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Insurgency Overview The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) is a far-left guerrilla group based in Peru. The group was led and founded in the late 1960s by Abimael Guzmán, also known by his alias – ‘Comrade Gonzalo’. The Shining Path’s ideology is based on Marxist foundations, mainly derived from Mao Zedong and China’s Cultural Revolution. Their goal is to topple the Peruvian government and implement a communist, peasant-led government in its place. Among those recruited were indigenous civilians and those from impoverished and neglected areas. The United States, Peru, and the European Union have recognized the Shining Path as a terrorist organization. It has mainly disbanded, but some remnants remain active (1). History and Foundations The Shining Path began as a small 12-member breakaway faction from the Communist Party of Peru. The Shining Path emerged in the late 60s and was led by Abimael Guzmán, who recruited many indigenous and poor Peruvians throughout the 70s. In May 1980, the group launched its first attack against the state by burning down ballot boxes in Ayacucho to disrupt the elections, which were the following day (3). The Shining Path was very influential in the mountainous regions of Huana and Ayacucho due to the lack of military and government presence. This lack of presence allowed the Shining Path to gain traction in the region until the rebels evolved into a legitimate threat and forced the government to intervene; the army was called into the region in December 1982. This was the beginning of a long war between the Shining Path and the Peruvian state. An estimated 70,000 people died between 1980 and 2000 as a result of the conflict between the two parties. Approximately 37,000 of those deaths were caused by Shining Path guerrillas (1), and around 11,000 of these were civilians (4). The Shining Path adopted assassinations, car bombs, and torture as their primary approaches to resistance. When Alberto Fujimori was elected as head of state in 1990, he increased government presence and carried out various raids against the group. Fujimori led assaults and established armed peasant patrols to combat the Shining Path, which suffered a steep decline in influence and in insurgence after the capture of Abimael Guzmán. Guzmán was imprisoned on the 12th of September 1992. With the arrest of their leader, the Shining Path began to suffer in terms of ability and it became clear that the group's integrity was being hindered. Since there was no clearly defined second-in-command, the group lacked a clear chain of command. The group began to split after Guzmán called members to introduce a peace deal between the Shining Path and the Peruvian government a year after he was initially arrested. While some perceived it as a traitorous act, others continued to follow his command. Contemporarily, there are a relatively low number of remnants of the Shining Path, and – while many aren’t as serious of a threat to the state as they once were – many of these remaining guerrillas participate in drug trafficking, and still carry out attacks on police and other security forces (3). Abimael Guzman died on September 11, 2021, at the age of 86. In January 2021, the Shining Path Faction commander, Jorge Quispe Palomino (alias ‘Raúl’) died of kidney failure following a military-police joint operation which resulted in the death of three shining path guerrillas, and the injuries of six others (including Raúl). Raúl fought alongside his brother, Victor Quispe Palomino, alias ‘Jose’, as the two brothers had been attempting to gain support from rural farmer communities by declaring themselves as the Militarized Communist Party of Peru. Without Raúl’s leadership, the internal procedures of the movement were compromised, especially as there was no designated member to replace his role (5). In March 2021, 16 people including 2 children were killed during the San Miguel Del Ene attack. This occurred two weeks before the national elections between Pedro Castillo and Keiko Fujimori. The Peruvian military has claimed the Shining Path’s breakaway faction – the Militarized Communist Party of Peru – was responsible for the killings (11). Political Objectives & Ideology As aforementioned, Guzmán founded the Shining Path by stemming from Maoist and Marxist foundations. In the 1960s, he visited China and was inspired by Maoist theory (7). The goal of the Shining Path was not to improve the Peruvian state through reforms, but instead to destroy it along with its institutions and replace it with a revolutionary, peasant-led communist regime (7). Those who only worked to organize workers were criticized by Guzmán. Guzmán’s followers regarded him as the ‘Fourth Sword’ of communist thought, after Marx, Lenin, and Mao (2). He believed in the abolition of money and industry, and instead promoted administering a life of trading between farmers and craftsmen (9). Approach to Resistance Assassinations, car bombings, and torture were common tactics used by the Shining Path. In regards to the group’s torture procedures, there have been instances of stoning and victims being submerged in boiling water. Moreover, activists were targeted for speaking out against the Shining Path; Maria Elena Moyano, for instance, was a well-known organizer and activist that spoke out against the Peruvian Government and the Shining Path’s actions. Pamphlets were spread by the Shining Path to discredit her work and – after she publicly stated that the Shining Path was no longer ‘revolutionary’, per se – the Shining Path shot her and exploded her corpse in front of her 2 children. The Peruvian general population mourned the death of Moyano and around 300,000 people attended her burial (8). Following this attack, the rebels lost the ability to gain major support from Peruvians (even peasants) due to the perceived atrocity of their actions. International Relations and Regional Funding The Shining Path’s primary sources of income involve drug trafficking and taxes. These taxes are imposed on corporations, cocaine processing plants, and illegal mining. They resemble the traditional ‘revolutionary taxes’ imposed by other communist movements around the world. Compared to other rebel groups, such as the FARC in Colombia, the Shining Path generates a significantly smaller amount of revenue. However, this does not imply that the Shining Path did not have significant funds at its peak (10). Furthermore, the Shining Path does not have relevant relations with other groups as it remains solely active in Peru – unlike other groups in the region who have expanded to other countries, such as the ELN in Venezuela. Additional Resources

Note: This is not the official flag of the Anti-Balaka militias, but rather a reproduction based on the badges they wear (which contains the CAR's flag) Introduction & Overview Anti-Balaka militias are an alliance of militant groups which have been present in the Central African Republic since the early 2000s. These militias are said to be primarily composed of Christians, although this claim has been contested by many analysts. The Tony Blair Faith Foundation, for instance, has noted that animists have also participated in the militias’ violent acts and compose a significant proportion of Anti-Balaka groups (Mellgard 2016a). Formed in 2009, the coalition of varying militias is a grouping of loosely organised ‘village self-protection groups’ which focused to combat bandits and other sources of insecurity on a local level. However, their activities and atrocities intensified following the 2013 coup by Séléka militia groups. The Séléka militias are the religious opposites of the Anti-Balaka militants, and they are mostly made up of Muslims from the north and northeast of the CAR; where the majority of the population is Muslim, unlike the rest of the country in which 90% is Christian (PEW Research Center 2011). History & Foundations Initially, the Anti-Balaka groups formed as a loose coalition of groups to combat bandits and other criminal organisations at a local level. Nonetheless, the Anti-Balaka militants’ focuses have shifted post-coup. Following the March 2013 coup d’état, Séléka fighters spread across the country and installed their commander, Michel Djotodia, as president. However, he quickly lost control of his militia coalition and the Séléka began attacking civilians, looting vehicles, and stealing crops. The Anti-Balaka began concretely fighting against the Séléka in September of 2013, and the number of fighters who joined the Anti-Balaka militias increased. This was partly because of the joining up of former CAR national army soldiers, who – following the coup – had been disbanded. Although the resignation of Djotodia in January 2014 signalled the end of the coup’s ruling regime, violence did not halt. As the Anti-Balaka militias (and the numerous groups which composed the coalition) still held grievances against the Séléka and those who orchestrated the coup d’état, the Anti-Balaka began conducting revenge attacks. The violence that Christian communities faced following the 2013 Séléka coup was used as justification by the Anti-Balaka for their revenge attacks (The New Humanitarian 2014). History & Foundations Due to the individualistic and autonomous nature of the Anti-Balaka militia groups, there is no overarching ideological basis for the movement beyond an anti-bandit and survival stance. Due to the composition of the groups being predominantly Christian, this stance is seen as a response by these communities to violence perpetrated by Islamic groups during the 2013 coup. Furthermore, cultural factors play a pivotal role; the nomadic nature of the Islamic population in the north signified that they had historically been herders of cattle. Over time, herding became less viable and this generally led to Muslims in the north becoming traders and shop owners. This societal and laboral divide is a major factor in explaining the domination of financial systems by the Muslim population (following the 2013 coup). Amongst other demographics in the country, this led to the belief that Muslims ‘owned’ the Central African Republics' economy (Crisis Group 2014). Anti-Balaka fighters claim to fight for the protection of Central African Christians, and the importance of this ideological component finds its roots therein. Nevertheless, these understandings have been refuted by religious leaders who sheltered both Christian and Muslim families during the 2013-2014 violence in their respective religious buildings and communities (Bouckaert 2014). Military & Political Abilities The informal militia nature of the Anti-Balaka limited their equipment and military capabilities at their founding, with their equipment oftentimes being bounded to machetes and locally sourced AK-47s. However, following the well-coordinated attack on Bangui on the 5th of December, they have become more well-equipped and are now additionally armed with RPG launchers, hand grenades, and other types of offensive weaponry (Amnesty International 2014). The recruitment of former CAR army soldiers led to an improvement in their military abilities since the beginning of the violence. The training provided by these aforementioned soldiers and officers was instrumental in the militias’ growing lethality and momentum, and the eventual capture of Bangui on the 5th of December 2013 (Mellgard 2016b). Approach to Resistance The Anti-Balaka militias are extremely violent and have conducted various crimes against humanity, including the rape and torture of women and children, kidnappings, and acts of ransom. These actions have become relatively customary within the Anti-Balaka’s approach to resistance and, although they were initially targeted against Muslims who made up the Séléka, they have spread in terms of targets. Post-coup, the violence committed by the Anti-Balaka militants targeted not only suspected Séléka supporters and militants, but also the wider Muslim community and even some Christians. Following the national elections which occurred in 2015, the Anti-Balaka militias demanded compensation for ‘liberating’ the CAR. When these demands were not answered, the Anti-Balaka set up roadblocks. This led to the extortion of residents and the widespread kidnappings of Christians as the militants were more likely to simply execute the Muslim rather than hold them for ransom (Mellgard 2016c). International Relations & Alliances As the Anti-Balaka are local militias simply concerned with local activities within the Central African Republic, they have limited if not negligible contacts with external groups. Instead, the Anti-Balaka has come into contact and into combat with the MINUSCA forces sent to stabilise the CAR (CGTN 2020). During the elections in 2020, former-president François Bozizé was rejected from running the major rebel groups (which were also composed of the Anti-Balaka militias). Bozizé then proceeded to create a coalition named the Coalition of Patriots for Change and began to seize towns. This larger coalition of rebel groups, in which the Anti-Balaka are included, prevented election voting from taking place in many areas (Huguet 2020). Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The South Is My Country (O Sul é o Meu Pais in Portuguese) is a separatist movement in the south of Brazil. The movement pushes for the independence of the three states of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul in response to what they perceive as their under-representation in the Brazilian government. The movement held unofficial referendums in 2017 and 2018 and its secessionist ambitions stem from discontent with the Brazilian state and supposed cultural differences between the south and the rest of Brazil. History & Foundations The current sentiment expressed by the SIMC finds its roots in Brazilian history and the recurring separatist envies of the country’s south. For instance, the Ragamuffin War – an uprising which began in the south in the early 19th century – exemplifies the omnipresence of separatism amongst southern Brazilians. This war was a Republican uprising which was primarily fuelled by the differences between Rio Grande do Sul (a state in the south of Brazil) and the rest of the country. Although these differences were mainly economic ones, social differences were also observable. ‘Gauchos’ – nomadic farmers – often emphasised that their migration throughout Uruguay and Argentina made them feel less Brazilian than the general Brazilian population (Lynch). Essentially, since the 19th century, separatist ideologies and values have been common in the south of Brazil. The SIMC movement is the contemporary political result stemming from centuries of a heterogeneous sentiment. Since the Brazilian Revolution of 1930, in fact, only two presidents from the three states in question have been elected democratically, and both have lost their mandates. Objectives & Ideology The SIMC movement was founded in 1992 by Adílcio Cadorin – a freemason and the former mayor of Laguna. The political aspect of the movement fights for the self-determination of the people of Paraná, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul. The supporters of the movement believe that these three states have sufficiently different economic, social, political, and cultural characteristics in order to obtain the right to self-determination (Lynch). In fact, the south of Brazil has numerous cultural differences; the city of Blumenau in Santa Catarina celebrates Oktoberfest (a German festivity) annually, and some southerners continue to pledge allegiance to the Portuguese state. Contemporarily, the SIMC’s approach towards unity has shifted from positive integration (the concept where people are unified through the emphasis of their similarities) to negative integration (the unification of a population through the emphasis of their differences from other populations). The results of the 2017 unofficial referendum – covered later in this Insurgency Report – were partially fuelled by a severe discontent with corruption in Brazil, notably regarding the escalations in the Petrobras scandal. The core ideological narrative involves the self-sufficiency of the Brazilian south; the SIMC esteems that – in addition to being different from the rest of Brazil – they have the ability to sustain themselves economically and without Brazil. Nonetheless, the SIMC has not materialised into a legitimate political party – despite the founders of the movement having always been involved in Brazilian politics. Political Abilities & Approach to Resistance The South Is My Country movement is unarmed and non-violent. It does not fight for the independence of the southern Brazilian states through riots, uprisings, or armed rebellions. Rather, the SIMC remains strictly political and has even organised unofficial independence referendums. The first referendum held by the SIMC took place in October 2016 and was named ‘Plebisul’. Plebisul asked over 600 thousand people in the three southern states whether they sought independence from Brazil, and 95% of the people voted in favour of secession (In Informal Referendum [...]). However, 600 thousand people only compose less than 3% of the total registered voters in these states, signifying the referendum had statistical and representative limitations. A second referendum was held in 2017, although this one only asked around 350 thousand people. The results were once again very strongly in favour of independence (with around 96% of voters seeking secession) (Phillips). Nonetheless, this second referendum was paired with a petition for a popular initiative bill which sought an official referendum in 2018 (Phillips). This means that the group utilised its political abilities to try and host a referendum. This remains a difficult task given that Brazil’s constitution makes any secessionist movement illegal by nature (Ling). International Relations & Perception in the Media The SIMC does not have any known alliances with other political groups. The movement’s specific and unarmed nature may partly justify why alliances with other groups are not required. Nevertheless, the perception of the SIMC in the media has been relatively pejorative, notably in Brazilian media. The Brazilian media tend to criticise the southern separatist sentiment by highlighting that their religious beliefs, literature, and other cultural values remain extremely similar. Moreover, the group is often associated with far-right ideas (Brooke) and the German background of many of its political militants pairs the group with a neo-Nazi connotation in the media. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) is an opposition movement in Myanmar. The Front was formed after the 8888 protests in 1988 — a series of nationwide marches launched by students in order to protest against the government. The ABSDF is mostly composed of current and former students (the majority of which study at the Rangoon Arts and Sciences University) and the insurgency even has an armed military wing, which has fought alongside other anti-government groups such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) or the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). History & Foundations Until the 1988 protests, the country was ruled by a totalitarian, one-party political system led by the Burma Socialist Programme Party. This political system caused Myanmar to face economic hardship due to its isolation, all while its army grew proportionately stronger (1). Moreover, the socialist government nationalised some of the country’s largest firms and its approach to governance caused the country to become increasingly traditionalist rather than secular; Buddhist beliefs, customs, and superstitions became inalienable from the Burmese political sphere (2). Eventually, this led to societal discontent and students in Rangoon eventually organised the aforementioned 8888 uprising. This series of uprisings led to the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of university students, common citizens, and even monks (3). After starting in August of 1988, the uprisings were stopped in mid-September of the same year after the military (notably the State Law and Order Restoration Council) led a coup d’état in Myanmar. Since this coup d’état, Burmese politics have become plagued with divisions, friction, and a flawed electoral system. In fact, Aung San Suu Kyi — the leader of the National League for Democracy — became one of the country’s most idolised politicians due to her democratic objectives (although the legitimacy of her democratic objectives remain debatable as some may attribute the Rohingya Genocide to her actions). After winning 81% of parliamentary seats in 1990 (4), the military junta rejected the results, placed Suu Kyi in house arrest, and continued to rule the country. Essentially, military officials suppressed political expression and the All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) decided to continue its struggle by maintaining semi-underground networks, forming a legitimate political party, and taking up arms. The ABSDF took up arms by forming its Front on the Myanmar-Thailand border. Objectives, Ideology, & Alliances The primary goal of the ABSDF is to liberate the Burmese population from what they view as the oppression of the military. Their motives are heavily guided by democratic values, a desire for political freedom, and the respect of human rights. Politically, the Front heavily criticises the one-party system and instead promotes federal systems. Interestingly, the ABSDF undergoes elections for its leadership role. As an avid supporter of democracy, the Front implements elections at its own level and all of its leaders serve for three-year terms. In 2018, Than Khe was elected as the Front’s chairman. The All Burma Students’ Democratic Front often compares the current resistance campaign in Myanmar to the 8888 protests (5), claiming that the rights of their people depend on their direct action. In 2021, there was another coup d’état (this time orchestrated by the Tatmadaw), and various groups have formed to resist against the national army. The ABSDF has often collaborated with these groups as a result. The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is one of the groups that the ABSDF collaborates with the most, although it has also formed relations with the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). This latter alliance is filled with controversy, however, as 35 members of the ABSDF died in custody in the Kachin State in 1991-1992 (where the KIA is located). 15 of these members were executed as spies, while the other 20 were tortured to death during interrogation procedures. More contemporarily, the ABSDF has allied with the People's Defence Force (PDF) to fight agains the State (6). Approach to Resistance The ABSDF upholds its strategy of a hybrid between armed intervention and direct political action. Due to the Front taking up arms, it was classified as a terrorist organisation by the United State between 2001 and 2010 (6). Presently, the ABSDF controls seven camps/headquarters along the Myanmar-Thailand border, one camp which spreads over the Myanmar-Indian border, and another camp over the Myanmar-China border. Interestingly, the ABSDF even has foreign branches in the US and in Australia. In 2012 and 2013, the ABSDF held ceasefire talks with the government. In fact, the ABSDF even signed a state-level ceasefire with the Kevin State government in early August 2013 (3). This was followed by the signature of a preliminary ceasefire agreement between the ABSDF and the Burmese government (3). Additional Resources

Note: the flag below is the flag of the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya; Tubu Militias do not have one general flag. Introduction & Overview There are a variety of local militia groups which are composed of the Tuba people in southern Libya, which has seen large amounts of violence post-2011. The deposed Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi (who died in 2011) sought support from cross-border communities such as the Tubu (or Teda amongst other names), whom he viewed as essential to securing the southern Libyan border against hostile powers. This in turn elicited support for the Tebu militia group's varying aims of resisting the Chadian and Nigerien governments in their respective countries by providing them with arms, while also enlisting the militias to protect oilfields (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018a, pp26). However, the fall of Ghaddafi’s regime in 2011 has caused the southern Libyan border to become a lawless center full of trafficking and violence. The autonomous nature of the Tubu militias’ operations in the south of Libya has led them to seek international and national legitimacy as this will help to secure funding and cement their footing as a regionally-influential ethnic group. History & Foundations The varying Tubu militias, many of which are unnamed, formed mostly after 2011 and this was mainly due to the massive discrimination that the Libyan Tubu suffered under Ghaddafi. This discrimination acted as a catalyst for the Tubu, and they formed militias to topple Ghaddafi and assist anti-regime forces in the war. However, they then subsequently took control of the Libyan border with Chad and Niger and began taxing gold miners and smugglers (Tubiana 2019a). These groups initially formed out of an ideology of Tubu nationalism and a willingness to defend the rights of the Tubu people in the regions in which they are present. However, they have quickly descended into armed banditry following the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011 and this has contemporarily led to them mainly acting out of interest – instead of prioritising the protection of the Tubu people. For instance, this includes the smuggling of both cigarettes and gold, but also weapons seized from the armouries of Ghaddafi which were raided following the revolution (Tubiana 2019b). Objectives and Ideology Although the Tubu militias as a whole don’t have one main ideology which is universally subscribed to, one of the most prominent groups – known as the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya – does. This group was formed in mid-2007 to defend against aggressions by the Libyan government and to defend the rights of the Tubu people in Libya. This led to an eruption of violence in 2008 in the oasis town of Kufrah, during which 11 people died after the Libyan government enforced discriminatory laws against the Tubu (Rafei and Daragahi 2008). They were disbanded in 2011 following the fall of Tripoli and were heavily involved in the Libyan Civil war on the side of the National Transitional Council (NTC – UN-recognised government of Libya during the war). However, in March 2012, the group was revived with the stated aim of “protecting the Toubou from ethnic cleansing” and they subsequently aligned themselves under the Government of National Accord against the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Paramilitary Capabilities Due to the informal nature of these organisations and their structure being extremely decentralised, this has led to the varying militia groups using only small arms such as AK-47s and other regionally-omnipresent weapons. Almost all of these weapons have been looted from Ghaddafi’s weapons stockpiles or bought on the black market. This reliance on the purchasing of their weapons has led some groups to need to drum up funds for this equipment through the smuggling of drugs and the kidnapping and ransoming of gold miners (Tubiana 2019c) Approach to Resistance The groups of Tubu tribesmen which are present in southern Libya began to fragment following the revolution. This has led to difficulties in terms of approaching their proclaimed aim of defending the Tubu people in the region against discrimination. The Tubu forces have only united when their community was under threat during interethnic conflicts, such as against Awlad Suleiman Arabs in Sebha in March of 2012 (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018b, pp27). The decentralised nature of their forces has even led the Tubu militias to be used in an irregular infantry fashion and this has therefore led to an overall ineffectiveness in combat (as they are simply not equipped effectively). International Relations & Potential Alliances Tubu militia allegiances have been shaped by foreign interference from countries such as Chad and the UAE. Both of these nations provided support to Barka Wardougou (who was a major Tubu militia leader) in the form of vehicles, arms, and food, amongst other supplies. This factor which is shaping the loyalty of the Tubu militias serves two primary purposes; one is to seek international recognition which they believe may end the discrimination against their group by the Libyan government, and the other is that they desire to be seen as a regular and legitimate force within the Libyan political sphere. This seeking of national legitimacy would mean that the Tubu would be able to seek payments and salaries from the northern Libyan governments, as Tubu militiamen were under government payroll by guarding petroleum facilities (Tubiana and Gramizzi 2018c, pp28). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) is an Afrikaans-South African far-right group fighting for an independent Afrikaner Republic. Consisting of approximately 6,000 members (as of 2016), AWB can be described as a white-supremacist, Christian nationalist group. Founded in 1973 due to the gradual dissolution of apartheid-era politics, its founder – Eugène Terre’Blanche – opposed what he perceived as the oppression of the white minority in South Africa. Following the fall of apartheid-era South Africa, the AWB has faded from the main stage due to the imprisonment, murder, or otherwise increased inactivity of its members. However, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging remains contemporarily pertinent as some groups have become inspired by their previous tactics (such as the Boeremag), and continue to carry out sporadic and seemingly isolated attacks (The rise and fall of South Africa’s Far Right, Rosa Lyster). History & Foundations The AWB formed in the 1970s, during a time of great socio-political change for South Africa. The group encapsulated many fears of the white South African population, such as the fears of being replaced and marginalised. Capitalizing on a time of change, Terre’Blanche rallied against laws allowing for equality on the basis of skin color, called for the AWB to harass liberal politicians, attempted assassinations on journalists, engaged in sporadic combat, and stormed government buildings. In one event, six AWB members set up fake road-blocks murdering four black civilians (Truth and Reconciliation Commision 1998, SAPA), and in an uninvited attempt to defend pro-Apartheid dictator Lucas Mangope of then-independent Bophuthatswana, four AWB members were killed while engaged in a firefight with local defence forces (Tebbut Commission, SAPA). Following the imprisonment of Terre’Blanche in 2001 for the assault of a black gas station employee, the AWB sought to reform their image as a pro-theocratic, reformed, and tamed political organisation, which would instead focus on the cultural preservation of the Afrikaans population in post-Apartheid South Africa. The murder of Terre’Blanche over a payment dispute in 2010 with one of his employees has seen the AWB shift dramatically in its methods of insurgence. Currently, they maintain the position that they have legal grounds upon which to reclaim historical Afrikaner land, and cultivate a manicured online presence of confidentiality and secrecy (“Die Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging.” AWB). Objectives and Ideology Prior to the complete reformation of apartheid-era politics in South Africa, the AWB sought to form a free and independent Afrikaaner state in South Africa by any means possible. Ideologically opposing racial integration, the AWB was unafraid to carry out acts of violence on the basis of their beliefs (“The Beloved Country”, Saskia Vredeveld). Following the incarceration of many members and the reformation of South African politics, the AWB’s membership has dwindled. With increased public visibility, a loss of support for their beliefs within the country, and the murder of Eugene Terre’Blanche, the AWB still holds on to beliefs of supremacy and the desire for an independent state. Alliances & Approach to Resistance During Apartheid era South Africa, the AWB managed to form and maintain a number of unofficial alliances with prominent political parties such as the Afrikaner Volksfront, the Boerestaat Party, and the Vereniging van Oranjewerkers. All of which were prominent dissident political parties and organisations whose aims were similar in nature to that of the AWB. (“Carrots and Sticks The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process”, Intersentia) On June 25th, 1993, hundreds of members of the AWB stormed the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, Johannesburg in order to disrupt proceedings. The former President F.W De Klerk condemned the storm on national television, “[the disturbance] discredited the conservative Afrikaner right-wingers when they were trying to unify and present themselves as a serious and respectable section of the South African public”. (“The…AWB Invade the World Trade Centre” South African History Online). Gallery Additional Resources

Group Overview Formed in 1992, the Houthi Movement is an Islamist political group that originates from northern Yemen (5). Founded by cousins Mohammed and Hussein al-Houthi, the group set out to promote the Islamisc sect of Zaydi -- a unique branch of Shi’ism. While originally remaining non-violent, the Houthis played a major role in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution and the eventual collapse of Yemen’s government. The group’s slogan, "God Is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam", demonstrates their anti-Western and anti-Israeli core ideologies, as well as their militant Islamic goals (5). History and Foundations In 1992, a group called The Believing Youth (BY) was formed by cousins Mohammed and Hussein al-Houthi in an attempt to advance the Zaydi sect of Islam. The group created summer camps for young adults and children where they were exposed to Shi’ite teachings from Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah (7). Like many Zaydi groups at this time, members of the BY were radicalized by the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and many of them perceived the increased western presence in the region as a threat to their sovereignty (5). Led by Hussein al-Houthi, the BY began increasing their anti-American protests, which troubled the Yemeni government. After Yemeni President Ali Abudallah Saleh issued an arrest warrant for Hussein, the latter retaliated by launching an insurgency against the central government. As the government’s actions against Hussein intensified and his bounty was raised from $55,000 to $75,000, he was killed by the Yemeni Interior and Defense Ministries in September 2004, along with 20 other members, in the Marran province. Despite having its leader killed early in the war, the Houthi Movement successfully fought off the Saudi-backed Yemeni military until a ceasefire was arranged in 2010 (1). Peace did not last long, however, as the Houthis played a key role in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution that saw them controlling a majority of the country (11). On January 20th, 2015, Houthi fighters overtook the presidential palace and assumed control over the government, officially ousting President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi from power (10). Despite constant pushback from neighboring Saudi Arabia, the Houthis remain the strongest social and political movement in Yemen (4). Objectives & Ideology Since its inception, the Houthis have remained a primarily political group with strong religious components. As a socially-conscious group, they started with the intention of reducing economic inequality and protecting the minority Zaydi population of Northwestern Yemen (3). Like many minority groups, the Zaydis were underrepresented and their culture was unrecognized, leading to frustration with the Yemeni government. Due to their proximity to Saudi Arabia, Wahhabi groups crept into Zaydi controlled areas and attempted to convert people. The Houthis saw this as a direct threat to their cultural sovereignty, and viewed the Yemeni government as complicit in this attempted colonization (3). As their slogan states, another element of their beliefs is their staunch anti-Israel and anti-semetic stance. This was not always the case, however, as the early Houthi founders received crucial support from Israel under Foreign Minister Golda Mier during the 1960 Yemeni Revolution (12). Israeli officials believed that by keeping Egyptian forces fighting in Yemen, they would be less inclined to pursue them. As a result, Israeli pilots delivered arms to Yemeni rebels which allowed them to continue the fight against the Egyptians (12). Houthi attitudes soured however, as a result of Hussein al-Houthi’s sermons which decried Israel as supporters of the Saudi regime and viewed their ire towards Iran as an indirect threat to themselves (12). Al-Houthi went a step further in his teachings as well, and described jewish people as “the ones who move this world, who spread corruption in this world” (13). While Houthi leaders have since stated that their true enemy is Israel and not Jewish people, the minority of Jews living in Yemen still live in fear of Houthi oppression (13). Approach to Resistance The Houthis have adopted a unique approach to their resistance by combining their cultural, political and military strengths into a powerful force. Initially, they began by taking a strictly political route; this meant participating in civil disobedience, or even attempting to create legal inroads to meet their demands. Hussein al-Houthi successfully ran for a parliamentary seat in 1993, which allowed the group to achieve some level of representation. Nonetheless, this did not last long as al-Houthi began to set his sights on larger issues, such as western influence in Yemen (4). In 2002, al-Houthi coined their infamous slogan of “ God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam.” This phrase deeply troubled Yemeni officials, and it soon became clear that a political route would no longer be feasible. After President Ali Abdullah Saleh issued an arrest warrant for Hussein al-Houthi, the Houthis responded with a violent insurgency that would last for years. In response, the Yemeni government deployed the full strength of their military and gathered support from neighboring Saudi Arabia. Outgunned and outtfunded, the Houthis relied on the Iranian military to obtain training and weaponry in the fight against the Saudis (2). Tactical training and access to advanced weaponry such as ballistic missiles, anti-tank missiles and naval defense tools helped level the playing field (2). While their military prowess has played a key role in their success, the Houthis also have an extensive media presence. Their use of televised speeches and published journals are some of their most powerful weapons in their “hearts and minds campaign” (5). Following the model of Hezbollah, the Houthis created their own television network, called ‘al-Masira TV’, which allows them to reach a wide audience (9). They have also employed the use of radio broadcasts such as al-Masira Radio and Sam FM in order to spread their propaganda nationwide. This method of resistance has allowed them to control much of their image as a group in the country, which is a main cause for the public’s support of them (9). Alliances and International Relations Despite being considered a terrorist group by many stakeholders in the Middle East, the Houthis are not totally ostracized from the region. The group's biggest foreign ally, Iran, has played a pivotal role in their continued resistance and military strength. Iran views them as another way to weaken Saudi control in the region, and thus an important long term investment (2). Essentially, the Houthis have found themselves at the midst of a proxy war, used as belligerents to the geopolitical Saudi-Iranian regional conflict. Although never officially substantiated, there have also been allegations that North Korea has provided weapons support via Syria (7). While North Korea does not have the same level of motivation that Iran does to back the Houthis, it still remains an important consideration in analyzing the Houthis’ foreign connections. Gallery Additional Resources

Group Overview Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (JNIM) is a Jihadist insurgent group that is active in the Maghreb and West Africa. Rather than being one singular organisation, JNIM is a coalition of several Jihadist groups. This has led to some confusion about its effectiveness and overall composition. Active in areas that stretch from Northern Mali to Southern Burkina Faso, violent terror-related incidents attributed to JNIM comprise more than 64 percent of all episodes of violent activity that are linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel region since 2017 (Eizenga and Williams 2020). History & Foundations JNIM formed through the merger of Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and the Saharan branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This merger occurred after the leaders of the respective groups declared allegiance to the leader of Al-Qaeda – Ayman al-Zawahiri – in March of 2017. This merger took place due to an adherence to Al-Qaeda’s doctrine of unification which would allow JNIM to bring resources such as weapons and materials together to expand its areas of operations. This unification essentially formalised previous collaborations between the varying jihadist groups which compose it, as well as allowing a form of hierarchy to be created in which AQIM would oversee the actions of JNIM (Stanford University 2018). Objectives & Ideology Although it is often presented as a singular group with united objectives such as the removal of French forces in the Sahel, this is not the case with the objectives of the coalition of Jihadists in its active areas. For example, in Central Mali and Northern Burkina Faso, one of the component groups – the MLF (Macina Liberation Front) – is more active in combating government forces and imposing its view of Sharia law upon the local populations. This has led the MLF to be responsible for the majority of violent events in JNIM-held territory (Eizenga and Williams 2020). Additionally, the vagueness of JNIM’s structure makes it difficult to specifically attribute the actions of each individual group which composes the coalition. Essentially, this complicates the task of pinning the blame on a specific group within the coalition. In JNIM-held territory, the coalition’s actions are motivated not only on a political or ideological basis, but also by the exertion of control over the lucrative gold mining routes. The gold-producing sites in the areas affected by jihadist violence are estimated to be valued at upwards of 34 million USD per year (Lewis and Mcneill 2019). Although the varying groups have differing local activities, ranging from gold theft to the extortion of locals and the forced implementation of Sharia law, one ideological domain does unify them – Salafism. Salafism is the radical form of Sunni Islam in which the adherents seek to establish a global caliphate through violence and militant actions. Military Abilities Due to the nature and structure of the coalition, the effectivennes of its abilities to commit to an armed resistance and terror campaign in the Sahel is limited to the overall coordination of the groups involved. JNIM is estimated to have around 1000 – 2000 active fighters at a given time. However, due to organisational vagueness and the lack of a concrete structure within the coalition, misperceptions about their operational strength are prominent. This can also lead to a failure when designating that certain attacks were indeed carried out by the coalition itself. However, the tactics used by all the groups are similar and can range from terror attacks on the local population to the kidnapping of aid workers and journalists; such as Olivier Dubois who was kidnapped in April of 2021 (Reuters 2021). This all utilises equipment seen commonly in the arsenal of other organisations and can also include bombs and IEDs which have been commonly used by JNIM to increase the lethality of their attacks (MacDougall 2021). Approach to Resistance JNIM is extremely violent and has been responsible for a variety of attacks on UN peacekeepers, as well as on the French Armed Forces present in the area as a part of Operation Barkhane. In response to a French raid on JNIM forces in northern Mali, the group attacked the French embassy and army headquarters in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, which resulted in the deaths of 8 people and the wounding of 80 others (Weiss 2018). This represents the JNIM’s approach to combat and resistance as they are willing to attack high-profile targets such as the French army’s foreign headquarters. International Relations & Alliances JNIM has incorporated various local groups which they view as inalienable to its political struggle to implement Sharia law in its active areas. This, for instance, has included the incorporation and integration of ethnic Fulani militias (such as the Macina Liberation Front), as well as other ethnic groups such as the Tuaregs. This approach is effective as these small local groups and militias have frequently been the subjects of responses by the French Forces (and other local governments) and view these interventions as an attack on their way of life. As JNIM is an al-Qaeda affiliate, it has a strong rivalry with the Islamic State (IS) and its militants who operate in the North Africa and Sahel region. The formation of JNIM coincides directly with the loss of territory suffered by the IS and the weakening of its affiliates and offshoots in their various active regions (Cristiani 2017). One of the major components of the Tuareg militia engaging in the north of Mali is Ansar Dine (AD). AD was founded by Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg militant from Mali’s Kidal Region. Iyad Ag Ghaly is a key stakeholder when analysing Tuareg rebellions in Mali since the 1980s, especially due to his founding of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in 1988. Nevertheless, since being a signee of the Tamanrasset Accords in 1991 (which aimed to end the Tuareg rebellion in Mali), Ag Ghaly has been active in other militant organisations in the region -- one of them being Ansar Dine. AD sought to impose absolute sharia across Mali and their takeover of Timbuktu in 2012 prompted the French-led Operation Serval (Daniel 2012). In 2013, following the successful conclusion of Operation Serval, the French military expanded the scope of Serval by initiating Operation Barkhane in 2014. Operation Barkhane had the public aim of helping the country's governments to maintain control of their territory (BBC News 2014). The merger of Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, and al-Mourabitoun into the JNIM organisation is another indicator of the further integration of Tuareg militia forces in the overall Islamic insurgency in the Mali conflict, as well as in the conflict in the affected Greater Sahel region. Additional Resources

Overview & Introduction Rev Dia (RD), known in English as ‘Revolutionary Action’, is an anarchist group with influence primarily spanning the former soviet states of Belarus and Ukraine (1). RD was formed after a meeting in a Minsk café on February 13th, 2005. They were initially established as a part of the libertarian-communist movement Autonomous Action. However, RD would later go on to become an independent organization in order to focus more on direct action and anarcho-activism (2). Using its website and social media accounts, RD aims to unite members of the anarchist movement in an attempt to concentrate their efforts in a singular direction and provide a platform to spread anarchist ideas (3). Taking part in political actions such as Chernobyl Way, The Maidan, and the 2020 Belarus election protests, RD has proven itself to be a consistent and sometimes violent part of social revolts in the region (3). Although they often ally with non-anarchist political movements, RD claims these actions are purely strategic; these alliances support the group’s struggle to shift their countries’ ideological tendencies away from what they view as restrictive, authoritarian laws which limit their ability to operate openly (4). Currently, RD works underground by spraying pro-anarchist graffiti and displaying banners in major metropolitan areas of Belarus and Ukraine (5). The increasing influence of neo-nazi ideology in their communities has also motivated RD to conduct attacks on known neo-nazi figures and hold training to familiarize members with firearms, hand-to-hand combat, and protest tactics (2). This training materialized in 2022, when some members volunteered to fight for Ukraine against Russia due to fears of similar invasions being carried out on other former-Soviet states (6). History & Foundations Belarus and Ukraine are two countries with long and varied histories with anarchy. Nestor Makhno and anti-government punk bands like Mister X, for instance, are some of the most notable references when overviewing these countries’ anarchist figures (7). This history – along with the politically active post-Soviet world – motivated members from the Belarusian Anarchist Front and individuals from the hardcore punk music scene to open their own Autonomous Action branch in Minsk, in February 2005. Under the name of Autonomous Action Belarus (AD-Belarus), and with a size of fewer than ten members, they began developing a website to draw attention to anarchists' actions. Offline, AD-Belarus would promote itself at punk concerts by handing out literature. The group quickly gained traction through its website and activity at the 2005 Chernobyl-Way rallies, causing a subsequent influx of applicants and members into the organization. AD-Belarus' original strategy was to create a network of every like-minded anarchist possible. However, the lack of consistently-active members caused the group to enact stricter policies, such as a probationary period for applicants and blacklisting alcohol abusers. During political actions in late 2007 and early 2008, anarchist protesters engaged in fights and direct confrontation with neo-nazi protesters AD-Belarus responded to the criticism that ensued by adopting a more militant approach, establishing a set of rules meant to change the public view of the group, from that of a subculture to that of an organized resistance. This shift in image led AD-Belarus to distance itself from the pacifist-minded strategies of Autonomous Action and caused them to launch their own organization, Revolutionary Action (2). Objectives & Ideology Compared to other anarchist organizations that reside in former Soviet states, RD aims to separate itself from the western style of cultural anarchism. Instead, the group opts for social anarchism which focuses more on mutual aid such as protest protection (2). The authoritarian nature of the Ukrainian and Belarusian governments has caused RD to adopt an illegalist ideology (3). This means the group will actively go against the law by partaking in illegal demonstrations and vandalism to promote resistance (8). RD hopes that by providing assistance to political movements, spreading literature, and showing resistance to the government, they will be able to inspire revolution – an element of societal revolt that they view as the foundations to a potential world-anarchist society (3). Militant Abilities Rev Dia works primarily as an underground organization. Instead of operating through a large overarching organization structure, RD has opted for the ability to operate through small, well-organized cells. Each cell member is responsible for a specific task, such as government agitation, writing articles, participating in protests, designing brochures, or organizing lectures (3). This division into multiple ‘cells’ allows Rev Dia members to prioritize their reach in a specific community, while also having the network of a national organization. The benefits of this network are shown by their annual training camps, where different cells meet to conduct combat drills, hold discussions on doctrine, and make acquaintances with other members (9). The information gained at these camps allows participants to return to their cells to help organize anarchist campaigns and even attacks on political adversaries which are relevant to achieving the goals discussed during the camp. Approach to Resistance Due to RD's illegalist component, the group's approach to resistance most notably consists of vandalism, illegal demonstrations, and occasional assaults (10). RD has posted media of members targeting government buildings with arson attacks and beating neo-nazi figures with batons (11). In metropolitan areas such as Kharkiv or Minsk, Rev Dia has plastered flyers, graffiti, and banners promoting the group's views. Online, RD members write articles that criticize government figures and raise awareness for political prisoners (12). Offline members hold and organize anti-government marches and protest outside of jails. For instance, RD members protested outside of the prison holding Azat Miftakhov – a Moscow State University student who was arrested under suspicion of trying to construct an explosive, but many believed was framed because he held anarchist views (11). Alliances & Relations Since the start of the 2022 Conflict in Ukraine, some RD members have joined a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force (TDF) unit, which labels itself as an anarchist/anti-fascist unit (13). Outside of this TDF, Rev Dia has also worked with members of the Anarcha Autonome movement in France to hold a benefit concert for the people of Ukraine (14). Besides these instances, RD tends not to report on its partnerships, presumably to remain underground. Additional Resources

Group Overview The Lords Resistance Army is an armed rebel group originally founded in Uganda in response to Museveni's takeover. The group now operates more in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan. It is led by the notorious Joseph Kony, who has been successfully hiding from the authorities and security forces for decades and who considers himself to be a spiritual 'medium'; hence the group's religious narrative, which is mixed with the traditional customs of clan society. The group's aim is to take power in Uganda and run the state according to Kony's 'adapted' Ten Commandments which stem off of the classic Ten Commandments yet also include a ban on smoking and on cycling. However, these commandments are not definitive and allegedly change persistently, depending on what the spirit 'says' to Joseph Kony (Holter 2019). The Lord's Resistance Army is particularly notorious for its brutality against the civilian population and for the kidnappings of children, who are then manipulated as child soldiers and slaves. The LRA is one of the longest-standing terrorist organisations in Africa. Nonetheless, the LRA has lost relevance and ability in recent years. History & Foundations The Lords Resistance Army was formed in 1988 in Uganda, a country where insurgent groups have a complex history. The first direct predecessor of the LRA was the Uganda Peoples Defence Army (UDPA), which was later succeeded by the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM). After the collapse of the HSM, its structural and ideological remnants complemented the rise of the Lord's Resistance Army. The conflict between the LRA and the government, on the other hand, has its roots in the fall of the Idi Amin regime. When Museveni took power, the Acholi people were excluded from political positions, security forces and other institutions. (NCTC 2022). This caused resistance to the new government, which subsequently led to fighting against the government. This created space for the emergence of rebel groups that eventually evolved into the Lord's Resistance Army. In 2005, an arrest warrant for Joseph Kony and four his commanders was issued by the International Criminal Court, but to this day without success (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010). Ideology & Objectives Ideologically, the Lord’s Resistance Army is a Christian extremist group with clannish elements. Central to their ideology is the Ten Commandments. Later, an eleventh commandment was added which forbade cycling – the penalty for this offense was the amputation of a limb. Ethnicity is very important when analysing the LRA's ideology, as the conflict is based on a battle between the Bantu tribes in the south and the Nilotic tribes in the north -- particularly the Baganda and Acholi people. These disputes are mainly about the occupation of the highest positions in government and politics by the different tribes. Acholis came to feel oppressed and discriminated against by Baganda people, who -- according to the Acholi people -- disproportionately rule the country. This created tensions and, over the decades, this situation has given rise to a large number of rebel groups. Joseph Kony, the leader of the LRA, sees himself as a prophet, messiah, and tribal "spiritual medium", creating the aforementioned religious narrative. In addition to Christian extremism, the LRA's ideology also contains elements of Acholi mysticism and tribal religious customs. (Allen, Vlassenroot, 2010) Military Strategy The central element of the LRA’s paramilitary strategy is violence. Common punishments include cutting ears, noses, or amputating limbs. The strategy of the Lord's Resistance Army has evolved quite a bit since its inception and has gone through several phases, even observing fluctuations in the level of brutality against the civilian population. Doy denotes the LRA’s strategic evolution in three phases - Homegrown Rebellion, Proxy Warfare and Roving Banditry (Doy 2017). The group reached the last descending phase partly due to two operations against the LRA - Operation North and Operation Iron Fist (Allen, Vlassenroot, 2010). For instance, the last phase (the LRA’s evolution into plain, roving banditry) is characterised by the group's involvement in local criminality and illegal markets – in particular the illegal acquisition and smuggling of diamonds, gold or ivory. Nonetheless, this phase has also resulted in a decrease in the level of brutality against the civilian population, and a decrease in the number of child abductions. Above all, the LRA's adaptation to the current situation can be seen in the group's gradual migration from Uganda to the east and north into the CAR, South Sudan and the DRC. The group is trying to maintain its existence through this strategic relocation, although this has also reduced the cohesion of the LRA (as it has been forced to flee into the jungle and abandon electronic communications in order to avoid detection and capture (Day 2017, Faber 2017). All of this makes communication significantly more difficult, leading to lower combat capability. Fragmentation of the group is also an important feature; due to jungle escape and communication problems, the group is fragmented into smaller groups that operate in their separate controlled territories (Faber, 2017). International Relations & Alliances The Lord's Resistance Army does not maintain much of a relationship with other insurgent groups, both because of its unique, unconventional religious ideology, and because it has primarily local ambitions. On the other hand, the LRA maintains a fairly strong relationship with the Sudanese government, which supports them both financially and materially – with money, arms, and bases in Sudan (Allen & Vlassenroot, 2010). Furthermore, the group is fairly isolated and this precludes potential alliances with other insurgencies. In addition, the fact that the organisation and leadership of the group is essentially in the hands of one man - Joseph Kony - reduces the possibility of official alliances (as all decision-making power relies on one individual). The LRA’s only formal alliance is with the Allied Democratic Forces (an Islamist rebel group). The LRA and the ADF have agreed to fight together against the Ugandan government (Batre 2019). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula (AQSP) is an Egyptian jihadist organisation that was formed during a merger of al-Qaeda operatives who were already present in the Sinai and the terror organisation Ansar al-Jihad. This branch of al-Qaeda was first announced to be operating in August of 2006 when the then-deputy leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced that it had split from a rival Islamist organisation in the region known as al-Islamiyya. In December 2011, Ansar al-Jihad announced its formation in which they promised to “fulfil the oath of the martyr of the Ummah, [their] Sheikh Osama bin Laden” (Roggio 2011b). While the cooperation between the component groups of AQSP is uncertain, they have all pledged an oath of allegiance to the overarching al-Qaeda organisation. History & Foundations AQSP released a pamphlet and statement in which they called for the abolition of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and an end to the discrimination against the Bedouin population (Simcox 2011). This follows similar foundations of al-Qaeda groups in other regions in which they latch onto particularly contentious ethnic relations between governments and minority ethnic groups. This was also seen in Somalia with al-Shabaab (an al-Qaeda affiliate group). These two groups (AQSP and al-Shabaab) follow a similar methodology and history in that they were set up in an attempt to gain local ethnic support for Salafist and jihadist causes. This support for minority ethnic groups such as the Bedouin tribe stems from the discrimination that the ethnic group suffered following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in which the Egyptian government believed that the Bedouins had collaborated with the Israeli army (Melik 2012). The exclusion of the Bedouin tribe from the Sinai region's development in economic terms has, over time, led to the Bedouins becoming involved with organised crime and more importantly smuggling of narcotics and even explosives (Gleis 2007). The contentious relationship between the Sinai province and the central Egyptian government has, over time, enabled terrorist stakeholders such as AQSP to gather and cement objectives preying on problems and negative relations between parties with vested interests in the area. Objectives and Ideology AQSP has several objectives within the Sinai province, which range from the creation of an independent Islamic emirate in the Sinai to the introduction of strict sharia law and the end of discrimination against the Bedouin population. This emphasis on independence for the Sinai region and the call to end discrimination by the Egyptian government seems to suggest that ideological elements of the main Bedouin population have been radicalised and implemented by AQ and that they are, as mentioned previously, attempting to gather larger amounts of support from the affected minority populations in the Sinai (Simcox 2011). Military & Political Abilities The military capabilities of al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula are extensive and revolve around similar tactics to other groups present in the region, including the local ISIS cell known as ISSP (Islamic State Sinai Province) and also AQSP’s component groups, such as Ansar al Sharia (Joscelyn 2012). This involves small arms attacks against the military forces of Egypt and Israel who are present in the Sinai province following Israeli military intervention in the area to “protect its insecure southern border” (Amer 2019). However, the group has more frequently been accused of using IEDs to increase the lethality of its attacks on police and military forces. Another aspect of AQSP’s military capabilities is that – since 2018 – it is believed that ex-Egyptian army officers had defected and joined the group. This poses a major problem and security threat for the Egyptian army in their efforts to combat the insurgency (Reuters 2018), as an increase in veterans within the group could allow the organisation to gain large amounts of crucial military training, as well as organisational improvement. Approach to Resistance AQSP has an extremely violent and coordinated approach to its resistance against the Egyptian state, which involves the aforementioned attacks on the Egyptian military and police forces. These attacks on the Egyptian police force have included the killing of 16 policemen in Egypt’s Western desert in an ambush (other sources tally the number as high as 52 police officers) (Mohamed Hassan and Tolba 2017). Another way in which AQSP approaches its ideological battle is through attacks on the pipeline which transports natural gas from Egypt to Israel (Roggio 2011a). This shows a willingness for the group to not only target the state forces of Egypt, but also to yield the capabilities to disable a major economic function of the state. International Relations & Potential Alliances Apart from being linked to the main al-Qaeda organisation through its swearing of allegiance (undertaken in 2011), AQSP has several notable links to other insurgent organisations which operate in and around the Sinai. One of these is the Mujahideen Shura Council. Although not related to the Mujahideen Shura Council which is present in Iraq, the MSC present in the Sinai released a video in 2012 praising the IED attack on a vehicle used by Israeli construction workers in which one person died (Roggio 2012). Similarly to other al-Qaeda offshoots present in other regions, AQSP has also come into conflict with the Islamic State and their affiliates. For instance, Jund al-Islam (one of the component members of AQSP), stated that it has the power to “uproot” ISIS following an attack on ISIS fighters in 2017 in which a number of the ISIS fighters were killed (Green 2017). This seems to show more evidence of a pattern of conflict between the rival Islamic insurgent groups, in which AQ will combat and come into conflict with ISIS in the regions in which they operate to gain influence amongst the local population.

Insurgency Overview The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (also spelled Ezzedine al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and abbreviated as IQB and EQB) are the armed wing of Hamas, the Islamist political party that rules the Gaza Strip. It is the best-equipped and largest militant faction in the Gaza Strip and has fought multiple wars against Israel. The IQB was founded in 1992 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to wage war against Israel. Objectives and Ideology The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades’ ideology is that of political Islamism and anti-Zionism. The Brigades were established as the military wing of Hamas, which was founded as a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (1). Many of the founding members were heavily influenced by the writings of Sayyid Qutb, the so-called “Father of Salafi jihadism”(2). Hamas and the IQB's ideological principles and objectives are laid out in a pair of documents: the 1988 Charter and the 2017 policy document. The 1998 Charter defines Hamas’ political program as Islam and its objectives as retaking the entirety of what was Palestine under the British Mandate, and that none of it should be given up as they consider it an Islamic Waqf (endowment) for Muslims dating back to the Islamic conquests (3). In 2017, Hamas released a document in which it said it would accept a two-state solution with the caveat of a return of refugees. However, this document also explicitly states that it still rejects the Oslo Accords and reaffirms the legitimate right to undertake jihad against Israel (4). History & Foundations The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades were established due to the near destruction of Hamas in the wake of the group’s first military operation against Israel. The 'Palestinian Mujahideen', as the organisation’s military command was known at the time, kidnapped IDF Sergeant Avi Sasportas on the 7th February 1989 and soldier Ilan Saadon on the 3rd of May the same year, with both being executed. A security breach meant that Israeli occupation authorities were able to uncover the chain of command responsible for the operation; this lead to the arrest of any person in the West Bank and Gaza with an affiliation with Hamas. Learning from this, all military operations were isolated from the rest of the group’s activities during the restructuring of Hamas. The first of these units to be created was the IQB, named after the militant Syrian cleric of the same name who advocated for jihad and organized armed resistance against Zionists and the British in Mandatory Palestine. The IQB undertook its first armed operation in 1992 (13). Between 1992 and 1998, the IQB developed to a moderate extent but was dealt a number of blows by both the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli authorities. The IQB was made up of a collection of cells that carried out ad hoc military operations and could not withstand the arrests and assassinations of their leaders by the PA and Israeli forces. In addition to a shortage of equipment and funds, a lack of military and security experience amongst both members and commanders exacerbated the Brigades’ shortcomings. Towards the end of the 1990s, the security forces tightened their grip on the IQB and by 1998 the PA’s security apparatus had largely uncovered the group’s command structure, resulting in the assassination of the group’s cadres by the Israeli security forces (14). The Second Intifada in 2000 reversed the IQB’s fortunes as it brought a wave of support for its parent organisation (Hamas) and military action. Furthermore, dozens of former IQB cadres were released from PA prisons, causing the militant group to experience an influx in personnel. Notably among those released were explosives experts Bilal and Abdullah al-Barghuti; the latter was The Brigades’ chief bomb maker and is currently serving 67 life-term sentences in Israeli prison (15). Until 2005, the IQB continued to operate as individual cells with no awareness of other cells’ activities. The group was further strengthened by the withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon in April 2005 (following the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese politician and the country’s former prime minister). This meant the Axis of Resistance, composed of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, had to rely more heavily on its local allies which led to the IQB inheriting Syrian material left in Lebanon (16). Approach to Resistance Serving as the military wing of Hamas, the IQB undertakes offensive operations against Israel. This includes suicide bombings and incursions into Israel through the use of tunnel networks to carry out kidnappings of Israelis (5). The group also employs rocket strikes against both military and civilian targets, which has led to psychological trauma amongst civilians living under the threat of rocket attack. The group's activities have led it to be proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the EU (6), Australia (7), New Zealand (8), Egypt (9), and the UK (10), whilst the US (11) and Canada (12) consider its parent organisation Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Following Hamas’ victory in the 2006 legislative elections, a power struggle the next year led to Hamas taking control of Gaza and the Fatah-affiliated President of the PA which remained in control of the West Bank. This has mostly limited the IQB’s activity to the Gaza Strip but has allowed them to build up a substantial military presence (17). Since Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007, the IQB has been involved in multiple wars with Israel, namely in 2008-9, 2012, 2014, and most recently in 2021. Operation Cast Lead was launched in late 2008 and involved a 22-day assault on Gaza, with Israel's stated aim to be toppling the Hamas government. The assault cost around 1,400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli lives (18). Operation Pillar of Defence, launched on the 14th of November, lasted 8 days and cost 175 Palestinian lives (19). The 2014 Gaza War cost around 2,200 Palestinian and 67 Israeli lives, with both sides committing war crimes (according to the United Nations). Over the course of the 50-day conflict, the IQB and other Palestinian factions fired 6,600 mortars and rockets into Israel (20). In May 2021, 260 Palestinians lost their lives in airstrikes that – according to Israel – were targeting military instalments in the Gaza Strip. Over the course of the fighting, Palestinian armed groups launched 4,360 unguided rockets and mortars towards Israeli population centres (21). Military Capabilities In terms of manpower, Hamas leaders estimated the number of troops in the Brigades’ ranks at close to 20,000. Nonetheless, MiddleEastEye reported in 2015 that some observers estimated the organisation’s manpower to be closer to 40,000 members (22). The most notable component of the IQB’s military capabilities is its rocket arsenal, which is composed of both foreign weapons and those developed in the Gaza Strip. Rockets produced in Gaza include the short-range Qassam series of rockets. The table below outlines the development of the Qassam series and its improving destructive power. Source: Al Jazeera. ‘Hamas Missiles: Qassam Frantisi, then Ja’bari’. Al Jazeera net. Accessed 15 October 2022. https://bit.ly/3gcEvN5. A fourth iteration of the Qassam exists, which reportedly has a range of 15-17km (23). Additional Resources