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Overview The Mullah Dadullah Front was an extreme insurgent faction of the Taliban in Afghanistan, named after a notoriously violent Taliban commander, who was killed in 2007. The Mullah Dadullah Front split from the Taliban by 2013, and under a commander called Najibullah the Feda’i Mahaz, they actively sought publicity through the method of high-profile killings. By 2014, their spokesperson was claiming that the group opposed the Taliban’s stance on peace talks. The Mullah Dadullah Front was part of a wider context of fragmentation within the Taliban in the early 2010s, which culminated in 2015 with a larger-scale fragmentation, though this was ultimately later recovered and reunified from. The namesake of the Front, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a raid by NATO forces; he was known for having controversially introduced the use of suicide bombings to the conflict in Aghanistan during the 2000s, and for engaging directly with the Western press, which was extremely rare at the time. The death of Dadullah had a lasting effect on the Taliban commander class: after his loss, it was several years before any of them would come into the public eye for disagreeing with their leadership. (1) The Mullah Dadullah Front were most well known for the killing of Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council, who had also served as a Deputy Education Minister during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Rahmani was assassinated in a shooting carried out in Kabul, which the Front later claimed responsibility for. (2) The assassination demonstrated the Mullah Dadullah Front’s ability at the time to dominate the news cycle around the negotiations between the Afghan government and the wider international community; it showed that there were many factions of the Taliban in the 2010s that went against the leadership’s propagated narrative of reconciliation, and instead were determined to exert control by other means. (3) History & Origins The origins of the Mullah Dadullah Front are inextricably tied to the ongoing factionalism and fragmentation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, throughout the conflict of the 2010s. While the word ‘fragmented’ is often used broadly to describe the Taliban’s loosely connected proliferation of groups and branches, it should also be understood as a more specific expression of division and factionalism within the organization. Practically, this means the splitting of the group into different splinter entities, which have their own politically distinct boundaries, and which join other existing groups, operate totally separately, or side with the state. Therefore, the fragmentation of decision making throughout the Taliban at this time stemmed from their being various ideological and pragmatic factions within the wider umbrella of the group; the Mullah Dadullah Front was part of this landscape. As early as 2007, there were signs of internal fragmentation within the Taliban; while there was no outright rejection of the authority of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, various figures and factions began to emerge from this time that gradually became defined and politically distinct from the leadership. Prior to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the US, the Taliban had actually developed a defined hierarchical structure that was not common among other mujahideen armed groups during this time, and their survival after the American invasion is thought by many to be due to the persistence but also, the looseness, of this hierarchy, which in large part consisted of personal, networked relationships and organization between top leaders and commanders. It was common for more local commanders to implicitly be left to pursue their own interests, as long as they broadly adhered to Taliban ideology. (1) Then, in 2007, the Taliban’s senior commander and the Mullah Dadullah Front’s namesake, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by NATO special forces, and rumors of betrayal surrounded his death, which contributed to a general feeling of apathy among the wider command. There followed the death or arrest of three other senior Taliban figures, and Mullah Omar’s other deputies began implementing a wave of reforms in an attempt to further solidify and institutionalize the Taliban with the aim of keeping the movement coherent, and managed under the central leadership. However, by early in 2012, there were signs that more factionalism was causing further fragmentation, and the Mullah Dadullah Front emerged explicitly as a separate splinter group, lead by Dadullah’s younger brother, Mansour Dadullah, who had adopted his name, and who was demoted and published by the Taliban for disobedience. After this, the group conducted high-profile attacks, and maintained an opposition to the reconciliationary thinking propagated by the Taliban’s leadership during negotiations at the time. Ideology & Goals The ideology of the Mullah Dadullah Front is largely consistent with that of the wider Taliban movement: this is described by the United States Institute for Peace as ‘armed mullahs – fighting priests’; ‘as an organization of clerics, it claims a certain morality that lay people do not have; it also has a sense of exclusivity, restricted to a priestly order.’ The Taliban have, in their years of fighting in Afghanistan, sought to differentiate the violence that they enact from the violence of other groups, by giving it the legitimacy of a quasi-state power – now a state power, after their takeover following the US and UK withdrawal from the country in 2021. The Taliban emerged in 1994 and has been engaged in violent conflict since its founding; it has propagated and legitimized armed struggle as a core part of its ideology. Since their founding, the movement has fought the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and individual mujahideen commanders, before establishing themselves gradually as the de facto Islamic administration throughout Afghanistan. They argued for the establishment of the authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), an Islamic state in Afghanistan. With their founder, Mullah Omar as their amir, or leader, the Taliban demanded that all other forces in the country submit to their authority, arguing that to disrupt this was to defy Islam itself. The ultimate goal, then, was to establish the rule of an Islamic state system in Afghanistan, if necessary through the use of violence. The Taliban also established themselves as the only true protectors of Afghan sovereignty, against the intervention of Western forces, often referring to themselves as continuing the long tradition of Afghanistan withholding invasion and conquest from opposing nations and insisting that those who participate in Western-style systems have shed their Afghan identity.  The Taliban utilizes the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet to guide the leadership and ideology of the movement, however, it is worth noting that the organization’s hierarchy has, at plenty of points in its history, been more decentralized and looser than one might expect given its current iteration as the de facto government of Afghanistan. This more decentralized nature is crucial when considering the development of individual factions and branches within the Taliban; many of these factions did not evolve out of large ideological disagreements, but instead from pragmatic disagreements about how to achieve the ultimate Taliban goals, and dissatisfaction with the immediate resourcing of their segments of the organization. As the Taliban experienced growing pains during its expansion across the country, some branches became more focused on their own missions, such as the Mullah Dadullah Front and their high-profile killings, which they saw as the most effective way forward. It is also worth noting that there were various viewpoints within the Taliban about the relationship they should have to the US-supported Afghan government, as well as the wider international community, and the Mullah Dadullah Front differed with the centralized Taliban leadership on this, believing that reconciliation and negotiation was not a productive path, instead favoring violence. (4) Approach to Resistance  The key methods of resistance for the Mullah Dadullah Front, were high-profile assassinations and suicide bombings. The namesake of the group, Dadullah, is responsible for introducing suicide tactics into the Afghan conflict, and this tactic persisted among the group. The group sent text messages and made phone calls to various members of the Afghan parliament in 2012, threatening suicide attacks if they voted to ratify the strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the US. For the same objective, they also conducted their most famous killing, that of Rahmani. Rahmani was the second Peace minister to be killed within the year: before him, Burhanuddin Rabbani was also assassinated, a killing that was again claimed by the Mullah Dadullah Front. This approach was used by the Mullah Dadullah Front to disrupt the ratification of the strategic partnership, and curtail any new efforts to restart the much-disrupted peace process in Afghanistan. While the Taliban insisted at the time that the Front had no connection with them, and were instead a construction of the Afghanistan intelligence forces, the Front were widely known to be a branch of the Taliban and were successful at delaying the peace process by not only the threats of violence, but also by their ability to demonstrate that the wider Taliban movement was not united in its resolutions of openness to negotiation. Prior to the moves towards (and disruption of)  ratification, the strategic partnership was signed by President Barack Obama and the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, during Obama’s visit to Kabul on 1 May 2012. Despite the intimidation by the Mullah Dadullah Front, the partnership was indeed ratified, agreeing that the US would be allowed to maintain a reduced number of troops in Afghanistan and continue training Afghan forces, as well as conducting targeted operations in the country against Al Qaeda.  Relations & Alliances  The Mullah Dadullah Front is largely thought to have remained affiliated with the Taliban, though Taliban spokespeople denied any relationship with the Front, claiming that the group was instead a creation of the Afghan government intelligence service. In August 2015, there was an announcement that Akhtar Mansour had succeeded the deceased Mullah Omar as the overall leader of the Taliban. Mansoor Dadullah refused to support the new leader, and this lead to several months of clashes between the Mullah Dadullah Front and the Taliban in Zabul Province, ultimately culminating in the killing of Mansoor Dadullah and many of his fighters in November 2015. In August 2016, the Mullah Dadullah Front then announced Dadullah’s nephew Mullah Emdadullah Mansoor as its new leader, threatening to take revenge on the Taliban. The Mullah Dadullah Front is also linked to a group known as the “Sacrifice Front” or Fidai Mahaz; this group was another splinter faction from the Taliban, and led by Mullah Najibullah, who was another former Taliban commander. This group was formed by many people who were ex-Taliban fighters and former members of the Mullah Dadullah Front, all of whom had become disillusioned with the Taliban itself. Overall, the Mullah Dadullah Front were part of a wider context of developing factionalism within the Taliban, and were vying for power and political purity alongside the backdrop of the Taliban’s participation with the current peace process in Afghanistan.  Works Cited Watkins, Andrew. ‘Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future’. United States Institute of Peace. March 2020. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/pw_160-taliban_fragmentation_fact_fiction_and_future-pw.pdf   Roggio, Bill. ‘Mullah Dadullah Front Claims Assassination of Afghan High Peace Council Member’. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD Long War Journal. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op-eds/2012/05/14/mullah-dadullah-front-claims-assassination-of-afghan-high-peace-council-member   ‘The Dadullah Front and the Assassination of Arsala Rahmani’. Institute for the Study of War. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dadullah-front-and-assassination-arsala-rahmani   Semple, Michael. ‘Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement’. United States Institute for Peace. December 2014. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-Organizational-Structure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf   Simpson, Connor. ‘Meet the New “More Radical” Insurgent Group in Afghanistan”. The Atlantic, 19 May 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/meet-new-more-radical-insurgent-group-afghanistan/327901/   Special Operations Interrogator's Report, “State of the Taliban Archived 16 November 2021 at the Wayback Machine,”. The New York Times , 6 January 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296489-taliban-report.html#document/p1   Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or “Basque Homeland and Liberty” was a Basque nationalist and separatist organization founded in 1959 with the primary goal of establishing an independent Basque state through armed revolutionary struggle.  The Basque country consists of 7 provinces in north-eastern Spain and south-western France.  The Basque people share a common language, ethnicity, and socio-cultural history.  Basque nationalism emerged in the 19th century with the rise of liberal centralism and modern industrialization. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was founded to protect and give power to the ethnic Basque and their way of life.  General Francisco Franco’s brutal repression of the Basque during the Spanish Civil War and the decades of repression that followed only strengthened the Basque identity and nationalist sentiment. The ETA emerged out of frustration with the PNV’s passive resistance.  Through confrontation, the ETA vowed to gain Basque independence by any means necessary, including violence. The group was classified as a terrorist organization by France, Spain, the EU, the UK, the US, and Canada.  This classification is due to ETA’s paramilitary tactics which include bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations.  Between 1968 and 2010, the ETA killed 829 people—including 340 civilians. (1)  Following five decades of armed insurgency, a permanent ceasefire was declared in 2011. In 2017 the group disarmed and one year later announced their complete dissolution as an organization. History & Origins The Basque country, Euskal Herria , is a region of 7 provinces located across Northern Spain and Southern France.  Most of the region resides in four Spanish provinces (Navarra, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava). The Basques are the region's indigenous population. They are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically distinct from the Spanish and French. Historians believe they have occupied the territory for at least 7,000 years (potentially 40,000). They have remained fiercely independent despite millennia of threats from outside invaders.  In the Middle Ages, they joined the French and Spanish Kingdoms.  The Spanish Basque provinces were granted charters, or fueros , that granted each province a right to self-government. (1)(2) The discovery of the Americas led to an increased demand for commerce, trade, and industry in the Basque country.  At this time, a class of bourgeoisie ( jauntxos ) began to develop and reshape Basque society. During the French Revolution, liberal ideas of a centralized government in Spain gained popularity, especially amongst the bourgeoisie.  Following a series of civil wars in the 19th century known as the Carlist campaigns, the Spanish government eliminated regional privileges and thus the Basque provinces lost their autonomy. (1)(3) In the late 19th century, the Basque provinces became one of the most heavily industrialized areas in Iberia. Massive migrations of non-Basque migrants entered the region looking for work. The Basque working class found themselves working in sweatshop conditions and slum housing while competing with non-Basque for jobs.  The Basque country was Spain’s economic powerhouse, but many felt their taxes weren’t being allocated fairly by Madrid. Many Basques felt their culture and way of life were under threat.  In response, Sabino de Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) for Basque independence in defence of Basque culture, language, and race. (4) In the early 20th century, the PNV became a dominant political force in local elections and a vocal minority in the Spanish parliament. In 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera became dictator of Spain and outlawed the PNV.  The party was forced to go underground. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, a coalition of Basque nationalist and republican forces enacted the Government of Euskadi but were defeated by General Francisco Franco’s forces in 1937. The exiled Basque government, synonymous with the PNV, fled to Paris. For decades, Franco continued to rule Spain with an iron fist; he outlawed all Basque culture including Euskadi, the Basque language.  The PNV believed the Allies, whom they collaborated with closely during World War 2, would rid Spain of Franco. Instead, the US made a deal with Franco in return for establishing military bases across Spain. In 1959, a group of Basque youths formed the ETA, which broke with the passivity of the PNV and called for a campaign of national liberation by any means necessary. (4) ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty), emerged out of a student group, Ekin , in the early 50s. (4) Their first major action occurred in 1961 when the group’s failed attempt to derail a train of Francoist supporters was met with immediate retaliation from Franco.  More than a hundred eterras  (ETA members) were arrested, tortured, and given lengthy prison sentences. Several key leaders fled into exile in France. (3) In 1962, the group held their first assembly and developed a structure of activist cells. The exiled leaders formed the Executive Committee which continued to give top-down orders to ETA cells in Spanish Basque from France. They also sent out a communique publicly declaring their intent to gain Basque independence by “whatever means necessary.”   In 64’ and 65’, the ETA held their third and fourth assemblies, adopting an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist position combining Basque nationalism with Marxist ideas of class struggle and Franz Fanon’s ‘Third-Worldist’ perspective on decolonization. In 67’, they reached a consensus on pursuing a strategy of armed struggle known as the ‘action-repression-action spiral theory’. The strategy would attempt to antagonize Franco into unbearable escalations of relation and repression that the Basque population would become compelled to join them in their revolutionary struggle for independence. (1)(2) In 1968, the ETA assassinated Meliton Manzanas, a police commissioner known for torturing Basque nationalists. In response, Franco declared a “State of Exception”, suspending constitutional rights and arresting, torturing, and imprisoning Basques perceived to be affiliated with ETA. The spiral theory did not account for the intensity and rapid development of Franco’s retaliation. (1)(2) In 1970, in the Burgos Trials, several ETA members were condemned to death.  Coverage of the trials received international attention and was condemned by figures like the Pope and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In response, those condemned to die received long prison sentences instead. (5) ETA’s most infamous action, dubbed ‘Operation Ogre’, occurred in 1972 when an ETA cell assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s second in command and Spain’s newly inaugurated Prime Minister. Blanco was notorious for his brutal counterinsurgent campaigns and a crackdown on illegal labour unions.  Following Franco’s death, Blanco was to continue to lead the regime. When ETA was informed of Blanco’s routine trips to and from mass, they seized on the opportunity to act.  Originally, they planned to kidnap Blanco to leverage a deal to have ETA prisoners released, but they decided it would be easier to have him killed.  On December 20th, an 80kg Goma-2 explosive planted in a tunnel beneath the road blew Blanco’s car several stories high, killing him instantly. His death is widely seen as the end of Francoism. (2) On November 22, 1975, General Franco took his last breath.  King Juan Carlos I declared an amnesty for all of Spain’s political prisoners and allowed a democratically elected parliament and Prime Minister. A new constitution was enacted in 1978 by popular vote. The constitution recognized autonomous communities and their ethnic nationalities. Basque culture and language were allowed to be practised openly once again. For Basque nationalists, the constitutional changes weren’t seen as ‘true independence’. Many Francoist officials guilty of crimes against humanity continued to retain their posts in judicial, military, and political administrations. During this time, the ETA increased their armed activity. Between 1978 and 1980, ETA claimed 227 lives, 213 casualties and 19 kidnappings. (2) During the transition to democracy, the ETA split into factions. A faction known as ETApm (ETA politico-militar) wanted to broaden its strategy to include both political engagement and militant activities, but ETAm (ETA-militar) were committed to the armed struggle. ETApm began to regard violent actions as counter-productive and saw working within the new democratic system as more beneficial to the Basque cause.  In 1977 they formed a political group known as Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), or ‘Basque Left’, and won several seats in both the Spanish and Basque parliaments.  The success of EE convinced ETAm to form their political group known as Herri Batasuna (HB), or ‘People’s Unity’. Both factions joined the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS), or ‘Socialist Patriotic Coordinator’, a unified coalition of political parties and labour unions representing the interest of the Basque working class. (2) In 1982, ETApm disbanded completely.  Following their dissolution, the ETAm was simply known as ETA. By the late 80s and 90s, the movement began to grow weak.  In 83’, the French government began to cooperate with the Spanish government in denying ETA members refuge and deporting them back to Spain. The Spanish government were also found to have ties to Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups), or GAL. GAL were a paramilitary coalition that illegally tortured and killed anyone they believed was connected to the ETA in what is as a “dirty war”. (6) Political parties that supported Basque nationalism, such as HB, were outlawed. Most notably, public support began to decline following bombing campaigns across Spain that resulted in civilian casualties and the assassination of former ETA leader María Dolores González Yoyes. (2) In 1988, many ETA members began to sign a cease-fire agreement with the Spanish government. Four years later, three of ETA’s leading figures were captured.  By this time, the movement had dwindled into bouts of youth-led street violence.  Many saw this as a clear sign of their weakness. In 1995, an ETA cell commuted a failed attempt to attack the Spanish royal family. That same year, they kidnapped and assassinated a Spanish political leader, Miguel Angel Blanco, beloved by both Spanish and Basque citizens. They were met with a further decline in public support. (2) Post 9/11, the United States’ “War on Terror” made it harder for ETA to continue to operate. In 2004, ETA was blamed for the Madrid Train Bombings that killed 191 and injured 1,800. Although the bombing was later revealed to have been orchestrated by an Islamic extremist group, damage to the group’s public image had already been done.  ETA reached out for cease-fire talks in 2006, but the treaty broke down following ETA’s bombing of a parking garage at Madrid’s airport that killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. In 2010, the group decided to announce a ‘permanent ceasefire’, and the following year they announced an end to their armed campaign. In 2017, they destroyed their arsenal of weapons and two years later announced their complete dissolution. (5) Despite no formal peace process, the ETA and Spanish government have remained dedicated to peace, but tension runs deep.  Recently, an ETA-affiliated political group known as EH Bildu ran forty-four ex-convicted ETA members for the Spanish general election. A conservative Christian party known as PP, or ‘People’s Party’, have responded with accusations that the “ETA is still alive” in the form of EH Bildu. Regardless of these accusations, Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, determined there is no legal basis for Spain to ban EH Bildu. EH Bildu insists that the days of armed revolution are over. Former ETA member and general coordinator of EH Bildu, Arnaldo Otegi, stated that ETA’s use of violence in the quest for independence  “should never have happened.” (7) Objectives & Ideology The ETA is strongly rooted within the Basque nationalist movement. They emerged out of frustration at the PNV’s passive resistance towards the Franco regime. The PNV saw cooperation with the Spanish government and coalition building as a pragmatic way to gain more autonomy for the Basque region. The younger and more radical ETA argued that only through direct action could independence be gained. (1)(3) The early ideological struggle within the ETA was concerned with the following: Ethnicity vs class as an organizing principle for revolution. Nationalism vs socialism as a guiding ideology   Conducting struggle based solely on ethnic Basques vs integrating non-Basque immigrants into the conflict. Use of ‘direct action’ or ‘activism’ vs nonviolent organizing among masses of industrial workers .   (3) Periodically, the ETA held debates at collective assemblies and made decisions on organisation structure, political ideology, philosophy of the movement, operations, strategy, tactics, etc. At their first assembly (1962), the ETA asserted its identity as a “revolutionary Basque movement” for national liberation. The Executive Committee issued their declaration of purpose: “ETA is a clandestine organization whose only objective is to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible—including violence—the independence of Euzkadi.” They advocated for the creation of a federated Europe based on ethnonationalities, separation of church and state, and opposition to racism and dictatorial regimes, whether fascist or communist. They supported a Basque national front composed of all ethnic Basque political groups regardless of social class and emphasized the Basque ethnic and cultural struggle. (3) By the third assembly (1964-1965), things began to radically change. Multiple factions who were focused solely on purely ethnic or class struggle left the group. The remaining members were more ideologically homogenous. They defined themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialists committed to the armed struggle for Basque independence.  Inspired by Franz Fanon’s writings on the struggles of the Third World against Western European and American colonialism, the group saw the Basque ethnic struggle and working-class struggle as two parts of a large struggle against Spanish colonization. Therefore, the ETA would wage an armed struggle against both the Spanish apparatus of domination (government, bureaucracy, economy, mass media, etc.) and the Basque bourgeoisie who refused to cooperate with the struggle. (3) Between 1967 and 1968, the ETA split due to ideological and strategic differences between factions. The ETApm were closer to traditional Marxist-Leninism and chose to combine an armed mobile proletariat and joint political-military strategy like the Tupamaros in Uruguay. In contrast, the ETAm maintained the use of small clandestine cells and was influenced by the Palestinian militant group Black September. By the 80s, ETApm dissolved but remained active politically as the EE. The ETAm continued the armed struggle as the sole ETA. (3) In 1978, ETA’s five conditions for a total cessation of hostilities were the following: Amnesty for all Basque political prisoners. Legalization of all political parties including those espousing separatism. Expulsion of the Spanish Guardia Civil and other police agencies from the Basque country.   Adoption of measures to improve conditions of the working class. Recognition of the national sovereignty of Euskadi and the right of the Basque people to self-determination.   (3) The Spanish government refused to negotiate. In 2011, the ETA were unpopular, isolated, and weakened beyond repair. They decided the armed struggle was no longer a viable option and called for an end to hostilities in 2011. In 2018, the last remnant of ETA announced its dissolution. (3) Today, many ex-ETA members continue to fight for the creation of a “Basque State”, but through democratic politics rather than armed actions. (ex. EH Bildu). (7) Political & Military Capabilities ETA militants, eterras , are estimated to have ranged somewhere between 300 to 2,000 active members at their peak.  After five decades of operations, they have killed 829, kidnapped 77, and wounded more than 22,000. (4) Their operations consisted of armed robberies, raids on weapons factories and depots, bombings, and sabotage.  Most operations were carried out in Spanish Basque but included cities in Spain, France, and Catalonia. (2) The ETA was organized along a three-tired, top-down pyramid-like structure. The Executive Committee, based in France, consisted of about 10 individuals. Their function was to recruit, gather and analyze intel, procure weapons, maintain finances, and handle publicity. The middle branch was a loosely operational committee that oversaw ETA activities in each of the Spanish Basque provinces. At the base of the organization are the commandos, cells of 3-5 members operating near the town or neighbourhood they live. They work in secrecy and stay isolated from the rest of the organization to prevent members from giving up any information under interrogation or torture. (2) There are several classes of etteras within the organization . Liberados , aka ilegales , or fichidos , have a police record, or ficha , on file. They work full-time for the ETA and earn a modest salary. Liberados  carry out most of the armed actions such as bombings, bank robberies, and kidnappings. Legales are unknown to police and live conventional lives.  Most ETA activists are young, single male legales  from Vizcaya or Guipúzcoa. They are full-time students, workers, and agriculturalists who could be sporadically activated for an ekintza  (action) at any moment. They serve as enlances  (links) and act as couriers of information, or buzons (mailboxes) which serve as drop-off points for messages, weapons, or other items passing through ETA’s network. Information would be shared in secure locations such as local bars, movie theatres, restaurants, etc. Contraband was hidden in secret compartments with false bottoms to avoid detection. (2) A recruiter scouts out new members at social clubs and hangouts and vets them for over a year. During the onboarding process, potential recruits play minor roles in operations and progressively take on more responsibility. Once admitted into the organization, they spend two weeks of basic training at a camp in southern France where they receive training on weapons, combat, explosives, communication devices and channels, intel gathering, etc. (2) ETA’s weapons and ammo cache were supplied via the international illegal arms market or stolen from arms depots in Spain, France, and elsewhere. Weapons were often smuggled across the Pyrenees or Bay of Biscay concealed within food crates or in vehicles/boats with false bottoms. ETA cells were as well equipped as a conventional infantry attachment in the Spanish Army. The preferred pistols include the Belgian-manufactured Browning 9mm HP35 and the Basque-manufactured Star, Astra, and Firebird. The preferred submachine guns included the Belgian-manufactured 9mm Vigneron, Israeli/Belgian-manufactured 9mm Uzi, and the United Kingdom-manufactured 9mm Sten Mark II. Most ETA were given pistols rather than submachine guns. Pistols were the least likely to result in accidental deaths or wasted ammunition. Specially trained commandos received automatic/semi-automatic rifles such as the American M-16 and Belgian FAL. Rocket launchers were rarely used because they tended to be old and unreliable. The go-to explosive was Goma-2.  It is manufactured across Spain and Portugal and used for construction and quarrying.  There were plenty of major deposits in Basque country from which to steal. (2) ETA was financed by donations, army robberies, kidnapping, ransoms, and so-called “revolutionary taxes” aka (extortion) they learned from the Irish Republican Army. Basque industrialists and bourgeoisie essentially “made an offer they couldn’t refuse” under threats of violence. For perspective, in 1978 ETA robbed 50 banks for over 4 million dollars. That same year over 800 wealthy Basques were paying revolutionary taxes. Kidnapping victims were kept behind false walls or windowless rooms known as “people’s prisons” until a ransom was paid or a political concession was granted. These same hiding spots could be used to hide eterras  from capture. (2) The ETA’s main targets were members of the Spanish security state. Civilian casualties were mostly politicians and police informants although 9% were estimated to be innocent bystanders. Bombs and crossfire were responsible for most of their accidental victims. Operations tended to avoid direct assault. Eterras used hit-and-run tactics catching their victims off guard when they were most vulnerable. Most victims were assassinated while driving, sitting at a bar/restaurant, taking a walk, etc. (2) Approach To Resistance The ETA’s primary approach to resistance was through armed insurgence. In 1967, there was a group consensus on applying the ‘Action-Repression-Action-Spiral Theory’ against Franco’s regime. In theory, cycles of escalating armed actions and retaliation would have led to such atrocious forms of repression that a civil war would break out and the general Basque population would join the ETA in its armed struggle for independence. In practice, the Franco regime cracked down swiftly and arrested, tortured, and imprisoned lETA leaders and hundreds of etteras. A ‘State of Exception’ (martial law) was implemented suspending constitutional rights for Spanish Basque and eventually the rest of Spain. There would be no civil war. Despite living under the conditions of a constant police state, ETA continued armed operations against Franco’s regime until his death. Their assassination of Admiral Blanco arguably put the nail in the coffin of Franco’s regime and facilitated the emergence of a Spanish democracy. (2) During Spain’s transition to democracy, ETA’s ideological split would precede both factions joining a workers’ coalition (KAS) and forming their political parties (EE and HB). Both parties responded “no” to the Constitutional referendum. Regardless, the referendum was passed. During these turbulent years, ETApm and ETAm increased armed insurgency for “true” liberation. Later, ETApm ultimately decided to forgo the militant path. Their reasoning behind that decision was twofold. First, they believed through politics they could gain more autonomy and worker’s rights for the Basque people. Secondly, they believed armed insurgence might trigger a right-wing coup and a loss of their recently gained autonomy. ETAm continued its armed insurgency but ultimately dissolved due to Spanish counterinsurgency, French cooperation with the Spanish government, and a loss of public support. (2) ETA was able to create a “spiral of silence” using street violence, intimidation, extortion, and a network of organizations within the Basque National Liberation Movement. The goal was to make their presence felt everywhere. Intimidation and extortion were leveraged to entice others to support the cause. There was a  “fear of physical and (sometimes irreversible) damage or destruction of property, but also social marginalization or emptiness, including stigmatization as Spanish.”   ETA encouraged supporters to occupy public spaces and show their support. It held symbolic power and attracted media attention which held the perception of legitimacy to ETA’s cause. (8) Relations & Alliances It has been alleged that the ETA had links to an international terrorist network.  In 1981, Spanish magazine Policia Espanola published an alleged foreign contact that claimed ETA was receiving weapons, explosives, and/or tactical training in South Yemen, Lebanon, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Algeria. Spanish intelligence claims a small group of eterras were trained in kidnapping and sabotage in Cuba in 1964. They are also alleged to have had ties to the IRA, Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang.  Exiles were given refuge in France (until 1983), Belgium and Algeria. (4) Political parties associated with ETA were Herri Batasuna and Euzkadiko Ezkerra.  EH Bildu, a Basque separatist party, is made up of many ex-ETA members, forty-four of which recently ran in Spain’s general elections. (4)(7) ETA had a strong presence in the Basque Liberation Movement. Organizations within the public sphere apart of this movement including workers’ unions (LAB), youth groups (Jarrai), feminist groups (Egizan), ecologist groups (Eguzki), student groups (Ikasle Abertzaleak), internationalist groups (Askapena), media and cultural groups (Egin & Egin Irratia), human rights groups (Herriko Tabernas) and other groups which serve as political and social apparatuses to create a counter society who ran against the prevailing narrative of the state. (8) Works Cited (1) - Watson, Cameron, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual origins of ETA, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, 2007. (2) - Anderson, Wayne, The ETA: Spain’s Basque Terrorists , Rosen Publication, New York, 2003. (3) - Clark, Robert P., The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 , University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1984. (4) - Douglas William A., and Joseba Zulaika, “On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process”, Comparative Studies in Society and History ,   Volume 32, No. 2, pp. 238-257, Cambridge University Press, Published: April, 1990.  Accessed: 6/23/2014 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/178914.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (5) - Who Were the ETA (Euskadia Ta Askatasuna)?, History With Hilbert, Educational Video, Published May 21, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iRB7SJ3S-4&t=28s (6) - Encarnación, Omar G., “Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain”, Human Rights Quarterly , Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 950-972, The John Hopkins University Press, Published November 2007 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/20072832.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (7) - Llach, Laura, Spanish Elections Re-Open Deep Wounds, as ETA Terrorists Run for Political Office, Euro News, Published: 5/19/2023 https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/19/spanish-elections-re-open-deep-wounds-as-eta-terrorists-run-for-political-office (8) - García, César, “The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of ETA, Perspectives on Terrorism , Vol. 12, No. 5 pp. 27-35, Terrorism Research Initiative, October 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26515429.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A809e306b3115dbd7d1be0a50be7330c6&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

Insurgency Overview Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front, or BRN for short) is an Islamist separatist group in southern Thailand. While it dates back to the 60s, it largely remained a non-violent group up until the 2000s, when it began an ongoing series of attacks and bombings. Today it is the chief opponent to Thai government forces in the South Thailand Insurgency, where it seeks an independent state called Pattani. As of 2021, over 7,000 people have been killed and another 13,000 wounded in southern Thailand. (1)(2)(3) History & Foundations Pattani (sometimes spelled Patani) used to be the seat of an independent Muslim sultanate. In the 16th century it was conquered and slowly incorporated into what is today Thailand. (2) In 1909 a treaty between Britain and Thailand determined the border between Malaysia and Thailand. At the time, Malaysia was a British colony and Thailand was known as Siam. This treaty saw Siam gain land in the south, which, as it was land gained from Muslim Malaysia, was majority Muslim. Siam then made attempts to assimilate the Muslim Malays into their Buddhist religion and Thai culture. (10)  In 1963 the Barisan Revolusi Nasional was formed by Haji Abdul Karim Hassan. It started out as a mainly political organization and initially had close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya. The BRN consisted of three factions, the BRN-Congress, BRN-Coordinate and BRN-Uran. The BRN-Coordinate became the most organized of the three factions. (3) The majority of people today in Pattani are Muslim Malays while the rest of Thailand is mostly Buddhist Thais. This was not a source of major unrest until 2001, when police, soldiers, teachers, civil servants and Buddhist monks began being attacked by Muslim militants. These attacks were sporadic, but government reactions were severe. For example, martial law was declared and during one mass-arrest of hundreds of Thai Malay men in 2004, 78 people suffocated to death after being crammed into trucks. (1)(2) In 2007, Thailand deployed 60,000 troops to the south, and has maintained a military presence there since. In March 2016 insurgents (it is not confirmed that the BRN was involved, but likely they had some involvement) carried out a series of bombing and attacks in Pattani, killing four and injuring 20. Later that year in August bombs were detonated in seven provinces, including tourist locations Prachuap Khiri Khan and Phuket. These attacks killed four and injured 30; the wounded included citizens from Austria, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. The government tried to downplay the August attacks, stating “Thailand doesn’t have conflicts regarding religion, ethnicity, territory or minority groups.” (10) Objectives & Ideology The objective of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional is to secede from Thailand and form an independent state of Pattani. A document the BRN prepared for a 2013 peace summit between the BRN, Malaysia and Thailand states that, “BRN is a liberation organization which represents [the] Patani Malay nation…” and further states that “The roots of conflict in Patani [are] due to the occupation and confiscation of the rights of [the] Patani Malay nation.” (5) While the movement used to have close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya at its inception it is now an Islamist movement. Thai intelligence claims that the movement developed through a network of mosques and schools. General Pisarn Wattanawongkeeree, a former Thai commander in the south, said in 2004, “There is no doubt that the basis for this new insurgency are the ustadz (religious teachers). This is something that has been in the making for a long time.” (3) Political & Military Capabilities The Barisan Revolusi Nasional is the largest of the separatist movements in southern Thailand, but it is still small compared to Thai forces. While the group has stated that it has goals of getting membership up to 300,000 people, with 30,000 of those being recruited as fighters, there are only around 1,000 people in the group according to Thai estimates. (3) Militarily the BRN is still a threat, but dwindling. At its height it maintained cells in an estimated 70% of all villages in southern Thailand. Some of its leaders received training in Afghanistan as well, although it is unknown if they were trained at camps or participated in combat against the U.S.-led coalition. (3) Perhaps the BRN’s most powerful asset is the Runda Kumpulan Kecil, or small patrol units. There are highly-trained fighters who specialize in commando-style raids. (7) 20 years of fighting has taken its toll though, and with many members killed or arrested the group has lost some of its former strength. In addition to losing physical numbers, the BRN is said to have lost a lot of their morale and zeal to fight in the decades of fighting. (6)  Politically the BRN has enough sway to bring the Thai government to the table for peace talks and has done so multiple times. There have not yet been any concrete peace plans agreed to, but in February 2024 the BRN said it was willing to “put pen to paper” and negotiate with the Thai government. Demands will most likely be similar to a list of demands from 2021, which were, “a political solution that meets the aspirations of Malay Muslims in the south; a reduction in military operations; and "the idea of inclusivity" to involve civil society representatives, religious and political figures, and community leaders in the peace dialogue.” (4)(6) Approach to Resistance Barisan Revolusi Nasional operates in a very similar way to many smaller insurgencies. Their primary tactics are assassinations (primarily government officials, schoolteachers and Buddhist monks) and bombings. Some of these attacks are very indiscriminate in nature, such as in 2007 when 15 ethnically Malay civilians were injured by a bomb detonated while they were waiting to pick their children up from school; the bomb was allegedly meant to kill Thai soldiers nearby. (7) BRN attacks do have terror elements to them at times. At least 29 beheadings have been recorded and some people have been hacked to death with machetes. In 2005, a teacher was attacked with machetes and burned alive in front of his students. (7) Despite the violence, there have been many attempts at solving things diplomatically by the BRN. As mentioned previously, in 2024 there has been yet another shot at a diplomatic solution to the conflict in southern Thailand. In 2020 good progress was happening on the diplomatic front, but this was stalled by the COVID pandemic. Most of these talks happen in Kuala Lumpur. (6)(9) Relations & Alliances BRN itself is not a completely cohesive organization, as is often the case with insurgencies. It could be said that the group's biggest relations are with itself. The political and military wings do not always see eye to eye on matters, and there has even been talk of the military wing separating due to its opinion on peace talks. 11 The BRN was formed because of negative relations with the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), they split due to a disagreement about how secular PULO is. That was back in 1963, however, and the groups have warmer relations nowadays. The leaders of the modern PULO admit that the BRN spearheads the Patani independence movement. (3) Works Cited https://www.economist.com/asia/2017/08/10/repression-is-feeding-the-muslim-insurgency-in-southern-thailand https://www.britannica.com/place/Pattani https://jamestown.org/program/a-breakdown-of-southern-thailands-insurgent-groups/ https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Thailand-s-troubled-Deep-South-makes-another-bid-for-peace https://scontent-den2-1.xx.fbcdn.net/v/t1.18169-9/988231_464865260255591_1150924162_n.jpg?_nc_cat=102&ccb=1-7&_nc_sid=5f2048&_nc_ohc=VrGUW5QMDroQ7kNvgG-rEcD&_nc_ht=scontent-den2-1.xx&oh=00_AYAOCPh8h-vdYD8dMmHnYtmiMmHfD1t7NXdiEGEQY4T-Pg&oe=669E8BA5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlbwaI2DMqU https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/thailand0807/2.htm https://www.monash.edu/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1678450/gtrec-proceedings-2008-08-virginie-andre.pdf https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/sustaining-momentum-southern-thailands-peace-dialogue https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/thailand-extremism-and-terrorism

Insurgency Overview The Bloods street gang is regarded as one of America’s most notorious and violent street gangs. It is described as a large alliance of a variety of different gangs. It was established in Los Angeles, California during the early 1970s. Like most street gangs, the Bloods engage in a variety of illegal activities to secure income and maintain control over territories. These activities include murder, robbery, drug trafficking, and extortion. Since its foundation, membership has flourished nationwide and has an estimated 15,000–20,000 members. (1) History The origins of the Bloods can be traced to their founding in Compton, California, in the early 1970s. While no official founder exists, Sylvester Scott and Vincent Owens are recognised as founding members. Following a power vacuum left behind by the dismantling of the Black Panther Party, gangs began forming to contest for power and protection over certain areas. The Crips gang would begin rising by absorbing the other local street gangs, however, not all gangs would allow themselves to be overrun. These gangs would form alliances to combat crips. Among these gangs were the Inglewood Family,  the Denver Lanes, the Pueblo Bishops, the La Brims, and the Piru Street Boys. The Piru Street Boys are regarded as being the forerunners of the Bloods. All of these anti-crip gangs would ally, eventually forming the Bloods. (1) The Piru’s (Piru Street Boys) were formed in 1971 after youth were targeted at their high school by Crips. After facing violence, Sylvester Scott, Vincent Owens, and others formed the Pirus. They then united with other anti-Crip gangs to establish the Bloods as a means of protecting against the Crips. The colour red was adopted as a strong contrast to the blue colour the Crips associate themselves with. The Piru faction operates within the Bloods alliance, with subsets like the Mob Pirus and Elm Street Pirus. While gangs within the Bloods operate independently, conflicts between them and even within subsets are common, blurring the lines between allies and adversaries. While Crips are the common enemy of the Bloods, certain Blood sets have negotiated truces with each other. An example would be the Watts Truce. In 1992, a peace treaty was declared by major Blood and Crip sets in the Watts neighbourhood of Los Angeles. This treaty was signed in a mosque, and the gangs involved agreed to keep the peace and, instead of targeting each other, to target police brutality. While violence still occurs, this agreement is credited as a notable victory in the decline of street violence in Los Angeles. (2) Crack cocaine began to emerge in the 1980s. This period marked a significant era of expansion for the Bloods. With this new drug on the streets, the Bloods became a top player in the American drug trade. With this growth came membership growth as well. Ronald Reagan's strict enforcement of drugs would lead to a large increase in incarceration, establishing a blood presence in prison. Gang recruiting is a complicated issue and can be attributed to many different things. Many in urban and impoverished areas would turn to gangs as a means of survival. It is important to mention that not all blood members commit crimes. Since the membership varies so much, some neighbourhood Blood sets are small collectives of people who don’t participate in crime and are mainly involved for the sake of the community. The United Blood Nation (East Coast Bloods) was founded in 1993 by Omar “OG Mack” Portee and Leonard “OG Dead Eye” Mckenzie. While in Rikers Island prison, the two would form a unified force combining blood sets within the prison to defend themselves from the other larger gang alliances, such as the Latin Kings and the Ńetas. The UBN acts as a separate entity with different sets and subsets, mainly operating in New York, and is loosely tied to California Blood sets. West Coast and East Coast Bloods while sharing the same Blood name do not necessarily get along. (3) Objectives and Ideology Initially focused on protection from the Crips, the Bloods evolved as their membership flourished, turning their attention to asserting dominance. Like typical criminal groups, they partake in various illicit activities such as murder, drug trafficking, and robbery. One of the most famous examples of a Blood member being involved in murder was the killing of Christopher Wallace (Biggie Smalls). A Blood member named Wardell Fouse, also known as “Poochie”, was implicated in Biggie's murder. The murder of Biggie is still unsolved and has led to many theories. One well-known theory is that Suge Knight, Mob Piru and co-founder of Death Row Records, was the shot-caller behind his death. This has not been confirmed but has raised a lot of speculation around the Blood's involvement.  While not all members subscribe to this lifestyle, some deeply entrenched in the gangs often perceive their sets as familial and integral to their existence. Loyalty and brotherhood are prized, yet internal violence challenges them. It is common that to join a gang you must be jumped in. Being jumped in means getting beat by several members of a gang to test the toughness of the incoming recruit. The beating lasts as long as each gang sees fit. Some hold certain significance with specific numbers so they will beat them for that amount of time. Each set has its own identity and culture. This results in a lot of confusion and difficulty analysing the Bloods as a whole.  Approach The Bloods, like many other street gangs, are heavily armed. Weapons such as pistols, semi-automatic submachine guns, and shotguns are most common. Automatic rifles are uncommon, and most crimes have been committed using common pistols. (4) A well-known tactic utilized is drive-by shootings. It's a fairly easy and safe alternative to confronting someone one-on-one. Drive-by shootings are described as someone firing a gun from a vehicle at someone or something. Usually, these types of shootings are used to target multiple people but are not limited to that. (5) Drug trafficking stands as a primary means to fuel and expand their influence and wealth. There are reports that they work with Mexican cartels specifically La Familia Michoacana. (6) Robberies and extortion add to their revenue stream, allowing for an illicit diversification of funds. Additionally, prostitution is another stream of income that it utilizes. Acting as pimps, they control and organize women to work under them. In exchange for the money brought in by the prostitutes, these pimps will “protect” them from possible abusers; however, it is not uncommon for pimps to also abuse the prostitutes that work under them. (7) Organisation and identification While the Bloods are a vast network, some individual sets have established defined hierarchical structures. This hierarchy includes set dynamics and roles to ensure efficiency. The following is an example of a structure of the Southside Brim’s which are a subset of the Bloods: Southside Brim  Triple OG OG Baby OG OYG Young Gangster OBG Baby Gangster This is only one of the many sets spanning across the U.S. It is important to note that not all sets are the same. Some sets are established hierarchically, and some are more informal and unorganized. (1)  Identification Gang members often use outward indicators to identify themselves. Things such as colours, tattoos, and hand signs are the most common. Bloods are distinguished by the colours red and black; this is often showcased by their attire, such as bandanas. Tattoos serve as diverse markers of gang affiliation, with common tattoos like “MOB” (Member of Bloods). Hand signs act similarly as another form of identification and allegiance. The most well-known hand sign for Blood members is the word blood spelt out using both hands, making the letters CK (Crip-Killer) and the letter B. (1)  Works Cited (1) - https://info.publicintelligence.net/BloodsStreetGangIntelligenceReport.pdf (2) - Momodu, Samuel. “The Watts Truce (1992) •.” •, March 10, 2022. https://www.blackpast.org/african-american-history/the-watts-truce-1992/ . (3) - " United Blood Nation (East Coast)" https://web.archive.org/web/20190812170637/http://www.sampsonsheriff.com/otherforms/20051011_united_blood_nation.pdf (4) - Kkienerm. “Firearms Module 7 Key Issues: Criminal Gangs.” Firearms Module 7 Key Issues: Criminal Gangs. Accessed May 14, 2024. https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/firearms/module-7/key-issues/criminal-gangs.html#:~:text=Gang%20firearms%20are%20usually%20procured,guns%20but%20rarely%20assault%20rifles . (5) - Dedel, Kelly. “Drive-by Shootings.” ASU Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, August 9, 2022. https://popcenter.asu.edu/content/drive-shootings-0 . (6) - Cawley, Marguerite. “Mexico Cartel-US Gang Ties Deepening as Criminal Landscape Fragments.” InSight Crime, April 24, 2023. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/mexico-cartel-us-gang-ties-criminal-groups-fragments/ (7) - “2011 National Gang Threat Assessment.” FBI, June 25, 2010. https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment .

Overview The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) was a hacker group that claimed to support the Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad, and aims to counteract what it sees as the deluge of “fabricated news” perpetuated by both the Western and Arab media. They carried out various hacking operations, including sending out false Tweets from large news organizations such as the Associated Press (AP), and operating via Facebook and Twitter (now X) to carry out denial of service attacks on individual, group and organization websites that they believed were undermining the legitimacy of Assad’s government. Some of the group’s earliest targets were  US President Barack Obama and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The group first emerged in 2011, and gradually rose to prominence due to the high profile of many of the people and organizations that they targeted. There have been various rumors over the years that the SEA is directly linked to the Syrian government, taking orders and funding from them; yet, this has still not been proven, over 10 years after their founding. The now defunct website of the SEA described the hackers as “a group of enthusiastic Syrian youths who could not stay passive towards the massive distortion of facts about the recent uprising in Syria”. They, contrastingly, described the pro-opposition demonstrators in Syria at the time as using Facebook to “spread their destructive ideas… urging demonstrators to terrorize the civilians who refuse to join their demonstrations and attack public facilities”. (1) The backdrop for the emergence of the SEA, is that of the Syrian Revolution uprisings in 2011: a series of mass protests against the Assad regime, which was subsequently followed by harsh repercussions from his government, the Syrian Arab Republic. The Qatar government was a prominent supporter and funder of opposition to Assad’s regime from the start of the Revolution, and they were therefore a key target for the SEA, along with the Qatari-backed al-Jazeera TV and the Qatar Foundation. (1) There have been intimations that the SEA has links to the Iranian and Lebanese governments, Hezbollah, and of course, the Syrian administration. (2) Yet, an analysis by the open source intelligence company, Recorded Future, did not find any links between SEA and Iranian government cyber attack patterns, so there is skepticism about this link. (3) In 2016, the US publicly named and charged three men who it believed were responsible for conducting SEA hacks under the banner of the SEA; the men were also suspected for extorting money in connection with the hacking group. (4) As of the time of writing, two of the men have not been caught and convicted, as at the time their charges were announced, they were believed to be in Syria; the US offered a $100,000 reward for information leading to their arrests.  History & Origins The SEA was founded during the uprisings of the 2011 Syrian Revolution, as a reaction to the protesters opposing the Assad regime; it was founded to maintain positivity around Assad’s leadership and denounce the actions of the protesting masses, which it saw as destructive and unruly. After they started being active in 2011, the group increased both the volume and the profile of their attacks over time, targeting everyone from the AP to Human Rights Watch, taking down what they saw as biased and ignorant coverage of the Syrian unrest; for instance, this included taking down an opinion poll on the website of British newspaper, The Telegraph , stating on their Twitter (now X) page, that Syria’s fate was not up to the Western media. After accomplishing a hack, the group posted details of it on their website, in both English and Arabic; these attacks were often social media takeovers achieved by using phishing tactics. The hackers, once they gained access to large outlets’ social media accounts, could then take down what they believed to be fabricated or inaccurate news, and post content that was positive about the Syrian government.  Some of the SEA’s victims include: Harvard University, Microsoft, Washington Post , New York Post , Reuters, Human Rights Watch, National Public Radio (NPR), and CNN. By 2013, the group was also attacking CBS’s 60 Minutes Twitter account to post that “professionals under US regime protection” were responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing. (1) They also hacked various BBC Twitter accounts, to post surreal statements like “chaotic weather forecast for Lebanon as the government decides to distance itself from the Milky Way” and “Saudi weather station down due to head-on-collision with camel”. Their attacks varied from the ironic, to the straightforwardly political, and were all aimed at furthering their overriding political aim of bolstering the Assad government. The SEA faded from activity partly due to three of its members being charged with hacking and extortion charges by the US government; one was arrested in Germany, and rewards were offered for information leading to the arrest of the other two, who remain at large, and were presumed to be in Syria when America announced their charges. (4)  In the announcement from the US Department of Justice, it is stated that as well as having political aims, members of the group also used the hacks to extort money for personal gain, with Assistant Attorney General John P. Carlin saying: “While some of the activity sought to harm the economic and national security of the United States in the name of Syria, these detailed allegations reveal that the members also used extortion to try to line their own pockets at the expense of law-abiding people all over the world.  The allegations in the complaint demonstrate that the line between ordinary criminal hackers and potential national security threats is increasingly blurry.” (5) The statement also says: ‘Ahmad Umar Agha, 22, known online as “The Pro,” and Firas Dardar, 27, known online as “The Shadow,” were charged with a criminal conspiracy relating to: engaging in a hoax regarding a terrorist attack; attempting to cause mutiny of the U.S. armed forces; illicit possession of authentication features; access device fraud; unauthorized access to, and damage of, computers; and unlawful access to stored communications.’ (6) According to the Center for Security Studies (CSS) in Zurich, the SEA likely disbanded in 2016, after the arrest and extradition of one of its members, Peter Romar, to the US and his subsequent conviction, after pleading guilty to all charges. However, it is still unclear how many members the hacking collective had, and what the nature of its links to Assad’s administration might be. (7) Ideology & Goals The SEA, during their short-lived active years, made their political leanings very clear: they wished for the Assad regime and the Syrian Arab Republic to be maintained, and were not supportive of the opposition protesters, who they saw as destroying an ordered society with a strong leader. The ideological commitment of the SEA is, of course, under some scrutiny due to them also using the hacks to extort money, however, they did appear to be committedly aligned with the Assad government, which they portrayed as embattled and misrepresented in the media across the world. They targeted a lot of news organizations, as well as the US and Qatari governments. When announcing the terror charges against three members of the SEA, the US government remarked that, in their view, ideology was not the only factor behind their actions, but that they were also attempting to use hacking actions for profit, such as by gaining access to the websites of online businesses in the US, and using threats of selling stolen data, deleting data, or damaging computers, to extort money from the victim. However, while there may have also been a profit motive behind the ideology of the SEA, it is clear that they were also the most notable cyber-actor throughout the 2011 Syrian civil war, and had a decided alignment with the Assad regime. This is shown by a 2011 TV address by Assad, in which he praises the work of the SEA; despite the group’s clarification after this speech (via its website) that they were not tied to the Syrian government, they clearly received at least tacit support from the administration. The SEA’s goals, apart from arguably monetary gain, were always centered on correcting what they saw as a biased and inaccurate media landscape around the Syrian civil war; they thought that the Assad regime was being misrepresented, and that both Western and Arab media coverage was too biased towards the opposition protesters and political forces. While the question of whether the SEA was actually instituted by the Syrian government was never answered, there is an argument to say that it became the administration’s de facto cyberforce, due to its very public and frequent attacks, and the reliability with which it made sure to claim responsibility for any actions it was involved in.  Approach to Resistance The toolkit of the SEA is that of a typical hacktivist: they focused on phishing techniques to obtain passwords, and once they gained access to social media accounts of news organizations or governments, they could gain control of the media narratives they sought to change by posting their own content or taking down posts that they disliked. When conducting extortion, they used typical techniques of leveraging data and the possibility of damage to influence victims. However, throughout the unrest in Syria that began in 2011, the SEA showed improvement in their methods, and it has been suggested by some that this indicates the involvement of additional support from a government, whether that be the government of Syria, Iran, or Russia, all of whom were supportive of Assad at the time. In 2013, further suspicion was sparked about the involvement of Russia in the SEA after the US-based internet domain name registrar Network Solutions LLC seized hundreds of Syrian domain names from the group, and they responded by registering their website in Russia to continue being active. (8) The lack of clarity around the SEA’s possible ties to the Syrian government result in a subsequent lack of clarity about its structure: if the group had governmental backing, then it would have possessed a more hierarchical structure that hacktivist groups typically exhibit, however, if the support of the Syrian regime was more distant, the SEA may have had a more typical decentralized structure. The SEA portrayed itself as a group of young, patriotic hackers rather than a governmental cyber security project, and it is thought that they attracted many young, patriotic hackers who wanted to be involved in the conflict, but did not feel confident being publicly associated with the Syrian government. The group’s hacking actions ended in 2015, and it was then that they appear to have switched to cybercrime, whether due to necessity or fading of ideological fervor for the Assad regime, it is unclear. It was after this shift, in 2016, that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made known their terror and extortion charges against three members of the group, and later arrested a member in Germany. The methods of the SEA, while conventional hacktivist tactics, remain interesting for the fact that this group is the largest cyber-force to have become active at the time, and it demonstrated a new use of cyber attacks within a conflict scenario. Relations & Alliances  As well as the SEA’s rumored links to the Syrian government, they also had some adverse relations with the hacking group Anonymous, who exposed five SEA alleged members in a hacktivist operation against the Syrian government, revealing that one of them was operating from Romania and one from Russia. The SEA was, furthermore, part of a wider context throughout the 2011 Syrian civil war, of cyber-actors becoming embroiled in the conflict, and during 2011, the group actually created a Facebook page entitled the Syrian Hackers School, where people could download and use a tool created for launching DDoS attacks against BBC News, Al Jazeera, OrientTV and Al-Arabyia TV. Other pro-government cyber-actors in this conflict included the Syrian Malware Team (SMT) and the Electronic National Defence Forces (ENDF), as well as some groups working from outside Syria. The SMT was very possibly an offshoot of the SEA, or at least the group appears to have contained members that were also linked to the SEA. The SMT used RAT and was active from 2011 to 2014. The ENDF was not linked to the SEA, but is instead thought to have been the cyber-actor arm of the Syrian National Defence Forces, a pro-government militia that operated throughout Syrian territory. One of their tactics was to lure victims on Facebook into providing their social media information, so that they could access their accounts and post pro-government messages. As well as there being an extensive landscape of hacking groups dedicated to pro-Assad operations, there are also plenty that aligned with the various opposition forces in this conflict, such as the cyber operations of the Free Syrian Army, as well as the Hackers of the Syrian Revolution, the Cyber Caliphate, and the cyber-branches of Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.  Works Cited (1) - Fowler, Sarah. ‘Who is the Syrian Electronic Army?’ BBC. 25 April 2013. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22287326   (2) - Robertson, Jordan. ‘Three Things You Should Know About the Syrian Electronic Army’. Bloomberg. 24 March 2014. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-24/three-things-you-should-know-about-the-syrian-electronic-army   (3) Rachael KingReporter. ‘Data Shows No Link Between Syrian Electronic Army and Iran.’ Wall Street Journal.  5 September 2013. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-CIOB-2730   (4) ‘Syrian Electronic Army hacker suspects charged.’ BBC. 23 March 2016. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-35881321   (5) ‘Computer Hacking Conspiracy Charges Unsealed Against Members of Syrian Electronic Army’. US Department of Justice. 22 March 2016. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/computer-hacking-conspiracy-charges-unsealed-against-members-syrian-electronic-army   (6) ‘Computer Hacking Conspiracy Charges Unsealed Against Members of Syrian Electronic Army’. Office of Public Affairs, US Department of Justice. 22 March 2016. Accessed 22 June 2024. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/computer-hacking-conspiracy-charges-unsealed-against-members-syrian-electronic-army   (7) ‘Guilty plea for Syrian Electronic Army accomplice’. BBC. 30 September 20216. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-37517891   (8) ‘Hotspot Analysis, The use of cybertools in an internationalized civil war context: Cyber activities in the Syrian conflict’. Risk and Resilience Team, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zürich. October 2017. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2017-05.pdf   Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Sect of Revolutionaries (SR), a far-left militant group, emerged in the wake of societal unrest following the 2008 police killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos. Operating primarily in Greece, the group advocated for radical changes through violent means, aiming to provoke a revolution against the state and its institutions. Their activities, marked by high-profile targeted attacks, positioned them as a significant figure in the landscape of revolutionary groups in Greece. History The Sect of Revolutionaries was born from radical leftist and anarchist ideologies that intensified after Greece’s military dictatorship era ended in 1974. This turbulent period led to the establishment of the notorious Revolutionary Organization on 17 November (17N) and Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), which carried out various attacks, including the assassination of CIA Station Chief Richard Welch in 1975. The failure of a 2002 operation and subsequent crackdown by Greek authorities diminished 17N, particularly in the lead-up to the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. (1) With time, new groups like the Sect of Revolutionaries emerged. The SR’s debut is tied to the aftermath of the Grigoropoulos incident which occurred in December 2008, where a 15-year-old teenager lost his life to a policeman. Starting in 2009, they led different violent actions, including death threats, bombing, shooting and assassinations of both an anti-terrorist police officer and a journalist. The group is also suspected to have ties to the Balkan criminal world, through which they obtained their weapons. (2) Despite their notoriety and the impact of their actions, the Sect of Revolutionaries has faced significant setbacks due to counterterrorism efforts. The arrests of key members and the disruption of their operations have hindered their ability to conduct further attacks. (3) The Sect of Revolutionaries (SR) remained active until 2010 and became dormant in 2011. In 2015, communications between jailed members of the 'Conspiracy of Fire Cells (SPF)—a radical anarchist group known for car bombings—revealed plans to revive the SR and potentially initiate new attacks.  This underscores the connections between anarchist groups in Greece and highlights SR's enduring influence within Greek anarchism, placing the organization as a symbol of  continuity in Greece’s history of political activism. (1)(3) Objectives and Ideology The objectives and ideology of the Sect of Revolutionaries are deeply rooted in their belief in the necessity of a violent overthrow of the Greek government to initiate societal and political change. Their ideology, characterized by radical leftist and anarchist principles, advocated for a revolution against what they perceived as a corrupt state apparatus. This perspective aligns with broader themes observed in Greek domestic anarchist terrorism, where groups share a common goal of challenging state power and advocating for radical societal restructuring. The Sect of Revolutionaries saw themselves as part of this broader struggle, aiming to inspire an insurrectionary movement within Greece that would challenge the status quo and instigate revolutionary change. (4) Military and Political Abilities The SR demonstrated their military and political capabilities through their strategic use of violence and propaganda. Their actions included assassination attempts, armed raids, car bombs, and rocket attacks against targets they deemed representative of the state and its supportive structures. (4) These operations aimed to destabilize the government and inspire a broader insurrectionary movement within Greece, a strategy that could be compared to the one used in the propaganda par le fait  (“propaganda by the deed”) theory​​. This political stand, better incarnated in the late 19th century by the Russian anarchist group Narodnaya Volya, holds that only violent action can inspire the people to lead to revolutionary actions. (4)(5) Approach to Resistance The SR’s approach to resistance was characterized by its reliance on violent tactics intended to provoke fear and uncertainty within the state and its agencies. The group claimed responsibility for a series of attacks, including the assassination of a journalist and a police officer, marking their violent campaign against figures and institutions they accused of perpetuating the existing societal and political order​​​​. (3)(6)  Specifically, the actions of the Sect of Revolutionaries include the assassination of an anti-terrorist police officer in June 2009 and the assassination of the Greek journalist Sokratis Giolias in July 2010, both incidents for which they claimed responsibility. (3) International Relations & Potential Alliances Internationally, the SR was designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization by the United States, reflecting the global concern over its activities and the threat they posed to Greece and to international security. This designation aimed to cut off the group’s financial support and limit their operational capabilities​​. (6) As mentioned before, the SR follows the same philosophical and political doctrine as many anarchist movements internationally and is even in direct line with Greek groups such as 17N, making more than likely the formation of alliances with other local groups sharing the same goals. (1)(4) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives Supporters of the SR might view the group as a radical yet necessary force fighting against state oppression and injustice, aiming to liberate society from the clutches of a corrupt and authoritarian regime. (1)(4) Critics, however, see the SR as a dangerous terrorist organization whose methods undermine democracy, threaten civil peace, and result in the loss of innocent lives, ultimately harming the very society they claim to fight for​​​​. (1)(4) Works Cited (1) - "Greek Domestic Terrorism". Counter Terrorism Guide. Accessed March 18, 2024. https://www.dni.gov/nctc/groups/greek_domestic.html (2) - "Sect of Revolutionaries". Wikipedia. Accessed March 22, 2024.   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sect_of_Revolutionaries (3) - Proto Thema. "Jailed terrorists wanted to reconstitute ‘Sect of Revolutionaries’ militant group." Protothema.gr , March 3, 2015.   https://en.protothema.gr/jailed-terrorists-wanted-to-reconstitute-sect-of-revolutionaries-militant-group/ (4) - U.S. Department of State. "Department of State's Designation of The Sect of Revolutionaries." Media Note. Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, February 24, 2011. Accessed March 19, 2024.   Archived at 2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157046.htm . (5) - "Propaganda of the deed". Wikipedia. Accessed March 22, 2024.   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propaganda_of_the_deed (6) - Popular Front. “Department of State's Designation of The Sect of Revolutionaries”. YouTube video, 28:17. Published June 16 2022.   https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157060.htm

Introduction & Overview The Karen (Kuh-ren) National Liberation Army (KNLA) is a military branch of the political organization, Karen National Union (KNU), which campaigns for the self-determination of the Karen people of Myanmar, and fights for peace and unity against the military dictatorship within the country. The KNU and its armed wing have been fighting the military, The Tatmadaw, or Junta for 75 years. History & Foundations Myanmar is a country that is rich in diversity, with over 135 ethnic groups. However, Myanmar wasn’t always formally known as Myanmar – “In 1988, after a brutal suppression of a pro-democracy uprising via the country’s military dictatorship (which saw thousands executed), leaders changed its name to Myanmar,” (1)  from Burma based on the dominantly ethnic group, the Burmese. During the colonial period of Burma, the British colonialist rule brought forth more ethnic division by favoring certain ethnicities, leading to greater social and economic differences. Predominantly, Buddhism is the main religion among the Burman ethnic group. This is noteworthy, for it influences perceptions within Myanmar, where there is a tendency among some sections of the Burmese population to view non-Buddhist ethnic groups as less traditional, or ‘civilized.’ “The initial conflict among Burma’s disparate ethnic groups and its Burman majority dates back to the British colonial era when ethnic minorities were given favorable treatment over the Burman majority.” (2) With the arrival of the British during World War II, the Karen – as well as other ethnicities – hoped to escape what they perceived to be the brutal and oppressive rule of the Military. But this was not the case; the tensions only heightened as the Burmans sided with the Imperial Japanese. In response, the Karens sided with the British. Since Myanmar’s independence from Britain in 1947, the KNLA has been engaged in this conflict. Initially, they were promised autonomy within the Burmese federation, with an option to secede after ten years. However, these promises were unfulfilled due to the subsequent civil war. Since 1962, the Karens, along with other insurgent groups, have conflicted with the military junta. Objectives & Ideology Following independence, the Karen's future was and still is uncertain. By mid-1948, the newly-formed Burmese state split into warring factions, and fighting started between the KNU and the Burmese army and other various ethnic groups. By 1950, the KNU had spelled out its political principles in four short statements: (3) “For us surrender is out of the question. The recognition of the Karen state must be complete. We shall retain our arms. We shall decide our own political destiny.” In an Al Jazeera report on the violence that the Karens face, Colonel Saw Kler Doh, a commander within the KNLA stated that the “Tatmadaw do not want ethnic minorities like us to have sovereignty and self-determination. They want to take control of everything. They want to control any area where there is a resistance group. They haven’t just been coming to our region for decades.” (4) Military/Political Abilities Despite limited resources and support, the KNLA has been resourceful in acquiring military weapons and equipment. On top of obtaining humanitarian aid, the KNLA somewhat benefits from the sanctions enacted by Western countries. The UK, the US, and Canada are implementing the most sanctions against the military dictatorship. The KNLA has shown innovation in creating their weapons, such as through 3D printing. The FGC-9mm or fully known as (Fuck Gun Control 9-millimeter), is known as a predecessor of the FP-45 which stands for ‘Flare Projector,’ an uncommon yet widely known weapon during World War 2, manufactured by the United States, solely for the discreet resistance within occupied territories within Europe. Through this reputation, it gained the name 'Liberator'. These single-shot pistols were only a stepping stone when it came to the resistance’s arsenal, as these pistols were only a gateway to acquiring better weaponry. Like the Liberator, 3D-printed weapons offer the same opportunity to the KNLA and other armed ethnic groups within Myanmar. Moreover, the KNLA is widely known for its guerrilla warfare and ambush tactics within the jungles of Myanmar, through which the armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU) can gain useful resources and much-needed equipment after these ambushes amongst trade routes of the Junta. The number of armed forces has varied since its formation in 1947. As early as 2021, it was reported that the KNLA had a strength of approximately 15,000 troops. (5) The KNLA is currently divided into seven brigades (6) and a 'Special Force' reserved for special operations. (7) Approach to Resistance The Karen National Liberation Army seeks autonomy for the Karen people and what it perceives as liberation for the the wider population of Myanmar. Their approaches to fight for this outcome involve guerrilla warfare tactics and ambush tactics, with a defensive focus within the Karen territory and communities. The KNLA has been a part of vast ethnic armed movements in Myanmar, such as EAO, otherwise known as Ethnic Armed Organization, and CDM (Civil Disobedience Movement.) Both organizations advocate for political dialogue and a federal system that fully recognizes the rights of the Karens, and other oppressed ethnic groups. On May 6th, 2022, Andrew Nachemson of Al Jazeera reported on how the Karen became a crucial group within Myanmar’s anti-coup resistance. Within the report, Nachemson re-released a statement from the KNU, which states, “We cannot accept the military taking power and detaining the country’s leaders. This is a massive obstacle and challenge in transitioning to democracy,” essentially accusing the military of violating its own 2008 constitution. (8) International Relations & Alliances The alliances of the KNLA within Myanmar are wide. As of 2023, they are associated with more than a dozen other insurgent groups. The KNLA is a part of the 4k Coalition which consists of the Karenni Army, Karenni National People’s Liberation Front, and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force. Other allies include the Karen National Defence Organisation, All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, Arakan Army, Bamar People’s Liberation Army, DKBA-5, Kachin Independence Army, People’s Defence Force, and the Free Burma Rangers. The KNLA/KNU is also allied with a similar organization called the National Unity Government, or NUG, which was founded on January 31st, 2007 by Major General Saw Htein Maung, who was the commander of 7th Brigade within the KNLA. (9)

Insurgency Overview The Indigenous Guard (Guardia Indígena) is a network of loosely affiliated nonviolent self-defense organizations based in Indigenous territories throughout Colombia. Indigenous Guard units are generally autonomous entities without formal affiliation to other organizations under the “Indigenous Guard” moniker, although they share a common history, organizational structure, and function. The Indigenous Guard is therefore more accurately understood as a movement, model, or organizational strategy and not as a single cohesive organization. Indigenous Guard units act as security forces for their respective Indigenous communities while coordinating with Indigenous government councils (cabildos) and other regional organizations. Their mission is generally defined as the peaceful, collective defense of human rights, territory, autonomy, and culture within the Indigenous communities and territories of Colombia (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020; CRIC, n.d.). The formation of Indigenous Guard units responded to the long history of violence and marginalization perpetrated against Indigenous Colombian communities by both state and non-state actors in the context of the long-running Colombian conflict (Díaz, 2023). The first Indigenous Guard unit to adopt and popularize the term was the Indigenous Guard of Cauca (Guardia Indígena del Cauca), which was formed by a regional association of Indigenous councils in southwest Colombia in 2001 (Jiménez González, 2020). Since then, dozens of other Indigenous Guard units have emerged in most of Colombia’s more than 100 Indigenous communities. According to the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca: CRIC), the purpose of the Indigenous Guard is to “protect, care for, defend, preserve, survive, and dream one’s own dreams, to hear one’s own voice, to laugh one’s own laugh, to sing one’s own song, and to cry one’s own tears” (CRIC, n.d.). The movement’s slogan is “Guard! Strength! For my race and for my land!” According to the Colombian Truth Commission, as of 2020, there were more than 20,000 members of Indigenous Guard units throughout Colombia’s 115 Indigenous communities (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020), while an estimate in the Spanish daily newspaper El País put the number at around 70,000 in 2023; reliable statistics are difficult to estimate given the decentralized nature of the movement (Díaz, 2023). Indigenous Guard units engage in community protection, territorial patrols, marches and political actions, and other acts of collective, territorial, and cultural defense. In so doing, they have come into the crosshairs of armed groups including guerrillas, paramilitaries, and the Colombian state. Assassinations, kidnappings, and massacres targeting Indigenous Guard units and their leaders are commonplace in parts of Colombia, particularly the Indigenous Guard’s homeland of Cauca (Díaz, 2023; Front Line Defenders, 2022; Human Rights Investigations Lab, 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2023). History & Foundations The first Indigenous Guard unit was formed in 2001 in the southwest Colombian department of Cauca by a regional association of Indigenous government councils. Known as the Indigenous Guard of Cauca, this first unit was staffed primarily by activists of the Nasa people, one of Colombia’s largest Indigenous communities. The founding organization, the Association of Indigenous Councils of North Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte del Cauca: ACIN) was an affiliate of one of Colombia’s largest Indigenous civil society organizations, the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca, founded in 1971 in the context of the long-running Colombian conflict. For this reason, the Indigenous Guard movement is commonly associated with the CRIC, although many units today are not formally affiliated with that group (Jiménez González, 2020). In the 23 years since the founding of the first Indigenous Guard unit, the majority of Colombia’s Indigenous communities have formed their own, with varying degrees of connection and collaboration between them. Historically, both the Indigenous Guard and its predecessors like the CRIC and the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia: ONIC) emerged in the context of the Colombian conflict, a long-term, low-intensity civil war beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present day. Indigenous communities have suffered disproportionately throughout the conflict at the hands of each of its major actors, from left-wing guerrillas (e.g., FARC, ELN) to right-wing paramilitaries (e.g., AUC) to the armed forces of the Colombian state, each of which coveted control over Indigenous territories for economic, political, or military reasons (Loaiza, 2019; Vadillo, 2019; Wallis, 2019; 2020). While some Indigenous communities responded by forming guerrillas of their own—such as Quintín Lame in Cauca and the FARIP on the Pacific coast—others responded with the eventual formation of the Indigenous Guard as a pacifist alternative aimed at curtailing Colombia’s long cycle of violence. The Indigenous Guard’s refusal of violent methods and the use of arms stemmed from the experience of some of its founders as guerrilla fighters in Quintín Lame, a group initially founded as a self-defense organization, but which went on the offensive in the 1980s, resulting in further bloodshed. When Quintín Lame demobilized in 1991 in favor of legal participation in Colombia’s Constitutional Assembly, Nasa activists decided to pursue their autonomy through legal and nonviolent means (Wyss, 2012). Some Indigenous Guard units and affiliate organizations also situate their activities within a historical tradition of Indigenous resistance to colonialism. The Indigenous Guard of Cauca, for instance, looks back to the legendary Nasa cacique Juan Tama de la Estrella, who led the struggle against the Spanish invasion in the late 1600s and who later obtained legal recognition of his people’s territory from the Spanish crown (Díaz, 2020). In the Sibundoy Valley of Putumayo, the Indigenous Guard of the Kamëntšá and Inga peoples likewise connect their territorial defense movement to a legendary cacique of their own, Carlos Tamabioy, who in 1700 secured legal recognition of his people’s territory—a claim that was ratified by the Colombian state in 2016, partly through the work of the valley’s Indigenous Guard unit (Bonilla, 2019; “Termina una disputa,” 2016). While the Indigenous Guard as such was only founded in 2001, some of its constituents claim that the movement in its current form is a continuation of a long tradition of Indigenous resistance and autonomous self-defense (Amórtegui, 2023). The Indigenous Guard increasingly entered the mainstream national consciousness throughout the 2000s by carrying out daring but effective and usually bloodless operations, such as the successful 2004 rescue of four kidnapped leaders from the FARC during a 400-man, 20-day chase through the jungle (Wyss, 2012). The movement’s impressive record has continued to the present; one of the most recent and widely publicized actions of Indigenous Guard units was the collaborative rescue of four Indigenous children lost in the Amazon following a plane crash in a remote region of rainforest on May 1, 2023. Together with 150 soldiers of the Colombian army, 80 members of five Indigenous Guard units—the Coreguaje of Caquetá, Siona of Putumayo, Isimali of Meta, Nasa of Cauca, and Murui-Muinane of Amazonas and Caquetá—succeeded in locating the children after a 40-day rescue operation (García Cano, 2023; Glatsky and Turkowitz, 2023). Objectives & Ideology The primary objective of each Indigenous Guard unit is to defend the territory and integrity of its respective Indigenous community through nonviolent means. Their tactics include patrolling the territory, documenting and opposing instances of trespassing and illegal activity, and confronting opponents such as armed groups, as well as carrying out humanitarian and political actions. Their ideology can be broadly described as Indigenist, seeking to promote the territorial, cultural, and political interests and autonomy of Indigenous peoples (CRIC, n.d.). The Indigenous Guard conceives of its legal and constitutional basis as deriving from the Colombian Constitution of 1991. More specifically, the Indigenous Guard has referenced Articles 7, 246, and 330 of the Constitution as the legal basis for its formation; these articles refer to, respectively, state recognition and protection of the ethnic and cultural diversity of Colombia; the rights of Indigenous communities to semi-autonomous jurisdictional functions; and the rights of Indigenous communities to semi-autonomous government and its related functions (Benítez Loaiza, 2021; Constitutional Court of Colombia, 2022). Indigenous Guard units also refer to the “life plans” (planes de vida) or “safeguard plans” (planes de salvaguardia), which are diagnostic and strategic documents formulated by various Indigenous communities in collaboration with state entities that lay out models and objectives of sustainable development and cultural, territorial, and political autonomy for the Indigenous communities of Colombia. The ratification of Law 152 of 1994 saw the genesis of these life plans within a greater national schema of “development plans” (planes de desarrollo). Since then, Indigenous communities have periodically revised and reissued their life plans (Mesa Salazar, 2020). Provisions for the formation of autonomous and ethnically or territorially constituted Indigenous Guard units are often included within these plans, and within these frameworks, Indigenous Guard units are construed as necessary for the advancement of Indigenous interests. In addition to defending the rights and interests of Indigenous communities, Indigenous Guard units are also known as environmental defenders with an ecological outlook—a dangerous combination in Colombia, which for several years running has been the deadliest country in the world for environmental defenders (Griffin, 2023). One of the core ecosystems defended by Indigenous Guard units is the páramo, an ecologically unique alpine wetland biome with a vital role in Andean ecology but which is increasingly threatened by climate change. For groups like the Environmental Indigenous Guard, a group based in Gran Cumbal region of southern Colombia, protecting these ecosystems is integral to the greater defense of Indigenous territory, rights, and livelihoods (ActionAid, 2023; Pozzebo, 2021; Selibas, 2023; United Nations, 2021). Political & Military Capabilities As a nonviolent organization, the Indigenous Guard does not possess formal military capabilities. The equipment carried by individual guards is limited to wooden staffs, with a symbolic more than a functional connotation (Wyss, 2012). Their staffs bear tassels in four colors: green for nature, red for the blood of their ancestors, blue for water, and black for the earth (Díaz, 2023). Participation in the Indigenous Guard is voluntary, and members do not receive pay. Only occasionally have Indigenous Guard units participated in violent confrontations, generally in response to other actors’ instigations. More often, Indigenous Guard units are the victims of targeted violence at the hands of the armed groups they peacefully confront (Front Line Defenders, 2022; Grattan and Mazars, 2022a; 2022b; Pozzebon, 2021; Servindi, 2015; 2024a; 2024b). As a political and civil defense force, Indigenous Guard units typically wield influence within their communities. At the national level, they have also shown themselves capable of organizing across regional and ethnic lines to advance demands through a popular front. Broadly speaking, there are three scales at which Indigenous Guard units operate: Within specific Indigenous communities or reservations (resguardos) Through delegates to the regional level, who articulate local guard units with political organizations At the national level, where around 53 Indigenous organizations are housed within the ONIC, which elects a national Indigenous Guard coordinator (Díaz, 2023). At the national level, the Indigenous Guard has played a prominent role in major protests, social movements, and marches, including a recent occupation of Bogotá’s historic Plaza de Bolívar (Emblin, 2023). Approach to Resistance The Indigenous Guard employs nonviolent resistance to protect Indigenous territories and oppose trespassers, including criminal groups such as guerrillas, paramilitaries, and narcotraffickers, as well as the Colombian army and police. Despite its commitment to nonviolent methods and its rejection of the use of arms, the Indigenous Guard has carried out dangerous yet effective operations against armed actors, such as dismantling guerrilla roadblocks, seizing arsenals, capturing combatants, and destroying drug laboratory camps. Indigenous Guard units have also carried out rescue missions, entering guerrilla camps to free victims of forced recruitment and kidnapping. They have also targeted state forces, such as by destroying police barricades and evicting soldiers from fortified positions. In some regions, the Indigenous Guard has set up roadblocks to control the entry of outsiders (Wyss, 2012; Participedia, 2021). The movement is also known for its humanitarian operations, such as combatting forced recruitment by armed groups, searching for “disappeared” people (desaparecidos), advocating for the release of kidnapping victims, and carrying out search and rescue actions (Comisión de la Verdad, 2020; Díaz, 2023; Sur Journal, 2020). Opponents of the Indigenous Guard have accused them of “terrorism” or of being a kind of paramilitary organization with military training and bearing arms. Some, such as former Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón, even went so far as to suggest that some Indigenous Guard units were in league with the FARC—even though the latter group has long targeted Indigenous communities in acts of violence, while the Indigenous Guard has carried out operations against the FARC (Andrés Barahona, 2011; Wyss, 2012). No evidence of such collusion is extant and Indigenous Guard units have denied such allegations (Díaz, 2023). Relations & Alliances The Indigenous Guard first emerged from Indigenous civil society organizations such as the CRIC and ONIC. Consequently, their closest alliances are still with these and similar organizations, which employ civil, participatory, and political strategies to advance the interests of Colombia’s Indigenous communities. The Indigenous Guard itself could be viewed as one approach within the broader movement for the rights and autonomy of Indigenous Colombians through civil means (CRIC, n.d.). The Indigenous Guard model has inspired some non-Indigenous communities in Colombia to follow suit and organize their own guard units along similar lines. Peasant communities have organized “peasant guard” (guardia campesina) units, while Afro-Colombian communities have organized “maroon guard” (guardia cimarrona) units (Díaz, 2023). The opponents of the Indigenous Guard include guerrilla organizations such as the FARC and ELN, both among the largest and most long-lived of Latin America’s left-wing guerrillas (though the FARC formally disbanded in 2016, dissident cells continue to operate). Both organizations have historically targeted Indigenous Guard units and leaders in assassinations and massacres—attacks which continue today in the case of the ELN, which remains operative in Cauca and other Indigenous-majority regions of Colombia (Wyss, 2012; Participedia, 2021). Similarly, the Indigenous Guard has clashed with right-wing paramilitaries and other criminal groups trespassing on their territory and threatening their communities, frequently through participation in the Colombian drug trade (Wallis, 2020). Neither has the Indigenous Guard had positive relations with the Colombian state. Consequently, one of their most consistent opponents has been Colombian media outlets, particularly those aligned with right-wing political figures such as Álvaro Uribe and his successor, Iván Duque; the Colombian right has tended to villainize Indigenous communities and their guard units while deploying troops to their territories against the wishes of locals (Alsema, 2019; Wyss, 2012). Indigenous Guard units have therefore not limited their operations to criminal groups but have also acted against Colombian forces such as police and soldiers. Another common opponent of the Indigenous Guard are the multinational corporations that seek to develop extractive economic projects in their territories (Díaz, 2023). In the Sibundoy Valley of Putumayo department, for example, an Indigenous Guard unit composed of Kamëntšá and Inga land defenders has organized marches against the construction of a planned bypass through both an ecological protected area and a zone of legally recognized Indigenous territory. The road, locally known as the San Francisco–Mocoa Bypass (la Variante San Francisco–Mocoa), is a public project permitted by the Colombian state but built by a consortium of private contractors and backed by multinational mining concessions hoping to capitalize on the land the project will open to commercial exploitation. Local guard members have received threats for their activism in opposition to the project, suggesting the collusion between state actors, Colombian business interests, multinational corporations, and criminal groups in their employ that characterizes such development projects and their interaction with Indigenous communities in Colombia (Fernanda Lizcano, 2020a; 2020b). The Indigenous Guard has also received international support. In 2020, Irish human rights organization Front Line Defenders recognized the Indigenous Guard of Cauca with the 2020 Americas Regional Front Line Defenders Award for Human Rights Defenders at Risk (Jiménez González, 2020; PAX, 2020). Members of the Indigenous Guard have also received such prestigious international awards as the Goldman Environmental Prize, and been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize (Selibas, 2023). It has also been suggested that the Indigenous Guard and affiliate organizations such as the CRIC have taken inspiration from the example of the EZLN in Mexico, a militant movement for Indigenous autonomy that also witnessed the creation of Indigenous self-defense units with similar goals and tactics; both groups maintain communications and advance similar political visions of Indigenous autonomy (Zibechi, 2023). *All Images courtesy of Rowan Glass - LinkedIn

Insurgency Overview The 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril), M-19, was a guerilla movement in Colombia active during the 1970s and 80s before demobilising in 1990 and transitioning into a political party, the ‘M-19 Democratic Alliance’ (Alianza Democrática M-19), or AD/M-19.  The movement’s name is a reference to the date (April 19th, 1970) when ex-military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional Popular), ANAPO, was allegedly denied electoral victory by the National Front, a coalition of power-sharing liberal and conservative establishment leaders.  The National Front subsequently imprisoned Pinilla and declared martial law, which inspired the founders of the M-19 to take up arms. (1).  The M-19 declared itself to be an urban armed protest movement for the people of Colombia. While most Colombian guerilla movements identified with Marxist ideology, the M-19 “advocated a nationalist, Bolívarian, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic model and argued for ‘Socialism Colombian-style.’” (2) The movement began in the early 1970s as a clandestine group of urban cells operating in Bogotá and other major cities across Colombia.  By the 80s, the movement had succeeded in building a military-political apparatus with mobile units on multiple fronts and became the second largest and most popular guerrilla movement in the country. (1) They funded their operations by kidnapping landowners, drug traffickers, politicians, and oligarchs (including their family members) and holding them ransom for large sums of money. (2) Their weapons were either imported from overseas and smuggled into the country or stolen from military installations or local individuals. (2,3,4) Their strategy of armed propaganda and ‘Robin Hood-like actions’ made them very popular and garnered public support.  On the flip side, they also attracted negative attention from the military and paramilitary units, like the MAS (Muerte a Secuestradores, ‘Death to Kidnappers’) and AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, ‘United Self-Defenders of Colombia), whose ‘dirty war’ led to the imprisonment, torture, and murder of guerrillas and anyone alleged to sympathize or support the movement. (2) Significant actions by the M-19 include the theft of Simón Bolívar’s Sword, the siege of the Embassy of the Dominican Republic, and the siege of the Palace of Justice.  M-19’s military operations were largely seen as political failures, but after a decade of failed peace negotiations, the M-19 successfully negotiated a ceasefire and peace agreement with the government. (2) In 1990, the group demilitarised in return for full amnesty and a path towards electoral politics. (1) The newly formed AD/M-19 played a significant role in the creation of Colombia’s modern 1991 constitution and paved the way for future peace negotiations between the Colombian government and other guerrilla organisations.  While the AD/M-19 initially had popular support, the movement began to decline due to poor political strategy and decisions regarding unpopular economic and social policies.  Many former members left to join other more successful leftist political groups, such as the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente, PDI). (2) In 2022, Gustavo Petro, a former M-19 guerilla, won Colombia’s presidential elections and became the first leftist president in the nation’s history. History Colombia has a long history of armed violence.  The current civil war has roots in a time of conflict known as La Violencia.  The decade-long civil war followed the 1948 assassination of Liberal party candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán.  Following a riot known as the Bogotázo, military, police, and conservative political leaders encouraged conservative-supporting peasants to seize agricultural land from liberal-supporting peasants.  This led to mass displacement and the deaths of over 200,000 Colombians. (5)  During this time, rural self-defence groups formed and eventually evolved into the guerilla movements of the 60s.  These first-generation guerilla organisations include the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberacion Nacional, ELN), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), and the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL). (2) In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla mounted a coup d’état and ruled the country as a military dictator.  He imposed martial law and implemented populist leftist policies.  The coup put an end to the conflict, but Pinilla’s policies conflicted with those of the oligarchic establishment.  Therefore, the Liberal and Conservative parties formed a power-swapping coalition known as the National Front and deposed Pinilla.  In opposition, Pinilla formed the ANAPO political party. (5) On April 19th, 1970, Pinilla was allegedly denied the presidency by the National Front, in a case of electoral fraud.  Pinilla was then imprisoned, and perpetual martial law went into effect which gave the state forces unconstitutional powers to search and seize.  For many, this reinforced their belief that Colombia’s government was not a true democracy. (1) In 1973, Jaime Bateman, a FARC separatist, and Carlos Toledo, a physician and ANAPO representative in Congress, founded the M-19 intending to build a popular urban armed protest movement capable of challenging the oligarchy and established order. (1) They began establishing clandestine cells in urban centres across the country.  Their first major operation occurred in 1974 when a clandestine cell stole Simón Bolívar’s sword from the Quinta de Bolívar in Bogotá.  The symbolic action grabbed the attention of the public in the form of armed propaganda that encouraged others to take up arms and join the movement. (2) In 1976, the M-19 kidnapped and executed union leader, Jose Mercado.  Mercado had been accused of “being a traitor to the interest of the working class.”  The next year the group took hostage the manager of an agro-industrial African Palm company.  In this action, they were able to work out a peaceful negotiation that led to better working conditions for the employees while sparing the life of the manager.  It was during this time that M-19 began to adopt a political-military organisational structure that oriented itself towards comprehensive political and military actions. (4,6) In 1978, the group smuggled more than 5,700 weapons from a military arms cache by digging a tunnel into an army weapons depot.  The arms provided the movement with the means to develop mobile units capable of large-scale actions across multiple fronts.  In response, the military raided, arrested, and tortured many suspected M-19 guerrillas, including alleged “sympathisers.” (2) One year later, M-19’s Jorge Marcos Zambrano commando unit laid siege to the Dominican Republic embassy in Bogotá.  The main objective of the operation was to force the release of their political prisoners.  The incident received international attention.  After 61 days of negotiation, a non-violent solution was reached with President Turbay’s administration.  The prisoners were not freed, but the action did open a dialogue between the government and M-19 regarding amnesty and peace negotiations. (2) In 1981, the group kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the sister of the Ochoa brothers, founders of the Medellín Cartel.  In response, the narco-traffickers funded a paramilitary group known as “Death to Kidnappers” (Muerte a Seceustradores, MAS) to destroy the M-19 and other guerrilla groups in revenge for the kidnapping of their families.  They carried out assassinations against M-19 leaders and tortured/killed those perceived to “support” the guerillas. (2) In the early 1980s, a series of military actions were waged to promote a peace proposal that called for the “ending of the state of emergency, the derogation of the Security State, [and] an unconditional general amnesty along with a national dialogue.” (2) In 1983, general commander Jaime Bateman was killed in a plane crash while travelling to Panama for peace talks with then-President Belisario Betancur. (1) The next year, President Betancur and M-19’s then-general commander Álvaro Fayad signed an agreement of truce and national dialogue.  However, the dialogue lacked support from the rest of the government, including hostile sectors within the military. (2) In fact, during this period one of the largest battles between the Army and M-19 occurred in Yarumales.  After the assassination of M-19 co-founder Carlos Toledo and a nearly fatal attack on commander Antonio Navarro, Commander Fayad declared an end to the truce. (4) In 1985, M-19’s Ivan Marino Ospina company, a special forces unit consisting of 35 guerrillas, laid siege to the Palace of Justice in Bogotá to protest President Betancur’s failure to comply with the peace agreements. (4) President Betancur refused to negotiate with the guerrillas and allowed the state forces to run an aggressive counter-siege operation.  The counter-siege was led by tanks, helicopters, and troops with machine guns, grenades, and rocket launchers; it led to the destruction of the Palace of Justice and the deaths of over 100 people, including the entire guerilla unit and half the nation’s supreme court. (7) The failed operation was a national tragedy and cost the movement a considerable amount of support.  Following the operation, Commander Fayad was murdered in a police raid. (2) After the Palace of Justice, the movement was unable to continue the armed struggle due to loss of public support and political isolation.  In 1988, then-general commander Carlos Pizarro called for a truce with the military and initiated a peace process with the government.  In 1990, the M-19 officially demilitarised and transitioned into politics.  The success of the peace process paved the way for other guerrilla movements like the EPL, PRT (Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Colombia), and Quintín Lame to follow in their footsteps toward peace agreements. (2) In 1990, M-19’s political organisation, AD/M-19, was officially established.  Pizarro ran for presidency but was assassinated by the Medellín cartel before the elections could take place. (1) An estimated 160 ex-guerillas were killed after demobilization. (2) Despite the murders, the M-19 did not revert to taking up arms but continued the peace process.  The political party saw some early successes.  Antonio Navarro was elected as the Minister of Health and the AD/M-19 won a significant number of votes for the National Constitutional Assembly.  They played a key role in the forging of the Colombian Constitution of 1991. (1,2,4) It didn’t take long for the AD/M-19 to lose momentum and face a massive decline in political support. The decline was due to a lack of political strategy including support for unpopular economic programs and several repressive pieces of legislation. Despite the failure of the party, many of its members went on to join the Independent Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Independiente, PDI) coalition which later merged with the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo, PDA) coalition.  Current President and ex-M19 guerilla, Gustavo Petro, combined his party, Humane Colombia (Humana Colombia), with the PDA and other leftist and liberal political organisations to form the Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico) coalition.  During Gustavo Petro’s time in the M-19, he was jailed and tortured.  As the first leftist president in Colombian history, he has championed peace negotiations with the remaining guerrillas and continued to lead investigations into ties between paramilitaries and politicians.  For example, former president Álvaro Uribe faces allegations linking him to the AUC paramilitary organisation, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking. (8) Objectives and Ideology "I’m not a Marxist.  Being a Marxist in today’s world is being dogmatic.  I am not dogmatic." - M-19 Commander Jaime Bateman (1) The M-19 considered itself the military arm of the ANAPO movement.  They advocated “a nationalist, Bolivarian, anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic model of ‘Socialism Colombian-style’.  Their main objective was to open ‘true’ electoral democracy in Colombia through armed protest. (2) M-19 saw itself as distinct from internationalist-oriented models, such as those of the ELN (Cuba-oriented), FARC (Soviet-oriented), and EPL (China-oriented).  They did not consider themselves Marxist-Leninist, which they saw as dogmatic.  Instead, the movement prided itself on its diversity of class, political orientation, and culture.  Their ranks were made up of mostly middle-class students/college graduates and working-class youth from popular urban sectors across the country. Women were allowed to participate as militants and serve as commanding officers. They claimed their movement was for the ‘common people’ united by Colombian identity, Latin American fraternity, and the revolutionary history of their ancestors.  There was a concern with building unity amongst various guerilla movements and political groups, despite the prevailing mood of extreme sectarianism. (2) Revolutionary movements such as the Montoneros in Argentina and the Tupamaros in Uruguay inspired M-19 to build a political-military apparatus of mobile guerrilla units that could channel the will of the people to bring about revolutionary economic and social change.  They believed democracy would only prevail after these revolutionary changes took place through armed rebellion. (6) Political and Military Capabilities The M-19 started as a small group of clandestine cells in popular urban centres.  They established columns (units) in Colombia’s major cities.  Each column was organised into independent cells.  They financed operations mainly by kidnapping or ‘detaining’ hostages and demanding ransom for large sums of money. (1) Undercover guerillas ran safehouses to smuggle weapons and hostages.  Their main military objectives were to carry out commando-like actions in urban centres as a form of armed propaganda (i.e. stealing the sword of Bolívar) and building a large-scale rural army capable of challenging the state to meet their demands for democratic and social reform. (2) In the 1986 siege of the Palace of Justice, author Ann Carrigan writes, “[they had] boxes of hand grenades and some Claymore mines…two 50mm and 30mm Mack machine guns, ammunition for the 7.62mm Galil rifles, the 7.63 G-3 guns, the 5.56mm AR-15s, the Uzi 9mm submachine guns, the M-16s, the 9mm Browning revolvers—all piled up in sacks on the floor.” (2) Two successful operations reveal how the M-19 collected large caches of arms. In 1979, a guerilla unit stole 5,700 small arms by digging a tunnel into a military armoury in northern Bogotá.  In 1981, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombian drug and weapons smuggler, helped smuggle 1,000 Belgian FN FAL combat rifles and one million rounds of 7.62 x 51mm ammunition by ship from Libya to Colombia in a mission known as Operation Karina. (3) Part of the arms were trucked to a clandestine airstrip and flown via a hijacked plane to the Oreteguaza River in Caqueta.  The remaining arms were lost when the ship was sunk by a Colombian Naval vessel.  The drastic increase in firepower led to an increase in large-scale operations and helped establish the M-19’s military apparatus on multiple fronts. (2) Formations of mobile guerilla groups on multiple fronts began to take shape after 1978.  They received training at Cuban military schools and learned technical skills such as “engineering trenches, pits, and tunnels, vaults, etc.” as well as “tactical, operational, and strategic elements such as radio communications, camouflage for infiltration operations, and mining for active defence operations.”  In Argentina, the Montoneros taught them specialised skills like “jamming TV channels” and in Libya, they received training to develop a special forces unit capable of large-scale, complex operations, such as seizing the Palace of Justice. (2) M-19 was at its height in the mid-1980s when active membership was estimated to have been between 1500-2000 militants.  They ran hit-and-run style tactics and used artillery to attack police and army outposts. In 1984, multiple rural fronts were in control of regional capitals and ‘freedom centres’ in rural towns, such as Yarumales. These mobile units could hold their defences against military attack.  For example, during the Battle of Yarumales, the M-19 were able to sustain a fight against the army for 22 days and push them away from their position. (2) The guerilla army was powered by popular support.  When the peace negotiations fell apart, the M-19’s legitimacy and popular support began to significantly decline.  The Palace of Justice siege was a desperate attempt to regain popularity and support but ultimately marked the group’s end as an effective military force. (2,4,7) As a political organisation, AD/M-19 had early successes in municipal elections and the National Constituent Assembly.  They played a significant role in drafting the modern Colombian Constitution of 1991.  However, they quickly lost momentum and public support due to strategic mistakes and support for unpopular policies.  Despite the party’s failure, many leftist political movements in Colombia can trace their roots back to M-19, including President Gustavo and the Historic Pact coalition. (2,4) Approach to Resistance Since the days of La Violencia, violence has been a traditional political tool in Colombia.  The M-19 took up arms in protest because they believed the oligarchy would not take them seriously unless they were armed.  Their main objective was to create a military apparatus that would serve as a tool to channel social indignation and support the popular will.  The movement was able to grow and spread throughout the country using ‘armed propaganda.’ (2) Armed propaganda is the action of carrying out specific objectives to serve as propaganda material for mass communications. (6) For example, when M-19 stole the sword of Simón Bolívar it gained mass media attention.  The sword carried historical, cultural, and revolutionary significance; its theft symbolised a ‘return to revolution’ and a ‘call to arms.’  The guerilla movement took over schools, towns, and work unions to spread propaganda.  They shared communiques through sympathetic journalists and took control of radio stations and newspapers to communicate their message to the masses.  Other actions of armed propaganda included bank robberies, ambushes, stealing weapons, rescuing prisoners, executing corrupt union leaders, kidnapping, hijacking planes, ships, and trains, and seizing embassies and the Palace of Justice. (2) M-19’s more militarised approach was largely seen as a political failure.  Their targets (i.e. the military, drug traffickers, police, corrupt union leaders, politicians, and oligarchs) led to the imprisonment, torture, and murder of many guerrillas and their (perceived) ‘supporters’ and ‘sympathizers.’ People were tired of the conflict and opposition to the M-19 saw guerrilla violence as evidence to support their stance against the peace negotiations.  When the M-19 seized the Palace of Justice, popular support had already been on the decline.  They made many strategic mistakes, but the most obvious is the location.  When they seized the embassy of the Dominican Republic, they took ambassadors hostage and received international coverage.  The government was forced to act diplomatically.  In the case of the Palace of Justice, the military was able to act without impunity or oversight. (2,7) Another strategic mistake was targeting the cartels.  For example, the kidnapping of Martha Ochoa led to the formation of the paramilitary organisation known as MAS. MAS and other paramilitaries targeted M-19 “sympathisers” and “supporters”. These paramilitaries tortured and murdered thousands of innocent civilians during what is known as the ‘dirty war.’ (5,8,9) The ‘dirty war’ effectively killed popular support for the movement. (9) By the late 80s, people were tired of the war and wanted peace. The siege of the Palace of Justice was a catastrophic failure and the movement faced isolation. Internally, the group had lost support and the will to continue fighting.  Meanwhile, the government was overwhelmed by fighting on two fronts against the guerillas and drug traffickers.  This made then-President Barco’s administration more susceptible to negotiations. General Commander Pizzaro and Commander Navarro decided to commit to peace negotiations, demilitarisation, and transition into politics. They reached out to the military and were able to reach a truce.  They tried to reach out to the Medellín cartel but were ignored. (1,2,4,7) Many guerrillas continued to be killed by the cartel after demilitarisation, including commander Pizarro.  Despite the killings, the M-19 remained committed to the peace process. Their actions laid the foundation for other guerilla organisations to follow their own peace process’. As a result, leftist political power in Colombia can be traced back to the peace negotiations and early political actions of M-19. (2,9) Relations and Alliances The M-19 fostered relationships with many international socialist organisations.  For example, they received support from international revolutionary and socialist movements in Nicaragua and Cuba.  Cuba provided the M-19 with guerrilla military training. Libya provided the guerrillas with special forces training.  Logistical support came from Panama, Cuba, and Venezuela and political support came from Mexico and Costa Rica.  Argentina’s Montoneros influenced the M-19’s development of rural armed fronts (mobile guerilla units) and the formation of joint operations with other guerrilla organisations. (2) M-19 promoted guerrilla unity through bilateral actions with guerrilla movements throughout Colombia and Latin America.  They created a joint force with EPL known as Fuerza Conjunta.  They also operated on joint campaigns with the ELN and Quintín Lame (an indigenous organisation). In fact, M-19 played a leading role in forming large, joint-led guerrilla movements such as the National Guerilla Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera, CNG), the Simón Bolívar Coordinating Board (Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, CGSB), and the America Battalion (Batallón América). They even made attempts to establish a guerrilla front with members of Peru’s Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolutionario Tupac Amaru) and Ecuador’s Alfaro Lives, Damn It! (Alfaro Vive, Carajo!). However, the M-19 eventually grew disenchanted with trying to unite guerilla organisations when they realised ideological sectarianism proved stronger than guerilla unity. (2,4)

Insurgency Overview The Guardians of the Forest (Guardiões da Floresta) is an armed Indigenous paramilitary and vigilante movement in the Brazilian Amazon based on community defense, environmentalism and rainforest conservation, and combatting illicit activities such as logging, mining, and narcotrafficking on Indigenous territory (Cardoso and Periera, 2019; Fantástico, 2022; Harris et al., 2020; Lichterbeck, 2021; Taylor, 2019). Like the Indigenous Guard in Colombia, the Guardians of the Forest are a loosely affiliated network or organizational framework rather than a single specific organization. Several Indigenous communities in different parts of the Brazilian Amazon have organized autonomous militant organizations under the “Guardians of the Forest” moniker, all with similar aims but formally unrelated to one another (Marçal, 2019). However, most media coverage of this movement centers on the first and largest such unit: that of the Guajajara people of the northeastern Brazilian state of Maranhão. Other Guardians units include one in the Caru reserve, also in Maranhão, as well as one formed by the Ka’apor people of the Alto Turiaçu reserve (Johnson, 2022; Mount, 2015). All Guardian units, regardless of ethnicity or location, share the primary goal of defending Indigenous communities and territories from illicit activities, colonial violence, and ecocide. The Guajajara founded the first Guardian militia in 2013 in the Araribóia Indigenous Land of Maranhão, one of nearly 400 Indigenous reserves designated as protected land under Brazilian law (Libardi, 2020; Marçal, 2019). The founding of this group responded to the long and ongoing history of Indigenous dispossession, targeted violence, illegal logging, mining, cattle ranching, and narcotrafficking in the Indigenous territories of the Brazilian Amazon—processes which have only accelerated in recent years (Phillips, 2019). Operating as a vigilante paramilitary, Guardian units equipped with firearms and bows patrol their territories in search of illicit actors, apprehending criminals and sabotaging their operations. Since the actors the Guardians of the Forest operate against are typically armed as well and linked to powerful organized crime networks, this is a dangerous job; Guardians are routinely targeted for assassination in what is already one of the most dangerous regions of the world in which to be an Indigenous leader or environmental activist (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Phillips, 2023; Viera de Souza et al., 2022). History & Foundations Beginning with the Portuguese colonization of what is today Brazil and extending through the independence period and to the present, the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon have been subjected to continuous genocidal violence. The colonization of Brazil began in 1500 when Pedro Álvares Cabral landed on the Atlantic coast and claimed it in the name of Portugal. The Portuguese immediately began forcing the Indigenous peoples they encountered to extract valuable rainforest resources, namely brazilwood, beginning a process of colonial extractivism that has defined Brazilian history ever since, most particularly and most brutally for its Indigenous populations. Some resisted, initiating a parallel history of Indigenous resistance, often militant in nature. The emergence of the Guardians of the Forest may be viewed as a chapter in Brazil’s scarred history of extractivism, colonial violence, and Indigenous resistance. For this reason, although the first Guardians of the Forest unit was founded in 2013, the Guajajara militants who established it continue that the true date of its founding stretches back to 1500, consciously situating themselves within a lineage of Indigenous resistance to colonial violence and ecocide. More concretely, the formal establishment of the Guajajara Guardians of the Forest in 2013 responded to rising rates of violence and deforestation committed by criminal actors in Araribóia, which intensified following the 2007 assassination of tribal leader Tome Guajajara by illegal loggers (Libardi, 2020). The Guardians of the Forest have since devoted their efforts to defending Indigenous communities and their rainforest territory (Benassato and Marcelino, 2019; Cardoso and Pereira, 2019). At present, more than one-third of Guajajara territory has been deforested (ABC News, 2020). Up to 80% of deforestation in the Amazon is driven by the cattle industry, which involves clearcutting large swaths of forest to convert it to pastureland; logging, mining, and monoculture account for the remainder (“Deforestation in the Amazon,” 2023). Frequently, the illegal loggers who do the dirty work of clearcutting are in the employ of wealthy cattle barons who take possession of the deforested land; the capture and prosecution of either party is an uncommon affair, and the rare sentence is generally light, failing to discourage either loggers or cattlemen from continuing to engage in criminal enterprise (ABC News, 2020). Where the law enforcement and justiciary arms of the Brazilian state have long proved ineffectual in combatting such actors, the Guardians of the Forest have taken matters into their own hands. Thanks to the Guajajara Guardians, between 2014 and 2015, the number of illegal logging trucks leaving the southern end of the Araribóia reserve dropped from as many as 130 per day to 10–15 (Mount, 2015). In 2018, Brazil saw the election of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, who launched an unprecedented attack on environmental protections in the Amazon. Bolsonaro’s policies contributed to skyrocketing rates of deforestation and forest fires while enabling the expansion of both legal and illicit extractive operations in the Brazilian Amazon—processes that have proved both ecologically and socially disastrous to the Amazon rainforest and its Indigenous guardians. This has prompted the Guajajara to accuse Bolsonaro of genocidal intent (Archibald, 2022; Guajajara, 2023; Netto, 2023; Phillips, 2019). The high rates of environmental crime under Bolsonaro only began to decline after the election of his successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who created a new Ministry of Indigenous Peoples and reinstated protections for the environment and Indigenous communities (Netto, 2023; Rodrigues, 2023). Lula also recently issued the Brazilian government’s first apology to Indigenous communities for their persecution during the 1964–85 military dictatorship (Phillips and Rogero, 2024). However, Indigenous communities throughout the Amazon continue to face widespread environmental crime and violence, prompting the emergence of multiple Guardians of the Forest groups for community and environmental defense (Branford and Torres, 2019; Marçal, 2019; Mount, 2015). The Guajajara have been particularly affected by environmental crimes and targeted violence. According to the Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples, 49 Guajajara were killed in armed conflicts with loggers in Maranhão between 2000 and 2020. Between 2006 and 2020, Guajajara land was illegally invaded 44 times, making Araribóia one of the most violence-stricken Indigenous territories in the Amazon (Libardi, 2020). The Guardians of the Forest in particular have frequently been targeted for assassination; in a well-publicized case in 2019, 26-year-old warrior Paulo Paulino Guajajara was ambushed and murdered by five heavily armed loggers while hunting. Local Guardian leader Paulo Paulino Guajajara was also wounded in the attack, going into hiding in the aftermath (Biller, 2019; Marçal, 2019; Silva de Sousa, 2019). The Ka’apor Guardians of Alto Turiaçu have also been threatened and killed for their activism (Mount, 2015). Though frequent assassinations have continued into the 2020s, the Guardians show no sign of giving up the fight for their territory and rights (Associated Press, 2022; Biller, 2020; Mendes 2023b). Objectives & Ideology The primary objective of the Guardians of the Forest is to safeguard Indigenous rights, territorial autonomy, and the ecological integrity of the rainforest. Their ideology could be described as Indigenist and environmentalist, recognizing and defending the interdependence that exists between Indigenous communities and their natural environments; as a United Nations report found in 2021, deforestation rates are up to 50% lower in Indigenous territories than elsewhere (Carrington, 2021). In this respect, the Guardians of the Forest share their objectives and ideology with other Indigenous and Indigenist social and militant movements in the Latin American context and beyond. However, the Guardians are relatively unique for having taken up arms to pursue their aims through force, perhaps a consequence of the particularly dangerous and violent context they operate within (Mendes, 2019; Mount, 2015). In addition to advancing and defending Indigenous rights and the rights of nature, one of the primary aims of the Guajajara Guardians of the Forest is to protect neighboring Indigenous communities with little or no contact with the outside world. For example, the Araribóia Indigenous Land contains an estimated 100 Awá people in voluntary isolation (Forline, 2015). In 2011, illegal loggers captured an eight-year-old girl from one of the uncontacted villages and burned her alive in an attempt to force her community from their land (Sanchez 2012). Gunmen have also attacked the Awá, who number only around 350 in total (Chamberlain 2012). Such attacks are a continuous threat to the Amazon’s last remaining isolated communities. In the absence of effective state protection, the Guardians have made the defense of their isolated neighbors a priority (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). Political & Military Capabilities The Guardians of the Forest represent the paramilitary wing of the broader Indigenous territorial defense, environmentalist, and human rights movement in the Brazilian Amazon. Politically, Guardian units are independent and autonomous, though they sometimes collaborate with political organizations such as Indigenous government entities, Brazilian law enforcement, and FUNAI, Brazil’s Indigenous affairs bureau (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). In the case of the Guajajara of Araribóia, their community has produced not only the Guardians but also Brazil’s first-ever minister for Indigenous peoples, the feminist and Indigenous rights activist Sônia Guajajara. She rose to prominence through her work on many of the same issues that the Guardians address through vigilante action, suggesting the cohesion of both political and militant strategies to the problems faced by Indigenous communities (Netto, 2023). The Guardians of the Forest are few in number and lightly armed. Their arsenal includes light firearms such as handguns, shotguns, and hunting rifles, as well as traditional weapons such as bows and clubs. Some guardians wear ballistic vests, though most appear to go without protective equipment (Silva de Sousa, 2019). For mobility, the Guardians employ vehicles such as trucks and motorcycles, typically moving in convoys of several vehicles and up to 20 militants (ABC News, 2020). Typical operations involve patrolling their territories, identifying the locations of illicit activities such as mining or logging camps, investigating reports of illicit activities, ambushing and apprehending suspects, and holding them for release to state authorities. In a context in which targeted assassinations against Indigenous leaders and environmental activists are common, many Guardians wear facemasks to disguise their identities. The number of Guardians varies by group and no official record is maintained for security reasons. In 2015, the Guajajara Guardians were estimated at 48 militants, while by 2020 their numbers were reported to range from 120 to 180 (Benassatto and Marcelino, 2019; Libardi, 2020; Mount, 2015). In 2015, the Ka’apor Guardians of Alto Turiaçu numbered up to 90 militants (Mount, 2015). Approach to Resistance The Guardians of the Forest engage in both peaceful and armed acts of resistance. Their regular duties include patrolling their territories, investigating instances of illicit activity, and intercepting criminals—with heavy force when necessary. Video footage of an intercept operation captured by ABC News in 2019 illustrates the rough treatment the Guardians employ against apprehended opponents, including beatings and death threats. However, such extreme methods are generally discouraged. In 2015, a federal police officer under FUNAI accompanying the Guajajara Guardians on an armed action intervened between a Guardian and a suspect he was threatening to kill; the Guardian in question was later expelled from the organization for his behavior (Mount, 2015). There are no recorded cases of the Guardians having killed anyone. In addition to physically confronting their opponents, the Guardians also employ sabotage, namely the destruction of criminals’ vehicles, machinery, camp infrastructure, and illegally felled timber, serving to curtail their opponents’ operations where they occur and disincentivize their return (ABC News, 2020; Benassatto and Marceloni, 2019; Mount, 2015). An important dimension of the Guardians’ overall strategy is winning their communities’ sympathy and allegiance; leaders of the movement are generally men of high standing in their respective communities, situating their actions as self-defense on behalf of their people (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). However, opinions within their communities are split; while some recognize the Guardians as legitimate and support their aims and methods, others criticize them for employing violence which they believe may provoke the ire of the criminals they target, risking further escalation (Mendes, 2019; Mount, 2015). An additional complication is that some Indigenous communities have collaborated with the criminals, such as by accepting bribes in exchange for access to logging grounds, prompting Indigenous infighting and reprisals by the Guardians (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). Media is another tool employed by the Guardians to advance their aims. The Guardians began receiving media coverage shortly after their founding, accelerating greatly with the election of Bolsonaro and the global interest in environmental crime and ecological devastation in the Brazilian Amazon that followed. The first investigative reports on the Guardians appeared in the mid-2010s, with an uptick in coverage coming in 2019 and continuing into the 2020s. In 2023 the Guajajara Guardians were the subject of a documentary film covering their struggle called We Are Guardians; the film was co-directed by a local activist, Edivan Guajajara. In addition to mobilizing public awareness and sympathy for the Guardians’ cause, a corresponding impact campaign succeeding in securing a $200,000 grant to support reforestation initiatives in the Tembé and Guajajara territories, indicating the practical benefits such media projects can bring to the Guardians and their communities (Brasil, 2020; Kamali Dehghan, 2024). Relations & Alliances The primary opponents of the Guardians of the Forest are the assorted criminal actors whom the Guardians collectively refer to as “invaders.” The main culprits include illegal loggers, miners, narcotraffickers, and cattle barons—not always mutually exclusive categories in a regional context in which diverse forms of criminal collusion are widespread. These outsiders are the cause of deforestation and violence in the politically autonomous and ecologically protected Indigenous territories that the Guardians seek to defend. However, Guardian operations generally only succeed in capturing low-level criminals, comprising the mere foot soldiers of large-scale illicit enterprises. Operating at a higher level across the region, higher-ups and bosses are rarely captured. Even when criminals are captured by the Guardians and released to Brazilian authorities, they rarely face criminal prosecution or legal consequences for their crimes, while cases of violence or assassination targeting Indigenous activities regularly go uninvestigated by the state (ABC News, 2020; Viera de Souza et al., 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2019). For this reason, the Guardians have little faith in the efficacy of the Brazilian state in addressing the problems their communities face. The Guardians of the Forest have had a fraught relationship with the Brazilian state, particularly under President Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022). While the Guajajara, like all Indigenous communities formally recognized under Brazilian law, have a legal right to patrol and protect their land as they see fit, Bolsonaro has regularly dismissed Indigenous communities’ claims to their land and has sided with environmentally destructive corporations over the interests of Indigenous communities and their ecosystems (Gómez-Upegui, 2021; Libardi, 2019; Marçal, 2019). Additionally, Brazilian law enforcement and justiciary entities have regularly obstructed or otherwise failed in their duties to the Indigenous communities represented by the Guardians (Viera de Souza et al., 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2019). Despite the Guardians’ enmity for certain elements of the Brazilian government, they have occasionally aligned themselves with others. One of their primary occasional allies in government is FUNAI, the Brazilian government’s Amerindian bureau. Like many such agencies in settler colonial countries, FUNAI has a checkered history, sometimes helping but often harming Indigenous communities. Nevertheless, it has historically represented an important bulwark in protecting Indigenous communities from the depredations of settlers and criminal enterprises through mechanisms such as close fieldwork with Indigenous communities, the demarcation of protected areas and Indigenous reservations, and aiding Indigenous communities in legal matters (Mendes, 2019b). Several Guardians of the Forest units have worked in a formal capacity with FUNAI representatives, such as federal police officers on assignment to accompany the Guardians’ armed actions and to prevent breaches of the law or escalations of violence (Mount, 2015).

Introduction & Overview The Lobos, the second-largest criminal group in Ecuador, comprises over 8,000 members incarcerated throughout the country. According to the local press, they predominantly operate in the Andean cities of Latacunga and Cuenca, as well as in the Amazonian province of Pastaza and in Machala along the coast. (1) As reported by the Primicias portal, a significant portion of the Lobos members are impoverished adolescents. Similar to the Choneros, Ecuador’s largest gang, the Lobos are involved in drug trafficking. It is believed that the Lobos have connections with the Jalisco Cartel - New Generation, a Mexican transnational drug trafficking organization known as well for its involvement in arms trafficking. (2) The decline of the Choneros' dominance in Ecuador paved the way for the Lobos to assume control of an extensive coalition of gangs, including the Tiguerones and the Chone Killers. This shift allowed them to vie for supremacy in Ecuador's prisons and drug trade, establishing connections to organized crime networks in Colombia and Mexico. Additionally, the gang has expanded its operations into the illegal mining sector. The Lobos, alongside the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones, were born as dissident groups of the Choneros, led by Jorge Luis Zambrano, also known as Rasquiña, whom they operated under. However, Rasquiña's death in a Manta shopping mall in December 2020 lead to the separation of these groups from the Choneros, and to a power struggle among these gangs as they compete for leadership. The groups have been wrapped in a vicious gang conflict, which has since led to an unprecedented surge of violence in Ecuador. The Lobos have been involved in several bloody prison massacres in Ecuador, which left over 315 inmates dead in 2021 alone. (1,2) (@entre_guerras Jan 11, 2024) History & Foundations Violent crime linked to drug gangs drastically increased hand in hand with Ecuador’s role in the global narcotics trade. This is reflected in the murder rate, which surged from 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to 25.6 in 2022, before soaring again to 45 in 2023, following successive waves of gang violence since 2020. The Lobos have played a leading role in the breakdown of Ecuador's security situation, which in 2021 led the country to record the highest increase in its homicide rate in Latin America. (1) The Prime Minister at the time, Rafael Correa, implemented a series of judiciary reforms including a more punitive penal code; this had an immediate effect on the prison population, which increased from 10,000 to 40,000. (11) Since the arrest of the Choneros’ leader in 2011 and its ensuing integration into the prison system, the group has had a permanent presence in jails all around the country, from where they maintained operations in multiple cities. Ecuador's attempts to contain prison gang violence accelerated the expansion of the Choneros, leading to the creation of loyalist gangs dependent on it, which has multiplied the Choneros' influence. As mentioned, similar to other gangs in Ecuador, the Lobos originated as a breakaway faction from the country's former leading criminal organization, the Choneros. According to Codigo Vidrio, since 2016, the Lobos and their associates have been supplying weapons and offering security services to the Jalisco Cartel - New Generation (CJNG), as the latter competes for dominance over cocaine trafficking routes in Ecuador. (3) After the death of the Choneros leader Jose Luis Zambrano in 2020, some of its allied groups, such as the Lobos, the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones, turned against the megagroup to fight it, marking the origin of the killings in Ecuador's prisons. They collectively call themselves the New Generation in reference to alleged unproven links to Mexico's Jalisco Cartel - New Generation (CJNG) (1,2) Over the next two years, the Choneros have steadily lost power to this alliance, led by the Lobos, who have taken control of the drug trafficking routes once controlled by the former. In February 2021, the New Generation coordinated attacks against the fragmented leaders of the Choneros, with attacks on two potential successors to Rasquiña, alias "JR" and alias "Fito". Both escaped alive, but the riots left 80 inmates dead. In a major escalation of violence, another 119 inmates died in prison riots in September 2021, when members of the Choneros and the Lobos clashed in a Guayaquil prison. That same year, authorities confiscated numerous high-caliber firearms within penitentiaries under the control of the Choneros, Lobos, and Lagartos, indicating an increasing flow of weapons into Ecuador that found their way into prisons. (2,3) In the study on the evolution of drug trafficking in Ecuador, the National Police explains that between 2021 and 2022, several members of the Lobos were transferred to different prisons in the country. This allowed their range of operations from the prisons to extend to Imbabura, Pichincha, Chimborazo, Los Rios, Napo, Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas, Santa Elena, El Oro, Azuay and Loja. (4) On April 24th 2024, police captured Fabricio Colón Pico, Los Lobos leader. He had escaped from Riobamba prison during riots earlier this year, evading capture until now. Objectives & Ideology Ecuador ranks third in the world in cocaine seizures, after Colombia and the United States, according to the UNODC's 2022 World Drug Report. This means that more cocaine, more money and more weapons are passing through the hands of Ecuadorian gangs like the Lobos. Over the past three years, the Lobos have played a leading role in the breakdown of Ecuador's security situation, which in 2021 led the country to record the highest increase in its homicide rate in Latin America. The Lobos and their allies have helped import criminal tactics into Ecuador that the country has rarely seen before, such as brutal prison massacres, the normalization of hired killings, the use of car bombs, mass attacks on police and the display of corpses hanging from bridges as a warning. (2) Ecuador's government has come up with no new ideas to contain the Lobos, whose presence in Ecuador's organized crime scene goes beyond drug trafficking. The criminal group has expanded its range of illicit activities to include illegal mining, the commercialization of counterfeit vaccines and human trafficking. On this transformation, former Vice Minister of the Interior and security analyst Max Campos commented: "They have been changing and mutating," showing the gang's adaptation to different forms of crime. (4) According to Campos, the Lobos dominate key areas of the criminal chain, manipulating strategic points within Ecuadorian territory to facilitate their criminal activities in an attempt to control the drug trafficking routes in the country and establish their dominance.(4) (Turi prison is the center of operation of Los Lobos (FERNANDO MACHADO / AFP) Military/Political Abilities The Lobos are involved in small-scale drug trafficking in several Ecuadorian cities, including Quito, Guayaquil, and Quevedo. In March 2021, twelve Lobos members were arrested and charged with various crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, robbery, and illegal firearm possession. Then, in February 2022, Ecuadorian authorities apprehended ten individuals believed to be associated with the Lobos for kidnapping and murder, marking one of the largest crackdowns on the group to date. The Lobos, along with other major gangs, have managed to penetrate the prison system through widespread corruption of officials and bribery schemes, even extending to prison directors. With many Ecuadorian prisons suffering from inadequate infrastructure and funding, gangs have taken control of these facilities, dictating movement and security within. Inside Ecuador's gang-dominated prisons, violence mirrors the power struggles for drug trafficking routes outside. Prison riots often erupt as proxy conflicts between rival groups, with the Lobos resorting to violence in response to external confrontations. (1) The primary criminal organizations receive funding from drug and micro-trafficking, along with extortion within prisons. They receive assistance from both public officials and private individuals working in prisons, who facilitate the smuggling of weapons, cell phones, and drugs. In 2023, Ecuador recorded the highest homicide rate of any country in Central and South America, as spiraling criminal violence raised the number from 25.5 deaths per capita in 2022 to 44.5, an increase of 74.5% over the previous year. (9) The Lobos have been linked to the assassination of anti-corruption presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in August 2023. Villavicencio faced death threats after his campaign, during which he advocated for stricter measures against corruption and a crackdown on gangs in the country. Villavicencio, an investigative journalist known for exposing corruption, had transitioned into politics as a congressman. He was fatally shot leaving a school event in Quito, with nine others injured, including a congressional candidate. Villavicencio campaigned on tackling crime, corruption, dismantling local gangs, and renegotiating deals with foreign companies for a larger state share in oil and mining. President Lasso condemned the killing, attributing it to Los Lobos. Six Colombians were arrested but later killed in prison after a shootout near Quito. Villavicencio's assassination added to a string of public figures murdered by gangs. Despite declaring a state of emergency, Lasso vowed to proceed with the election. Fundamedios, a local journalism advocacy group, lamented the state of Ecuadorian democracy, while former President Correa criticized the country as a "failed state." (11,12) Approach to Resistance Considered the main organized criminal group in Ecuador, according to a police intelligence report, the Lobos has been accused of crimes related to drug trafficking, murders, robberies, kidnappings, smuggling, extortion and massacres in the country's prisons. The gang is reportedly operating in the province of Imbabura, with activities dedicated to illegal mining. (8) The citizen platform SOS Cárceles has indicated that the attacks registered in various parts of the country in 2023 were due to the transfer of the leader of the Lobos, alias Gordo Lucho, who was relocated from Latacunga Prison to the maximum security prison La Roca. The then security secretary, Wagner Bravo, without referring to a specific criminal group, said in a radio interview that the car bombs that exploded in Quito in 2023 "are possibly repercussions of the transfers (of prisoners) that are made to the different prisons in the country. (5) The Lobos would be the protagonists of two riots. On July 24, 2023 according to Infobae, through a source close to the prisons, that both the hunger strike and the retention of guides that then took place would be related to the authorities' intention to carry out transfers of members of the Lobos who are in the country's prisons. The Centro de Privación de Libertad de Azuay, better known as the Turi prison, is the center of operation of this gang. Previously, on the weekend of July 22 and 23, the Litoral Penitentiary, the most violent prison in the country, also recorded a massacre. (4) The Lobos have also been ruthless when it comes to eliminating their opposition. In December 2022 and February 2023, the gang repeatedly attempted to assassinate Junior Roldan, alias "JR," one of the founders of Choneros, before he was killed in uncertain circumstances in Colombia in March 2023. (1) To consolidate their hegemony, the Lobos also recruit members of the gangs/nations and minorities from other small gangs, who change their hegemony according to each center, the police report notes. In the Buenos Aires sector, in the Urcuquí canton, the Lobos have set up sophisticated camps to extract gold illegally, in a lucrative business that leaves losses for the Ecuadorian government of more than $900 million annually. According to the government report, alias 'Chino' would be the member of this drug trafficking organization that is in command of at least 20 armed people guarding the mining area. (8) International Relations & Alliances The Lobos are allied with several smaller criminal groups in Ecuador, including the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones. The groups call themselves the New Generation, which some analysts see as an homage to the Mexican cartel CJNG, which is presumed to be the main international connection of this Ecuadorian structure. The Lobos have connections to other international actors and are linked to Balkan criminal groups, especially Albanian ones. La Nueva Generación reportedly supplies the cocaine they traffic to Ecuador's port cities. They are also linked to the 48th Front, a dissident of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to Insight Crime, in the country, the Lobos' biggest rival is the Choneros, Ecuador's largest gang. Although the Lobos were once allied with this group, they split in early 2021. They also maintain a rivalry with another small gang, the R7, in a conflict that has left dozens dead in 2022. (6) Additional Resources

Overview The Ku Klux Klan, often known as the “KKK,” are an American white supremacist group, listed as a terrorist organization in the US. The KKK’s origin story is not linear; there are thought to be two organizations founded that became what we know as the Ku Klux Klan today. A first version of the Ku Klux Klan was founded immediately after the Civil War, and lasted through until the 1870s. Then, another group of the same name was founded in 1915: it is this iteration of the Ku Klux Klan that persists today in America. The 19th Century version of the Klan reached a peak between 1868 and 1870, as it was part of the impetus behind the restoration of white rule throughout the states of North Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia. However, largely due to its excessive violence, this iteration of the KKK was disbanded by its first leader in 1869. While the Supreme Court did declare the Klan unconstitutional in 1882, by then it had largely dissipated, simply because its original objective – of restorating white supremacy in the US South – had been achieved by Jim Crow laws. (1) After this, the KKK was later revived by white Protestants near Atlanta in 1915, where it became the group that still persists today. (2) The estimated membership of the Ku Klux Klan has declined somewhat recently, due perhaps to the appeal of newer, varied racist groups that have both more modern tactics and a more updated aesthetic. The rhetoric of these newer groups is often focused more online and specifically aimed at younger audiences, in comparison to the Klan. However, the news coverage and mythology of the KKK still powerfully endures, conveying the perception that the group is a central force within white supremacist politics and action in America today. The KKK operate in the same alternative online spaces as many other far-right groups in the US, and have become part of the election denial malaise that gathered momentum after the 2020 US election. The Klan is fast becoming seen as out of touch and defunct in comparison to the proliferation of other white supremacist organizations throughout the US. (2) History & Origins The Ku Klux Klan has effectively two founding stories, both tied into the developing history of race in America. In 1865, six Confederate veterans gathered in Pulaski, Tennessee, at the conclusion of the Civil War. They created the Ku Klux Klan: a vigilante group that would organize a campaign of violence and terror against the African American people that might benefit from any steps forward taken during Reconstruction. There is an argument that the Ku Klux Klan’s rapid founding and expansion is linked to the spirit of ‘frontier justice’ that has been entwined into American politics from very early in the country’s founding: in the words of the Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘[t]he quest for personal justice and  revenge became a key motivation for many who later rode with the Ku Klux Klan, especially among those who were poor and uneducated.’ (3) Examples of this so-called ‘frontier justice’ were the night patrols set up by white men deputized for the purpose of prowling Southern roads and enforcing a curfew for enslaved people, as well as looking for those who ran away. Following the end of the Civil War, the founders of the Ku Klux Klan were able to capitalize on the fact that many people’s cities, plantations and farms were ruined: white Southerners were often impoverished, hungry, and surrounded by the army that had defeated them. It was in this atmosphere that the KKK was able to secure a quick rise to influence. The KKK began with a meeting of six ex-Confederates in December 1865 in the town of Pulaski, Tennessee. They formed a secret club, called the Ku Klux Klan. While academics and historians disagree on the intention of these founders, the word quickly spread about this new organization whose members met secretly and hid their faces, practicing rituals and holding initiations. Some of the first Klan activities were very different from the violence that they would later enact: a common one was to ride up to a black family’s home wearing a frightening mask, and ask for water. When it was offered, the Klansman would ‘gulp’ it down while it secretly went into a rubber tube leading to a leather bottle beneath his robe; when several water buckets were drained, he would tell the family he had not had a drink since he died on the battlefield of Shiloh, before galloping away. The presence of armed white men roving the countryside at night recalled slave patrols, and the Klansman’s actions soon evolved into violence, such as whippings and then bloody clashes. (3) Ironically, the increasing violence of the KKK during 1866 supported the Radical Republicans in the North of the US who argued for harsher measures to be taken against Southern administrations. The Radicals won overwhelming victories in the Congressional elections of 1866, while in 1867 the Klan called all chapters to send representatives to Nashville for a meeting to decide how the group would respond to Reconstruction policies. At this convention, white supremacy was determined to be the ideological foundation of the Klan, and with this codification of thought came a commitment to harsher tactics: it was here that the KKK doubled down on violence, leaving behind its prior scare tactics. By 1868, stories about the Klan were appearing in newspapers, and state capitols took action to repress the group – however, it was too late, as the KKK quickly became the de facto law enforcement in some areas. It is widely believed that the first era KKK was disbanded in January 1869 by its first leader, Forrest, due to the widespread atrocities committed in its name – while many of these were indeed perpetrated by the group, some were done by individuals masquerading as Klansmen, and Forest wanted to avoid responsibility for either. Nathan Bedford Forrest was a Confederate cavalry commander, and controversial figure, in the American Civil War. However, he lost his fortune in the war, and the abolition of slavery meant that he could not continue to utilize that previously lucrative form of generating income; eventually, Forrest settled on managing a plantation that used convict labor. Forrest’s controversial nature mainly originated from his culpability in the Fort Pillow Massacre, where on April 12, 1864, his command surrounded a small Union installation on the Mississippi River, 40 miles north of Memphis. After failing to negotiate the surrender of the fort, Forrest ordered his soldiers to take it, leading to a battle characterized by close combat and chaos. It is also clear that Forrest’s men were, at some points, killing African American soldiers who were attempting to surrender. This massacre outraged the Northern populace, and after between 277 and 295 Union soldiers were skilled – many of whom were black – the rallying cry “Remember Fort Pillow” was used by many African American troops. In 1871, night riding and mask wearing were expressly forbidden by the US Congress; yet a more powerful dampener on the Klan’s popularity was the fact that white Southern Democrats in fact won elections easily and were able to pass laws taking away the rights black people had won. Thus, those that had flocked to the KKK did not need them. However, in the latter half of the 19th century, there was a wave of immigration to the US, and this sparked a feeling in some that the nation was being overrun by alien people. Then, World War I had a deep, destabilizing effect on people’s lives across the Western world. Lastly, the 1890s marked the beginning of a movement in the South to give meaningful agency to black people, and a reactionary white populace instead wanted them frozen out of society. Among these events, a Spanish war veteran named William J. Simmons took 15 Fraternalists via hired bus to Stone Mountain, where he lit a match and called into being the second iteration of the Ku Klux Klan. It would later become apparent that Simmons mainly wanted to make money from the Klan, as he would later sign over its membership proceeds to two publicists as a fee for promotion – the Klan expanded its hatred of black people to become hated of Jews, Catholics, Asian people, immigrants, night clubs and more. Growth in Klan membership was fueled by the 1915 film Birth of a Nation, based on the 1905 book The Clansman; it depicted black Americans as lazy and violent, suggesting if they gained full citizenship, they would threaten the security of the white race. Almost as quickly as the resurrection of the KKK took off however, it began to dissipate. By 1926, the group was suffering counterattacks from the clergy, the press and some politicians. Yet it did not fade away entirely as it had done previously: instead, the Ku Klux Klan became a smaller, more underground organization throughout the 1930s, with a membership that had fallen from its peak of over 100,000 to now 30,000, who focused on intimidating black people who attempted to vote, night riding, and clashing with union organizers. Gradually leadership was replaced various times, and the Klan’s actions continued amid internal disputes; by the 1950s, the group was at its lowest membership since the resurgence of 1915. Broadly, the Klan is strong when its leaders are able to capitalize on social tensions and fears stirring among white people, yet its popularity often brings scrutiny on its violence, which leads to partial collapse. In more modern times, the largest KKK presence has been the Unite the Right rally of Charlottesville, where an antifascist activist Heather Heyer was murdered by a white supremacist who drove his car into a crowd of counter protesters. This rally was a gathering of far-right, white supremacist activists and characterized by the carrying of classic Klan symbols such as tiki torches, as well as chants of “Jews will not replace us”. (4) It is arguable that the biggest impact of the KKK in modern times is the echoing of its imagery by other far-right groups. Ideology & Goals The Ku Klux Klan arose in reaction to black people attaining more rights within America – while it later expanded to hatred of various other minorities and an oppressive attitude towards women’s rights, the Klan’s original ideology is that of white supremacy, and its goals were ultimately the return to an enslaved, oppressed black population throughout the US. They felt particular vitriol for the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, which extended civil and legal protections to former slaves and prevented states from disenfranchising voters “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ (5) Later, when it became clear that slavery was not returning, successive versions of the KKK campaigned for the return for segregation, and then more broadly the white power movement. Later leaders also brought their own angles to the KKK while continuing to operate under the umbrella of white supremacy, such as David Duke, who founded the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in 1975, and who held distinctly antisemitic views that crossed over with neo-Nazism. (3) The ideology of the first era KKK took two years to become fully codified – from its founding till the convention in Nashville in 1967. However, by the second era, there was more organization: the Klan now had a rule book, published in 1916. Entitled the Kloran, it lays out the ideological framework of the group and includes the rituals and internal titles as well as beliefs. While the book spent many years in secrecy, the advent of the internet has made it easily accessible. This text is where the white supremacy is codified: ‘we shall ever be true in the faithful maintenance of White Supremacy and will strenuously oppose any compromise thereof in any and all things.’ Prospective members had to be (and swear they were) ‘native-born white, Gentile American citizen[s].’ The book also includes famous visual imagery associated with the Klan, namely, the long white robes often worn by Klansmen, as well as the motif of the burning cross, which is named as ‘the emblem of that sincere, unselfish devotedness of all Klansmen to the sacred purpose and principles we espoused.’ Then, there are the titles – the Klan has an internal structure that has become unique and recognisable among political groups. The overall leader of the KKK is always named the ‘Grand Wizard’, and is the  ‘Emperor of the Invisible Empire’; the KKK also call themselves ‘the Invisible Empire’, seeing themselves as an entity answering to and following the Grand Wizard. The chief of an individual KKK unit is named an ‘Exalted Cyclops’, also known as a ‘Klavern’; group chaplains then go by ‘Kludd’, which is a name taken from the language used by ancient Druids. The internal structural and mythological titles used within it are some of the most famous aspects of the Ku Klux Klan, and during its rise to recognition, they afforded the Klan a sense of mystique – however whimsical the naming structure appears today. Approach to Resistance The Klan’s approach to achieving their aims has always centered on intimidation of black people – and later a wider variety of minority groups. As well as frightening people with masks and robes, they swiftly progressed into violence when they were still quite a young movement, deliberately giving their violent acts the aesthetic and blueprint of slave patrols to further frighten black communities. They carried out whippings, beatings and lynchings in their early days, and this violent approach has continued to be entwine with the organization’s history, leading them to be listed as a terrorist group in the US. In both eras of the KKK, their violent approach to furthering their cause led them to be targeted by law enforcement; however, the pattern throughout history of the Klan seems to be one of resurgence, descent into violence, then dissipation, so it remains to be seen whether the group has died down in a permanent sense. During the mid 20th century, the Klan discovered bombing as a mode of resistance that they had not yet explored to its full potential: between 1956 and 1963, 138 bombings were reported and the KKK was thought to be responsible for many, as they sought to prevent integration in the South. The Klan also clashed with counter protesters and communities that they intimidated, such as a 1979 incident where 80 Invisible Empire members armed with shotguns, pistols and clubs squared up to a “Free Tommy Lee Hines” parade in Decatur, leading to two black men and two Klansmen being shot in a resulting battle. There was also a Texas Knights guerrilla warfare branch set up, who called themselves the Texas Emergency Reserve, indicating at least one instance of organized paramilitary coordination by the group. (3) The KKK also use rallies and marches, partly to intimidate black communities, but also to create imagery that is unsettling, with their long white robes, pointed hats, and masks. This garb, decreed in the group’s codifying text, is designed to conceal the wearer’s identity and absolve them of responsibility for their (often) violent actions, while the tiki torches add to the effect. While the aesthetic may be holding the Klan back in the age of the internet, where far-right aestheticism has moved towards military-style clothing and tactical gear, at the time of their founding, they were much more terrifying. There were still Klan rallies throughout 2022, and KKK messages such as “take back the country” were still part of their propaganda – and working their way into the political conversation more widely. However, in the last five years, the Klan rallies have shrunk, and their largest presence in the last 10 years remains the tiki-torch-adorned Unite the Right rally of 2017. The other Ku Klux Klan rallies were all smaller, more remote and operated independently by individual Klan branches, rather than being more widely coordinated. Relations & Alliances The first notable alliance made by the Ku Klux Klan is the one they made with the neo-Nazis. During the 1970s, there emerged a neo-Nazi movement alongside the resurgence of the Klan, and this movement attracted people who agreed with the KKK that the white race was superior, but who dressed in military-style uniforms instead of robes, and who followed Adolf Hitler as their teacher. They also shared a contradiction with the Klan: that of longing for mainstream acceptance, while practicing violent confrontational tactics. As the late 1970s turned into the 1980s, Klansmen and neo-Nazis began to work together, united by their focus on white supremacy. There were some leaders in the Klan’s history who began their journeys as neo-Nazis, and progressed into Klan membership – and later, many Klansmen were radicalized by the more paramilitary tendencies of their neo-Nazi counterparts. (3) The combination of the Klan, with its deep roots in American history, and the neo-Nazis, with their militarism, was a forceful combination by the early 1980s. Secret camps sprang up to give paramilitary training to white supremacists of all persuasions, preparing them for a race war that they believed would take place across America. This is part of the wider expansion that would happen in the far-right and white supremacist movement throughout the 1980s and up to the present day, in the 2020s. The Klan’s white supremacist ideology became a framework through which its members could be united with other movements that shared this cornerstone belief, and while the KKK itself may now be more a collection of recognizable imagery than an organization planning rallies, it has infiltrated and blended with today’s far-right movement over decades previously. Additional Resources