Search Results

Introduction & Overview The Armed Forces of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (AFPMR) were founded on the 8th of September 1991. Their primary purpose is to uphold and maintain the sovereignty and independence of the largely unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), commonly called Transnistria. History & Foundations Transnistria emerged as an unrecognised state in a highly conflictual environment. The region, part of the Moldovan SSR, always enjoyed a special relationship with Moscow, as it was seen as a region inhabited by politically reliable and pro-Soviet people (1). It proclaimed its independence from the Soviet Union in November 1991, but even earlier than that, Transnistrian secessionists had started assembling a military force, which was founded in September 1991 as “Transnistrian Republican Guard”. Since reform attempts inside the Soviet Union had been proclaimed under the slogan of Perestroika in 1986, tensions in the most peripheral areas of the Union had significantly increased, especially in conjunction with a revival of pro-Romanian feelings and the idea of Moldovan-Romanian unification (2). Tensions between the Romanian-speaking Moldovan SSR and the Russian-speaking Transnistrian region reached breaking point when a brief war broke out along the river Dniester in 1992. Ever since then, Moldovan authorities have had no access to Transnistria and the Armed Forces of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic have continued to uphold the region’s self-proclaimed independence. Ideology & Objectives The military conflict involving Moldovan forces has become a significant element within the shaping of Transnistrian identity (3). For instance, the conflict is integrated into the broader civilisational ideology of the Russkij Mir, the 'Russian World' (4). This ideological element represents a set of ideas for the Transnistrian people, who are ethnically divided between Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians. Indeed, some polls carried out in Transnistria highlight how 2/3 of respondents identified their country as part of the 'Russian World' (5). In essence, the conflict against Moldova has solidified, per se, their affiliation with the ‘Russian World’. The status of the military in Transnistria is enshrined in its constitution (6), which entrusts the President of Transnistria with the power to command military forces (article 71). Other legal acts describe the AFPMR’s task of upholding the sovereignty and independence of the PMR (7). Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance The AFPMR are thought to number around 7000 active members (8), with about 15,000 reservists (9), and have inherited substantial military equipment and expertise from the Soviet/Russian 14th Guards Army. The latter has also participated in the final phase of the Transnistrian War. They also maintain their own SOBR special forces (10) and paratroopers (11). The complete international isolation of Transnistria has meant that the AFPMR have largely been unable to import any modern military technology, but the relationship with the Soviet/Russian Army has led the AFPMR to inherit disproportional amounts of very specialised equipment. For example, the AFPMR holds IRM 'Zhuk' combat engineering/river-wading vehicles, UR-77 mine-clearing vehicles, and 9P148 tank destroyers (12). Together with these unique vehicles, outdated or locally-produced vehicles are also used. The Transnistrian Armed Forces are also equipped with more standard Soviet equipment, such as 19 T-64BV tanks (13), BMP-2 IFVs and BTR-60/60 APCs. Generally, the AFPMR’ military capabilities remain relatively low, and most of their equipment is outdated Soviet vintage. Nonetheless, it must also be noted that their direct opposition — the Moldovan Army — is possibly in an even worse condition, with all of their helicopter gunships and tanks believed to be unserviceable (14). International Relations & Alliances The ”Operational Group of Russian Forces”, the heirs to the Soviet/Russian 14th Guards Arm, are the most important partner of the AFPMR, both historically and contemporarily. While the purpose of their stay in Transnistria is to guard an old Soviet arms depot said which contains more than 20,000 tons of degraded weapons and ammunition, Russian forces in Transnistria are also mandated to deter any Moldovan incursion on Transnistrian territory (15), and may have grown to a size of 12,000 according to some reports (16). These are believed to be mostly Transnistrian residents with Russian citizenship, who opt to serve in the Russian Armed Forces for better pay and perspectives. Additionally, the AFPMR hold cordial relations with the armed forces of other unrecognized states, such as South Ossetia (17) and Abkhazia (18), although this does not imply that they cooperate concretely. While the AFPMR have not engaged in any military operations ever since the Transnistria War, a series of bombings in 2022 (including an attack on the Ministry of State Security) have prompted Transnistrian authorities to elevate all security forces to the maximum alert level (19). Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag of the Janjaweed, but rather a reproduction based on the badges they wear (which contains Sudan's flag) Insurgency Overview The Janjaweed is a Sudanese Arab militia group which operates in Sudan and eastern Chad with a particular concentration around Darfur. Although it has been linked to recruiting fighters from other tribes, its main source of recruits is from one main tribe; the Abbala (camel herders) people and more specifically the northern Rizeigat people (McGregor 2017). The origin of the word Janjaweed is unclear. although it has been translated into English as “devils on horseback”. They have been in constant conflict with the black Sudanese population within Sudan and this has led to conflicts and raiding being carried out on farms and villages. Despite the origins of the group being traced back to the 1980s, they became largely active in 2003 when the War in Darfur began. This conflict was started by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) who accused the government in Darfur (which was dominated by Sudanese Arabs) of favouring the Sudanese Arab population over the non-Arab black population (BBC News 2010). Originally used to suppress an uprising in 1986, they were then subsequently outfitted with military equipment and became a paramilitary organisation which was at the centre of the Darfuri government's counter-insurgency strategy (Human Rights Watch 2004). Sudanese Arabs make up 70% of the population of Sudan. However, prior to the independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudanese Arabs made up only 40% of the population (CIA 2022). Sudanese Arabs are among the 600 ethnic groups who live there, and there are discriminatory elements within Arab-Sudanese society that pejoratively portray black people. Sudan is dominated by a light-skinned, Arabic-speaking elite, while black Africans often face oppression and marginalisation. History & Foundations Created in 1988, the Janjaweed supported Libyan armed forces in combat in eastern Chad. When the Libyan army under Ghaddafi was defeated, they retreated to Darfur and were hosted by Sheikh Musa Hilal (Polgreen 2022) who is currently believed to be the coordinator of the group and the leader accountable for the crimes committed by them (Reeves 2008). Throughout the 1990s, the Janjaweed were armed partisans who were tolerated by the central Sudanese government. When the War in Darfur began in 2003, the Sudanese military and government responded by utilising the Janjaweed in their aforementioned anti-insurgency role. With equipment given to them by the central government, the Janjaweed turned the tide in the battle for Darfur and routed the opposing forces of the SLM and the JEM. This then led to what has been commonly labelled as ethnic cleansing of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa people (Ray 2019). In October of 2007, the United States government labelled the killings in Darfur (which had been perpetrated by the Janjaweed) to be genocide, since an estimated 200,000 – 400,000 civilians had died (Kessler and Lynch 2004). The Janjaweed militias, however, were disbanded in 2013 and folded under the command of the Sudanese government and subsequently rebranded as the Rapid Support Forces (Loeb 2015). Objectives and Ideology The group subscribes to a nominally pan-Arabist vision which it has adhered to since its foundation. This has led to allegations of ethnic cleansing and Arab supremacist elements within the group’s ideology. These Arab supremacist notions stem from the domination of the forces and central Sudanese government by Arabs from various tribes in the north of the country. When two non-Arab groups (SLM and JEM) began an uprising against the central government in 2003, the government utilised the Janjaweed group against them, which only cemented the group's notorious reputation as a terror organisation (Tarumbwa 2019). Military & Political Abilities The military abilities of this group are extensive and are closely linked to the military of the Sudanese government, notably as both are commonly seen working alongside one another. This includes the National Armed Forces of Sudan providing air and ground support in advance of RSF/Janjaweed attacks (Etefa 2019). Their military equipment is also extensive and includes numerous small arms as well as RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). Images of the group also frequently display large amounts of heavy weaponry, such as heavy machine guns (HMGs) and also anti-aircraft weaponry. Due to the ingrained nature of the RSF leadership within the wider Sudanese government, this has led to their political capabilities becoming extensive. The leader of the RSF Lt-Gen Mohamed Hamdan “Hemeti” Dagolo is Sudan’s vice president and therefore wields significant influence in the nation. He has been accused by observers of using the RSF to inflame tensions and commit violent acts in the nation to further his political ambitions (Hashim 2022). Approach to Resistance The Janjaweed militias are/were extremely violent and have been accused of committing crimes against humanity. Many of its top leaders have been accused of committing genocidal acts and the ICC have charged several of the group's leaders. One of these is the suspected former leader of the Janjaweed militia who has been charged with over 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity (BBC News 2022). The group has also been accused of committing rapes and murders, as well as ethnic cleansing campaigns across the Darfur area and Sudan as a whole (The New Arab 2015). International Relations & Potential Alliances Due to the nature of the organisation as being a local militia group present only in the Sudan region, the Janjaweed have little to no international alliances or relations with other groups. Due to the restructuring of the organisation in August of 2013, the group became known as the Rapid Support Forces and this, alongside their new government support, has enabled them to operate outside of the country. RSF forces have been fighting in several war zones in Africa and the Middle East such as in the Libyan civil war and the Yemeni civil war. During its participation in the Libyan civil war, the RSF has reportedly sent around 1000 to 4000 militiamen who are to protect Libyan oil institutions under the control of General Khalifa Haftar for him to concentrate on attacking Tripoli (Dabanga 2019). Additionally, RSF/Janjaweed participation in the Yemeni civil war is extensive as they support pro-Hadi forces. The numbers of militiamen are suspected to number around 40,000. Sudanese forces in Yemen have been accused of committing war crimes and human rights violations as they have been similarly accused of in Sudan (Heras 2017). However, the number of Sudanese pro-Hadi RSF militiamen has been reduced by 10,000, who have subsequently returned to Sudan (SudanTribune 2011). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Mai-Mai Kata Katanga is a rebel organisation which formed in 2011 and operates in the Southeastern province of Katanga in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The group was formed shortly after leader Gedeon Kyungu Mutanga escaped from Lubumbashi (a provincial capital) in 2011. The name Mai-Mai Kata Katanga is rooted in an amalgamation of Swahili words, ‘Maji’ meaning water, and Kata Katanga which loosely means to ‘cut Katanga’. Maji is in reference to the ‘magic potions’ they spray on themselves which protects them from bullets. The Mai-Mai is a collection of community-based rebel organisations fighting against the Banyamulenge – a Rwanda-backed rebel group in the Eastern DRC – who committed acts of violence, livestock rustling, looting, and general banditry (Hoffman, 2018). The Mai-Mai is an umbrella term, and remains prominent in the governance structures of the Kivu region in the Eastern DRC, also operating as a national political party representative of rural interests. Objectives, Motivations & Ideology The group’s main objective is to secede Katanga (the second largest state in the Democratic Republic of Congo) from the rest of the nation. Katanga is an important city to the Congolese government as its abundance in natural resources makes it an asset. The Katanga province contains the largest Cobalt reserves and the second largest Copper reserves in the entire world – two internationally sought-after resources. The wealth of the region underpins the primary motivations of the movement, with an anonymous spokesperson for the group stating that “in 2012 alone, mining companies in Katanga paid out 96 million dollars in royalties, but this isn’t reflected in the standards of living in the province”. Approach to Resistance The Mai-Mai’s approach to resistance is violent and involves direct, armed confrontation. For instance, on the 23rd of March 2013, 350 Mai-Mai Kata Katanga insurgents launched an assault on Lubumbashi. Dressed in civilian clothing, distinguished by their green, red, and white bandanas, the insurgents were armed with around 30 AK-47s, rockets, javelins, and bows and arrows. During this attack, the group attempted to seize the governorate and provincial assembly. They clashed with Congolese Armed Forces, and eventually surrendered to the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). Thirty-three people were killed and sixty wounded in the incursion. This is not the first attack by the Mai-Mai, with the group hoisting their flag at Place de la Poste square in May 2010 in Lubumbashi, but were quickly routed by government forces in a counter offensive. Moreover, the group is speculated to be responsible for a variety of attacks, including two on the Lubumbashi airport, and even to the prison break of Gedeon Kyungu in October 2011. Kyungu is a Congolese warlord who led the Mai-Mai for five years between 2011 and 2016 (after his escape). He was once again arrested in 2016 but escaped house arrest in 2020. Overall, the group has been linked to the displacement of 340,000 people in Katanga and has recruited children as young as eight years old (BBC Africa, 2013). International Relations & Corrupt Governance Following the Lubumbashi attacks in March 2013, opposition leader Fabian Mutomb has stated that the impunity the group has enjoyed between attacks, proves some level of complicity with the state. In fact – and following these attacks – the Congolese Minister for Internal Affairs and Security (Richard Muyej) launched a federal investigation. Two-weeks after the attack, General Michel Ekuchu, commander of 6th Battalion based in Lubumbashi, was suspended on a charge of “grave dereliction of duty” (Kennes & Larmer, 2016). The Mai-Mai’s international political affiliations are unclear, with no clear links to foreign financial or material support. The group does not seem to have any clear allies domestically and its scope of attacks remains regional. Political & Paramilitary Abilities Mai-Mai Kata Katanga’s violence declined after 2013, largely fading into obscurity. In 2015, Kyungu announced that he would create a political party to run in the 2017 elections. In October 2016, Kyungu and several hundred rebels surrendered their arms in a prominent ceremony in Lubumbashi. Kyungu’s political party became the Movement of African Revolutionary Independentists (Mouvement des Independantiste Revolutionnaires Africains, MIRA). However, Mai Mai Kata Katanga remains active. There has been a significant uptick in incursions as of 2019, with three government soldiers and two rebels being killed in a confrontation in Lubumbashi. These attacks have continued in towns across Katanga, with 30 rebels getting killed in an assault in March 2020 (Tchoubar, 2020). Finally, another attack in Lubumbashi (in 2020) killed a further 16 rebels and 3 soldiers. During these attacks, the rebels used and waved the Katanga flag, a feature of the attacks in 2013 (Tchoubar, 2020). Nonetheless, this time they were armed with machetes, suggesting a regression in hardware following the disarmament in 2016 (Kennes & Larmer, 2016). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Since 2014, The Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) in eastern Ukraine have been engaged in direct confrontations with the Ukrainian government in an attempt to gain independence and eventually integrate into the Russian Federation (1). Initially sparked by the Maidan revolution and Russia's annexation of Crimea, this civil conflict has since escalated into a full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine (2). Before the Russian military's official involvement in the conflict, anti-government paramilitary groups in the Donbas region began taking control of essential government facilities using a mixture of civilian protests and armed raids (3). These pro-Russian paramilitary units established partially-recognised governments across the region, such as the DPR and LPR (Luhansk People’s Republic) (4). The creation of these autonomous states and the insurgency that followed led the Ukrainian military to begin mobilizing units to conduct operations against the separatists (5). While initially having been labeled as terrorists, the separatists are now considered to be invaders by Ukraine and they fight alongside the Russian military (6). However, the soldiers of these self-proclaimed governments believe they are protecting the region's culture, history, and linguistic rights from fascists (7). History & Foundations Pro-Russian sentiments in Eastern Ukraine can be traced back to the Second World War, when an influx of migrants from across the Soviet Union came to the Donbas to fill a demand for factory workers; this demand can be traced back to the high civilian casualty rates during the war (8). Throughout the years, the Donbas remained a crucial region in the Soviet industrial geosphere, causing it to be further influenced by Russian culture (9). While most of the population would support joining Ukraine during the fall of the Soviet Union, they wished to keep close ties with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (10). As the Ukrainian government pushed for acceptance into the European Union in the 21st Century, disagreements and tensions developed amongst the citizens of the Donbas (11). Those who had ethnic and religious backgrounds in Russia saw this move away from fellow former-soviet states as an attack on their cultural heritage. In 2014, Russia welcomed Crimea into the Federation after military personnel (which resembled those of the Russian Special Forces) took control of government facilities across the peninsula (12). Claiming to be local self-defense units, these suspectedly-Russian troops began surrounding Ukrainian military installations and preventing the movement of Ukrainian forces (13). With no official declarations of war, both sides remained relatively hesitant to engage in direct confrontation due to fears of international escalation. Since military forces could not act directly, Pro-Russian separatists eventually used civilian demonstrations to block Ukrainian troops inside their bases (14). With support from pro-Russian protests and state council members, the separatists quickly held a referendum to integrate Crimea into Russia. Unable to react, the Ukrainian government ordered all troops who wanted to continue serving Ukraine to withdraw from Crimea. Citizens of the pro-Russian Donbas region in eastern Ukraine saw this chain of events and Russia's alleged involvement as inspiration for their own revolution. Fuelled by the Maidan Revolution and angered by the corruption in the Ukrainian government, pro-Russian protesters occupied government facilities across the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in early April 2014 (16). With armed checkpoints surrounding three major cities across the Donbas, the separatists demanded a referendum to be held to vote for their regions' independence (17). When the Ukrainian government did not comply with their demands, the separatists went ahead with the creation of an interim government for the Donetsk People's Republic, as well as the launch of a region-wide insurgency aimed to repel Ukrainian influence from the area (18). During the lead-up to the referendum, violent clashes broke out in Donbas cities such as Mariupol and Donetsk, as Ukrainian forces attempted to hold buildings in the now-separatist-controlled region (19). However, civilian demonstrations hampered the Ukrainian military's ability to conduct what Ukrainian officials claimed to be counter-terrorist operations against DPR fighters (20). With no military support, additional Ukrainian government facilities fell under the control of the separatists. Similarly as in Crimea, pro-Russian civilians and armed separatists surrounded military bases, leaving the troops inside unable to mobilize (21). On May 12th, 2014, DPR officials held a press conference inside the occupied administration building. They announced the referendum, which resulted in 2,252,867 votes for independence and 256,040 votes to stay a part of Ukraine (22). While the region has a long history of pro-Russian and pro-Donbas sentiment in its politics (as seen in movements such as the 1990 International Movement of Donbas), the vote caused international scrutiny for allegedly being falsified (23). Due to this scrutiny, the DPR did not receive meaningful international recognition until February 21st, 2022, when Russia recognized its independence just days before launching an invasion of Ukraine (24). After this referendum, the DPR began constructing a full-time government and used military force to occupy key structures around the city. The most crucial was the Donetsk Airport, held by the Ukrainian military at the time (25). On May 26th, 2014, DPR forces took control of the Donetsk Airport terminal building and demanded the withdrawal of the remaining Ukrainian troops in the area. Seeing the logistical importance of the runway, Ukrainian forces launched an airborne assault on the airport (26). After 48 hours of intense combat, Ukrainian forces announced they were in control of the terminal (27). Minor skirmishes continued throughout the following days, but there would be no significant fighting until a few months later, on September 28th, 2014. As the airport was the last Ukrainian-held position in Donetsk, the DPR prioritized its capture and sieged the facility for the following five months. They eventually took control of the airport after Ukrainian troops completely withdrew in January of the next year (28). With the end of this battle – which was the bloodiest offensive of this initial secession – the conflict primarily transformed into a war of trench lines and artillery strikes. This caused the civilian populations of these frontline towns to either evacuate or attempt to survive without basic necessities (29). Objectives and Ideology The DPR wishes to gain independence from the Ukrainian government in order to hold a referendum and to integrate into the Russian Federation. They state in their constitution that their purpose is to establish an independent state based on the restoration of a unified cultural and civilizational space of the Russian World. This unified space would be formed on the basis of its traditional, religious, social, cultural, and moral values, with the prospect of becoming a part of ‘Greater Russia’ as halo territories of the Russian World (30). During the interim period between fighting for their independence and joining the Federation, the DPR have implemented authoritarian forms of governance to maintain domestic control, such as extrajudicial executions, restrictions against the press, and the implementation of secret police units (31). While the DPR does not consider itself to be a communist government (32), most of its early government officials once held positions in the Ukrainian Communist Party (33). Military & Political Abilities The DPR’s militia quickly grew from a coalition of paramilitary units (which used surplus equipment gained via captured Ukrainian military depots, donations, and personal purchases) to a professional military with access to Russian-made main battle tanks, anti-air weapons, and high-caliber artillery assets (34). The separatist government has expanded to begin exporting and importing goods, most recently seizing multiple shipping vessels for state use after the 2022 invasion (35). However, trade is mainly restricted to Russia due to sanctions placed by the international community (36). Approach to Resistance The DPR’s access to long-range weapon systems has caused their doctrine to primarily focus on fortifying already-occupied territory with conventional ground units and implementing indirect fire weapons for offensive strikes against Ukrainian positions (37). The DPR has also attempted to maintain a secure air space above the region, and this has led to sudden rises of tension, notably after a BUK M1 (NATO designation SA-11) surface-to-air missile system was used against a commercial airliner in the summer of 2014 (38). While the role of civilians in the pro-Russian resistance was much more violent during the original occupation of Ukrainian Government facilities in 2014, nationalist rallies and public celebrations are now used to boost support for the war (39). Alliances & Relations The DPR relies heavily on Russia for necessities such as pensions, passports, and military equipment (40). They have tried to hide this support to limit accusations that they are puppet states of the Kremlin. However, a large majority of the ‘Western’, per se, international community still considers their insurgency to be an occupation led by the Russian government (41). This has limited the DPR to only building relationships with Russia's allies, private military contractors, and European extremists, such as the Wagner Group and Johan Bäckman (42). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Abkhazian Armed Forces (AAF) is the acting military of the Georgian breakaway state, the Republic of Abkhazia, which is located south of the Caucasus Mountains, along the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The republic established a small paramilitary just before the start of the 1992-1993 Abkhazia-Georgia war. The paramilitary was formed by Abkazhia as the Georgian government’s move towards independence was perceived as a threat to Abkhazia’s status as an autonomous republic (1). In the modern day, the AAF is a well-equipped military force comprising about 5,000 active members and around 50,000 reservists deployed during war times (2). To ensure their region’s autonomy, the AAF has amassed a state arsenal that includes a variety of Soviet-era armored vehicles, artillery, small arms, and aircrafts (3). Although Abkhazia declared itself a sovereign state in 1990, the government has had difficulty receiving international recognition (4). Despite receiving support from allied breakaway and secessionist republics such as Transnistria and South Ossetia, Abkhazia has not been recognized by any foreign government. Nevertheless, the republic received recognition from a small number of UN members in the late 2000s, one of which was the Russian Federation (5). History & Foundations Abkhazia was initially designated as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazia SSR), which was under the control of the broader Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (6). Due to the Abkhazia SSR losing a significant amount of political autonomy after integrating with the Georgian SSR in 1931, tensions slowly began to build between the two republics (7). These tensions continued to build up until Georgian politicians staged a coup in 1992, overthrowing the then-active government which was cooperating with Abkhazian officials (8). The new Georgian government readopted the 1921 Georgian constitution, leading Abkhazians to believe they would lose their sovereignty which was declared after civil unrest broke out in the late 1980s (9). Tensions reached a peak in June 1992, when Abkhazian militants took control of Georgian government facilities in the coastal city of Sukhumi, and allegedly kidnapped a Georgian official (10). In response, Georgian military and police forces moved into the region to regain control in August of the same year. Georgian forces were confronted with light resistance during their attempts to enter Sukhumi. However, the Abkhazians’ lack of modern weaponry allowed Georgian forces to overwhelm the separatists, forcing those remaining to flee further west. War crimes and atrocities committed against civilians by both sides during the skirmishes led to the conflict receiving large amounts of international attention (11). After Abkhazian militants successfully retreated to Guadata, they established alliances with ethnic paramilitaries in the Caucasus mountains and organized a more consolidated military force (12). On October 11, 1992, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. This date is officially considered as the founding date of the AAF (13). Objectives & Ideology The AAF was founded to ensure Abkhazian autonomy in the Abkhaz ancestral territory of Northwestern Georgia and provide armed security for the Republic of Abkhazia. Motivated by ethnic disputes which date back to the Middle Ages, a widespread anti-Georgian sentiment is present amongst the Abkhaz people (14). This general resentment between the two ethnicities led to many atrocities being committed by both sides during the war, ranging from the executions of POWs, to attempted genocides against civilian populations (15). Military & Political Ability Currently, the AAF has adopted the Swiss-style military structure. This means that the AAF holds a relatively small number of around 5,000 full-time soldiers to act as a national guard force. Nonetheless, a more significant number of 40,000 to 50,000 reservists would be deployed during times of war (16). Due to the AAF’s access to soviet era armaments such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and high-caliber artillery guns, much of their doctrine seen in use during the battles of Sukhumi revolved around besieging the city with checkpoints and indiscriminate artillery barrages (17). Before the AAF established itself as a professional military with international backers, most of its attacks consisted of guerilla-style assaults on large concentrations of Georgian forces, such as convoys (18). Due to their relative under-armament during their initial stages, pre-AAF militants would use homemade explosives and petrol bombs to conduct these attacks (19). Approach to Resistance Despite years of diplomacy dating back to the 1920s, the AAF’s armed resistance has proven to be a much more significant approach to reaching Abkhazia’s goal of autonomy from Georgia. Initially starting as a civilian-led revolt against government officials, the AAF quickly had to adapt to combat military forces (which they perceived to be a threat to their self-proclaimed sovereignty). As the conflict with Georgia has died down since the late 2000s, the AAF has taken a completely defensive approach, instead relying on politicians to increase the republic’s international influence and stability. International Relations & Alliances The AAF would not be in its current position without support from international backers. One of the most influential is the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucuses. This militarized political organization provided training and weapons to the Abkhaz militants after being forced out of Sukhumi (20). While never officially involved in the conflict, Russian forces were deployed in Abkhazia during the war, and it is claimed that Russia supplied most of the weapons that the AAF received (21). Since Abkhazia is not the only secessionist republic in Georgia, they share mutual support with their fellow breakaway nation South Ossetia. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) is a far-left guerrilla group based in Peru. The group was led and founded in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, also known by his alias – ‘Comrade Gonzalo’. The Shining Path’s ideology is based on Marxist foundations, mainly derived from Mao Zedong and China’s Cultural Revolution. Their goal is to topple the Peruvian government and implement a communist, peasant-led government in its place. Among those recruited were indigenous civilians and those from impoverished and neglected areas. The United States, Peru, and the European Union have recognized the Shining Path as a terrorist organization. It has mainly disbanded, but some remnants remain active (1). History and Foundations The Shining Path began as a small 12-member breakaway faction from the Communist Party of Peru. The Shining Path emerged in the late 60s and was led by Abimael Guzmán, who recruited many indigenous and poor Peruvians throughout the 70s. In May 1980, the group launched its first attack against the state by burning down ballot boxes in Ayacucho to disrupt the elections, which were the following day (3). The Shining Path was very influential in the mountainous regions of Huana and Ayacucho due to the lack of military and government presence. This lack of presence allowed the Shining Path to gain traction in the region until the rebels evolved into a legitimate threat and forced the government to intervene; the army was called into the region in December 1982. This was the beginning of a long war between the Shining Path and the Peruvian state. An estimated 70,000 people died between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the conflict between the two parties. Approximately 37,000 of those deaths were caused by Shining Path guerrillas (1), and around 11,000 of these were civilians (4). The Shining Path adopted assassinations, car bombs, and torture as their primary approaches to resistance. When Alberto Fujimori was elected as head of state in 1990, he increased government presence and carried out various raids against the group. Fujimori led assaults and established armed peasant patrols to combat the Shining Path, which suffered a steep decline in influence and in insurgence after the capture of Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán was imprisoned on the 12th of September 1992. With the arrest of their leader, the Shining Path began to suffer in terms of ability and it became clear that the group's integrity was being hindered. Since there was no clearly defined second-in-command, the group lacked a clear chain of command. The group began to split after Guzmán called members to introduce a peace deal between the Shining Path and the Peruvian government a year after he was initially arrested. While some perceived it as a traitorous act, others continued to follow his command. Contemporarily, there are a relatively low number of remnants of the Shining Path, and – while many aren’t as serious of a threat to the state as they once were – many of these remaining guerrillas participate in drug trafficking, and still carry out attacks on police and other security forces (3). Abimael Guzman died on September 11, 2021, at the age of 86. In January 2021, the Shining Path Faction commander, Jorge Quispe Palomino (alias ‘Raúl’) died of kidney failure following a military-police joint operation which resulted in the death of three shining path guerrillas, and the injuries of six others (including Raúl). Raúl fought alongside his brother, Victor Quispe Palomino, alias ‘Jose’, as the two brothers had been attempting to gain support from rural farmer communities by declaring themselves as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru. Without Raúl’s leadership, the internal procedures of the movement were compromised, especially as there was no designated member to replace his role (5). In March 2021, 16 people including 2 children were killed during the San Miguel Del Ene attack. This occurred two weeks before the national elections between Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori. The Peruvian military has claimed the Shining Path’s breakaway faction – the Militarized Communist Party of Peru – was responsible for the killings (11). Political Objectives & Ideology As aforementioned, Guzmán founded the Shining Path by stemming from Maoist and Marxist foundations. In the 1960s, he visited China and was inspired by Maoist theory (7). The goal of the Shining Path was not to improve the Peruvian state through reforms, but instead to destroy it along with its institutions and replace it with a revolutionary, peasant-led communist regime (7). Those who only worked to organize workers were criticized by Guzmán. Guzmán’s followers regarded him as the ‘Fourth Sword’ of communist thought, after Marx, Lenin, and Mao (2). He believed in the abolition of money and industry, and instead promoted administering a life of trading between farmers and craftsmen (9). Approach to Resistance Assassinations, car bombings, and torture were common tactics used by the Shining Path. In regards to the group’s torture procedures, there have been instances of stoning and victims being submerged in boiling water. Moreover, activists were targeted for speaking out against the Shining Path; Maria Elena Moyano, for instance, was a well-known organizer and activist that spoke out against the Peruvian Government and the Shining Path’s actions. Pamphlets were spread by the Shining Path to discredit her work and – after she publicly stated that the Shining Path was no longer ‘revolutionary’, per se – the Shining Path shot her and exploded her corpse in front of her 2 children. The Peruvian general population mourned the death of Moyano and around 300,000 people attended her burial (8). Following this attack, the rebels lost the ability to gain major support from Peruvians (even peasants) due to the perceived atrocity of their actions. International Relations and Regional Funding The Shining Path’s primary sources of income involve drug trafficking and taxes. These taxes are imposed on corporations, cocaine processing plants, and illegal mining. They resemble the traditional ‘revolutionary taxes’ imposed by other communist movements around the world. Compared to other rebel groups, such as the FARC in Colombia, the Shining Path generates a significantly smaller amount of revenue. However, this does not imply that the Shining Path did not have significant funds at its peak (10). Furthermore, the Shining Path does not have relevant relations with other groups as it remains solely active in Peru – unlike other groups in the region who have expanded to other countries, such as the ELN in Venezuela. Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag of the Anti-Balaka militias, but rather a reproduction based on the badges they wear (which contains the CAR's flag) Introduction & Overview Anti-Balaka militias are an alliance of militant groups which have been present in the Central African Republic since the early 2000s. These militias are said to be primarily composed of Christians, although this claim has been contested by many analysts. The Tony Blair Faith Foundation, for instance, has noted that animists have also participated in the militias’ violent acts and compose a significant proportion of Anti-Balaka groups (Mellgard 2016a). Formed in 2009, the coalition of varying militias is a grouping of loosely organised ‘village self-protection groups’ which focused to combat bandits and other sources of insecurity on a local level. However, their activities and atrocities intensified following the 2013 coup by Séléka militia groups. The Séléka militias are the religious opposites of the Anti-Balaka militants, and they are mostly made up of Muslims from the north and northeast of the CAR; where the majority of the population is Muslim, unlike the rest of the country in which 90% is Christian (PEW Research Center 2011). History & Foundations Initially, the Anti-Balaka groups formed as a loose coalition of groups to combat bandits and other criminal organisations at a local level. Nonetheless, the Anti-Balaka militants’ focuses have shifted post-coup. Following the March 2013 coup d’état, Séléka fighters spread across the country and installed their commander, Michel Djotodia, as president. However, he quickly lost control of his militia coalition and the Séléka began attacking civilians, looting vehicles, and stealing crops. The Anti-Balaka began concretely fighting against the Séléka in September of 2013, and the number of fighters who joined the Anti-Balaka militias increased. This was partly because of the joining up of former CAR national army soldiers, who – following the coup – had been disbanded. Although the resignation of Djotodia in January 2014 signalled the end of the coup’s ruling regime, violence did not halt. As the Anti-Balaka militias (and the numerous groups which composed the coalition) still held grievances against the Séléka and those who orchestrated the coup d’état, the Anti-Balaka began conducting revenge attacks. The violence that Christian communities faced following the 2013 Séléka coup was used as justification by the Anti-Balaka for their revenge attacks (The New Humanitarian 2014). History & Foundations Due to the individualistic and autonomous nature of the Anti-Balaka militia groups, there is no overarching ideological basis for the movement beyond an anti-bandit and survival stance. Due to the composition of the groups being predominantly Christian, this stance is seen as a response by these communities to violence perpetrated by Islamic groups during the 2013 coup. Furthermore, cultural factors play a pivotal role; the nomadic nature of the Islamic population in the north signified that they had historically been herders of cattle. Over time, herding became less viable and this generally led to Muslims in the north becoming traders and shop owners. This societal and laboral divide is a major factor in explaining the domination of financial systems by the Muslim population (following the 2013 coup). Amongst other demographics in the country, this led to the belief that Muslims ‘owned’ the Central African Republics' economy (Crisis Group 2014). Anti-Balaka fighters claim to fight for the protection of Central African Christians, and the importance of this ideological component finds its roots therein. Nevertheless, these understandings have been refuted by religious leaders who sheltered both Christian and Muslim families during the 2013-2014 violence in their respective religious buildings and communities (Bouckaert 2014). Military & Political Abilities The informal militia nature of the Anti-Balaka limited their equipment and military capabilities at their founding, with their equipment oftentimes being bounded to machetes and locally sourced AK-47s. However, following the well-coordinated attack on Bangui on the 5th of December, they have become more well-equipped and are now additionally armed with RPG launchers, hand grenades, and other types of offensive weaponry (Amnesty International 2014). The recruitment of former CAR army soldiers led to an improvement in their military abilities since the beginning of the violence. The training provided by these aforementioned soldiers and officers was instrumental in the militias’ growing lethality and momentum, and the eventual capture of Bangui on the 5th of December 2013 (Mellgard 2016b). Approach to Resistance The Anti-Balaka militias are extremely violent and have conducted various crimes against humanity, including the rape and torture of women and children, kidnappings, and acts of ransom. These actions have become relatively customary within the Anti-Balaka’s approach to resistance and, although they were initially targeted against Muslims who made up the Séléka, they have spread in terms of targets. Post-coup, the violence committed by the Anti-Balaka militants targeted not only suspected Séléka supporters and militants, but also the wider Muslim community and even some Christians. Following the national elections which occurred in 2015, the Anti-Balaka militias demanded compensation for ‘liberating’ the CAR. When these demands were not answered, the Anti-Balaka set up roadblocks. This led to the extortion of residents and the widespread kidnappings of Christians as the militants were more likely to simply execute the Muslim rather than hold them for ransom (Mellgard 2016c). International Relations & Alliances As the Anti-Balaka are local militias simply concerned with local activities within the Central African Republic, they have limited if not negligible contacts with external groups. Instead, the Anti-Balaka has come into contact and into combat with the MINUSCA forces sent to stabilise the CAR (CGTN 2020). During the elections in 2020, former-president François Bozizé was rejected from running the major rebel groups (which were also composed of the Anti-Balaka militias). Bozizé then proceeded to create a coalition named the Coalition of Patriots for Change and began to seize towns. This larger coalition of rebel groups, in which the Anti-Balaka are included, prevented election voting from taking place in many areas (Huguet 2020). Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The South Is My Country (O Sul é o Meu Pais in Portuguese) is a separatist movement in the south of Brazil. The movement pushes for the independence of the three states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul in response to what they perceive as their under-representation in the Brazilian government. The movement held unofficial referendums in 2017 and 2018 and its secessionist ambitions stem from discontent with the Brazilian state and supposed cultural differences between the south and the rest of Brazil. History & Foundations The current sentiment expressed by the SIMC finds its roots in Brazilian history and the recurring separatist envies of the country’s south. For instance, the Ragamuffin War – an uprising which began in the south in the early 19th century – exemplifies the omnipresence of separatism amongst southern Brazilians. This war was a Republican uprising which was primarily fuelled by the differences between Rio Grande do Sul (a state in the south of Brazil) and the rest of the country. Although these differences were mainly economic ones, social differences were also observable. ‘Gauchos’ – nomadic farmers – often emphasised that their migration throughout Uruguay and Argentina made them feel less Brazilian than the general Brazilian population (Lynch). Essentially, since the 19th century, separatist ideologies and values have been common in the south of Brazil. The SIMC movement is the contemporary political result stemming from centuries of a heterogeneous sentiment. Since the Brazilian Revolution of 1930, in fact, only two presidents from the three states in question have been elected democratically, and both have lost their mandates. Objectives & Ideology The SIMC movement was founded in 1992 by Adílcio Cadorin – a freemason and the former mayor of Laguna. The political aspect of the movement fights for the self-determination of the people of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The supporters of the movement believe that these three states have sufficiently different economic, social, political, and cultural characteristics in order to obtain the right to self-determination (Lynch). In fact, the south of Brazil has numerous cultural differences; the city of Blumenau in Santa Catarina celebrates Oktoberfest (a German festivity) annually, and some southerners continue to pledge allegiance to the Portuguese state. Contemporarily, the SIMC’s approach towards unity has shifted from positive integration (the concept where people are unified through the emphasis of their similarities) to negative integration (the unification of a population through the emphasis of their differences from other populations). The results of the 2017 unofficial referendum – covered later in this Insurgency Report – were partially fuelled by a severe discontent with corruption in Brazil, notably regarding the escalations in the Petrobras scandal. The core ideological narrative involves the self-sufficiency of the Brazilian south; the SIMC esteems that – in addition to being different from the rest of Brazil – they have the ability to sustain themselves economically and without Brazil. Nonetheless, the SIMC has not materialised into a legitimate political party – despite the founders of the movement having always been involved in Brazilian politics. Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance The South Is My Country movement is unarmed and non-violent. It does not fight for the independence of the southern Brazilian states through riots, uprisings, or armed rebellions. Rather, the SIMC remains strictly political and has even organised unofficial independence referendums. The first referendum held by the SIMC took place in October 2016 and was named ‘Plebisul’. Plebisul asked over 600 thousand people in the three southern states whether they sought independence from Brazil, and 95% of the people voted in favour of secession (In Informal Referendum [...]). However, 600 thousand people only compose less than 3% of the total registered voters in these states, signifying the referendum had statistical and representative limitations. A second referendum was held in 2017, although this one only asked around 350 thousand people. The results were once again very strongly in favour of independence (with around 96% of voters seeking secession) (Phillips). Nonetheless, this second referendum was paired with a petition for a popular initiative bill which sought an official referendum in 2018 (Phillips). This means that the group utilised its political abilities to try and host a referendum. This remains a difficult task given that Brazil’s constitution makes any secessionist movement illegal by nature (Ling). International Relations & Perception in the Media The SIMC does not have any known alliances with other political groups. The movement’s specific and unarmed nature may partly justify why alliances with other groups are not required. Nevertheless, the perception of the SIMC in the media has been relatively pejorative, notably in Brazilian media. The Brazilian media tend to criticise the southern separatist sentiment by highlighting that their religious beliefs, literature, and other cultural values remain extremely similar. Moreover, the group is often associated with far-right ideas (Brooke) and the German background of many of its political militants pairs the group with a neo-Nazi connotation in the media. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) is an opposition movement in Myanmar. The Front was formed after the 8888 protests in 1988 — a series of nationwide marches launched by students in order to protest against the government. The ABSDF is mostly composed of current and former students (the majority of which study at the Rangoon Arts and Sciences University) and the insurgency even has an armed military wing, which has fought alongside other anti-government groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). History & Foundations Until the 1988 protests, the country was ruled by a totalitarian, one-party political system led by the Burma Socialist Programme Party. This political system caused Myanmar to face economic hardship due to its isolation, all while its army grew proportionately stronger (1). Moreover, the socialist government nationalised some of the country’s largest firms and its approach to governance caused the country to become increasingly traditionalist rather than secular; Buddhist beliefs, customs, and superstitions became inalienable from the Burmese political sphere (2). Eventually, this led to societal discontent and students in Rangoon eventually organised the aforementioned 8888 uprising. This series of uprisings led to the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of university students, common citizens, and even monks (3). After starting in August of 1988, the uprisings were stopped in mid-September of the same year after the military (notably the State Law and Order Restoration Council) led a coup d’état in Myanmar. Since this coup d’état, Burmese politics have become plagued with divisions, friction, and a flawed electoral system. In fact, Aung San Suu Kyi — the leader of the National League for Democracy — became one of the country’s most idolised politicians due to her democratic objectives (although the legitimacy of her democratic objectives remain debatable as some may attribute the Rohingya Genocide to her actions). After winning 81% of parliamentary seats in 1990 (4), the military junta rejected the results, placed Suu Kyi in house arrest, and continued to rule the country. Essentially, military officials suppressed political expression and the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) decided to continue its struggle by maintaining semi-underground networks, forming a legitimate political party, and taking up arms. The ABSDF took up arms by forming its Front on the Myanmar-Thailand border. Objectives, Ideology, & Alliances The primary goal of the ABSDF is to liberate the Burmese population from what they view as the oppression of the military. Their motives are heavily guided by democratic values, a desire for political freedom, and the respect of human rights. Politically, the Front heavily criticises the one-party system and instead promotes federal systems. Interestingly, the ABSDF undergoes elections for its leadership role. As an avid supporter of democracy, the Front implements elections at its own level and all of its leaders serve for three-year terms. In 2018, Than Khe was elected as the Front’s chairman. The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front often compares the current resistance campaign in Myanmar to the 8888 protests (5), claiming that the rights of their people depend on their direct action. In 2021, there was another coup d’état (this time orchestrated by the Tatmadaw), and various groups have formed to resist against the national army. The ABSDF has often collaborated with these groups as a result. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is one of the groups that the ABSDF collaborates with the most, although it has also formed relations with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). This latter alliance is filled with controversy, however, as 35 members of the ABSDF died in custody in the Kachin State in 1991-1992 (where the KIA is located). 15 of these members were executed as spies, while the other 20 were tortured to death during interrogation procedures. More contemporarily, the ABSDF has allied with the People's Defence Force (PDF) to fight agains the State (6). Approach to Resistance The ABSDF upholds its strategy of a hybrid between armed intervention and direct political action. Due to the Front taking up arms, it was classified as a terrorist organisation by the United State between 2001 and 2010 (6). Presently, the ABSDF controls seven camps/headquarters along the Myanmar-Thailand border, one camp which spreads over the Myanmar-Indian border, and another camp over the Myanmar-China border. Interestingly, the ABSDF even has foreign branches in the US and in Australia. In 2012 and 2013, the ABSDF held ceasefire talks with the government. In fact, the ABSDF even signed a state-level ceasefire with the Kevin State government in early August 2013 (3). This was followed by the signature of a preliminary ceasefire agreement between the ABSDF and the Burmese government (3). Additional Resources

Note: the flag below is the flag of the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya; Tubu Militias do not have one general flag. Introduction & Overview There are a variety of local militia groups which are composed of the Tuba people in southern Libya, which has seen large amounts of violence post-2011. The deposed Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi (who died in 2011) sought support from cross-border communities such as the Tubu (or Teda amongst other names), whom he viewed as essential to securing the southern Libyan border against hostile powers. This in turn elicited support for the Tebu militia group's varying aims of resisting the Chadian and Nigerien governments in their respective countries by providing them with arms, while also enlisting the militias to protect oilfields (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018a, pp26). However, the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime in 2011 has caused the southern Libyan border to become a lawless center full of trafficking and violence. The autonomous nature of the Tubu militias’ operations in the south of Libya has led them to seek international and national legitimacy as this will help to secure funding and cement their footing as a regionally-influential ethnic group. History & Foundations The varying Tubu militias, many of which are unnamed, formed mostly after 2011 and this was mainly due to the massive discrimination that the Libyan Tubu suffered under Ghaddafi. This discrimination acted as a catalyst for the Tubu, and they formed militias to topple Ghaddafi and assist anti-regime forces in the war. However, they then subsequently took control of the Libyan border with Chad and Niger and began taxing gold miners and smugglers (Tubiana 2019a). These groups initially formed out of an ideology of Tubu nationalism and a willingness to defend the rights of the Tubu people in the regions in which they are present. However, they have quickly descended into armed banditry following the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011 and this has contemporarily led to them mainly acting out of interest – instead of prioritising the protection of the Tubu people. For instance, this includes the smuggling of both cigarettes and gold, but also weapons seized from the armouries of Ghaddafi which were raided following the revolution (Tubiana 2019b). Objectives and Ideology Although the Tubu militias as a whole don’t have one main ideology which is universally subscribed to, one of the most prominent groups – known as the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya – does. This group was formed in mid-2007 to defend against aggressions by the Libyan government and to defend the rights of the Tubu people in Libya. This led to an eruption of violence in 2008 in the oasis town of Kufrah, during which 11 people died after the Libyan government enforced discriminatory laws against the Tubu (Rafei and Daragahi 2008). They were disbanded in 2011 following the fall of Tripoli and were heavily involved in the Libyan Civil war on the side of the National Transitional Council (NTC – UN-recognised government of Libya during the war). However, in March 2012, the group was revived with the stated aim of “protecting the Toubou from ethnic cleansing” and they subsequently aligned themselves under the Government of National Accord against the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Paramilitary Capabilities Due to the informal nature of these organisations and their structure being extremely decentralised, this has led to the varying militia groups using only small arms such as AK-47s and other regionally-omnipresent weapons. Almost all of these weapons have been looted from Ghaddafi’s weapons stockpiles or bought on the black market. This reliance on the purchasing of their weapons has led some groups to need to drum up funds for this equipment through the smuggling of drugs and the kidnapping and ransoming of gold miners (Tubiana 2019c) Approach to Resistance The groups of Tubu tribesmen which are present in southern Libya began to fragment following the revolution. This has led to difficulties in terms of approaching their proclaimed aim of defending the Tubu people in the region against discrimination. The Tubu forces have only united when their community was under threat during interethnic conflicts, such as against Awlad Suleiman Arabs in Sebha in March of 2012 (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018b, pp27). The decentralised nature of their forces has even led the Tubu militias to be used in an irregular infantry fashion and this has therefore led to an overall ineffectiveness in combat (as they are simply not equipped effectively). International Relations & Potential Alliances Tubu militia allegiances have been shaped by foreign interference from countries such as Chad and the UAE. Both of these nations provided support to Barka Wardougou (who was a major Tubu militia leader) in the form of vehicles, arms, and food, amongst other supplies. This factor which is shaping the loyalty of the Tubu militias serves two primary purposes; one is to seek international recognition which they believe may end the discrimination against their group by the Libyan government, and the other is that they desire to be seen as a regular and legitimate force within the Libyan political sphere. This seeking of national legitimacy would mean that the Tubu would be able to seek payments and salaries from the northern Libyan governments, as Tubu militiamen were under government payroll by guarding petroleum facilities (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018c, pp28). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) is an Afrikaans-South African far-right group fighting for an independent Afrikaner Republic. Consisting of approximately 6,000 members (as of 2016), AWB can be described as a white-supremacist, Christian nationalist group. Founded in 1973 due to the gradual dissolution of apartheid-era politics, its founder – Eugène Terre’Blanche – opposed what he perceived as the oppression of the white minority in South Africa. Following the fall of apartheid-era South Africa, the AWB has faded from the main stage due to the imprisonment, murder, or otherwise increased inactivity of its members. However, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging remains contemporarily pertinent as some groups have become inspired by their previous tactics (such as the Boeremag), and continue to carry out sporadic and seemingly isolated attacks (The rise and fall of South Africa’s Far Right, Rosa Lyster). History & Foundations The AWB formed in the 1970s, during a time of great socio-political change for South Africa. The group encapsulated many fears of the white South African population, such as the fears of being replaced and marginalised. Capitalizing on a time of change, Terre’Blanche rallied against laws allowing for equality on the basis of skin color, called for the AWB to harass liberal politicians, attempted assassinations on journalists, engaged in sporadic combat, and stormed government buildings. In one event, six AWB members set up fake road-blocks murdering four black civilians (Truth and Reconciliation Commision 1998, SAPA), and in an uninvited attempt to defend pro-Apartheid dictator Lucas Mangope of then-independent Bophuthatswana, four AWB members were killed while engaged in a firefight with local defence forces (Tebbut Commission, SAPA). Following the imprisonment of Terre’Blanche in 2001 for the assault of a black gas station employee, the AWB sought to reform their image as a pro-theocratic, reformed, and tamed political organisation, which would instead focus on the cultural preservation of the Afrikaans population in post-Apartheid South Africa. The murder of Terre’Blanche over a payment dispute in 2010 with one of his employees has seen the AWB shift dramatically in its methods of insurgence. Currently, they maintain the position that they have legal grounds upon which to reclaim historical Afrikaner land, and cultivate a manicured online presence of confidentiality and secrecy (“Die Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging.” AWB). Objectives and Ideology Prior to the complete reformation of apartheid-era politics in South Africa, the AWB sought to form a free and independent Afrikaaner state in South Africa by any means possible. Ideologically opposing racial integration, the AWB was unafraid to carry out acts of violence on the basis of their beliefs (“The Beloved Country”, Saskia Vredeveld). Following the incarceration of many members and the reformation of South African politics, the AWB’s membership has dwindled. With increased public visibility, a loss of support for their beliefs within the country, and the murder of Eugene Terre’Blanche, the AWB still holds on to beliefs of supremacy and the desire for an independent state. Alliances & Approach to Resistance During Apartheid era South Africa, the AWB managed to form and maintain a number of unofficial alliances with prominent political parties such as the Afrikaner Volksfront, the Boerestaat Party, and the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers. All of which were prominent dissident political parties and organisations whose aims were similar in nature to that of the AWB. (“Carrots and Sticks The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process”, Intersentia) On June 25th, 1993, hundreds of members of the AWB stormed the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, Johannesburg in order to disrupt proceedings. The former President F.W De Klerk condemned the storm on national television, “[the disturbance] discredited the conservative Afrikaner right-wingers when they were trying to unify and present themselves as a serious and respectable section of the South African public”. (“The…AWB Invade the World Trade Centre” South African History Online). Gallery Additional Resources

Group Overview Formed in 1992, the Houthi Movement is an Islamist political group that originates from northern Yemen (5). Founded by cousins Mohammed and Hussein al-Houthi, the group set out to promote the Islamisc sect of Zaydi -- a unique branch of Shi’ism. While originally remaining non-violent, the Houthis played a major role in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution and the eventual collapse of Yemen’s government. The group’s slogan, "God Is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam", demonstrates their anti-Western and anti-Israeli core ideologies, as well as their militant Islamic goals (5). History and Foundations In 1992, a group called The Believing Youth (BY) was formed by cousins Mohammed and Hussein al-Houthi in an attempt to advance the Zaydi sect of Islam. The group created summer camps for young adults and children where they were exposed to Shi’ite teachings from Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah (7). Like many Zaydi groups at this time, members of the BY were radicalized by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and many of them perceived the increased western presence in the region as a threat to their sovereignty (5). Led by Hussein al-Houthi, the BY began increasing their anti-American protests, which troubled the Yemeni government. After Yemeni President Ali Abudallah Saleh issued an arrest warrant for Hussein, the latter retaliated by launching an insurgency against the central government. As the government’s actions against Hussein intensified and his bounty was raised from $55,000 to $75,000, he was killed by the Yemeni Interior and Defense Ministries in September 2004, along with 20 other members, in the Marran province. Despite having its leader killed early in the war, the Houthi Movement successfully fought off the Saudi-backed Yemeni military until a ceasefire was arranged in 2010 (1). Peace did not last long, however, as the Houthis played a key role in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution that saw them controlling a majority of the country (11). On January 20th, 2015, Houthi fighters overtook the presidential palace and assumed control over the government, officially ousting President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi from power (10). Despite constant pushback from neighboring Saudi Arabia, the Houthis remain the strongest social and political movement in Yemen (4). Objectives & Ideology Since its inception, the Houthis have remained a primarily political group with strong religious components. As a socially-conscious group, they started with the intention of reducing economic inequality and protecting the minority Zaydi population of Northwestern Yemen (3). Like many minority groups, the Zaydis were underrepresented and their culture was unrecognized, leading to frustration with the Yemeni government. Due to their proximity to Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi groups crept into Zaydi controlled areas and attempted to convert people. The Houthis saw this as a direct threat to their cultural sovereignty, and viewed the Yemeni government as complicit in this attempted colonization (3). As their slogan states, another element of their beliefs is their staunch anti-Israel and anti-semetic stance. This was not always the case, however, as the early Houthi founders received crucial support from Israel under Foreign Minister Golda Mier during the 1960 Yemeni Revolution (12). Israeli officials believed that by keeping Egyptian forces fighting in Yemen, they would be less inclined to pursue them. As a result, Israeli pilots delivered arms to Yemeni rebels which allowed them to continue the fight against the Egyptians (12). Houthi attitudes soured however, as a result of Hussein al-Houthi’s sermons which decried Israel as supporters of the Saudi regime and viewed their ire towards Iran as an indirect threat to themselves (12). Al-Houthi went a step further in his teachings as well, and described jewish people as “the ones who move this world, who spread corruption in this world” (13). While Houthi leaders have since stated that their true enemy is Israel and not Jewish people, the minority of Jews living in Yemen still live in fear of Houthi oppression (13). Approach to Resistance The Houthis have adopted a unique approach to their resistance by combining their cultural, political and military strengths into a powerful force. Initially, they began by taking a strictly political route; this meant participating in civil disobedience, or even attempting to create legal inroads to meet their demands. Hussein al-Houthi successfully ran for a parliamentary seat in 1993, which allowed the group to achieve some level of representation. Nonetheless, this did not last long as al-Houthi began to set his sights on larger issues, such as western influence in Yemen (4). In 2002, al-Houthi coined their infamous slogan of “ God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam.” This phrase deeply troubled Yemeni officials, and it soon became clear that a political route would no longer be feasible. After President Ali Abdullah Saleh issued an arrest warrant for Hussein al-Houthi, the Houthis responded with a violent insurgency that would last for years. In response, the Yemeni government deployed the full strength of their military and gathered support from neighboring Saudi Arabia. Outgunned and outtfunded, the Houthis relied on the Iranian military to obtain training and weaponry in the fight against the Saudis (2). Tactical training and access to advanced weaponry such as ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles and naval defense tools helped level the playing field (2). While their military prowess has played a key role in their success, the Houthis also have an extensive media presence. Their use of televised speeches and published journals are some of their most powerful weapons in their “hearts and minds campaign” (5). Following the model of Hezbollah, the Houthis created their own television network, called ‘al-Masira TV’, which allows them to reach a wide audience (9). They have also employed the use of radio broadcasts such as al-Masira Radio and Sam FM in order to spread their propaganda nationwide. This method of resistance has allowed them to control much of their image as a group in the country, which is a main cause for the public’s support of them (9). Alliances and International Relations Despite being considered a terrorist group by many stakeholders in the Middle East, the Houthis are not totally ostracized from the region. The group's biggest foreign ally, Iran, has played a pivotal role in their continued resistance and military strength. Iran views them as another way to weaken Saudi control in the region, and thus an important long term investment (2). Essentially, the Houthis have found themselves at the midst of a proxy war, used as belligerents to the geopolitical Saudi-Iranian regional conflict. Although never officially substantiated, there have also been allegations that North Korea has provided weapons support via Syria (7). While North Korea does not have the same level of motivation that Iran does to back the Houthis, it still remains an important consideration in analyzing the Houthis’ foreign connections. Gallery Additional Resources