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Insurgency Overview The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies, known simply as the G9, is an alliance of gangs known for its role in the ongoing Haitian gang war. Formed in 2020 by former police officer Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, the gang is the most powerful faction in the conflict. Influenced by Chérizier’s police experience, the G9 is heavily armed and organized into a hierarchical paramilitary (1) . In the absence of a meaningful state presence, the G9 aims to establish control over the country through violence. Chérizier hopes to legitimize his power and has established a larger coalition known as Viv Ansanm, which currently controls over 80% of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. The gang was supported by assassinated Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, who provided the G9 with weapons, funding, and immunity in exchange for maintaining order on the streets when government forces could not (2) . Although Chérizier claims that the G9 is a revolutionary organization with the goal of taking back Haiti from a corrupt government and restoring power to the people, the gang is mostly focused on street-level conflict with rival gangs and police that has led to the deaths of over four thousand Haitians. It is also responsible for several massacres and jailbreaks, and its members are known for extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. The gang has thousands of members, many of them teenagers (1) . Chérizier speaking to G9 gang members: History & Foundations Since the colonial period and the Haitian Revolution, Haiti has long been a hotbed for violence and political turmoil. State-sponsored gangs go back to the regime of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier from 1957 to 1971, during which he employed death squads to attack his political rivals and suppress dissent (1) . Recent years have brought a sequence of destabilizing events, starting with the 2010 earthquake that destroyed the country’s infrastructure, caused USD $8 billion in damage, and killed over 200 thousand people (3) . After the earthquake, gang violence surged as the government and UN forces were incapable of maintaining control over the devastated nation (1) . In 2017, Jovenel Moïse was hand-picked to replace Michel Martelly as president by Martelly himself. Martelly oversaw widespread corruption and government support for gangs during the country’s post-hurricane recovery (4) . Moïse’s presidency was marked by parliamentary deadlock as the state crumbled and gangs stepped into its place (1) . With UN forces gone, no presence of authority, and another hurricane in 2018, Haiti found itself in a dire situation (5) . Jimmy Chérizier was raised in the Delmas neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, which would go on to become his stronghold. It is disputed whether he got his nickname “Barbecue” from his mother’s chicken stand or from his alleged habit of burning his enemies alive. During the post-hurricane instability in Haiti, Chérizier served in a special unit in the Haitian National Police, where he was alleged to have overseen massacres and extrajudicial killings. He was fired from the police force in 2018, but by then he had already formed the Delmas 6 gang based out of his childhood neighborhood (6) . Chérizier began to unite with other gangs supported by then-president Moïse in 2020. With Moïse’s support, the gangs began to attack other anti-government gangs to expand their territory while committing massacres against civilians in the process. In a June 2020 YouTube video, Chérizier announced the formation of the G9 Alliance (7) . Initially consisting of nine gangs, the “family” soon expanded to over 12 (8) . Chérizier leading his gang in a march: After the formation of the alliance, the G9 attacked the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cité Soleil, a stronghold for anti-government gangs. During the assault, the gang killed at least 111 people, including many civilians, while authorities stood by (7) . The next month, the rival G-Pep alliance was formed. Based out of neighborhoods under attack by the G9 such as Cité Soleil, the gang is backed by opposition parties and prominent businessmen (9) . The cycle of violence escalated, with both gangs engaging in street warfare in which civilians were often caught in the crossfire or were targeted as residents of rival neighborhoods. The situation in the country became more desperate as gangs expanded their control, infrastructure crumbled, businesses closed, and the economy disintegrated. All the while, the police, military, and government were powerless to stop the conflict. Not only were they outmanned and outgunned by the gangs, but even if they could quell the violence they were directed not to by corrupt government officials, including President Moïse himself (10) (7) . In the middle of the night on July 7th, 2021, 28 mercenaries stormed Moïse’s home in Port-au-Prince and assassinated him (11) . The mercenaries, 26 Colombians and two Haitian Americans, were hired by Counter Terrorist Unit Security, a company based out of Florida. Many of them were former Colombian military soldiers and were told that their mission in Haiti would be to provide security to government officials (29) . It is still unknown who was ultimately behind the assassination. However several of Moïse’s political rivals and his widow, Martine Moïse, have been charged for their involvement (12) . After Moïse’s assassination, Chérizier and other gang leaders exploited the weakness of the government to further expand their control. Despite calling for the president’s resignation a week before his death, Chérizier held a memorial for Moïse filled with G9 members and had his men participate in the manhunt for the assailants (13) (14) . He began to espouse more explicitly political rhetoric, stating that Haiti’s elite, opposition politicians, and foreign imperialists conspired to assassinate Moïse. He declared that he was leading an armed revolution against these parties, marking a shift in the G9’s role in the conflict (15) . Instead of solely fighting for control of territory against rival gangs, Chérizier sought to unite Haiti's gangs against his political enemies, such as the new government. The G9 took control of Terminal Varreux, Haiti’s major oil terminal, for leverage over Ariel Henry, the country’s new president (16) . However, all the while the G9 and G-Pep continued fighting. In April 2022, the G9 and their allies Chen Mechan clashed with the 400 Mawozo, the largest gang in Haiti, in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac suburb of Port-au-Prince. Over 200 people were killed in the span of two weeks, the vast majority of whom were civilians murdered for associating with a rival gang. Following the battle, the 400 Mawozo joined the conflict on the side of G-Pep, giving them a fighting chance against the G9. Another 89 people were killed in two days in July of 2022 during a battle for control of the Cité Soleil neighborhood, a G-Pep stronghold (17) . Both battles resulted in little change in territory. In the wake of the violence, vigilante groups formed against gangs and law enforcement (18) . With almost all of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area in the hands of gangs, the United Nations Security Council signed off on a resolution allowing a foreign intervention of troops led by Kenya and supported by the United States. The resolution came after the Haitian government requested international help fighting the G9 and other gangs the previous year (19). However, when President Ariel Henry flew to Kenya to sign off on the intervention on February 29, 2024, the G9 attacked the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Haiti’s largest airport, to prevent Henry’s return. In the days following, gangs stormed two prisons and freed almost 5,000 inmates. They took control of the country’s main port and attacked government and police buildings while Chérizier demanded Henry’s resignation. Henry gave in to the demands on March 12th (20) . In February 2024, G9, G-Pep, and other gangs united to form the Viv Ansanm coalition, meaning “Living Together,” to take on government and foreign forces. The coalition is led by Chérizier, as he hopes to use it to achieve his political ambitions. However, members of the coalition do occasionally still fight amongst each other (2) . In June 2024, the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti was deployed to bolster the local police’s efforts against the G9 and other gangs. So far, Kenya, Benin, The Bahamas, and Jamaica have deployed personnel on the ground, with several other countries having pledged troops. The mission is backed by the UN and has received over USD $18 million in funding from the United States, Canada, and France (21) . Chérizier sees the intervention as an act of imperialism and has mobilized the G9 and the Viv Ansanm to fight against it (22) . Objectives & Ideology The G9 is unlike other gangs in the sense that it is not a criminal enterprise with the goal of profit. The gang war in Haiti is fueled by competing factions vying for control. With its well-organized structure and the ambitious Chérizier at its head, the G9 has come to be the strongest of these factions. At the onset of the conflict, the G9 and other gangs were backed by politicians in exchange for political support. The gangs were allowed to do as they pleased and even received material support, as was the case with the G9 and the Moïse government. Politicians would send resources to the areas controlled by aligned gangs while neglecting those controlled by rivals. This arrangement also allowed politicians to control neighborhoods that the police could not due to the rampant violence (7) . As their power became legitimized through government support, the G9 found itself filling a power vacuum. However as the state deteriorated following Moïse’s assassination and the ousting of Henry, it became clear that the politicians created a monster they could not control, and the gangs began focusing their efforts on police, infrastructure, and government institutions (2) . Chérizier has done everything in his power to accelerate the collapse of the government so he can seize power in its place. Chérizier has branded himself as a left-wing populist, using black nationalist and anticolonial rhetoric appealing to Haiti’s long history of struggle against colonialism. He has popularized an image of himself in the likeness of Che Guevara (23) . He claims that he is leading a revolution against Haiti’s corrupt elite and foreign powers that seek to encroach upon the country’s sovereignty. However, no evidence suggests the G9 rank and file are motivated by ideology, and although Chérizier has taken the fight to Haiti’s most powerful people, his talk of revolution serves as little more than a weak facade. The G9 frequently targets the civilians Chérizier claims to defend and the gang has held Haiti’s supply chain hostage to further their power, preventing vital goods from reaching a desperate population. Furthermore, before Moïse’s assassination, the G9 were affiliated with the center-right Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK). The PHTK has been accused of the same corruption that Chérizier claims to be fighting against (1) . Political & Military Capabilities In comparison to other gangs active in Haiti at the moment, the G9 is a well-organized, heavily armed group with an established hierarchy. Although it is not the largest gang in the country, Chérizier’s police background helped him distinguish the G9 from the numerous other disorganized gangs, allowing the G9 to establish itself at the top of the pack. The G9 is organized in a paramilitary structure with various commanders and lieutenants. The original nine gangs that formed the coalition are Chérizier’s own Delmas 6 Gang, the Belekou gang, Baz Pilate, Baz Krache Dife, Nan Ti Bwa, Nan Boston, the Simon Pelé gang, Baz Nan Chabon, and Waf Jérémie. Many members are teenagers from poor backgrounds (1) . Young Haitians have few opportunities, making the power and prestige that comes with joining gangs appealing. Although it is unknown how many members the G9 has, there are around 12,000 gang members in Haiti spread throughout over 200 different gangs (24) (9) . The G9 and other gangs currently control over 80% of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area, as the local police and multinational intervention do not have the resources to combat them at this point (2) . The gang is armed with military-grade weapons trafficked from the USA, including AR-15s and AK-47s. Firearms are obtained through strawman purchases in states with weak gun control laws and then shipped to Florida, where they make their way through the Caribbean Sea to Haiti, typically hidden in shipping containers containing consumer goods. There are also smaller streams of weapons coming from Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Some weapons legally obtained by Haitian police and security forces are also resold to or stolen by gangs. The arms market in Haiti is a particularly lucrative business, as weapons sold in Haiti can fetch up to 20 times their value in the USA (10) . A G9 weapons cache: Approach to Resistance The G9 has solidified control over its territory through street conflict with government forces and rival gangs. Fighting is extremely close quarters, with gangs battling it out block by block. The G9 extorts and kidnaps for ransom the residents of their neighborhoods as a source of income. However, it also provides public services, such as distributing food and water, in an effort to maintain Chérizier’s image as a Robin Hood figure (1) . The gang does not hold the same grace for rival neighborhoods, carrying out numerous extrajudicial killings and massacres to exert their control. During these massacres, rape and torture are common (7) . The G9 is active in drug trafficking, as Haiti is a trans-shipment point for cocaine and marijuana coming from South America to the US and Europe; however, this is not one of its main focuses. Although Haiti’s weak law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the flow of drugs in and out of the country, major drug trafficking organizations regard the situation in Haiti as too chaotic to move their merchandise through. In recent years, drug trafficking through Haiti has declined as South American traffickers have opted to use the Central American corridor instead. While Haiti is not a large drug market, the narcotics flowing through the country are also distributed by gangs domestically. The G9 controls key ports in Port-au-Prince used for arms and drug trafficking (10) . As the conflict has escalated and the gang has focused its efforts against the government, it has taken to capturing vital infrastructure, such as Terminal Varreux and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, to use as bargaining chips. These operations, as well as the 2024 jailbreaks, have also weakened the government and allowed the gang to expand its power. These destructive actions have accelerated Haiti’s collapse, allowing gangs to fill the void and Chérizier to become one of the country’s most powerful men. Relations & Alliances The G9’s alliances and rivalries frequently change based on Chérizier’s opportunistic whims. One day he may be condemning one group and the next he will find himself standing alongside them. For instance, the G-Pep alliance, which until recently was the G9’s most formidable rival, has now allied with the G9 in the Viv Ansanm coalition. G-Pep formed in reaction to the G9’s terror (9) . The two gangs were backed by opposing parties, with the center-right PHTK supporting the G9 and the center-left Struggling People's Organization and other opposition parties supporting G-Pep (25) . The gangs have a complicated relationship with the government and police. Although Chérizier claims to be fighting against a corrupt state and has attacked police and government targets, the G9 and other gangs have often been granted amnesty from the government for their affiliation with politicians (7) . Furthermore, many gang members are former police officers or soldiers, including Chérizier himself (6) . The Bwa Kale vigilante movement sprung up in 2022 after the massacres in the Cité Soleil and Plaine du Cul-de-Sac neighborhoods, using brutal tactics against the G9 and other gangs. Vigilantes have been known to lynch and burn their victims alive. Vigilantes killed over 300 people in 2023 alone (26) . Chérizier has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury and the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to stop the flow of weapons to the G9 (27) . The G9’s escalation of the conflict has led to the UN-backed intervention. The multinational coalition has pledged 2,500 personnel to fight the gangs, but only 600 have arrived thus far after months of delays (28) . Although there is a history of human rights abuses from the previous UN intervention in the country, 63% of Haitians polled in 2023 said that they support an intervention. However, Chérizier has used that history, including widespread sexual abuse by peacekeepers and a cholera outbreak stemming from a UN facility that killed over 9,300 Haitians, to legitimize his fight against the foreign force (22) (30) . Haitians living in gang-controlled areas are still reliant on gangs for basic necessities in the absence of a functioning economy and state. Meanwhile, the disoriented and corrupt Haitian National Police is ill-prepared to receive coalition forces. There is also a lack of clarity on the mission’s mandate, chain of command, and human rights oversight (31) . Works Cited (APA) (1) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2022). Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power, and an escalating crisis . https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti.pdf . (2) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024). Viv Ansanm: How a gang coalition has transformed violence in Port-au-Prince . https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/ht-obs-001/01-viv-ansanm-gang-coalition-violence-port-au-prince.html . (3) - National Centre For Environmental Information. (2010). Significant Earthquake Information: Haiti 2010. https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazel/view/hazards/earthquake/event-more-info/8732#:~:text=The%20official%20estimate%20settled%20on,170%2C000%20buried%20in%20mass%20graves.&text=Ref%20%237096%3A,the%20UN%20mission%20in%20Haiti . (4) - Psaledakis, D. and Webber, C. (2024, August 20). US sanctions Haiti's ex-president Martelly, citing drug trafficking. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-imposes-sanctions-former-haitian-president-over-drug-trafficking-2024-08-20/ . (5) - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). Haiti: 2018 Earthquake Situation report No. 1. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-2018-earthquake-situation-report-no-1-07-october-2018 . (6) - Coto, D. (2019, June 7). Leader or killer? A day with ‘Barbecue’ in Haiti’s capital. The Associated Press . https://apnews.com/article/ebc2cee089f149309bd73afa07816a63 . (7) - Bui, J. and Gunasekera, N. (2021). Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti . Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf . (8) - Coto, D. (2022, October 21). Who’s behind Haiti’s powerful gang alliance? PBS . https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/whos-behind-haitis-powerful-gang-alliance . (9) - Da Rin, D. (2022, July 27). New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists. International Crisis Group . https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists . (10) - Muggah, R. (2023). Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking . United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf . (11) - Phillips, T., Beaumont, P. and Delone, J.D. (2021, July 8). Haiti security forces arrest six alleged gunmen after president’s assassination. The Guardian . https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/haiti-president-assassination-arrests-gunmen-latest . (12) - Al Jazeera. (2024, February 20). Haiti President Moise’s widow, ex-PM among 50 charged in his assassination. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/haiti-president-moises-widow-ex-pm-among-50-charged-in-his-assassination . (13) - Lemaire, S. and Vilme, M. (2021, July 7). Haiti Prime Minister Appeals for Calm After President Shot Dead. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/americas_haiti-prime-minister-appeals-calm-after-president-shot-dead/6207936.html . (14) - Celiné, S. (2021, July 27). Gang boss leads protest rally against Moïse assassination. The Haitian Times . https://haitiantimes.com/2021/07/27/gang-boss-leads-protest-rally-against-moise-assassination/ . (15) - Sanon, R. and Paultre, A. (2021, June 24). Haiti gang leader launches 'revolution' as violence escalates. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gang-leader-launches-revolution-violence-escalates-2021-06-24/ . (16) - Wilson, M. (2021, November 18). A Faustian Bargain: The Cost of Restoring Haiti’s Fuel Supply. Insight Crime . https://insightcrime.org/news/a-faustian-bargain-the-cost-of-restoring-haitis-fuel-supply/ . (17) - Charles, J. (2022, July 13). Gang continues deadly attack on Haiti slum, sparking violent protests over fuel shortages. Miami Herald . https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article263446333.html . (18) - Dyer, E. (2023, May 8). In Haiti, a grassroots vigilante movement is fighting back against gang warfare. CBC . https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-bwa-kale-port-au-prince-gang-warfare-1.6833758 . (19) - Nichols, M. (2023, October 3). UN approves Haiti security mission to fight gangs. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-authorizes-haiti-security-mission-fight-gangs-2023-10-02/ . (20) - Coto, D. (2024, April 25). With fear and hope, Haiti warily welcomes new governing council as gang-ravaged country seeks peace. The Associated Press . https://apnews.com/article/haiti-ariel-lhenry-resigns-violence-gangs-government-22868c51b5f4c9ca5a8d69fcb5df376b . (21) - UN News. (2024, May 20). Haiti: Multinational mission and the ‘inexorable requirement to restore security conditions’. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149831 . (22) - S.L. (2023, August 8). Foreign intervention, Barbecue warns and threatens. Haiti Libre . https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-40275-haiti-flash-foreign-intervention-barbecue-warns-and-threatens-video.html . (23) - Misra, A. (2024, March 12). Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own. The Conversation . https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangster-behind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 . (24) - Besheer, M. (2024, July 3). Haiti's prime minister vows ‘new era’ for gang-plagued nation. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/haiti-prime-minister-vows-new-era-for-gang-plagued-nation/7684245.html . (25) - Mistler-Ferguson, S. (2022, July 21). G9 vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart. Insight Crime . https://insightcrime.org/news/g9-gpep-two-gang-alliances-tearing-haiti-apart/ . (26) - Woodford, I. and Morland, S. (2023, August 18). UN says over 350 killed by Haiti vigilante groups as thousands flee gang warfare. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/more-than-350-killed-by-haiti-vigilante-groups-thousands-flee-gang-warfare-says-2023-08-18/ . (27) - Besheer, M. (2022, October 21). UN Authorizes Sanctions on Haitian Gangs. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/un-authorizes-sanctions-on-haitian-gangs-/6800038.html . (28) - Andrew-Gee, E. (2024, May 31). Haiti’s gangs ramp up violence against police as nation awaits intervention by foreign forces. The Globe and Mail . https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-haitis-gangs-ramp-up-violence-as-nation-awaits-intervention-by-foreign/ . (29) - Turkewitz, J. and Kurmanaev, A. (2021, July 13). Big Dreams and False Claims: How Colombians Got Embroiled in Haiti Assassination. The New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/13/world/americas/haiti-colombia-military-veterans.html . (30) - Osgood, B. (2024, March 14). What is the history of foreign interventions in Haiti? Al Jazeera . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/14/what-is-the-history-of-foreign-interventions-in-haiti . (31) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024, June 18). Who is in charge of the Haiti mission? https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/who-is-in-charge-of-the-haiti-mission/ . Additional Resources The Gangs Controlling Haiti: A Dead President, Amish Hostages, and a Psycho Named BBQ - The Underworld Podcast Inside the World’s Most Dangerous Gang War - Rolling Stone

Insurgency Overview Cossacks have a centuries-long history in Ukraine and have fought countless wars against invaders from all great powers surrounding the region. The cultural relevance of the Cossacks increased during the nineteenth century, when they became, on the one hand, a romantic model for Ukrainian intellectuals, and on the other deeply tied to the autocratic tsarist regime. Originally, Cossacks were organized communities with a mixed ethnic heritage that were subsequently coopted to fight for the tsar in the borderlands of the Russian Empire. Following the Russian Civil War, Cossacks went through periods of repression and rehabilitation under Soviet rule. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cossacks have played an intermittent role in many post-Soviet conflicts. Their military activities increased in relevance after the 2014 secession of Donetsk and Lugansk from Ukraine, culminating in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with many Cossack communities indirectly supporting or joining Russian forces. Video from the channel of the commander of the Dnepr Cossack Brigade, a Russian unit staffed by Cossacks: History & Foundations Cossack history is deeply connected to Ukraine, and vice versa. Originally a nomadic people, Cossacks eventually established ties with the Russian monarchy, which employed them as ad hoc military forces in the borderlands of the Russian Empire while also allowing them a degree of autonomy as communities. Through their history, Cossacks eventually became an ethnic group that identified more with a certain geographic area—roughly encompassing the lands between the Volga and Dnepr rivers and the Caucasus—and their militarized lifestyle more than a specific population. The earliest autonomous polities that emerged in modern Ukraine were the self-ruling Cossacks, broadly united under the authority of the Cossack Hetmanate, until Catherine the Great of Russia’s great centralizing and modernizing drive led to the Hetmanate’s abolishment during the eighteenth century. As Imperial Russia imposed stricter control on what had once been a chaotic borderland of little interest to the tsars, the legacy of Cossack identity contributed to and contrasted with the self-understanding of the people inhabiting the region, which became known as Little Russia (1) . The ethnonym Little Russian became a contested term in the nineteenth century, when a nascent movement of Ukrainian nationalism opposed the idea that Ukrainians had much in common with Russia proper. Throughout the era of romanticism nationalism, a Ukrainian mythology rooted in Cossack identity was developed by Ukrainian intellectuals (2) . Cossacks once again appeared as significant actors in Ukrainian history during the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, when the region became a battleground between various warring factions. One of the most notable was the short-lived pro-German and White-affiliated (i.e., opposing the Bolsheviks) Second Hetmanate, aptly named after Pavlo Skoropadskij, its leader and hetman, the highest rank in the Cossack military hierarchy. Remarkably, almost all sides fighting in Ukraine at the time used Cossack symbology to some extent, including the soviets, or revolutionary workers’ councils (3) . Another remarkable event in Cossack history was the formation of the Don Republic, also known as the Almighty Don Host, a self-proclaimed independent Cossack republic that controlled parts of the Donbas and other regions to the east of modern Ukraine’s borders between 1918 and 1920. This brief separatist state was the last time Cossacks mobilized to restore a form of political independence that had been lost by the end of the eighteenth century and that never again materialized. While Cossacks fought on all sides of the Russian Civil War, and some did side with the Bolsheviks as recounted in Šolochov’s masterly tetralogy Quiet Flows the Don ¸ the majority fought with separatist, nationalist, or White-affiliated factions, which led to the implementation of decossackization and collectivization measures after the war (4) . State policy against Cossacks eased during the 1930s, and by the time of Germany’s invasion of the USSR in 1941, Cossacks had been reintegrated into Soviet society. While thousands of Cossacks did fight for the Third Reich in collaborationist units (5) , the overwhelming majority remained loyal to the Soviet Union, where entire divisions were formed specifically out of Cossacks (6) . Amid the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which was preceded by years of cultural and economic liberalization, Cossack identity re-emerged, most prominently in Ukraine and Russia. In Ukraine, the symbolism of the newly independent state drew much from Cossack heritage, drawing an ideal connection between Ukrainian identity and Cossack identity as a form of “national pedagogism” (7) . This has also created a limited cultural mobilization, spurred more by Ukrainian secular authorities than genuine popular sentiment, that has sought to integrate Cossack identity into a wider Ukrainian identity (8) . Nevertheless, the great majority of registered and unregistered Cossacks live in the Russian Federation, where a more structured integration of Cossacks into public life began in the mid-1990s (9) . In 1994, the Russian state established an official register of Cossack hosts, allowing Cossack communities to receive official recognition, in addition to financial and institutional support (10) . Their status was further expanded under Putin’s rule and they are now legally able to perform non-military public security duties (11) . In 2012, the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation was registered as a political party, remaining active today. Other organizations related to Cossack identity, such as the All-Russian Cossack Society, have since emerged (12) . With the most recent additions of the Black Sea Cossack Host (2021) and the North-West Cossack Host (2023), the total number of registered hosts in Russia has reached fourteen (13) . However, the great majority of Russia’s Cossacks remain unregistered and under informal self-governing arrangements within their own communities. Population estimates range between two and seven million Cossacks in the Russian Federation, with at least 200,000–300,000 performing paramilitary duties or being otherwise employed in state service (14) . Objectives & Ideology The majority of Cossacks active in the Russo-Ukrainian War side with Russia, and therefore fully support the Russian state agenda regarding the annexation of significant parts of Ukraine. Cossacks, as exemplified by their history of service to the Russian Empire, and notwithstanding their service under the Soviet Union, have long been regarded as culturally and politically ultraconservative; Cossacks fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side since 2014 have been known to hold beliefs that can be summarized in the motto: “For the Tsar, the Faith, and the Fatherland” (15) . Representatives of Russian Cossack organizations have expressed full support for Russian military and political objectives in the war, stating that the conflict is a “holy war,” as the areas where the majority of the fighting is currently taking place are regarded as ancestral Cossack homelands (16) . Military & Political Abilities Some Cossack units were involved in operations in Ukraine as early as 2014, when several militias emerged in the Donbas region and elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine as “self-defense” groups, supposedly formed as neighborhood watches to prevent operations of the Maidan-aligned groups, such as Right Sector (17) . Cossacks have a history of fierce independence, and those fighting on the separatist side in Donbas were often at odds with the leaders of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (18) . Some of these joined the loose grouping known as the Union of Donbass Volunteers, a paramilitary association that has served as a rallying point for all militiamen involved in the Donbas conflict since 2014. Since then, the relationship of many Russian Cossacks with the Russian state has significantly intensified, with institutional cooperation and support increasing at all levels. When the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out in 2022, Cossack participation was initially negligible. In April 2022, sources reported a total combat strength of 4,000 Cossacks, up from 1,400 earlier that month and possibly bolstering up to 5,500 fighters divided into two paramilitary units, the Don and Tavrida detachments (19) . By late 2023, this number had grown to over 25,000, with Cossack troops mostly organized in the “Combat Reserves” detachments known as BARS (20) . BARS units began the activation process in late 2021, creating a structure of military reservists previously absent from the Russian Armed Forces (21) . Appeals by politicians close to Russian Cossack organizations for heavier equipment to be provided to Cossack units in late 2023 indicated that many Cossack units had been operating as light infantry formations until then (22) . The continued creation of new Cossack units has led to the effective replacement of PMC Wagner’s role on the Ukrainian front, including the formation of Cossack PMCs (23) . Relations & Alliances Russian Cossacks have been undergoing an unprecedented historical phase of “re-Cossackisation” in partnership with the Russian state. However, this movement is not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, involving a burgeoning network of ties within former Soviet countries, as well as independent Cossack communities abroad (24) . The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad represents about 30,000 Cossacks living outside the borders of Russia proper and has established ties with Kazakh and Kyrgyz Cossacks, but also with individual Cossacks from Belgium, Germany, and Finland (25) . Works Cited (1) - Cfr. Sysin, F. E. The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity. In: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 14, 3/3, 1990. (2) - Sysyn, F. The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology. In: Social Research, 58, 4, 1991. pp. 850-851. (3) - Ibidem. (4) - Holquist, P. "Conduct Merciless Mass Terror": Decossackization on the Don, 1919. In: Cahiers du Monde russe, 38, 1/2, 1997. pp. 127-148. (5) - Cfr. Ratushnyak, O. V. The Cossacks on the side of the Third Reich (1949-1945 ГГ.). In: Science and Society, 1, 2013. pp. 222-236. (6) - Cfr. Trut, V. P. & Narezhny, A. I. On the Participation of Don Cossacks in World War II in 1941. In: Bylye God, 36, 2, 2015. pp. 428-433. (7) - Cfr. Bureychak, T. & Petrenko, O. Heroic Masculinity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Cossacks, UPA and “Svoboda”. In: East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 2, 2, 2015. pp. 6-9. (8) - Ibidem. (9) - Macievskiy, G. O. State and the Cossacks: On the Way to Public Service. In: Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 24, 4, Volgograd, 2019. (10) - Ibidem. (11) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks -  Folklore, Business or Politics?. In: Point of View, 68, Warsaw, 2017. pp. 18-21. (12) - http://kaprf.ru/   (13) - Arnold, R. Moscow Moves to Establish Cossack Hosts in Occupied Ukrainian Territories. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor – The Jamestown Foundation, 25.01.2024. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-moves-to-establish-zaporizhzhian-cossack-host/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (14) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks -  Folklore, Business or Politics?. Cit. pp. 15, 24-25. (15) - Arnold, R. Geschichte der Beziehungen der Kosaken zum Kreml. In: Russland-Analysen, 415, 08.03.2022. DOI: 10.31205/RA.415.01 (16) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181, 28.11.2023. https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (17) - Arnold, R. Russian Special Services Employ Cossacks, Ukrainian Religious Institutions Against Kyiv. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17, 52, 16/04/2020 [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (18) - Ibidem. (19) - Arnold, R. Cossacks and the Battle for Donbas. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19, 59, 25/04/2022. https://jamestown.org/program/cossacks-and-the-battle-for-donbas/   [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (20) - Arnold, R. The Kremlin Uses Registered Cossacks as a Means of Stealth Mobilization. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 155, 10/10/2023 https://jamestown.org/program/the-kremlin-uses-registered-cossacks-as-a-means-of-stealth-mobilization/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (21) -  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/reserves-bars.htm   (22) - Kozyin, N. Казаки хотят получить танки и артиллерию. In: Parlamentskaya Gazeta, 22.11.2023 https://www.pnp.ru/social/kazaki-khotyat-poluchit-tanki-i-artilleriyu.html  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (23) - Arnold, R. Cossack Fighters Replace Wagner Forces in Ukraine. In: : Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21, 5, 16.01.2024 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-fighters-replace-wagner-forces-in-ukraine/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (24) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181. 28.11.2023 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/   [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (25) - Ibidem.

Introduction & Overview The Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a self-proclaimed secular Palestinian Marxist-Lenninist and Socialist organization, created shortly after the Six-Day War/June War with Israel in December of 1967. The PFLP was established by George Habash, who originally had ties with the Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab (Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM)). ANM was formed in the 1950s in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon in response to Israel’s occupation of Palestine and to promote Arab unity. After the Six-Day War with Israel, three Palestinian Nationalist insurgent groups merged — The Revenge Youth, Heroes of Return, and the Palestinian Liberation Front to create the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine alongside The Arab Nationalist Movement. With these three groups merging and through the resources of the ANM, and its various military colleagues in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine was created. The PFLP first joined the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968, the umbrella organization that's in charge of the Palestinian Nationalist movement. Both remained in agreement on an armed struggle in its early years, the PFLP and PLO opposed several peace talks between Israel and Palestine throughout the years; the PFLP has also removed themselves from the organization to reject peace accords but rejoined despite solution disagreements. (1) History & Foundations The Arab Revolt or Great Arab Revolt, was initiated by Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, in 1916, and marked a significant chapter in the struggle for Arab independence from Ottoman rule in Palestine. However, in 1917, the Balfour Declaration displayed British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine, further solidifying the groundwork for tensions between Arab and Jewish communities in the region. The League of Nations was an international organization until 1946. It was founded after World War I to promote peace and cooperation among countries to prevent another global war. The League of Nations ultimately granted Britain the mandate to assist Palestine after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.  After World War I, the Sykes-Picot Agreement placed Palestine under British control, then in 1947, the United Nations Partition Plan, Resolution 181, aimed to address the competing national aspirations by proposing separate Arab and Jewish states. The plan's rejection by Arab leaders led to the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, which was followed by an invasion by Arab states, sparking the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949. After the first Arab-Israeli war, massive displacement ensued as a result of an Israeli victory. An estimated 700,000 Palestinians were displaced, with many fleeing to neighboring Arab states, although many stayed within Israel’s new borders within the West Bank, and Gaza. With Israel’s victory, they gained independence and recognition as a country first by the United States, and the Soviet Union. As of 2020, Israel is recognized by 165 countries. More conflicts followed after the 1948-49 war, including the Suez Crisis of 1956 and then the Six-Day War of 1967, which also escalated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, resulting in the Israeli occupation of territories including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. These events contributed to the displacement of Palestinians, latching them into continuing cycles of brutal violence, poverty, and further resistance. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 offered hope for a peaceful resolution, but successive deteriorations became constant regarding negotiations. (2) During the creation of the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine, a document was released that outlined the PFLP’s principles, and their goals. The PFLP firstly opposes Zionism and considers it a colonialist movement that aims to displace the Palestinian people from their homeland. The founding document further states that the PFLP advocates for a secular and democratic state, where all citizens enjoy equal rights. The document also emphasizes the importance of their armed struggle as a legitimate means to resist occupation and achieve liberation. Through this emphasis, they call for the mobilization of all Palestinian people, and the Arab nations in a unified armed struggle against Israel, the World Zionist Organization, and lastly, what the document states as a ‘third force,’ which is  ‘that of world imperialism led by the United States of America. (3) By the 1980s, with the rise of Islamist movements like Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine started to lose its influence in the Palestinian resistance movements in Gaza and the West Bank. The PFLP remained marginally aligned with the Palestinian movement’s armed struggle, including in the first and second Intifada. The first Intifada, which began on December 9th, 1987 happened due to an Israeli truck driver killing four Palestinian refugees in an automobile accident who were from the Jabalia Refugee Camp. Protests and civil disobedience erupted in response throughout the West Bank and Gaza. During the first Intifada, the Israeli army killed 1,087 Palestinians, 240 of whom were children. 100 Israeli civilians and 60 Israeli soldiers were killed. (4) The PFLP remained active in the Palestinian movement during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. (5) Objectives & Ideologies  The PFLP openly opposes Zionism, a nationalist movement that emerged in the late 19th century and advocated for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which was then in the 19th century part of the Ottoman Empire. The Zionist movement, created by Theodor Herzl, strongly advocated establishing a sovereign Jewish state. Theodor Herzl focused on Palestine as the primary location for a Jewish homeland due to its historical and biblical connections to the Jewish people. However, The Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine considers Zionism a colonialist movement that aims to displace the Palestinian people from their homeland instead of assimilating them. The PFLP also opposes a two-state solution and instead calls for the creation of a democratic Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine through armed struggle, and for Jerusalem to be Palestine’s capital. The PFLP’s founding document's conclusion calls for the mobilization of all Palestinian people and Arab nations in a unified fight against imperialism and Zionism. The PFLP also pledges solidarity with revolutionary movements worldwide, viewing the Palestinian struggle as a part of a broader global struggle against imperialism and colonialism. It also emphasizes their commitment to social justice, economic equality, and the rights of workers and peasants in Palestine. (6)  Military & Political Capabilities  The PFLP is assumed to have 18 Political Bureau members, most of whose identities are unknow; however, it is known that at the last General Conference, held in 2001, Ahmad Sa’adat was re-elected as Secretary General. As for military capabilities, the PFLP and its umbrella organization since 1968, PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) have a variety of suppliers. Syria has provided financial support and training, and the PFLP-General Command also maintains its headquarters in Damascus, Syria. They have also received support from Russia, China, and Iran. The PFLP has remained an off-and-on significant player within the Palestinian movement. Although often rejecting any peace negotiation and politically detached, the PFLP has remained marginally fastened to the movement's armed struggle. (7)   Since Hamas' attack and subsequent Israeli air and ground operation on October 7th, 2023, the PFLP has posted a variety of texts, videos, and photographs displaying targeted cyber and armed attacks on Israeli watchtowers and military checkpoints along the Gaza Strip border. Along with these statements taking credit for terror attacks and cyber-attacks, the PFLP’s Central Media Department released a statement on the October 7th attack against Israel:  "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said that the solid mountains of the sons of the resistance came out united in response to the call of Palestine, the call of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa, in which the nature of the conflict is restored and the dignity of the Arab nation is restored, determined to achieve a strategic victory over this enemy in a battle that will open the door of return and redraw the history of Palestine and the region. The PFLP called on our heroic people throughout Palestine to actively participate in the battle of the "Al-Aqsa Flood", both from its position and with the tools it possesses, to attack the enemy army and its settlers, cut off its supply routes, sabotage its vital facilities, and chase the Zionist invaders who are terrified in front of the strikes of the resistance and their proxy strikes in every inch of the land of Palestine. The Front stressed its call to all those who carry weapons, especially the sons of the security services, to engage in the battle of the Palestinian people against their enemy, and to position themselves in the natural position of every free Palestinian struggling for salvation from the occupation, and to achieve the goals and rights of all our people. The Front said that the timing of the battle coinciding with the glorious October War is an invitation to the sons of the Arab nation and the peoples of the region to realize their position in the overall conflict with the Zionist enemy and in this particular battle and to carry out their duties alongside their rebellious people fighting in occupied Palestine." (8) Approach to Resistance Predominantly fighting for a one-state solution in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, the PFLP rejects any peace negotiations. The PFLP’s tactics have changed since its early years, switching from hijackings that aimed to put the Palestinian cause on the world stage to firing a combination of rockets and mortars from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Additionally, the PFLP also uses suicide bombings against the State of Israel. (9) Internal Relations and Alliances With the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine first joining the PLO, in 1968, the PFLP has had a variety of alliances since its creation. It has received support from Russia, China, Iran, and Syria. (10) Works Cited “Terrorism Profile – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” The Mackenzie Institute , 21 Jan. 2016, mackenzieinstitute.com/terrorism-profile-the-popular-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-pflp/ .   Charif, Maher. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP.” Palquest , palquest.palestine-studies.org/en/highlight/23332/popular-front-liberation-palestine-%E2%80%93-pflp . Library, Jewish Virtual. “Palestinian Terror Groups.” Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) , 2021, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/popular-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-pflp .  News, BBC. “Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” BBC News , BBC, 18 Nov. 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30099510 .  “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” ECFR , 3 July 2023, ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/popular_front_for_the_liberation_of_palestine/ .  Charif, Maher. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP.” Palquest , 2024, palquest.palestine-studies.org/en/highlight/23332/popular-front-liberation-palestine-%E2%80%93-pflp .  Dean, Laura. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Marxists with a History of Global Ties.” The World from PRX , 30 July 2016, theworld.org/stories/2016/07/30/popular-front-liberation-palestine-marxists-history-global-ties .  Monitor, NGO. “PFLP Involvement in the October 7 Atrocities " Ngomonitor.” Ngomonitor , 30 Jan. 2024, www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/pflp-involvement-in-the-october-7-atrocities/ .  Kilani, Ramsis. “Strategies for Liberation: Old and New Arguments in the Palestinian Left • International Socialism.” International Socialism , 26 June 2024, isj.org.uk/strategies-for-liberation-old-and-new-arguments-in-the-palestinian-left/ .  10. “Timeline: Key Events in the Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” AJC , American Jewish Committee, 26 Feb. 2024, www.ajc.org/IsraelConflictTimeline . Additional Resources

Overview The Mullah Dadullah Front was an extreme insurgent faction of the Taliban in Afghanistan, named after a notoriously violent Taliban commander, who was killed in 2007. The Mullah Dadullah Front split from the Taliban by 2013, and under a commander called Najibullah the Feda’i Mahaz, they actively sought publicity through the method of high-profile killings. By 2014, their spokesperson was claiming that the group opposed the Taliban’s stance on peace talks. The Mullah Dadullah Front was part of a wider context of fragmentation within the Taliban in the early 2010s, which culminated in 2015 with a larger-scale fragmentation, though this was ultimately later recovered and reunified from. The namesake of the Front, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a raid by NATO forces; he was known for having controversially introduced the use of suicide bombings to the conflict in Aghanistan during the 2000s, and for engaging directly with the Western press, which was extremely rare at the time. The death of Dadullah had a lasting effect on the Taliban commander class: after his loss, it was several years before any of them would come into the public eye for disagreeing with their leadership. (1) The Mullah Dadullah Front were most well known for the killing of Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council, who had also served as a Deputy Education Minister during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Rahmani was assassinated in a shooting carried out in Kabul, which the Front later claimed responsibility for. (2) The assassination demonstrated the Mullah Dadullah Front’s ability at the time to dominate the news cycle around the negotiations between the Afghan government and the wider international community; it showed that there were many factions of the Taliban in the 2010s that went against the leadership’s propagated narrative of reconciliation, and instead were determined to exert control by other means. (3) History & Origins The origins of the Mullah Dadullah Front are inextricably tied to the ongoing factionalism and fragmentation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, throughout the conflict of the 2010s. While the word ‘fragmented’ is often used broadly to describe the Taliban’s loosely connected proliferation of groups and branches, it should also be understood as a more specific expression of division and factionalism within the organization. Practically, this means the splitting of the group into different splinter entities, which have their own politically distinct boundaries, and which join other existing groups, operate totally separately, or side with the state. Therefore, the fragmentation of decision making throughout the Taliban at this time stemmed from their being various ideological and pragmatic factions within the wider umbrella of the group; the Mullah Dadullah Front was part of this landscape. As early as 2007, there were signs of internal fragmentation within the Taliban; while there was no outright rejection of the authority of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, various figures and factions began to emerge from this time that gradually became defined and politically distinct from the leadership. Prior to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the US, the Taliban had actually developed a defined hierarchical structure that was not common among other mujahideen armed groups during this time, and their survival after the American invasion is thought by many to be due to the persistence but also, the looseness, of this hierarchy, which in large part consisted of personal, networked relationships and organization between top leaders and commanders. It was common for more local commanders to implicitly be left to pursue their own interests, as long as they broadly adhered to Taliban ideology. (1) Then, in 2007, the Taliban’s senior commander and the Mullah Dadullah Front’s namesake, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by NATO special forces, and rumors of betrayal surrounded his death, which contributed to a general feeling of apathy among the wider command. There followed the death or arrest of three other senior Taliban figures, and Mullah Omar’s other deputies began implementing a wave of reforms in an attempt to further solidify and institutionalize the Taliban with the aim of keeping the movement coherent, and managed under the central leadership. However, by early in 2012, there were signs that more factionalism was causing further fragmentation, and the Mullah Dadullah Front emerged explicitly as a separate splinter group, lead by Dadullah’s younger brother, Mansour Dadullah, who had adopted his name, and who was demoted and published by the Taliban for disobedience. After this, the group conducted high-profile attacks, and maintained an opposition to the reconciliationary thinking propagated by the Taliban’s leadership during negotiations at the time. Ideology & Goals The ideology of the Mullah Dadullah Front is largely consistent with that of the wider Taliban movement: this is described by the United States Institute for Peace as ‘armed mullahs – fighting priests’; ‘as an organization of clerics, it claims a certain morality that lay people do not have; it also has a sense of exclusivity, restricted to a priestly order.’ The Taliban have, in their years of fighting in Afghanistan, sought to differentiate the violence that they enact from the violence of other groups, by giving it the legitimacy of a quasi-state power – now a state power, after their takeover following the US and UK withdrawal from the country in 2021. The Taliban emerged in 1994 and has been engaged in violent conflict since its founding; it has propagated and legitimized armed struggle as a core part of its ideology. Since their founding, the movement has fought the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and individual mujahideen commanders, before establishing themselves gradually as the de facto Islamic administration throughout Afghanistan. They argued for the establishment of the authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), an Islamic state in Afghanistan. With their founder, Mullah Omar as their amir, or leader, the Taliban demanded that all other forces in the country submit to their authority, arguing that to disrupt this was to defy Islam itself. The ultimate goal, then, was to establish the rule of an Islamic state system in Afghanistan, if necessary through the use of violence. The Taliban also established themselves as the only true protectors of Afghan sovereignty, against the intervention of Western forces, often referring to themselves as continuing the long tradition of Afghanistan withholding invasion and conquest from opposing nations and insisting that those who participate in Western-style systems have shed their Afghan identity.  The Taliban utilizes the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet to guide the leadership and ideology of the movement, however, it is worth noting that the organization’s hierarchy has, at plenty of points in its history, been more decentralized and looser than one might expect given its current iteration as the de facto government of Afghanistan. This more decentralized nature is crucial when considering the development of individual factions and branches within the Taliban; many of these factions did not evolve out of large ideological disagreements, but instead from pragmatic disagreements about how to achieve the ultimate Taliban goals, and dissatisfaction with the immediate resourcing of their segments of the organization. As the Taliban experienced growing pains during its expansion across the country, some branches became more focused on their own missions, such as the Mullah Dadullah Front and their high-profile killings, which they saw as the most effective way forward. It is also worth noting that there were various viewpoints within the Taliban about the relationship they should have to the US-supported Afghan government, as well as the wider international community, and the Mullah Dadullah Front differed with the centralized Taliban leadership on this, believing that reconciliation and negotiation was not a productive path, instead favoring violence. (4) Approach to Resistance  The key methods of resistance for the Mullah Dadullah Front, were high-profile assassinations and suicide bombings. The namesake of the group, Dadullah, is responsible for introducing suicide tactics into the Afghan conflict, and this tactic persisted among the group. The group sent text messages and made phone calls to various members of the Afghan parliament in 2012, threatening suicide attacks if they voted to ratify the strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the US. For the same objective, they also conducted their most famous killing, that of Rahmani. Rahmani was the second Peace minister to be killed within the year: before him, Burhanuddin Rabbani was also assassinated, a killing that was again claimed by the Mullah Dadullah Front. This approach was used by the Mullah Dadullah Front to disrupt the ratification of the strategic partnership, and curtail any new efforts to restart the much-disrupted peace process in Afghanistan. While the Taliban insisted at the time that the Front had no connection with them, and were instead a construction of the Afghanistan intelligence forces, the Front were widely known to be a branch of the Taliban and were successful at delaying the peace process by not only the threats of violence, but also by their ability to demonstrate that the wider Taliban movement was not united in its resolutions of openness to negotiation. Prior to the moves towards (and disruption of)  ratification, the strategic partnership was signed by President Barack Obama and the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, during Obama’s visit to Kabul on 1 May 2012. Despite the intimidation by the Mullah Dadullah Front, the partnership was indeed ratified, agreeing that the US would be allowed to maintain a reduced number of troops in Afghanistan and continue training Afghan forces, as well as conducting targeted operations in the country against Al Qaeda.  Relations & Alliances  The Mullah Dadullah Front is largely thought to have remained affiliated with the Taliban, though Taliban spokespeople denied any relationship with the Front, claiming that the group was instead a creation of the Afghan government intelligence service. In August 2015, there was an announcement that Akhtar Mansour had succeeded the deceased Mullah Omar as the overall leader of the Taliban. Mansoor Dadullah refused to support the new leader, and this lead to several months of clashes between the Mullah Dadullah Front and the Taliban in Zabul Province, ultimately culminating in the killing of Mansoor Dadullah and many of his fighters in November 2015. In August 2016, the Mullah Dadullah Front then announced Dadullah’s nephew Mullah Emdadullah Mansoor as its new leader, threatening to take revenge on the Taliban. The Mullah Dadullah Front is also linked to a group known as the “Sacrifice Front” or Fidai Mahaz; this group was another splinter faction from the Taliban, and led by Mullah Najibullah, who was another former Taliban commander. This group was formed by many people who were ex-Taliban fighters and former members of the Mullah Dadullah Front, all of whom had become disillusioned with the Taliban itself. Overall, the Mullah Dadullah Front were part of a wider context of developing factionalism within the Taliban, and were vying for power and political purity alongside the backdrop of the Taliban’s participation with the current peace process in Afghanistan.  Works Cited Watkins, Andrew. ‘Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future’. United States Institute of Peace. March 2020. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/pw_160-taliban_fragmentation_fact_fiction_and_future-pw.pdf   Roggio, Bill. ‘Mullah Dadullah Front Claims Assassination of Afghan High Peace Council Member’. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD Long War Journal. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op-eds/2012/05/14/mullah-dadullah-front-claims-assassination-of-afghan-high-peace-council-member   ‘The Dadullah Front and the Assassination of Arsala Rahmani’. Institute for the Study of War. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dadullah-front-and-assassination-arsala-rahmani   Semple, Michael. ‘Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement’. United States Institute for Peace. December 2014. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-Organizational-Structure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf   Simpson, Connor. ‘Meet the New “More Radical” Insurgent Group in Afghanistan”. The Atlantic, 19 May 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/meet-new-more-radical-insurgent-group-afghanistan/327901/   Special Operations Interrogator's Report, “State of the Taliban Archived 16 November 2021 at the Wayback Machine,”. The New York Times , 6 January 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296489-taliban-report.html#document/p1   Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or “Basque Homeland and Liberty” was a Basque nationalist and separatist organization founded in 1959 with the primary goal of establishing an independent Basque state through armed revolutionary struggle.  The Basque country consists of 7 provinces in north-eastern Spain and south-western France.  The Basque people share a common language, ethnicity, and socio-cultural history.  Basque nationalism emerged in the 19th century with the rise of liberal centralism and modern industrialization. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was founded to protect and give power to the ethnic Basque and their way of life.  General Francisco Franco’s brutal repression of the Basque during the Spanish Civil War and the decades of repression that followed only strengthened the Basque identity and nationalist sentiment. The ETA emerged out of frustration with the PNV’s passive resistance.  Through confrontation, the ETA vowed to gain Basque independence by any means necessary, including violence. The group was classified as a terrorist organization by France, Spain, the EU, the UK, the US, and Canada.  This classification is due to ETA’s paramilitary tactics which include bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations.  Between 1968 and 2010, the ETA killed 829 people—including 340 civilians. (1)  Following five decades of armed insurgency, a permanent ceasefire was declared in 2011. In 2017 the group disarmed and one year later announced their complete dissolution as an organization. History & Origins The Basque country, Euskal Herria , is a region of 7 provinces located across Northern Spain and Southern France.  Most of the region resides in four Spanish provinces (Navarra, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava). The Basques are the region's indigenous population. They are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically distinct from the Spanish and French. Historians believe they have occupied the territory for at least 7,000 years (potentially 40,000). They have remained fiercely independent despite millennia of threats from outside invaders.  In the Middle Ages, they joined the French and Spanish Kingdoms.  The Spanish Basque provinces were granted charters, or fueros , that granted each province a right to self-government. (1)(2) The discovery of the Americas led to an increased demand for commerce, trade, and industry in the Basque country.  At this time, a class of bourgeoisie ( jauntxos ) began to develop and reshape Basque society. During the French Revolution, liberal ideas of a centralized government in Spain gained popularity, especially amongst the bourgeoisie.  Following a series of civil wars in the 19th century known as the Carlist campaigns, the Spanish government eliminated regional privileges and thus the Basque provinces lost their autonomy. (1)(3) In the late 19th century, the Basque provinces became one of the most heavily industrialized areas in Iberia. Massive migrations of non-Basque migrants entered the region looking for work. The Basque working class found themselves working in sweatshop conditions and slum housing while competing with non-Basque for jobs.  The Basque country was Spain’s economic powerhouse, but many felt their taxes weren’t being allocated fairly by Madrid. Many Basques felt their culture and way of life were under threat.  In response, Sabino de Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) for Basque independence in defence of Basque culture, language, and race. (4) In the early 20th century, the PNV became a dominant political force in local elections and a vocal minority in the Spanish parliament. In 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera became dictator of Spain and outlawed the PNV.  The party was forced to go underground. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, a coalition of Basque nationalist and republican forces enacted the Government of Euskadi but were defeated by General Francisco Franco’s forces in 1937. The exiled Basque government, synonymous with the PNV, fled to Paris. For decades, Franco continued to rule Spain with an iron fist; he outlawed all Basque culture including Euskadi, the Basque language.  The PNV believed the Allies, whom they collaborated with closely during World War 2, would rid Spain of Franco. Instead, the US made a deal with Franco in return for establishing military bases across Spain. In 1959, a group of Basque youths formed the ETA, which broke with the passivity of the PNV and called for a campaign of national liberation by any means necessary. (4) ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty), emerged out of a student group, Ekin , in the early 50s. (4) Their first major action occurred in 1961 when the group’s failed attempt to derail a train of Francoist supporters was met with immediate retaliation from Franco.  More than a hundred eterras  (ETA members) were arrested, tortured, and given lengthy prison sentences. Several key leaders fled into exile in France. (3) In 1962, the group held their first assembly and developed a structure of activist cells. The exiled leaders formed the Executive Committee which continued to give top-down orders to ETA cells in Spanish Basque from France. They also sent out a communique publicly declaring their intent to gain Basque independence by “whatever means necessary.”   In 64’ and 65’, the ETA held their third and fourth assemblies, adopting an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist position combining Basque nationalism with Marxist ideas of class struggle and Franz Fanon’s ‘Third-Worldist’ perspective on decolonization. In 67’, they reached a consensus on pursuing a strategy of armed struggle known as the ‘action-repression-action spiral theory’. The strategy would attempt to antagonize Franco into unbearable escalations of relation and repression that the Basque population would become compelled to join them in their revolutionary struggle for independence. (1)(2) In 1968, the ETA assassinated Meliton Manzanas, a police commissioner known for torturing Basque nationalists. In response, Franco declared a “State of Exception”, suspending constitutional rights and arresting, torturing, and imprisoning Basques perceived to be affiliated with ETA. The spiral theory did not account for the intensity and rapid development of Franco’s retaliation. (1)(2) In 1970, in the Burgos Trials, several ETA members were condemned to death.  Coverage of the trials received international attention and was condemned by figures like the Pope and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In response, those condemned to die received long prison sentences instead. (5) ETA’s most infamous action, dubbed ‘Operation Ogre’, occurred in 1972 when an ETA cell assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s second in command and Spain’s newly inaugurated Prime Minister. Blanco was notorious for his brutal counterinsurgent campaigns and a crackdown on illegal labour unions.  Following Franco’s death, Blanco was to continue to lead the regime. When ETA was informed of Blanco’s routine trips to and from mass, they seized on the opportunity to act.  Originally, they planned to kidnap Blanco to leverage a deal to have ETA prisoners released, but they decided it would be easier to have him killed.  On December 20th, an 80kg Goma-2 explosive planted in a tunnel beneath the road blew Blanco’s car several stories high, killing him instantly. His death is widely seen as the end of Francoism. (2) On November 22, 1975, General Franco took his last breath.  King Juan Carlos I declared an amnesty for all of Spain’s political prisoners and allowed a democratically elected parliament and Prime Minister. A new constitution was enacted in 1978 by popular vote. The constitution recognized autonomous communities and their ethnic nationalities. Basque culture and language were allowed to be practised openly once again. For Basque nationalists, the constitutional changes weren’t seen as ‘true independence’. Many Francoist officials guilty of crimes against humanity continued to retain their posts in judicial, military, and political administrations. During this time, the ETA increased their armed activity. Between 1978 and 1980, ETA claimed 227 lives, 213 casualties and 19 kidnappings. (2) During the transition to democracy, the ETA split into factions. A faction known as ETApm (ETA politico-militar) wanted to broaden its strategy to include both political engagement and militant activities, but ETAm (ETA-militar) were committed to the armed struggle. ETApm began to regard violent actions as counter-productive and saw working within the new democratic system as more beneficial to the Basque cause.  In 1977 they formed a political group known as Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), or ‘Basque Left’, and won several seats in both the Spanish and Basque parliaments.  The success of EE convinced ETAm to form their political group known as Herri Batasuna (HB), or ‘People’s Unity’. Both factions joined the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS), or ‘Socialist Patriotic Coordinator’, a unified coalition of political parties and labour unions representing the interest of the Basque working class. (2) In 1982, ETApm disbanded completely.  Following their dissolution, the ETAm was simply known as ETA. By the late 80s and 90s, the movement began to grow weak.  In 83’, the French government began to cooperate with the Spanish government in denying ETA members refuge and deporting them back to Spain. The Spanish government were also found to have ties to Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups), or GAL. GAL were a paramilitary coalition that illegally tortured and killed anyone they believed was connected to the ETA in what is as a “dirty war”. (6) Political parties that supported Basque nationalism, such as HB, were outlawed. Most notably, public support began to decline following bombing campaigns across Spain that resulted in civilian casualties and the assassination of former ETA leader María Dolores González Yoyes. (2) In 1988, many ETA members began to sign a cease-fire agreement with the Spanish government. Four years later, three of ETA’s leading figures were captured.  By this time, the movement had dwindled into bouts of youth-led street violence.  Many saw this as a clear sign of their weakness. In 1995, an ETA cell commuted a failed attempt to attack the Spanish royal family. That same year, they kidnapped and assassinated a Spanish political leader, Miguel Angel Blanco, beloved by both Spanish and Basque citizens. They were met with a further decline in public support. (2) Post 9/11, the United States’ “War on Terror” made it harder for ETA to continue to operate. In 2004, ETA was blamed for the Madrid Train Bombings that killed 191 and injured 1,800. Although the bombing was later revealed to have been orchestrated by an Islamic extremist group, damage to the group’s public image had already been done.  ETA reached out for cease-fire talks in 2006, but the treaty broke down following ETA’s bombing of a parking garage at Madrid’s airport that killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. In 2010, the group decided to announce a ‘permanent ceasefire’, and the following year they announced an end to their armed campaign. In 2017, they destroyed their arsenal of weapons and two years later announced their complete dissolution. (5) Despite no formal peace process, the ETA and Spanish government have remained dedicated to peace, but tension runs deep.  Recently, an ETA-affiliated political group known as EH Bildu ran forty-four ex-convicted ETA members for the Spanish general election. A conservative Christian party known as PP, or ‘People’s Party’, have responded with accusations that the “ETA is still alive” in the form of EH Bildu. Regardless of these accusations, Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, determined there is no legal basis for Spain to ban EH Bildu. EH Bildu insists that the days of armed revolution are over. Former ETA member and general coordinator of EH Bildu, Arnaldo Otegi, stated that ETA’s use of violence in the quest for independence  “should never have happened.” (7) Objectives & Ideology The ETA is strongly rooted within the Basque nationalist movement. They emerged out of frustration at the PNV’s passive resistance towards the Franco regime. The PNV saw cooperation with the Spanish government and coalition building as a pragmatic way to gain more autonomy for the Basque region. The younger and more radical ETA argued that only through direct action could independence be gained. (1)(3) The early ideological struggle within the ETA was concerned with the following: Ethnicity vs class as an organizing principle for revolution. Nationalism vs socialism as a guiding ideology   Conducting struggle based solely on ethnic Basques vs integrating non-Basque immigrants into the conflict. Use of ‘direct action’ or ‘activism’ vs nonviolent organizing among masses of industrial workers .   (3) Periodically, the ETA held debates at collective assemblies and made decisions on organisation structure, political ideology, philosophy of the movement, operations, strategy, tactics, etc. At their first assembly (1962), the ETA asserted its identity as a “revolutionary Basque movement” for national liberation. The Executive Committee issued their declaration of purpose: “ETA is a clandestine organization whose only objective is to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible—including violence—the independence of Euzkadi.” They advocated for the creation of a federated Europe based on ethnonationalities, separation of church and state, and opposition to racism and dictatorial regimes, whether fascist or communist. They supported a Basque national front composed of all ethnic Basque political groups regardless of social class and emphasized the Basque ethnic and cultural struggle. (3) By the third assembly (1964-1965), things began to radically change. Multiple factions who were focused solely on purely ethnic or class struggle left the group. The remaining members were more ideologically homogenous. They defined themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialists committed to the armed struggle for Basque independence.  Inspired by Franz Fanon’s writings on the struggles of the Third World against Western European and American colonialism, the group saw the Basque ethnic struggle and working-class struggle as two parts of a large struggle against Spanish colonization. Therefore, the ETA would wage an armed struggle against both the Spanish apparatus of domination (government, bureaucracy, economy, mass media, etc.) and the Basque bourgeoisie who refused to cooperate with the struggle. (3) Between 1967 and 1968, the ETA split due to ideological and strategic differences between factions. The ETApm were closer to traditional Marxist-Leninism and chose to combine an armed mobile proletariat and joint political-military strategy like the Tupamaros in Uruguay. In contrast, the ETAm maintained the use of small clandestine cells and was influenced by the Palestinian militant group Black September. By the 80s, ETApm dissolved but remained active politically as the EE. The ETAm continued the armed struggle as the sole ETA. (3) In 1978, ETA’s five conditions for a total cessation of hostilities were the following: Amnesty for all Basque political prisoners. Legalization of all political parties including those espousing separatism. Expulsion of the Spanish Guardia Civil and other police agencies from the Basque country.   Adoption of measures to improve conditions of the working class. Recognition of the national sovereignty of Euskadi and the right of the Basque people to self-determination.   (3) The Spanish government refused to negotiate. In 2011, the ETA were unpopular, isolated, and weakened beyond repair. They decided the armed struggle was no longer a viable option and called for an end to hostilities in 2011. In 2018, the last remnant of ETA announced its dissolution. (3) Today, many ex-ETA members continue to fight for the creation of a “Basque State”, but through democratic politics rather than armed actions. (ex. EH Bildu). (7) Political & Military Capabilities ETA militants, eterras , are estimated to have ranged somewhere between 300 to 2,000 active members at their peak.  After five decades of operations, they have killed 829, kidnapped 77, and wounded more than 22,000. (4) Their operations consisted of armed robberies, raids on weapons factories and depots, bombings, and sabotage.  Most operations were carried out in Spanish Basque but included cities in Spain, France, and Catalonia. (2) The ETA was organized along a three-tired, top-down pyramid-like structure. The Executive Committee, based in France, consisted of about 10 individuals. Their function was to recruit, gather and analyze intel, procure weapons, maintain finances, and handle publicity. The middle branch was a loosely operational committee that oversaw ETA activities in each of the Spanish Basque provinces. At the base of the organization are the commandos, cells of 3-5 members operating near the town or neighbourhood they live. They work in secrecy and stay isolated from the rest of the organization to prevent members from giving up any information under interrogation or torture. (2) There are several classes of etteras within the organization . Liberados , aka ilegales , or fichidos , have a police record, or ficha , on file. They work full-time for the ETA and earn a modest salary. Liberados  carry out most of the armed actions such as bombings, bank robberies, and kidnappings. Legales are unknown to police and live conventional lives.  Most ETA activists are young, single male legales  from Vizcaya or Guipúzcoa. They are full-time students, workers, and agriculturalists who could be sporadically activated for an ekintza  (action) at any moment. They serve as enlances  (links) and act as couriers of information, or buzons (mailboxes) which serve as drop-off points for messages, weapons, or other items passing through ETA’s network. Information would be shared in secure locations such as local bars, movie theatres, restaurants, etc. Contraband was hidden in secret compartments with false bottoms to avoid detection. (2) A recruiter scouts out new members at social clubs and hangouts and vets them for over a year. During the onboarding process, potential recruits play minor roles in operations and progressively take on more responsibility. Once admitted into the organization, they spend two weeks of basic training at a camp in southern France where they receive training on weapons, combat, explosives, communication devices and channels, intel gathering, etc. (2) ETA’s weapons and ammo cache were supplied via the international illegal arms market or stolen from arms depots in Spain, France, and elsewhere. Weapons were often smuggled across the Pyrenees or Bay of Biscay concealed within food crates or in vehicles/boats with false bottoms. ETA cells were as well equipped as a conventional infantry attachment in the Spanish Army. The preferred pistols include the Belgian-manufactured Browning 9mm HP35 and the Basque-manufactured Star, Astra, and Firebird. The preferred submachine guns included the Belgian-manufactured 9mm Vigneron, Israeli/Belgian-manufactured 9mm Uzi, and the United Kingdom-manufactured 9mm Sten Mark II. Most ETA were given pistols rather than submachine guns. Pistols were the least likely to result in accidental deaths or wasted ammunition. Specially trained commandos received automatic/semi-automatic rifles such as the American M-16 and Belgian FAL. Rocket launchers were rarely used because they tended to be old and unreliable. The go-to explosive was Goma-2.  It is manufactured across Spain and Portugal and used for construction and quarrying.  There were plenty of major deposits in Basque country from which to steal. (2) ETA was financed by donations, army robberies, kidnapping, ransoms, and so-called “revolutionary taxes” aka (extortion) they learned from the Irish Republican Army. Basque industrialists and bourgeoisie essentially “made an offer they couldn’t refuse” under threats of violence. For perspective, in 1978 ETA robbed 50 banks for over 4 million dollars. That same year over 800 wealthy Basques were paying revolutionary taxes. Kidnapping victims were kept behind false walls or windowless rooms known as “people’s prisons” until a ransom was paid or a political concession was granted. These same hiding spots could be used to hide eterras  from capture. (2) The ETA’s main targets were members of the Spanish security state. Civilian casualties were mostly politicians and police informants although 9% were estimated to be innocent bystanders. Bombs and crossfire were responsible for most of their accidental victims. Operations tended to avoid direct assault. Eterras used hit-and-run tactics catching their victims off guard when they were most vulnerable. Most victims were assassinated while driving, sitting at a bar/restaurant, taking a walk, etc. (2) Approach To Resistance The ETA’s primary approach to resistance was through armed insurgence. In 1967, there was a group consensus on applying the ‘Action-Repression-Action-Spiral Theory’ against Franco’s regime. In theory, cycles of escalating armed actions and retaliation would have led to such atrocious forms of repression that a civil war would break out and the general Basque population would join the ETA in its armed struggle for independence. In practice, the Franco regime cracked down swiftly and arrested, tortured, and imprisoned lETA leaders and hundreds of etteras. A ‘State of Exception’ (martial law) was implemented suspending constitutional rights for Spanish Basque and eventually the rest of Spain. There would be no civil war. Despite living under the conditions of a constant police state, ETA continued armed operations against Franco’s regime until his death. Their assassination of Admiral Blanco arguably put the nail in the coffin of Franco’s regime and facilitated the emergence of a Spanish democracy. (2) During Spain’s transition to democracy, ETA’s ideological split would precede both factions joining a workers’ coalition (KAS) and forming their political parties (EE and HB). Both parties responded “no” to the Constitutional referendum. Regardless, the referendum was passed. During these turbulent years, ETApm and ETAm increased armed insurgency for “true” liberation. Later, ETApm ultimately decided to forgo the militant path. Their reasoning behind that decision was twofold. First, they believed through politics they could gain more autonomy and worker’s rights for the Basque people. Secondly, they believed armed insurgence might trigger a right-wing coup and a loss of their recently gained autonomy. ETAm continued its armed insurgency but ultimately dissolved due to Spanish counterinsurgency, French cooperation with the Spanish government, and a loss of public support. (2) ETA was able to create a “spiral of silence” using street violence, intimidation, extortion, and a network of organizations within the Basque National Liberation Movement. The goal was to make their presence felt everywhere. Intimidation and extortion were leveraged to entice others to support the cause. There was a  “fear of physical and (sometimes irreversible) damage or destruction of property, but also social marginalization or emptiness, including stigmatization as Spanish.”   ETA encouraged supporters to occupy public spaces and show their support. It held symbolic power and attracted media attention which held the perception of legitimacy to ETA’s cause. (8) Relations & Alliances It has been alleged that the ETA had links to an international terrorist network.  In 1981, Spanish magazine Policia Espanola published an alleged foreign contact that claimed ETA was receiving weapons, explosives, and/or tactical training in South Yemen, Lebanon, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Algeria. Spanish intelligence claims a small group of eterras were trained in kidnapping and sabotage in Cuba in 1964. They are also alleged to have had ties to the IRA, Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang.  Exiles were given refuge in France (until 1983), Belgium and Algeria. (4) Political parties associated with ETA were Herri Batasuna and Euzkadiko Ezkerra.  EH Bildu, a Basque separatist party, is made up of many ex-ETA members, forty-four of which recently ran in Spain’s general elections. (4)(7) ETA had a strong presence in the Basque Liberation Movement. Organizations within the public sphere apart of this movement including workers’ unions (LAB), youth groups (Jarrai), feminist groups (Egizan), ecologist groups (Eguzki), student groups (Ikasle Abertzaleak), internationalist groups (Askapena), media and cultural groups (Egin & Egin Irratia), human rights groups (Herriko Tabernas) and other groups which serve as political and social apparatuses to create a counter society who ran against the prevailing narrative of the state. (8) Works Cited (1) - Watson, Cameron, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual origins of ETA, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, 2007. (2) - Anderson, Wayne, The ETA: Spain’s Basque Terrorists , Rosen Publication, New York, 2003. (3) - Clark, Robert P., The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 , University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1984. (4) - Douglas William A., and Joseba Zulaika, “On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process”, Comparative Studies in Society and History ,   Volume 32, No. 2, pp. 238-257, Cambridge University Press, Published: April, 1990.  Accessed: 6/23/2014 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/178914.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (5) - Who Were the ETA (Euskadia Ta Askatasuna)?, History With Hilbert, Educational Video, Published May 21, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iRB7SJ3S-4&t=28s (6) - Encarnación, Omar G., “Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain”, Human Rights Quarterly , Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 950-972, The John Hopkins University Press, Published November 2007 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/20072832.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (7) - Llach, Laura, Spanish Elections Re-Open Deep Wounds, as ETA Terrorists Run for Political Office, Euro News, Published: 5/19/2023 https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/19/spanish-elections-re-open-deep-wounds-as-eta-terrorists-run-for-political-office (8) - García, César, “The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of ETA, Perspectives on Terrorism , Vol. 12, No. 5 pp. 27-35, Terrorism Research Initiative, October 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26515429.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A809e306b3115dbd7d1be0a50be7330c6&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

Insurgency Overview Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front, or BRN for short) is an Islamist separatist group in southern Thailand. While it dates back to the 60s, it largely remained a non-violent group up until the 2000s, when it began an ongoing series of attacks and bombings. Today it is the chief opponent to Thai government forces in the South Thailand Insurgency, where it seeks an independent state called Pattani. As of 2021, over 7,000 people have been killed and another 13,000 wounded in southern Thailand. (1)(2)(3) History & Foundations Pattani (sometimes spelled Patani) used to be the seat of an independent Muslim sultanate. In the 16th century it was conquered and slowly incorporated into what is today Thailand. (2) In 1909 a treaty between Britain and Thailand determined the border between Malaysia and Thailand. At the time, Malaysia was a British colony and Thailand was known as Siam. This treaty saw Siam gain land in the south, which, as it was land gained from Muslim Malaysia, was majority Muslim. Siam then made attempts to assimilate the Muslim Malays into their Buddhist religion and Thai culture. (10)  In 1963 the Barisan Revolusi Nasional was formed by Haji Abdul Karim Hassan. It started out as a mainly political organization and initially had close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya. The BRN consisted of three factions, the BRN-Congress, BRN-Coordinate and BRN-Uran. The BRN-Coordinate became the most organized of the three factions. (3) The majority of people today in Pattani are Muslim Malays while the rest of Thailand is mostly Buddhist Thais. This was not a source of major unrest until 2001, when police, soldiers, teachers, civil servants and Buddhist monks began being attacked by Muslim militants. These attacks were sporadic, but government reactions were severe. For example, martial law was declared and during one mass-arrest of hundreds of Thai Malay men in 2004, 78 people suffocated to death after being crammed into trucks. (1)(2) In 2007, Thailand deployed 60,000 troops to the south, and has maintained a military presence there since. In March 2016 insurgents (it is not confirmed that the BRN was involved, but likely they had some involvement) carried out a series of bombing and attacks in Pattani, killing four and injuring 20. Later that year in August bombs were detonated in seven provinces, including tourist locations Prachuap Khiri Khan and Phuket. These attacks killed four and injured 30; the wounded included citizens from Austria, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The government tried to downplay the August attacks, stating “Thailand doesn’t have conflicts regarding religion, ethnicity, territory or minority groups.” (10) Objectives & Ideology The objective of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional is to secede from Thailand and form an independent state of Pattani. A document the BRN prepared for a 2013 peace summit between the BRN, Malaysia and Thailand states that, “BRN is a liberation organization which represents [the] Patani Malay nation…” and further states that “The roots of conflict in Patani [are] due to the occupation and confiscation of the rights of [the] Patani Malay nation.” (5) While the movement used to have close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya at its inception it is now an Islamist movement. Thai intelligence claims that the movement developed through a network of mosques and schools. General Pisarn Wattanawongkeeree, a former Thai commander in the south, said in 2004, “There is no doubt that the basis for this new insurgency are the ustadz (religious teachers). This is something that has been in the making for a long time.” (3) Political & Military Capabilities The Barisan Revolusi Nasional is the largest of the separatist movements in southern Thailand, but it is still small compared to Thai forces. While the group has stated that it has goals of getting membership up to 300,000 people, with 30,000 of those being recruited as fighters, there are only around 1,000 people in the group according to Thai estimates. (3) Militarily the BRN is still a threat, but dwindling. At its height it maintained cells in an estimated 70% of all villages in southern Thailand. Some of its leaders received training in Afghanistan as well, although it is unknown if they were trained at camps or participated in combat against the U.S.-led coalition. (3) Perhaps the BRN’s most powerful asset is the Runda Kumpulan Kecil, or small patrol units. There are highly-trained fighters who specialize in commando-style raids. (7) 20 years of fighting has taken its toll though, and with many members killed or arrested the group has lost some of its former strength. In addition to losing physical numbers, the BRN is said to have lost a lot of their morale and zeal to fight in the decades of fighting. (6)  Politically the BRN has enough sway to bring the Thai government to the table for peace talks and has done so multiple times. There have not yet been any concrete peace plans agreed to, but in February 2024 the BRN said it was willing to “put pen to paper” and negotiate with the Thai government. Demands will most likely be similar to a list of demands from 2021, which were, “a political solution that meets the aspirations of Malay Muslims in the south; a reduction in military operations; and "the idea of inclusivity" to involve civil society representatives, religious and political figures, and community leaders in the peace dialogue.” (4)(6) Approach to Resistance Barisan Revolusi Nasional operates in a very similar way to many smaller insurgencies. Their primary tactics are assassinations (primarily government officials, schoolteachers and Buddhist monks) and bombings. Some of these attacks are very indiscriminate in nature, such as in 2007 when 15 ethnically Malay civilians were injured by a bomb detonated while they were waiting to pick their children up from school; the bomb was allegedly meant to kill Thai soldiers nearby. (7) BRN attacks do have terror elements to them at times. At least 29 beheadings have been recorded and some people have been hacked to death with machetes. In 2005, a teacher was attacked with machetes and burned alive in front of his students. (7) Despite the violence, there have been many attempts at solving things diplomatically by the BRN. As mentioned previously, in 2024 there has been yet another shot at a diplomatic solution to the conflict in southern Thailand. In 2020 good progress was happening on the diplomatic front, but this was stalled by the COVID pandemic. Most of these talks happen in Kuala Lumpur. (6)(9) Relations & Alliances BRN itself is not a completely cohesive organization, as is often the case with insurgencies. It could be said that the group's biggest relations are with itself. The political and military wings do not always see eye to eye on matters, and there has even been talk of the military wing separating due to its opinion on peace talks. 11 The BRN was formed because of negative relations with the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), they split due to a disagreement about how secular PULO is. That was back in 1963, however, and the groups have warmer relations nowadays. The leaders of the modern PULO admit that the BRN spearheads the Patani independence movement. (3) Works Cited https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/08/10/repression-is-feeding-the-muslim-insurgency-in-southern-thailand https://www.britannica.com/place/Pattani https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/ https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Thailand-s-troubled-Deep-South-makes-another-bid-for-peace https://scontent-den2-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.18169-9/988231_464865260255591_1150924162_n.jpg?_nc_cat=102&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=5f2048&_nc_ohc=VrGUW5QMDroQ7kNvgG-rEcD&_nc_ht=scontent-den2-1.xx&oh=00_AYAOCPh8h-vdYD8dMmHnYtmiMmHfD1t7NXdiEGEQY4T-Pg&oe=669E8BA5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlbwaI2DMqU https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0807/2.htm https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1678450/gtrec-proceedings-2008-08-virginie-andre.pdf https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/sustaining-momentum-southern-thailands-peace-dialogue https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/thailand-extremism-and-terrorism

Insurgency Overview The Bloods street gang is regarded as one of America’s most notorious and violent street gangs. It is described as a large alliance of a variety of different gangs. It was established in Los Angeles, California during the early 1970s. Like most street gangs, the Bloods engage in a variety of illegal activities to secure income and maintain control over territories. These activities include murder, robbery, drug trafficking, and extortion. Since its foundation, membership has flourished nationwide and has an estimated 15,000–20,000 members. (1) History The origins of the Bloods can be traced to their founding in Compton, California, in the early 1970s. While no official founder exists, Sylvester Scott and Vincent Owens are recognised as founding members. Following a power vacuum left behind by the dismantling of the Black Panther Party, gangs began forming to contest for power and protection over certain areas. The Crips gang would begin rising by absorbing the other local street gangs, however, not all gangs would allow themselves to be overrun. These gangs would form alliances to combat crips. Among these gangs were the Inglewood Family,  the Denver Lanes, the Pueblo Bishops, the La Brims, and the Piru Street Boys. The Piru Street Boys are regarded as being the forerunners of the Bloods. All of these anti-crip gangs would ally, eventually forming the Bloods. (1) The Piru’s (Piru Street Boys) were formed in 1971 after youth were targeted at their high school by Crips. After facing violence, Sylvester Scott, Vincent Owens, and others formed the Pirus. They then united with other anti-Crip gangs to establish the Bloods as a means of protecting against the Crips. The colour red was adopted as a strong contrast to the blue colour the Crips associate themselves with. The Piru faction operates within the Bloods alliance, with subsets like the Mob Pirus and Elm Street Pirus. While gangs within the Bloods operate independently, conflicts between them and even within subsets are common, blurring the lines between allies and adversaries. While Crips are the common enemy of the Bloods, certain Blood sets have negotiated truces with each other. An example would be the Watts Truce. In 1992, a peace treaty was declared by major Blood and Crip sets in the Watts neighbourhood of Los Angeles. This treaty was signed in a mosque, and the gangs involved agreed to keep the peace and, instead of targeting each other, to target police brutality. While violence still occurs, this agreement is credited as a notable victory in the decline of street violence in Los Angeles. (2) Crack cocaine began to emerge in the 1980s. This period marked a significant era of expansion for the Bloods. With this new drug on the streets, the Bloods became a top player in the American drug trade. With this growth came membership growth as well. Ronald Reagan's strict enforcement of drugs would lead to a large increase in incarceration, establishing a blood presence in prison. Gang recruiting is a complicated issue and can be attributed to many different things. Many in urban and impoverished areas would turn to gangs as a means of survival. It is important to mention that not all blood members commit crimes. Since the membership varies so much, some neighbourhood Blood sets are small collectives of people who don’t participate in crime and are mainly involved for the sake of the community. The United Blood Nation (East Coast Bloods) was founded in 1993 by Omar “OG Mack” Portee and Leonard “OG Dead Eye” Mckenzie. While in Rikers Island prison, the two would form a unified force combining blood sets within the prison to defend themselves from the other larger gang alliances, such as the Latin Kings and the Ńetas. The UBN acts as a separate entity with different sets and subsets, mainly operating in New York, and is loosely tied to California Blood sets. West Coast and East Coast Bloods while sharing the same Blood name do not necessarily get along. (3) Objectives and Ideology Initially focused on protection from the Crips, the Bloods evolved as their membership flourished, turning their attention to asserting dominance. Like typical criminal groups, they partake in various illicit activities such as murder, drug trafficking, and robbery. One of the most famous examples of a Blood member being involved in murder was the killing of Christopher Wallace (Biggie Smalls). A Blood member named Wardell Fouse, also known as “Poochie”, was implicated in Biggie's murder. The murder of Biggie is still unsolved and has led to many theories. One well-known theory is that Suge Knight, Mob Piru and co-founder of Death Row Records, was the shot-caller behind his death. This has not been confirmed but has raised a lot of speculation around the Blood's involvement.  While not all members subscribe to this lifestyle, some deeply entrenched in the gangs often perceive their sets as familial and integral to their existence. Loyalty and brotherhood are prized, yet internal violence challenges them. It is common that to join a gang you must be jumped in. Being jumped in means getting beat by several members of a gang to test the toughness of the incoming recruit. The beating lasts as long as each gang sees fit. Some hold certain significance with specific numbers so they will beat them for that amount of time. Each set has its own identity and culture. This results in a lot of confusion and difficulty analysing the Bloods as a whole.  Approach The Bloods, like many other street gangs, are heavily armed. Weapons such as pistols, semi-automatic submachine guns, and shotguns are most common. Automatic rifles are uncommon, and most crimes have been committed using common pistols. (4) A well-known tactic utilized is drive-by shootings. It's a fairly easy and safe alternative to confronting someone one-on-one. Drive-by shootings are described as someone firing a gun from a vehicle at someone or something. Usually, these types of shootings are used to target multiple people but are not limited to that. (5) Drug trafficking stands as a primary means to fuel and expand their influence and wealth. There are reports that they work with Mexican cartels specifically La Familia Michoacana. (6) Robberies and extortion add to their revenue stream, allowing for an illicit diversification of funds. Additionally, prostitution is another stream of income that it utilizes. Acting as pimps, they control and organize women to work under them. In exchange for the money brought in by the prostitutes, these pimps will “protect” them from possible abusers; however, it is not uncommon for pimps to also abuse the prostitutes that work under them. (7) Organisation and identification While the Bloods are a vast network, some individual sets have established defined hierarchical structures. This hierarchy includes set dynamics and roles to ensure efficiency. The following is an example of a structure of the Southside Brim’s which are a subset of the Bloods: Southside Brim  Triple OG OG Baby OG OYG Young Gangster OBG Baby Gangster This is only one of the many sets spanning across the U.S. It is important to note that not all sets are the same. Some sets are established hierarchically, and some are more informal and unorganized. (1)  Identification Gang members often use outward indicators to identify themselves. Things such as colours, tattoos, and hand signs are the most common. Bloods are distinguished by the colours red and black; this is often showcased by their attire, such as bandanas. Tattoos serve as diverse markers of gang affiliation, with common tattoos like “MOB” (Member of Bloods). Hand signs act similarly as another form of identification and allegiance. The most well-known hand sign for Blood members is the word blood spelt out using both hands, making the letters CK (Crip-Killer) and the letter B. (1)  Works Cited (1) - https://info.publicintelligence.net/BloodsStreetGangIntelligenceReport.pdf (2) - Momodu, Samuel. “The Watts Truce (1992) •.” •, March 10, 2022. https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/the-watts-truce-1992/ . (3) - " United Blood Nation (East Coast)" https://web.archive.org/web/20190812170637/http://www.sampsonsheriff.com/otherforms/20051011_united_blood_nation.pdf (4) - Kkienerm. “Firearms Module 7 Key Issues: Criminal Gangs.” Firearms Module 7 Key Issues: Criminal Gangs. Accessed May 14, 2024. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/firearms/module-7/key-issues/criminal-gangs.html#:~:text=Gang%20firearms%20are%20usually%20procured,guns%20but%20rarely%20assault%20rifles . (5) - Dedel, Kelly. “Drive-by Shootings.” ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, August 9, 2022. https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/drive-shootings-0 . (6) - Cawley, Marguerite. “Mexico Cartel-US Gang Ties Deepening as Criminal Landscape Fragments.” InSight Crime, April 24, 2023. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-cartel-us-gang-ties-criminal-groups-fragments/ (7) - “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment.” FBI, June 25, 2010. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment .

Overview The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) was a hacker group that claimed to support the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, and aims to counteract what it sees as the deluge of “fabricated news” perpetuated by both the Western and Arab media. They carried out various hacking operations, including sending out false Tweets from large news organizations such as the Associated Press (AP), and operating via Facebook and Twitter (now X) to carry out denial of service attacks on individual, group and organization websites that they believed were undermining the legitimacy of Assad’s government. Some of the group’s earliest targets were  US President Barack Obama and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The group first emerged in 2011, and gradually rose to prominence due to the high profile of many of the people and organizations that they targeted. There have been various rumors over the years that the SEA is directly linked to the Syrian government, taking orders and funding from them; yet, this has still not been proven, over 10 years after their founding. The now defunct website of the SEA described the hackers as “a group of enthusiastic Syrian youths who could not stay passive towards the massive distortion of facts about the recent uprising in Syria”. They, contrastingly, described the pro-opposition demonstrators in Syria at the time as using Facebook to “spread their destructive ideas… urging demonstrators to terrorize the civilians who refuse to join their demonstrations and attack public facilities”. (1) The backdrop for the emergence of the SEA, is that of the Syrian Revolution uprisings in 2011: a series of mass protests against the Assad regime, which was subsequently followed by harsh repercussions from his government, the Syrian Arab Republic. The Qatar government was a prominent supporter and funder of opposition to Assad’s regime from the start of the Revolution, and they were therefore a key target for the SEA, along with the Qatari-backed al-Jazeera TV and the Qatar Foundation. (1) There have been intimations that the SEA has links to the Iranian and Lebanese governments, Hezbollah, and of course, the Syrian administration. (2) Yet, an analysis by the open source intelligence company, Recorded Future, did not find any links between SEA and Iranian government cyber attack patterns, so there is skepticism about this link. (3) In 2016, the US publicly named and charged three men who it believed were responsible for conducting SEA hacks under the banner of the SEA; the men were also suspected for extorting money in connection with the hacking group. (4) As of the time of writing, two of the men have not been caught and convicted, as at the time their charges were announced, they were believed to be in Syria; the US offered a $100,000 reward for information leading to their arrests.  History & Origins The SEA was founded during the uprisings of the 2011 Syrian Revolution, as a reaction to the protesters opposing the Assad regime; it was founded to maintain positivity around Assad’s leadership and denounce the actions of the protesting masses, which it saw as destructive and unruly. After they started being active in 2011, the group increased both the volume and the profile of their attacks over time, targeting everyone from the AP to Human Rights Watch, taking down what they saw as biased and ignorant coverage of the Syrian unrest; for instance, this included taking down an opinion poll on the website of British newspaper, The Telegraph , stating on their Twitter (now X) page, that Syria’s fate was not up to the Western media. After accomplishing a hack, the group posted details of it on their website, in both English and Arabic; these attacks were often social media takeovers achieved by using phishing tactics. The hackers, once they gained access to large outlets’ social media accounts, could then take down what they believed to be fabricated or inaccurate news, and post content that was positive about the Syrian government.  Some of the SEA’s victims include: Harvard University, Microsoft, Washington Post , New York Post , Reuters, Human Rights Watch, National Public Radio (NPR), and CNN. By 2013, the group was also attacking CBS’s 60 Minutes Twitter account to post that “professionals under US regime protection” were responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing. (1) They also hacked various BBC Twitter accounts, to post surreal statements like “chaotic weather forecast for Lebanon as the government decides to distance itself from the Milky Way” and “Saudi weather station down due to head-on-collision with camel”. Their attacks varied from the ironic, to the straightforwardly political, and were all aimed at furthering their overriding political aim of bolstering the Assad government. The SEA faded from activity partly due to three of its members being charged with hacking and extortion charges by the US government; one was arrested in Germany, and rewards were offered for information leading to the arrest of the other two, who remain at large, and were presumed to be in Syria when America announced their charges. (4)  In the announcement from the US Department of Justice, it is stated that as well as having political aims, members of the group also used the hacks to extort money for personal gain, with Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin saying: “While some of the activity sought to harm the economic and national security of the United States in the name of Syria, these detailed allegations reveal that the members also used extortion to try to line their own pockets at the expense of law-abiding people all over the world.  The allegations in the complaint demonstrate that the line between ordinary criminal hackers and potential national security threats is increasingly blurry.” (5) The statement also says: ‘Ahmad Umar Agha, 22, known online as “The Pro,” and Firas Dardar, 27, known online as “The Shadow,” were charged with a criminal conspiracy relating to: engaging in a hoax regarding a terrorist attack; attempting to cause mutiny of the U.S. armed forces; illicit possession of authentication features; access device fraud; unauthorized access to, and damage of, computers; and unlawful access to stored communications.’ (6) According to the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zurich, the SEA likely disbanded in 2016, after the arrest and extradition of one of its members, Peter Romar, to the US and his subsequent conviction, after pleading guilty to all charges. However, it is still unclear how many members the hacking collective had, and what the nature of its links to Assad’s administration might be. (7) Ideology & Goals The SEA, during their short-lived active years, made their political leanings very clear: they wished for the Assad regime and the Syrian Arab Republic to be maintained, and were not supportive of the opposition protesters, who they saw as destroying an ordered society with a strong leader. The ideological commitment of the SEA is, of course, under some scrutiny due to them also using the hacks to extort money, however, they did appear to be committedly aligned with the Assad government, which they portrayed as embattled and misrepresented in the media across the world. They targeted a lot of news organizations, as well as the US and Qatari governments. When announcing the terror charges against three members of the SEA, the US government remarked that, in their view, ideology was not the only factor behind their actions, but that they were also attempting to use hacking actions for profit, such as by gaining access to the websites of online businesses in the US, and using threats of selling stolen data, deleting data, or damaging computers, to extort money from the victim. However, while there may have also been a profit motive behind the ideology of the SEA, it is clear that they were also the most notable cyber-actor throughout the 2011 Syrian civil war, and had a decided alignment with the Assad regime. This is shown by a 2011 TV address by Assad, in which he praises the work of the SEA; despite the group’s clarification after this speech (via its website) that they were not tied to the Syrian government, they clearly received at least tacit support from the administration. The SEA’s goals, apart from arguably monetary gain, were always centered on correcting what they saw as a biased and inaccurate media landscape around the Syrian civil war; they thought that the Assad regime was being misrepresented, and that both Western and Arab media coverage was too biased towards the opposition protesters and political forces. While the question of whether the SEA was actually instituted by the Syrian government was never answered, there is an argument to say that it became the administration’s de facto cyberforce, due to its very public and frequent attacks, and the reliability with which it made sure to claim responsibility for any actions it was involved in.  Approach to Resistance The toolkit of the SEA is that of a typical hacktivist: they focused on phishing techniques to obtain passwords, and once they gained access to social media accounts of news organizations or governments, they could gain control of the media narratives they sought to change by posting their own content or taking down posts that they disliked. When conducting extortion, they used typical techniques of leveraging data and the possibility of damage to influence victims. However, throughout the unrest in Syria that began in 2011, the SEA showed improvement in their methods, and it has been suggested by some that this indicates the involvement of additional support from a government, whether that be the government of Syria, Iran, or Russia, all of whom were supportive of Assad at the time. In 2013, further suspicion was sparked about the involvement of Russia in the SEA after the US-based internet domain name registrar Network Solutions LLC seized hundreds of Syrian domain names from the group, and they responded by registering their website in Russia to continue being active. (8) The lack of clarity around the SEA’s possible ties to the Syrian government result in a subsequent lack of clarity about its structure: if the group had governmental backing, then it would have possessed a more hierarchical structure that hacktivist groups typically exhibit, however, if the support of the Syrian regime was more distant, the SEA may have had a more typical decentralized structure. The SEA portrayed itself as a group of young, patriotic hackers rather than a governmental cyber security project, and it is thought that they attracted many young, patriotic hackers who wanted to be involved in the conflict, but did not feel confident being publicly associated with the Syrian government. The group’s hacking actions ended in 2015, and it was then that they appear to have switched to cybercrime, whether due to necessity or fading of ideological fervor for the Assad regime, it is unclear. It was after this shift, in 2016, that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made known their terror and extortion charges against three members of the group, and later arrested a member in Germany. The methods of the SEA, while conventional hacktivist tactics, remain interesting for the fact that this group is the largest cyber-force to have become active at the time, and it demonstrated a new use of cyber attacks within a conflict scenario. Relations & Alliances  As well as the SEA’s rumored links to the Syrian government, they also had some adverse relations with the hacking group Anonymous, who exposed five SEA alleged members in a hacktivist operation against the Syrian government, revealing that one of them was operating from Romania and one from Russia. The SEA was, furthermore, part of a wider context throughout the 2011 Syrian civil war, of cyber-actors becoming embroiled in the conflict, and during 2011, the group actually created a Facebook page entitled the Syrian Hackers School, where people could download and use a tool created for launching DDoS attacks against BBC News, Al Jazeera, OrientTV and Al-Arabyia TV. Other pro-government cyber-actors in this conflict included the Syrian Malware Team (SMT) and the Electronic National Defence Forces (ENDF), as well as some groups working from outside Syria. The SMT was very possibly an offshoot of the SEA, or at least the group appears to have contained members that were also linked to the SEA. The SMT used RAT and was active from 2011 to 2014. The ENDF was not linked to the SEA, but is instead thought to have been the cyber-actor arm of the Syrian National Defence Forces, a pro-government militia that operated throughout Syrian territory. One of their tactics was to lure victims on Facebook into providing their social media information, so that they could access their accounts and post pro-government messages. As well as there being an extensive landscape of hacking groups dedicated to pro-Assad operations, there are also plenty that aligned with the various opposition forces in this conflict, such as the cyber operations of the Free Syrian Army, as well as the Hackers of the Syrian Revolution, the Cyber Caliphate, and the cyber-branches of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.  Works Cited (1) - Fowler, Sarah. ‘Who is the Syrian Electronic Army?’ BBC. 25 April 2013. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22287326   (2) - Robertson, Jordan. ‘Three Things You Should Know About the Syrian Electronic Army’. Bloomberg. 24 March 2014. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-24/three-things-you-should-know-about-the-syrian-electronic-army   (3) Rachael KingReporter. ‘Data Shows No Link Between Syrian Electronic Army and Iran.’ Wall Street Journal.  5 September 2013. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CIOB-2730   (4) ‘Syrian Electronic Army hacker suspects charged.’ BBC. 23 March 2016. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35881321   (5) ‘Computer Hacking Conspiracy Charges Unsealed Against Members of Syrian Electronic Army’. US Department of Justice. 22 March 2016. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/computer-hacking-conspiracy-charges-unsealed-against-members-syrian-electronic-army   (6) ‘Computer Hacking Conspiracy Charges Unsealed Against Members of Syrian Electronic Army’. Office of Public Affairs, US Department of Justice. 22 March 2016. Accessed 22 June 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/computer-hacking-conspiracy-charges-unsealed-against-members-syrian-electronic-army   (7) ‘Guilty plea for Syrian Electronic Army accomplice’. BBC. 30 September 20216. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37517891   (8) ‘Hotspot Analysis, The use of cybertools in an internationalized civil war context: Cyber activities in the Syrian conflict’. Risk and Resilience Team, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. October 2017. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-05.pdf   Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Sect of Revolutionaries (SR), a far-left militant group, emerged in the wake of societal unrest following the 2008 police killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos. Operating primarily in Greece, the group advocated for radical changes through violent means, aiming to provoke a revolution against the state and its institutions. Their activities, marked by high-profile targeted attacks, positioned them as a significant figure in the landscape of revolutionary groups in Greece. History The Sect of Revolutionaries was born from radical leftist and anarchist ideologies that intensified after Greece’s military dictatorship era ended in 1974. This turbulent period led to the establishment of the notorious Revolutionary Organization on 17 November (17N) and Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), which carried out various attacks, including the assassination of CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in 1975. The failure of a 2002 operation and subsequent crackdown by Greek authorities diminished 17N, particularly in the lead-up to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. (1) With time, new groups like the Sect of Revolutionaries emerged. The SR’s debut is tied to the aftermath of the Grigoropoulos incident which occurred in December 2008, where a 15-year-old teenager lost his life to a policeman. Starting in 2009, they led different violent actions, including death threats, bombing, shooting and assassinations of both an anti-terrorist police officer and a journalist. The group is also suspected to have ties to the Balkan criminal world, through which they obtained their weapons. (2) Despite their notoriety and the impact of their actions, the Sect of Revolutionaries has faced significant setbacks due to counterterrorism efforts. The arrests of key members and the disruption of their operations have hindered their ability to conduct further attacks. (3) The Sect of Revolutionaries (SR) remained active until 2010 and became dormant in 2011. In 2015, communications between jailed members of the 'Conspiracy of Fire Cells (SPF)—a radical anarchist group known for car bombings—revealed plans to revive the SR and potentially initiate new attacks.  This underscores the connections between anarchist groups in Greece and highlights SR's enduring influence within Greek anarchism, placing the organization as a symbol of  continuity in Greece’s history of political activism. (1)(3) Objectives and Ideology The objectives and ideology of the Sect of Revolutionaries are deeply rooted in their belief in the necessity of a violent overthrow of the Greek government to initiate societal and political change. Their ideology, characterized by radical leftist and anarchist principles, advocated for a revolution against what they perceived as a corrupt state apparatus. This perspective aligns with broader themes observed in Greek domestic anarchist terrorism, where groups share a common goal of challenging state power and advocating for radical societal restructuring. The Sect of Revolutionaries saw themselves as part of this broader struggle, aiming to inspire an insurrectionary movement within Greece that would challenge the status quo and instigate revolutionary change. (4) Military and Political Abilities The SR demonstrated their military and political capabilities through their strategic use of violence and propaganda. Their actions included assassination attempts, armed raids, car bombs, and rocket attacks against targets they deemed representative of the state and its supportive structures. (4) These operations aimed to destabilize the government and inspire a broader insurrectionary movement within Greece, a strategy that could be compared to the one used in the propaganda par le fait  (“propaganda by the deed”) theory​​. This political stand, better incarnated in the late 19th century by the Russian anarchist group Narodnaya Volya, holds that only violent action can inspire the people to lead to revolutionary actions. (4)(5) Approach to Resistance The SR’s approach to resistance was characterized by its reliance on violent tactics intended to provoke fear and uncertainty within the state and its agencies. The group claimed responsibility for a series of attacks, including the assassination of a journalist and a police officer, marking their violent campaign against figures and institutions they accused of perpetuating the existing societal and political order​​​​. (3)(6)  Specifically, the actions of the Sect of Revolutionaries include the assassination of an anti-terrorist police officer in June 2009 and the assassination of the Greek journalist Sokratis Giolias in July 2010, both incidents for which they claimed responsibility. (3) International Relations & Potential Alliances Internationally, the SR was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization by the United States, reflecting the global concern over its activities and the threat they posed to Greece and to international security. This designation aimed to cut off the group’s financial support and limit their operational capabilities​​. (6) As mentioned before, the SR follows the same philosophical and political doctrine as many anarchist movements internationally and is even in direct line with Greek groups such as 17N, making more than likely the formation of alliances with other local groups sharing the same goals. (1)(4) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives Supporters of the SR might view the group as a radical yet necessary force fighting against state oppression and injustice, aiming to liberate society from the clutches of a corrupt and authoritarian regime. (1)(4) Critics, however, see the SR as a dangerous terrorist organization whose methods undermine democracy, threaten civil peace, and result in the loss of innocent lives, ultimately harming the very society they claim to fight for​​​​. (1)(4) Works Cited (1) - "Greek Domestic Terrorism". Counter Terrorism Guide. Accessed March 18, 2024. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/greek_domestic.html (2) - "Sect of Revolutionaries". Wikipedia. Accessed March 22, 2024.   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sect_of_Revolutionaries (3) - Proto Thema. "Jailed terrorists wanted to reconstitute ‘Sect of Revolutionaries’ militant group." Protothema.gr , March 3, 2015.   https://en.protothema.gr/jailed-terrorists-wanted-to-reconstitute-sect-of-revolutionaries-militant-group/ (4) - U.S. Department of State. "Department of State's Designation of The Sect of Revolutionaries." Media Note. Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, February 24, 2011. Accessed March 19, 2024.   Archived at 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157046.htm . (5) - "Propaganda of the deed". Wikipedia. Accessed March 22, 2024.   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda_of_the_deed (6) - Popular Front. “Department of State's Designation of The Sect of Revolutionaries”. YouTube video, 28:17. Published June 16 2022.   https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157060.htm

Introduction & Overview The Karen (Kuh-ren) National Liberation Army (KNLA) is a military branch of the political organization, Karen National Union (KNU), which campaigns for the self-determination of the Karen people of Myanmar, and fights for peace and unity against the military dictatorship within the country. The KNU and its armed wing have been fighting the military, The Tatmadaw, or Junta for 75 years. History & Foundations Myanmar is a country that is rich in diversity, with over 135 ethnic groups. However, Myanmar wasn’t always formally known as Myanmar – “In 1988, after a brutal suppression of a pro-democracy uprising via the country’s military dictatorship (which saw thousands executed), leaders changed its name to Myanmar,” (1)  from Burma based on the dominantly ethnic group, the Burmese. During the colonial period of Burma, the British colonialist rule brought forth more ethnic division by favoring certain ethnicities, leading to greater social and economic differences. Predominantly, Buddhism is the main religion among the Burman ethnic group. This is noteworthy, for it influences perceptions within Myanmar, where there is a tendency among some sections of the Burmese population to view non-Buddhist ethnic groups as less traditional, or ‘civilized.’ “The initial conflict among Burma’s disparate ethnic groups and its Burman majority dates back to the British colonial era when ethnic minorities were given favorable treatment over the Burman majority.” (2) With the arrival of the British during World War II, the Karen – as well as other ethnicities – hoped to escape what they perceived to be the brutal and oppressive rule of the Military. But this was not the case; the tensions only heightened as the Burmans sided with the Imperial Japanese. In response, the Karens sided with the British. Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain in 1947, the KNLA has been engaged in this conflict. Initially, they were promised autonomy within the Burmese federation, with an option to secede after ten years. However, these promises were unfulfilled due to the subsequent civil war. Since 1962, the Karens, along with other insurgent groups, have conflicted with the military junta. Objectives & Ideology Following independence, the Karen's future was and still is uncertain. By mid-1948, the newly-formed Burmese state split into warring factions, and fighting started between the KNU and the Burmese army and other various ethnic groups. By 1950, the KNU had spelled out its political principles in four short statements: (3) “For us surrender is out of the question. The recognition of the Karen state must be complete. We shall retain our arms. We shall decide our own political destiny.” In an Al Jazeera report on the violence that the Karens face, Colonel Saw Kler Doh, a commander within the KNLA stated that the “Tatmadaw do not want ethnic minorities like us to have sovereignty and self-determination. They want to take control of everything. They want to control any area where there is a resistance group. They haven’t just been coming to our region for decades.” (4) Military/Political Abilities Despite limited resources and support, the KNLA has been resourceful in acquiring military weapons and equipment. On top of obtaining humanitarian aid, the KNLA somewhat benefits from the sanctions enacted by Western countries. The UK, the US, and Canada are implementing the most sanctions against the military dictatorship. The KNLA has shown innovation in creating their weapons, such as through 3D printing. The FGC-9mm or fully known as (Fuck Gun Control 9-millimeter), is known as a predecessor of the FP-45 which stands for ‘Flare Projector,’ an uncommon yet widely known weapon during World War 2, manufactured by the United States, solely for the discreet resistance within occupied territories within Europe. Through this reputation, it gained the name 'Liberator'. These single-shot pistols were only a stepping stone when it came to the resistance’s arsenal, as these pistols were only a gateway to acquiring better weaponry. Like the Liberator, 3D-printed weapons offer the same opportunity to the KNLA and other armed ethnic groups within Myanmar. Moreover, the KNLA is widely known for its guerrilla warfare and ambush tactics within the jungles of Myanmar, through which the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) can gain useful resources and much-needed equipment after these ambushes amongst trade routes of the Junta. The number of armed forces has varied since its formation in 1947. As early as 2021, it was reported that the KNLA had a strength of approximately 15,000 troops. (5) The KNLA is currently divided into seven brigades (6) and a 'Special Force' reserved for special operations. (7) Approach to Resistance The Karen National Liberation Army seeks autonomy for the Karen people and what it perceives as liberation for the the wider population of Myanmar. Their approaches to fight for this outcome involve guerrilla warfare tactics and ambush tactics, with a defensive focus within the Karen territory and communities. The KNLA has been a part of vast ethnic armed movements in Myanmar, such as EAO, otherwise known as Ethnic Armed Organization, and CDM (Civil Disobedience Movement.) Both organizations advocate for political dialogue and a federal system that fully recognizes the rights of the Karens, and other oppressed ethnic groups. On May 6th, 2022, Andrew Nachemson of Al Jazeera reported on how the Karen became a crucial group within Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance. Within the report, Nachemson re-released a statement from the KNU, which states, “We cannot accept the military taking power and detaining the country’s leaders. This is a massive obstacle and challenge in transitioning to democracy,” essentially accusing the military of violating its own 2008 constitution. (8) International Relations & Alliances The alliances of the KNLA within Myanmar are wide. As of 2023, they are associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups. The KNLA is a part of the 4k Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, Karenni National People’s Liberation Front, and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies include the Karen National Defence Organisation, All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, Arakan Army, Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, Kachin Independence Army, People’s Defence Force, and the Free Burma Rangers. The KNLA/KNU is also allied with a similar organization called the National Unity Government, or NUG, which was founded on January 31st, 2007 by Major General Saw Htein Maung, who was the commander of 7th Brigade within the KNLA. (9)

Insurgency Overview The Indigenous Guard (Guardia Indígena) is a network of loosely affiliated nonviolent self-defense organizations based in Indigenous territories throughout Colombia. Indigenous Guard units are generally autonomous entities without formal affiliation to other organizations under the “Indigenous Guard” moniker, although they share a common history, organizational structure, and function. The Indigenous Guard is therefore more accurately understood as a movement, model, or organizational strategy and not as a single cohesive organization. Indigenous Guard units act as security forces for their respective Indigenous communities while coordinating with Indigenous government councils (cabildos) and other regional organizations. Their mission is generally defined as the peaceful, collective defense of human rights, territory, autonomy, and culture within the Indigenous communities and territories of Colombia (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020; CRIC, n.d.). The formation of Indigenous Guard units responded to the long history of violence and marginalization perpetrated against Indigenous Colombian communities by both state and non-state actors in the context of the long-running Colombian conflict (Díaz, 2023). The first Indigenous Guard unit to adopt and popularize the term was the Indigenous Guard of Cauca (Guardia Indígena del Cauca), which was formed by a regional association of Indigenous councils in southwest Colombia in 2001 (Jiménez González, 2020). Since then, dozens of other Indigenous Guard units have emerged in most of Colombia’s more than 100 Indigenous communities. According to the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca: CRIC), the purpose of the Indigenous Guard is to “protect, care for, defend, preserve, survive, and dream one’s own dreams, to hear one’s own voice, to laugh one’s own laugh, to sing one’s own song, and to cry one’s own tears” (CRIC, n.d.). The movement’s slogan is “Guard! Strength! For my race and for my land!” According to the Colombian Truth Commission, as of 2020, there were more than 20,000 members of Indigenous Guard units throughout Colombia’s 115 Indigenous communities (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020), while an estimate in the Spanish daily newspaper El País put the number at around 70,000 in 2023; reliable statistics are difficult to estimate given the decentralized nature of the movement (Díaz, 2023). Indigenous Guard units engage in community protection, territorial patrols, marches and political actions, and other acts of collective, territorial, and cultural defense. In so doing, they have come into the crosshairs of armed groups including guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the Colombian state. Assassinations, kidnappings, and massacres targeting Indigenous Guard units and their leaders are commonplace in parts of Colombia, particularly the Indigenous Guard’s homeland of Cauca (Díaz, 2023; Front Line Defenders, 2022; Human Rights Investigations Lab, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023). History & Foundations The first Indigenous Guard unit was formed in 2001 in the southwest Colombian department of Cauca by a regional association of Indigenous government councils. Known as the Indigenous Guard of Cauca, this first unit was staffed primarily by activists of the Nasa people, one of Colombia’s largest Indigenous communities. The founding organization, the Association of Indigenous Councils of North Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca: ACIN) was an affiliate of one of Colombia’s largest Indigenous civil society organizations, the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca, founded in 1971 in the context of the long-running Colombian conflict. For this reason, the Indigenous Guard movement is commonly associated with the CRIC, although many units today are not formally affiliated with that group (Jiménez González, 2020). In the 23 years since the founding of the first Indigenous Guard unit, the majority of Colombia’s Indigenous communities have formed their own, with varying degrees of connection and collaboration between them. Historically, both the Indigenous Guard and its predecessors like the CRIC and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia: ONIC) emerged in the context of the Colombian conflict, a long-term, low-intensity civil war beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present day. Indigenous communities have suffered disproportionately throughout the conflict at the hands of each of its major actors, from left-wing guerrillas (e.g., FARC, ELN) to right-wing paramilitaries (e.g., AUC) to the armed forces of the Colombian state, each of which coveted control over Indigenous territories for economic, political, or military reasons (Loaiza, 2019; Vadillo, 2019; Wallis, 2019; 2020). While some Indigenous communities responded by forming guerrillas of their own—such as Quintín Lame in Cauca and the FARIP on the Pacific coast—others responded with the eventual formation of the Indigenous Guard as a pacifist alternative aimed at curtailing Colombia’s long cycle of violence. The Indigenous Guard’s refusal of violent methods and the use of arms stemmed from the experience of some of its founders as guerrilla fighters in Quintín Lame, a group initially founded as a self-defense organization, but which went on the offensive in the 1980s, resulting in further bloodshed. When Quintín Lame demobilized in 1991 in favor of legal participation in Colombia’s Constitutional Assembly, Nasa activists decided to pursue their autonomy through legal and nonviolent means (Wyss, 2012). Some Indigenous Guard units and affiliate organizations also situate their activities within a historical tradition of Indigenous resistance to colonialism. The Indigenous Guard of Cauca, for instance, looks back to the legendary Nasa cacique Juan Tama de la Estrella, who led the struggle against the Spanish invasion in the late 1600s and who later obtained legal recognition of his people’s territory from the Spanish crown (Díaz, 2020). In the Sibundoy Valley of Putumayo, the Indigenous Guard of the Kamëntšá and Inga peoples likewise connect their territorial defense movement to a legendary cacique of their own, Carlos Tamabioy, who in 1700 secured legal recognition of his people’s territory—a claim that was ratified by the Colombian state in 2016, partly through the work of the valley’s Indigenous Guard unit (Bonilla, 2019; “Termina una disputa,” 2016). While the Indigenous Guard as such was only founded in 2001, some of its constituents claim that the movement in its current form is a continuation of a long tradition of Indigenous resistance and autonomous self-defense (Amórtegui, 2023). The Indigenous Guard increasingly entered the mainstream national consciousness throughout the 2000s by carrying out daring but effective and usually bloodless operations, such as the successful 2004 rescue of four kidnapped leaders from the FARC during a 400-man, 20-day chase through the jungle (Wyss, 2012). The movement’s impressive record has continued to the present; one of the most recent and widely publicized actions of Indigenous Guard units was the collaborative rescue of four Indigenous children lost in the Amazon following a plane crash in a remote region of rainforest on May 1, 2023. Together with 150 soldiers of the Colombian army, 80 members of five Indigenous Guard units—the Coreguaje of Caquetá, Siona of Putumayo, Isimali of Meta, Nasa of Cauca, and Murui-Muinane of Amazonas and Caquetá—succeeded in locating the children after a 40-day rescue operation (García Cano, 2023; Glatsky and Turkowitz, 2023). Objectives & Ideology The primary objective of each Indigenous Guard unit is to defend the territory and integrity of its respective Indigenous community through nonviolent means. Their tactics include patrolling the territory, documenting and opposing instances of trespassing and illegal activity, and confronting opponents such as armed groups, as well as carrying out humanitarian and political actions. Their ideology can be broadly described as Indigenist, seeking to promote the territorial, cultural, and political interests and autonomy of Indigenous peoples (CRIC, n.d.). The Indigenous Guard conceives of its legal and constitutional basis as deriving from the Colombian Constitution of 1991. More specifically, the Indigenous Guard has referenced Articles 7, 246, and 330 of the Constitution as the legal basis for its formation; these articles refer to, respectively, state recognition and protection of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Colombia; the rights of Indigenous communities to semi-autonomous jurisdictional functions; and the rights of Indigenous communities to semi-autonomous government and its related functions (Benítez Loaiza, 2021; Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2022). Indigenous Guard units also refer to the “life plans” (planes de vida) or “safeguard plans” (planes de salvaguardia), which are diagnostic and strategic documents formulated by various Indigenous communities in collaboration with state entities that lay out models and objectives of sustainable development and cultural, territorial, and political autonomy for the Indigenous communities of Colombia. The ratification of Law 152 of 1994 saw the genesis of these life plans within a greater national schema of “development plans” (planes de desarrollo). Since then, Indigenous communities have periodically revised and reissued their life plans (Mesa Salazar, 2020). Provisions for the formation of autonomous and ethnically or territorially constituted Indigenous Guard units are often included within these plans, and within these frameworks, Indigenous Guard units are construed as necessary for the advancement of Indigenous interests. In addition to defending the rights and interests of Indigenous communities, Indigenous Guard units are also known as environmental defenders with an ecological outlook—a dangerous combination in Colombia, which for several years running has been the deadliest country in the world for environmental defenders (Griffin, 2023). One of the core ecosystems defended by Indigenous Guard units is the páramo, an ecologically unique alpine wetland biome with a vital role in Andean ecology but which is increasingly threatened by climate change. For groups like the Environmental Indigenous Guard, a group based in Gran Cumbal region of southern Colombia, protecting these ecosystems is integral to the greater defense of Indigenous territory, rights, and livelihoods (ActionAid, 2023; Pozzebo, 2021; Selibas, 2023; United Nations, 2021). Political & Military Capabilities As a nonviolent organization, the Indigenous Guard does not possess formal military capabilities. The equipment carried by individual guards is limited to wooden staffs, with a symbolic more than a functional connotation (Wyss, 2012). Their staffs bear tassels in four colors: green for nature, red for the blood of their ancestors, blue for water, and black for the earth (Díaz, 2023). Participation in the Indigenous Guard is voluntary, and members do not receive pay. Only occasionally have Indigenous Guard units participated in violent confrontations, generally in response to other actors’ instigations. More often, Indigenous Guard units are the victims of targeted violence at the hands of the armed groups they peacefully confront (Front Line Defenders, 2022; Grattan and Mazars, 2022a; 2022b; Pozzebon, 2021; Servindi, 2015; 2024a; 2024b). As a political and civil defense force, Indigenous Guard units typically wield influence within their communities. At the national level, they have also shown themselves capable of organizing across regional and ethnic lines to advance demands through a popular front. Broadly speaking, there are three scales at which Indigenous Guard units operate: Within specific Indigenous communities or reservations (resguardos) Through delegates to the regional level, who articulate local guard units with political organizations At the national level, where around 53 Indigenous organizations are housed within the ONIC, which elects a national Indigenous Guard coordinator (Díaz, 2023). At the national level, the Indigenous Guard has played a prominent role in major protests, social movements, and marches, including a recent occupation of Bogotá’s historic Plaza de Bolívar (Emblin, 2023). Approach to Resistance The Indigenous Guard employs nonviolent resistance to protect Indigenous territories and oppose trespassers, including criminal groups such as guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers, as well as the Colombian army and police. Despite its commitment to nonviolent methods and its rejection of the use of arms, the Indigenous Guard has carried out dangerous yet effective operations against armed actors, such as dismantling guerrilla roadblocks, seizing arsenals, capturing combatants, and destroying drug laboratory camps. Indigenous Guard units have also carried out rescue missions, entering guerrilla camps to free victims of forced recruitment and kidnapping. They have also targeted state forces, such as by destroying police barricades and evicting soldiers from fortified positions. In some regions, the Indigenous Guard has set up roadblocks to control the entry of outsiders (Wyss, 2012; Participedia, 2021). The movement is also known for its humanitarian operations, such as combatting forced recruitment by armed groups, searching for “disappeared” people (desaparecidos), advocating for the release of kidnapping victims, and carrying out search and rescue actions (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020; Díaz, 2023; Sur Journal, 2020). Opponents of the Indigenous Guard have accused them of “terrorism” or of being a kind of paramilitary organization with military training and bearing arms. Some, such as former Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón, even went so far as to suggest that some Indigenous Guard units were in league with the FARC—even though the latter group has long targeted Indigenous communities in acts of violence, while the Indigenous Guard has carried out operations against the FARC (Andrés Barahona, 2011; Wyss, 2012). No evidence of such collusion is extant and Indigenous Guard units have denied such allegations (Díaz, 2023). Relations & Alliances The Indigenous Guard first emerged from Indigenous civil society organizations such as the CRIC and ONIC. Consequently, their closest alliances are still with these and similar organizations, which employ civil, participatory, and political strategies to advance the interests of Colombia’s Indigenous communities. The Indigenous Guard itself could be viewed as one approach within the broader movement for the rights and autonomy of Indigenous Colombians through civil means (CRIC, n.d.). The Indigenous Guard model has inspired some non-Indigenous communities in Colombia to follow suit and organize their own guard units along similar lines. Peasant communities have organized “peasant guard” (guardia campesina) units, while Afro-Colombian communities have organized “maroon guard” (guardia cimarrona) units (Díaz, 2023). The opponents of the Indigenous Guard include guerrilla organizations such as the FARC and ELN, both among the largest and most long-lived of Latin America’s left-wing guerrillas (though the FARC formally disbanded in 2016, dissident cells continue to operate). Both organizations have historically targeted Indigenous Guard units and leaders in assassinations and massacres—attacks which continue today in the case of the ELN, which remains operative in Cauca and other Indigenous-majority regions of Colombia (Wyss, 2012; Participedia, 2021). Similarly, the Indigenous Guard has clashed with right-wing paramilitaries and other criminal groups trespassing on their territory and threatening their communities, frequently through participation in the Colombian drug trade (Wallis, 2020). Neither has the Indigenous Guard had positive relations with the Colombian state. Consequently, one of their most consistent opponents has been Colombian media outlets, particularly those aligned with right-wing political figures such as Álvaro Uribe and his successor, Iván Duque; the Colombian right has tended to villainize Indigenous communities and their guard units while deploying troops to their territories against the wishes of locals (Alsema, 2019; Wyss, 2012). Indigenous Guard units have therefore not limited their operations to criminal groups but have also acted against Colombian forces such as police and soldiers. Another common opponent of the Indigenous Guard are the multinational corporations that seek to develop extractive economic projects in their territories (Díaz, 2023). In the Sibundoy Valley of Putumayo department, for example, an Indigenous Guard unit composed of Kamëntšá and Inga land defenders has organized marches against the construction of a planned bypass through both an ecological protected area and a zone of legally recognized Indigenous territory. The road, locally known as the San Francisco–Mocoa Bypass (la Variante San Francisco–Mocoa), is a public project permitted by the Colombian state but built by a consortium of private contractors and backed by multinational mining concessions hoping to capitalize on the land the project will open to commercial exploitation. Local guard members have received threats for their activism in opposition to the project, suggesting the collusion between state actors, Colombian business interests, multinational corporations, and criminal groups in their employ that characterizes such development projects and their interaction with Indigenous communities in Colombia (Fernanda Lizcano, 2020a; 2020b). The Indigenous Guard has also received international support. In 2020, Irish human rights organization Front Line Defenders recognized the Indigenous Guard of Cauca with the 2020 Americas Regional Front Line Defenders Award for Human Rights Defenders at Risk (Jiménez González, 2020; PAX, 2020). Members of the Indigenous Guard have also received such prestigious international awards as the Goldman Environmental Prize, and been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Selibas, 2023). It has also been suggested that the Indigenous Guard and affiliate organizations such as the CRIC have taken inspiration from the example of the EZLN in Mexico, a militant movement for Indigenous autonomy that also witnessed the creation of Indigenous self-defense units with similar goals and tactics; both groups maintain communications and advance similar political visions of Indigenous autonomy (Zibechi, 2023). *All Images courtesy of Rowan Glass - LinkedIn

Insurgency Overview The 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril), M-19, was a guerilla movement in Colombia active during the 1970s and 80s before demobilising in 1990 and transitioning into a political party, the ‘M-19 Democratic Alliance’ (Alianza Democrática M-19), or AD/M-19.  The movement’s name is a reference to the date (April 19th, 1970) when ex-military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular), ANAPO, was allegedly denied electoral victory by the National Front, a coalition of power-sharing liberal and conservative establishment leaders.  The National Front subsequently imprisoned Pinilla and declared martial law, which inspired the founders of the M-19 to take up arms. (1).  The M-19 declared itself to be an urban armed protest movement for the people of Colombia. While most Colombian guerilla movements identified with Marxist ideology, the M-19 “advocated a nationalist, Bolívarian, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic model and argued for ‘Socialism Colombian-style.’” (2) The movement began in the early 1970s as a clandestine group of urban cells operating in Bogotá and other major cities across Colombia.  By the 80s, the movement had succeeded in building a military-political apparatus with mobile units on multiple fronts and became the second largest and most popular guerrilla movement in the country. (1) They funded their operations by kidnapping landowners, drug traffickers, politicians, and oligarchs (including their family members) and holding them ransom for large sums of money. (2) Their weapons were either imported from overseas and smuggled into the country or stolen from military installations or local individuals. (2,3,4) Their strategy of armed propaganda and ‘Robin Hood-like actions’ made them very popular and garnered public support.  On the flip side, they also attracted negative attention from the military and paramilitary units, like the MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores, ‘Death to Kidnappers’) and AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, ‘United Self-Defenders of Colombia), whose ‘dirty war’ led to the imprisonment, torture, and murder of guerrillas and anyone alleged to sympathize or support the movement. (2) Significant actions by the M-19 include the theft of Simón Bolívar’s Sword, the siege of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, and the siege of the Palace of Justice.  M-19’s military operations were largely seen as political failures, but after a decade of failed peace negotiations, the M-19 successfully negotiated a ceasefire and peace agreement with the government. (2) In 1990, the group demilitarised in return for full amnesty and a path towards electoral politics. (1) The newly formed AD/M-19 played a significant role in the creation of Colombia’s modern 1991 constitution and paved the way for future peace negotiations between the Colombian government and other guerrilla organisations.  While the AD/M-19 initially had popular support, the movement began to decline due to poor political strategy and decisions regarding unpopular economic and social policies.  Many former members left to join other more successful leftist political groups, such as the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente, PDI). (2) In 2022, Gustavo Petro, a former M-19 guerilla, won Colombia’s presidential elections and became the first leftist president in the nation’s history. History Colombia has a long history of armed violence.  The current civil war has roots in a time of conflict known as La Violencia.  The decade-long civil war followed the 1948 assassination of Liberal party candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.  Following a riot known as the Bogotázo, military, police, and conservative political leaders encouraged conservative-supporting peasants to seize agricultural land from liberal-supporting peasants.  This led to mass displacement and the deaths of over 200,000 Colombians. (5)  During this time, rural self-defence groups formed and eventually evolved into the guerilla movements of the 60s.  These first-generation guerilla organisations include the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberacion Nacional, ELN), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL). (2) In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla mounted a coup d’état and ruled the country as a military dictator.  He imposed martial law and implemented populist leftist policies.  The coup put an end to the conflict, but Pinilla’s policies conflicted with those of the oligarchic establishment.  Therefore, the Liberal and Conservative parties formed a power-swapping coalition known as the National Front and deposed Pinilla.  In opposition, Pinilla formed the ANAPO political party. (5) On April 19th, 1970, Pinilla was allegedly denied the presidency by the National Front, in a case of electoral fraud.  Pinilla was then imprisoned, and perpetual martial law went into effect which gave the state forces unconstitutional powers to search and seize.  For many, this reinforced their belief that Colombia’s government was not a true democracy. (1) In 1973, Jaime Bateman, a FARC separatist, and Carlos Toledo, a physician and ANAPO representative in Congress, founded the M-19 intending to build a popular urban armed protest movement capable of challenging the oligarchy and established order. (1) They began establishing clandestine cells in urban centres across the country.  Their first major operation occurred in 1974 when a clandestine cell stole Simón Bolívar’s sword from the Quinta de Bolívar in Bogotá.  The symbolic action grabbed the attention of the public in the form of armed propaganda that encouraged others to take up arms and join the movement. (2) In 1976, the M-19 kidnapped and executed union leader, Jose Mercado.  Mercado had been accused of “being a traitor to the interest of the working class.”  The next year the group took hostage the manager of an agro-industrial African Palm company.  In this action, they were able to work out a peaceful negotiation that led to better working conditions for the employees while sparing the life of the manager.  It was during this time that M-19 began to adopt a political-military organisational structure that oriented itself towards comprehensive political and military actions. (4,6) In 1978, the group smuggled more than 5,700 weapons from a military arms cache by digging a tunnel into an army weapons depot.  The arms provided the movement with the means to develop mobile units capable of large-scale actions across multiple fronts.  In response, the military raided, arrested, and tortured many suspected M-19 guerrillas, including alleged “sympathisers.” (2) One year later, M-19’s Jorge Marcos Zambrano commando unit laid siege to the Dominican Republic embassy in Bogotá.  The main objective of the operation was to force the release of their political prisoners.  The incident received international attention.  After 61 days of negotiation, a non-violent solution was reached with President Turbay’s administration.  The prisoners were not freed, but the action did open a dialogue between the government and M-19 regarding amnesty and peace negotiations. (2) In 1981, the group kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the sister of the Ochoa brothers, founders of the Medellín Cartel.  In response, the narco-traffickers funded a paramilitary group known as “Death to Kidnappers” (Muerte a Seceustradores, MAS) to destroy the M-19 and other guerrilla groups in revenge for the kidnapping of their families.  They carried out assassinations against M-19 leaders and tortured/killed those perceived to “support” the guerillas. (2) In the early 1980s, a series of military actions were waged to promote a peace proposal that called for the “ending of the state of emergency, the derogation of the Security State, [and] an unconditional general amnesty along with a national dialogue.” (2) In 1983, general commander Jaime Bateman was killed in a plane crash while travelling to Panama for peace talks with then-President Belisario Betancur. (1) The next year, President Betancur and M-19’s then-general commander Álvaro Fayad signed an agreement of truce and national dialogue.  However, the dialogue lacked support from the rest of the government, including hostile sectors within the military. (2) In fact, during this period one of the largest battles between the Army and M-19 occurred in Yarumales.  After the assassination of M-19 co-founder Carlos Toledo and a nearly fatal attack on commander Antonio Navarro, Commander Fayad declared an end to the truce. (4) In 1985, M-19’s Ivan Marino Ospina company, a special forces unit consisting of 35 guerrillas, laid siege to the Palace of Justice in Bogotá to protest President Betancur’s failure to comply with the peace agreements. (4) President Betancur refused to negotiate with the guerrillas and allowed the state forces to run an aggressive counter-siege operation.  The counter-siege was led by tanks, helicopters, and troops with machine guns, grenades, and rocket launchers; it led to the destruction of the Palace of Justice and the deaths of over 100 people, including the entire guerilla unit and half the nation’s supreme court. (7) The failed operation was a national tragedy and cost the movement a considerable amount of support.  Following the operation, Commander Fayad was murdered in a police raid. (2) After the Palace of Justice, the movement was unable to continue the armed struggle due to loss of public support and political isolation.  In 1988, then-general commander Carlos Pizarro called for a truce with the military and initiated a peace process with the government.  In 1990, the M-19 officially demilitarised and transitioned into politics.  The success of the peace process paved the way for other guerrilla movements like the EPL, PRT (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Colombia), and Quintín Lame to follow in their footsteps toward peace agreements. (2) In 1990, M-19’s political organisation, AD/M-19, was officially established.  Pizarro ran for presidency but was assassinated by the Medellín cartel before the elections could take place. (1) An estimated 160 ex-guerillas were killed after demobilization. (2) Despite the murders, the M-19 did not revert to taking up arms but continued the peace process.  The political party saw some early successes.  Antonio Navarro was elected as the Minister of Health and the AD/M-19 won a significant number of votes for the National Constitutional Assembly.  They played a key role in the forging of the Colombian Constitution of 1991. (1,2,4) It didn’t take long for the AD/M-19 to lose momentum and face a massive decline in political support. The decline was due to a lack of political strategy including support for unpopular economic programs and several repressive pieces of legislation. Despite the failure of the party, many of its members went on to join the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente, PDI) coalition which later merged with the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDA) coalition.  Current President and ex-M19 guerilla, Gustavo Petro, combined his party, Humane Colombia (Humana Colombia), with the PDA and other leftist and liberal political organisations to form the Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition.  During Gustavo Petro’s time in the M-19, he was jailed and tortured.  As the first leftist president in Colombian history, he has championed peace negotiations with the remaining guerrillas and continued to lead investigations into ties between paramilitaries and politicians.  For example, former president Álvaro Uribe faces allegations linking him to the AUC paramilitary organisation, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking. (8) Objectives and Ideology "I’m not a Marxist.  Being a Marxist in today’s world is being dogmatic.  I am not dogmatic." - M-19 Commander Jaime Bateman (1) The M-19 considered itself the military arm of the ANAPO movement.  They advocated “a nationalist, Bolivarian, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic model of ‘Socialism Colombian-style’.  Their main objective was to open ‘true’ electoral democracy in Colombia through armed protest. (2) M-19 saw itself as distinct from internationalist-oriented models, such as those of the ELN (Cuba-oriented), FARC (Soviet-oriented), and EPL (China-oriented).  They did not consider themselves Marxist-Leninist, which they saw as dogmatic.  Instead, the movement prided itself on its diversity of class, political orientation, and culture.  Their ranks were made up of mostly middle-class students/college graduates and working-class youth from popular urban sectors across the country. Women were allowed to participate as militants and serve as commanding officers. They claimed their movement was for the ‘common people’ united by Colombian identity, Latin American fraternity, and the revolutionary history of their ancestors.  There was a concern with building unity amongst various guerilla movements and political groups, despite the prevailing mood of extreme sectarianism. (2) Revolutionary movements such as the Montoneros in Argentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay inspired M-19 to build a political-military apparatus of mobile guerrilla units that could channel the will of the people to bring about revolutionary economic and social change.  They believed democracy would only prevail after these revolutionary changes took place through armed rebellion. (6) Political and Military Capabilities The M-19 started as a small group of clandestine cells in popular urban centres.  They established columns (units) in Colombia’s major cities.  Each column was organised into independent cells.  They financed operations mainly by kidnapping or ‘detaining’ hostages and demanding ransom for large sums of money. (1) Undercover guerillas ran safehouses to smuggle weapons and hostages.  Their main military objectives were to carry out commando-like actions in urban centres as a form of armed propaganda (i.e. stealing the sword of Bolívar) and building a large-scale rural army capable of challenging the state to meet their demands for democratic and social reform. (2) In the 1986 siege of the Palace of Justice, author Ann Carrigan writes, “[they had] boxes of hand grenades and some Claymore mines…two 50mm and 30mm Mack machine guns, ammunition for the 7.62mm Galil rifles, the 7.63 G-3 guns, the 5.56mm AR-15s, the Uzi 9mm submachine guns, the M-16s, the 9mm Browning revolvers—all piled up in sacks on the floor.” (2) Two successful operations reveal how the M-19 collected large caches of arms. In 1979, a guerilla unit stole 5,700 small arms by digging a tunnel into a military armoury in northern Bogotá.  In 1981, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug and weapons smuggler, helped smuggle 1,000 Belgian FN FAL combat rifles and one million rounds of 7.62 x 51mm ammunition by ship from Libya to Colombia in a mission known as Operation Karina. (3) Part of the arms were trucked to a clandestine airstrip and flown via a hijacked plane to the Oreteguaza River in Caqueta.  The remaining arms were lost when the ship was sunk by a Colombian Naval vessel.  The drastic increase in firepower led to an increase in large-scale operations and helped establish the M-19’s military apparatus on multiple fronts. (2) Formations of mobile guerilla groups on multiple fronts began to take shape after 1978.  They received training at Cuban military schools and learned technical skills such as “engineering trenches, pits, and tunnels, vaults, etc.” as well as “tactical, operational, and strategic elements such as radio communications, camouflage for infiltration operations, and mining for active defence operations.”  In Argentina, the Montoneros taught them specialised skills like “jamming TV channels” and in Libya, they received training to develop a special forces unit capable of large-scale, complex operations, such as seizing the Palace of Justice. (2) M-19 was at its height in the mid-1980s when active membership was estimated to have been between 1500-2000 militants.  They ran hit-and-run style tactics and used artillery to attack police and army outposts. In 1984, multiple rural fronts were in control of regional capitals and ‘freedom centres’ in rural towns, such as Yarumales. These mobile units could hold their defences against military attack.  For example, during the Battle of Yarumales, the M-19 were able to sustain a fight against the army for 22 days and push them away from their position. (2) The guerilla army was powered by popular support.  When the peace negotiations fell apart, the M-19’s legitimacy and popular support began to significantly decline.  The Palace of Justice siege was a desperate attempt to regain popularity and support but ultimately marked the group’s end as an effective military force. (2,4,7) As a political organisation, AD/M-19 had early successes in municipal elections and the National Constituent Assembly.  They played a significant role in drafting the modern Colombian Constitution of 1991.  However, they quickly lost momentum and public support due to strategic mistakes and support for unpopular policies.  Despite the party’s failure, many leftist political movements in Colombia can trace their roots back to M-19, including President Gustavo and the Historic Pact coalition. (2,4) Approach to Resistance Since the days of La Violencia, violence has been a traditional political tool in Colombia.  The M-19 took up arms in protest because they believed the oligarchy would not take them seriously unless they were armed.  Their main objective was to create a military apparatus that would serve as a tool to channel social indignation and support the popular will.  The movement was able to grow and spread throughout the country using ‘armed propaganda.’ (2) Armed propaganda is the action of carrying out specific objectives to serve as propaganda material for mass communications. (6) For example, when M-19 stole the sword of Simón Bolívar it gained mass media attention.  The sword carried historical, cultural, and revolutionary significance; its theft symbolised a ‘return to revolution’ and a ‘call to arms.’  The guerilla movement took over schools, towns, and work unions to spread propaganda.  They shared communiques through sympathetic journalists and took control of radio stations and newspapers to communicate their message to the masses.  Other actions of armed propaganda included bank robberies, ambushes, stealing weapons, rescuing prisoners, executing corrupt union leaders, kidnapping, hijacking planes, ships, and trains, and seizing embassies and the Palace of Justice. (2) M-19’s more militarised approach was largely seen as a political failure.  Their targets (i.e. the military, drug traffickers, police, corrupt union leaders, politicians, and oligarchs) led to the imprisonment, torture, and murder of many guerrillas and their (perceived) ‘supporters’ and ‘sympathizers.’ People were tired of the conflict and opposition to the M-19 saw guerrilla violence as evidence to support their stance against the peace negotiations.  When the M-19 seized the Palace of Justice, popular support had already been on the decline.  They made many strategic mistakes, but the most obvious is the location.  When they seized the embassy of the Dominican Republic, they took ambassadors hostage and received international coverage.  The government was forced to act diplomatically.  In the case of the Palace of Justice, the military was able to act without impunity or oversight. (2,7) Another strategic mistake was targeting the cartels.  For example, the kidnapping of Martha Ochoa led to the formation of the paramilitary organisation known as MAS. MAS and other paramilitaries targeted M-19 “sympathisers” and “supporters”. These paramilitaries tortured and murdered thousands of innocent civilians during what is known as the ‘dirty war.’ (5,8,9) The ‘dirty war’ effectively killed popular support for the movement. (9) By the late 80s, people were tired of the war and wanted peace. The siege of the Palace of Justice was a catastrophic failure and the movement faced isolation. Internally, the group had lost support and the will to continue fighting.  Meanwhile, the government was overwhelmed by fighting on two fronts against the guerillas and drug traffickers.  This made then-President Barco’s administration more susceptible to negotiations. General Commander Pizzaro and Commander Navarro decided to commit to peace negotiations, demilitarisation, and transition into politics. They reached out to the military and were able to reach a truce.  They tried to reach out to the Medellín cartel but were ignored. (1,2,4,7) Many guerrillas continued to be killed by the cartel after demilitarisation, including commander Pizarro.  Despite the killings, the M-19 remained committed to the peace process. Their actions laid the foundation for other guerilla organisations to follow their own peace process’. As a result, leftist political power in Colombia can be traced back to the peace negotiations and early political actions of M-19. (2,9) Relations and Alliances The M-19 fostered relationships with many international socialist organisations.  For example, they received support from international revolutionary and socialist movements in Nicaragua and Cuba.  Cuba provided the M-19 with guerrilla military training. Libya provided the guerrillas with special forces training.  Logistical support came from Panama, Cuba, and Venezuela and political support came from Mexico and Costa Rica.  Argentina’s Montoneros influenced the M-19’s development of rural armed fronts (mobile guerilla units) and the formation of joint operations with other guerrilla organisations. (2) M-19 promoted guerrilla unity through bilateral actions with guerrilla movements throughout Colombia and Latin America.  They created a joint force with EPL known as Fuerza Conjunta.  They also operated on joint campaigns with the ELN and Quintín Lame (an indigenous organisation). In fact, M-19 played a leading role in forming large, joint-led guerrilla movements such as the National Guerilla Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera, CNG), the Simón Bolívar Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, CGSB), and the America Battalion (Batallón América). They even made attempts to establish a guerrilla front with members of Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolutionario Tupac Amaru) and Ecuador’s Alfaro Lives, Damn It! (Alfaro Vive, Carajo!). However, the M-19 eventually grew disenchanted with trying to unite guerilla organisations when they realised ideological sectarianism proved stronger than guerilla unity. (2,4)