedly aimed at cleaning up the streets from crime (2). Physically violent militancy against antagonistic groups was a common feature, and mainly directed against left-wing circles and members of ethnic and religious minorities. In 1998, MP Antonios Androutsopoulos and other party members violently assaulted a group of left-wing students, wounding two and almost killing a third (2)(5). For this crime, Androutsopoulos was sentenced to 21 years in prison. International Relations & Alliances In the 2014 elections, Golden Dawn received 9.3% of the total votes and 3 MEPs, who joined the European Parliament under the category of “Non-attached”. Indeed, at the international level, GD has found itself on the margins of European politics, being isolated and ignored even from other far-right parties. In reference to this trend, Marine Le Pen, the leader of France's Rassemblement National, said that Golden Dawn has a "filthy image" and had clearly excluded the will to include the Greek party in their alliance (3). Despite its isolation within European institutions, Golden Dawn has – over the years – cultivated numerous international relations with similar political parties and movements (3). In fact, a series of meetings in various European capitals involved far-right parties. In 2013, Golden Dawn, the Spanish La Falange Movement, Romania’s Noua Dreapta and other similar parties met in Madrid, where they signed a collaboration pact. Another meeting took place in Rome and was attended by GD, Forza Nuova and the German Nazis of National Democratic Party (3). Although GD has been ignored by the most influential right-wing politicians on the continent, it can still be assumed that the Greek party enjoyed a veiled sympathy. In 2016, Lorenzo Fontana, one of Matteo Salvini’s far-right Party deputies, sent his best wishes to his "Golden Dawn friends". Nowadays, with the new far-right Italian Government, Lorenzo Fontana is Speaker of the Lower House and the third most important figure in the State (1). Additional Resources

Introduction and Overview The Cyber Partisans are a Belarusian hacktivist group founded in September of 2020. The group formed as a reaction to fraudulent elections which had been held in the country and saw the long-reigning President, Aleksandr Lukashenko, remain in power. The primary objective of the group is to use hacking as a method to disrupt and ‘expose’, per se, the current regime in Belarus in order to democratise the country (as they see it). History and Foundations On the 9th of August 2020, the Belarusian presidential elections were held and were rife with procedural violations and fraud (Beford). Aleksandr Lukashenko (the ruling President of Belarus since 1994) won these elections. In the past, this type of fraudulent electoral activity — destined to keep the ruling government in power — had been met with little resistance. However, the social conditions in the country had changed over time and eventually led to mobilisation of protestors following the 2020 elections and their seemingly-flawed outcome (Bedord). This change in Belarusian society was primarily driven by the regime’s inability to continue to provide for the citizenry in any kind of meaningful way that would prop up their popularity, or at least acceptance, in certain segments of society. With this decline in support, the government began to rely increasingly on heavy-handed tactics to remain in power. It is likely that this increase in authoritarian tactics matched with a decrease in ability to provide for the people led to a sense of illegitimacy in the eyes of the public that boiled over following the 2020 elections (Bedford). In response, the Belarusian government cracked down on protestors; police brutality and intimidation were widely used to quell the unrest and uphold Lukashenko’s control of the country. During this period of instability, the Lukashenko regime had also relied heavily on the Russian government and Vladimir Putin for support and maintaining power. This drew the two countries and leaders even closer than they had been before, all while further weakening Lukashenko and Belarus’ autonomy over their foreign policy as they became increasingly compliant to Russia and Vladimir Putin. As a response to the domestic repression of the Belarusian people, a group of former IT workers who had fled Belarus came together to form the Cyber Partisans. Belarus had a thriving tech sector before the elections and the subsequent protests, and many of the individuals working in this field left the country due to crackdowns on tech companies and workers who opposed the government (Smeets). This ‘tech-savvy’ group of young and politically-motivated tech workers drove the formation of the hacktivists known as the Cyber Partisans. Objectives and Ideology Since the formation of the Cyber Partisans, the group’s objective has been to help support the downfall of the Lukashenko regime and end authoritarian rule over Belarus. The group’s hope is that this will allow the country to develop into a free and democratic nation. Moreover, one of the group’s additional objectives is to revive the Belarusian tech sector (as it has largely been shut down following the 2020 president elections) in order to transform Belarus into a place where young people can work and innovate. In a way, this motivation is fuelled by the group’s desire to transform the country into a new regional tech hub (Antoniuk). While hacking as a sole strategy is unlikely to bring about this change, the Cyber Partisans’ operations against the government are often in coordination with, and in support of, a coalition of groups both inside and outside of the country with similar objectives. The collection of these groups is referred to broadly as the “Suprativ Collective”(Smeets). The driving ideology across this coalition of activists is broadly anti-authoritarian and pro-democracy. The objectives of the Cyber Partisans have also developed since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine. The Russian military began to heavily rely on Belarus as a transit point through which they could move their troops and equipment to the front lines. Since this development, the Cyber Partisans have expanded their operations to target Russian convoys and equipment moving through Belarus, in order to disrupt the Russian war effort in Ukraine. This has primarily been achieved by hacking Belarusian railroad networks used to move Russian equipment through the country (Dickinson). In this regard, while the Cyber Partisans exclusively carry out operations in their country of Belarus, their efforts have also reflected a struggle against Russia’s political domination in their country and against Russian military aggression in the region. Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance The use of cyber weapons and hacking has created a new grey area in modern conflict and geopolitics. This has sparked debate over how hacking should be classified in regards to its level of aggression; —> Does hacking rise to the same level as physical attacks or is there a clear distinction between the two? —> If the Cyber Partisans hack a railroad network in Belarus, shutting it down, is that any different than blowing the rail line up (even if the results are the same)? Evidently, the answer to these questions lie outside the scope of the Cyber Partisans’ struggle with the Belarusian government. The Belarusian regime has labeled the group as an illegal extremist organization for their actions (Bennett). For all intents and purposes, however, the group’s methods are non-violent. The group’s most renowned actions include their hacking operations, which have shut down Belarusian rail networks transporting Russians military equipment and weapons to the frontlines in Ukraine (Smeets). These operations are similar to those of other resistance groups in the region that have targeted rail lines in physical attacks to disrupt the Russian war effort. The group has previously stated that carrying out operations such as these has been made considerably easier by Lukashenko’s government, which they deem has failed to upgrade the country’s security software for its critical infrastructure. Running outdated Windows softwares — such as Windows XP — has left the country’s infrastructure vulnerable to even unsophisticated and relatively simple cyber attacks (Cox). This is a vulnerability that the Cyber Partisans have repeatedly taken advantage of. The Cyber Partisans have also started to prepare for what they hope will be the inevitable downfall of the Belarusian dictatorship, by collecting evidence on members of the regime that could one day be used against them in a human rights court. This has involved hacking the communications of the police and intelligence services in the country, as well as obtaining recordings of members of the security services admitting to crimes they have committed against protesters and ordinary civilians. In these recordings, members of the police have admitted to unlawful beatings and inhumane treatment of prisoners. The group has also hacked surveillance cameras to record the police acting unlawfully and expose information to the public such as the cars being used by police and security services. The targeting of government officials and agencies has been aided by an alliance between the Cyber Partisans and former members of the security services who fled the country following the 2020 elections. This group — known as ByPOL — has assisted the identification of targets, as well as provided the Cyber Partisans with a better understanding of government networks, data storage, and security practices. ByPOL also uses the information obtained from the Cyber Partisans to conduct their own investigations into the regime, the results of which are posted on their Telegram channel. Information obtained by the Cyber Partisans and ByPOL has been used by human rights organizations which are investigating the regime, as well as by the United States Congress during congressional hearings that later led to sanctions being placed on the country. The operations conducted against the Belarusian government by the Cyber Partisans has led to waves of data leaks and vital intelligence gathering. Some of the leaks have included extensive data collection processes, such as the entire country’s passport database, drone footage from protest crackdowns, the Ministry of Interior’s mobile phone surveillance database, as well as recordings from emergency services and detentions centers where prisoners are held (O’Neill). The group also prioritises the assistance and education of the Belarusian public in regards to digital surveillance defense. The group has developed its own mobile phone apps that provide encrypted platforms for protestors and other resisters of the regime (in order to enable their communication and coordination). One such app is the Partisans’ Telegram, which was created by using the open-source code of the Telegram app. Additional security and encryption features were added to make it more reliable for those working to undermine the government. One such feature allows users to enter a secret code that will automatically delete all data on the app. The Partisan Telegram app has also become popular in regions of Ukraine that have been occupied by Russian forces (Antionuk). Similar efforts to protect protestors have included creating SMS messaging services that are encrypted and do not require internet connection to operate (Smeets). These efforts to combat digital surveillance are increasingly important for opposition and insurgent groups to resist governments in general, as even democracies increase their use of digital surveillance tools. However, in a country such as Belarus, it is even more critical as authoritarian governments increasingly rely on digital tools to suppress their people. International Relations & Perception in the Media The groups that the Cyber Partisans work with to undermine the Belarusian government are predominantly made up of other Belarusians, both inside and outside of the country. These would include groups such as ByPOL and protestors and resisters in Belarus. They share similar objectives with other hacking groups in the region also opposed to Russian domination, such as the IT Army of Ukraine and anti-Putin Russian hackers. Nonetheless, there is no indication that these groups have ever cooperated directly with the Cyber Partisans so far. Due to the conflict in Ukraine, most international support is directed towards Ukrainian and Russian hacking collectives opposed to the Putin regime. Therefore, most resources are directed to those groups as well. The Cyber Partisans can and do receive donations from abroad via cryptocurrencies but the amount presumably would not compare to the donations received by Ukrainian groups fighting Russia. Due to the conflict in the region (and the backing of Ukraine by the Western world), the Cyber Partisans receive relatively meliorative and positive media coverage and little to no interference from Western countries. The group’s public spokesperson, Yuliana Shemetovets, lives in New York City and has not endured any type of legal action from the U.S. government in spite of her open involvement with the Cyber Partisans (Antionuk). The problem the Cyber Partisans seem to face in their international relations and media coverage is not a lack of support but more a lack of coverage, resources, and recognition. Additional Resources