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Note: This is not the official flag of the JAM;, but rather a reproduction containing the flag of Northern Cyprus (as this is the country they are active in). The badge on the right is the official one of the SFC, but it is too small to include on its own. Insurgency Overview The Security Forces Command (SFC), established on August 1st, 1976, are the security forces of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) – a de facto state that comprises the northeastern section of the island of Cyprus (1). The SFC’s primary function is to maintain the territorial integrity of the TRNC. History & Foundations For decades, the partition of Cyprus has been a heavily contentious issue between Turkey and Greece, with both countries attempting to draw the island into their respective spheres of influence (2). Although the island is mainly composed of an ethnic Greek majority, there has been a sizable Turkish Cypriot minority since the Ottoman conquest in 1571 (3). On July 15th, 1974, the Greek military junta, which had ruled Greece since 1967, orchestrated a coup d’etat against the Greek Cypriot government with the intention of installing a pro-enosis, “union”, regime (4). A byproduct of Greek nationalism, enosis claims that Cyprus is Greek land and calls for its direct integration due to its Hellenic culture and history. Nationalism was the central ideology of the junta, and a successful Cypriot unification would not only provide the government benefits derived from the island’s strategic location, but would also legitimize and strengthen their rule. Concerned with Greece’s desire to annex the island, Turkey quickly launched an invasion on July 20th of the same year, claiming that the Greeks had violated the Treaty of Guarantee, a 1960 UN treaty involving Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in which signatories promised to “guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and not to promote the union of Cyprus with other states or partition of the Island.” (5) Although Turkish Cypriots only constituted a minority within Cyprus’ demographics, Turkey was included in these negotiations due to its status as a regional power. Both Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952, and their involvement throughout the Cypriot independence negotiations was likely envisioned to prevent infighting between the two alliance members. Additionally, Turkey’s geopolitical influence may have prompted the United Kingdom to further respect Turkish interests in the island. With control over the Bosphorus Strait, in addition to housing American ICBMs, retaining Turkey’s allegiance to the West was of great importance during the heightened tensions of the Cold War in the 1960s. When the final ceasefire was agreed upon in August 1974, after just over a month of fighting, the Turkish military had secured roughly 36% of the island’s territory. Concerned for the future safety of the Turkish Cypriots, virtually all of whom had migrated north towards the invasion force, the Turkish military established an occupation zone, which formally became the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on the 13th of February 1975. A predecessor to the TRNC, this federated state, although internationally unrecognized, provided the framework for the foundation of a distinct Turkish Cypriot government and enabled the formation of the SFC on August 1, 1976 (6). Ideology & Objectives The SFC claims heritage to earlier forms of Turkish Cypriot militants, specifically the Turkish-backed Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT), which was created in August 1958. The TMT’s primary objective was to challenge the Greek Cypriot nationalist paramilitary group – the Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) (7). However, while the EOKA campaigned for the end of British rule in Cyprus, and the eventual enosis with Greece, the TMT was rooted in taksim, an alternative ideology that advocated for the partition of Cyprus and self-determination for Turkish Cypriots (8). In 1967, the TMT was renamed Mücahit, “mujahid”, until it was finally transformed into the SFC after the invasion (9). Although the SFC is not a jihadist organization in the traditional Islamist sense, the SFC still refers to their soldiers as mücahitlerin “mujahideen”, and claims that their central goal is to maintain the existence of the TRNC (10). Military Capabilities The SFC operates as a gendarmerie, overseeing military duties in addition to law enforcement among the Turkish Cypriot civilian population (11). The SFC relies heavily on conscription in order to source its manpower, and all male TRNC citizens aged 19 to 49 are eligible for 24-month periods of service (12). Although there is little information regarding the current size of the SFC, it was estimated to be about 4,000 soldiers strong in 1989, with 15,000 troops in reserve (13). It is unlikely that the current size of the SFC has deviated significantly from this initial figure due to the presence of the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force Command, a permanent Turkish garrison about 30,000 soldiers strong (14). Since their inception, they have attempted to transform themselves into a modern, regular military. It is a combined arms force, featuring a coast guard, aviation units, special forces, and a police organization (15). The SFC cooperates heavily with Turkey; most equipment, training, and high-grade officers are sourced from there, and the SFC effectively falls under the Turkish Military’s chain of command (16). Approach to Resistance Since the TRNC’s official declaration of independence in 1983, the island has not witnessed major violence between the TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus. The most recent incident occurred on August 14th, 1996, when two British troops patrolling the UN “Green Line” (the demilitarized zone that divides the island) were wounded by fire originating from the Turkish side. The perpetrator of the shooting remains unclear. The Associated Press reported that Turkish troops fired into a crowd of Greek Cypriot protestors but did not specify whether the troops were SFC or members of the Turkish garrison (17). In response to this incident, the Cypriot government issued five arrest warrants, two of which were for SFC members: Attila Sab, the police chief at the time, and Erdal Emanet, a commander within the SFC military. Since 1996, the island has seen relative calmness between the two Cypriot communities. Nowadays, the SFC’s role is mainly limited to peacekeeping operations and enforcing TRNC jurisdiction over its land and territorial waters. International Recognition The SFC’s international legitimacy remains ambiguous due to the TRNC’s status as a 'geopolitical pariah'. The United States Department of State refers to the TRNC as “Cyprus - the Area Administered by Turkish Cypriots” (18). Turkey is the only UN member that recognizes the TRNC, and therefore the SFC is not considered a de jure military force by virtually all official foreign governments. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (SSCS) is a US-based marine conservation group that specifically targets illegal fishing operations internationally. Founded in 1977, the organization is known for its use of direct action. The SSCS’ activities range from research to sabotage in an effort to prevent unregulated fishing vessels from harming marine life. The quasi-legal and radical nature of their activism have made the SSCS controversial within the public eye, international community, and environmental movement. History In 1977, Canadian environmentalist Paul Watson was removed from the Greenpeace board of directors. Watson did not agree with the organization’s pacifist brand of activism and his vocal support for direct action led to divisions with other board members. Watson claims he was a “founding member” of Greenpeace, although the latter formally deny this (1). After earning the funds to purchase their first ship -- the Sea Shepherd I -- Watson set off on the SSCS’ first campaign in 1979 against seal hunters in the Canadian arctic. Seal hunters would then become a frequent target of the SSCS. During the 1990s, the SSCS shifted towards cooperating with local governments and police forces to achieve its goals. The 2000s and the rise of social media saw the group grow in popularity, as a number of documentaries were produced on the group. Additionally, many celebrities, including Pamela Anderson and Heath Ledger, announced their support for the SSCS, thereby increasing its popularity. The funds from its newfound viral fame allowed for the expansion of its fleet (2). The Japanese whaling fleet has been a primary focus for the SSCS over the past 20 years. The Japanese government hunts and kills hundreds of whales a year for the alleged purpose of research, although the International Court of Justice found that claim to be untrue and thus ruled the hunt illegal (notably as the meat is then sold on the market). Japanese officials have labelled the SSCS as terrorists and have tried to prosecute the group numerous times. In 2017, the society ended its campaigns against Japanese whalers. Watson said the SSCS was at a legal and technological disadvantage and could not continue to fight them (2). Objectives & Ideology The group aims to exclusively protect marine life, strengthen environmental regulations, and help authorities guard their bodies of water from poachers. The SSCS saddles itself in a unique position amongst environmental activists. Although it employs direct action to achieve its goals, it operates in a legal gray area and frequently works with local governments. Beyond environmentalism, the organization is politically ambiguous. Thus, it stands between environmentalist pacifism and radicalism. This has allowed for the group to maintain its 'Robin Hood-like' public image and its widespread support. It must be noted, however, that in its early years, the group had less concern for the law and thus more pushback from authorities. Capabilities The SSCS operates all over the world, with its actions ranging from the Arctic to the Galapagos Islands. In certain countries, such as in Mexico and Sierra Leone, they work together with local authorities that may not have the resources nor the tactical knowledge to combat poaching. Currently, the group has a fleet of 12 main ships worldwide staffed by volunteers (4). It also pushes for governments and international institutions to strengthen their protections for marine life. Approach to Resistance The SSCS uses its fleet for all of its activities, which range from reconnaissance and scientific research to acts of sabotage and ramming the vessels of poachers. Members have been known to use water cannons, acid, lasers, smoke bombs, and mines (3). It targets practices that it deems to be particularly harmful to marine life, such as driftnet fishing, whaling, and sealing (2). The group’s activities have been attributed to one death, that of a Mexican fisherman who died in 2021 after an accidental collision with a Sea Shepherd vessel (5). Another important element of the SSCS’ strategy is its media presence. Because of the controversial nature of their activism, the society has received plenty of attention from the media over the years. The group documents and publishes its activities online, having built up a large following. This is different from most other direct action groups who, for legal reasons, tend to limit their public exposure. International Relations and Adjacent Groups Although the SSCS was founded by former Greenpeace members, the two groups have denounced one another on the basis of their positions on non-violence (1). The SSCS is a registered non-profit charity in the US and UK. However, many governments have been more apprehensive towards the group. The governments of Japan, Costa Rica, New Zealand, Australia, and Malta have all opposed the SSCS’ actions (3). Gallery Additional Resources

Group Overview Born out of the struggle for Kurdish independence in the 1940s, the Peshmerga are the military force of Kurdistan, an autonomous region in Northern Iraq (and also semi-autonomous/disputed in Turkey, Iran, and Syria). Founded by Mustafa Barzani (a central figure in the fight for Kurdistan’s sovereignty), the group seeks to continue the Kurdish warrior’s tradition to protect their region. The group has played vital roles in fighting terrorism in Iraq, helping to defeat al-Qaeda and playing a key role in the fight against ISIS (5). Despite their commitment to fighting regional insurgents, the group is plagued with financial irregularities and internal corruption, which are a limiting factor in achieving international legitimacy (10). The group’s name translates to “those who face death” and exemplifies their commitment (as they see it) to the cause of an independent Kurdistan and the protection of its people. History & Foundations Originally comprised of independent guerilla groups, the Peshmerga was consolidated under the control of Mustafa Barzani in 1946 and designated as the national army of the Republic of Mahabad (1). While the Republic of Mahabad proved to be short-lived as it ended a year after its inception, the Peshmerga remained in place as Iraqi Kurdistan’s primary military force (4). After a period of relative inactivity, the Peshmerga emerged again during the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War, where they suffered a defeat that fractured the group along party lines. The two parties -- the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union Kurdistan (PUK) -- were substantially different, with the left-leaning PUK splitting from the big-tent tribalist KDP (3). This split would erupt in violence with the start of the Iraqi-Kurdish Civil War in 1994, with the KDP and the PUK at the center of the conflict. The international community took sides, with the KDP receiving support from Israel and Iraq and the PUK supported by both Iran and the United States. While the conflict lasted three years, the fault lines have remained intact and the Peshmerga henceforth continues to experience internal divisions. Despite ongoing internal political tensions, the group has played a prominent role in every Iraqi conflict since their inception, most notably the Iraq War and the Iraqi-ISIS War. The United States’ toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime was thoroughly supported by the Peshmerga, as the group provided intelligence and military support in the mission to capture the Iraqi leader (13). Moreover, the Peshmerga aided the assassination of Osama Bin Laden; by working directly with the CIA, Peshmerga forces captured Hassan Ghul, an al-Qaeda member who worked directly with bin Laden. Through interrogations led by the Kurds, Ghul revealed the identity of bin Laden’s personal courier, Abu Ahmed al-Kuwaiti (11). After interrogating the latter, the CIA then learned the location of Bin Laden’s compound which enabled the US to carry out a successful raid on his Abbottabad house. Another instance where the Peshmerga fought against terrorism includes the Iraqi-ISIS War, where Kurdish forces fought on the front lines to repel their attacks in Northern Iraq (3). Widely being considered as the most effective force fighting against ISIS, the Peshmerga continue to work with international organizations such as Center for Civilians in Conflict to eliminate what remains of ISIS (7). Despite their success fighting the ISIS insurgency, the Peshmerga continue to be steeped in corruption and fraud, in particular the use of “ghost employees”. This term is used to describe the group’s use of fraudulent soldiers that are used for the purpose of inflating the size of their forces, which results in excess funding. These funds are often then divided amongst group leaders, which leads to less real support for their troops (10). Objectives & Ideology Since its very early roots, the Peshmerga have existed as both the Kurdish defense force and as a sort of ambiguous rebel group with nationalist interests. This duality was a major cause of the strife that has politically and geographically divided the group. Since the 1991 Gulf War, however, Kurdistan has mostly been respected as an autonomous region operating under a unified government. After the first Kurdish general election in 1992, the PUK and KDP each received roughly half of the votes, with both parties agreeing to a power-sharing arrangement (6). As a result of this arrangement, the Peshmerga would no longer act as a fragmented militia (on paper), but instead as a united Kurdish defense force. The real outcome of this arrangement, nonetheless, was quite different as made clear by the 1994 civil war that saw the Peshmerga at war with itself. While fighting ended in 1998, the Peshmerga remains solidly split between the KDP and PUK, with each party commanding their own forces (6). Political & Military Capabilities Although officially designated as the Kurdish military, very little has changed in the operations of the Peshmerga forces since their days as a militia group. For instance, loosely-organized units aligned by political parties make up the decentralized group, which poses significant challenges in fighting against major threats. Much like the Peshmerga, Kurdistan is currently divided into two zones; a KDP-controlled “yellow” zone and a PUK-controlled “green” zone (7). As a result of this arrangement, there is no central leadership within the group, and each zone has their own commanders that operate without communicating with the other party. This hampers the ability for the Peshmerga to respond effectively to outside threats and makes them especially vulnerable to intrastate conflict. Due to the group’s internal and political separation, funding is limited. This forces the Peshmerga to cut down on the training of its troops and on the purchasing of modern equipment. Since the majority of the Kurdish territory is still legally and constitutionally a part of Iraq (and the other nations through which the geo-cultural region spreads) the Peshmerga have been required to purchase their weaponry through the Iraqi government, which is often complicated by internal politics (6). Most Peshmerga soldiers relied on weapons left behind by the fleeing Iraqi military after their failed attempts to expel ISIS from Mosul in 2014 (7). In 2016 the group began to receive modern arms from the United States and its coalition, but support was often unfairly divided amongst the units (11). Consequently, the group is at a great disadvantage in dealing with more substantial threats, such as Iran for instance. Approach to Resistance Since their formal designation as the Kurdish defense forces, the Peshmerga have been engaged in multiple significant disputes, most recently the Iraq-ISIS conflict and the ongoing strife with Iran. While the fragmented structure of the group presents challenges, the Peshmerga have been successful in all of their recent battles, most notably defeating ISIS in 2017. Initially, the group was unprepared for an assault from ISIS, but in conjunction with the United States the group was able to emerge victorious. Because of their experience engaged in battle locally, the group was able to use their knowledge of the environment in order to launch a guerilla warfare campaign against ISIS fighters (5). Recently, the Peshmerga have had to revitalize their approach to fighting, as the Iranian military has begun firing on Kurdish cities with missiles (2). Although Peshmerga forces have not yet responded to this attack, they remain alert, notably in the areas surrounding the shared border. International Alliances While many world powers are hesitant to formally align themselves with the Peshmerga due to Kurdistan’s nation status, the United States has remained committed to the group for almost two decades. While their relationship became solidified after the successful military operations against ISIS strongholds, the alliance began during the Iraq War (13). Peshmerga intelligence was vital in the war against the Iraqi government, and proved invaluable in toppling Saddam’s regime. In September of 2022, the United States renewed both their financial and military commitment to the group, and met with top Kurdish officials to reaffirm their relationship in fighting ISIS splinter cells (8). The newly signed memorandum lays out the guidelines for this support and sets a four year timetable for their joint operations. Though the future remains unknown, it is probable that the United States will continue a contingent alliance with the group as Western powers struggle to maintain regional influence. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Friends Stand United (FSU) is a loose network of militant anti-racist and anti-narcotic groups. FSU was formed in Boston, Massachusetts in the late 1980’s by Elgin James (now an American filmmaker and musician). The organization grew from the hardcore music scene – a more aggressive offshoot of punk rock. FSU particularly finds its roots within the straight edge subculture within the hardcore scene. Initially, the group formed in order to purge the Neo Nazi skinheads and drugs from the hardcore scene through violent action. Over its history, FSU has been accused of various incidents of unprovoked violence, some which have resulted in murders. FSU has also been accused of using their power to extort individuals in the hardcore scene. History & Foundations As aforementioned, FSU was born out of the Boston hardcore scene. Early bands like Bad Brains, Black Flag, and Minor Threat brought on a more aggressive and heavier sound. Individuals within the scene also changed their appearance from the stereotypical punk aesthetics (i.e mohawks and spiked jackets) to athletic clothing and streetwear (1). A subculture that came about within the hardcore scene was straight edge; a personal promise amongst members to abstain from drugs and alcohol. The tenants of this subculture within hardcore grew from the song “Straight Edge” by the DC hardcore band, Minor Threat. Although this straight edge subculture initially began as a positive one within the broader hardcore scene, it began to adopt a more militant significance as a result of its spread to other cities, such as New York City and Boston (2). One individual that was captivated by the straight edge hardcore scene was Elgin James. Elgin James grew up in rural Connecticut on a farm, and his adoptive parents were a white couple who were involved in the Civil Rights movement in Mississippi (1). James noted that his upbringing was chaotic due to frequent physical abuse from his adoptive father. He also experienced an identity crisis due to him being mixed race with white adoptive parents. He also knew almost nothing about his biological parents (1). This alienation and abuse brought James into punk rock music (3) and – as he began seeking a ‘harder’ scene – James became part of the anti-racist skinhead culture (before becoming a part of the hardcore one). Within the hardcore scene, James became part of the straight edge lifestyle. After high school, James enrolled in Antioch College in Ohio and – while he was at home for the holidays – he was attacked walking down an alleyway. His injuries were extremely severe and he spent several months recovering, henceforth forcing him to withdraw from the university. This forced James to live on the streets living in squatters and after a long period of train hopping and squatting across the US, he eventually settled in Boston, Massachusetts (3). James and other squatters, being straight edge, began clearing the neighborhood of drug dealers by beating them up and robbing their money to use for survival. In the 1980s, the Boston hardcore scene was plagued by Neo Nazi skinheads. Individuals like James did not take kindly to this intrusion into the scene and decided to fight back. After various battles and instances of direct confrontation with Neo Nazi skinheads, James and his friends decided to form a more legitimate group (1), which led to the formation of FSU. The FSU originally stood for “Fuck Shit Up”, but later stood for “Friends Stand United”. Ideology & Objectives Word of FSU spread throughout the national hardcore scene. Makeshift hardcore crews that stood for the same anti-drug and anti-Nazi ethos reached out directly to James for permission to become a chapter of the organisation. Eventually, FSU chapters formed in Philadelphia, Chicago, Arizona, Los Angeles, Seattle, Upstate New York, and New Jersey (1). Each one of these chapters carried out an agenda of ridding their local scene of drugs and Neo-Nazism through violent means. Fist fighting is the standard approach of the FSU, although the organization is also known to use weapons. For instance, FSU would use brass knuckles, baseball bats, knives, hammers, and even makeshift weapons like padlocks in socks. A lot of the violence carried out by the FSU is only formally known to the hardcore scenes where they have a presence and remains relatively unknown to the general public. However, this changed after the release of the documentary “Boston Beatdown: See The World Through our Eyes – Volume II” in 2004. The documentary was a mix of commentary from FSU leaders, footage of their street fights, their fights at hardcore shows, as well as collections of music of various FSU-affiliated hardcore bands (4). The documentary gave the general public a glimpse and quick history of the straight edge and hardcore scene. The goal of FSU is to have control over the local hardcore scene wherever they are located. FSU aims to entirely purge the scene from drug dealers and any Neo-Nazis. They also regulate the venues and bookings for concerts by working directly as promoters and posing as security. This type of control has put the organization under scrutiny. After claims by individuals as well as the release of the “Boston Beatdown” documentary, FSU began to draw the attention of law enforcement. Approach to Resistance & Armed Capabilities There have been various incidents linked to FSU that have caused the organization to be labeled as a street gang by the FBI. In 2005, a 36-year old man named Matthew Carlo was beaten to death following an altercation involving members of FSU at a hardcore show in Troy, New York. Six men were arrested, among which Lionel Bliss (an FSU member and bouncer) was charged with negligent homicide (1). Again in 2005, an FSU-affiliated band held a show in Tucson, Arizona. A large fight erupted and – after spilling out into the parking lot of the venue – men affiliated with FSU who were armed with hammers and machetes chased an individual. This eventually escalated into this individual shooting and killing an FSU member (1). In 2014, another major brawl occurred in Cleveland, Ohio. Allegedly, the reason for the fight was tension between FSU members and members of another hardcore crew called “Swing On Sight Family” (6). The festival called “Fire Fest” booked bands affiliated with FSU and bands affiliated with SOSF, causing tension at the festival. A witness stated that 50 to 100 men were armed with machetes and guns. Everyone was fighting in the street outside the venue until someone fired shots in the air, resulting in everyone dispersing and fleeing. This brawl resulted in the hospitalization of 5 people and the arrest of 23 others (6). Elgin James also faced federal extortion charges in 2009 that involved FSU (6). Additionally, Tony Lovato (from the band “Mest”) claims that his band had an argument with FSU-affiliated members in Chicago. Lovato stated that, after the tour, they were attacked by FSU members. Afterwards, Lovato claimed that they were contacted by Elgin James, who demanded money from Lovato’s band and threatened to attack them with other FSU members if they did not comply. During the following tour, Lovato stated that his band was repeatedly attacked by alleged FSU members and consistently contacted by James to pay $5,000 to FSU for protection (6). There was speculation that Lovato was targeted by James and FSU due to his ties to a white power band early in his musical career (7). Elgin James was charged with federal extortion charges and served 10 months in jail for the crime. Current Situation Many of the original members of FSU have either stepped away from the hardcore scene and FSU as a whole, or have moved on to outlaw motorcycle clubs. After serving time for federal extortion charges, Elgin James stepped away from FSU and the Boston area to pursue a career as a film director in Los Angeles. FSU still exists in the form of various autonomous chapters in Philadelphia, Chicago, Arizona, Los Angeles, Seattle, Upstate New York, and New Jersey. Due to prevalent hardcore crews in various areas, it has prevented any nationwide expansion of FSU. Over the years, it appears that FSU has made attempts to keep a lower profile out of the public eye, only being well known to those within the hardcore scene. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Armed Forces of South Ossetia (AFSO), often simply referred to as the South Osstian Army, is the military of the partially-recognized state of South Ossetia. Nestled in the Greater Caucasus Mountains, their headquarters is in the capital of Tskhinvali, with their commander-in-chief being the head of state Alan Gagloyev. With the assistance of the Russian military stationed at the 4th Guards Military Base, the South Ossetian military exists to resist any attempt by Georgia to retake the territory. History & Foundations Under Soviet rule, the region of South Ossetia was given the status of Autonomous Oblast within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. When the Soviet Union collapsed, both governments in Tbilisi and Tskhinvali sought national identity, with the Georgian leadership labeling the South Ossetian efforts as illegal. After bouts of civil strife, both sides began to send armed units into the area to secure each other's interests. The South Ossitian military came out of this by having the first armed groups formed to create a South Ossetian Republican Guard. This Republican Guard, however, was more than a conglomeration of local militias and popular armed groups; assistance from North Ossetia came in the form of irregular troops. In the resulting South Ossetia War, the AFSO would be formed with organized Military Intelligence, Artillery, and command staff first. Following the Georgian Civil War, the AFSO began to rebuild their military. Their model mirrored that of the Russian Armed Forces, both in equipment and in doctrine. Years later in 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin would confirm this. "It isn't a secret [...] there was a plan in place and we were guided by it. It was developed by the General Staff in late 2006 - early 2007, and it was negotiated with me. We trained South Ossetian militia under this plan [...]", Putin told reporters at the time. Ideology & Objectives The overall objective of the AFSO is the defense of South Ossetian territory against Georgian forces. Despite cohabitation during the Soviet era, they believe that Tbilisi is intent on eradicating their autonomy and acting against their regional interests, as well as their cultural identity. This divide has been exacerbated by the actions of Georgian military and pro-Georgian militants in the post-Soviet conflicts, including eviction, shelling of Ossetian villages, and alleged war crimes. The AFSO enjoys popularity at home, being seen as a protective force against the predations of Tbilisi. Approach to Resistance In the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, the AFSO were the primary force resisting Georgian military advances until the arrival of Russian troops for the 58th Army. Once the Georgian military had left Tskhinvali, the AFSO followed Russian troops into Georgia proper, where Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other international human rights organizations have blamed them for a multitude of human rights violations. For instance, HRW noted in a 2009 report that “Ossetian forces rounded up at least 159 ethnic Georgians [...] killing at least one and subjecting nearly all of them to inhuman and degrading treatment and conditions of detention. They also tortured at least four Georgian prisoners of war and executed at least three.” These violations suggest that the AFSO’s approach to resistance is relatively violent and has involved HR violations. At the time of writing, the AFSO are purely defensive in nature and aside from the occasional cross-border incident, do not overtly seek out conflict with Georgian security forces. The AFSO response to any incursion into their territory is likely to involve the formation of defensive positions and an immediate formal request for Russian military assistance. As a result, the country’s sovereignty is tethered to Russian military response. Military & Political Abilities The AFSO has, since the closing of the 2008 war, been tasked with repulsing any cross-border operation by Georgian military units. The President of South Ossetia in 2017, Leonid Tibilov, said that "South Ossetia plays a huge role in strengthening Russia's geopolitical presence in the Transcaucasus.” They, along with other internal security forces and Russian reconnaissance elements, continuously and visibly patrol the border, also known as the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL). On occasion, they have been seen by drone and by civilians crossing this line into Tbilisi-controlled territory. The tactical and strategic capabilities of the AFSO reflect the heavy influences of the Russian Armed Forces. While their size is commonly counted as 16,000 members, this is said to include both active duty and reserve personnel. Active duty numbers are difficult to come by, but are typically assessed to be around 2,500, with the remainder being reservists and part-time specialists. There have been several attempts to integrate either the entirety or a portion of the AFSO into the Russian Armed Forces. However, each time it has been presented before the legislature it has never passed. Regardless, both militaries do train together and host joining exercises. Lieutenant-General Ibragim Gasseev, South Ossetian Defense Ministry in 2016, described the issue by saying “it is impossible to imagine that an Ossetian warrior is no longer entrusted with the fulfillment of the sacred duty of defending the Fatherland and is destined to be an outside observer of the defense of the state, to the recognition of whose independence a difficult and bloody path has been traveled.” The AFSO regular force consists of 4 Rifle Battalions, a Tank Brigade, and a Logistics Brigade. In its headquarters is the army general staff, communications, special operations, administrative, and engineering elements. Each element is reportedly a company in size (around 120 soldiers), but exact numbers may not fill an entire company’s personnel numbers. The reserve component, largely filled by conscripts on an annual basis, consists of 9 Rifle battalions, typically light infantry in nature. International Relations & Alliances At an international level, South Ossetia is largely seen by the international community as a part of Georgia, as and such the AFSO as an illegal armed organization. South Ossetia only maintains formal relations with Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria, and Venezuela. Tskhinvali also has shared relations with 4 other partially-recognized states. These partially-recognized entities are Abkhazia (also claimed by Georgia), Artsakh (claimed by Azerbaijan), the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (self-declared state in the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara), and Transnistria (claimed by Moldova). It has attempted to have relations with the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, but have deferred to Moscow since their annexation in September, 2022. The future of the AFSO, and South Ossetia as a whole, is dependent on the willingness of Russia to participate in its national defense efforts. The Georgian government, currently headed by the “Georgian Dream” party, has repeatedly expressed its interest in resolving their existing differences through diplomacy rather than force. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) was a Republican Socialist paramilitary organisation which operated mainly in Northern Ireland during The Troubles. It is the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, both of which were founded in 1974 by former members of the Official IRA. The INLA formally ended its armed campaign in 1999 but remains active on a smaller scale. The group’s primary objective was a full British withdrawal from Ireland and the establishment of a united Ireland socialist republic. History & Foundations During the 1960s, the Dublin led IRA became a more socialist organisation, less focused on militant nationalism and more on class struggle. However, with the escalation and spread of violence in 1969, they split into the Official IRA and the Provisional IRA, who were more northern based and more eager to take up arms. Dragged into an armed campaign against the will of its leadership and after carrying out a number of widely condemned attacks, the officials called a ceasefire in 1972 (1). A number of 'Stickies' (the colloquial nickname for the Official IRA volunteers) were unhappy with the ceasefire and with the fact that, by then, the conservative Provisionals had become the mainstream in Irish Republicanism, pulling the mainstream Republican movement in Ireland away from socialism and towards nationalism. After a series of arguments and court-martials, a splinter organisation was created in 1974; it was led by the experienced volunteer and ardent socialist, Seamus Costello, who instantly took up the positions of Chairman of the IRSP and Chief of Staff of the INLA. Thereby, the INLA was born as a splinter of a splinter (2). Ideology & Objectives The disagreement on the armed campaign stemmed from a fundamentally ideological dispute. The Stickies had taken a Stalinist approach to socialist struggle, believing that Protestant and Catholic workers would have to unite before having a chance at victory. Costello, and thus the INLA, advocated for a broad front of militant republicanism and socialism in Ireland. Costello believed that a militant campaign alone would never defeat the British army, and that the fusion of militant activism and widespread public agitation was the only way to fulfil their goals. It was the desire for a broad front in Ireland which led the INLA to lead a number of meetings between the INLA, Provisionals and the Communist Party of Ireland in 1977. While progress was slow, it seemed that the leadership of the Provisionals was open to the idea, on the condition that all parties involved publicly supported the armed campaign in the North. The CPI argued the opposite, refusing to join until the Provisionals announced a ceasefire (as they feared losing Protestant members if they were to associate with the Provisionals) (3). Today, the IRSP – the political wing of the INLA – is still active in local politics. They supported Brexit and wished for an Irish withdrawal from the EU, with the slogan “Britain out of Ireland. Ireland out of the EU” (4). The IRSP is also staunchly anti-NATO, posting several messages of support for the Donetsk and Luhansk separatists, including one on February 25th, 2022. They also staged a pro-Russian protest in Dublin, which authorities believe to have been supported by the Russian government (5). Political & Military Abilities The IRSP is not strictly abstentionist, and IRSP members have campaigned for elections to councils, assemblies and trade unions in the both jurisdictions of Ireland, with Costello himself being elected to councils in the Republic in 1966. In Belfast, the IRSP contested city council elections in 1981 and won two seats, although both councillors were on the run from authorities before their term was finished (6). The IRSP did not contest any more elections until 2011, when they put 5 candidates forward. One was originally elected, but on a recount lost by less than 1% (7). Another attempt in 2022 won no seats (8). Militarily, the INLA was never able to compete with the Provisionals. Most estimates at the membership of the INLA are at a couple of dozen active members, with connections abroad (9). However, some claim the organisation had as many as 100 active members, with 300 in the IRSP (10). The Republican movement has traditionally struggled with arms acquisition, and it was no different for the INLA. By the time the INLA agreed to decommissioning their weapons, it was estimated that they held a small stockpile of rifles, handguns, hand grenades and commercial explosives (11). There is evidence that the INLA possessed and used a wide variety of weapons, including assault rifles and submachine guns, often stolen in one way or another from security forces or rival Republicans (12). They have also been seen using AK pattern rifles as late as 2019 when firing shots over the funeral of a volunteer (13). Most of their weapons supposedly originated from the Middle East (14). Approach to Resistance Their low numbers, both in terms of active volunteers and arms, did not stop the INLA from being extremely violent. The organisation is estimated to have killed 125 people during the Troubles, including 45 members of security forces. Around 20 of their own volunteers were killed during the conflict (15). The INLA, constantly aiming to “outgun” the ‘Provos’, were responsible for some of the most publicised actions of the conflict (16). Their most successful operations included the assassination of Airey Neave, a close ally of Margaret Thatcher’s in 1979, when a bomb under his car exploded as he left the car park of the Palace of Westminster (17). In 1999, they shot Billy “King Rat” Wright dead in Long Kesh prison (18). In addition, 3 members of the INLA died during the famous hunger strikes of 1981 (19). They were also responsible for some of the worst atrocities committed, including the Droppin Well bomb in 1982 (20) and the 1983 Darkley Killings (21). The group is infamous for its internal feuds (22)(23) and links to criminality (24). In fact, its birth instigated a violent feud in which the Stickies attempted to maintain control over Republican Socialism by crushing the INLA (25). Since the conflict has ended, the INLA is alleged to be continuously involved in criminality, most notably the taxation of drug dealers in nationalist majority areas (26). They have been accused of committing a host of murders since the end of the conflict, mostly due to drug dealers refusing to pay their demands (27). Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê - PJAK) is a Kurdish armed group fighting against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Founded in 2004, its goals are to obtain political and cultural rights for Kurds in Iran, and to replace the Iranian state with a highly decentralized administration. It is a member of the Kurdistan Committees Union (KCK), the umbrella organization for all PKK affiliated Kurdish groups. History & Foundations Following years of organization and protests by leftist and Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) launched its war against the Turkish state in 1984 and its influence among Kurds across the region grew. Although Komala and PDKI dominated Kurdish politics and militancy in Iran for decades, there were still many disaffected Kurds who maintained sympathy towards the PKK. To close this gap, PJAK was established in 2004, adding its name to the list of varied Iranian Kurdish opposition groups. It caught the attention of the Iranian government quickly due to their many raids against military and police targets. In 2011, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched an offensive against PJAK targets, forcing them across the border into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq after months of fighting. Despite the ceasefire which followed, clashes between PJAK and its enemies in the IRGC continued. Due to its armed activity and affiliation with the PKK, PJAK is a frequent target for both the IRGC and Turkish armed forces (Stansfield, Hassaniyan 2021). Ideology & Objectives As a sister party of the PKK, PJAK is a proponent of democratic confederalism, an ideology devised by Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK, and influenced by American anarchist thinker Murray Bookchin. Democratic confederalism is a libertarian socialist doctrine that emphasizes bottom-up organization and decision making, environmentalism, cooperative based socialism, and women’s liberation. Under these tenets, PJAK does not seek the creation of an independent Kurdish state - for they view nation-states as inherently flawed and oppressive. Instead, they advocate a form of stateless direct democracy, where local communities have the most influence over governing. Each group is allowed to organize and express its own language and culture as they see fit, with additional input from civil society in creating laws and solving problems (Matin, 2019). Women’s rights is an equally important aspect of democratic confederalism. Women hold a great deal of autonomy in KCK organizations, maintaining their own parallel political military structures. The phrase “women, life, liberty” (jin, jiyan, azadi) which spread through Iran as a chant during the Jina Amini protests is a PKK slogan emblematic of this belief (Bayram, 2022). Military/Political Abilities Like other KCK organizations, PJAK has two separate armed wings: a mixed, but primarily male fighting group (the YRK) and one exclusively for women (the HPJ). Estimates place the combined fighting force of these two groups around 3,000, with about half being women. Many of their members have combat experience, if not in Iran then in Syria. Due to their designation as a terrorist group by the U.S., coming by heavy arms like their counterparts in the YPG is more difficult. (Milburn, 2017). In 2014, PJAK formed KODAR (Society for a Free and Democratic East Kurdistan) with the stated purpose of solving problems through dialogue (Milliyet, 2014). Approach to Resistance PJAK continues to use violence as part of its strategy. Using the Zagros mountains as cover, PJAK launches cross border attacks against IRGC bases and border guards, and even attempted to assassinate Iranian MP Heshmatollah Falahat-Pisheh. The terrain and ability to link up with sympathizers in Iran helps PJAK fighters carry out hit and run attacks (Milburn, 2017). PJAK also attempts to mobilize Kurds in Iran through statements urging action, such as their September 2022 call for a general strike in wake of the Jina Amini killing (Arknews, 2022). International Relations and Potential Alliances In coordination with its NATO ally, Turkey, the United States joined Ankara in designating PJAK as a foreign terrorist organization due to its ties with the PKK in 2009 (Milburn 2017). In the years since, however, the United States has funded and trained the YPG - the armed wing of the KCK in Syria. This has resulted in damaged ties between the U.S. and Turkey, making future possible support for PJAK difficult to determine. Outside of other KCK groups, the biggest potential allies for PJAK are other Iranian Kurdish groups. Rivalry exists between the different factions, but the left-leaning Komala may have areas of ideological overlap with PJAK, making cooperation possible if they can put their differences aside (Hawez, 2022). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Armed Forces of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (AFPMR) were founded on the 8th of September 1991. Their primary purpose is to uphold and maintain the sovereignty and independence of the largely unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), commonly called Transnistria. History & Foundations Transnistria emerged as an unrecognised state in a highly conflictual environment. The region, part of the Moldovan SSR, always enjoyed a special relationship with Moscow, as it was seen as a region inhabited by politically reliable and pro-Soviet people (1). It proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991, but even earlier than that, Transnistrian secessionists had started assembling a military force, which was founded in September 1991 as “Transnistrian Republican Guard”. Since reform attempts inside the Soviet Union had been proclaimed under the slogan of Perestroika in 1986, tensions in the most peripheral areas of the Union had significantly increased, especially in conjunction with a revival of pro-Romanian feelings and the idea of Moldovan-Romanian unification (2). Tensions between the Romanian-speaking Moldovan SSR and the Russian-speaking Transnistrian region reached breaking point when a brief war broke out along the river Dniester in 1992. Ever since then, Moldovan authorities have had no access to Transnistria and the Armed Forces of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic have continued to uphold the region’s self-proclaimed independence. Ideology & Objectives The military conflict involving Moldovan forces has become a significant element within the shaping of Transnistrian identity (3). For instance, the conflict is integrated into the broader civilisational ideology of the Russkij Mir, the 'Russian World' (4). This ideological element represents a set of ideas for the Transnistrian people, who are ethnically divided between Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians. Indeed, some polls carried out in Transnistria highlight how 2/3 of respondents identified their country as part of the 'Russian World' (5). In essence, the conflict against Moldova has solidified, per se, their affiliation with the ‘Russian World’. The status of the military in Transnistria is enshrined in its constitution (6), which entrusts the President of Transnistria with the power to command military forces (article 71). Other legal acts describe the AFPMR’s task of upholding the sovereignty and independence of the PMR (7). Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance The AFPMR are thought to number around 7000 active members (8), with about 15,000 reservists (9), and have inherited substantial military equipment and expertise from the Soviet/Russian 14th Guards Army. The latter has also participated in the final phase of the Transnistrian War. They also maintain their own SOBR special forces (10) and paratroopers (11). The complete international isolation of Transnistria has meant that the AFPMR have largely been unable to import any modern military technology, but the relationship with the Soviet/Russian Army has led the AFPMR to inherit disproportional amounts of very specialised equipment. For example, the AFPMR holds IRM 'Zhuk' combat engineering/river-wading vehicles, UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles, and 9P148 tank destroyers (12). Together with these unique vehicles, outdated or locally-produced vehicles are also used. The Transnistrian Armed Forces are also equipped with more standard Soviet equipment, such as 19 T-64BV tanks (13), BMP-2 IFVs and BTR-60/60 APCs. Generally, the AFPMR’ military capabilities remain relatively low, and most of their equipment is outdated Soviet vintage. Nonetheless, it must also be noted that their direct opposition — the Moldovan Army — is possibly in an even worse condition, with all of their helicopter gunships and tanks believed to be unserviceable (14). International Relations & Alliances The ”Operational Group of Russian Forces”, the heirs to the Soviet/Russian 14th Guards Arm, are the most important partner of the AFPMR, both historically and contemporarily. While the purpose of their stay in Transnistria is to guard an old Soviet arms depot said which contains more than 20,000 tons of degraded weapons and ammunition, Russian forces in Transnistria are also mandated to deter any Moldovan incursion on Transnistrian territory (15), and may have grown to a size of 12,000 according to some reports (16). These are believed to be mostly Transnistrian residents with Russian citizenship, who opt to serve in the Russian Armed Forces for better pay and perspectives. Additionally, the AFPMR hold cordial relations with the armed forces of other unrecognized states, such as South Ossetia (17) and Abkhazia (18), although this does not imply that they cooperate concretely. While the AFPMR have not engaged in any military operations ever since the Transnistria War, a series of bombings in 2022 (including an attack on the Ministry of State Security) have prompted Transnistrian authorities to elevate all security forces to the maximum alert level (19). Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag of the Janjaweed, but rather a reproduction based on the badges they wear (which contains Sudan's flag) Insurgency Overview The Janjaweed is a Sudanese Arab militia group which operates in Sudan and eastern Chad with a particular concentration around Darfur. Although it has been linked to recruiting fighters from other tribes, its main source of recruits is from one main tribe; the Abbala (camel herders) people and more specifically the northern Rizeigat people (McGregor 2017). The origin of the word Janjaweed is unclear. although it has been translated into English as “devils on horseback”. They have been in constant conflict with the black Sudanese population within Sudan and this has led to conflicts and raiding being carried out on farms and villages. Despite the origins of the group being traced back to the 1980s, they became largely active in 2003 when the War in Darfur began. This conflict was started by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) who accused the government in Darfur (which was dominated by Sudanese Arabs) of favouring the Sudanese Arab population over the non-Arab black population (BBC News 2010). Originally used to suppress an uprising in 1986, they were then subsequently outfitted with military equipment and became a paramilitary organisation which was at the centre of the Darfuri government's counter-insurgency strategy (Human Rights Watch 2004). Sudanese Arabs make up 70% of the population of Sudan. However, prior to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudanese Arabs made up only 40% of the population (CIA 2022). Sudanese Arabs are among the 600 ethnic groups who live there, and there are discriminatory elements within Arab-Sudanese society that pejoratively portray black people. Sudan is dominated by a light-skinned, Arabic-speaking elite, while black Africans often face oppression and marginalisation. History & Foundations Created in 1988, the Janjaweed supported Libyan armed forces in combat in eastern Chad. When the Libyan army under Ghaddafi was defeated, they retreated to Darfur and were hosted by Sheikh Musa Hilal (Polgreen 2022) who is currently believed to be the coordinator of the group and the leader accountable for the crimes committed by them (Reeves 2008). Throughout the 1990s, the Janjaweed were armed partisans who were tolerated by the central Sudanese government. When the War in Darfur began in 2003, the Sudanese military and government responded by utilising the Janjaweed in their aforementioned anti-insurgency role. With equipment given to them by the central government, the Janjaweed turned the tide in the battle for Darfur and routed the opposing forces of the SLM and the JEM. This then led to what has been commonly labelled as ethnic cleansing of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people (Ray 2019). In October of 2007, the United States government labelled the killings in Darfur (which had been perpetrated by the Janjaweed) to be genocide, since an estimated 200,000 – 400,000 civilians had died (Kessler and Lynch 2004). The Janjaweed militias, however, were disbanded in 2013 and folded under the command of the Sudanese government and subsequently rebranded as the Rapid Support Forces (Loeb 2015). Objectives and Ideology The group subscribes to a nominally pan-Arabist vision which it has adhered to since its foundation. This has led to allegations of ethnic cleansing and Arab supremacist elements within the group’s ideology. These Arab supremacist notions stem from the domination of the forces and central Sudanese government by Arabs from various tribes in the north of the country. When two non-Arab groups (SLM and JEM) began an uprising against the central government in 2003, the government utilised the Janjaweed group against them, which only cemented the group's notorious reputation as a terror organisation (Tarumbwa 2019). Military & Political Abilities The military abilities of this group are extensive and are closely linked to the military of the Sudanese government, notably as both are commonly seen working alongside one another. This includes the National Armed Forces of Sudan providing air and ground support in advance of RSF/Janjaweed attacks (Etefa 2019). Their military equipment is also extensive and includes numerous small arms as well as RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). Images of the group also frequently display large amounts of heavy weaponry, such as heavy machine guns (HMGs) and also anti-aircraft weaponry. Due to the ingrained nature of the RSF leadership within the wider Sudanese government, this has led to their political capabilities becoming extensive. The leader of the RSF Lt-Gen Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagolo is Sudan’s vice president and therefore wields significant influence in the nation. He has been accused by observers of using the RSF to inflame tensions and commit violent acts in the nation to further his political ambitions (Hashim 2022). Approach to Resistance The Janjaweed militias are/were extremely violent and have been accused of committing crimes against humanity. Many of its top leaders have been accused of committing genocidal acts and the ICC have charged several of the group's leaders. One of these is the suspected former leader of the Janjaweed militia who has been charged with over 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity (BBC News 2022). The group has also been accused of committing rapes and murders, as well as ethnic cleansing campaigns across the Darfur area and Sudan as a whole (The New Arab 2015). International Relations & Potential Alliances Due to the nature of the organisation as being a local militia group present only in the Sudan region, the Janjaweed have little to no international alliances or relations with other groups. Due to the restructuring of the organisation in August of 2013, the group became known as the Rapid Support Forces and this, alongside their new government support, has enabled them to operate outside of the country. RSF forces have been fighting in several war zones in Africa and the Middle East such as in the Libyan civil war and the Yemeni civil war. During its participation in the Libyan civil war, the RSF has reportedly sent around 1000 to 4000 militiamen who are to protect Libyan oil institutions under the control of General Khalifa Haftar for him to concentrate on attacking Tripoli (Dabanga 2019). Additionally, RSF/Janjaweed participation in the Yemeni civil war is extensive as they support pro-Hadi forces. The numbers of militiamen are suspected to number around 40,000. Sudanese forces in Yemen have been accused of committing war crimes and human rights violations as they have been similarly accused of in Sudan (Heras 2017). However, the number of Sudanese pro-Hadi RSF militiamen has been reduced by 10,000, who have subsequently returned to Sudan (SudanTribune 2011). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Mai-Mai Kata Katanga is a rebel organisation which formed in 2011 and operates in the Southeastern province of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The group was formed shortly after leader Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga escaped from Lubumbashi (a provincial capital) in 2011. The name Mai-Mai Kata Katanga is rooted in an amalgamation of Swahili words, ‘Maji’ meaning water, and Kata Katanga which loosely means to ‘cut Katanga’. Maji is in reference to the ‘magic potions’ they spray on themselves which protects them from bullets. The Mai-Mai is a collection of community-based rebel organisations fighting against the Banyamulenge – a Rwanda-backed rebel group in the Eastern DRC – who committed acts of violence, livestock rustling, looting, and general banditry (Hoffman, 2018). The Mai-Mai is an umbrella term, and remains prominent in the governance structures of the Kivu region in the Eastern DRC, also operating as a national political party representative of rural interests. Objectives, Motivations & Ideology The group’s main objective is to secede Katanga (the second largest state in the Democratic Republic of Congo) from the rest of the nation. Katanga is an important city to the Congolese government as its abundance in natural resources makes it an asset. The Katanga province contains the largest Cobalt reserves and the second largest Copper reserves in the entire world – two internationally sought-after resources. The wealth of the region underpins the primary motivations of the movement, with an anonymous spokesperson for the group stating that “in 2012 alone, mining companies in Katanga paid out 96 million dollars in royalties, but this isn’t reflected in the standards of living in the province”. Approach to Resistance The Mai-Mai’s approach to resistance is violent and involves direct, armed confrontation. For instance, on the 23rd of March 2013, 350 Mai-Mai Kata Katanga insurgents launched an assault on Lubumbashi. Dressed in civilian clothing, distinguished by their green, red, and white bandanas, the insurgents were armed with around 30 AK-47s, rockets, javelins, and bows and arrows. During this attack, the group attempted to seize the governorate and provincial assembly. They clashed with Congolese Armed Forces, and eventually surrendered to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Thirty-three people were killed and sixty wounded in the incursion. This is not the first attack by the Mai-Mai, with the group hoisting their flag at Place de la Poste square in May 2010 in Lubumbashi, but were quickly routed by government forces in a counter offensive. Moreover, the group is speculated to be responsible for a variety of attacks, including two on the Lubumbashi airport, and even to the prison break of Gedeon Kyungu in October 2011. Kyungu is a Congolese warlord who led the Mai-Mai for five years between 2011 and 2016 (after his escape). He was once again arrested in 2016 but escaped house arrest in 2020. Overall, the group has been linked to the displacement of 340,000 people in Katanga and has recruited children as young as eight years old (BBC Africa, 2013). International Relations & Corrupt Governance Following the Lubumbashi attacks in March 2013, opposition leader Fabian Mutomb has stated that the impunity the group has enjoyed between attacks, proves some level of complicity with the state. In fact – and following these attacks – the Congolese Minister for Internal Affairs and Security (Richard Muyej) launched a federal investigation. Two-weeks after the attack, General Michel Ekuchu, commander of 6th Battalion based in Lubumbashi, was suspended on a charge of “grave dereliction of duty” (Kennes & Larmer, 2016). The Mai-Mai’s international political affiliations are unclear, with no clear links to foreign financial or material support. The group does not seem to have any clear allies domestically and its scope of attacks remains regional. Political & Paramilitary Abilities Mai-Mai Kata Katanga’s violence declined after 2013, largely fading into obscurity. In 2015, Kyungu announced that he would create a political party to run in the 2017 elections. In October 2016, Kyungu and several hundred rebels surrendered their arms in a prominent ceremony in Lubumbashi. Kyungu’s political party became the Movement of African Revolutionary Independentists (Mouvement des Independantiste Revolutionnaires Africains, MIRA). However, Mai Mai Kata Katanga remains active. There has been a significant uptick in incursions as of 2019, with three government soldiers and two rebels being killed in a confrontation in Lubumbashi. These attacks have continued in towns across Katanga, with 30 rebels getting killed in an assault in March 2020 (Tchoubar, 2020). Finally, another attack in Lubumbashi (in 2020) killed a further 16 rebels and 3 soldiers. During these attacks, the rebels used and waved the Katanga flag, a feature of the attacks in 2013 (Tchoubar, 2020). Nonetheless, this time they were armed with machetes, suggesting a regression in hardware following the disarmament in 2016 (Kennes & Larmer, 2016). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Since 2014, The Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) in eastern Ukraine have been engaged in direct confrontations with the Ukrainian government in an attempt to gain independence and eventually integrate into the Russian Federation (1). Initially sparked by the Maidan revolution and Russia's annexation of Crimea, this civil conflict has since escalated into a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine (2). Before the Russian military's official involvement in the conflict, anti-government paramilitary groups in the Donbas region began taking control of essential government facilities using a mixture of civilian protests and armed raids (3). These pro-Russian paramilitary units established partially-recognised governments across the region, such as the DPR and LPR (Luhansk People’s Republic) (4). The creation of these autonomous states and the insurgency that followed led the Ukrainian military to begin mobilizing units to conduct operations against the separatists (5). While initially having been labeled as terrorists, the separatists are now considered to be invaders by Ukraine and they fight alongside the Russian military (6). However, the soldiers of these self-proclaimed governments believe they are protecting the region's culture, history, and linguistic rights from fascists (7). History & Foundations Pro-Russian sentiments in Eastern Ukraine can be traced back to the Second World War, when an influx of migrants from across the Soviet Union came to the Donbas to fill a demand for factory workers; this demand can be traced back to the high civilian casualty rates during the war (8). Throughout the years, the Donbas remained a crucial region in the Soviet industrial geosphere, causing it to be further influenced by Russian culture (9). While most of the population would support joining Ukraine during the fall of the Soviet Union, they wished to keep close ties with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (10). As the Ukrainian government pushed for acceptance into the European Union in the 21st Century, disagreements and tensions developed amongst the citizens of the Donbas (11). Those who had ethnic and religious backgrounds in Russia saw this move away from fellow former-soviet states as an attack on their cultural heritage. In 2014, Russia welcomed Crimea into the Federation after military personnel (which resembled those of the Russian Special Forces) took control of government facilities across the peninsula (12). Claiming to be local self-defense units, these suspectedly-Russian troops began surrounding Ukrainian military installations and preventing the movement of Ukrainian forces (13). With no official declarations of war, both sides remained relatively hesitant to engage in direct confrontation due to fears of international escalation. Since military forces could not act directly, Pro-Russian separatists eventually used civilian demonstrations to block Ukrainian troops inside their bases (14). With support from pro-Russian protests and state council members, the separatists quickly held a referendum to integrate Crimea into Russia. Unable to react, the Ukrainian government ordered all troops who wanted to continue serving Ukraine to withdraw from Crimea. Citizens of the pro-Russian Donbas region in eastern Ukraine saw this chain of events and Russia's alleged involvement as inspiration for their own revolution. Fuelled by the Maidan Revolution and angered by the corruption in the Ukrainian government, pro-Russian protesters occupied government facilities across the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in early April 2014 (16). With armed checkpoints surrounding three major cities across the Donbas, the separatists demanded a referendum to be held to vote for their regions' independence (17). When the Ukrainian government did not comply with their demands, the separatists went ahead with the creation of an interim government for the Donetsk People's Republic, as well as the launch of a region-wide insurgency aimed to repel Ukrainian influence from the area (18). During the lead-up to the referendum, violent clashes broke out in Donbas cities such as Mariupol and Donetsk, as Ukrainian forces attempted to hold buildings in the now-separatist-controlled region (19). However, civilian demonstrations hampered the Ukrainian military's ability to conduct what Ukrainian officials claimed to be counter-terrorist operations against DPR fighters (20). With no military support, additional Ukrainian government facilities fell under the control of the separatists. Similarly as in Crimea, pro-Russian civilians and armed separatists surrounded military bases, leaving the troops inside unable to mobilize (21). On May 12th, 2014, DPR officials held a press conference inside the occupied administration building. They announced the referendum, which resulted in 2,252,867 votes for independence and 256,040 votes to stay a part of Ukraine (22). While the region has a long history of pro-Russian and pro-Donbas sentiment in its politics (as seen in movements such as the 1990 International Movement of Donbas), the vote caused international scrutiny for allegedly being falsified (23). Due to this scrutiny, the DPR did not receive meaningful international recognition until February 21st, 2022, when Russia recognized its independence just days before launching an invasion of Ukraine (24). After this referendum, the DPR began constructing a full-time government and used military force to occupy key structures around the city. The most crucial was the Donetsk Airport, held by the Ukrainian military at the time (25). On May 26th, 2014, DPR forces took control of the Donetsk Airport terminal building and demanded the withdrawal of the remaining Ukrainian troops in the area. Seeing the logistical importance of the runway, Ukrainian forces launched an airborne assault on the airport (26). After 48 hours of intense combat, Ukrainian forces announced they were in control of the terminal (27). Minor skirmishes continued throughout the following days, but there would be no significant fighting until a few months later, on September 28th, 2014. As the airport was the last Ukrainian-held position in Donetsk, the DPR prioritized its capture and sieged the facility for the following five months. They eventually took control of the airport after Ukrainian troops completely withdrew in January of the next year (28). With the end of this battle – which was the bloodiest offensive of this initial secession – the conflict primarily transformed into a war of trench lines and artillery strikes. This caused the civilian populations of these frontline towns to either evacuate or attempt to survive without basic necessities (29). Objectives and Ideology The DPR wishes to gain independence from the Ukrainian government in order to hold a referendum and to integrate into the Russian Federation. They state in their constitution that their purpose is to establish an independent state based on the restoration of a unified cultural and civilizational space of the Russian World. This unified space would be formed on the basis of its traditional, religious, social, cultural, and moral values, with the prospect of becoming a part of ‘Greater Russia’ as halo territories of the Russian World (30). During the interim period between fighting for their independence and joining the Federation, the DPR have implemented authoritarian forms of governance to maintain domestic control, such as extrajudicial executions, restrictions against the press, and the implementation of secret police units (31). While the DPR does not consider itself to be a communist government (32), most of its early government officials once held positions in the Ukrainian Communist Party (33). Military & Political Abilities The DPR’s militia quickly grew from a coalition of paramilitary units (which used surplus equipment gained via captured Ukrainian military depots, donations, and personal purchases) to a professional military with access to Russian-made main battle tanks, anti-air weapons, and high-caliber artillery assets (34). The separatist government has expanded to begin exporting and importing goods, most recently seizing multiple shipping vessels for state use after the 2022 invasion (35). However, trade is mainly restricted to Russia due to sanctions placed by the international community (36). Approach to Resistance The DPR’s access to long-range weapon systems has caused their doctrine to primarily focus on fortifying already-occupied territory with conventional ground units and implementing indirect fire weapons for offensive strikes against Ukrainian positions (37). The DPR has also attempted to maintain a secure air space above the region, and this has led to sudden rises of tension, notably after a BUK M1 (NATO designation SA-11) surface-to-air missile system was used against a commercial airliner in the summer of 2014 (38). While the role of civilians in the pro-Russian resistance was much more violent during the original occupation of Ukrainian Government facilities in 2014, nationalist rallies and public celebrations are now used to boost support for the war (39). Alliances & Relations The DPR relies heavily on Russia for necessities such as pensions, passports, and military equipment (40). They have tried to hide this support to limit accusations that they are puppet states of the Kremlin. However, a large majority of the ‘Western’, per se, international community still considers their insurgency to be an occupation led by the Russian government (41). This has limited the DPR to only building relationships with Russia's allies, private military contractors, and European extremists, such as the Wagner Group and Johan Bäckman (42). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Abkhazian Armed Forces (AAF) is the acting military of the Georgian breakaway state, the Republic of Abkhazia, which is located south of the Caucasus Mountains, along the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The republic established a small paramilitary just before the start of the 1992-1993 Abkhazia-Georgia war. The paramilitary was formed by Abkazhia as the Georgian government’s move towards independence was perceived as a threat to Abkhazia’s status as an autonomous republic (1). In the modern day, the AAF is a well-equipped military force comprising about 5,000 active members and around 50,000 reservists deployed during war times (2). To ensure their region’s autonomy, the AAF has amassed a state arsenal that includes a variety of Soviet-era armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and aircrafts (3). Although Abkhazia declared itself a sovereign state in 1990, the government has had difficulty receiving international recognition (4). Despite receiving support from allied breakaway and secessionist republics such as Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia has not been recognized by any foreign government. Nevertheless, the republic received recognition from a small number of UN members in the late 2000s, one of which was the Russian Federation (5). History & Foundations Abkhazia was initially designated as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazia SSR), which was under the control of the broader Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (6). Due to the Abkhazia SSR losing a significant amount of political autonomy after integrating with the Georgian SSR in 1931, tensions slowly began to build between the two republics (7). These tensions continued to build up until Georgian politicians staged a coup in 1992, overthrowing the then-active government which was cooperating with Abkhazian officials (8). The new Georgian government readopted the 1921 Georgian constitution, leading Abkhazians to believe they would lose their sovereignty which was declared after civil unrest broke out in the late 1980s (9). Tensions reached a peak in June 1992, when Abkhazian militants took control of Georgian government facilities in the coastal city of Sukhumi, and allegedly kidnapped a Georgian official (10). In response, Georgian military and police forces moved into the region to regain control in August of the same year. Georgian forces were confronted with light resistance during their attempts to enter Sukhumi. However, the Abkhazians’ lack of modern weaponry allowed Georgian forces to overwhelm the separatists, forcing those remaining to flee further west. War crimes and atrocities committed against civilians by both sides during the skirmishes led to the conflict receiving large amounts of international attention (11). After Abkhazian militants successfully retreated to Guadata, they established alliances with ethnic paramilitaries in the Caucasus mountains and organized a more consolidated military force (12). On October 11, 1992, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. This date is officially considered as the founding date of the AAF (13). Objectives & Ideology The AAF was founded to ensure Abkhazian autonomy in the Abkhaz ancestral territory of Northwestern Georgia and provide armed security for the Republic of Abkhazia. Motivated by ethnic disputes which date back to the Middle Ages, a widespread anti-Georgian sentiment is present amongst the Abkhaz people (14). This general resentment between the two ethnicities led to many atrocities being committed by both sides during the war, ranging from the executions of POWs, to attempted genocides against civilian populations (15). Military & Political Ability Currently, the AAF has adopted the Swiss-style military structure. This means that the AAF holds a relatively small number of around 5,000 full-time soldiers to act as a national guard force. Nonetheless, a more significant number of 40,000 to 50,000 reservists would be deployed during times of war (16). Due to the AAF’s access to soviet era armaments such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and high-caliber artillery guns, much of their doctrine seen in use during the battles of Sukhumi revolved around besieging the city with checkpoints and indiscriminate artillery barrages (17). Before the AAF established itself as a professional military with international backers, most of its attacks consisted of guerilla-style assaults on large concentrations of Georgian forces, such as convoys (18). Due to their relative under-armament during their initial stages, pre-AAF militants would use homemade explosives and petrol bombs to conduct these attacks (19). Approach to Resistance Despite years of diplomacy dating back to the 1920s, the AAF’s armed resistance has proven to be a much more significant approach to reaching Abkhazia’s goal of autonomy from Georgia. Initially starting as a civilian-led revolt against government officials, the AAF quickly had to adapt to combat military forces (which they perceived to be a threat to their self-proclaimed sovereignty). As the conflict with Georgia has died down since the late 2000s, the AAF has taken a completely defensive approach, instead relying on politicians to increase the republic’s international influence and stability. International Relations & Alliances The AAF would not be in its current position without support from international backers. One of the most influential is the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucuses. This militarized political organization provided training and weapons to the Abkhaz militants after being forced out of Sukhumi (20). While never officially involved in the conflict, Russian forces were deployed in Abkhazia during the war, and it is claimed that Russia supplied most of the weapons that the AAF received (21). Since Abkhazia is not the only secessionist republic in Georgia, they share mutual support with their fellow breakaway nation South Ossetia. Additional Resources