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Insurgency Overview The Guardians of the Forest (Guardiões da Floresta) is an armed Indigenous paramilitary and vigilante movement in the Brazilian Amazon based on community defense, environmentalism and rainforest conservation, and combatting illicit activities such as logging, mining, and narcotrafficking on Indigenous territory (Cardoso and Periera, 2019; Fantástico, 2022; Harris et al., 2020; Lichterbeck, 2021; Taylor, 2019). Like the Indigenous Guard in Colombia, the Guardians of the Forest are a loosely affiliated network or organizational framework rather than a single specific organization. Several Indigenous communities in different parts of the Brazilian Amazon have organized autonomous militant organizations under the “Guardians of the Forest” moniker, all with similar aims but formally unrelated to one another (Marçal, 2019). However, most media coverage of this movement centers on the first and largest such unit: that of the Guajajara people of the northeastern Brazilian state of Maranhão. Other Guardians units include one in the Caru reserve, also in Maranhão, as well as one formed by the Ka’apor people of the Alto Turiaçu reserve (Johnson, 2022; Mount, 2015). All Guardian units, regardless of ethnicity or location, share the primary goal of defending Indigenous communities and territories from illicit activities, colonial violence, and ecocide. The Guajajara founded the first Guardian militia in 2013 in the Araribóia Indigenous Land of Maranhão, one of nearly 400 Indigenous reserves designated as protected land under Brazilian law (Libardi, 2020; Marçal, 2019). The founding of this group responded to the long and ongoing history of Indigenous dispossession, targeted violence, illegal logging, mining, cattle ranching, and narcotrafficking in the Indigenous territories of the Brazilian Amazon—processes which have only accelerated in recent years (Phillips, 2019). Operating as a vigilante paramilitary, Guardian units equipped with firearms and bows patrol their territories in search of illicit actors, apprehending criminals and sabotaging their operations. Since the actors the Guardians of the Forest operate against are typically armed as well and linked to powerful organized crime networks, this is a dangerous job; Guardians are routinely targeted for assassination in what is already one of the most dangerous regions of the world in which to be an Indigenous leader or environmental activist (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Phillips, 2023; Viera de Souza et al., 2022). History & Foundations Beginning with the Portuguese colonization of what is today Brazil and extending through the independence period and to the present, the Indigenous peoples of the Amazon have been subjected to continuous genocidal violence. The colonization of Brazil began in 1500 when Pedro Álvares Cabral landed on the Atlantic coast and claimed it in the name of Portugal. The Portuguese immediately began forcing the Indigenous peoples they encountered to extract valuable rainforest resources, namely brazilwood, beginning a process of colonial extractivism that has defined Brazilian history ever since, most particularly and most brutally for its Indigenous populations. Some resisted, initiating a parallel history of Indigenous resistance, often militant in nature. The emergence of the Guardians of the Forest may be viewed as a chapter in Brazil’s scarred history of extractivism, colonial violence, and Indigenous resistance. For this reason, although the first Guardians of the Forest unit was founded in 2013, the Guajajara militants who established it continue that the true date of its founding stretches back to 1500, consciously situating themselves within a lineage of Indigenous resistance to colonial violence and ecocide. More concretely, the formal establishment of the Guajajara Guardians of the Forest in 2013 responded to rising rates of violence and deforestation committed by criminal actors in Araribóia, which intensified following the 2007 assassination of tribal leader Tome Guajajara by illegal loggers (Libardi, 2020). The Guardians of the Forest have since devoted their efforts to defending Indigenous communities and their rainforest territory (Benassato and Marcelino, 2019; Cardoso and Pereira, 2019). At present, more than one-third of Guajajara territory has been deforested (ABC News, 2020). Up to 80% of deforestation in the Amazon is driven by the cattle industry, which involves clearcutting large swaths of forest to convert it to pastureland; logging, mining, and monoculture account for the remainder (“Deforestation in the Amazon,” 2023). Frequently, the illegal loggers who do the dirty work of clearcutting are in the employ of wealthy cattle barons who take possession of the deforested land; the capture and prosecution of either party is an uncommon affair, and the rare sentence is generally light, failing to discourage either loggers or cattlemen from continuing to engage in criminal enterprise (ABC News, 2020). Where the law enforcement and justiciary arms of the Brazilian state have long proved ineffectual in combatting such actors, the Guardians of the Forest have taken matters into their own hands. Thanks to the Guajajara Guardians, between 2014 and 2015, the number of illegal logging trucks leaving the southern end of the Araribóia reserve dropped from as many as 130 per day to 10–15 (Mount, 2015). In 2018, Brazil saw the election of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro, who launched an unprecedented attack on environmental protections in the Amazon. Bolsonaro’s policies contributed to skyrocketing rates of deforestation and forest fires while enabling the expansion of both legal and illicit extractive operations in the Brazilian Amazon—processes that have proved both ecologically and socially disastrous to the Amazon rainforest and its Indigenous guardians. This has prompted the Guajajara to accuse Bolsonaro of genocidal intent (Archibald, 2022; Guajajara, 2023; Netto, 2023; Phillips, 2019). The high rates of environmental crime under Bolsonaro only began to decline after the election of his successor, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who created a new Ministry of Indigenous Peoples and reinstated protections for the environment and Indigenous communities (Netto, 2023; Rodrigues, 2023). Lula also recently issued the Brazilian government’s first apology to Indigenous communities for their persecution during the 1964–85 military dictatorship (Phillips and Rogero, 2024). However, Indigenous communities throughout the Amazon continue to face widespread environmental crime and violence, prompting the emergence of multiple Guardians of the Forest groups for community and environmental defense (Branford and Torres, 2019; Marçal, 2019; Mount, 2015). The Guajajara have been particularly affected by environmental crimes and targeted violence. According to the Missionary Council for Indigenous Peoples, 49 Guajajara were killed in armed conflicts with loggers in Maranhão between 2000 and 2020. Between 2006 and 2020, Guajajara land was illegally invaded 44 times, making Araribóia one of the most violence-stricken Indigenous territories in the Amazon (Libardi, 2020). The Guardians of the Forest in particular have frequently been targeted for assassination; in a well-publicized case in 2019, 26-year-old warrior Paulo Paulino Guajajara was ambushed and murdered by five heavily armed loggers while hunting. Local Guardian leader Paulo Paulino Guajajara was also wounded in the attack, going into hiding in the aftermath (Biller, 2019; Marçal, 2019; Silva de Sousa, 2019). The Ka’apor Guardians of Alto Turiaçu have also been threatened and killed for their activism (Mount, 2015). Though frequent assassinations have continued into the 2020s, the Guardians show no sign of giving up the fight for their territory and rights (Associated Press, 2022; Biller, 2020; Mendes 2023b). Objectives & Ideology The primary objective of the Guardians of the Forest is to safeguard Indigenous rights, territorial autonomy, and the ecological integrity of the rainforest. Their ideology could be described as Indigenist and environmentalist, recognizing and defending the interdependence that exists between Indigenous communities and their natural environments; as a United Nations report found in 2021, deforestation rates are up to 50% lower in Indigenous territories than elsewhere (Carrington, 2021). In this respect, the Guardians of the Forest share their objectives and ideology with other Indigenous and Indigenist social and militant movements in the Latin American context and beyond. However, the Guardians are relatively unique for having taken up arms to pursue their aims through force, perhaps a consequence of the particularly dangerous and violent context they operate within (Mendes, 2019; Mount, 2015). In addition to advancing and defending Indigenous rights and the rights of nature, one of the primary aims of the Guajajara Guardians of the Forest is to protect neighboring Indigenous communities with little or no contact with the outside world. For example, the Araribóia Indigenous Land contains an estimated 100 Awá people in voluntary isolation (Forline, 2015). In 2011, illegal loggers captured an eight-year-old girl from one of the uncontacted villages and burned her alive in an attempt to force her community from their land (Sanchez 2012). Gunmen have also attacked the Awá, who number only around 350 in total (Chamberlain 2012). Such attacks are a continuous threat to the Amazon’s last remaining isolated communities. In the absence of effective state protection, the Guardians have made the defense of their isolated neighbors a priority (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). Political & Military Capabilities The Guardians of the Forest represent the paramilitary wing of the broader Indigenous territorial defense, environmentalist, and human rights movement in the Brazilian Amazon. Politically, Guardian units are independent and autonomous, though they sometimes collaborate with political organizations such as Indigenous government entities, Brazilian law enforcement, and FUNAI, Brazil’s Indigenous affairs bureau (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). In the case of the Guajajara of Araribóia, their community has produced not only the Guardians but also Brazil’s first-ever minister for Indigenous peoples, the feminist and Indigenous rights activist Sônia Guajajara. She rose to prominence through her work on many of the same issues that the Guardians address through vigilante action, suggesting the cohesion of both political and militant strategies to the problems faced by Indigenous communities (Netto, 2023). The Guardians of the Forest are few in number and lightly armed. Their arsenal includes light firearms such as handguns, shotguns, and hunting rifles, as well as traditional weapons such as bows and clubs. Some guardians wear ballistic vests, though most appear to go without protective equipment (Silva de Sousa, 2019). For mobility, the Guardians employ vehicles such as trucks and motorcycles, typically moving in convoys of several vehicles and up to 20 militants (ABC News, 2020). Typical operations involve patrolling their territories, identifying the locations of illicit activities such as mining or logging camps, investigating reports of illicit activities, ambushing and apprehending suspects, and holding them for release to state authorities. In a context in which targeted assassinations against Indigenous leaders and environmental activists are common, many Guardians wear facemasks to disguise their identities. The number of Guardians varies by group and no official record is maintained for security reasons. In 2015, the Guajajara Guardians were estimated at 48 militants, while by 2020 their numbers were reported to range from 120 to 180 (Benassatto and Marcelino, 2019; Libardi, 2020; Mount, 2015). In 2015, the Ka’apor Guardians of Alto Turiaçu numbered up to 90 militants (Mount, 2015). Approach to Resistance The Guardians of the Forest engage in both peaceful and armed acts of resistance. Their regular duties include patrolling their territories, investigating instances of illicit activity, and intercepting criminals—with heavy force when necessary. Video footage of an intercept operation captured by ABC News in 2019 illustrates the rough treatment the Guardians employ against apprehended opponents, including beatings and death threats. However, such extreme methods are generally discouraged. In 2015, a federal police officer under FUNAI accompanying the Guajajara Guardians on an armed action intervened between a Guardian and a suspect he was threatening to kill; the Guardian in question was later expelled from the organization for his behavior (Mount, 2015). There are no recorded cases of the Guardians having killed anyone. In addition to physically confronting their opponents, the Guardians also employ sabotage, namely the destruction of criminals’ vehicles, machinery, camp infrastructure, and illegally felled timber, serving to curtail their opponents’ operations where they occur and disincentivize their return (ABC News, 2020; Benassatto and Marceloni, 2019; Mount, 2015). An important dimension of the Guardians’ overall strategy is winning their communities’ sympathy and allegiance; leaders of the movement are generally men of high standing in their respective communities, situating their actions as self-defense on behalf of their people (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). However, opinions within their communities are split; while some recognize the Guardians as legitimate and support their aims and methods, others criticize them for employing violence which they believe may provoke the ire of the criminals they target, risking further escalation (Mendes, 2019; Mount, 2015). An additional complication is that some Indigenous communities have collaborated with the criminals, such as by accepting bribes in exchange for access to logging grounds, prompting Indigenous infighting and reprisals by the Guardians (ABC News, 2020; Mount, 2015). Media is another tool employed by the Guardians to advance their aims. The Guardians began receiving media coverage shortly after their founding, accelerating greatly with the election of Bolsonaro and the global interest in environmental crime and ecological devastation in the Brazilian Amazon that followed. The first investigative reports on the Guardians appeared in the mid-2010s, with an uptick in coverage coming in 2019 and continuing into the 2020s. In 2023 the Guajajara Guardians were the subject of a documentary film covering their struggle called We Are Guardians; the film was co-directed by a local activist, Edivan Guajajara. In addition to mobilizing public awareness and sympathy for the Guardians’ cause, a corresponding impact campaign succeeding in securing a $200,000 grant to support reforestation initiatives in the Tembé and Guajajara territories, indicating the practical benefits such media projects can bring to the Guardians and their communities (Brasil, 2020; Kamali Dehghan, 2024). Relations & Alliances The primary opponents of the Guardians of the Forest are the assorted criminal actors whom the Guardians collectively refer to as “invaders.” The main culprits include illegal loggers, miners, narcotraffickers, and cattle barons—not always mutually exclusive categories in a regional context in which diverse forms of criminal collusion are widespread. These outsiders are the cause of deforestation and violence in the politically autonomous and ecologically protected Indigenous territories that the Guardians seek to defend. However, Guardian operations generally only succeed in capturing low-level criminals, comprising the mere foot soldiers of large-scale illicit enterprises. Operating at a higher level across the region, higher-ups and bosses are rarely captured. Even when criminals are captured by the Guardians and released to Brazilian authorities, they rarely face criminal prosecution or legal consequences for their crimes, while cases of violence or assassination targeting Indigenous activities regularly go uninvestigated by the state (ABC News, 2020; Viera de Souza et al., 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2019). For this reason, the Guardians have little faith in the efficacy of the Brazilian state in addressing the problems their communities face. The Guardians of the Forest have had a fraught relationship with the Brazilian state, particularly under President Jair Bolsonaro (2019–2022). While the Guajajara, like all Indigenous communities formally recognized under Brazilian law, have a legal right to patrol and protect their land as they see fit, Bolsonaro has regularly dismissed Indigenous communities’ claims to their land and has sided with environmentally destructive corporations over the interests of Indigenous communities and their ecosystems (Gómez-Upegui, 2021; Libardi, 2019; Marçal, 2019). Additionally, Brazilian law enforcement and justiciary entities have regularly obstructed or otherwise failed in their duties to the Indigenous communities represented by the Guardians (Viera de Souza et al., 2022; Human Rights Watch, 2019). Despite the Guardians’ enmity for certain elements of the Brazilian government, they have occasionally aligned themselves with others. One of their primary occasional allies in government is FUNAI, the Brazilian government’s Amerindian bureau. Like many such agencies in settler colonial countries, FUNAI has a checkered history, sometimes helping but often harming Indigenous communities. Nevertheless, it has historically represented an important bulwark in protecting Indigenous communities from the depredations of settlers and criminal enterprises through mechanisms such as close fieldwork with Indigenous communities, the demarcation of protected areas and Indigenous reservations, and aiding Indigenous communities in legal matters (Mendes, 2019b). Several Guardians of the Forest units have worked in a formal capacity with FUNAI representatives, such as federal police officers on assignment to accompany the Guardians’ armed actions and to prevent breaches of the law or escalations of violence (Mount, 2015).

Introduction & Overview The Lobos, the second-largest criminal group in Ecuador, comprises over 8,000 members incarcerated throughout the country. According to the local press, they predominantly operate in the Andean cities of Latacunga and Cuenca, as well as in the Amazonian province of Pastaza and in Machala along the coast. (1) As reported by the Primicias portal, a significant portion of the Lobos members are impoverished adolescents. Similar to the Choneros, Ecuador’s largest gang, the Lobos are involved in drug trafficking. It is believed that the Lobos have connections with the Jalisco Cartel - New Generation, a Mexican transnational drug trafficking organization known as well for its involvement in arms trafficking. (2) The decline of the Choneros' dominance in Ecuador paved the way for the Lobos to assume control of an extensive coalition of gangs, including the Tiguerones and the Chone Killers. This shift allowed them to vie for supremacy in Ecuador's prisons and drug trade, establishing connections to organized crime networks in Colombia and Mexico. Additionally, the gang has expanded its operations into the illegal mining sector. The Lobos, alongside the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones, were born as dissident groups of the Choneros, led by Jorge Luis Zambrano, also known as Rasquiña, whom they operated under. However, Rasquiña's death in a Manta shopping mall in December 2020 lead to the separation of these groups from the Choneros, and to a power struggle among these gangs as they compete for leadership. The groups have been wrapped in a vicious gang conflict, which has since led to an unprecedented surge of violence in Ecuador. The Lobos have been involved in several bloody prison massacres in Ecuador, which left over 315 inmates dead in 2021 alone. (1,2) (@entre_guerras Jan 11, 2024) History & Foundations Violent crime linked to drug gangs drastically increased hand in hand with Ecuador’s role in the global narcotics trade. This is reflected in the murder rate, which surged from 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to 25.6 in 2022, before soaring again to 45 in 2023, following successive waves of gang violence since 2020. The Lobos have played a leading role in the breakdown of Ecuador's security situation, which in 2021 led the country to record the highest increase in its homicide rate in Latin America. (1) The Prime Minister at the time, Rafael Correa, implemented a series of judiciary reforms including a more punitive penal code; this had an immediate effect on the prison population, which increased from 10,000 to 40,000. (11) Since the arrest of the Choneros’ leader in 2011 and its ensuing integration into the prison system, the group has had a permanent presence in jails all around the country, from where they maintained operations in multiple cities. Ecuador's attempts to contain prison gang violence accelerated the expansion of the Choneros, leading to the creation of loyalist gangs dependent on it, which has multiplied the Choneros' influence. As mentioned, similar to other gangs in Ecuador, the Lobos originated as a breakaway faction from the country's former leading criminal organization, the Choneros. According to Codigo Vidrio, since 2016, the Lobos and their associates have been supplying weapons and offering security services to the Jalisco Cartel - New Generation (CJNG), as the latter competes for dominance over cocaine trafficking routes in Ecuador. (3) After the death of the Choneros leader Jose Luis Zambrano in 2020, some of its allied groups, such as the Lobos, the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones, turned against the megagroup to fight it, marking the origin of the killings in Ecuador's prisons. They collectively call themselves the New Generation in reference to alleged unproven links to Mexico's Jalisco Cartel - New Generation (CJNG) (1,2) Over the next two years, the Choneros have steadily lost power to this alliance, led by the Lobos, who have taken control of the drug trafficking routes once controlled by the former. In February 2021, the New Generation coordinated attacks against the fragmented leaders of the Choneros, with attacks on two potential successors to Rasquiña, alias "JR" and alias "Fito". Both escaped alive, but the riots left 80 inmates dead. In a major escalation of violence, another 119 inmates died in prison riots in September 2021, when members of the Choneros and the Lobos clashed in a Guayaquil prison. That same year, authorities confiscated numerous high-caliber firearms within penitentiaries under the control of the Choneros, Lobos, and Lagartos, indicating an increasing flow of weapons into Ecuador that found their way into prisons. (2,3) In the study on the evolution of drug trafficking in Ecuador, the National Police explains that between 2021 and 2022, several members of the Lobos were transferred to different prisons in the country. This allowed their range of operations from the prisons to extend to Imbabura, Pichincha, Chimborazo, Los Rios, Napo, Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas, Santa Elena, El Oro, Azuay and Loja. (4) On April 24th 2024, police captured Fabricio Colón Pico, Los Lobos leader. He had escaped from Riobamba prison during riots earlier this year, evading capture until now. Objectives & Ideology Ecuador ranks third in the world in cocaine seizures, after Colombia and the United States, according to the UNODC's 2022 World Drug Report. This means that more cocaine, more money and more weapons are passing through the hands of Ecuadorian gangs like the Lobos. Over the past three years, the Lobos have played a leading role in the breakdown of Ecuador's security situation, which in 2021 led the country to record the highest increase in its homicide rate in Latin America. The Lobos and their allies have helped import criminal tactics into Ecuador that the country has rarely seen before, such as brutal prison massacres, the normalization of hired killings, the use of car bombs, mass attacks on police and the display of corpses hanging from bridges as a warning. (2) Ecuador's government has come up with no new ideas to contain the Lobos, whose presence in Ecuador's organized crime scene goes beyond drug trafficking. The criminal group has expanded its range of illicit activities to include illegal mining, the commercialization of counterfeit vaccines and human trafficking. On this transformation, former Vice Minister of the Interior and security analyst Max Campos commented: "They have been changing and mutating," showing the gang's adaptation to different forms of crime. (4) According to Campos, the Lobos dominate key areas of the criminal chain, manipulating strategic points within Ecuadorian territory to facilitate their criminal activities in an attempt to control the drug trafficking routes in the country and establish their dominance.(4) (Turi prison is the center of operation of Los Lobos (FERNANDO MACHADO / AFP) Military/Political Abilities The Lobos are involved in small-scale drug trafficking in several Ecuadorian cities, including Quito, Guayaquil, and Quevedo. In March 2021, twelve Lobos members were arrested and charged with various crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, robbery, and illegal firearm possession. Then, in February 2022, Ecuadorian authorities apprehended ten individuals believed to be associated with the Lobos for kidnapping and murder, marking one of the largest crackdowns on the group to date. The Lobos, along with other major gangs, have managed to penetrate the prison system through widespread corruption of officials and bribery schemes, even extending to prison directors. With many Ecuadorian prisons suffering from inadequate infrastructure and funding, gangs have taken control of these facilities, dictating movement and security within. Inside Ecuador's gang-dominated prisons, violence mirrors the power struggles for drug trafficking routes outside. Prison riots often erupt as proxy conflicts between rival groups, with the Lobos resorting to violence in response to external confrontations. (1) The primary criminal organizations receive funding from drug and micro-trafficking, along with extortion within prisons. They receive assistance from both public officials and private individuals working in prisons, who facilitate the smuggling of weapons, cell phones, and drugs. In 2023, Ecuador recorded the highest homicide rate of any country in Central and South America, as spiraling criminal violence raised the number from 25.5 deaths per capita in 2022 to 44.5, an increase of 74.5% over the previous year. (9) The Lobos have been linked to the assassination of anti-corruption presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in August 2023. Villavicencio faced death threats after his campaign, during which he advocated for stricter measures against corruption and a crackdown on gangs in the country. Villavicencio, an investigative journalist known for exposing corruption, had transitioned into politics as a congressman. He was fatally shot leaving a school event in Quito, with nine others injured, including a congressional candidate. Villavicencio campaigned on tackling crime, corruption, dismantling local gangs, and renegotiating deals with foreign companies for a larger state share in oil and mining. President Lasso condemned the killing, attributing it to Los Lobos. Six Colombians were arrested but later killed in prison after a shootout near Quito. Villavicencio's assassination added to a string of public figures murdered by gangs. Despite declaring a state of emergency, Lasso vowed to proceed with the election. Fundamedios, a local journalism advocacy group, lamented the state of Ecuadorian democracy, while former President Correa criticized the country as a "failed state." (11,12) Approach to Resistance Considered the main organized criminal group in Ecuador, according to a police intelligence report, the Lobos has been accused of crimes related to drug trafficking, murders, robberies, kidnappings, smuggling, extortion and massacres in the country's prisons. The gang is reportedly operating in the province of Imbabura, with activities dedicated to illegal mining. (8) The citizen platform SOS Cárceles has indicated that the attacks registered in various parts of the country in 2023 were due to the transfer of the leader of the Lobos, alias Gordo Lucho, who was relocated from Latacunga Prison to the maximum security prison La Roca. The then security secretary, Wagner Bravo, without referring to a specific criminal group, said in a radio interview that the car bombs that exploded in Quito in 2023 "are possibly repercussions of the transfers (of prisoners) that are made to the different prisons in the country. (5) The Lobos would be the protagonists of two riots. On July 24, 2023 according to Infobae, through a source close to the prisons, that both the hunger strike and the retention of guides that then took place would be related to the authorities' intention to carry out transfers of members of the Lobos who are in the country's prisons. The Centro de Privación de Libertad de Azuay, better known as the Turi prison, is the center of operation of this gang. Previously, on the weekend of July 22 and 23, the Litoral Penitentiary, the most violent prison in the country, also recorded a massacre. (4) The Lobos have also been ruthless when it comes to eliminating their opposition. In December 2022 and February 2023, the gang repeatedly attempted to assassinate Junior Roldan, alias "JR," one of the founders of Choneros, before he was killed in uncertain circumstances in Colombia in March 2023. (1) To consolidate their hegemony, the Lobos also recruit members of the gangs/nations and minorities from other small gangs, who change their hegemony according to each center, the police report notes. In the Buenos Aires sector, in the Urcuquí canton, the Lobos have set up sophisticated camps to extract gold illegally, in a lucrative business that leaves losses for the Ecuadorian government of more than $900 million annually. According to the government report, alias 'Chino' would be the member of this drug trafficking organization that is in command of at least 20 armed people guarding the mining area. (8) International Relations & Alliances The Lobos are allied with several smaller criminal groups in Ecuador, including the Chone Killers and the Tiguerones. The groups call themselves the New Generation, which some analysts see as an homage to the Mexican cartel CJNG, which is presumed to be the main international connection of this Ecuadorian structure. The Lobos have connections to other international actors and are linked to Balkan criminal groups, especially Albanian ones. La Nueva Generación reportedly supplies the cocaine they traffic to Ecuador's port cities. They are also linked to the 48th Front, a dissident of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). According to Insight Crime, in the country, the Lobos' biggest rival is the Choneros, Ecuador's largest gang. Although the Lobos were once allied with this group, they split in early 2021. They also maintain a rivalry with another small gang, the R7, in a conflict that has left dozens dead in 2022. (6) Additional Resources

Overview The Ku Klux Klan, often known as the “KKK,” are an American white supremacist group, listed as a terrorist organization in the US. The KKK’s origin story is not linear; there are thought to be two organizations founded that became what we know as the Ku Klux Klan today. A first version of the Ku Klux Klan was founded immediately after the Civil War, and lasted through until the 1870s. Then, another group of the same name was founded in 1915: it is this iteration of the Ku Klux Klan that persists today in America. The 19th Century version of the Klan reached a peak between 1868 and 1870, as it was part of the impetus behind the restoration of white rule throughout the states of North Carolina, Tennessee and Georgia. However, largely due to its excessive violence, this iteration of the KKK was disbanded by its first leader in 1869. While the Supreme Court did declare the Klan unconstitutional in 1882, by then it had largely dissipated, simply because its original objective – of restorating white supremacy in the US South – had been achieved by Jim Crow laws. (1) After this, the KKK was later revived by white Protestants near Atlanta in 1915, where it became the group that still persists today. (2) The estimated membership of the Ku Klux Klan has declined somewhat recently, due perhaps to the appeal of newer, varied racist groups that have both more modern tactics and a more updated aesthetic. The rhetoric of these newer groups is often focused more online and specifically aimed at younger audiences, in comparison to the Klan. However, the news coverage and mythology of the KKK still powerfully endures, conveying the perception that the group is a central force within white supremacist politics and action in America today. The KKK operate in the same alternative online spaces as many other far-right groups in the US, and have become part of the election denial malaise that gathered momentum after the 2020 US election. The Klan is fast becoming seen as out of touch and defunct in comparison to the proliferation of other white supremacist organizations throughout the US. (2) History & Origins The Ku Klux Klan has effectively two founding stories, both tied into the developing history of race in America. In 1865, six Confederate veterans gathered in Pulaski, Tennessee, at the conclusion of the Civil War. They created the Ku Klux Klan: a vigilante group that would organize a campaign of violence and terror against the African American people that might benefit from any steps forward taken during Reconstruction. There is an argument that the Ku Klux Klan’s rapid founding and expansion is linked to the spirit of ‘frontier justice’ that has been entwined into American politics from very early in the country’s founding: in the words of the Southern Poverty Law Center, ‘[t]he quest for personal justice and  revenge became a key motivation for many who later rode with the Ku Klux Klan, especially among those who were poor and uneducated.’ (3) Examples of this so-called ‘frontier justice’ were the night patrols set up by white men deputized for the purpose of prowling Southern roads and enforcing a curfew for enslaved people, as well as looking for those who ran away. Following the end of the Civil War, the founders of the Ku Klux Klan were able to capitalize on the fact that many people’s cities, plantations and farms were ruined: white Southerners were often impoverished, hungry, and surrounded by the army that had defeated them. It was in this atmosphere that the KKK was able to secure a quick rise to influence. The KKK began with a meeting of six ex-Confederates in December 1865 in the town of Pulaski, Tennessee. They formed a secret club, called the Ku Klux Klan. While academics and historians disagree on the intention of these founders, the word quickly spread about this new organization whose members met secretly and hid their faces, practicing rituals and holding initiations. Some of the first Klan activities were very different from the violence that they would later enact: a common one was to ride up to a black family’s home wearing a frightening mask, and ask for water. When it was offered, the Klansman would ‘gulp’ it down while it secretly went into a rubber tube leading to a leather bottle beneath his robe; when several water buckets were drained, he would tell the family he had not had a drink since he died on the battlefield of Shiloh, before galloping away. The presence of armed white men roving the countryside at night recalled slave patrols, and the Klansman’s actions soon evolved into violence, such as whippings and then bloody clashes. (3) Ironically, the increasing violence of the KKK during 1866 supported the Radical Republicans in the North of the US who argued for harsher measures to be taken against Southern administrations. The Radicals won overwhelming victories in the Congressional elections of 1866, while in 1867 the Klan called all chapters to send representatives to Nashville for a meeting to decide how the group would respond to Reconstruction policies. At this convention, white supremacy was determined to be the ideological foundation of the Klan, and with this codification of thought came a commitment to harsher tactics: it was here that the KKK doubled down on violence, leaving behind its prior scare tactics. By 1868, stories about the Klan were appearing in newspapers, and state capitols took action to repress the group – however, it was too late, as the KKK quickly became the de facto law enforcement in some areas. It is widely believed that the first era KKK was disbanded in January 1869 by its first leader, Forrest, due to the widespread atrocities committed in its name – while many of these were indeed perpetrated by the group, some were done by individuals masquerading as Klansmen, and Forest wanted to avoid responsibility for either. Nathan Bedford Forrest was a Confederate cavalry commander, and controversial figure, in the American Civil War. However, he lost his fortune in the war, and the abolition of slavery meant that he could not continue to utilize that previously lucrative form of generating income; eventually, Forrest settled on managing a plantation that used convict labor. Forrest’s controversial nature mainly originated from his culpability in the Fort Pillow Massacre, where on April 12, 1864, his command surrounded a small Union installation on the Mississippi River, 40 miles north of Memphis. After failing to negotiate the surrender of the fort, Forrest ordered his soldiers to take it, leading to a battle characterized by close combat and chaos. It is also clear that Forrest’s men were, at some points, killing African American soldiers who were attempting to surrender. This massacre outraged the Northern populace, and after between 277 and 295 Union soldiers were skilled – many of whom were black – the rallying cry “Remember Fort Pillow” was used by many African American troops. In 1871, night riding and mask wearing were expressly forbidden by the US Congress; yet a more powerful dampener on the Klan’s popularity was the fact that white Southern Democrats in fact won elections easily and were able to pass laws taking away the rights black people had won. Thus, those that had flocked to the KKK did not need them. However, in the latter half of the 19th century, there was a wave of immigration to the US, and this sparked a feeling in some that the nation was being overrun by alien people. Then, World War I had a deep, destabilizing effect on people’s lives across the Western world. Lastly, the 1890s marked the beginning of a movement in the South to give meaningful agency to black people, and a reactionary white populace instead wanted them frozen out of society. Among these events, a Spanish war veteran named William J. Simmons took 15 Fraternalists via hired bus to Stone Mountain, where he lit a match and called into being the second iteration of the Ku Klux Klan. It would later become apparent that Simmons mainly wanted to make money from the Klan, as he would later sign over its membership proceeds to two publicists as a fee for promotion – the Klan expanded its hatred of black people to become hated of Jews, Catholics, Asian people, immigrants, night clubs and more. Growth in Klan membership was fueled by the 1915 film Birth of a Nation, based on the 1905 book The Clansman; it depicted black Americans as lazy and violent, suggesting if they gained full citizenship, they would threaten the security of the white race. Almost as quickly as the resurrection of the KKK took off however, it began to dissipate. By 1926, the group was suffering counterattacks from the clergy, the press and some politicians. Yet it did not fade away entirely as it had done previously: instead, the Ku Klux Klan became a smaller, more underground organization throughout the 1930s, with a membership that had fallen from its peak of over 100,000 to now 30,000, who focused on intimidating black people who attempted to vote, night riding, and clashing with union organizers. Gradually leadership was replaced various times, and the Klan’s actions continued amid internal disputes; by the 1950s, the group was at its lowest membership since the resurgence of 1915. Broadly, the Klan is strong when its leaders are able to capitalize on social tensions and fears stirring among white people, yet its popularity often brings scrutiny on its violence, which leads to partial collapse. In more modern times, the largest KKK presence has been the Unite the Right rally of Charlottesville, where an antifascist activist Heather Heyer was murdered by a white supremacist who drove his car into a crowd of counter protesters. This rally was a gathering of far-right, white supremacist activists and characterized by the carrying of classic Klan symbols such as tiki torches, as well as chants of “Jews will not replace us”. (4) It is arguable that the biggest impact of the KKK in modern times is the echoing of its imagery by other far-right groups. Ideology & Goals The Ku Klux Klan arose in reaction to black people attaining more rights within America – while it later expanded to hatred of various other minorities and an oppressive attitude towards women’s rights, the Klan’s original ideology is that of white supremacy, and its goals were ultimately the return to an enslaved, oppressed black population throughout the US. They felt particular vitriol for the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, which extended civil and legal protections to former slaves and prevented states from disenfranchising voters “on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.’ (5) Later, when it became clear that slavery was not returning, successive versions of the KKK campaigned for the return for segregation, and then more broadly the white power movement. Later leaders also brought their own angles to the KKK while continuing to operate under the umbrella of white supremacy, such as David Duke, who founded the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in 1975, and who held distinctly antisemitic views that crossed over with neo-Nazism. (3) The ideology of the first era KKK took two years to become fully codified – from its founding till the convention in Nashville in 1967. However, by the second era, there was more organization: the Klan now had a rule book, published in 1916. Entitled the Kloran, it lays out the ideological framework of the group and includes the rituals and internal titles as well as beliefs. While the book spent many years in secrecy, the advent of the internet has made it easily accessible. This text is where the white supremacy is codified: ‘we shall ever be true in the faithful maintenance of White Supremacy and will strenuously oppose any compromise thereof in any and all things.’ Prospective members had to be (and swear they were) ‘native-born white, Gentile American citizen[s].’ The book also includes famous visual imagery associated with the Klan, namely, the long white robes often worn by Klansmen, as well as the motif of the burning cross, which is named as ‘the emblem of that sincere, unselfish devotedness of all Klansmen to the sacred purpose and principles we espoused.’ Then, there are the titles – the Klan has an internal structure that has become unique and recognisable among political groups. The overall leader of the KKK is always named the ‘Grand Wizard’, and is the  ‘Emperor of the Invisible Empire’; the KKK also call themselves ‘the Invisible Empire’, seeing themselves as an entity answering to and following the Grand Wizard. The chief of an individual KKK unit is named an ‘Exalted Cyclops’, also known as a ‘Klavern’; group chaplains then go by ‘Kludd’, which is a name taken from the language used by ancient Druids. The internal structural and mythological titles used within it are some of the most famous aspects of the Ku Klux Klan, and during its rise to recognition, they afforded the Klan a sense of mystique – however whimsical the naming structure appears today. Approach to Resistance The Klan’s approach to achieving their aims has always centered on intimidation of black people – and later a wider variety of minority groups. As well as frightening people with masks and robes, they swiftly progressed into violence when they were still quite a young movement, deliberately giving their violent acts the aesthetic and blueprint of slave patrols to further frighten black communities. They carried out whippings, beatings and lynchings in their early days, and this violent approach has continued to be entwine with the organization’s history, leading them to be listed as a terrorist group in the US. In both eras of the KKK, their violent approach to furthering their cause led them to be targeted by law enforcement; however, the pattern throughout history of the Klan seems to be one of resurgence, descent into violence, then dissipation, so it remains to be seen whether the group has died down in a permanent sense. During the mid 20th century, the Klan discovered bombing as a mode of resistance that they had not yet explored to its full potential: between 1956 and 1963, 138 bombings were reported and the KKK was thought to be responsible for many, as they sought to prevent integration in the South. The Klan also clashed with counter protesters and communities that they intimidated, such as a 1979 incident where 80 Invisible Empire members armed with shotguns, pistols and clubs squared up to a “Free Tommy Lee Hines” parade in Decatur, leading to two black men and two Klansmen being shot in a resulting battle. There was also a Texas Knights guerrilla warfare branch set up, who called themselves the Texas Emergency Reserve, indicating at least one instance of organized paramilitary coordination by the group. (3) The KKK also use rallies and marches, partly to intimidate black communities, but also to create imagery that is unsettling, with their long white robes, pointed hats, and masks. This garb, decreed in the group’s codifying text, is designed to conceal the wearer’s identity and absolve them of responsibility for their (often) violent actions, while the tiki torches add to the effect. While the aesthetic may be holding the Klan back in the age of the internet, where far-right aestheticism has moved towards military-style clothing and tactical gear, at the time of their founding, they were much more terrifying. There were still Klan rallies throughout 2022, and KKK messages such as “take back the country” were still part of their propaganda – and working their way into the political conversation more widely. However, in the last five years, the Klan rallies have shrunk, and their largest presence in the last 10 years remains the tiki-torch-adorned Unite the Right rally of 2017. The other Ku Klux Klan rallies were all smaller, more remote and operated independently by individual Klan branches, rather than being more widely coordinated. Relations & Alliances The first notable alliance made by the Ku Klux Klan is the one they made with the neo-Nazis. During the 1970s, there emerged a neo-Nazi movement alongside the resurgence of the Klan, and this movement attracted people who agreed with the KKK that the white race was superior, but who dressed in military-style uniforms instead of robes, and who followed Adolf Hitler as their teacher. They also shared a contradiction with the Klan: that of longing for mainstream acceptance, while practicing violent confrontational tactics. As the late 1970s turned into the 1980s, Klansmen and neo-Nazis began to work together, united by their focus on white supremacy. There were some leaders in the Klan’s history who began their journeys as neo-Nazis, and progressed into Klan membership – and later, many Klansmen were radicalized by the more paramilitary tendencies of their neo-Nazi counterparts. (3) The combination of the Klan, with its deep roots in American history, and the neo-Nazis, with their militarism, was a forceful combination by the early 1980s. Secret camps sprang up to give paramilitary training to white supremacists of all persuasions, preparing them for a race war that they believed would take place across America. This is part of the wider expansion that would happen in the far-right and white supremacist movement throughout the 1980s and up to the present day, in the 2020s. The Klan’s white supremacist ideology became a framework through which its members could be united with other movements that shared this cornerstone belief, and while the KKK itself may now be more a collection of recognizable imagery than an organization planning rallies, it has infiltrated and blended with today’s far-right movement over decades previously. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Chin National Front (CNF) is a political party in Myanmar that seeks self-determination for the Chin people alongside democracy and federalism in Myanmar as a whole. Their armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), has over 4,500 soldiers and 10,000 auxiliaries, it is the largest organization in the Chin resistance movement. The CNF had formerly signed ceasefire agreements with the Myanmar government in 2012, but since the 2021 military coup, the CNF/CNA has been at war with the military junta. Chin state, the region of the country where the Chin people are located, is in the western part of Myanmar, on the border with India. The CNF/CNA is based at a place called Camp Victoria. (1,2) History and Foundations The Chin people number about 500,000, living in the mountainous northwestern part of Myanmar. Despite commonly being grouped, the Chin encompass multiple different ethnic and linguistic groups, with at least six different groups existing and 20 mutually unintelligible languages being spoken between the groups. (3) The CNF was formed on 20 March 1988 in Mizoram, an Indian state on the Myanmar border. A few months later, in August 1988, a massive uprising took place in Myanmar in opposition to the military dictatorship. This uprising caused many displaced peoples to flee from Myanmar to the Mizoram state of India (which borders Chin state), and Chin refugees began to join the CNF, swelling its numbers. (3) For most of its history before the current civil war, the CNA/CNF was ineffective owing to its small numbers and the comparative might of the Tatmadaw. Before the civil war militant activity was limited to small-scale skirmishes and government reprisals made CNA/CNF recruitment an unattractive prospect for many. (3) Ideology and Objectives The CNF believes in self-determination for the Chin people and wants Myanmar to become a democratic country with a federal government, similar to how Germany or the United States functions. (1) Approach to Resistance and Capabilities The CNF's military wing, the CNA, conducts guerrilla operations against the Myanmar military junta. The CNA is trained at Camp Victoria in Chin State, with reports indicating the existence of various units trained in different disciplines such as urban and guerilla warfare. (2) The CNA is a fairly complex militia; they have enough members to do R&R (rest and recuperation) rotations after units suffer casualties. They wear uniforms which are either olive drab green or digital jungle camouflage. They also possess HUMINT resources in the form of agents who live in surrounding villages and update the CNA with information about junta troop movements. (2) The mountainous jungle terrain of the Chin State makes logistics difficult for large vehicles to pass through, so the CNA makes use of Chinese-made motorbikes to transport troops, ammunition, and supplies enabling rapid supply of its units. The CNA is primarily armed with small arms such as shotguns that were originally used for hunting birds and Soviet-style rifles that were either smuggled or taken from junta forces. They also use homemade rifles and improvised explosive devices. However, they face ammunition shortages for all types of weapons, with Project Maje noting that these shortages impact the CNA’s ability to accept everyone who is willing to volunteer for the group. (4,2,5) The CNF adheres to the Geneva Military Code of Conduct and is a signatory to the Geneva Call, which is a document that non-state actors and de facto powers sign to adhere to human rights standards. They adhere to the Ottawa Convention, which seeks to eliminate the use of landmines. Landmines have caused over 1,000 casualties in Myanmar so far, although Chin State has seen a comparatively low share of this violence. Landmines have been used by both junta and anti-junta forces in the civil war, although it's unclear if the CNF has ever used them. (1,6,7) Relations and Alliances The CNF/CNA is a part of the Chinland Joint Defense Committee and is broadly allied with other groups fighting the military junta in Myanmar. The CNA and the Chinland Defense Forces, another Chin ethnic militia, are trained at Camp Victoria in Chin State (sometimes referred to as Chinland). In 2021 the CNF's vice chairman, Suikar, said that the National Unity Government, a democratic coalition in opposition to the junta, was leading the CNF. However, American media outlet CNN reported that the National Unity Government had very little command and control over the armed groups that pledged allegiance to it. (4,2)

Insurgency Overview The Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is an international resistance movement founded in 1976.  The movement’s main objective is to fight animal cruelty and exploitation.  Their anarchist ideology has led to them being both decentralised and leaderless.  The movement is composed of autonomous cells of one or more persons and each cell is anonymous and insular to protect the group from infiltration.  ALF cells carry out clandestine operations of ‘animal liberation’ and economic sabotage.  For nearly 50 years, the ALF has conducted operations to remove animals from laboratories, farms, factories, and related facilities, and instead place them in safe houses, veterinaries, and sanctuaries.  Despite their pacifist approach, critics and government authorities have labelled the group “eco-terrorists” due to its more controversial practices of harassment and economic sabotage, which include arson attacks and bombings.  The ALF utilize sabotage and disruption techniques to affect the revenue streams of industries they believe contribute to the exploitation of animals. History and Foundations The ALF has roots in an earlier resistance group known as the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA).  Hunt sabs set about sabotaging local hunts (hunters on horseback chase foxes or deer with a pack of hounds) using tactics such as distracting hounds with meat and scent-dulling compounds, blowing hunting horns and whistles, laying false trails, locking gates, and blocking roads.  These actions were often met with violence and members of the HSA were routinely assaulted and arrested. (1) By 1971, HSA groups had spread throughout the UK.  Two members of an HSA group in Luton, England, Ronnie Lee and Cliff Goodman, decided to form a new clandestine group of militant activists.  That year they co-founded the Band of Mercy, which they named after a 19th-century Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) youth group. (2) The Band of Mercy’s first operations involved slashing hunters’ tyres and breaking car windows to prevent hunts from taking place.  In 1973, the Band committed its first act of arson against a research laboratory owned by Hoechst Pharmaceuticals, whose experiments involved operating on live animals, a practice known as vivisection.  After the operation, they released a public statement to the press explaining who they were and the philosophy behind their actions.  In 1974, the Band set fire to two boats involved in seal culling and the boats’ owner went out of business.  The operation put an end to seal culling in that area.  Later, the Band launched 8 more raids against vivisection lab animal suppliers and carried out their first act of animal rescue of guinea pigs at a farm in Wiltshire, England.  The raid put the guinea pig farm out of business. (3) In August of 1974, following a string of successful operations, the Band were spotted by a security guard whilst raiding the Oxford Laboratory Animal Colonies in Bicester.  Both were convicted and sentenced to prison.  The press nicknamed the duo the “Bicester Two” and framed them not as terrorists, but as latter-day “Robin Hoods for the animals”.  In prison, Cliff became an informant, while Lee became more dedicated to the cause.  In 1976, Lee co-founded the Animal Liberation Front with leftover members of the Band and two dozen recruits.  Within the first year, ALF carried out 10 direct action campaigns against vivisectionists. (3) According to the FBI, the ALF movement made its way to the United States in the 1970s.  Others attribute earlier animal liberation actions to different organizations.  Regardless, by the 1980s, the US had become a primary front for the movement.  The first wave of ALF actions included animal rescues of  “cats, dogs, rabbits, guinea pigs, pigs, and primates from experimental labs at Howard University, Bethesda Naval Research Institute, various branches of the University of California, the University of Oregon, the University of Pennsylvania, Texas Tech University, the City of Hope, SEMA lab, the Beltsville Agricultural Research Center, and elsewhere.” (3) The 1984 raid of the University of Pennsylvania’s Head Injury Laboratory was a major success for the movement.  It caused $60,000 worth of damage and stole 60 hours of research footage.  The stolen footage was sent to PETA who edited it and produced a film, Unnecessary Fuss, which garnered a lot of publicity and ultimately caused the lab to close down.  Encouraged to repeat these tactics, the group continued to be met with success.  Once again, PETA’s media campaign used ALF’s confiscated footage which outraged the public resulting in The City of Hope National Medical Center losing more than a million dollars in National Institute of Health (NIH) funding.  In response to the raids, NIH director James Wyngaarden said, “Thefts of laboratory animals by animal rights groups should be considered acts of terrorism”. (4) In the 80s and 90s, the ALF began to emphasize arson and property damage over animal rescues.  According to the FBI, ALF’s economic sabotage campaigns against animal research facilities, fur companies, mink farms, and restaurants throughout the 90s resulted in a loss of $45 million. According to the Department of Homeland Security, ALF was responsible for 45% of 239 “eco-terrorist” related arsons and bombings between the years 1995-2010. (5) In 2002, the Southern Poverty Law Center in the US made a report on the ALF’s involvement in the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty political movement, which allegedly employed terrorist tactics.  However, the SPD later noted that no one had been killed during this campaign.  Later in 2005, the US Department of Homeland Security included the ALF in its list of dangerous organizations.  The UK also started monitoring the group in 2004 for accusations of domestic extremism. (3) Following the September 11th attacks on the US World Trade Centers, governments began to crack down on what they perceived as “terrorist threats”.  In 2006, an attempted firebombing near the home of a UCLA researcher and the kidnapping and branding of undercover investigative journalist Graham Hall influenced US Congress’s decision to pass the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA). (6,7) The act increased the maximum prison time by up to 20 years for anyone interfering directly with an animal enterprise.  ALF was labelled the “number 1 domestic terrorist threat” in the US and ‘domestic extremists’ in the UK.  Critics refer to this time as “The Green Scare” reminiscent of “The Red Scare” of the 1950s. (8) The movement has never fully recovered from these crackdowns. It should be noted that the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing by white supremacists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, which killed 168 and injured 680, was still fresh on the minds of the American public. (9) Some argue that choosing eco-extremism as the primary domestic terrorist threat was either an oversight or intentional. (8) In 2005, a multi-agency criminal investigation known as “Operation Backfire” led to the convictions and imprisonment of several members of ALF and ELF, including members of the cell known as “The Family” responsible for over $40 million in damages from ‘96 to ‘01. (7) This crackdown has proven effective with only one to zero acts of eco-terrorism reported since 2012. (10) While ALF activity has significantly diminished, ALF communiques continue to report small operations throughout the world.  For example, in 2019, ALF launched a campaign against McDonald's in Colorado and Wisconsin and as recently as 2022, ALF claimed responsibility for sabotaging 26 hunting towers in Belgium.  The North American Animal Liberation Press Office (NAALPO) continues to post communiques left anonymously by ALF members and other animal liberation groups online. (11) Objectives and Ideology The Animal Liberation Front’s ultimate objective is to end animal abuse by organizations that profit from the cruelty and exploitation of animals. (12) Their practice of direct action is implemented with the “aim to save as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse.”  Their targets include scientific laboratories, research institutions, zoos, circuses, fur farms, and factory farms.  ALF believes that animals are not property and, therefore, cannot be owned.  They believe that non-human animals are conscious beings who experience pain and pleasure, and therefore have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  They attribute what they see as the unethical treatment of animals as a form of bigotry they refer to as “speciesism”.  ALF considers themselves to be akin to the anti-Nazi resistance movement during World War 2 and the Underground Railroad in 19th century America. (13) Historically, the movement has operated under several guidelines: To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e., laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc. and place them in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering. To inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals. To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing direct actions and liberations. To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal, human, and non-human. Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans and who carry out actions according to these guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part of the Animal Liberation Front. (12) According to ALF, violence can only be inflicted on human and non-human animals. Therefore, they believe property destruction is permitted because they do not believe the destruction of inanimate objects is a form of ‘violence’.  In their eyes, organizations being targeted are guilty of violence against animals.  They refer to their campaigns as “extensional self-defence”.  This recently coined term refers to humans acting in defence of animals who cannot defend themselves. (11) Military and Political Capabilities As with the ELF, ALF’s precise numbers are impossible to configure.  The cell's autonomous and anonymous structure obfuscates any attempts to track membership.  According to the CSIS Transnational Threats Project, the years the movement was most active occurred between the 90s and early 2000s.  A conservative estimate of ALF and ELF raids number 1,100 of which have caused a total of $110 million in damages. (11) ALF’s main tactic involves sabotage.  Arson is ALF’s most implemented and effective use of sabotage.  Explosives and incendiaries have been the most common weapons.  Some incidents involved Molotov cocktails.  Others used small, homemade incendiary bombs with timing devices strategically placed around flammable targets. According to the Department of Homeland Security, about two-thirds of ALF’s attacks were bombings, and one-third were arson attacks. Due to increased security measures, government crackdowns, and long prison sentences, the movement has been greatly diminished.  Currently, small acts of arson and vandalism are reported but nothing to the scale of previous campaigns. (11) To this day, no one has ever been severely injured or killed by ALF. (14) Approach to Resistance ALF’s direct action campaigns target industries involved in animal exploitation with tactics involving sabotage, animal release, and espionage.  After nearly 5 decades of actions, fewer than 40 activists have been arrested.  Before initiating their assault, cells will often take time to plan out operations with intense surveillance of the target.  Intel is gathered through open-source information, photographic/video surveillance, confiscated confidential information or sympathetic insiders.  Information on potential targets can be found online.  An example is FinalNail.com, which uses Google Maps to chart and compile information and locations of organizations involved in the fur industry. (14) There is evidence that ALF’s actions have been effective.  For example, Susan Paris, the president of vivisection front group Americans for Medical Progress (AMP) admitted, “Because of terrorist acts by animal activists like [Rod] Coronado, crucial research projects have been delayed or scrapped.  More and more of the scarce dollars available to research are spent on heightened security and higher insurance rates.  Promising young scientists are rejecting careers in research.  Top-notch researchers are getting out of the field.”  Another example includes an August 1993 Report to Congress on Animal Enterprise Terrorism which writes: “Where the direct, collateral, and indirect effects of incidents such as this are factored together, ALFs professed tactic of economic sabotage can be considered successful, and its objectives, at least towards the victimized facility, fulfilled.” (12) Not all animal rights activists agree with ALF’s methods of resistance.  In his essay, “A Personal Overview of Direct Action in the United Kingdom and the United States,” British animal rights activist Kim Stallwood condemns ALF’s engagement in property damage as ‘violence’.  He believes the group should only engage in animal liberation and expose the animal industry with documents, photographs, and videos.  In his opinion, engaging in sabotage has isolated the movement. (4) Some folks don’t think the group is violent enough.  During the 80s and 90s, several ALF cells targeted people with letter and car bombs.  ALF condemned the group's actions which goes against its policy of non-violence.  Then, spin-off groups like the Animal Rights Militia (ARM) and Justice Department (JD) organized to carry out acts that involved threats and acts of violence against individuals with car bombs, letter bombs, and poison.  Some people suggest ARM and JD remain affiliated with ALF and were only distanced from the movement for public relations purposes.  Another belief accuses ALF of creating the side groups as scapegoats for plausible deniability in case an action goes wrong.  Others believe these threats and acts of violence have been perpetrated as a form of psyops by the government or private companies to “bad-jacket” the movement. (4) There is no way of knowing if the ALF will see another resurgence or drift into obscurity.  While they have no doubt made an impact, it is hard to see the exploitation of animals going away any time soon.  Regardless, you can’t kill an idea, especially when it’s made a footprint both online and around the globe. International Relations and Potential Alliances ALF’s decentralized structure prevents it from establishing an official alliance with other groups but there have been cases of crossover and friendliness with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).  Both groups share a similar structure and guidelines.  It is common for government agencies or media to refer to both under the “eco-terrorist” umbrella.  It is obvious they share a sort of solidarity and comradery. PETA has a history of providing support and public relations for ALF.  On their website, PETA states they “will not condemn (ALF) for carrying out illegal actions in which no sentient being is harmed.” (15) Support groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front Support Group (ALF SG), provide financial and practical support to incarcerated ALF members. (16). Press organizations like the North American Animal Liberation Press Organization (NAALPO) share communiques from anonymous animal liberation activists (including ALF).  They also provide information about the group and how to get involved. (11)  Peter Young continues to publish archived collections of ALF-related material including essays, guidebooks, communiques, and action reports through his publication, WarCry Press. (17)

Overview Sandworm (also known as VooDoo Bear, Telebots, IRIDIUM, Seashell Blizzard and Iron Viking) is the name given to Russia’s GRU intelligence unit, Military Unit 74455, specialising in cyber attacks and espionage. Its exact founding date is unknown, however, it is believed to have been commissioned in the 2000s and operated unknown to the outside world until its discovery in 2015. As a military unit which falls under the direction of Russia’’s Ministry of the Interior, it carries out operations based on the Russian Federation’s military and political objectives. Many of its operations have been carried out against Ukraine. History The independent American intelligence corporation iSight made the breakthrough responsible for unearthing Sandworm in 2015. It uncovered a “zero-day” (a hole in an organisation’s cyber security they are unaware of and therefore, have zero days to respond to in case of an attack) in a PowerPoint presentation on key figures in the pro-Russian breakaway areas of Ukraine. With PowerPoint’s large global user base, the spyware could easily be spread across multiple continents, to thousands of users, and given the content of what it was attached to, to high-profile users. Comparing the code it unearthed to other samples in its database, iSight uncovered multiple similar strands that had been in use on different platforms since the mid-2000s. (1) The malware had the name arrakis02 - a reference to the desert planet setting of the science fiction series Dune. There were other references to Dune too - leading iSight to name it after the characteristic Sandworms which roam beneath the planet and are used by the series’ protagonists in its battle against their enemies. The combination of its nickname and its series of daring cyber attacks led to the group gaining notoriety quickly after its discovery. (2) Sandworm had been responsible for multiple cyber attacks in different countries. It successfully knocked out Ukraine’s power grid twice, in 2015 and 2016. Evidence suggests it has targeted European elections, including French President Emmanual Macron’s party. Its wide range of targets has also included the Winter Olympics and civilian and government infrastructure in the United Kingdom and the United States. (3) While its exact founding date is unknown, it is blamed for cyberattacks during Georgia’s 2008 election and was named responsible for operations against American and European infrastructure in 2023. It is likely that the group is still active and operating. (4) Ideology According to Western intelligence and the cybersecurity company CrowdStrike, Sandworm operates in accordance with the Russian state’s geopolitical objectives, which is to be expected if it operates under the GRU’s command. They cite its particular focus on Ukrainian targets and Western political figures as evidence of this claim. (5) Capabilities No other attack demonstrates the level of damage Sandworm is capable of than its 2017 NotPetya cyberattack. Launched on the eve of Ukraine’s Constitution Day, the Notpetya malware targeted several industries across Ukraine and Europe. Ukrainian banks, communications, television, metro, and electric companies across the public and private sectors were targeted and brought down. Several other companies under European or American ownership were also targeted. The estimated cost of the cyberattack was $10 billion. (6) Approach to Resistance The group uses both malware and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to target its opponents. Sandworm used “Black Energy” malware to disable the Ukrainian power grid. Accessing corporate networks through phishing emails containing Black Energy, the group remotely turned off multiple power substations across the country. Simultaneously, they bombarded tech support centers with DDoS attacks, which flooded the recipient network with repeated requests causing access to them to slow dramatically. (7) Sandworm continues to target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure using hardware. This has become especially important during its war with Ukraine. In 2023, western intelligence uncovered Sandworm-linked malware that attempted to target Android devices that would scan for pertinent information to extract. The hackers attempted to extract financial information, communications, media, and VPN data. (8) International Relations Other countries, particularly the United States, view Sandworm as a profound threat. Following cyberattacks that took place near the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the US offered $10 million for any info that might help identify or track down six members its government had indicted for their role in carrying out cyber attacks. The six targeted members, Artem Ochichenko, Anatoliy Kovalev, Petr Pliskin, Yuriy Andrienko, Sergey Detistov, and Pavel Frolov, are yet to be caught. (9) Currently, no country apart from the United States is offering an award to help track down the hackers. Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada have contributed efforts to help track the group’s movements and uncover its malware. While Western powers still view China as the biggest cybersecurity threat, Sandworm ensures that they must also be cautiously aware of Russia.

Insurgency Overview The Base is a multinational far-right white supremacist militant group. It was founded in 2018 by Rinaldo Nazzaro in the United States. Since then, it has spread to several other countries, some of which have designated it as a terrorist group (1). The organization trains its members in combat and survival skills. Its goal is to create a worldwide network of cells regularly carrying out terrorist attacks in order to weaken governments and create white ethnostates in their wake (2). It is organized into small cells that train and recruit new members. Thus far, its plans have been largely unsuccessful and several members have been arrested and prosecuted for their actions. Its most notable actions have been instances of vandalism and arson, despite talk of extreme violence. History and Foundations Rinaldo Nazzaro grew up in New Jersey, attending Catholic schools and joining the Democratic Socialists of America in his college years. After graduating, he worked in security. He was an FBI analyst and a Pentagon contractor. In 2002, he founded Omega Solutions International, a security consulting firm (2). He claimed that he did tours as a contractor in Afghanistan and Iraq (3). Nazzaro, who has also gone by Roman Wolf and Norman Spear online, started posting far-right content online in 2016. The next year, he moved to St. Petersburg, Russia, where he allegedly continues to run The Base. Finally, in 2018 he formally launched The Base and purchased off-the-grid land in Washington State to operate a “hate camp” (2). He alleged that he was inspired to start the group when he had plans to meet Harold Covington, a prominent American white nationalist, but he did not show up. Nazzaro said he got in touch with Covington’s people, who then found him dead in his home (3). Two synagogues were vandalized in 2019 by members of The Base. They spray painted swastikas and the organization’s logos on the buildings in Racine, Wisconsin and Hancock, Michigan. David Tobin, the leader of the group’s “Great Lakes Cell,” admitted to prosecutors that he had organized the vandalisms, which he dubbed “Operation Kristallnacht” after the 1938 Nazi pogrom (4). The Base hosted a training camp in October 2019 in rural Georgia where, besides regular training drills and the creation of propaganda to be posted online, they stole a ram from a nearby farm, proceeding to decapitate and drink the blood of the animal in a ritual sacrifice. Some members took LSD during the sacrifice. One of the camp’s attendees was an undercover FBI agent (3). Another was Patrik Jordan Mathews, a Canadian Army Reservist who had fled his home country in 2019 after a journalist from the Winnipeg Free Press had infiltrated the group and exposed Mathews for running a cell from the province of Manitoba (5)(6). In December 2019, two members of The Base were arrested by the FBI after shining lights on and taking pictures of a home they thought belonged to Daniel Harper. Harper is a host of I Don’t Speak German, a podcast tracking far-right activity that has covered The Base. However, it was in fact not his house. They posted the photos on the group’s Telegram channel. Prosecutors said that one of the members involved in the incident, Justen Watkins, also had run a training camp for the organization and planned to create a fortified compound for future training exercises (7). Meanwhile, in the south of Sweden, a mink farm was the victim of an arson attack allegedly carried out by a self-proclaimed eco-fascist cell of The Base. An iFunny account linked to a member of the group posted videos of the attack. Another video posted from the account depicts the member making an explosive recipe popularized by ISIS (8). On January 16th, 2020, six members of the group were arrested in the US. Three of them were surveilled by the FBI as they planned to attack Lobby Day, a gun rights protest organized by the Virginia Citizens Defense League. They believed that, given that the state government had recently become controlled by Democrats, the protest would trigger the collapse of the US government, which members of The Base refer to as the “Boogaloo.” The members planned to derail trains, shut down highways, destroy other critical infrastructure, and attack federal buildings and employees (5). One of the members arrested was Patrik Jordan Mathews. Before Canadian authorities raided his home, he had already made his way to the United States with the help of Brian Lemley and William Bilbrough, the other two men arrested. He attended the October 2019 camp in Georgia with Bilbrough and Lemley. Mathews and Lemley were sentenced to nine years in prison for their roles in the plot, while Bilbrough got five years (6). The three others were arrested in Georgia for planning to murder a couple they thought to be antifascists (9). Shortly after the arrests, the previously anonymous Nazzaro was exposed by The Guardian as the leader of The Base, leading to concerns within the group that he was a Russian or American government asset (10). The group’s social media accounts and chat rooms were shut down, but not before a disgruntled member got their hands on the login information and posted memes making fun of Nazzaro on the accounts. The organization has since gone back underground (3). Nazzaro did an interview in 2020 broadcasted on Russian state television, where he claimed that The Base was acting in “self-defense” while inside a holocaust museum (11). Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia all designated The Base as a terrorist group in 2021 after the gang’s profile had risen in the previous years. New Zealand did so in 2022 (12). Objectives and Ideology The Base’s members vary ideologically. Neo-Nazis, eco-fascists, regular white nationalists, and all kinds of far-right beliefs fall under the group’s umbrella. Some members have even been associated with the Order of Nine Angles, a group of esoteric fascist Satanists whose members have been responsible for many acts of terrorism, rape, and pedophilia (13). What unites the group is the belief that electoral politics are futile in achieving its goals, so instead it hopes to bring about a race war that it believes to be inevitable. The organization encourages its members to engage in lone-wolf attacks to do so. It believes that over a period of time, the system could not withstand consistent attacks and would eventually crumble, creating the conditions for the race war and the creation of white ethnostates (5). The Base can be classified as an accelerationist group, as it seeks to use terrorism to actively create the conditions that it believes to be necessary in order to achieve its objectives. It does not believe that the current system will deteriorate into fascism. Instead, its members must be ready to fight government forces once they destabilize the system to establish new, separatist ethnostates (2). Nazzaro has said that he was inspired by the Northwest Territorial Imperative, a plan pioneered by Harold Covington and endorsed by several American white supremacist groups to migrate to the Pacific Northwest region of the United States and secede from the country, establishing a white ethnostate. Copies of Siege, a white supremacist newsletter that encourages acts of lone-wolf terrorism, have been found at member’s residences. Siege’s author, James Mason, is a prominent American neo-Nazi affiliated with several far-right terrorist groups, most recently the Atomwaffen Division (3). Capabilities The Base specifically targets white teenagers and young adults who are vulnerable to radicalization when recruiting, but it also recruits former military and law enforcement personnel for their expertise. Its cells are very small, with only two or three members (14). This shows that it is concerned not with the quantity, but the quality of its members. It is not interested in developing a mass movement, hence its secretive practices and small size. It has cells across North America and Europe, as well as in other predominantly white countries such as Australia and South Africa. However, its stronghold is in the United States, where it started (1). These cells are largely autonomous and despite being the group’s founder, Nazarro exercises little organizational control over their actions. He instead focuses on spreading The Base’s message while recruiting and vetting prospective members (2). Approach to Resistance The Base finds recruits online and through poster campaigns. Prospective members are interviewed by Nazzaro and other senior members to determine if they are fit for the group. In these screening calls, they are asked about their ethnicity, ideology, background, combat and survival experience, and what white supremacist books they have read, such as Mein Kampf. Much of the group’s communications happen online through encrypted apps to conceal the identity of its members (1). The organization also publishes online propaganda, depicting its members during training exercises and featuring white supremacist symbols such as skull masks. In these photos and videos, members are seen wearing surplus military gear and brandishing the Sieg Heil salute (14). Along with other far-right groups, The Base has been known to use iFunny, a meme website popular with teenagers, for propaganda and recruitment purposes (3). The group meets in rural areas for training camps that consist of firearms and survival skill exercises. Although the only successful actions it has carried out so far are instances of vandalism, arson, and harassment, its members have attempted to plan large-scale attacks on infrastructure as well as racial minorities, government employees, and other perceived enemies. This was the case in the 2020 Lobby Day plot, where Patrik Jordan Mathews and Brian Lemley discussed attacking police officers and antifascist activists as well as critical infrastructure in an attempt to bring about the fall of the US government (5). Relations and Alliances The Base emerged from Iron March, a now-defunct online forum where several fascist groups were formed (13). One of these groups, the Atomwaffen Division, has shared several members with The Base, including Patrik Jordan Mathews. The Atomwaffen Division is a neo-Nazi terrorist organization with a similar structure, objectives, and ideology to The Base (5). Although the group predates Iron March, the Order of Nine Angles maintained a large presence on the forum (13). It not only heavily influenced The Base and the Atomwaffen Division, but the groups also have had common members. One of the individuals arrested in 2020 for plotting to murder an antifascist couple, Luke Austin Lane, was a member of the Order who led a particularly extreme cell of The Base in Georgia. Lane also attended the October 2019 camp and participated in the ritual sacrifice (3). One of the group’s main adversaries are antifascist activists. Members have frequently spoken about targeting them for violence and, on multiple occasions, have gone through with their claims, as was the case in Watkins and Lane’s plots (3)(7). The organization has a mixed relationship with law enforcement and military personnel. While it sees them as ideal recruits, ultimately they are perceived as agents of the system and will thus need to be defeated in a time of crisis. Lemley and Mathews discussed attacking police officers and stealing their equipment before their arrest (5). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The North Korean People’s Liberation Front (NKPLF) is a Seoul-based paramilitary organisation founded in 2010 by defectors of the North Korean Army. It plans to overthrow the North Korean regime and in the event of an uprising, they state to be prepared to provide armed support. As of now, their activities are rather limited to information warfare, distributing censored materials into North Korea, as well as smuggling information out of the country. The NKPLF often works with other defector groups and organisations with the common goal of inducing a regime change in the country. History & Foundations The North Korean People’s Liberation Front was founded on 9 September 2010 by a variety of former members of the Korean People’s Army [1]. The group’s headquarters are in Seoul, and according to descriptions, it’s a nondescript office with the NKPLF’s logo on the wall, a map of Korea with a gunsight targeting Pyongyang, and several pairs of combat boots [2]. Among the NKPLF’s members, there are officers and special forces soldiers, as well as specialists in propaganda and cyberwarfare. They are not armed, although they often dress in camouflage uniforms, with sunglasses and berets, and carry plastic weapons [3]. The number of members in the organisation is unclear, as it ranges considerably depending on the source of the data. While the group seemed to be composed of around 100 men in September 2010 [4], they allegedly reached 330 members in December of the same year [5]. Yet, five years later, some reports describe the NKPLF as consisting of less than a dozen people [6]. Nonetheless, it is relevant to take into consideration that tens of thousands of North Korean defectors live in South Korea and many of them live in secret, under the protection of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) of South Korea. While some members of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front use pseudonyms for security reasons, others are, to a certain degree, well-known. However, it is unclear who is actually in charge of leading the group, as various sources identify different leaders. The profiles of the known members provide a further understanding of the composition of the group. Choi Jung-hoon is a commander of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front [7]. He studied political science in North Korea and claims to still have contacts with people working in North Korean security, military, and police. Additionally, he was an army officer in the cyber hacking unit for almost 20 years before leaving in 2006 [8]. In 2000, his brother was executed for anti-regime activities [9]. In 2006, Choi decided to flee the country, motivated by an imminent order of execution issued by North Korean authorities. The decree came after Choi was caught aiding a South Korean family in locating a man who had been abducted and taken to North Korea and helping him escape to China, in exchange for a reward of $10,000. Following the man's escape, his family held a press conference, which exposed Choi’s actions. In 2014, he survived an assassination attempt at the hands of a female agent impersonating a defector in South Korea [10]. He is said to head the North Korean People’s Liberation Front [11]. Jang Se-yul was formerly a hacker for the “automisation unit” in the North Korean army, where he was in charge of digitalizing operational strategies and collecting intelligence on the enemy’s tactics [12]. He graduated from Mirim University, a technology college where he specialised in command automisation. He defected in 2008 and is also reported to supposedly lead the NKPLF [13]. Kim Seong-min was born in 1962 and grew up and studied in Pyongyang. He served in the military as a propaganda specialist for 10 years and fled to China in 1997. He was inspired by Hwang Jang-yop, who, although in a position of senior leadership, defected that same year. After 2 years, Kim Seong-min arrived in Seoul, and in 2004 he established the Free North Korea Radio (FNKR) intending to enable North Koreans to listen to messages of freedom. In 2015, he was following a PhD programme in Seoul [14]. In a series of three videos on YouTube showing a press conference held in 2010 by the North Korean People’s Liberation Front, Kim Seong-min appears as the director of the group [15] [16] [17]. Therefore, there seems to be visual evidence that, as of December 2010, he was the chairman of the NKPLF [18]. Moreover, as director of the Free North Korea Radio, he enabled the formation of a close connection between the two organisations. A year after its formation, the NKPLF had already established 6 networks within North Korea [19]. Such networks, of which they claim to be developing more, are composed of active duty and retired military members, as well as civilian people who share an anti-regime standpoint. Objectives & Ideology The NKPLF's main objective is to intervene in the case of an uprising against the regime in North Korea. They prepare precisely for the goal of crossing the border and taking up arms against the government. Their ultimate aim is to unify the Korean peninsula [20]. The main rationale behind their fight and struggle is helping those who were not able to flee, by supporting families still living in North Korea and liberating prisoners from camps [21]. To be part of the NKPLF and actively try to overthrow the regime is perceived by its members as their duty and mission as defectors [22]. In order to achieve their goals, they first intend to forcibly remove the Kim dynasty. As part of their training, a group of 20 members of the North Korean People’s Liberation Army trained on skis in the Gangwon-do mountains in order to be physically prepared for their actions. The men were led by the commander Jung Hoon-choi, who perceived this team-building activity also as somewhat relieving for those who experienced poverty and brutality in North Korea [23]. Additionally, the NKPLF had a plan, to be carried out with the group called “Group to Bring Down the Statue of Kim Il Sung”, precisely to bring down a statue of Kim Il Sung in North Korea by activating the network between the South and the North [24]. On other occasions they have manifested the ultimate aim of their training: killing the supreme leader [25]. At the time when Kim Jong-il was in power, such intention was apparent during a rally where members of the NKPLF, wearing camouflage clothes and brandishing plastic weapons, pretended to shoot a man, dressed in a grey jumpsuit and tied to a post, who was wearing a mask of the leader [26]. Regardless of the threats and dangers related to defecting from North Korea, the dissidents of the NKPLF understand that they have to continue with their actions if they seek to bring positive change to their country of origin. They perceive actively operating and organising against the Kim regime as the only way to help their compatriots [27]. As such, the NKPLF, like many other groups of defectors, is constantly under the threat of violence from the North Korean regime. For this reason, many people involved in the organisation live under protection. Nonetheless, they carry out information operations, and activism, aimed at inducing the North Korean population to undergo a process of critical revision and realisation of the reality of the regime. The group has a strong focus on information and psychological warfare, with the aim of changing the mindset of the North Korean army [28]. One of their goals is to show media and information that is strictly unavailable to people living in North Korea. For instance, they have smuggled Chinese devices that play DVDs and content on memory sticks. Moreover, in 2014 they managed to send 6000 laptops to North Korea, and in 2015 they sent 800 copies of the movie “The Interview”. In this way, they could enable at least some North Korean residents to be able to access such media without being monitored [29]. A crucial objective of the group, and perhaps their greatest capability, is to spread truthful knowledge about the situation in North Korea and its regime. The ultimate goal of this is to change the beliefs of North Koreans [30]. For this purpose, they send anti-regime leaflets into the country and broadcast radio programs. They want to take advantage of the fact that military and police personnel in North Korea have access to phones, radios, and TVs. The group of defectors sees them as the section of the population who, once properly informed through their means of information warfare and propaganda, can be the first to turn against the regime [31]. On the other hand, they emphasize the necessity of South Korea to build and increase capabilities to be prepared and effective in the case of a confrontation against North Korea [32]. The North Korean People’s Liberation Front seems to have the intention to obtain a more recognised legitimate status in South Korea. In fact, they have been asking the South Korean government to form their own division in the special forces to help fight against North Korea [33]. Moreover, after years of stating their intention to form a political party, the NKPLF might have found its way into South Korean politics. Kim Seong-min, who has proven to be a key member of the group and able to establish a network of connections between the NKPLF and other organisations, such as the Free North Korea Radio, has been elected co-leader of the Unification Party of North and South Koreas. The political party was established in 2020 by North Korean defectors [34], and although there is no explicitly mentioned relation between the party and the North Korean People’s Liberation Front, the prominent role taken by Kim seems to hint at a possible connection between the two. However, their objectives, according to some analysts such as Professor Namkung Young [35], seem largely unlikely to materialise. Commander Choi Jung-hoon actually admits that the goal of overthrowing the dictatorial government is rather a hope than a concrete possibility [36]. International Relations & Alliances The group claims to be in contact with discontent officers of the Korean People’s Army, as well as with members of the police [42]. Besides their obvious enemy, the North Korean government, they also clash with leftist organisations and groups in South Korea that are in favour of the Kim regime [43]. Thus, the NKPLF organises protests against these groups. The NKPLF is connected with and supports the actions of other similar groups. Several defector groups share comparatively similar backgrounds, objectives, needs and struggles. Therefore, a collaboration between these organisations works towards the creation of a stronger network that increases the potential to reach the common goal of influencing the North Korean population and ultimately overthrowing the regime. Some of such groups mentioned by Kim Seong-min are: Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK), North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS), and the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea [44]. Additionally, the NKPLF has sought a closer connection with the South Korean authorities. However, a formal relationship between the two, especially military cooperation, bears the risk of hindering the current situation between the South Korean government and North Korea [45]. Furthermore, some analysts have proposed a potential threat to be taken into consideration: the possibility of some defectors being in fact spies. This seems to be one of the reasons for the reluctance of the South Korean military to allow the members of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front to serve in the event of a conflict [46]. Perhaps the closest ally and collaborator of the North Korean People’s Liberation Front is the Free North Korea Radio, which broadcasts anti-regime messages into the country [47]. Kim Seong-min is in fact not only a commander of the NKPLF, but also the director of the radio [48]. Other people involved in the Free North Korea Radio seem to be related to the NKPLF. For instance, a broadcaster on the radio served food to the members of the group during the snow training exercise aforementioned, highlighting the close connection between the two [49].

Insurgency Overview The Five Percent Nation, also known as the Nation of Gods and Earths (NGE), the Five Percenters, or simply as the Nation, is an American Black nationalist group. The Five Percenters formed when their founder, Clarence 13X, split from the Nation of Islam (NOI) in 1964 to create a new group. Clarence’s teachings struck a chord with disenfranchised Black youth in New York City where he began to develop a following. The group synthesizes Black nationalism, numerology, and a heterodox form of Islam in its teachings. Since Clarence was murdered in 1969, the Five Percenters have continued without a singular leader. Much of the Nation’s prominence has come due to its affiliation with hip-hop, as it influenced the ideology of many early rappers and continues to be a relevant force in hip-hop culture today (1). History & Foundations Clarence 13X, born Clarence Edward Smith, grew up in Virginia during the Jim Crow era. As a teenager, he moved to Harlem, New York City with his mother (1). He was one of six million African Americans who moved from the Southern states to large Northern cities, like New York, between 1910 and 1970, a period known as the Great Migration. Fleeing intense racism and poverty in the South, they were able to establish predominantly Black communities, like in Harlem, in the North. However, upon coming North they encountered racial tensions, ghettoization, and disenfranchisement (2). Clarence’s story is typical of many members of the Nation of Islam, including Malcolm X (3). Clarence served in the Korean War between 1952 and 1954. When he arrived back in the United States, his wife had begun to follow the NOI under the leadership of Elijah Muhammad. He joined Mosque No. 7, where Malcolm X was then a minister (future NOI leader Louis Farrakhan also attended this mosque at the time), and changed his name to Clarence 13X just like other NOI members. Clarence studied the NOI’s doctrine and rose up the ranks. He joined the NOI’s security apparatus, the Fruit of Islam (FOI), where he taught martial arts skills he learned during his time in the military (1). He was also known as a skilled orator and for these reasons, he caught the attention of Malcolm X (4). During the early 1960s as Clarence was gaining a name for himself within the NOI, there was much internal strife within the organization. Malcolm X began to speak out against the hypocrisy of Elijah Muhammad and problems with the NOI’s doctrine. He eventually left the organization in 1964 and was killed by three NOI members a year later (3). Clarence had his own issues with the NOI. He openly criticized the organization’s leadership, doubted founder Wallace Fard Muhammad’s divinity due to his white ancestry, and ignored their rules to use drugs, drink, and gamble. He was disciplined by the NOI several times before leaving in 1963. It is debated whether he was kicked out or left on his own accord. Clarence was followed by his friends, John 37X and James 109X, who together started a new group that became the Nation of Gods and Earths. He left his wife, who stayed in the NOI (1). Clarence and his followers began to create a new doctrine based on NOI teachings, doing away with their obscure beliefs and strict rules around personal conduct. The group changed their names yet again, and Clarence began going by Allah the Father, John by Abu Shahid, and James by Justice. They soon gained a following amongst disenfranchised Black youth in Harlem, who were surrounded by poverty, crime, and gangs. In the early days, Clarence gathered his followers on street corners to spread his message. Clarence was shot twice on December 9th, 1964 in Harlem. He survived the shooting, claiming that he had died and came back to life. The assailant was never found and Clarence demanded his followers to not take revenge (1). The shooting increased the Five Percenters’ profile in the media and amongst law enforcement (5). After Malcolm X was killed in 1965, Clarence and several followers visited Mosque No. 7, where they were made to leave by police. The group got into an altercation with police and were eventually arrested. Clarence was charged for assault and drug possession, as he had marijuauna on him at the time of the arrest. While awaiting trial, he was sent for a psychological assessment. He was ruled unfit for trial and sent to a mental asylum where doctors determined Clarence had symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia and delusions of grandeur. He continued to proselytize and instruct his followers from the hospital. He was released in 1967 (1). As the group began to gain traction, the FBI began to surveil them, opening up a file on the group in 1965 under the pretense that the Five Percenters were a gang (6). Due to the newfound attention the Five Percenters had been receiving from law enforcement and the high racial tensions in the city at the time, then-New York Mayor John Lindsay sent a representative to meet with Clarence. Clarence made a positive impression and convinced the mayor’s office that he was a nonviolent community leader, leading to a relationship with the city. Clarence met with Mayor Lindsay and other city officials who helped him run youth programs and open up a school in 1967. After the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968, Five Percenters marched with Lindsay through Harlem to calm racial tensions (1). On June 12th, 1969, Clarence was on his way home from the Five Percenters’ school when he was shot and killed by three individuals. Mayor Lindsay visited the school the next day. As with Clarence’s previous shooting, it is unknown who was responsible. The NOI and FBI have been accused of killing Clarence. Some have also suggested Clarence was killed over gambling debts, extortion, or a failed robbery. After Clarence’s death, there was no clear successor to the NGE’s leadership and the group’s membership fell. This led to tensions and infighting within the group, as without Clarence’s guidance and structure the NGE’s gang affiliations rose. The group became divided between those who saw the NGE’s message as a positive and uplifting force and those who engaged in criminal activity. For instance, in New Jersey violence broke out between Five Percenters over these tensions (1). In the 1970s, the NGE reemerged with new leadership and its membership bounced back (1). However, there was no single leader of the group, reflecting the NGE’s belief that God is within every Black person as opposed to being a particular figure (7). At this time, hip-hop was developing in New York and many Five Percenters ran in the same crowds as rappers due to their socioeconomic and cultural positions. Hip-hop pioneer DJ Kool Herc began hosting parties out of his Bronx apartment in the early 70s, birthing the genre in the process. At the same time, he befriended a group of Five Percenters and invited them to his parties, where they quelled tensions between rival gangs present. As hip-hop became more popular throughout the 1980s and 90s, the Five Percenters’ beliefs and jargon spread with it. One of the groups that utilized Five Percenter teachings in hip-hop was Wu-Tang Clan, whose members were active Five Percenters at the time of the release of their early classic albums such as Enter the Wu-Tang (36 Chambers) (5). The crack epidemic in the 1980s and 90s saw another blow to the NGE. The NGE struggled with widespread crack use within its ranks and membership once again declined. This led to some elders taking a harder stance against drugs. During the height of the epidemic, a gang of Five Percenters known as the Supreme Team led by Kenneth "Supreme" McGriff controlled the crack trade in Jamaica, Queens. The group was making hundreds of thousands of dollars a day and was responsible for many murders. Members would use the NGE’s alphabetical and mathematical systems, known as the Supreme Alphabet and Supreme Mathematics, to communicate in code with one another. The gang was allegedly behind an infamous incident in 2000 when rapper 50 Cent was shot nine times, and survived, after he mentioned the gang in the lyrics of his song “Ghetto Qu’ran (Forgive Me)”. McGriff was connected with the record label Murder Inc. and allegedly laundered money through the label, who attempted to blacklist 50 Cent from the music industry (1). In 2007, McGriff was charged and sentenced to life imprisonment for drug trafficking and murder (8). The NGE remains active today. In the 2000s, a series of states overturned bans on Five Percenters practicing in prisons (7). The school founded by Clarence 13X remains open and there are now many pages on social media sharing Five Percenter teachings. In 2019, the corner by the school was officially co-named Allah and Justice Square by the City of New York (9). Objectives & Ideology Much of the Five Percenters’ belief system is similar to that of the Nation of Islam, however there are some key differences. The Five Percenters believe that Black people are Gods and the original people of the earth. As opposed to the Nation of Islam who believe that its founder, Wallace Fard Muhammad, was the reincarnation of Allah, the Five Percenters believe that God is within Black people (10). The “five percent” refers to the NGE’s belief that 85% of the world’s population lives in ignorance to the truth, 10% are the elite who control the world, and the 5%, the NGE, are aware of the truth and must spread it to others (11). Alternatively, Clarence 13X has stated that the Five Percenters are the 5% of the NOI that knows the truth (1). Borrowing from NOI doctrine, Five Percenters teach that Black people and all other races originate from the planet’s first inhabitants, the Tribe of Shabazz, while white people, who are seen as devils, were created by an evil scientist known as Yakub 6,000 years ago (10). Whites are said to be “devils” in Five Percenter teachings, however many members do not take this literally. The biggest difference between the Five Percenters and the NOI’s ideologies are their respective stance on practices like drug use, gambling, and dress. Whereas the NOI prohibits such activities and has a strict dress code, Five Percenters are not under such restrictions. Clarence, who was known to regularly smoke marijuauna, allowed drinking and drug use but discouraged his members from using harder drugs, like heroin, or developing addictions (1). These positions were influenced by Clarence’s own habits as well as the NOI’s alienation of poor Black youth with its conservative stances (5). Five Percenters do not eat pork or seafood and some practice vegetarianism and veganism. Later in his life, Clarence took on more conservative positions, such as support for American military presence in Vietnam, partially in an attempt to legitimize the NGE in the eyes of institutions and authorities. Despite the NGE’s homophobic stances which have led to gay members being exiled, many Five Percenter rappers, such as Wu-Tang Clan, have participated in AIDS benefits sponsored by LGBTQ rights organizations (1). Clarence developed numerological and alphabetical systems known as Supreme Mathematics and the Supreme Alphabet. Letters and numbers are assigned particular meanings; 1 means Knowledge and A means Allah. Five Percenters use backronyms to decipher secret meanings in words. For example, Allah is said to stand for arm, leg, leg, arm, head, representing that God is personified in Black people (5). The NGE believes that both men and women are divine, but in different ways. It is believed that God is within every Black man, while earth is in every woman, hence the Nation of Gods and Earths. Men and women serve different social roles in the NGE’s teachings, resulting in accusations of misogyny. However, men and women are, in theory, equally as devine. The importance of family is emphasized in the NGE’s teachings. One of its tenets states that “the unified Black family is the vital building block of the Nation,” however the NGE permits polygamy (1). The nature of the NGE has been debated. While some critics call the NGE a Black supremacist group, Clarence 13X claimed it was neither “anti-white nor pro-black” and the NGE has had white members, including a young man Clarence converted during his time in a mental hospital and Michael Muhammad Knight, who went on to write extensively about the group (1). The NGE is not necessarily religious in the sense that it does not promote the worship of a particular deity or prophet. Clarence 13X is seen as the group’s leader and he is not more or less divine than any other member. One of the NGE’s tenets states that “Islam is a natural way of life, not a religion” and its members do not consider themselves to be Mulsims, unlike the NOI. The group also does not consider itself to be a formal organization, as its structure is loose (11). The NGE’s practices have been compared to Gnosticism and Sufism (12). Capabilities It is unclear how many Five Percenters there are today, but during Clarence’s leadership there were at least 1000 members (1). Their membership is concentrated in New York City but has a presence across the United States and even in Canada (7). The NGE has a large influence on hip-hop culture, and hip-hop’s explosion during the 1990s is largely responsible for the NGE’s continued cultural relevance outside of New York (5). Critics and law enforcement agencies such as the FBI have accused the five percenters of being a gang (6). Although many members, such as the Supreme Team, have been gang members and participated in criminal activity including theft and drug dealing, it is not encouraged or organized within the NGE (1). Clarence was mostly indifferent to criminal activity and did not take a strong stance against gangs like tha NOI has. The NGE is present in prisons, as some members participate in criminal activity and are affiliated with gangs. Due to these affiliations as well as the group’s extremist nature, some states have banned Five Percenter literature (7). Members have also been known to commit crimes in order to intentionally get arrested so that they can proselytize to inmates (1). Approach to Resistance Despite some of its members’ actions, the NGE is a primarily nonviolent group and chooses to spread its message through education, media, and music. As opposed to the religious sermons delivered by Nation of Islam ministers, the Five Percenters’ meetings, known as Universal Parliaments, are more like lessons (1). The NGE operates a school known as the Allah School in Mecca that is the de facto headquarters for the group. The group refers to Harlem as Mecca, as it has its own names for neighborhoods in New York City (11). The group also has published several newspapers such as The Word and The Five Percenter. Clarence 13X and his successors have developed a positive relationship with the City of New York, leading them to be seen as a legitimately positive force in the community by some and allowing them to use city resources to organize events and run programs, particularly during the mayorship of John Lindsay (1). The NGE’s symbol is known as the “Universal Flag” that includes a 7, or God in Supreme Mathematics, and a moon that represents women, or earths. A mural of the symbol is on the side of the Allah School in Mecca (13). The symbol has been used by percenters on clothing and jewelry, such as rapper Jay Z’s Universal Flag chain (14). Many influential New York rappers, including Big Daddy Kane, Wu-Tang Clan, Rakim, Nas, Jay Z, Busta Rhyme, and Brand Nubian have all been members of or influenced by the Five Percent Nation. Other celebrities such as singer Erykah Badu and NBA player Carmelo Anthony are also Five Percenters. Five Percenter teachings, symbolism, and jargon have spread through and are embedded in hip-hop culture. “Word is bond”, “cipher”, and “dropping science” are examples of Five Percenter phrases frequently referenced in hip-hop (5). Five Percenter rappers will also use the Supreme Alphabet and Supreme Mathematics in their lyrics, such as in “Wu-Tang: 7th Chamber”. In the song, Ghostface Killah raps “word is bond, I'm comin' to get my Culture Cipher, God”. In the Supreme Mathematics, “culture” translates to 4 and “cipher” to 0, meaning that the line is referencing a 40-ounce bottle of malt liquor (15). Relations and Alliances The Five Percenters have had a mixed relationship with the Nation of Islam, as the NGE’s doctrine contradicts the NOI’s, they have competed to recruit new members, and the FOI has attacked Five Percenters. On the contrary, Clarence borrowed much from the NOI and Five Percenters have been known to attend NOI events (1). Five Percenter beliefs influenced those of the Nuwaubian Nation, a Black supremacist new religious movement with an even more esoteric ideology than the NGE or the NOI (16). As with many other Black organizations during the time of the Civil Rights Movement, the Five Percenters were received with antagonism and surveilled by the FBI and police who saw them as an extremist hate group and a gang (6). Some believe that law enforcement was behind the murder of Clarence 13X, along with other murdered Black leaders like Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. (7). Five Percenter literature and practices have been banned in prisons in several states, however many of these bans have been overturned in recent years (7) (17). Despite the NGE’s hostile relationship with police, Clarence fostered a positive one with the City of New York that continues today, allowing the Five Percenters to open up the Allah School in Mecca in 1967 and co-name the nearby intersection Allah and Justice Square in 2019 (1) (9). Additional Resources

Introduction The Student Armed Force (SAF) is a Burmese militia group formed in the wake of the 2021 Burmese coup d’etat. The group is primarily composed of student activists who have taken up arms against the Tatmadaw (Burmese for military) junta. With deep ties to the Arakan Army, it has mounted a guerilla warfare campaign in the Dry Zone of Burma (in Northwest Myanmar) since its founding in April of 2021 (Frontier Myanmar). History Students have long played a part in anti-authoritarian resistance in Burma. The 8888 uprising in 1988 which saw mass protests force democratic concessions from the Tatmadaw was both started and spearheaded by student unions in Yangon, where the Student Armed Force originates from (Fortify Rights 35-36). By 2021, with the exception of the many ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) present in the countryside, students were perhaps the most politically organized segment of the Burmese population, consequently, most anti-Tatmadaw protests immediately following the coup on the 1st of February were disproportionately made up of young people. The first death of what would become the Burmese Spring Revolution was of a 20-year-old student named Mya Thwe Thwe Khaing who was shot by security forces in the capital of Naypyidaw on the 9th of February (Fortify Rights 46-47). A little more than a month after her death, 92 people had reportedly died at the hands of the Tatmadaw during protests (Fortify Rights 53-54). The Student Armed Force originated from the University Students’ Union, a Yangon-based student union that was a part of the larger All Burma Federation of Student Unions (Hlaing). When the Tatmadaw launched their coup in 2021, the University Students’ Union followed their fellow students throughout the country in protesting the coup. Yangon was a particular hotspot for clashes with the Tatmadaw, where police and military forces worked with snipers to suppress protests (Fortify Rights 46). There are numerous reports of snipers targeting student protestors, including students acting as protest medics (Fortify Rights 54). Some student protesters in the streets of Yangon eventually resorted to using airguns in volley fire tactics against Tatmadaw forces (Lone). By April it became apparent that protests in the streets could not dislodge the Tatmadaw from power; leaders in the University Students’ Union turned to the Arakan Army EAO for assistance in forming the Student Armed Force (Hlaing). Objectives and Ideology The primary goal of the Student Armed Force is the complete removal of the Tatmadaw from the reins of power. As a dispatch from the “Steering Committee”, the committee in charge of the group's strategic planning, put it: “The vision of the Student Armed Forces is to promote peace and stability in the public, and to be a good force for all oppressed people who are trying to build a new nation and create their own destiny. The objectives are to protect the public, to encourage and support the construction of a new nation, to achieve success in military activities, and to fight in alliance with all oppressed people who are trying to create their own destiny” (မဇ္ဈိမ). Military and political abilities The SAF is principally an infantry force and has received exhaustive training and supplies from the Arakan Army as well as technical assistance (“AA မှ ကျောင်းသားလက်ရုံးတပ်တော်ကို အထူးတိုက်ခိုက်ရေးသင်တန်းပေး”). Most images of group members show them equipped with Chinese Kalashnikov pattern rifles. Approach to Resistance While originating from a student union engaged in peaceful protests, the SAF was founded to be a militant group. Today they remain active in the Dry Zone of Burma, still conducting a violent guerilla war against Tatmadaw forces (Frontier Myanmar). Most engagements between Tatmadaw and SAF forces consist of close-range ambushes on vehicle columns and foot patrols; the most recent example of which being an attack on a Tatmadaw vehicle column in the Sagaing Region in October of 2023 which after a 20-minute firefight produced enough casualties to force the column to retreat. International Relations and Alliances The SAF’s most critical ally has thus far been the Arakan Army EAO, as they have provided the SAF with massive amounts of military assistance in mounting their guerrilla campaign (Hlaing). Besides the Arakan Army, they take inspiration from the All Burma Students' Democratic Front and seek to follow their example of a popular student army fighting together against the Tatmadaw (မဇ္ဈိမ). The SAF is part of a larger popular front of armed groups, protesters, and some non-violent student unions. Though they hail from ideologically diverse backgrounds, students in Burma have come to be a critical part and leading force in the resistance against the Tatmadaw.

Overview Thousands of supporters of the exiled Iranian opposition group, Mojaehdin-e-Kalq (MEK), gathered as American political figure Rudy Giuliani took to the podium. The enamoured, passionate crowd that was his audience that day were not even American. The flags they waved were the green, white, and red tricolour of the old Iranian monarchy, with the lion and sun at its centre. Yet this group and its followers had helped to displace the Shah in the events of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In his speech, the former New York Mayor and ally of then President Donald Trump (known for his hardline against the Islamic Republic) promised that “they would be in Tehran much sooner than the cynics believe”  to a response of massive applause from the audience. The same people applauding, however, can hardly be known for their adherence to ideas like freedom and democracy. The organization hosting Giuliani, the MEK started as a leftist student movement in the 1960s and helped to topple the Shah's government in the 1970s, leading to the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Now opposing the IRI, the MEK was forced into exile where it became even more radical, more contradictory, and more controlling. What began as a revolutionary political movement is now viewed by many as a cult which demands total submission from its members and dishes out punishment to those who dare act independently. Its ideology has become esoteric; its violent acts not only impacting its opponents but also its members, particularly women. Despite its lack of support in Iran, it has managed to become the United States handpicked choice for Iran's diaspora opposition. Though it has never been more unpopular and threatened, the group maintains its belief that it will topple the Islamic Republic. History Founded in 1965, the MEK came to life in an era where activism against the Shah, then ruler of Iran, was on the rise. Backed by the United States, the Shah was an increasingly unpopular autocrat who had been restored to power with the help of Western intelligence in the 1950s. The MEK took part in his overthrow during the revolutions of 1979. They soon came to oppose the governance and ideology of the Islamic Republic as well, garnering a ban on their activity in 1981. From there they were exiled to France. In 1986, the French government made a deal with the Islamic Republic for the release of French hostages on the condition of the MEK's exile. From there they relocated to Iraq.(1) The MEK started losing favour with the Iranian population in the 1980s when it sided with Saddam Hussein in the Iran-Iraq War. In the days following the war's end, the MEK made one last desperate attempt to inflict a blow to the Islamic Republic. 7000 of its forces launched a military operation into Iran. Dubbed "Eternal Light" the mission was doomed to failure as the IRI caught wind of the poorly thought-out military plan. Advancing down just a single road in mass, the IRGC was able to inflict high casualties on the MEK's forces, killing an estimated 2000. In response, the IRI ordered the execution of thousands of political prisoners. During this time, Massoud and Marynam Rajavi took control of the organisation and began its pivot towards a more cult-like structure. (2) Despite its failures, the MEK remained in Iraq for the next two and a half decades. When the U.S. invaded and toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, the MEK surrendered. In the power vacuum which followed, Iranian influence grew, threatening the MEK's presence. In 2012, the United States removed MEK from its Foreign Terrorist Organization list, facilitating its relocation to Albania, where they still reside today. (3) During the Trump administration, the group’s status as America’s preferred opposition group soared with many U.S. officials making appearances and statements for the group. The MEK publicly endorsed the protests resulting from the Murder of Jina Amini by the Iranian government in 2022. (4) Ideology and Objectives The MEK was founded by revolutionary students in the 1960s and attempted to combine Marxist socialism and revolutionary Shia Islamism. It has since denied its links to Marxism, a hard sell considering its original logo is clearly inspired by Marxist iconography. Today it can be seen more as a cult that has overthrown the Islamic Republic and dedication to the Rajavis as its two core tenants. (5) To become as contrary to the Islamic Republic as possible, the MEK incorporated feminism into its worldview. Their form of “feminism” proved far from liberatory, however; women command each military unit within the MEK and also compose the entirety of the group’s High Council. At the same time, the group demands total submission to Rajavi and its goals. There can be no distractions or other commitments. Under this justification, there have been forced divorces, separation of families, and worst of all, non-consensual hysterectomies. (6) All members of the group must adhere to celibacy and any steps out of line result in sleep deprivation, physical and emotional abuse, and isolation. (7) Military and Political Abilities The MEK has evolved from an armed organisation to more of a political one due to its remoteness from Iran and elderly membership. Instead of conducting strikes in Iran or using weapons like a legitimate military force, their primary activities these days are lobbying US lawmakers and using troll farms to intimidate IRI leaders and sympathisers. They have shown themselves to be highly successful in this area. John Bolton, former National Security Advisor to Donald Trump and a long-time influential voice in American foreign policy, is a registered lobbyist for the group. Both the MEK and Bolton opposed the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal with Iran, which was repealed under the Trump presidency. Several prominent American politicians in addition to Bolton have had deep ties to the MEK, including Rudy Giuliani, John McCain, Newt Gingrich, and Howard Dean. They have also obtained the support of both Conservative and Labour politicians in the UK. (8) Approach to Resistance In its first decades of existence, the MEK was capable of carrying out bold and deadly attacks on entities tied to the Shah’s Iranian government and the Islamic Republic. Many of their early attacks were carried out against American targets for their support of the Shah’s government. In 1972, they set off bombs at the U.S. embassy and assassinated one of the main American military figureheads in the country the next year. It is also claimed they partook in the 1979 American embassy siege and ensuing hostage crisis. (9) Following exile, they continued armed activity for some time. Armed by Saddam, they fought alongside the Iraqi military in the 1980s against Iran. (10) In the early 1990s, they carried out a series of raids against Iranian embassies in Europe. (11) Currently, most of the MEK’s resistance activity is done through internet troll farms, which flood the social media accounts of Islamic Republic officials and supporters, while simultaneously voicing support for the MEK. As will be discussed later, the group may also be responsible for carrying out assassinations inside Iran with the backing of Israel. (12) International Relations and Alliances With its ageing member base and its lack of popularity among Iranians, the question arises: where does the MEK get the funding for its lobbying efforts and other activities? Based on some of its guests as well as sharing some common enemies, it is thought the governments of Saudi Arabia and Israel are the prime backers of the MEK’s activity. The Saudi prince and former intelligence chief of the Kingdom Turki al-Faisal has spoken for the group at events. The Intercept, quoting an anonymous former intelligence official for the United States, claims that MEK members have been “deniable assets” taking part in the assassinations on Iranian nuclear scientists on behalf of the Israelis. (13) Anti-Iran hawks in the United States continue to back the MEK as their preferred opposition group, but what happens as the remaining members of the group age and die out is a question left for the future. For now, and for the foreseeable future, the group will likely remain in Albania - its members confined to life inside the organization with the odds of seeing their homeland again slim to none. For many inside the MEK, the biggest enemy is no longer the Islamic Republic, but their own cause.

Introduction and Overview Resistência Galega (Galician Resistance or RG) is an armed organisation from Galicia, located in Spain’s northwest. Its ideology is pro-independence, socialist, feminist and environmentalist. The term was first used in 2005, when a manifesto titled Manifesto da Resistência Galega  was published online. RG has an ideological definition in which violence plays an important role that complements and reinforces the political action of nationalism. Its discourse falls within the typical scheme of nationalist thought which finds in Galicia's insertion within Spain the root of a supposed decadence and exploitation which, it is claimed, can only be overcome through the simultaneous achievement of independence and socialism. (5,7,3) Resistência Galega is considered a terrorist organisation by, among other courts and institutions, the Audiencia Nacional, the Supreme Court, the Junta de Galicia, the Government of Spain, the Parliament of Galicia, the Congress of Deputies and Europol. It is to this day the only officially recognized terrorist organisation in Spain, along with the ETA (Basque nationalist separatist organisation) (7). This has since been a topic of controversy, as there has been a lack of “evidence that they (RG) attempted against the life, integrity or freedom of people.” (8) History and Foundation On 20 July 2005, a few days before the celebration of Galicia Day, coinciding with the feast of St. James the Apostle, Resistência Galega (RG), made itself known through the publication of a manifesto, announcing its support for armed struggle and the immediate start of a violent campaign. Three days after the manifesto’s publication, the organisation’s first attack took place. RG placed an explosive device at the head offices of the bank Caixa Galicia in the community’s capital of Santiago de Compostela. This act was the solidification of the movement to lead Galician independence and brought multiple violent groups which had been responsible for a chain of acts denounced as terrorist since the start of the new century. (5) During the 1970s and 1980s, Galicia witnessed the emergence of various armed groups, including the Loita Armada Revolucionaria, "Liga Armada Galega", the Ejército Guerrilheiro do Povo Galego Ceive (EGPGC), and the military front Unión do Povo Galego (UPG), which had a dozen militants. Reportedly, Resistencia Galega was established by the Assembleia da Mocidade Independentista (Assembly of Independentist Youth) as a continuation of these militant groups, as evidenced by the publication of their manifesto in 2005. This document also detailed previous attacks on Spanish army installations and political party offices, among other incidents. (7) The Spanish National High Court traces the origins of Resistência Galega back to 2005 when Antón García Matos, also known as Tonihno, initiated the revival of EGPGC, a group he was previously involved with and had been incarcerated for. EGPGC had been disbanded in 1975 following the death of one of its members at the hands of the police, with four others imprisoned, prompting the remaining members to flee into exile. At the end of the decade, the Partido Galego do Proletariado (PGP), which split from UPG in 1978, established Galiza Ceive-OLN (GC-OLN). Under its arm, Loita Armada Revolucionaria (LAR), GC-OLN orchestrated multiple attacks until its dissolution in September 1980, leading to the arrest of several members, including Antom Arias Curto. Curto later became a key figure in the Exército Guerriheiro do Povo Galego Ceive (EGPGV), the terrorist organisation that saw significant growth during those years. Formed in 1983, EGPGV comprised former GC-OLN and UPG members, conducting attacks until 1990, and vanishing permanently three years later. (5,7) EGPGV is linked to a total of 90 attacks, primarily involving bombs, resulting mainly in material damage. However, they are held responsible for the murder of a civil guard in 1989, as well as the deaths of two individuals in one of their final acts: the explosion in October 1990 at a club, where the two terrorists involved also died, injuring 49 people to varying degrees. (3) The Guerriheiro Army was defeated by State Security Forces, leading to Arias Curto's imprisonment until 1995. On the same date, the Asamblea de Mocidade Independentista (AMI) was established as an independent entity, although it had operated since two years prior as a branch of the Assemblea do Povo Unido (APU), a breakaway faction of the Frente Popular Galego (FPG). FPG itself had connections to various dissenting groups from UPG in the late 1980s. A decade later, Galician Resistance emerged from AMI. In 2001, AMI joined forces with other organisations, notably the communist Primeira Linha (PL), to form Nós-Unidade Popular (Nós-UP), from which members later contributed to RG. These groups are part of the Galician National Liberation Movement (MLNG), which also includes sectorial militant groups—such as those advocating feminism, ecology, sports, language preservation, youth, civil rights, student activism, and trade unionism—that maintain close ties with similar organisations within the Basque, Catalan, Asturian, and Castilian independence movements. (5) The MLNG's terrorist escalation predates the emergence of Resistência Galega. Since 2001, the most radical members of AMI, Nós-UP, AGIR, and BRIGA—student and youth factions within the movement—have engaged in a violent campaign, seeking to mirror the street terrorism seen in the Basque Country. (3) The final attack attributed to RG took place in 2014 at the City Hall of Baralla, where the Popular Party held power, causing substantial material damage. (5,6) The arrest of the remaining leaders Toninho and his partner, Asunción Losada Camba, in 2019, marked the downfall of the organisation. They had been fugitives for 13 years, residing in an abandoned farmhouse in the municipality of Fornelos (Pontevedra). Following their apprehension, the two leaders accepted a sentence of 28 years and 3 months in prison after admitting to the crimes they were charged with, resulting in reduced sentences. (3,6) Objectives and Ideology The ideological stance of Resistência Galega centres on asserting the national sovereignty of the Galician people within a far-left ideology. RG hasn’t elaborated extensively ideologically or theoretically. There have only been two documents in which the group has expressed its thinking and its project of armed struggle. (5) The first document was the previously mentioned Manifesto, published in 2005. The second one would be published in October 2011. The ideological arguments expressed in both are very similar, the main innovation of the second one being its affirmation of the validity of terrorism as a form of struggle for the achievement of pro-independence objectives. (1) The starting point of the group’s ideology, corresponds to the affirmation of the national character of Galicia and the longing of itself. The first manifesto, states: "We have the collective will and determination to assert our right to exist as a people ... taking pride in our identity(...) We are a nation ... a collective subjectivity formed by free citizens in a sovereign Galicia that built generation after generation a warp and tradition of struggle ... The Galician people are not an abstract concept, a metaphysical entity ... (since) national identity is always forged in a historical time and in a territorial space in the presence of socioeconomic, political and environmental catalysts." (1) Later on, the document states the decadence of the Galician people and land brought by Spain’s nationalist oppression. “Spanish democratic normality is a historical fact that administers our death as a nation, preventing needs from becoming realities, historically frustrating the desire and need for sovereignty.” In the second manifesto, this idea is further enforced, talking about Spain as “aggressors of their land” who have only taken the “(Galician) working class into desperation” RG further identifies the Spanish nation as rooted in the Francoist dictatorship who hasn’t evolved into a democratic state and which police forces are “a criminal network seated on (a) gigantic electoral machinery that is proof against great failures, and with its knives always sharpened, has been marking the destinies of our nation with blood and fire.” (2) After naming the issues and establishing their ideas, RG advocates for cultural, economical, political and illegal resistance as a remedy. This illegal resistance, includes the use of armed force as part of a broader political and social spectrum, which would be more directly addressed in their second manifesto, making a correlation with the group’s attacks and their economic impact to the state, with a warning for their future actions: “The enemies of our land must know that Galicia is neither sold nor destroyed, that the Galician people do not submit. If they are committed to the opposite, they should stick to the consequences.” As a closing of their second manifesto, RG writes: ADIANTE A RESISTÊNCIA GALEGA GALIZA CEIVE, PODER POPULAR ANTES MORTOS QUE ESCRAVOS FORWARD OF THE GALICIAN RESISTANCE A FREE GALICIA, POPULAR POWER BETTER DEAD THAN SLAVES (2) Military/Political Abilities Since its inception, RG has claimed terrorism as a tactic, but it wasn't until six years later, with the publication of its second manifesto, that it emphasised its revolutionary effectiveness. However, RG's advocacy for terrorism is solely practical; it has never articulated a theory advocating for the subordination of political or cultural actions to armed struggle. RG appears as one more among the organisations integrated under the umbrella of the political party OLN, each of which exercises a specialised function. RG has positioned terrorism alongside other forms of political combat within the pro-independence movement. Despite this, the intention to use violence to energise these actions is hinted at in the first manifesto and made explicit in the second. Criticising pro-independence forces that oppose terrorism, RG suggests that Galician independence gains strength when all forms of struggle are intelligently combined, including armed tactics. (5) Approach to Resistance "The personal and social costs of armed struggle ... are infinitely lighter than those of disarmament and compliance with the rules imposed on us ... Without conflict there is no change, no future." The approach to resistance of the RG was mainly focused at offices and headquarters of the Popular Party (PP). Their acts tend to be handmade explosives placed or thrown at different objects or establishments, being predominant the political parties’ headquarters, banks, public offices, or the homes of public figures. These attacks are normally intended to only cause material damage. The 137 attacks registered from 2005 to 2013 have left six wounded and one premeditated death, that of an ex militant of AMI. (3) It's important to mention that the RG typically doesn't admit to carrying out its attacks. Additionally, concerning the resources utilised by the terrorist group, it's worth noting that the RG has turned to theft to acquire explosives. Specifically, two robberies in Portugal in 2008 resulted in over 26,000 euros worth of stolen goods being attributed to them. Apart from theft for the group’s finances, there have also been donations by nationalist supporters exposed. The data from the attacks shows that a third of them target various types of companies, with banking institutions being the most common targets, followed by infrastructure and construction companies, as well as real estate companies. Political parties, trade unions, and employers' associations have also been systematically targeted, often resulting in severe destruction. About one fifth of the attacks are directed at specific individuals, including political representatives, but frequently targeting prominent figures in civic movements against nationalist interests. Lastly, less frequent actions include symbolic gestures, such as burning national flags in illegal demonstrations, attacks on public offices (typically courts or employment offices), and the destruction of municipal facilities. International Relations & Alliances According to the Spanish Guardia Civil, RG has maintained relations with other Spanish organisations such as ETA and GRAPO, through public support and intel exchange with reported contact between the Basques.(10) There were investigations of the regrouping of revolutionary youth from ETA to RG following the dissolution of the former group. (9) RG also maintained political relations and military training through Jarrai, ETA's most aggressive youth movement, and pro-Palestinian people who gave them courses in the area of Monforte and Cangas do Morraz. (11) The Prosecutor's Office after the arrest of the remaining leaders in 2019, stated that despite the ineffective illegalization of Causa Galiza in December 2016, the organisation continued to engage in specific activities aimed at supporting members of Resistencia Galega and past terrorist groups associated with it. These activities included campaigns supporting individuals like María Osorio López, convicted of terrorism in 2013, as well as events commemorating Galicia Day on July 25 and Día da Galiza Combatente on October 11. The prosecutor also highlighted Causa Galiza's collaboration with radical and violent independentist groups at the national level, expressing support and solidarity with their causes(12), such as GRAPO and Grupos Anarquistas Coordinados.