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Group Overview Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) is a Jihadist insurgent group that is active in the Maghreb and West Africa. Rather than being one singular organisation, JNIM is a coalition of several Jihadist groups. This has led to some confusion about its effectiveness and overall composition. Active in areas that stretch from Northern Mali to Southern Burkina Faso, violent terror-related incidents attributed to JNIM comprise more than 64 percent of all episodes of violent activity that are linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel region since 2017 (Eizenga and Williams 2020). History & Foundations JNIM formed through the merger of Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This merger occurred after the leaders of the respective groups declared allegiance to the leader of Al-Qaeda – Ayman al-Zawahiri – in March of 2017. This merger took place due to an adherence to Al-Qaeda’s doctrine of unification which would allow JNIM to bring resources such as weapons and materials together to expand its areas of operations. This unification essentially formalised previous collaborations between the varying jihadist groups which compose it, as well as allowing a form of hierarchy to be created in which AQIM would oversee the actions of JNIM (Stanford University 2018). Objectives & Ideology Although it is often presented as a singular group with united objectives such as the removal of French forces in the Sahel, this is not the case with the objectives of the coalition of Jihadists in its active areas. For example, in Central Mali and Northern Burkina Faso, one of the component groups – the MLF (Macina Liberation Front) – is more active in combating government forces and imposing its view of Sharia law upon the local populations. This has led the MLF to be responsible for the majority of violent events in JNIM-held territory (Eizenga and Williams 2020). Additionally, the vagueness of JNIM’s structure makes it difficult to specifically attribute the actions of each individual group which composes the coalition. Essentially, this complicates the task of pinning the blame on a specific group within the coalition. In JNIM-held territory, the coalition’s actions are motivated not only on a political or ideological basis, but also by the exertion of control over the lucrative gold mining routes. The gold-producing sites in the areas affected by jihadist violence are estimated to be valued at upwards of 34 million USD per year (Lewis and Mcneill 2019). Although the varying groups have differing local activities, ranging from gold theft to the extortion of locals and the forced implementation of Sharia law, one ideological domain does unify them – Salafism. Salafism is the radical form of Sunni Islam in which the adherents seek to establish a global caliphate through violence and militant actions. Military Abilities Due to the nature and structure of the coalition, the effectivennes of its abilities to commit to an armed resistance and terror campaign in the Sahel is limited to the overall coordination of the groups involved. JNIM is estimated to have around 1000 – 2000 active fighters at a given time. However, due to organisational vagueness and the lack of a concrete structure within the coalition, misperceptions about their operational strength are prominent. This can also lead to a failure when designating that certain attacks were indeed carried out by the coalition itself. However, the tactics used by all the groups are similar and can range from terror attacks on the local population to the kidnapping of aid workers and journalists; such as Olivier Dubois who was kidnapped in April of 2021 (Reuters 2021). This all utilises equipment seen commonly in the arsenal of other organisations and can also include bombs and IEDs which have been commonly used by JNIM to increase the lethality of their attacks (MacDougall 2021). Approach to Resistance JNIM is extremely violent and has been responsible for a variety of attacks on UN peacekeepers, as well as on the French Armed Forces present in the area as a part of Operation Barkhane. In response to a French raid on JNIM forces in northern Mali, the group attacked the French embassy and army headquarters in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, which resulted in the deaths of 8 people and the wounding of 80 others (Weiss 2018). This represents the JNIM’s approach to combat and resistance as they are willing to attack high-profile targets such as the French army’s foreign headquarters. International Relations & Alliances JNIM has incorporated various local groups which they view as inalienable to its political struggle to implement Sharia law in its active areas. This, for instance, has included the incorporation and integration of ethnic Fulani militias (such as the Macina Liberation Front), as well as other ethnic groups such as the Tuaregs. This approach is effective as these small local groups and militias have frequently been the subjects of responses by the French Forces (and other local governments) and view these interventions as an attack on their way of life. As JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate, it has a strong rivalry with the Islamic State (IS) and its militants who operate in the North Africa and Sahel region. The formation of JNIM coincides directly with the loss of territory suffered by the IS and the weakening of its affiliates and offshoots in their various active regions (Cristiani 2017). One of the major components of the Tuareg militia engaging in the north of Mali is Ansar Dine (AD). AD was founded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg militant from Mali’s Kidal Region. Iyad Ag Ghaly is a key stakeholder when analysing Tuareg rebellions in Mali since the 1980s, especially due to his founding of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in 1988. Nevertheless, since being a signee of the Tamanrasset Accords in 1991 (which aimed to end the Tuareg rebellion in Mali), Ag Ghaly has been active in other militant organisations in the region -- one of them being Ansar Dine. AD sought to impose absolute sharia across Mali and their takeover of Timbuktu in 2012 prompted the French-led Operation Serval (Daniel 2012). In 2013, following the successful conclusion of Operation Serval, the French military expanded the scope of Serval by initiating Operation Barkhane in 2014. Operation Barkhane had the public aim of helping the country's governments to maintain control of their territory (BBC News 2014). The merger of Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoun into the JNIM organisation is another indicator of the further integration of Tuareg militia forces in the overall Islamic insurgency in the Mali conflict, as well as in the conflict in the affected Greater Sahel region. Additional Resources

Overview & Introduction Rev Dia (RD), known in English as ‘Revolutionary Action’, is an anarchist group with influence primarily spanning the former soviet states of Belarus and Ukraine (1). RD was formed after a meeting in a Minsk café on February 13th, 2005. They were initially established as a part of the libertarian-communist movement Autonomous Action. However, RD would later go on to become an independent organization in order to focus more on direct action and anarcho-activism (2). Using its website and social media accounts, RD aims to unite members of the anarchist movement in an attempt to concentrate their efforts in a singular direction and provide a platform to spread anarchist ideas (3). Taking part in political actions such as Chernobyl Way, The Maidan, and the 2020 Belarus election protests, RD has proven itself to be a consistent and sometimes violent part of social revolts in the region (3). Although they often ally with non-anarchist political movements, RD claims these actions are purely strategic; these alliances support the group’s struggle to shift their countries’ ideological tendencies away from what they view as restrictive, authoritarian laws which limit their ability to operate openly (4). Currently, RD works underground by spraying pro-anarchist graffiti and displaying banners in major metropolitan areas of Belarus and Ukraine (5). The increasing influence of neo-nazi ideology in their communities has also motivated RD to conduct attacks on known neo-nazi figures and hold training to familiarize members with firearms, hand-to-hand combat, and protest tactics (2). This training materialized in 2022, when some members volunteered to fight for Ukraine against Russia due to fears of similar invasions being carried out on other former-Soviet states (6). History & Foundations Belarus and Ukraine are two countries with long and varied histories with anarchy. Nestor Makhno and anti-government punk bands like Mister X, for instance, are some of the most notable references when overviewing these countries’ anarchist figures (7). This history – along with the politically active post-Soviet world – motivated members from the Belarusian Anarchist Front and individuals from the hardcore punk music scene to open their own Autonomous Action branch in Minsk, in February 2005. Under the name of Autonomous Action Belarus (AD-Belarus), and with a size of fewer than ten members, they began developing a website to draw attention to anarchists' actions. Offline, AD-Belarus would promote itself at punk concerts by handing out literature. The group quickly gained traction through its website and activity at the 2005 Chernobyl-Way rallies, causing a subsequent influx of applicants and members into the organization. AD-Belarus' original strategy was to create a network of every like-minded anarchist possible. However, the lack of consistently-active members caused the group to enact stricter policies, such as a probationary period for applicants and blacklisting alcohol abusers. During political actions in late 2007 and early 2008, anarchist protesters engaged in fights and direct confrontation with neo-nazi protesters AD-Belarus responded to the criticism that ensued by adopting a more militant approach, establishing a set of rules meant to change the public view of the group, from that of a subculture to that of an organized resistance. This shift in image led AD-Belarus to distance itself from the pacifist-minded strategies of Autonomous Action and caused them to launch their own organization, Revolutionary Action (2). Objectives & Ideology Compared to other anarchist organizations that reside in former Soviet states, RD aims to separate itself from the western style of cultural anarchism. Instead, the group opts for social anarchism which focuses more on mutual aid such as protest protection (2). The authoritarian nature of the Ukrainian and Belarusian governments has caused RD to adopt an illegalist ideology (3). This means the group will actively go against the law by partaking in illegal demonstrations and vandalism to promote resistance (8). RD hopes that by providing assistance to political movements, spreading literature, and showing resistance to the government, they will be able to inspire revolution – an element of societal revolt that they view as the foundations to a potential world-anarchist society (3). Militant Abilities Rev Dia works primarily as an underground organization. Instead of operating through a large overarching organization structure, RD has opted for the ability to operate through small, well-organized cells. Each cell member is responsible for a specific task, such as government agitation, writing articles, participating in protests, designing brochures, or organizing lectures (3). This division into multiple ‘cells’ allows Rev Dia members to prioritize their reach in a specific community, while also having the network of a national organization. The benefits of this network are shown by their annual training camps, where different cells meet to conduct combat drills, hold discussions on doctrine, and make acquaintances with other members (9). The information gained at these camps allows participants to return to their cells to help organize anarchist campaigns and even attacks on political adversaries which are relevant to achieving the goals discussed during the camp. Approach to Resistance Due to RD's illegalist component, the group's approach to resistance most notably consists of vandalism, illegal demonstrations, and occasional assaults (10). RD has posted media of members targeting government buildings with arson attacks and beating neo-nazi figures with batons (11). In metropolitan areas such as Kharkiv or Minsk, Rev Dia has plastered flyers, graffiti, and banners promoting the group's views. Online, RD members write articles that criticize government figures and raise awareness for political prisoners (12). Offline members hold and organize anti-government marches and protest outside of jails. For instance, RD members protested outside of the prison holding Azat Miftakhov – a Moscow State University student who was arrested under suspicion of trying to construct an explosive, but many believed was framed because he held anarchist views (11). Alliances & Relations Since the start of the 2022 Conflict in Ukraine, some RD members have joined a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force (TDF) unit, which labels itself as an anarchist/anti-fascist unit (13). Outside of this TDF, Rev Dia has also worked with members of the Anarcha Autonome movement in France to hold a benefit concert for the people of Ukraine (14). Besides these instances, RD tends not to report on its partnerships, presumably to remain underground. Additional Resources

Group Overview The Lords Resistance Army is an armed rebel group originally founded in Uganda in response to Museveni's takeover. The group now operates more in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan. It is led by the notorious Joseph Kony, who has been successfully hiding from the authorities and security forces for decades and who considers himself to be a spiritual 'medium'; hence the group's religious narrative, which is mixed with the traditional customs of clan society. The group's aim is to take power in Uganda and run the state according to Kony's 'adapted' Ten Commandments which stem off of the classic Ten Commandments yet also include a ban on smoking and on cycling. However, these commandments are not definitive and allegedly change persistently, depending on what the spirit 'says' to Joseph Kony (Holter 2019). The Lord's Resistance Army is particularly notorious for its brutality against the civilian population and for the kidnappings of children, who are then manipulated as child soldiers and slaves. The LRA is one of the longest-standing terrorist organisations in Africa. Nonetheless, the LRA has lost relevance and ability in recent years. History & Foundations The Lords Resistance Army was formed in 1988 in Uganda, a country where insurgent groups have a complex history. The first direct predecessor of the LRA was the Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UDPA), which was later succeeded by the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). After the collapse of the HSM, its structural and ideological remnants complemented the rise of the Lord's Resistance Army. The conflict between the LRA and the government, on the other hand, has its roots in the fall of the Idi Amin regime. When Museveni took power, the Acholi people were excluded from political positions, security forces and other institutions. (NCTC 2022). This caused resistance to the new government, which subsequently led to fighting against the government. This created space for the emergence of rebel groups that eventually evolved into the Lord's Resistance Army. In 2005, an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony and four his commanders was issued by the International Criminal Court, but to this day without success (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010). Ideology & Objectives Ideologically, the Lord’s Resistance Army is a Christian extremist group with clannish elements. Central to their ideology is the Ten Commandments. Later, an eleventh commandment was added which forbade cycling – the penalty for this offense was the amputation of a limb. Ethnicity is very important when analysing the LRA's ideology, as the conflict is based on a battle between the Bantu tribes in the south and the Nilotic tribes in the north -- particularly the Baganda and Acholi people. These disputes are mainly about the occupation of the highest positions in government and politics by the different tribes. Acholis came to feel oppressed and discriminated against by Baganda people, who -- according to the Acholi people -- disproportionately rule the country. This created tensions and, over the decades, this situation has given rise to a large number of rebel groups. Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, sees himself as a prophet, messiah, and tribal "spiritual medium", creating the aforementioned religious narrative. In addition to Christian extremism, the LRA's ideology also contains elements of Acholi mysticism and tribal religious customs. (Allen, Vlassenroot, 2010) Military Strategy The central element of the LRA’s paramilitary strategy is violence. Common punishments include cutting ears, noses, or amputating limbs. The strategy of the Lord's Resistance Army has evolved quite a bit since its inception and has gone through several phases, even observing fluctuations in the level of brutality against the civilian population. Doy denotes the LRA’s strategic evolution in three phases - Homegrown Rebellion, Proxy Warfare and Roving Banditry (Doy 2017). The group reached the last descending phase partly due to two operations against the LRA - Operation North and Operation Iron Fist (Allen, Vlassenroot, 2010). For instance, the last phase (the LRA’s evolution into plain, roving banditry) is characterised by the group's involvement in local criminality and illegal markets – in particular the illegal acquisition and smuggling of diamonds, gold or ivory. Nonetheless, this phase has also resulted in a decrease in the level of brutality against the civilian population, and a decrease in the number of child abductions. Above all, the LRA's adaptation to the current situation can be seen in the group's gradual migration from Uganda to the east and north into the CAR, South Sudan and the DRC. The group is trying to maintain its existence through this strategic relocation, although this has also reduced the cohesion of the LRA (as it has been forced to flee into the jungle and abandon electronic communications in order to avoid detection and capture (Day 2017, Faber 2017). All of this makes communication significantly more difficult, leading to lower combat capability. Fragmentation of the group is also an important feature; due to jungle escape and communication problems, the group is fragmented into smaller groups that operate in their separate controlled territories (Faber, 2017). International Relations & Alliances The Lord's Resistance Army does not maintain much of a relationship with other insurgent groups, both because of its unique, unconventional religious ideology, and because it has primarily local ambitions. On the other hand, the LRA maintains a fairly strong relationship with the Sudanese government, which supports them both financially and materially – with money, arms, and bases in Sudan (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010). Furthermore, the group is fairly isolated and this precludes potential alliances with other insurgencies. In addition, the fact that the organisation and leadership of the group is essentially in the hands of one man - Joseph Kony - reduces the possibility of official alliances (as all decision-making power relies on one individual). The LRA’s only formal alliance is with the Allied Democratic Forces (an Islamist rebel group). The LRA and the ADF have agreed to fight together against the Ugandan government (Batre 2019). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP) is an Egyptian jihadist organisation that was formed during a merger of al-Qaeda operatives who were already present in the Sinai and the terror organisation Ansar al-Jihad. This branch of al-Qaeda was first announced to be operating in August of 2006 when the then-deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced that it had split from a rival Islamist organisation in the region known as al-Islamiyya. In December 2011, Ansar al-Jihad announced its formation in which they promised to “fulfil the oath of the martyr of the Ummah, [their] Sheikh Osama bin Laden” (Roggio 2011b). While the cooperation between the component groups of AQSP is uncertain, they have all pledged an oath of allegiance to the overarching al-Qaeda organisation. History & Foundations AQSP released a pamphlet and statement in which they called for the abolition of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and an end to the discrimination against the Bedouin population (Simcox 2011). This follows similar foundations of al-Qaeda groups in other regions in which they latch onto particularly contentious ethnic relations between governments and minority ethnic groups. This was also seen in Somalia with al-Shabaab (an al-Qaeda affiliate group). These two groups (AQSP and al-Shabaab) follow a similar methodology and history in that they were set up in an attempt to gain local ethnic support for Salafist and jihadist causes. This support for minority ethnic groups such as the Bedouin tribe stems from the discrimination that the ethnic group suffered following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in which the Egyptian government believed that the Bedouins had collaborated with the Israeli army (Melik 2012). The exclusion of the Bedouin tribe from the Sinai region's development in economic terms has, over time, led to the Bedouins becoming involved with organised crime and more importantly smuggling of narcotics and even explosives (Gleis 2007). The contentious relationship between the Sinai province and the central Egyptian government has, over time, enabled terrorist stakeholders such as AQSP to gather and cement objectives preying on problems and negative relations between parties with vested interests in the area. Objectives and Ideology AQSP has several objectives within the Sinai province, which range from the creation of an independent Islamic emirate in the Sinai to the introduction of strict sharia law and the end of discrimination against the Bedouin population. This emphasis on independence for the Sinai region and the call to end discrimination by the Egyptian government seems to suggest that ideological elements of the main Bedouin population have been radicalised and implemented by AQ and that they are, as mentioned previously, attempting to gather larger amounts of support from the affected minority populations in the Sinai (Simcox 2011). Military & Political Abilities The military capabilities of al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula are extensive and revolve around similar tactics to other groups present in the region, including the local ISIS cell known as ISSP (Islamic State Sinai Province) and also AQSP’s component groups, such as Ansar al Sharia (Joscelyn 2012). This involves small arms attacks against the military forces of Egypt and Israel who are present in the Sinai province following Israeli military intervention in the area to “protect its insecure southern border” (Amer 2019). However, the group has more frequently been accused of using IEDs to increase the lethality of its attacks on police and military forces. Another aspect of AQSP’s military capabilities is that – since 2018 – it is believed that ex-Egyptian army officers had defected and joined the group. This poses a major problem and security threat for the Egyptian army in their efforts to combat the insurgency (Reuters 2018), as an increase in veterans within the group could allow the organisation to gain large amounts of crucial military training, as well as organisational improvement. Approach to Resistance AQSP has an extremely violent and coordinated approach to its resistance against the Egyptian state, which involves the aforementioned attacks on the Egyptian military and police forces. These attacks on the Egyptian police force have included the killing of 16 policemen in Egypt’s Western desert in an ambush (other sources tally the number as high as 52 police officers) (Mohamed Hassan and Tolba 2017). Another way in which AQSP approaches its ideological battle is through attacks on the pipeline which transports natural gas from Egypt to Israel (Roggio 2011a). This shows a willingness for the group to not only target the state forces of Egypt, but also to yield the capabilities to disable a major economic function of the state. International Relations & Potential Alliances Apart from being linked to the main al-Qaeda organisation through its swearing of allegiance (undertaken in 2011), AQSP has several notable links to other insurgent organisations which operate in and around the Sinai. One of these is the Mujahideen Shura Council. Although not related to the Mujahideen Shura Council which is present in Iraq, the MSC present in the Sinai released a video in 2012 praising the IED attack on a vehicle used by Israeli construction workers in which one person died (Roggio 2012). Similarly to other al-Qaeda offshoots present in other regions, AQSP has also come into conflict with the Islamic State and their affiliates. For instance, Jund al-Islam (one of the component members of AQSP), stated that it has the power to “uproot” ISIS following an attack on ISIS fighters in 2017 in which a number of the ISIS fighters were killed (Green 2017). This seems to show more evidence of a pattern of conflict between the rival Islamic insurgent groups, in which AQ will combat and come into conflict with ISIS in the regions in which they operate to gain influence amongst the local population.

Insurgency Overview The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (also spelled Ezzedine al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and abbreviated as IQB and EQB) are the armed wing of Hamas, the Islamist political party that rules the Gaza Strip. It is the best-equipped and largest militant faction in the Gaza Strip and has fought multiple wars against Israel. The IQB was founded in 1992 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to wage war against Israel. Objectives and Ideology The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ ideology is that of political Islamism and anti-Zionism. The Brigades were established as the military wing of Hamas, which was founded as a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (1). Many of the founding members were heavily influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the so-called “Father of Salafi jihadism”(2). Hamas and the IQB's ideological principles and objectives are laid out in a pair of documents: the 1988 Charter and the 2017 policy document. The 1998 Charter defines Hamas’ political program as Islam and its objectives as retaking the entirety of what was Palestine under the British Mandate, and that none of it should be given up as they consider it an Islamic Waqf (endowment) for Muslims dating back to the Islamic conquests (3). In 2017, Hamas released a document in which it said it would accept a two-state solution with the caveat of a return of refugees. However, this document also explicitly states that it still rejects the Oslo Accords and reaffirms the legitimate right to undertake jihad against Israel (4). History & Foundations The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades were established due to the near destruction of Hamas in the wake of the group’s first military operation against Israel. The 'Palestinian Mujahideen', as the organisation’s military command was known at the time, kidnapped IDF Sergeant Avi Sasportas on the 7th February 1989 and soldier Ilan Saadon on the 3rd of May the same year, with both being executed. A security breach meant that Israeli occupation authorities were able to uncover the chain of command responsible for the operation; this lead to the arrest of any person in the West Bank and Gaza with an affiliation with Hamas. Learning from this, all military operations were isolated from the rest of the group’s activities during the restructuring of Hamas. The first of these units to be created was the IQB, named after the militant Syrian cleric of the same name who advocated for jihad and organized armed resistance against Zionists and the British in Mandatory Palestine. The IQB undertook its first armed operation in 1992 (13). Between 1992 and 1998, the IQB developed to a moderate extent but was dealt a number of blows by both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli authorities. The IQB was made up of a collection of cells that carried out ad hoc military operations and could not withstand the arrests and assassinations of their leaders by the PA and Israeli forces. In addition to a shortage of equipment and funds, a lack of military and security experience amongst both members and commanders exacerbated the Brigades’ shortcomings. Towards the end of the 1990s, the security forces tightened their grip on the IQB and by 1998 the PA’s security apparatus had largely uncovered the group’s command structure, resulting in the assassination of the group’s cadres by the Israeli security forces (14). The Second Intifada in 2000 reversed the IQB’s fortunes as it brought a wave of support for its parent organisation (Hamas) and military action. Furthermore, dozens of former IQB cadres were released from PA prisons, causing the militant group to experience an influx in personnel. Notably among those released were explosives experts Bilal and Abdullah al-Barghuti; the latter was The Brigades’ chief bomb maker and is currently serving 67 life-term sentences in Israeli prison (15). Until 2005, the IQB continued to operate as individual cells with no awareness of other cells’ activities. The group was further strengthened by the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in April 2005 (following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese politician and the country’s former prime minister). This meant the Axis of Resistance, composed of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, had to rely more heavily on its local allies which led to the IQB inheriting Syrian material left in Lebanon (16). Approach to Resistance Serving as the military wing of Hamas, the IQB undertakes offensive operations against Israel. This includes suicide bombings and incursions into Israel through the use of tunnel networks to carry out kidnappings of Israelis (5). The group also employs rocket strikes against both military and civilian targets, which has led to psychological trauma amongst civilians living under the threat of rocket attack. The group's activities have led it to be proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the EU (6), Australia (7), New Zealand (8), Egypt (9), and the UK (10), whilst the US (11) and Canada (12) consider its parent organisation Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Following Hamas’ victory in the 2006 legislative elections, a power struggle the next year led to Hamas taking control of Gaza and the Fatah-affiliated President of the PA which remained in control of the West Bank. This has mostly limited the IQB’s activity to the Gaza Strip but has allowed them to build up a substantial military presence (17). Since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007, the IQB has been involved in multiple wars with Israel, namely in 2008-9, 2012, 2014, and most recently in 2021. Operation Cast Lead was launched in late 2008 and involved a 22-day assault on Gaza, with Israel's stated aim to be toppling the Hamas government. The assault cost around 1,400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli lives (18). Operation Pillar of Defence, launched on the 14th of November, lasted 8 days and cost 175 Palestinian lives (19). The 2014 Gaza War cost around 2,200 Palestinian and 67 Israeli lives, with both sides committing war crimes (according to the United Nations). Over the course of the 50-day conflict, the IQB and other Palestinian factions fired 6,600 mortars and rockets into Israel (20). In May 2021, 260 Palestinians lost their lives in airstrikes that – according to Israel – were targeting military instalments in the Gaza Strip. Over the course of the fighting, Palestinian armed groups launched 4,360 unguided rockets and mortars towards Israeli population centres (21). Military Capabilities In terms of manpower, Hamas leaders estimated the number of troops in the Brigades’ ranks at close to 20,000. Nonetheless, MiddleEastEye reported in 2015 that some observers estimated the organisation’s manpower to be closer to 40,000 members (22). The most notable component of the IQB’s military capabilities is its rocket arsenal, which is composed of both foreign weapons and those developed in the Gaza Strip. Rockets produced in Gaza include the short-range Qassam series of rockets. The table below outlines the development of the Qassam series and its improving destructive power. Source: Al Jazeera. ‘Hamas Missiles: Qassam Frantisi, then Ja’bari’. Al Jazeera net. Accessed 15 October 2022. https://bit.ly/3gcEvN5. A fourth iteration of the Qassam exists, which reportedly has a range of 15-17km (23). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Boogaloo Movement (whose adherents are referred to as the "Boogaloo Boys", "Boogaloo Bois", or “Boojahideen”) is a loosely-organized American far-right, anti-government, anti-law enforcement movement which also proclaims extremist and accelerationist ideals. Founded on the Internet during the early 2010s, the Boogaloo movement is composed of disparate cells of anti-government militants who call for a second American Civil War (which they often refer to as the "boogaloo" or "boog", and which they often spell "big luau" or "big igloo", prompting their use of Hawaiian patterns as their traditional attire and of an igloo as their symbol and flag) (Pemberton, 2020). History & Foundations Tracing an accurate history of the Boogaloo movement is a difficult task, notably because of how diverse its members' objectives are. The term ‘boogaloo’ was first used in 2012 on white supremacist and far-right message boards, particularly in memes on platforms such as 4chan and Reddit (Evans, 2020). Referencing the 1984 musical Breakin’ 2: Electric Boogaloo, internet users began referring to an imminent Civil War 2: Electric Boogaloo. Its adherents supported the ideal of a future where gun confiscation, continued police brutality, and militarization would lead to a large-scale uprising of the American people against the government (with some going as far as believing that the beginning of this violent uprising should be intentionally accelerated) (ACLED, 2021). The movement grew on platforms such as Facebook, Telegram, Discord, and the fascist web platform “Iron March'' throughout the 2010s (Gunesch & Newhouse, 2020). The Boogaloo garnered the most support in early 2020, galvanized by the death of the Boogaloos’ Facebook group moderator – Duncan Lemp – during a no-knock police raid, as well as by the COVID-19 lockdowns, which they viewed as yet another example of excessive government oversight and tyranny. The death of Duncan Lemp in particular has become a rallying cry for the movement, with the death of one of their own at the hands of law enforcement elevating Lemp to an almost-martyr status. Moreover, slogans such as “his name was Duncan Lemp” and “we are Duncan Lemp” became common ‘boog mantras’ (Sottile, 2020). Today, boog-adjacent online groups count tens of thousands of members, and the Bois’ easily recognizable Hawaiian shirts are mainstays at gun rights, anti-police, and white supremacist marches. Ideology & Objectives The recurring ideological elements that are omnipresent in Boogaloo spaces include calls for armed, violent opposition to governmental authority and the police, and a near-religious veneration of firearms (with calls for completely unrestricted access to guns being the Boojahideen’s main rallying point) (Everytown Research & Policy, 2021). However, outside of these two central values, the Boogaloo movement is far from homogenous (Thompson, 2021). From the very inception of the Boogaloo concept into American political consciousness, there appeared to be two major trains of ideology. On the one hand, certain proponents of the Boogaloo concept called for the new Civil War to be a race war, with the term ‘Boogaloo’ being routinely used in white nationalist and neo-nazi spaces to this day. Others, however, envisioned the Boogaloo as a new American Revolution, uniting people of all races to promote gun rights and stand against the police and other aspects of "Big Government". This belief was notably backed by their alliance with certain anti-authoritarian leftist and black liberation movements, prompting some to incorrectly view the Boogaloo Bois as a left-wing movement (Newton, 2021). This ideological divide has led to ambiguous situations at certain events – such as the Black Lives Matter protests sparked after the death of George Floyd – where Boogaloo Bois found themselves on both sides of the protest (with a member of the group even being killed while peacefully marching at one of these protests). The question of what it is the Boogaloo Boys exactly stand for is made even more complex by the difficulty of finding direct access to Boogaloo talking points and opinions: although openly boog-sympathetic pages used to be rife on mainstream social media, Meta coordinated a large scale takedown of boogaloo content in late 2020, purging Instagram and Facebook of hundreds of pages about this movement, leading the movement’s adherents to resort to less open methods of communication and propagandizing (Beer, 2020). Military Capabilities & Approach to Resistance The Boogaloo movement’s veneration of firearms and its commitment to inciting and participating in violent uprising makes them a relative security threat. Organizing into small-scale, heavily armed local chapters (which often include active or former military personnel and police officers), the Boogaloo remains an extremely disparate movement, mostly organizing impromptu small-scale demonstrations and appearances at other groups’ protests thanks to social media and online forums (ACLED, 2021). However, the ‘Boojahideen’ have also been involved in direct acts of violence. Firstly, some Bois’ behavior at BLM protests (such as their excessive antagonization of the police) has been revealed to be less about solidarity with victims of police brutality, and more about attempting to galvanize the start of the Boogaloo revolt or even to incite violent retribution onto people of color (Gunesch & Newhouse, 2020). In fact, 26% of BLM protests with Boog presence turned violent (compared to only 6% of all BLM protests), and boogaloo members have been arrested at these protests due to their possessions of molotov cocktails and illegal weapons (ACLED, 2021; Price & Sonner, 2020). Boogaloo members have also been prosecuted for several (sometimes deadly) armed attacks on police stations, and a Michigan-based Boogaloo faction even devised a plan to abduct their local governor and overthrow the state government (Burke & Snell, 2020; Hurd, Lightfoot, & Pérez de Acha, 2021). The NCIS have published an official threat awareness message warning governmental and police entities of the danger of this group (NCIS, 2020). Relations & Alliances As of yet, the Boogaloo movement has no official alliances with any domestic or international facets of government. They also very much remain a domestic militia, with a few Boog factions operating in Canada appearing to be the only sign of the movement existing outside of the United States (Public Safety Canada, 2021). Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Coordinadora de Comunidades en Conflicto Arauco-Malleco (Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco), known as CAM, is an active insurgent organization founded in 1998 and currently present in Chile. The primary objective of the organization is the emancipation of the Mapuche people (1), which places them in the context of the wider “Mapuche Conflict” as it is called in Chile and Argentina (2). The group's approaches involve direct action, particularly the sabotaging of forestry equipment and engaging in combat with state authorities, such as the G.O.P.E (Special Police Operations Group). The CAM also strongly defends the territories they claim as their tribal grounds, but are legally owned by landowners or forestry industries. The group is present in four regions of the country: Bio-Bio, Los Lagos, Los Rios and Araucanía, and their actions have been increasing in number since 2010 (3). History & Ideology CAM’s historical context involves the Mapuche Conflict, which can be traced back to the resistance of the Mapuche people during the conquest of Chile by the Spanish. Furthermore, the Mapuche people are amongst the most marginalized and discriminated people in Chile, many of them being part of poor communities (2). The organization formed in 1998 following the split of the CTL (Lafkenche Territorial Coordinator) (4) as an effort to coordinate the actions of the different Mapuche communities present in the Arauco and Malleco zones. During this time, they had no clear ideological background, nor a well-defined approach to resistance, although their fight for the rights of the Mapuche people relied on combating against discriminatory state policies, as well as against the growing development of the forestry industry and the exploitation of their land (5). However, some founding members of the CAM were former far-left militants, henceforth causing the group to rapidly evolve into an armed militant group with a clear and novel ideological framework (4). In 2022, the congress of Chile declared the CAM and other Mapuche organizations as terrorist groups (6). The ideological framework of the CAM was compiled in a document called “El pensamiento emancipatorio de la CAM” (‘the emancipatory theory of the CAM’) written by one of the organization's speakers and founding members – Hector Llaitul. This document states that the main objective of the organization is independence from the Chilean state, and it defines its ideology as ‘Indianist Anti-capitalism’ (1). The CAM consider themselves Indianist because they seek the reconstruction and reconstitution of the Mapuche social reproduction system. They also emphasize that an anti-capitalist approach is fundamental because they uphold that capitalism is a system which is not theirs, which oppresses them, and condemns them to extermination (1). They declare that due to their anti-capitalistic nature, they cannot participate in formal Chilean democratic politics, because turning away from capitalism also inherently means they are separated from what they view as ‘dominant occidental relations’. Consequently, Llaitul also defines the group as anti-systemic (1). Approach to Resistance The CAMs beliefs are that territorial control is the prime foundation for the reconstruction of their political structures and the revitalization of Mapuche economic, social and cultural fabrics. In order to achieve this, the organization engages in two main activities: the sabotage of forestry industry infrastructure and territorial occupation. The groups that are involved in direct action are denominated as ‘Órganos de Resistencia Territorial’ (‘territorial resistance organs’, or ORT). These groups are composed of individuals known as weychafe (1) which means warrior in Mapudungun (the Mapuche language). This denomination is another aspect of the process of reconstitution of the Mapuche culture. The weychafe – organized in ORTs – are involved in direct action. As aforementioned, the main actions of the CAM involve attacks on forestry infrastructure by burning transport trucks, machinery, offices, and also the sabotage of plantations by uprooting recently-planted trees (4). During acts of sabotage, ORT members leave behind messages claiming responsibility for the attacks and simultaneously promoting the Mapuche cause. These messages usually include some form of political demand, such as the liberation of Mapuche political prisoners, although these demands are often omitted by news anchors during coverage of their events (7). However, these demands gain friction as they are often shared by different Mapuche activist groups over social media platforms (8). The other main approach employed by the CAM is trespassing into private land (which may belong to the same forestries or different local landowners) and occupying it. These actions are called ‘recuperaciónes productivas’ (productive recuperations) and consist of occupying the land while also utilizing it. This approach is key to the CAM’s objectives as it concurrently offers a solution to the poverty problem in different communities. After they occupy land, they begin a process of preparing it for the plantation of different crops or, if they are occupying lands that belong to the forestry industry, they use the wood by distributing it or selling it to fund the organization (4)(5). Once the occupation of land begins, the ORT members stay in order to fight the police attempts to evict the Mapuche (1). Alliances & Relations The organization operates in the same region as other mapuche paramilitary groups, one of them being the Weychan Auka Mapu (founded by former CAM members). Although there is no formal alliance between these groups, they don’t interfere with each other and follow similar patterns of action and ideals (4). This signifies that the CAM is sharing its cause and motivations with other similar organizations in the region. Additional Resources

Group Overview The Patriot Front (PF) is a white nationalist and neo-fascist organization which uses traditional fascist imagery conveyed through an ‘Americana’ chic perspective to spread their message (1). As of 2021, they have 42 chapters throughout the United States and are estimated to have around 230 to 300 active members (3). Their group’s leader, Thomas Ryan Rousseau, is based in Dallas, Texas, but travels extensively to the different chapters around the country to participate in the group’s activist actions. The Patriot Front is considered a part of the ‘alt-right’ political subculture in the United States. It uses a top-down discipline structure that is highly regulated by Rousseau, which has provided them with more success and visibility over the past few years, while other groups have struggled (5). Their motto is ‘Life, Liberty, and Victory’. History & Foundations The group was founded in 2017 after the 'Unite the Right' rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, when Rousseau broke off from another white supremacist group – Vanguard America. Rousseau’s dissociation followed internal disagreement amongst members of Vanguard America regarding how to move forward from the issues of their aforementioned rally (5). From that point onwards, the group has been focusing on ‘flash demonstrations’, flier and graffiti campaigns, hand-to-hand combat training, as well as recruitment drives. They have had a number of prominent actions that have given them notoriety and brought awareness to their brand of ‘patriotic fascism’. Their most recent notable event was on June 11th, 2022, when police stopped a Uhaul with 50 members of PF headed to a Pride Event being held in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. They were found with riot shields, smoke bombs, and other small arms and were arrested on charges of conspiracy to riot (1). On January 21st, 2022, the left-wing website Unicorn Riot gained access to leaked chats, server data, and videos of the Patriot Front which gave an insight into the inner workings of the groups. These leaks revealed how the group trained for riot preparedness, as well as their omni-utilization of racist (notably anti-semetic) language (4). Ideology & Goals The Patriot Front’s primary objective is to establish a white ethno-state through the closure of all borders and the mass deportation of those deemed as ‘non-American’. They view the current republic as a failure of democracy which has specifically let down the white man. In fact – and as they state in their manifesto – "the time of the Republic has passed in America as the system grows too weak to perform its duty. [...] The damage done to this nation and its people will not be fixed if every issue requires the approval and blessing from the dysfunctional American democratic system. Democracy has failed in this once great nation."(2) The group also heavily incorporates anti-semitist ideals within its ideology, as they have used slogans such as “Blood and Soil” (a nationalist slogan which can be traced back to Nazi Germany), and have protested outside of Israili consulates against ‘Zionist influences’ (1). Approach to Resistance The group adopts a non-lethal philosophy, specifically staying away from firearms and tactical firearm training. However, in the background, a number of their members have been caught manufacturing ‘ghost-guns’ – untraceable firearms due to a lack of a serial number – as well as being charged with other weapon-related crimes (3). The group’s general approach to political outreach involves propaganda and compilations of their activities, turning their activism into social media posts and short videos. Most of their activism takes the form of posters, stickers, banners, and graffiti, while also regularly conducting marches a number of times a year. Some of their events which attract the most popularity involve marches with 50 to 150 of their members, all marching in uniforms fitted with a phalanx of altered American flags, as well as with Patriot Front fascist symbols. Its members tend to target minority neighborhoods for their stickering campaigns to increase the provocation of their activities (4). Relations & Alliances The Patriot Front is an organization pushing for completely closed borders, a halt on immigration, an end to foreign wars, and the mass deportation of anyone not born in the United States (1). The members of the Front are also barred from holding membership or positions in other competing right-wing groups (5). In the early days of the organization, they would hold rallies with other groups such as some Daily Stormer book clubs, the Whomsters, or even the Houston Gargoyles. Nonetheless, in recent years, the group has not associated with any others during their rallies, marches, or other activist operations (1). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), also known as the National Liberation Army, is a Colombian-based far-left guerrilla group. The group was founded in 1964 by Fabio and Manuel Vasquéz Castaño -- two brothers who prioritised the defence of those who they deemed were victims of economic, political, and other forms of oppression at the hands of the Colombian government (1). The group has been labeled as a terrorist organization not only by Colombia, but also by the United States, the European Union, Canada, and Venezuela's National Assembly (2). The ELN works as an armed resistance against the Colombian State as well as against multinational corporations (2). The ELN uses kidnapping, extortion, bombings, assassinations, and hijackings in order to combat the Colombian state (3). History & Foundations The ELN came to be on July 4th, 1964, after a dangerous period in Colombia's history, a period named “La Violencia”, where over 200,000 deaths occurred as a result of political violence (4). The ELN officially announced its formation on January 7th, 1965, after overrunning a village in Santander named Simacota (5). Many guerilla groups arose in the aftermath of La Violencia, but the ELN is the most powerful and one of the only remaining ones (5). The ELN reached almost 5,000 members in 1999, although membership has declined since 2000. However, the group has grown back to 3,000 members after Venezuelan refugees and ex-Farc Fighters joined the ELN (1). The ELN’s peak was reached in 1999. Its membership was between 4,000 and 5,000 and accumulated around 15,000 supporters. As aforementioned, the ELN would see a decline in the 2000s as the ELN was becoming increasingly less organized as many internal and external conflicts would affect the group. Within the ELN, units began to disobey leader orders and some allied with drug traffickers for their own personal and financial security. US-backed offensives such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and Death to Kidnappers (MAS) targeted leftist groups including the ELN, which caused the group to lose large amounts of territory – especially in the Bolivar Province as well as their former home base (1). The ELN has had a history of trouble with peace talks with the Colombian government. Since the 2016 peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC (another far-left guerilla group), the ELN had all eyes on them and were the largest remaining armed group in Colombia (2). In 2018 the ELN and the Colombian government were in the initial stages of peace talks. Nonetheless, Ivan Duque (Colombia's president at the time), suspended the talks after the ELN refused to release hostages and detonated a car bomb in Bogota which killed 22 police cadets. On October 4, 2022, the Colombian government and the ELN signed an agreement to restart the negotiations which were suspended in 2018. More recently, the Colombian government has said that the ELN has been scaling back attacks against the Colombian military and releasing hostages, which has enabled the government to gain trust in the group’s willingness to negotiate. The new talks between both parties are scheduled to begin during the first week of November 2022 (6). Political Objectives & Ideology The ELN was originally built upon Marxist-Leninism and Catholic Liberation Theology. They opposed foreign influence in Colombia and aimed to create a republic in place of the Colombian government. The ELN now participates heavily in kidnappings as well as in drug trafficking, although they originally opposed those methods. This is because the ELN considered these approaches to be anti-revolutionary, as well as not corresponding with the group's ideological beliefs. The ELN focused heavily on combating the Colombian government but after peace deals with other guerrilla groups, the ELN is shifting their goals to demobilizing and reintegrating ex-combatants to achieve a new goal -- ending its conflict with the Colombian government (1). Approach to Resistance The ELN has used a wide variety of tactics, ranging from kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, extortions, hijackings, and attacks on economic infrastructure (such as bombing large oil pipelines) as forms of revenue and achieving their own objectives. However, the ELN has not always used these tactics. As highlighted earlier, the ELN's early days involved a strong condemnation against kidnappings. This all changed, however, after the group experienced almost complete disintegration in 1973 during a government offensive. One of the notable events of this offensive was an attack which left 135 out of the 200 members of the ELN dead (which was the total size of the group at the time), including its founders Fabio and Manuel Vásquez Castaño. New leaders Perez and Nicolás Rodríguez Bautista “Gabino” increased the use of previously-condemned kidnapping methods. Kidnapping became a large source of revenue for the ELN. Interestingly, the ELN also made large oil discoveries which led multinational companies into their regions. With these new large companies flocking in, oil theft and extortion aided in the rise of the ELN (5). Localized ELN efforts in Chocó – which is Colombia's poorest province – have different approaches to resistance. The Anti-drug Fumigation Program works to fight against narcotics by using aircraft and other equipment to fumigate coca crops. However many have criticized this program for the health risks it often brings. Artisanal hand-made weapons are used to combat military aircrafts which fumigate the coca crops. The ELN has gained extensive support from locals because of their efforts to fight against these government aircrafts. Fumigation destroys many food crops that the locals depend on for survival and revenue, as well as brings disease and even death among children in the region. The ELN believes that this act is a form of direct violence against the people to benefit multinational companies in their acts of exploitation of natural resources, such as water and minerals (7). International Relations & Regional Funding The ELN does not only operate on Colombian soil -- Venezuela has also become an area of economic and political interest for the ELN. The ELN controls territory where illegal gold mining and drug trafficking is prevalent. Venezuela’s government under Maduro has allowed the ELN to have access to these areas without much interference from authorities (9). Alliances between the ELN and Venezuelan security forces have been criticized by citizens due to high rates of violence and displacement along Colombia’s province of Arauca and Venezuela's state of Apure. Former FARC fighters who rejected the peace deal in 2016 with the Colombian government have formed dissident groups, which are being actively fought against by joint operations uniting the ELN and the Venezuelan Security Forces. Although reports suggest that FARC dissidents and the ELN made an alliance in 2018 (10), this has changed due to territorial disputes, and both parties are no longer linked. The Venezuelan government, meanwhile, has repeatedly denied that it is harboring dissidents and the ELN (8). Gallery Additional Resources

Group Overview Kurdish Hezbollah (also known as ‘Turkish Hezbollah’ or sometimes simply ‘Hizbullah’) is an armed Sunni Islamist group formed in 1993, just outside of Batman, Turkey (4). The group was founded by Hüseyin Velioğlu following a violent rift in the Union Movement after the 1980 Turkish Coup (4). Their main goal was to destroy the militant leftist group PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and topple the current Turkish government in an attempt to instate their brand of Islamist rule. During the peak of their operation, Hizbullah members carried out assassinations and killings of both combatants and civilians, which brought fear to the communities of southeastern Turkey. History & Foundations Stemming from the once-peaceful Union Movement, Hizbullah finds its roots in the Islamist movement that formed after the 1980 Turkish Coup (4). The Union Movement was headed by Hüseyin Velioğlu and Fidan Gündör, until ideological disagreements led to the fracture of the group into the Menzil and İlim factions (4). The İlim sect, headed by Velioğlu, stressed the importance of immediate armed revolution against leftist militia groups and the secularist government in charge (1). Hizbullah saw the rising influence of leftist groups, specifically the PKK as a threat to Turkish nationalism, and targeted its members in assasination campaigns. Objectives & Ideology Since its earliest inception in the 1980s, Kurdish Hezbollah has maintained their commitment to toppling the secularist Turkish regime and replacing it with an Islamist governmental system (2). After being unable to achieve this goal through democratic means, the group took violent action to accomplish this objective. In connection to their extremist religious belief system, the group adopts a violent use of force to defeat societal outcomes of secularism, such as women’s rights and the right to drink alcohol. As an extension of their radical nationalist belief system, they also view leftist organizations as a threat to their goals, and have taken great lengths to fight their influence. Military Abilities Despite their humble roots, Hezbollah is known for their assassinations and urban prowess in their war against their enemies. The group was known for their trademarked “three shot assassination” technique, which they employed (often in broad daylight). This method was trademarked to them after the assassination of a Turkish-Armenian journalist – Hrant Dink – in 2007. While many of its early members were inexperienced college-aged men, the group received crucial support from the Turkish military and police in the form of direct training and armament (3). The military had been engaged against the PKK, and used Hizbullah as an extension of their forces in order to defeat the Marxist enemy. In return, Hizbullah offered their intelligence on the PKK to military officials, which created a mutually-beneficial relationship between the two parties (1). While never formally admitted by either side, many Hizbullah fighters have also stated that they received direct military training from the Iranian Secret Service (4). Approach to Resistance After the fracture of the Union Movement, Velioğlu’s group began an immediate attack against its enemies. Their assassination campaigns that targeted both military and civilian individuals brought a sense of fear to the communites in southeastern Anatolia. At the conflict’s peak in 1992, PKK members “were being killed at the rate of two a day” (3). Initially the group only targeted PKK members, but soon broadened their focus to anyone that did not align with them. Hizbullah was known for their use of axe attacks on those they deemed immoral, and these assaults were done in public places with the intention of creating terror amongst the population (1). Other victims were found buried alive or hacked to pieces with meat cleavers. Local establishments such as liquor stores and brothels were firebombed and their owners shot because of their secular values (5). Outside of PKK affiliates, journalists and those that spoke out about their connections to Iran and the Turkish military were their primary targets (6). Like most extremist groups, Hizbullah attempted to control the populace through fear and such methods of killing were their greatest tool. Alliances & International Relations While operating without any official alliances, Hizbullah had connections to military actors both in Turkey and internationally. Despite often targeting police in their violent campaign, they received training from officers in their fight against the PKK (1). The Turkish military viewed Hizbullah as a valuable asset in their own fight against the marxist militants, and thus offered key support in the form of armament and intelligence aid. 2000'e Doğru, a weekly newspaper in Turkey, reported that Hizbullah fighters were trained under Turkey’s Rapid Deployment Force, which trained them in specialized warfare methods (6). Through their connections to Eastern Europe, the military was able to supply Hizbullah with pistols sourced from the region (6). The group also found support from certain sectors of the Iranian military, specifically the Iranian Secret Service (4). While Iran denies these allegations, official reports document their support in the form of arms and funding towards Hizbullah. Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview The Hells Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) has been one of the most notorious outlaw biker gangs since its conception on Saint Patrick's Day, March 17th, 1948 (1). After The Hells Angels opened their first chapter in California, they quickly grew into an international organization. Within the next few decades, they would see their influence reach countries such as New Zealand, Germany, Brazil, Russia, and Turkey (2). Like the Bōsōzoku gangs of Japan, HAMC was founded as a way for World War II veteran pilots to regain a sense of camaraderie (3). Over time the organization's overall intent has evolved from establishing itself as an imposing force during the 1960s counterculture movement to helping like-minded motorcycle riders form communities that will allow them to better enjoy riding. Throughout the years, their laissez-faire approach to governance has allowed each chapter to find and adapt its own purpose (4). The HAMC's freedom-loving outlaw counterculture influenced its chapters internationally to adopt various motives. With operations ranging from toy donation campaigns -- such as the Christmas drive held by the San Diego HAMC -- to illegal drug smuggling attempts that led members from the same San Diego chapter to be arrested in Malta. The Hells Angels' individual chapters have often found themselves in a strange limbo between criminality, political activism, and simple automotive hobbyism (5). History At the end of the Second World War, many veterans returning to the United States had difficult times detoxing from the adrenaline-filled lifestyle of a serviceman and coping with their then unrecognized PTSD (6). Unable to create connections with those who had not experienced the shock of war firsthand, these veterans would start to classify themselves as outcasts from typical American society. Isolating into social groups made up of fellow veterans, they formed similar bonds to the ones created during the war. To many in these groups, the connections they made were more substantial than that of their families (6). While these tight-knit friends would satisfy the veterans' social needs, they still sought out a replacement for the highs of combat. The average bar brawl was a start, but the economic boom after the war would give them the funds to acquire a love for the large CC motorcycles HAMC is known for (6). Although the groups were primarily focused on their shared passion for motorcycles, they would not officially be categorised as a Motorcycle Club until the American Motorcycle Association (AMA) required them to create formal charters to compete in sanctioned races (6). This AMA legislation led to the recognition and creation of numerous clubs nationwide, all with different compositions and ideologies (6). On July 4th, 1947, an AMA-sanctioned race gave way to a riot in the town of Hollister, California. The media tension after the event caused the AMA to break away from clubs associated with the rioting and paint them as outlaws (7). Some of the clubs cast aside by the AMA used their new rebellious personas to make a mark on America, either intentionally or not. Now labeled as 'outlaw' motorcycle clubs, they used intimidation and disorder to form their own counterculture. Clubs such as the Pissed off Bastards of Bloomington (POBOB) and the Booze Fighters Motorcycle Club became some of the first to have the image of "Gangis Khan on an iron horse" cast upon them by the press (8). With the help of the media, outlaw biker culture swept east from California, giving rise to like-minded clubs all around the country. The creation of new clubs meant the creation of new rivalries; which, for instance, caused tension to form inside the Piss Off Bastards of Bloomington. During the height of these underreported tensions, then-members of the POBOB broke away to create the first Hells Angels chapter in the Fontana area of California (9). Political Ideology Today, it is difficult to determine all of HAMC's driving motives other than to fill a natural need for community, as well as curate a network of different businesses (10). Hells Angels are incorporated and have their own registered trademark (11). They have also created two churches, named the Church of the Angels and the Church of the Free Highway, for which they receive tax exemptions on club assets (11). Each chapter and its members can differ widely, from libertarian-minded businessmen to lifelong criminals (12). Depending on the Hells Angels clubhouse that one walks into, they may find anything from toys ready for donation, or methamphetamine being prepared to move across the border (13). A specific chapter's goals and political views are determined mainly by those actively involved in the club and their current thoughts on the world around them. In the club's earlier years, it was much easier to pin down the rebellious intent of the HAMC and its unique ideology. Besides the goal of funding their chapters through both legal and illegal means, HAMC seemingly wanted to curate their own unique style of 1960s American counterculture (14). This style is summarized by a quote used in the book 'Hell's Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga' in which a Hell's Angel states -- "We're the one percenters, man—the one percent that don't fit and don't care. So don't talk to me about your doctor bills and your traffic warrants—-I mean you get your woman and your bike and your banjo and I mean you're on your way…." Throughout the 1960s-70s, HAMC's image grew immensely due to the release of various films inspired by them and the high public disdain for the U.S. government (15). The perceived liberal nature that these films cast on the club through renditions of psychedelic drug use and their presence in the politically active San Francisco Bay area helped attract support from well-known public figures (16). One of them was Allen Ginsberg, an American poet that became renowned after the release of his anti-capitalist poem titled 'Howl' (17). This support and romanticization in the media led many Americans who were a part of the counterculture movement to use the Hells Angels as a militant arm of their otherwise peaceful ideology. While the Hells Angels would accept this role inside liberal politics, HAMC members were primarily motivated by ideological markers such as masculinity, a sense of brotherhood, territorial defense, and autonomy from society (18). Constant struggles with the police, defamation by officials, and their general outlaw persona left a vast majority of Hells Angels to develop an anti-authoritarian mindset towards U.S. Government and state officials. Since HAMC members did not apply this same anti-authoritarian mindset to the club itself, which involves a multitude of various ranks and strict laws, some have created the label ‘Rebel Authoritarians’ for them (19). This unique form of authoritarianism allowed HAMC to act as a structured security force for Haight-Ashbury's alternative communities and new age events such as the Rolling Stones free concert at Altamont Speedway (20). Although most altercations they were involved in ended violently, the counterculture favored HAMC over the police. However, this relationship quickly changed when Hells Angels attacked anti-war protesters in Berkeley. The demonstrators who once looked at the Hells Angels as comrades in their fight against the establishment had become their targets. HAMC members beat and harassed Vietnam Day Committee protesters which they believed had become too radical and were traitors to the country (21). Hells Angels claimed they were protecting Oakland from out-of-town Berkeley radicals (22). The incident would forever hinder the bond between the two cultures and further confuse the public's perception of the Hells Angels' ideology (22). To distance themselves from the hostile media that surrounded these anti-Vietnam War protests, Oakland Chapter President at the time, Ralph 'Sonny' Bargers, held a press conference. He would go on to denounce the demonstrations—even offering to volunteer Hells Angels members to fight against the Viet Cong (23). Other HAMC members stood behind Vietnam veteran 'Sonny' Bargers and exposed their underlying patriotic views. Since then, it has been challenging to determine the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club’s political affiliations or if they even maintain any. Militant & Political Abilities Although the Hells Angels involves many chapters with unique focuses, they have still developed legislation allowing them to operate as a worldwide organization. Chapters of HAMC fall under a 'Regional Officer'. This officer acts as a representative for all chapters that exist in their area (24). These areas usually encompass the eastern or western half of a country (24). During annual country-specific and worldwide club events, these representatives will meet to vote on matters relating to the Hells Angels. While chapters are mostly regarded as equal to each other, the Oakland California Chapter is considered to have the most influence on club decisions. This influence is due to their large number of members and the universal respect Hells Angels have for former chapter president Ralph 'Sonny' Bargers. The HAMC's maintained connection between all chapters allows HAMC to conduct international operations, ranging from running a bar chain called 'The Other Place' to waging multi-country turf wars with rival clubs (25). Approach to Resistance & Alliances During the height of HAMC's popularity in the 60s-70s, they often targeted rival clubs that threatened the criminal and political operations a chapter may have been running. The HAMC carried out numerous bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and beatings to protect their interests (26). At one point, they also attacked mafias such as the Chicago Italian mob, who was the target of a failed car bombing that left one Hells Angels member dead (27). This violence continued onwards to the late 1990s, when HAMC members were convicted for bombing a Bandidos MC headquarters in Norway. While violent actions are less likely to be carried out by HAMC chapters in the modern day, this does not mean they have entirely ceased. For example, in June of 2022, a group of Hells Angels members fired at a rival gang on a Las Vegas highway (28). Even though HAMC has chapters in twenty-seven states throughout the US and five continents, they have been known to work in conjunction with other motorcycle clubs worldwide to aid in both community and criminal activities. In 2015, HAMC and ex-rivals the Bandidos MC were accused of working together in Zelenograd, Russia, against the Night Wolves MC, also known as 'Putin's biker gang' (29). This ability to establish international chapters and the willingness to cooperate with once-rivals of HAMC only reinforces the Hells Angels' role as a player in world economics and politics. Gallery Additional Resources

Overview & Introduction The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) is a guerrilla movement fighting for the independence of the Angolan province of Cabinda. After Angola obtained its independence from Portugal in 1975, the territory of Cabinda became an exclave province of the country (1). The FLEC is currently fighting the Cabinda War. Interestingly, Cabinda is located north of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Bas-Congo province, signifying that land access into Cabinda requires travelling through DRC territory as it does not connect directly with Angola (2). History In 1963, three organisations — the Movement for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (MLEC), Action Committee of the Cabinda National Union (CAUNC), and the Mayombe National Alliance (ALLIAMA) — merged to form the FLEC. During the Portuguese Colonial War which took place between 1961 and 1974, the nationalist movements of Cabinda fought against the Portuguese Armed Forces. Once Angola had obtained independence in 1975, the FLEC organised a provisional government and self-proclaimed its independence. However, the People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola, as well as the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (which was supported by Cuba) invaded the Cabinda territory. The FLEC did not manage to keep its control of urban areas and was hence heavily suppressed by Angolan forces (3). The period which followed caused the FLEC to divide and part ways. However, the movement was reborn in the 1990s under two separate branches; the FLEC-Renovada and the FLEC-Armed Forces of Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) (3). The former was captured by the Angolan Armed Forces in 2002 and this led to the signing of a cease-fire. FLEC-FAC has often criticised this ceasefire and it continues to fight for Cabinda’s independence since. In fact, in 2006, the FLEC-FAC even demanded the African Union to intervene and support its political struggle. Around this time, the FLEC also formed the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue, an organisation more centred around the civil sector. This initiative fuelled the separatist ideology in the region (3). International Relations & Alliances The FLEC movement’s main alliances involve the United States and France. French intelligence services have often been connected with FLEC since the Cold War as France used the opportunity to oppose the MPLA government in Angola (which was backed by Cuba). Even after the war, however, French intelligence continues to be connected the FLEC. The ‘Angologate’ arms scandal also directly linked the nation to the Angolan civil war as leaks revealed that it was illicitly selling arms to Angola (4). In addition to the illicit sale of arms, France has an interest in Angola due to TotalEnergies (5) — a French oil exporter. After TotalEnergies discovered a patch of oil in 2009, it has continued to increase its influence in Angola; which is now the second-biggest contributor of oil to TotalEnergies. The US has also been heavily involved in Cabinda due to the territory’s oil reserves. There have been claims that the US’ involvement in Cabinda has worsened the corruption problem in Cabinda and in Angola as a whole. France’s support for the FLEC (heavily impacted by its desired influence in Angola) has shifted in 2010 after the FLEC organised attacks on Togo’s national football team. Since then, France has allowed the extradition of FLEC separatist leaders. There have also been allegations that another branch of the FLEC — the FLEC-UNITA — was operating in Cabinda thanks to support from South Africa during the 1980s. This aid eventually stopped and hence FLEC-UNITA fell apart in the same years. Approach to Resistance On the 8th of January 2010, the Togo national football team’s bus was attacked by gunmen. This occurred as the team was travelling to the 2010 Africa Cup of Nations tournament. The attack killed Togo’s assistant coach, its team spokesman, and its bus driver. The attack was claimed by a branch of the FLEC. The secretary general of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Military Position (Flec-PM) — Rodrigues Mingas — later explained that his fighters were supposed to attack security guards instead of the national team’s bus. He claimed the injuries and killings of Togolese staff/players were purely accidental (6). In addition to this attack, the FLEC kidnapped an officer of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission in February 1993 (and released him unharmed). The group also continues sporadic attacks on oil workers and army patrols. In 2007, for instance, a Brazilian paramedic who worked for an oil company in Angola was killed by the FLEC. A Portuguese technician who worked for Tecnovia was also severely wounded in 2008 (3). Additional Resources