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Insurgency overview Harakat al-Jihād al-Islāmi fi Filastīn (حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين), also known as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a radical Sunni Islamic organization founded in the Gaza Strip with the aim of forming a Palestinian Islamic state. The PIJ was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1984 and its militancy has always been militarily, politically and financially supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the view of the organization, rather than a nationalist core, the Palestine question has mainly religious importance and Islam is indissolubly related to the State of Palestine. History and Foundations The first structure of the PIJ was established in the Gaza Strip in November 1981. At the time the Palestinian political context was entirely dominated by secularized nationalist forces and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), since 1974, was the sole representative of the Palestinian people internationally recognized. In this political scenario, a part of Palestinian society began to shift toward Sunni organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Shiite Iranian opposition led by Khomeini (2). From the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood, Fathi Ibrahim Abdulaziz Shaqaqi and Abd Al Aziz Awda emerged. They came across fundamentalist Islamist ideas while they were university students in Egypt and later became the two co-founders of PIJ. In 1979 Shaqaqi was arrested in Egypt for his political Salafist activity and for the publication of a text in which he urged all Sunnis to support the Islamic Revolution that was overwhelming Iran. After prison and his return to Gaza, Shaqaqi established with Awda the first structure of PIJ (10).  The first archetype of the Awda and Shaqaqi organization, called al-Tāli'aʿ al-Islāmiyyah (the Islamic Vanguard) had an innovative view of the eternal battle against the Jewish state, perceived as a religious war. During the First Intifada (1987 - 1993) the PIJ strongly influenced Hamas, the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been pushed towards a religious perception of its armed struggle against Israel (2). In 1988 the leader of the PIJ was expelled from Gaza by Israeli authorities and founded an exile directorial unit in Damascus, from where the organization’s jihad continued. In 1993 the historic Oslo Agreement was signed: the PLO recognized the State of Israel, and the Jewish State allowed the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Both Hamas and PIJ categorically rejected the Oslo Agreement and clashed with PLO in PNA’s territories. Shaqaqi considered the treaty a deception that would allow Israel to lock out Palestinians from an economic and security point of view (8). In this context, the leader of the PIJ was killed by Mossad in Cyprus, after returning from a visit with Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 1994. At the outbreak of the al-Aqsā intifada, the PIJ increased the frequency and intensity of its actions, especially through suicide attacks. This profoundly compromised the peace treaties in progress at the time (2). With the Second Intifada outbreak, the PIJ realized that, from a cost-calculation perspective, suicide attacks were the most cost-effective weapon. Due to this tactical consideration, the organization carried out a large number of terrorist actions against Israeli citizens until 2006 (2). PIJ boycotted the Palestinian Legislative Election both in 1996 and 2006 due to Palestinian democracy’s structural deficiencies (9). PIJ fighters repeatedly directly faced the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the various invasions of Gaza. Despite the harsh fighting, the IDF never managed to behead the leader of the organization.  The Gaza Strip wars of 2012, 2019 and 2022 managed to weaken PIJ and destroyed part of its infrastructure (1). On October 7th 2023, PIJ and al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, conducted the al-Aqsa Flood operation– a massive joint military offensive on Israeli territory. The October 7 attack hit the world not only for its significant qualitative and quantitative goals but also due to the brutality of the action, which resulted in over 1000 Israeli casualties and the taking of 250 prisoners (9). Israel violently responded with a full-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip. Due to the ongoing Israeli attack, the PIJ’s future is still unclear. Objectives and Ideology During the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a moderate line over the Palestinian conflict while the PIJ approach and tactic deeply changed at the end of the decade with Shaqaqi and Awda’s interest in the Iranian Islamic Revolution (2). From the victorious experience of the Khomeinist revolution, the PIJ understood that overthrowing the Israeli regime was not enough but above all, it is necessary to delineate a new Islamic state project: PIJ’s mission of Palestinian national liberation has to be read as part of the great Islamic revolution for the creation of a single Caliphate throughout the Middle East (10). In this political interpretation the right sources of legislation, like the Quran, the Sunna and Ulama’s consensus, will guarantee justice and freedom (8). Considering this perspective, the PIJ would follow a pan-Islamist approach. Already in the 1980s, the PIJ defined the fight against the Israeli state with the term jihad, giving priority to the religious aspect over the national one (2). Shaqaqi’s view on Islam went beyond the religious belief. Religion is considered a cultural and political system that should be the desirable core of the Palestinian national topic and the cultural war against the West. This vision led Shaqaqi to criticize secularized Arab nationalism on several occasions, mainly due to its detachment from Islam. This fragmentation would be a dangerous ideological issue because it would provoke a division in the Arab front and give a tactical advantage to the West (10). The failures of nationalist regimes with socialist and anti-religious tones, such as Nasser's Egypt or the Ba'athist Syrian regime, would confirm the PIJ’s disagreement toward secularized Arab nationalism. Despite that Shaqaqi has been an excellent example of pragmatism and reconciliation within the Palestinian framework (10). Military and Political Abilities The PIJ has always been a background actor due to the bulky Hamas presence. Despite that, the growth process has never stopped and nowadays PIJ is rightly considered a leading Palestinian resistance organization, the third largest in Palestine after Fatah and Hamas and the second one in Gaza. Although the US State Department has stated that PIJ can count on just 1000 units, other internal and external sources reported bigger numbers, with between 8000 and 10000 ready-to-fight militants (2). The PIJ, like most Palestinian organizations, has a military wing called the al-Quds Brigades (The Jerusalem Brigades). The al-Quds Brigades are divided into cells with their own commanders, with a concrete presence in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1). The Brigades presents a decentralized structure. Even if Israel manages to kill the military leader he would be immediately replaced by a lower-level command and the organization's efficiency would not be heavily weakened (1). The al-Quds Brigades adopted unconventional warfare tools, establishing a cyber unit called the Quds Banner. This branch aims to face and prevent eventual Israeli actions of espionage, surveillance, hacking and attacks on cyber infrastructures (1). In recent times, the al-Quds Brigades engaged mainly in rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip despite its participation in the “al-Aqsa Flood” military offensive on October 7th (2). Despite the overwhelming and ultra-sophisticated Israel military capacity, the organization never stopped to strengthen its ranks and as of now,  no Israeli military operation has managed to eliminate PIJ infrastructure (1). The PIJ is not just a paramilitary organization. Over the decades, the Palestinian group has increasingly developed widespread social infrastructures with intensity and efficiency. Islamic Jihad is present in Gaza through the control of some mosques, the publication of various newspapers and the presence in universities through student associations, the main one is called al-Rābita al-Islāmiyya (the Islamic Link) (2). Through these activities, PIJ recruits new members to employ in its armed resistance. University associations are particularly effective in pursuing this goal. In 2015 an Al-Quds University student member of al-Rābita al-Islāmiyya stabbed to death two Israelis and wounded two more. This event led to a new wave of lone-wolf attacks, mainly through knives, which took the name of Al-Quds Intifada or Knives intifada. In 2015, the PIJ was directly accountable for 5% of all lone-wolf attacks against Israel (2). Iran’s long-term missile development project has become a prime pillar of the Islamic Republic’s military posture and has primarily focused on Assad’s regime in Syria and other non-state actors in Iran’s sphere of influence, like Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip (6). Although the support for these regional actors began in the early 1980s, just in the last twenty years the Iranian regime has begun to provide relevant weapons systems, providing heavy-artillery rockets and strategic ballistic missiles as well as contributing to significantly develop their home-production capacity and technical know-how (6). Due to a fluctuating relationship with Hamas, PIJ is indeed more closely linked to Iran in the Gaza Strip and has been equipped with wide artillery-rocket technology (5). Iranian rocket proliferation fueled the struggles of Palestinian resistance and consisted in its core strategy during several military confrontations with Israel over the last decade. In 2012 both Hamas and PIJ struck Tel Aviv with Fajr-5 rockets, which have been smuggled to Gaza through the Egyptian border. Even if external supply was a key aspect, PIJ moved its focus to domestic production (6).  Moreover, several sources claim that Iran provided training to PIJ cadres in the production of key propellant components (5). Due to the massive Iranian aid, the Sunni group has overcome the primitive short-range artillery, developing in a few years long-range rockets (6). Recent leaks not independently verified would indicate that Teheran equipped PIJ with an unguided system, such as the Jihad and Imad and heavy artillery rockets, the Badr-3, which has been tested and developed on Iranian soil and has a range of up to 160 km (1).  The latter system is significantly less complex than other rocket artillery owned by Iranian armed forces. It is highly likely that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), considered the main organization responsible for Iranian missile proliferation efforts, designed the Badr-3 system with a simple design specifically to encourage local production by proxy allies. Similarly to the Badr-3 case, also the PIJ’s 225 mm precision-guided missile was first developed inside Iran and later optimized for proxy production in Gaza (5). It’s estimated that al-Quds Brigades possessed from 6000 to 8000 short- and long-range missiles before October 7th (1). Approach to Resistance The suicide attack strategy was raised around the 1993-2000 period, in the prelude of the Second Intifada. During these years the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel were engaged in the Oslo Agreement process, to obtain a nonviolent resolution. Both PA internal opponents, Hamas and PIJ entirely rejected the political process and carried out more than 30 suicide actions. (7) Suicide bombing attacks became a hallmark of PIJ’s milestones. The planning and the actuation of this tactic attained different goals, like obtaining revenge for unprecedented anti-Palestinian pogroms, reducing the casualties gap between the two sides, fighting Arafat’s political hegemony and convincing Palestinian society that armed terrorism was the correct way of struggle. Moreover, suicide attacks are cheap and easy to organize and overall deadly and efficient. Due to these features, suicide terrorism is one of PIJ’s preferred tactics (7). The method reached its peak and achieved a new dimension with the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Figure 2: Schweitzer Yoram, (2010), “The Rise And The Fall Of Suicide Bombing In The Second Intifada“. The massive use of suicide attacks led to the birth of the myths of the martyrs among Palestinian resistance, redacting martyr biographies with a clear propagandistic purpose (9). This wave of terrorism overcame the goal of causing death, suffering and destruction and became a psychological weapon against Israeli society’s morale in its daily life (7). Despite PIJ martyrdom, the organization keeps a pragmatic view over this practice: immediately preceding the Israeli military invasion of Jenin in 2002, the fighters decided to withdraw to preserve the continuity of the organization instead of being martyrized facing the enemy (9). International Relations and Potential Alliances PIJ is the closest actor connected to Iran in Palestine and a key organization in the so-called Axis of Resistance, the set of proxy groups and actors militarily and politically linked to the Islamic Republic. The Axis of Resistance, which was born from the mind of Qasem Soleimani, has the aim of cultivating Iranian regional interests in the Middle East and includes Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias linked to Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) in Iraq, the Houthi-Ansar Allah Movement in Yemen and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the common system of alliances, PIJ has never sided with the Houthis in the Saudi and UAE aggression in the context of the Yemen civil war (2). Despite the obvious ideological affinities, the relations between Hamas and the PIJ have not always been linear. Disputes are however almost entirely practical rather than ideological. Nonetheless, Hamas and PIJ often conduct joint operations, like the October 7th terrorist attack against Israeli kibbutz (9). Furthermore, PIJ always cultivated strict ties and support with Jenin and Nablus Brigades in West Bank territories (1). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Fatah al-Intifada is an armed militant Palestinian faction which is active in the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Founded by Colonel Said al-Murugha, also known as Abu Musa, it officially represents itself as the ‘Palestinian National Liberation Movement - Fatah’, although it is not a part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); it split from the main Fatah organisation in 1983 due to wanting to correct “the course of the revolution”. This came about following internal disagreements over the direction of the Palestinian struggle. History & Foundations The group was created in 1983 following internal disagreements within the Fatah movement over the direction in which Yasser Arafat was taking the Palestinian struggle. The PLO, in agreement with the Israelis, had decided to relocate the fighters of the PLO after the Siege of Beirut in 1982 to Tunisia and other Arab countries (Schlaim, 2014, p.425). Colonel Abu Mousa returned to Damascus after the Siege of Beirut to announce an “intifada within the Fatah movement” (Al-Tamimi, 2018). This was done under the impression that Arafat and other executive decision makers within the PLO had betrayed the original mission of the Palestinian movement and that being relocated to Tunisia and elsewhere would be a mistake. In 1984, Abu Musa led Fatah al-Intifada to join the Palestinian National Alliance in Damascus but failed to gain a majority of Palestinian support in opposition to the PLO. Opposing the Oslo Accords in 1993, it has been unable to secure a mainline role in present day Palestinian politics. Moreover, the group has regularly backed Syrian initiatives to influence Palestinian politics (Al-Tamimi, 2018). Fatah al-Intifada has also fought alongside the Syrian government in the Syrian civil war, taking part in several battles such as the Siege of Eastern Ghouta and the Southern Damascus offensive (AGPS, 2018a). The group has begun to lay off fighters due to the decreasing intensity of the Syrian Civil War and a lack of funding (AGPS, 2018b). However, as of 2024, the group has been active in the recent escalation of the conflict in Gaza, sending fighters to fight against the IDF (Dostor, 2024). Objectives & Ideology The stated aims of the Fatah al-Intifada group are similar to other Palestinian liberation groups. This includes the “liberation of Palestine by both armed struggle and armed resistance” and also the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with “noble Jerusalem'' as its capital city (Al-Tamimi, 2018). The group also has socialist elements incorporated within its ideological basis and it has often taken a broader leftist orientation within Fatah. For instance, this can be demonstrated through Abu Musa’s visions – he notably claimed that the Lebanese Civil War was not a sectarian conflict (which was a relatively mainstream view), but that it was a form of class war instead (Khalidi, 1983). Military/Political Abilities Due to the group's relative inactivity since the Oslo Accords, its military abilities are relatively difficult to gauge. During the 1980s, the groups were involved in several attacks on Israel, including on Israeli civilians. It took part in the War of the camps in the 1980s which was a Syrian attempt to remove the PLO from its refugee camp strongholds. Additionally, more recently, it has been active in Syria as a Syrian government-backed group. It has participated in several of the aforementioned battles such as the Siege of Eastern Ghouta and the Southern Damascus offensive, in which several of its members have died in fighting against ISIS (AGPS, 2018a). Images of the group feature small arms such as AKMs and Ak-47s which highlight the group’s relative lack of funding as opposed to other groups which reduces its military capabilities significantly. As of 2024, the group has been active in the Gaza strip conflict in which similarly, images of the group feature small arms such as AK-47s. In regards to its political abilities, Fatah al-Intifada has severely reduced capabilities due to its distancing from mainline PLO oriented groups which occurred upon its founding in the 1980s (Al-Tamimi, 2018). Its military wing, Al-Asifah Forces, actively records its operations since October 7th and these videos (as seen below) circulate online. Approach to Resistance The group is violent and has attacked Israeli forces and other groups in the region such as ISIS. It is relatively small in size in comparison to other groups and is estimated to have 3000-3500 members (Eshel, 2005). Most of its military approaches are similar to those of other groups recently active in Gaza. The group seemingly uses explosive devices and Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), as seen below. International Relations & Potential Alliances The group has several alliances, most notably to the Syrian government which has used it as a proxy force in the Syrian Civil War. However, the group has reportedly fought against Hamas in the Yarmouk Camp for example and it has coordinated with the al-Qassam Battalions in Gaza. However the group reportedly holds no political meetings with any other Palestinian group in any of the regions it is active (Al-Tamimi, 2018).

Insurgency Overview The Young Army Cadets National Movement (Russian: Всероссийское военно-патриотическое общественное движение «Юнармия»), commonly known as "Yunarmiya", is a paramilitary youth organisation founded in 2016 by the Russian government. The movement is part of the general effort to revive patriotic sentiments and military readiness among the younger generation. History Although not directly through the Yunarmiya, Russia’s aim at those goals is not recent. During the Soviet era, basic military training was part of school curriculum, and numerous paramilitary programs have been instituted by the State. After the fall of the Soviet Union, which saw the decline of those programs, and Putin’s election in the early 2000s, new political youth groups were created such as Nashi, which aimed at fostering pro-Kremlin support and countering youth protest movements. This strategy paid off during and after the massive 2011 protests in Russia, where Nashi and other pro-Kremlin youth groups played a role in ensuring the regime's stability. (1) (2) (3) The context of geopolitical tensions caused by the 2014 annexation of Crimea, catalyzed further militarization within Russian society. It was within this environment of heightened nationalistic fervour and perceived threats from the West that the Yunarmiya was established on the initiative of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in 2016 as a strategic effort to fortify Russian youth with not only a sense of patriotism but also basic military skills, to nurture a strong military ethos among its young population. (1) (2) (6) The Yunarmiya's formation was part of a broader Kremlin strategy to solidify national identity and ensure a cohesive societal front in support of state policies. This initiative was not merely a response to immediate geopolitical challenges but also a long-term vision to embed a robust patriotic spirit and readiness for defense among the next generation. (2) (3) Objectives and Ideology The Yunarmiya's official objectives are to enhance state policy in the field of youth education, fostering the development of children and young people in a manner consistent with specific moral values and guidelines, with a special emphasis on military and patriotic themes. This development includes spiritual, moral, social, physical, sporting and intellectual aspects. (6) The organization promotes interest in Russian history, geography, and the acquaintance with various ethnic groups within Russia. It also focuses on learning about Russian national heroes and military commanders. Additionally, the movement nurtures young generations in line with Russian nationalist values, opposing what it perceives as foreign influences contrary to these traditions. (1) (4) (5) This leads us to the Yunarmiya untold objectives, which are to make the youth docile and to prepare the next generation of soldiers. By following the ideological course directly set by the Kremlin, the organization impeaches the creation of slightly variant points of view. For instance, members of the movement have been seen with the flag of the Donetsk Republic during an official Yunarmiya parade. (2) (3) Military/Political Abilities The Yunarmiya provides military training programs, equipping Russian youth from 7 to 17 years old, boys and girls, with basic military skills and knowledge. This training is part of a broader objective to prepare the younger generation for potential future roles in the nation's uniformed services. (2) (3) Today, more than a million young Russians are part of the Yunarmiya movement, which is present in all 85 federal subjects of Russia, allowing for a centralized and controlled training of the youth, positioning it as an important indoctrination center. (2) (6) (8) It is worth noticing that branches have already been implanted in the disputed regions of Kherson, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Crimea, showing the efforts deployed to fully gain the population to Moscow’s views as well as Russia’s long-term objectives. (2) (8) Approach to Resistance As an organization linked to the government, the Yunarmiya does not actively engage in direct opposition or resistance tactics against Russian institutions. Instead, the movement uses its legitimacy to approach resistance in predominantly educational and formative ways, focusing on instilling a specific set of values and skills in the youth; it operates as a platform for propaganda aiming at patriotic and military education. (1) (2) (4) (5) The training also takes a more physical turn in the form of AK-47 maintenance, uniform wearing, performing manoeuvres, national heroes commemoration, etc. (1) (2) International Relations & Potential Alliances Internationally, the Yunarmiya's perception varies, reflecting broader attitudes towards Russian domestic policies and military ambitions. The organization aligns closely with the Russian government's objectives and is actively seeking foreign candidates with similar views, especially on the country’s right to defense readiness, traditionalism, and patriotic education. We mentioned that the movement has administrative structures in all of Russia, but it is also present abroad, notably in regions accepting of Moscow’s policy such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Transnistria, and Azerbaijan. More surprisingly, as of 2019, the Yunarmiya also had a branch in the United States of America. (1) (2) (5) (7) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives From a pro-group perspective, the Yunarmiya is seen as a crucial institution for fostering patriotism, military readiness, and national pride among Russian youth. Supporters view it as a positive influence in shaping a responsible, well-informed younger generation. On the other hand, critics might perceive the Yunarmiya as a tool for state-driven militarization of youth and for promoting a narrow, government-sanctioned set of values and ideologies, potentially at the expense of broader, more diverse educational objectives. (1) (4) (2) (5) There is a third perspective, a more apolitical one: the parents’ perspective. They appear to appreciate the movement, thinking that military training prevents them from taking drugs, drinking or hanging around in the streets. This could explain the enthusiasm around Yunarmiya, in a country that up until recently had one of the highest suicide rates among youth. (2) (3) (6) (7) Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Falun Gong (法轮功)(Dharma Wheel Practice) or Falun Dafa (法轮大法)(Great Dharma Wheel Practice) is a type of Chinese new religious movement that incorporates qigong or flowing exercise movements. Falun Gong is headed by Li Hongzhi (李洪志), who is described by followers as being godlike, however, others accuse him of being autocratic. There is very little information about Hongzhi’s early life, and many conflicting accounts of it exist (1)(9). The organization is considered a cult by the Chinese Communist Party and in 1999 the group was banned and a large crackdown was conducted against them (2)(3). At the height of the organization in the 90s there were estimated to be 70 million members and to this day by some estimates, there are still millions of members (16). Hongzhi and the group hold numerous controversial opinions, such as qigong being able to cure illnesses and grant special powers, that modern technology was invented as a result of extraterrestrials manipulating human scientists, that those same extraterrestrials are going through a program of replacing human beings with clones, and that wars and conflicts are caused by extraterrestrials (4). Besides its religious aspects, Falun Gong is also involved in news with The Epoch Times and theatre with Shen Yun. The Epoch Times has been criticized for spreading misinformation about the COVID-19 virus and Shen Yun is described by some as propaganda for Falun Gong. Epoch Times representatives deny any link to Falun Gong, but there are clear financial and organizational ties (1)(4). History and Foundations Falun Gong started as a private qigong group in 1989 and became public in 1992. This was towards the end of a period of intense popularity of qigong in China. Qigong is a type of exercise that incorporates flowing movement and breathing exercises; it is similar to tai chi. Between the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the 1990s, qigong and tai chi exploded in popularity throughout China, and thousands of qigong organizations were formed (6)(7). Falun Gong initially had the support of the CCP and was formally recognized as a qigong group in the state-run China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQRS). Falun Gong was highly regarded as a qigong society and the group was lauded in numerous magazines, with Li Hongzhi appearing on magazine covers. In 1995, Li began spreading the teachings of Falun Gong overseas (6)(8)(9). By 1996 things began to fall apart in China for the group. Falun Gong left the CQRS and started facing media scrutiny, with some outlets denouncing it as spreading pseudoscience and superstitious beliefs. Officials in the CCP also began to view the group with suspicion (6). In 1999 Falun Gong was banned by the CCP. The government began to shut down Falun Gong exercise sites; previously they had begun to clandestinely collect information on the group, which made subsequent arrests easier to conduct. Soon the government launched a campaign to eradicate the group. Falun Gong was declared the most serious political threat to China since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (9). Crackdowns escalated and many Falun Gong members were arrested, with reports surfacing of them being beaten in custody. On 23 January 2001, five people who were allegedly connected to Falun Gong (Falun Gong denies any connection to the individuals) self-immolated themselves in Tiananmen Square with gasoline carried in Sprite bottles. This incident caused public perception of Falun Gong to drop in China, and due to the split between Falun Gong and the CCP Falun Gong began to publicly oppose the CCP internationally (10)(11). After the crackdowns and widespread loss of public support, most Falun Gong activities take place in the United States. The group is currently headquartered in a compound in New York state called Dragon Springs. This compound houses temples, private schools, and places for the Shen Yun dance troupe to rehearse (11)(12). Ideology and Objectives The ideology of Falun Gong is, on a surface level, very related to Eastern philosophical traditions such as Buddhism and Taoism. Qi (energy) cultivation plays a big part in the philosophy of Falun Gong, as it does in every qigong group. Simply put, there is a widely held belief in China and other East Asian countries that you can cultivate positive life energy through meditation, breathing exercises, and body posture exercises (6)(13). Besides the beliefs that all qigong societies hold, Falun Gong has some controversial beliefs as well -- these beliefs are the ones that make many people label Falun Gong as a cult. As mentioned previously, Li believes that extraterrestrials interfere with human society and that they create things like war and conflict in an attempt to destroy humanity. He believes that humans are the most perfect creatures to inhabit the universe and that the extraterrestrials covet our form. Li also believes that heaven is segregated by race and that homosexuality, feminism, and pop music are evil. He claims to be able to levitate and walk through walls and says that practicing Falun Gong’s form of qigong will grant you similar supernatural powers including advanced healing powers. Some people in Falun Gong believe that Donald Trump was sent from heaven to destroy the Chinese Communist Party. However, it should be noted that there are millions of people in Falun Gong, and it is possible that many of them see it just like any other qigong society (5)(6)(11)(12). Approach to Resistance and Capabilities Falun Gong has yet to ever use violence against others as a form of resistance. Their approach to resisting the CCP relies entirely on propaganda and dance. The propaganda wing of Falun Gong, Epoch Media Group, consists of The Epoch Times newspaper and New Tang Dynasty television. The Epoch Times, which is given out for free in newspaper form, and New Tang Dynasty focus on decrying the Chinese Communist Party and pushing for democracy in China. They are also very intertwined with the American hard right. Both outlets have been described as ultra-conservative and have featured articles and videos on conspiracies about COVID-19, the 1969 moon landing, and 9/11. Falun Gong tries to drum up support for its cause by claiming that thousands of its practitioners have died in prison and that the CCP harvests organs from live Falun Gong prisoners, but this is debated by experts (1)(5)(12)(14). Relations and Alliances Falun Gong, mainly through Epoch Media Group, has ties with the American hard right. They have produced a film about Chinese tech company Huawei with Steve Bannon, who was the chairman of Breitbart News and advisor to Donald Trump. Epoch Media Group has received donations from American anti-vaccine groups, evangelical Christians, and far-right media outlets (1)(15).

Insurgency Overview The Indian Posse (IP) is a Canadian street gang formed by brothers Danny and Richard Wolfe in 1988 in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Membership is exclusive to Indigenous people. The gang makes a majority of its profits from drug and sex trafficking, but they also partake in a number of other criminal enterprises including robbery, illegal gambling, car theft, and arms trafficking. The gang is known to frequently use violence to further their interests and its members have been responsible for arson and murder (1). The gang is also active throughout the Canadian prison system, where they aggressively pursue other inmates to recruit them (2). History and Foundations The founders of the Indian Posse, Richard Wolfe and his brother Danny were born in 1975 and 1976 to Richard Wolfe Senior and Susan Creely in Saskatchewan. The family belongs to the Cree First Nation. Both of the Wolfe parents were alcoholics and drug addicts during their children’s upbringing. Danny had fetal alcohol syndrome and was born prematurely. Creely was in a residential school as a child where she was raped by a teacher, leading to her addiction issues. Richard Jr. himself was raped three times at the age of seven (3). The Wolfe family moved to the North End of Winnipeg in 1979. Richard Senior then abandoned his family, leaving the Wolfe brothers to effectively raise themselves while their mother neglected them and spent all of her welfare checks on drugs and alcohol. They stole to provide for themselves, beginning with food but eventually escalating to cars by the age of 10. They were placed in foster care several times but repeatedly escaped (1). The IP was formed by the then-12-year-old Wolfe brothers in 1988, the last year they saw their father. By that time, he was homeless and barely acknowledged his children. The IP split off from another small gang that the Wolfe brothers were a part of, Scammers Inc. Shortly after starting the gang, the brothers started partaking in armed robberies and carrying firearms, which led to Richard’s first conviction in 1989 after a teacher found him with a handgun at school. By the early 90s, they took up prostituting women and dealing drugs. They established territory in predominantly Indigenous areas of Winnipeg’s North End where they built a profitable drug operation. Other local youths, faced with poverty and a lack of opportunities, began to join the Wolfe Brothers. In 1989, there were already hundreds of members (1). Despite the Wolfe brothers’ frequent prison stints throughout the 1990s, the IP continued to expand. In 1994, the IP made connections with other criminals in British Columbia and the United States to further its operations. By then, the gang had cemented itself as the dominant organized crime group in Winnipeg’s North End through intimidation and violence. This led to a crackdown by Winnipeg Police to try and shut down the gang (1). Richard Wolfe shot a pizza delivery man, Maciej Slawik, in 1995 with a shotgun. The owner of the pizza chain Slawik worked for owed the IP a $60,000 drug debt and Wolfe thought that the pizza boxes Slawik carried had his money in them. However, Slawik was not involved in crime and the boxes in fact contained pizza. Wolfe was arrested and convicted of attempted murder for the incident. He was sentenced to 19 years in prison (4). He then chose to leave the gang due to what he saw as unnecessary violence. The incident that brought him to this decision was when one of the IP’s rivals, the Nine Deuces, shot and killed a 13-year-old boy who was not a gang member and simply hung around the IP (1). The gang ostracized Richard, as the shooting of Slawik damaged their reputation. He was beaten by the IP in prison for his actions. Meanwhile, Danny was arrested and convicted for threatening to kill a couple who were testifying against his brother. He was incarcerated for three years due to this incident (4). With Richard’s departure from the gang, Danny supplanted him as its leader and the gang kept on growing. The IP soon controlled the crime in many predominantly Indigenous areas and reserves throughout Manitoba and neighboring Saskatchewan. Drugs were particularly profitable in reserves, as their remote locations allowed dealers to charge up to ten times as much as the usual price. The police in these reserves were ill-equipped to deal with organized crime and were easily bought off to look the other way from the gang’s activities (1). With the gang’s rapid expansion, it made some enemies including the Manitoba Warriors, another Indigenous gang. This feud culminated in a 1996 prison riot at the Headingley Correctional Institution in Manitoba, a prison where both of the Wolfe brothers had been incarcerated. The IP dominated Headingley, where it had free reign with drugs, sex, and violence. It would intimidate new inmates into joining the gang, even forcefully branding them with the IP initials. On April 25th, 1996, members of the Warriors attacked the IP (5). The prison’s guards were overwhelmed and the violence escalated into a full-scale riot that lasted for 24 hours and caused $8 million in damage to the prison. Eight guards were injured during the riot and four had their fingers cut off (1). Various Indigenous leaders attempted to mediate a truce between the two gangs to alleviate the violence their rivalry caused in the years after the Headingley riot but were ultimately unsuccessful. In the early 2000s, the Hells Angels approached Danny about becoming the IP’s drug suppliers, to which he declined (1). This led to a number of confrontations between the IP and the Angels and their puppet gangs. IP members fired a bazooka at the prison cell of Maurice Boucher, a Quebecoise high-ranking member of the Angels, in 2002 but failed to kill him (6). At this time, the gang’s profile was rising. Media coverage made them infamous and there was even a movie, Stryker, released in 2004 that centers around a young IP prospect (7). On September 20th, 2007, Danny Wolfe was confronted by a member of one of the IP’s rivals, the Native Syndicate, while at a Fort Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan bar. After noticing Wolfe’s IP tattoo, Native Syndicate member Bernard Percy Pascal told him he was in Native Syndicate territory and that he had to leave. After Wolfe threatened him with a pool ball in his sock, Pascal left the bar. However, Wolfe could not tolerate the fact that he was disrespected. Later that night, Wolfe, along with two others, tracked him down to the house of an elderly Indigenous couple who took in youth to keep them out of trouble. He broke into the house and began shooting those inside. He killed two people, one of which being Marvin Arnault, one of the owners of the house who was shot while jumping in front of his wife as she was shot at by Wolfe for calling the police. Wolfe injured three others during his rampage including Pascal, shooting him nine times (8). Danny was arrested and charged eight days later for the Fort Qu'Appelle incident while driving to Regina with his mother. The getaway driver, Gerrard Granbois, agreed to testify against Wolfe, guaranteeing his conviction. While awaiting trial, Wolfe escaped the Regina Correctional Centre on August 24th, 2008. After his escape, he went to Winnipeg where he robbed a bank. He spent his time free on parties, drugs, and sex. The cocky Wolfe even posted on Facebook “What’s up? I’m out!”. Canadian police took part in a manhunt across the prairies to look for Wolfe and was arrested after three weeks of freedom when his whereabouts were reported to the police by an anonymous source in exchange for a reward (1). On November 18th, 2009, Wolfe was convicted of two counts of murder and three counts of attempted murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for a parole application after 25 years. He was stabbed to death in prison on January 4th, 2010 by a Native Syndicate Killers (a separate gang from the Native Syndicate) member (8). Soon after Danny’s death, Richard was released from prison on parole and claimed that he would change his ways. However in 2013, he broke up with his girlfriend and relapsed on drugs and alcohol in reaction to the death of his stepson. Wolfe was staying with a couple who wanted to help him get his life on track when on April 6th, 2014, he raped the woman and beat the man with a baseball bat, for which he was yet again imprisoned. He was held in solitary confinement, which caused him to fall into depression and led to his death from a heart attack at age 40 on May 27th, 2016 (9). Despite the Wolfe brothers’ demise, the gang is still active and continues to feud with its rivals, including the Terror Squad (10). Objectives and Ideology The Indian Posse is primarily concerned with providing its members, but primarily its leaders, with money and power. Sometimes this has come at the expense of its members further down the hierarchy. As the gang is mostly composed of young people, the IP claims to be a family that fulfills the role of an actual one for youths who lack supportive guardians, such as the Wolfe brothers. Many members see themselves as soldiers and their immoral acts as a means of survival. However, it is clear that the gang’s leaders are mostly only concerned with themselves, hence the constant infighting within the IP. That being said, the Wolfe brothers had strong ideological leanings. They saw their conditions as a product of colonialism and Canada as an illegitimate settler state whose land belongs to its First Nations. Richard displayed an upside-down Canadian flag in his cell. “Indian” is considered a derogatory term to Indigenous people, however, the gang’s use of the word is in an effort to reclaim it. The brothers harbored a deep resentment towards whites, for instance, Danny wrote a poem mocking the death of a white man who was killed during an IP robbery. Although they did not actively practice these traditions, the brothers believed in traditional Cree spirituality (1). However, their Red Power politics contradict the fact that the IP preyed on and damaged Indigenous communities. Military and Political Capabilities The Indian Posse is only open to Indigenous people, including various First Nations as well as Métis (descendants of French settlers and First Nations people). It is active throughout Canada but is dominant in areas of Western Canada (the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan) with a large Indigenous population, including on reserves where economic conditions are particularly bad. In the late 1990s, the gang was estimated to have 500 members. The gang’s structure was inspired by biker and African-American gangs. It is governed by a ruling circle of ten who are supposed to make decisions as a collective, however in reality the Wolfe brothers were in control during their lives. Before he left the gang, Richard led the gang with Danny as his second-in-command. Richard was seen by his comrades as intelligent and level-headed, whereas Danny was emotional and extremely violent. This made him an effective enforcer and he was known to take on the gang’s enemies without fear. Although the gang has an organized structure, there is much dysfunction and infighting within the gang that has led to violence. In 2003, a faction known as the Cash Money Brothers split from the IP after Danny Wolfe had ordered an IP member to be shot over drug profits. A number of IP members went to Winnipeg intending to kill the leaders of the faction, but their plan was foiled when they were caught with their guns by local police (1). Approach to Resistance The Wolfe brothers took inspiration from West Coast African-American gangs in their structure and activities, the common use of drive-by shootings by the Indian Posse being an example of this. Los Angeles Crips member Sanyika Shakur’s autobiography Monster has been found by police many times while raiding IP members’ residences. Sanyika Shakur was an American gangster turned Black nationalist and author whose work gave readers a raw look into the violence of LA gang life. He was also friends with rapper Tupac Shakur, an idol of Danny’s. The Wolfe brothers were also hip-hop fans and that culture is emulated in the IP’s dress. The gang’s bread and butter are drugs and prostitution. Cocaine, marijuana, and heroin are trafficked by the IP and the girls the gang prostitutes are typically teenagers, but it has been known to traffic girls as young as 10. Its members have frequently engaged in theft as well, particularly in the gang’s early days, but it now typically serves as a source of supplementary income or a way for young members to prove themselves. The gang is very violent and besides guns, members will also use their hands and melee weapons as beatings are an essential tool for the gang to intimidate rivals and punish its members. Arson is another common practice in the IP, for instance, Danny Wolfe ordered a Royal Canadian Mounted Police station on Opaskwayak Cree Reserve Manitoba to be burnt down in 2007 (1). Prospective members are jumped in during a practice known as the “minutes of pain”, where the prospect is beaten on for five minutes. As new members gain the gang’s trust by completing orders, their rank in the gang is raised, as identified by their tattoos. A “full patch” member had to have served a prison sentence and was rewarded with full-body tattoos. Members have been known to have tattoos of traditional Indigenous imagery, cash signs, and shields. The gang’s color is red and members wear red bandannas, a practice started by the Wolfe brothers. Despite his own departure, Richard Wolfe implemented a rule in the gang’s early days that membership was for life and anyone who tried to leave would be killed. The IP also prohibits its members from taking hard drugs and speaking about the gang’s activities with outsiders (1). Although initially allowed in, women are prohibited from joining the gang. However, the Indian Posse Girls, an IP puppet gang, runs prostitution rings in Alberta (11). Alike to the Wolfe brothers, the IP’s recruits typically come from disenfranchised backgrounds and unstable upbringings. These conditions stem from the socioeconomic issues that surround Canada’s Indigenous communities, including poverty, addiction and mental health issues, and a lack of opportunity. These issues are a product of colonial practices, such as residential schools like the one the Creely was taken to. As is typical with street gangs, such factors create breeding grounds for criminal activity as economic opportunities and positive influences are few and far between. However, experts (such as the judge who tried Danny in his final convictions) have also commented that although the Wolfe brothers and other IP members have suffered the consequences of various social factors, they are nonetheless violent criminals who particularly victimize their own people, regardless of their claims to defend Indigenous people. The fact is that despite the poor conditions of Indigenous people in Canada and the many social problems that come with them, a majority of Indigenous people do not engage in criminal behavior and the Wolfe brothers and their comrades took advantage of those conditions to gain money and power and are responsible for the harm and destruction they have caused (1). International Relations and Potential Alliances The Indian Posse’s most violent conflicts have been with other Indigenous gangs, such as the Manitoba Warriors and the Native Syndicate. The rivalry between the IP and the Warriors stems from their difference of opinion on the Hells Angels. Whereas the Warriors were allied to and bought drugs from the Hells Angels to distribute, Danny Wolfe believed that the Angels were racist and refused to do their bidding despite the fact that the IP had been approached by the bikers to distribute their drugs. The Wolfe brothers were adamant that the IP remained independent and that they would never have to be beholden to anyone (6). Another Indigenous gang, Redd Alert, was formed to protect inmates from the aggressive and violent recruiting practices of the IP and the Warriors (2). The gang had connections with several other groups. In the early 2000s, Danny Wolfe became friends with Gerry Matticks, the boss of the Irish West End Gang based in Montreal, after helping the illiterate Matticks read and write letters. This connection proved useful as the West End Gang controlled the port of Montreal, a hub for drug smuggling. Danny also met with the American Indian Movement (AIM), a non-criminal organization that seeks to uphold the civil rights of Indigenous people in the United States. After this meeting, he claimed that he wanted the IP to become more like AIM. While in prison, Richard came under the protection of the Mafia, who ensured his survival after his departure from the IP (1). The IP has a hostile relationship with the police due to Canadian police’s history of anti-Indigenous racism and the cynicism and a lack of trust in the attitudes of many Indigenous people towards police (2) (12). Richard Wolfe claimed that he was taken by police on two “starlight tours”, a practice that has led to a number of deaths in Western Canada where an Indigenous person is taken to the outskirts of a city in the middle of the night during winter and abandoned there (1). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The English Defence League (EDL) is a right-wing group based in the UK that believes English society is under attack from Muslim extremists and seeks to use tactics such as protest, marching, and propaganda to counter what they see as an invasion of British culture and politics by Islam. The EDL was founded in Luton, England, in 2009 by Kevin Carroll and Stephen Christopher Yaxley-Lennon, a.k.a. Tommy Robinson. The group’s mission statement, which now appears to have been taken down from the internet, used to read that they were leading “the struggle against global Islamification.” They also believe in “rape jihad”, where they argue that rape is ingrained into Islamic texts and that Muslim people are coming to the UK to rape English women. They blame the Muslim community in England for many issues, such as organized sexual abuse of children, oppression of women, honor killing, homophobia, female genital mutilation, and anti-Semitism and intolerance of non-Muslims. Indeed, the group was formed by Carroll and Robinson in response to what they called “militant Islam.” (1) Robinson (often known in the UK media by his pseudonym, Tommy Robinson), has also used other names – such as Andrew McMaster and Paul Harris – to protect himself against violence. He led the EDL from its founding in 2009 to 2013, and has continued to participate in far-right politics in the UK, sometimes surging in prominence. (2) He was also present at the recent far-right clash at the Cenotaph war memorial in the UK, where a group of far-right extremists counter-protested against the Palestine solidarity march taking place in London on the same day. (3) The EDL itself went from being only a small group in 2009 to gathering thousands at marches only two years later. Yet, by 2018, the antifascist organization Hope Not Hate was referring to the EDL as being in a “lethargic and alcohol-fuelled almost comic collapse.”(4) The group went from looking like an organized street movement and talking about forming as a political party in the UK, (5) to disbanding in 2015 and now only exists as a splintered presence on Facebook and in various other far-right networks in the UK. However, with Robinson’s recent appearance at the far-right’s clash with police at the Cenotaph war memorial in London, it is possible that former and prospective EDL members could coalesce once again into a more codified movement in the coming years. History & Origins The story of the EDL’s founding centers on the founders’ opposition of Islam, and their determination to react against any Muslim presence in England, or the country’s political culture. After its founding in 2009, the EDL took part in vigilante marches in local communities around England, sometimes clashing with police, and according to Matthew Collins from the NGO Hope Not Hate, in a short few years the EDL “went from being concerned about extremism to radicalizing themselves.” (6) The group’s clashes with police and visible street presence at marches led to it having a public image of violence and extremism, to the extent that the group’s founders abandoned it, citing this as their reasoning. While both have been important figures in far-right politics in the UK, they felt that the EDL had become too radical for them in 2013, four years after its creation. A poll done the same year (2013) by the Mail on Sunday, a popular tabloid in the UK, discovered that 61% of its 1,121 survey participants thought that the existence of groups like the EDL raised the likelihood of terrorism. (7) There are no accessible member lists for the EDL but the group is thought to have had a membership of 30,000 at its peak in 2013, before it was abandoned by its founders. (8) It is possible that the EDL’s demise was due to a fundamental tension between its organizers’ slogans, and the behavior of its proponents at rallies. The slogan “not racist, not violent, just no longer silent” was drowned out at their rallies by racist chants, and overshadowed by the overlap in membership between the EDL and other groups like the British National Party and National Front. (4) All of the EDL’s former social media channels have been suspended and its members have scattered throughout other various far-right organizations and networks in Britain, with many taking to the streets in the recent far-right clashes with police at the Cenotaph war memorial, where Robinson also made his presence known. The EDL’s website has been offline since April 2020, after which the group created an online radio show on a website called BlogTalkRadio. They also created a Gab account in 2017, however this account has seemed to have been put on indefinite hold within a few years, and so the main contact points for former EDL members appear to be Tommy Robinson’s newsletter and the personal networks that were formed and remain after the group’s more organized activity in the 2010s. Objectives & Ideology The official goals of the EDL are to stand against what it calls ‘militant Islam’, which it equates to an invasion of the UK. During a 2009 homecoming parade for British soldiers in Luton to mark their return from Iraq, there was a disruption by Muslim extremists: the founding of the EDL was sparked by Carroll and Robinson’s reaction against this event. The Muslim protesters waved placards at the soldiers’ parade reading:  “Anglian Soldiers: Butchers of Basra” and “Anglian Soldiers: cowards, killers, extremists.” (6) Two people were arrested at the event. From here followed the anti-Islam ideology of the EDL, with Muslims being seen as an invading force into UK culture and politics. Many issues are blamed by the EDL on Muslim influence, such as the denigration of women, organized sexual abuse, and more. (1) The group sees itself as a defender of British values, including the army, with Robinson telling Channel 4 News in 2013 he was “extremely passionate about our troops”. He was later dismayed when the veterans’ charity, Help For Heroes, rejected donations raised by his sponsored walk. (6) EDL members or associates feel that human rights are threatened by the presence of a Muslim community in Britain. A YouGov survey of 1,600 EDL supporters found that these views also influenced their ideas about immigration: this was a top concern they chose, followed by the economy, and then “Muslims in Britain.” The researcher who conducted this survey, Matthew Goodwin, told Channel 4 News that the EDL’s concerns are more broadly focused on the direction that Britain is headed in, saying, “It’s a broader fear about society, rather than a fear of Muslim terrorists. It is much more nuanced.” (6)  This fear about the unfamiliarity of a developing society can be seen in many far-right ideologies, and in that sense, although the EDL’s focus on Islam is very specific, the grounding of its ideology is extremely rooted in the usual tenets of the extreme right. The group insists that it is not racist, or fascist; however, those bearing the EDL insignia have been seen doing Nazi salutes at rallies, and over the years the membership became steadily more extreme, moving towards fascism. Approach to Resistance The central tension in the EDL’s organizational methods is most clearly seen in its various tactics of resistance. Despite claiming to be non-violent, the group participated in multiple clashes with police throughout its years of being active on the streets of Britain. It is arguable that the group initially grew so rapidly because of its broad tent approach to ideology: with its framework less clearly defined, the EDL could become an umbrella under which many with anti-Islamic ideas could gather, combining those with less extreme views with a more radicalized right-wing contingent. This meant, however, that the tactics of marching or distributing propaganda online, could easily spill into acts of violence by those members with more extreme ideas. One such instance was that of Darren Osbourne in 2017, a British man who drove his car into a crowd outside a mosque in London, killing one person and wounding nine; Osbourne was later found to have been radicalized over the space of a few weeks by the writings of Yaxley, Robinson, and other far-right figures. Then, in 2015, 50 EDL supporters were collectively sentenced to more than 75 years in prison for violent disorder. (1) Whether violence or non-violent, the main tactic of the EDL was marching and  gathering a street presence in significant locations. As well as London, the members targeted their actions in locations with large Muslim communities, such as Bradford, Birmingham, and Newcastle. This tactic grew the EDL membership and made them, for a short few years, the most prominent far-right presence on UK streets since the 1970s when the National Front was using similar tactics. It is possible that this tactic began as a counter-protest action against extremist Muslim demonstrations, of which there were relatively few however. Online communication was also extremely important to the EDL, even when its presence on the ground was growing. According to a Guardian investigation in 2010, the EDL online division for army personnel had 842 at the time, perhaps illustrating the success of the group’s rhetoric of patriotism as well as its online reach. (9) At its peak the EDL maintained Facebook pages for 17 regional chapters around the country; their online outreach mainly utilized Facebook, Twitter, and the EDL website, which contained a user forum. Their Facebook pages were suspended in 2019, and EDL leadership recommended that members instead connect with each other on their website forum. By this time however, interest had waned in the EDL: the group’s main Facebook page only had 2,728 likes in March 2019, and was suspended by 2020. The EDL Twitter page was suspended in 2017, and the deplatforming of Robinson’s own Twitter followed a year later in 2018. Following the Twitter suspension in 2017, the group created a Gab account. However, as of January 2024, this account only has 1,100 followers. (10) While the more overtly hateful rhetoric remained in forums and on social media, the EDL’s leadership focused instead on their aims of peacefully protesting ‘militant Islam,’ and expressed desires to enter British politics on more official grounds as a political party. (1) This range of tactics allowed the EDL to reach a range of different audiences – online, offline and via the UK mainstream media – yet the disparate nature of the tactics arguably also led the group to struggle with internal coherence and led to their collapse, with the extremism of many of the EDL’s followers going beyond what its founders intended and proving uncontrollable. This eventually led to its dissolution and the scattering of its members throughout the various far-right networks and initiatives throughout the UK. International Relations & Potential Alliances Perhaps the most interesting alliance at play with those involved in the EDL, is that of the group’s relationship to football hooliganism. UK football hooligan culture is not inherently right-wing, however, there are crossovers between EDL involvement and some football hooligans. Some EDL members stated “you need an army for war” to encourage football supporters to take part in their rallies, perhaps for the purposes of intimidating the Muslim communities where they were being held. (11) This link was present from the beginning in 2009. Early on, as the EDL was being founded, there was also a group called the British Citizens Against Muslim Extremists, based in Birmingham, which was later absorbed as a local faction into the growing national organization of the EDL. This gradual splintering and absorption between the EDL and different anti-Muslim groups has been a hallmark of its development since 2009, and is now a continued feature of its limited, underground existence. Rather than existing as a force in British politics or protest today, the EDL is more a collection of personal relationships and online gatherings in the less moderated areas of the internet. Many of its members (such as they can still be called so) have dissipated into other right-wing networks in the UK, which they may have always had connections with. This includes the Nazi music and promotion network, Blood and Honour, which has documented links to the ruling Conservative Party in Britain, as well as the remains of the British National Party, the National Front and even UKIP. (3) While the EDL faded from British political news after 2018, it laid the modernizing groundwork for radical right-wing politics in the UK. The key principle of this was breaking with the more explicit racism of previous movements like the BNP, and focusing instead on a much narrower anti-Islamic platform that its leaders sought to prevent from widening into an anti-immigration stance. This distanced them from the rest of the UK far-right, but ensured them an increased reach amongst people who subscribed to Islamophobic views. (12) This narrow focus was reflected in the contrast between the BNP’s “Outlaw Homosexuality” stickers and the EDL’s LGBTQ+ division. The EDL was perhaps the first right-wing group to position the right to be queer as a ‘Western value’ that could be used as a wedge issue to radicalize more people against the Muslim community. It is debatable how genuine this view was among the EDL membership, but it simultaneously made them more palatable, and more distant from explicitly fascist far-right groups such as the National Front – though the EDL did release a 2011 manifesto sharing some wording with BNP propaganda. Therefore, while the EDL lacked codified alliances with both mainstream political parties and other extremist groups, they instead pioneered methods of presenting far-right ideas that have echoed through British politics since. The positing of anti-Islam ideas as protection of human rights has outlasted the group, with the 2018-19 UKIP leader, Gerard Batton, quoting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights during his speech at the 2018 ‘Day for Freedom’ rally in London. (12) The recent clashes at the Cenotaph in the UK mark the appearance offline of these informal relationships, as Robinson could be spotted there alongside other far-right figures. Robinson did not participate in clashes with police; he instead walked with the protesters to Whitehall and then departed. However, Robinson later stated on Twitter (now X), “If you want the EDL back, Rishi, I could easily organize that for you.” (3). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Hoods Hoods Klan (HHK), also known as the Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans, is a Ukrainian anti-fascist and anti-racist unit part of the Resistance Committee founded in 2006. Originally football ultras supporting Arsenal Kyiv, they reformed into a battalion within the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) to fight against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, even keeping the colours of their club as a battle standard. They were the first hooligan formation in Ukraine to declare themselves as anti-fascist officially. History Before the establishment of HHK, most of its founding members were active in the hardcore punk scene, participating in gigs and at various venues, where fights with right-leaning individuals were common. This shared background fostered a common culture and a sense of unity within the emerging hooligan supporter group, which began to rally around Arsenal Kyiv Football Club in the mid-2000s. Arsenal Kyiv, originally established in 1925 by workers of the Arsenal Factory and dissolved in the 1960s, was reformed in 2001. (1), (2) Thus, the HHK’s political combat traces back to its very creation. Historically, the Ukrainian ultra scene tends to be dominated by far-right ideologies; by openly claiming to be anti-racists, the Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans immediately became enemies with most of the other football-supporting formations, and notably with the supporters of Dynamo Kyiv, their eternal rivals. (3) As individuals, members of the HHK participated in the 2013 Euromaidan uprising. The Euromaidan movement, beginning in November 2013 in Ukraine, was a response to the government's decision to prioritise ties with Russia over European integration. This significant political protest centred in Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti square, evolved from demanding EU integration to broader calls for political reform and anti-corruption measures. The protests, initially focused on EU integration, quickly escalated into a broader call for political reforms, anti-corruption measures, and the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych. Despite facing violent crackdowns, the movement culminated in February 2014 with Yanukovych fleeing the country. (1) (4) The Euromaidan, while advancing Ukraine's democratic aspirations, indirectly contributed to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and heightened tensions in the Donbas region, leading to secessions and the War in Donbas, where individuals from the HHK also fought, notably in Donetsk. (5) (1) The HHK took its actual form in 2022. In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group joined the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) as a battalion, before getting deployed to the Eastern front, where they still fight today. (3) (6) Objectives and Ideology As mentioned above, the HHK was originally an ultra organisation, fervent football fans who embrace a deep sense of community, identity, and loyalty toward their local football club. More precisely, the HHK primarily engaged in football hooliganism, focusing on supporting their team, Arsenal Kyiv, and confronting rival fans and far-right activists. Their activities were centred around the football culture, with a notable stance against fascism, racism, and homophobia within the football community. Their involvement in physical confrontations was more about asserting dominance in the football fan scene than broader, organised, political objectives. (1) Although the geopolitical destiny of Ukraine held importance for some HHK members, it was only upon joining the TDF in response to the Russian invasion that the group’s focus shifted significantly. Their objective transformed into defending Ukrainian territory against Russian advances, viewing the Russian military as embodying the authoritarianism and imperialism they opposed and giving a direct application of their principles in a broader geopolitical conflict. Their transition from football hooliganism to active military action implied a truce with traditionally opposed far-right groups, which are also part of the TDF. However, the HHK maintains their official stance against fascism and racism. (1) (3) Arsenal Kyiv's professional team was dissolved in 2019, though their junior teams continue to compete in city competitions and it is unclear if the HHK maintains an active presence in the football scene while engaged in military activities. It seems that their focus has entirely shifted towards addressing the immediate concerns of the conflict in Ukraine, and yet they conserve the mention “Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans” on their Instagram page, now used to raise funds for their ongoing fights with the Russian forces. (2) (6) Military/Political Abilities: Having a background in football hooliganism, HHK members have partaken in violence as civilians. As mentioned above, some affiliates had previous military experience during the Russian invasion of Crimea and the following uprisings in Donbas. The HHK is part of the Resistance Committee, also known as the Black Headquarter, a coordination body for anarchist and anti-authoritarian fighting groups within the TDF. The commander of both those organisations, Yuriy Samoilenko, died on the front on September 10th 2022. Although The HHK is under the command of the Ministry of Defense which supplies arms and ammunition, all the rest (from kneepad to medi-kit, from bulletproof vests to vehicles) come from international donations. This support can be direct or passed through Operation Solidarity, a humanitarian organisation​ which — amongst other objectives — helps anti-authoritarian fighters during the Russo-Ukrainian war. (3) (7) Approach to Resistance Like most anti-fascist entities, their approach to resistance is primarily violent, from fist fights near stadiums during peacetime to active military training and engagement in the Ukrainian East. The group has built up an international reputation, particularly in left-wing militant circles, giving it legitimacy to engage in interviews and public statements. (1) International Relations & Potential Alliances As we have seen above, the HHK has formed alliances with various anti-authoritarian, anarchist, and anti-fascist groups within and outside Ukraine, especially through the Resistance Committee or Operation Solidarity. It is worth noticing that the HHK has made a truce with right-wing groups fighting alongside them against the Russian forces. (1) (3) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives Pro-group perspectives view the HHK as a valiant force defending their country against an oppressive invader and/or against fascism and imperialism. The anti-group perspectives are more diverse. First, supporters of the Russian invasion obviously criticise the HHK defence of Ukraine. Some far-right Telegram channels also describe them as “degenerates”. Finally, criticism has emerged from the international anti-authoritarian camp as well: the HHK’s truce with right-wing formations during this wartime has led to accusations of betrayal of antifascist principles and has negatively impacted their image. (8) (9) Works Cited (Chigaco Style) (1) - Kostick C. "Hoods Hoods Klan Interview." Independent Left. Published May 30, 2023. Accessed December 3, 2023.  https://independentleft.ie/hoods-hoods-klan-interview/ (2) - "Arsenal Kiev." Wikipedia. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arsenal_Kiev. (3) - Popular Front. “Frontline Hooligan: Ukraine's Antifa Football Hooligans Fighting the Russian Invasion”. YouTube video, 28:17. Published June 16 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsodbPkjO3c. (4) - "The Maidan Protest Movement." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed December 15, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement. (5) - "The Crisis in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed December 15, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine. (6) - hoodshoodsklan. Instagram. Accessed December 1, 2023. https://www.instagram.com/hoodshoodsklan/. (7) - Popular Front. ”RIP Yuriy”. YouTube video, 0:37. Published, December 10 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_4-gQLNz30. (8) - "@antiglobahomo." Telegram. December 6, 2023. https://tgstat.com/channel/@antiglobahomo. (9) - Totale R. "No War but Class War: Against State Nationalism and Inter-Imperialist War in Ukraine." Libcom.org.Published May 15, 2022. Accessed December 5, 2023. https://libcom.org/article/no-war-class-war-against-state-nationalism-and-inter-imperialist-war-ukraine. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The ‘Islamic Resistance Movement’ (also known as Hamas, or Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah) is a Palestinian militant organisation that has effectively controlled the Gaza Strip since the Battle of Gaza in 2007 (2).This battle was an armed conflict between Hamas and Fatah with Hamas emerging victorious and ruling over the Gaza Strip from then until the present day. Hamas emerged after the beginning of the first intifada (uprising) in December 1987 and quickly grew into the most prominent form of Palestinian armed resistance against what they view as the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories (12). Hamas’ overarching goals are to end this claimed Israeli occupation of Palestine and establish an Islamic state in historical Palestine (13). Hamas’ military wing are frequently engaged in armed resistance against Israel and often launch rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territories in response to what they perceive as Israeli aggressions (7). History & Foundations On the 9th of December 1987, four Palestinian workers from the Jabalia refugee camp were killed in a car crash. A rumour quickly spread that this accident was a deliberate attempt to kill Palestinians, although the validity of this rumour has not been concretely confirmed. Israel, in return, denied that the crash was an intentional move to target Palestinians. In the following days, Palestinians responded with demonstrations and violence (the first intifada), leading to the IDF deploying thousands of soldiers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1). The Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation that preceded Hamas and was heavily criticised for inactivity against Israel, was reorganised in Palestine under the banner of Hamas to lead the resistance against Israel (1). However, the relationship between both groups is somewhat complex. Between 1987 and 1993, Hamas consolidated itself as a popular resistance throughout the first intifada to represent the interests of the Palestinian population, and later in 2017 it declared itself entirely autonomous and separate from the Muslim Brotherhood. Although this latter structural change has proven to be more symbolic than truly instrumental, relations between both groups have worsened since. Throughout the 90s, when the United States attempted to broker peace in the middle east through the Oslo Accords, Hamas’ popularity surged when the peace process failed to meet Palestinian expectations (13). During this period, Hamas orchestrated several suicide bombing attacks to strike fear in Israel, create an atmosphere of chaos and derail the peace process (3). Talks eventually broke down following the assassination of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 (14). After the second intifada broke out in September 2000, Hamas led the armed Palestinian resistance against Israel, engaging in bloody clashes and orchestrating more suicide bombing attacks. In the 2006 Palestinian legislative election, Hamas won the majority of seats and entered government, defeating rivals Fatah in the process (5). The first Palestinian election in fifteen years was due to take place in 2021 but this was cancelled by President Mahmoud Abbas. Thus, Hamas still exercises a huge degree of political influence in the Gaza Strip specifically and has supporters across the West Bank. A poll conducted in 2021 highlighted that 45% of Palestinians believe that Hamas should lead Palestine (16). Objectives & ideology Hamas’ official website states that the group’s ultimate goal is to “bring an end to the prolonged occupation on historical Palestine”. They describe themselves as a “national liberation movement with a moderate Islamic school of thought”. However, Hamas is regarded as merely a ‘terrorist organisation’ by the Israeli and U.S. governments, among others. Hamas claims that their resistance against Israel is rooted in the Israeli occupation rather than a hatred towards Judaism (8), although this claim is often rebutted by Israel and other states. Their transitional and strategic objective is to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine by establishing an Islamic state in Palestine. Hamas regard Israel as a coloniser which illegally occupies Palestinian lands and they wish to rid Israeli forces from all of these respective territories (2). Hamas also wishes to promote Islamic values and preserve Palestinian identity (2). They respond with force to every action taken by Israel that they deem to be an act of aggression, such as the storming of Al-Aqsa Mosque in early April 2023. Military Capabilities Hamas’ military wing, composed of the al-Qassam Brigades, may not direct specific orders towards the group’s political leaders but these leaders are often obliged to take them into consideration. Over the past ten years, Hamas has evolved from a guerrilla organisation into a fully fledged military group, mirroring the organisational structure and capabilities of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hamas militants carry M-16s and AK-47s mainly as personal weapons (6). Despite the sea blockade on Gaza which heavily monitors every boat entering the Gazan waters, the group has managed to amass machine guns, anti-tank rockets and anti-aircraft missiles (6). Though the majority of rockets fired by Hamas from Gaza towards Israel are intercepted by the Iron Dome air defence system, they occasionally reach Israeli soil, causing death and destruction on occasion. Many claim that these rockets are being smuggled from Iran (11). One of the most important elements of Hamas’ military tactics is their use of an extensive underground tunnel system, where each tunnel is between approximately 2.5 and 5 kilometres in length, 25 to 40 metres below ground, and can enable around 20 fighters to swiftly cross borders without detection. Hamas reportedly has an elite force dubbed “Nuchba'', who are trained to attack Israel via these tunnels. The tunnels are reportedly intended to be used as a vehicle through which to launch attacks on Israel. In an interview with VICE in 2021, Hamas militant Abu Khalid said “this is our only choice”, noting that Hamas cannot fight Israel in the air or at sea due to the strength of the Israeli military. He added that Hamas will “keep going unless they stop occupying our lands” (15). In Telegram channels such as the Jenin Al Samoud news channel and the Al-Qassam Brigade channel, users are notified of recent attacks on military tunnels as a means of protecting militants, enabling some to evade Israeli attacks. This video shows fighters from the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (IQB) -- the military wing of Hamas -- going through these tunnels. This video is purely for informational and journalistic purposes. It was found on the Telegram channel of the respective group. International Relations & Political Alliances Regarding their interaction with other countries, Hamas maintains that their decision making is independent of any other state or political organisation (10). However, there are some states who have been linked to supporting the group (4). In 2012, Qatari Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani was the first state leader to visit the government of Hamas. As of 2021, Qatar had reportedly donated €1.5 billion to Hamas to fund their regime. Though Turkey has historically been ardent supporters of Hamas (11), reports emerged in early 2023 of President Erdogan softening ties with Israel, plundering their support for the group into question. The Iranian state has been linked with supplying vast amounts of munitions to Hamas to support their military wing (9). Furthermore, the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah have been long established supporters of Hamas, often accused of supplying the group with military weaponry and knowledge (11). In late 2022, following a meeting with Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, Hamas reportedly mended ties with Syria who have been accused of financing and supporting Hamas’ military movement. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Formerly the Palestine National Liberation Movement, Fatah is a Palestinian nationalist political party. The group was founded in the late 1950s in Kuwait by Yasser Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir. At the time of its founding, the goal of Fatah was to liberate the Palestinian territories from Israeli occupation through the use of guerrilla warfare. The group engaged in violent conflict with Israel before signing a peace agreement (The Oslo Accords) in 1993 and seeking a two-state solution. This change in approach created rifts within the organization and led to the creation of splinter groups. Fatah governed the Palestinian territories, leading the Palestinian Authority, until the group was defeated in the 2006 elections by Hamas (Britannica, 2024). History and Foundations Fatah was founded in the late 1950s as one of many different organizations that were birthed out of the Israeli occupation and the desire to see a liberated Palestine. The decade following Fatah’s establishment would see numerous conflicts arise between Israel, its surrounding states, and resistance organizations. This culminated in the War of 1967 (or the 6-Day War). The specific events that sparked this outbreak are complex, but the tensions between Israel and its neighbors had been building for years. The war began on June 5th and within 6 days Israel had defeated Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. In the wake of the defeat of the Arab states, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip (previously under Egyptian control), The West Bank, East Jerusalem (previously under Jordanian control), and the Golan Heights (previously under Syrian control). After numerous iterations of diplomatic accords, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, but they have continued to occupy the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem to this day (Office of the Historian). After its founding, Fatah was supported by Syria and based in Damascus before moving to Jordan. The group remained in Jordan until the 1970 Black September civil conflict between the Jordanian Armed Forces and Fatah/Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In the wake of this conflict, thousands of Palestinian refugees were expelled from Jordan and the leadership and headquarters of Fatah relocated to Lebanon (UNRWA). The Black September War of 1970 began when the Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the more radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked four planes, diverted three to a Jordanian airstrip to blow them up, and took dozens of hostages. The Jordanian King Hussein had maintained secret relations with Israel throughout the 1950s and 60s and was not eager to see the PLO continue to launch attacks on Israel from Jordanian territory, or from the West Bank which had been under Jordanian rule (Tristam, 2019). After the hijacking and destruction of the planes, King Hussein set the Jordanian Military on the PLO, a bloody conflict ensued which left around 15,000 Palestinian militants and civilians dead, many Palestinian towns and refugee camps flattened, and between 50,000 and 100,000 people displaced. Before the war, the Palestinians had maintained a state-like regime in Jordan, with militias controlling many areas and imposing disciplinary measures on residents with impunity (Tristam, 2019). After the war, in early 1971, the PLO and Fatah were expelled from Jordan, forcing them to relocate their headquarters to southern Lebanon. The consequences of this expulsion were not only a relocation for the PLO but also the creation of the Palestinian Black September Movement, a commando faction that broke off from the PLO and directed several retaliatory attacks including the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasif Tel in Cairo on November 28, 1971, as well as the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich (Tristam, 2019). The PLO and Fatah’s existence in Lebanon was similarly short-lived and violent. With their base established in Lebanon, the PLO continued to launch operations against Israel, something that many Lebanese — particularly Christian militias— opposed. In retaliation to the continued attacks, Israeli special forces launched a secret attack in April of 1973 in Southern Lebanon which killed three PLO leaders. In 1975, the Lebanese Civil War broke out, embroiling the PLO in yet another conflict with state military forces (Salhani, 2023). Meanwhile, Israel continued to launch counter-offensives against the PLO in Lebanon and finally, in 1982 they invaded the country and successfully expelled Fatah and the PLO once again. The two-month attack, led by General Ariel Sharon, brought the Israeli army into the southern neighborhoods of Beirut. This invasion cost the lives of some 18,000 people, mostly Lebanese civilians. In August of 1982, under international mediation, Yasser Arafat and the PLO left Lebanon and their leadership relocated to Tunisia, from where many ended up back in Gaza and the West Bank (Tristam, 2019). Along with the ousting of the PLO, and the destruction left in Lebanon, the Israeli invasion sparked the creation of Hezbollah, with the support of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (Salhani, 2023). Following this expulsion and dispersion of Fatah and the PLO, internal rifts within the organization further challenged the group's coherence in the following years. Along with the internal division, tensions with Israel were once again on the rise. This boiled over in December of 1987, when an Israeli vehicle crashed into two vans of Palestinian workers, killing four. This was seen by many Palestinians as revenge for the stabbing of an Israeli in Gaza a few days before, and the already heightened tensions rose, sparking the beginning of the first Intifada. The incident resulted in widespread Palestinian protests and attacks against Israeli forces, as well as severe Israeli repression (Britannica, 2024). Approach to Resistance In 1988 as the Intifada continued, after beginning peace talks facilitated by the US, the Fatah-led PLO declared independence as an exiled government, recognized the state of Israel, renounced terrorism, and sought to pursue a two-state solution — fundamentally changing their approach to resistance. This culminated in the 1993 signing of a peace agreement (the Oslo Accords) by Israel and the PLO which established a framework for peace and reconstruction (Britannica, 2024) — these negotiations led to Arafat being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1994 along with Shimon Peres (the then President of Israel) and Yitzhak Rabin (the then Prime Minister of Israel) (Nobel Prize, 1994). Though the signing of the Oslo Accords and the end of the first Intifada served to de-escalate the violence and establish the Palestinian Authority (PA), a new organization that refused to accept the agreements came to prominence — Hamas. Hamas rejected the peace talks, envisioned a traditional Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, and launched a series of suicide attacks against Israel (Britannica, 2024). Despite the work of Hamas however, and following the peace accords, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1994 and Fatah moved its headquarters to Gaza City. Arafat then won the presidency in the first PA-organized elections in 1996 (Britannica, 2024). Currently, the official position of Fatah is a non-violent one. Fatah’s espoused aim is that of a two-state solution based on the 1967 borders, and they aim to achieve this vision through a diplomatic rather than militant approach (Al Tahhan, 2017). Though Fatah follows the diplomatic path, some splinter organizations that came from Fatah are more violent. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades — the armed wing of Fatah which was sidelined following the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004 — have remained a militant resistance force, and participated in the October 7th attacks on Israel and the ensuing conflict (Smyth, 2023) (France24, 2023). Military and Political Capabilities At the time, the Oslo Accords seemed to be a potential turning point, but both sides continued to violate the agreements in their wake — Israel continued to establish settlements in the occupied territories and the PLO continued to import arms. Then, in 2000, as tensions continued to rise on both sides, riots broke out among the Palestinians and the second Intifada began. During the Second Intifada, high-powered weaponry became much more common among resistance fighters. M16s, Uzi’s, and other automatic weapons had become much more accessible — largely due to underground smuggling and seizures from Israeli military targets. Corrupt army members, along with smugglers and gunsellers had created an underground network to sell weapons from the Israeli army's supplies on the black market (Goldenberg, 2000). The second Intifada was more violent than the first, with 4,300 registered fatalities, compared to 2,000 in the first Intifada. The uprising lasted for 5 years, coming to an end in 2005 (Britannica, 2024). Another factor contributing to the violence was the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah. The group initially utilized drive-by shootings and suicide bombings within the West Bank to target Israeli forces and civilians. In 2001, the Brigades leader — and co-founder with Arafat — Yasser Badawi was killed in a car bomb, which sparked an escalation in the Brigade's tactics. They began to launch attacks on civilians inside Israel — a notable attack occurred in January of 2002 when a Brigade member killed 6 people and wounded dozens at a bar mitzvah in Hadera. Following this, a wave of shootings and suicide bombings throughout March of that year led the US State Department to classify the Brigades as a terrorist organization (Pearson, 2023). During all of this, Arafat remained the president of the PA until his death in 2004, when Mahmoud Abbas, one of the original Fatah members, replaced him as leader of the PLO and then president of the PA in 2005 (Britannica, 2024). At the time of Mahmoud Abbas’s election, Fatah’s popularity was waning. Critics saw them and the PA as largely ineffective, tensions were rising between them and Hamas, and many Palestinians were turning to Hamas as an alternative in light of the second Intifada and accusations of corruption against the PA. However, Abbas reached a tenuous agreement with Hamas at the beginning of his presidency, and Hamas entered the political process and worked with the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) to participate in the next round of elections (they had refused to participate in previous elections). Then, surprisingly, Hamas won 57.6 percent of the seats in the PLC in the 2006 elections. After the elections, Israel and the US rejected the results and implemented heavy sanctions on the newly Hamas-led PA. Tensions increased and fighting broke out, with Hamas fighters overrunning Fatah’s security forces compounds. Then, in February 2007, after the fighting had already broken out, the two sides agreed to the Saudi-brokered Mecca Accords to enter into a unified government. This did not last long however, and in June of 2007, it was dissolved by President Abbas along with a call to emergency in the West Bank after Hamas wrestled control of the Gaza Strip away from Fatah. Following 2007 there were sporadic clashes between the groups in Gaza, but the power had settled with Hamas (JustVision). The first attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas came in 2011. Though they reached an agreement that year, it was never implemented. Agreements were reached again in 2012, 2014, and 2017, and while these agreements saw scattered results they never saw a true reconciliation. One of the notable attempts to secure peace was the election of Rami Hamdallah as Prime Minister, who was not a member of Fatah or Hamas but the president of the Al-Najah University. Though Hamdallah was not explicitly a member of Fatah, it was well known that he had close ties to the organization. Then, in 2019 amidst another failure of reconciliation, uncertainty over the future of the PA, and growing tensions in the West Bank, Hamdallah resigned and the tenuous unity between the governing forces came to an end (Britannica, 2024). International Relations and Alliances The degree of alliances and relations that Fatah has are somewhat convoluted. While the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were officially disbanded and absorbed into the PA’s security forces after Araftas death, the group has continued to claim responsibility for a large number of suicide bombings and shootings — sometimes carried out with other organizations like Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Pearson, 2023). Fatah’s seventh conference was held in Ramallah in November 2016. There, Abbas was unanimously elected the commander in chief of Fatah. An eighty-member revolutionary council and a new eighteen-member central committee were also elected at that time (Charif). Most recently there were plans to hold parliamentary and presidential elections in 2021, but before they could happen Abbas canceled the elections – citing concerns that Israel would prevent voting in East Jerusalem (Britannica, 2024). After the events of October 7th, Fatah’s position has become even more tenuous. Fatah has been careful to not show signs of approval for the attack committed by Hamas and has remained intent on peace talks and a de-escalation, despite some of its members having praised or defended the attacks (Pacchiana, 2023). Following the October 7 attacks and the ensuing conflict, at least one of Fatah’s senior officials has been arrested in Gaza (Al Jazeera, 2023). In the West Bank, where Fatah has held sway, the old guard remains unchanged, but many of the younger generation are no longer content with what they view as Fatah’s ineffective approach. Many feel that the peaceful tactics of the PA have not created tangible results — an example of this is the continued expansion of Israeli settlements into the West Bank, despite the fact that these settlements are against international law. Along with these challenges, the recent Israel-Hamas war has led to increased support for Hamas in the West Bank, where Fatah and President Abbas were already losing popularity. Many Palestinians view the PA as conforming to Israeli policies — either through their inaction or infectivity. Among the younger generation, many of whom feel they have nothing to lose, there is a desire to fully revive the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (France24, 2023). Fatah’s silence is a major reason that their support has fallen off among many Palestinians. Many view them as conforming to the Israeli occupation, and in October the PA sparked outrage when they suppressed protests over the violence in Gaza with tear gas and live ammunition, which led to the death of a 12-year-old Palestinian girl and injuries to other protesters (Tahhan, 2023). With rival factions vying for control, waning popularity, and increased unrest, Hamas in power, and the violence from the Israeli occupation in Gaza escalating to unprecedented levels in 2024, the future of Fatah remains unclear.

Insurgency Overview​​ Liwa al-Quds (Free Jerusalem) is a Palestinian armed group loyal to the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Fighting on the side of the Damascus based government since its founding in 2013, Liwa al-Quds has fought anti-government rebels in Aleppo and the Islamic State in Deir ez-Zor. It is currently commanded by Colonel Muhammad al-Sa’eed. History & Foundations Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs found themselves displaced following Israel’s victory in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War in an event known as “the nakba” (the catastrophe). Many settled in Syria, living in the Neirab and Ein al-Tal refugee camps all the way through the start of the 21st century. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, around 20,000 Palestinian refugees lived in Neirab prior to the Syrian Civil War’s outbreak.(1) Not even the camps would be spared from the new wave of violence. Anti-Assad rebels, including members of the then al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra laid siege to both the Neirab and Ein al-Tal camps as part of the wider battle for the city of Aleppo, Syria’s economic epicenter. Muhammad al-Sa’eed, an engineer who lived in Neirab camp and according to some sources a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP - GC, a splinter faction of the larger PFLP loyal to the government in Syria), began organizing Palestinians in the camp, possibly with the help of Syrian intelligence.(2)(3) This led to the group’s establishment in 2013, after which they played a pivotal role in the battle for Aleppo. Currently, they are one of the main forces combing the desert of Deir ez-Zor to dig out the remaining elements of the Islamic State.(4) Liwa al-Quds, although not existing prior to the conflict, has since emerged as one of the most influential groups in Syria, is a great illustration of how the regime's focus on particular nationalities in particular areas enables it to effectively combat the varying groups in the region. Objectives & Ideology Loyalty to the Ba’athist Syrian state is the brigade’s raison d’etat. As one commander of the group put it “we came out to fight for the Syrian Republic because... they took us in as refugees. Now Syria is our Motherland, and we will defend it." Overlapping nationalities seem to play a  role in motivating those to join the group. Despite largely practicing Sunni Islam, the members of Liwa al-Quds did not choose a sectarian alignment by siding with Sunni opposition groups and instead remained loyal to the Alawite dominated regime. Tribal loyalties might also play a part, though the anger many felt at rebels laying siege to their homes in 2013 is a main contributor to the group’s existence.(5) Being a Palestinian militia, the organization would likely take to fighting Israel if a regional war broke out but much would likely depend on the position of the Syrian government, considering it is part of their military structure. The group does not actively antagonize Israel, with the exception of one rocket attack committed in April 2023 - its focus is mostly on Syria and consolidating regime control over the country. But as the largest organized Palestinian group in the country, it would likely see its numbers swell in the event of armed conflict with Israel.(6) Approach to Resistance Liwa al-Quds operates as a conventional military force, receiving training and equipment from the Syrian state as well as Russia and Iran. They were frequently used to shore up regime positions and flanks and received logistical support from the Syrian regime, Iran, and Russia.(7) Some of its members have received special forces training from the Russian military and possibly the Wagner unit as seen in a video shared online. The brigade also cooperates closely with Syrian intelligence agencies and plays a part in suppressing dissent both in the Palestinian camps and elsewhere. One former member of Liwa al-Quds is one of only a few to be put on international trial for crimes against humanity in the conflict, standing accused of having taken part in the detention and torture of a person in 2013.(8) The former Liwa al-Quds fighter was found guilty and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. This does not appear to be an isolated incident, as many pro-opposition Palestinians and Syrians have reported their homes being seized by the group arbitrarily in the Neirab camp.(9) Military & Political Abilities Liwa al-Quds has become one of the largest and most important of the pro-Assad Palestinian groups in Syria. With backing from the government, it has consolidated control over Neirab and Ein al Taf, and played a critical part in organizing the Palestinian community in defense of the regime in Aleppo.(10) It is estimated to have around 5000 members and is heavily supported by Russia. In videos of the group in combat, they can be seen using more rudimentary technicals (trucks fitted with machine guns) and heavier weapons like T-55 tanks provided by the state. Liwa al-Quds heavily promotes political and cultural activities among Syria’s Palestinian population. The group operates its own Youth and Cultural forums, which it has used to put on events in previous years. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Liwa al-Quds emphasized the aid it provided to residents in the Neirab and Ein al-Tal camps. Sa’eed frequently appeared in regime media to discuss health and environmental factors in the camps and Liwa al-Quds role in aiding locals.(11) International Relations & Potential Alliances Liwa al-Quds has received support from both Russia and Iran, both in operations against opposition groups and the Islamic State. By some accounts, Liwa’ al-Quds is one of Russia’s closest allies in the country, with Russian commanders having bestowed several medals on the group’s soldiers and providing them with modern weaponry.(12) Russia will also apparently alert Liwa al-Quds when other Iranian-backed groups are launching operations in Deir ez-Zor. At the same time, the group has been deployed to the same areas as the IRGC in Syria, including Homs.(13) Though it operates independently of other Palestinian factions across the region, it was accused of launching rockets at Israel simultaneously to Hamas in April 2023 due to fighting over Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.(14)  If a wider conflict pulled neighboring countries into battle with Israel, it is possible that Liwa al-Quds would be deployed to the fight, particularly because of its connections with Iran. For now, the group continues to operate in the desert of Deir Ez Zor, fighting the Islamic State for the Syrian government while holding on to elements of their Palestinian national identity.

Insurgency Overview The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, also known as the MILF, is a Filipino militant group dedicated to the self-determination of the Moro people through both political and insurgent action. Formed as a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977, the group engaged in a brutal conflict with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) across the island of Mindanao until a peace agreement was finally agreed on in 2014. Today the MILF continues as a political group, seeking to further the autonomy of the Moro people. History & Foundations Mindanao has hosted Moro insurgent groups since the Spanish annexed the Philippines in the 16th century. Throughout the American annexation in 1898, the Japanese occupation in 1942, and the eventual creation of an independent Philippine state, Moro independence groups have continued to fight what they see as foreign occupation. The MILF sees all of these conflicts as a part of the greater “Moro Jihad,” with three distinct phases, the first being against the Spanish, the second against the Americans, and the third against the Philippines. As a result, they view themselves as the continuation of a century-spanning legacy of mujahideen fighters (Zahir). On the 22nd of September 1972, the Defense Minister of the Philippines, Juan Ponce Enrile, was ambushed during a car ride in Manila. Communist infiltrators were blamed for the attack and the following day, the 23rd, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law (Ortega). Today, increased scrutiny has been placed on this event, with many believing that the ambush was a false flag operation, designed to give Marcos dictatorial powers (Montalván). Crackdowns soon followed and Moro political groups were suppressed. In the political vacuum that ensued, the MNLF, a militant offshoot of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), rose to power. Led by a former student organizer, Nur Misuari, the MNLF consolidated various separatist insurgent and militia groups and began their war against the AFP in October of that year (“MMP: Moro National Liberation Front | FSI”). In 1976, the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement which attempted to broker peace between the MNLF and the Philippine Government (Cagoco-Guiam). While its Moro signatories hoped it would usher in a new age of Moro autonomy, it became almost immediately apparent that no major changes would be made and hostilities flared up again soon after (“MMP: Moro National Liberation Front | FSI”). In the wake of these events, a group of MNLF members split off from the larger organization. Led by their founder, Salamat Hashim, they denounced Misuari as an autocrat and tyrant whose whims were leading the MNLF to destruction. They called for the creation of a Moro autonomous zone, in opposition to the separatist policies of Misuari’s MNLF (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). This “New MNLF'' would change its name to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1984, in an effort to rally the diverse Moro militia groups that made up the MNLF around the flag of Islam (Bale 16). The MILF laid dormant for much of the early years of its existence until its first attack in 1986 on a Catholic wedding in the city of Salvador (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Attacks continued throughout the 80s but the MILF was always overshadowed by the larger and more popular MNLF. The coalition built by Misuari was simply too powerful for the MILF to compete with. In 1996, the “Mindanao Final Agreement” was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government, and with it, Misuari was given control of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (“Mindanao Final Agreement - Peace Accords Matrix”). The new peace agreements fractured the MNLF, and while Misuari had come to rule the autonomous zone, many militia groups in his coalition opted to continue fighting. Most of these groups eventually joined the MILF, greatly increasing its size and power throughout Mindanao (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). This, alongside support from other Mujahideen movements throughout the world, secured the MILF as the predominant insurgent cause amongst the Moro (Bale 17). Misuari’s decision to come out of the jungle created the very same type of power vacuum that propelled the MNLF to notoriety, which would then be filled by the MILF. In March of 2000, a militia unit associated with the MILF raided the municipality of Kauswagan, taking hundreds hostage. In response, the President of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada, declared war against the MILF (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Keeping with traditional Moro strategies used against the Spanish, the MILF relied heavily on fortified strongholds hidden deep in the jungle (Lalkovič 18). In response to this, Philippine forces used a combination of strategic strikes, force consolidation, communications disruption, and maneuver warfare to crush MILF strongholds (Ileto 160-162). All of these efforts culminated in Operation Terminal Velocity, where Philippine forces demolished Camp Abubakar, the central stronghold and command post of MILF forces throughout Mindanao (Ileto 126-139). Throughout the campaign, the MILF failed to adopt guerilla warfare tactics, relying on their strongholds to hold up against the artillery and airpower of the enemy. The MILF would no longer hide in bunkers waiting for the enemy to attack with overwhelming force, instead opting to become guerillas. In 2003, Salamat Ibrahim died of natural causes and was replaced by Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. Ebrahim broke the policy of his hardline predecessor by beginning peace talks with the Philippine government (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Despite a multitude of political hurdles, the “Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro” was signed in 2014, establishing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (“THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO” 4). Today a tenuous peace exists between the two parties, with clashes occasionally occurring between a multitude of MILF affiliated groups and Philippine forces (Uday). Despite this, the group seems to be adjusting to more peaceful political action, endorsing Leni Robredo in her bid for the presidency during the 2022 election (Pedrajas). They continue to advocate for Moro autonomy and reconciliation through their political wing, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP). Objectives and Ideology Since its very beginning, the MILF has been committed to the establishment of an Islamic state. Educated throughout the Middle East, the leaders of the MILF sought to replicate a similar level of conservatism in their home country (Bale 16). They have been active in anti-drug operations, both with vigilante-style reprisals on drug users (Umel and Maitem) and collaborating with the government in its war on drugs (Glang). Today the group seeks to further Moro autonomy and reconcile with the Philippine government through the UBJP (“Philippines election: Moro Islamic Liberation Front endorses candidate”). However, in 2022, the UBJP failed to secure critical municipal seats in the autonomous region and even had some MILF members break ranks and vote for other parties (Xu and Bertrand). The UBJP losing control of the autonomous region could have untold consequences for their future as a peaceful organization as well as the stability of the region. Military and Political Abilities The MILF inherited from their predecessors a very decentralized organization. Even during their zenith, most of the recruitment, training, and logistical responsibilities belonged in the hands of individual units rather than having any sense of standardization (Lalkovič 15). Their weaponry ranged from surplus AFP Vietnam-era M16s and M60s to World War II rifles, Libyan-provided RPGs, as well as handmade guns of every variety. This led to a major problem with splintering and failure to cooperate with ceasefire orders as these units could simply ignore the orders of their commanders (Lalkovič 15-16). Another failure of the decentralized system was the absence of effective communications equipment, something that Philippine forces exploited during the 2000 campaign to sever the connection between MILF central command and their subordinate units, destroying any coordination between them (Ileto 69). For those reasons, despite their estimated size of 15,690 fighters in 1999, the actual force that MILF central command could effectively command was far smaller (Ileto 68). Approach to Resistance Despite its origins as a militant group, the MILF has effectively transitioned into a peaceful political organization, electing to use its political arm, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) as a way to achieve its goals. Most militant factions of the organization have either laid down their arms and been given amnesty or have splintered from the MILF, joining more radical groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) or Abu Sayyaf (ISIS - East Asia). International Relations and Alliances Throughout its tumultuous history, the MILF has held relationships with various other Islamist groups and governments. Gaddafi’s Libya was heavily involved in supporting both the MNLF and MILF, supplying arms to both groups, and even mediating the 1976 Tripoli Agreement that oversaw autonomous divisions for Muslims in the Southern Philippines (Bautista). During the 1990s certain MILF units and leaders associated with Al-Qaeda integrated themselves into AQ logistic networks and received training from AQ operatives (Bale 17). The MILF has also had tenuous relations with its splinter groups, and has particularly been criticized for some of its members retaining relationships with Abu Sayyaf despite the group denouncing them in the 2000s (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Some MILF members, however, have taken it upon themselves to actively fight the Maute Group, the IS group responsible for the Battle of Marawi in 2017 (Fernandez). The most important relationship that the MILF currently has is with the Philippine government. Since 2014 tensions have occasionally flared up, with splinter groups attacking Philippine forces causing dialogues to go sour, but despite this, the MILF continues to negotiate, condemn, and denounce hardline elements in its ranks; even as it loses its grip on the autonomous region.

Insurgency Overview The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a paramilitary republican organization active throughout the island of Ireland since 1986. Since the Irish War of Independence, passing through the Troubles, until nowadays, at least five different organizations have distinguished themselves as the "Irish Republican Army", Óglaigh na hÉireann in Gaelic. Each claimed to be the only one entitled, directly descending from the ancient Fenian army of the Irish War of Independence. History and Foundations CIRA was formed in 1986 following a split from the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the main Republican group in the Troubles. The reasons for the split, similar to the one that led to the separation of the PIRA in 1969 from the Original IRA (OIRA), are rooted in disagreement with the organization’s policy of abstention (3).  Following the rise in popularity due to the 1981 hunger strikes, Gerry Adams, a leading member of Sinn Féin (SF) and the PIRA, convinced himself to capitalize on the electoral success, trying to start a new phase of participatory politics. (5). Since the 1921 partition of Ireland, the political arm of the IRA had always refused to take seats in the Dublin and Stormont Parliaments. However, In September 1986, the PIRA General Army Convention (GAC), the most important body of the organization, decided to suspend the policy of "abstentionism.” Immediately after the resolution was passed, several members of the Army’s Executive Council, a wider level of GAC, left the PIRA (5). According to dissident militants, provisional (provo) leadership was no longer carrying out the anti-British campaign, giving up the "Brits out" line (7). The newborn split group ultimately took the name of Continuity IRA, while another split faction called Republican Sinn Féin (RSF), headed by Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, emerged from Sinn Féin’s lines (5). The organization became militarily active only in 1996, bombing the Killyhevlin Hotel, in Fermanagh County (6). The inactivity between the group's creation and the beginning of military activities is due to the fear of reprisals by the PIRA and as well for a general lack of resources, such as weapons and money. Despite initial logistical difficulties, the CIRA launched a series of bombing actions in collaboration with other republican groups, such as the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). This new attack campaign forced the British army to use military helicopters in the South Armagh, known as Bandit County. The usage of helicopters for military operations was a common practice during the Troubles, and which had been interrupted by peace treaties (6). On August 15th 1998, the most devastating attack of the Troubles took place. It is still unclear whether the CIRA or the RIRA orchestrated the attack. At 3:10 PM a car bomb exploded in downtown Omagh, Tyrone County, despite warnings and vain attempts to evacuate the area. The explosion caused 31 deaths and 220 injuries. Although Continuity IRA has consistently denied any link to the massacre, several clues have thus been suggested that the CIRA played a significant, even though unattributed, role in the attack (3). The attack was condemned without any hesitation by all Irish and British political forces, including Sinn Féin (SF) (6). Even though the Real IRA is now considered the main Omagh bombing suspect, evidence from Michael McKevitt's trial, the former RIRA leader, suggests that the Continuity IRA provided logistical and practical support for the attack (8). During the 2000s, the CIRA experienced a period characterized by internal splits and conflicts. In 2006, another split group started a series of pipe bomb attacks against the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (1). The police force active in Northern Ireland, (NI) strongly hostile to the republican forces and historically composed of a solid Protestant majority (7). With constancy and attention, the organization continued to grow and develop new units throughout Ireland. These cells, called Active Service Units (ASU), are established not only in major centers such as Derry, Belfast and Dublin, but also in counties like Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Louth and Limerick (6). In 2007, Sinn Féin recognized the PSNI as a legitimate police force and this event served as justification for the majority of the paramilitary activities carried out by Continuity IRA and Real IRA. However, 2010 was a crucial year for the organization: a power shift shook the CIRA leadership. The core of the group saw a shift from the south of the island to Northern Ireland and a generational renovation, with the formation of a younger Council. This led to a more decentralized organization and the various ASUs became more independent from the Continuity Army Council (3). Objectives and Ideology Despite the political and mediatic disaster following the Omagh tragedy, the Continuity IRA still emerges as the only Republican paramilitary group that has never declared a cease-fire (3). The organization pursues republican guerrilla warfare according to an historical, traditional and, overall, determinist approach. CIRA's path is militant republicanism and views it as the only way forward (8). Following the republican tradition, CIRA categorically rejects the British presence on the island and does not recognize the authority of the PSNI. Paramilitary actions are strategically confined to Northern Ireland, and they target police stations and government buildings, which are attacked by bomb and arson blitzes (8). The justification for the armed struggle is based on military targets blaming: the PSNI and the British Army are portrayed by the CIRA as occupying forces and, for this reason, as legitimate targets. According to this logic, republican dissidents would not use violence as common criminals but as a self-defense tool (7). One of CIRA's pillars is the historic fight against petty crime and drug dealers, through which the organization has attempted to build an alternative to state presence (7). Even if the intensity of CIRA's activity was significantly lower than past Republican standards, an amount of popular support is always necessary for the continuity of the armed campaign. Ahead of the 2010 elections in Northern Ireland, the Economic and Social Research Council estimated that population support for nationalist dissidents was 8.2% among the Ulster. This data goes up to 15% in the 26-35 age group, and those who sympathize with or justify Republican political violence mostly identify themselves as left-wing and nationalist, which seems to be the main basis for dissidents’ support (7). Paramilitary attacks toward Northern Ireland’s security forces have the main objective of destabilizing the post-Good Friday Agreement (GFA) context and provoking a repressive overreaction that would make London's colonial regime publicly evident. By destabilizing the Northern Irish context post-GFA the paramilitary organization would fulfil a double goal: the delegitimizing of SF, which recognized the PSNI, and the demonstration that Ulster is still going through civil war today as it was in the last century (7). Military and Political Abilities As a result of the Balkan Wars, the CIRA was able to supply itself with weapons and equipment, necessary to conduct its armed struggle through and beyond the various ceasefires (6). The Omagh bombing proved disastrous for the already limited popular support for the post-GFA armed struggle. Unlike the Real IRA, which declared a cease-fire and reorganized under the New IRA banner, the CIRA never abandoned its arms, despite its very limited military capacity (6). By the late 1990s, the IRA tended to have only a dozen volunteers: a policy of cautious growth was adopted, recruiting only individuals radically aligned with the party's political line. (6). By 2006, following splits and internal clashes, CIRA had about fifty active members. Republican Sinn Féin is considered the political wing of the movement, even though the party denies any connection with the CIRA and does not support armed struggle in its media. The Northern Irish legislature strictly prohibits the publication of material in support of any form of terrorism or armed group (7). Despite this, Saoirse and other newspapers linked to Republican dissident groups regularly publish the various statements of CIRA (7). Approach to Resistance Tiger kidnapping, extortion, drug dealer protection, robbery, fuel theft, cigarette smuggling, and drug trafficking are the main activities CIRA uses to self-finance. The group also receives donations from flankers residing in the United States. Republican paramilitaries continue to be viewed by Belfast institutions as a serious threat to Northern Irish society. In reports by the Independent Monitoring Commission, the Continuity IRA is considered directly or indirectly responsible for numerous violent attacks against PSNI property or members. Shootings and bomb attacks against police stations and law enforcement agencies are reportedly traced to members of the organization (4). It is also reported that paramilitaries continue to improve and develop their organizational and military capabilities through the continuous purchase of new weaponry. This is done through the recruitment of new members, mainly young males without a paramilitary background, who are trained in the manufacture of IEDs. The Continuity IRA is still considered one of the main dangers in Northern Ireland (4). Although a process of normalization has been underway for years, Catholic and Protestant communities are still "segregated" and the so-called "culture of violence" is still present in Northern Ireland. Songs, murals, and commemorations celebrating the events of the troubles. Marches, often organized indirectly by paramilitary groups, serve mainly to mobilize youth in working-class neighborhoods. Because of the unclear structure of the groups and little informal support for Republican dissidents, attempts to dismantle these recruitment mechanisms are arduous. (7). International Relations and Potential Alliances The RSF is considered a stable political interlocutor, if not the political arm of the CIRA. The party is in charge of issuing communiqués on behalf of CIRA and manages the welfare system related to the families of political prisoners. RSF considers CIRA's actions legitimate and in continuity with the tradition of militant republicanism (8). In 2012, various radical republican groups, such as the RIRA and Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), decided to converge into a single armed republican front, named the New Irish republican army (New IRA) (2). However, The IRA chose not to converge with the newly formed organization, toward which, however, it feels no animosity (8). On the contrary, the two groups are in all likelihood in constant contact and possible joint operations cannot be ruled out (2). Furthermore, frequent and active cooperation between CIRA and INLA is well reported, mostly during the 90s (3). The provisionals have had dealings with various entities such as ETA, RAF, PLO, Red Brigades, and Qaddafi's Libya; currently, there are known ties between NIRA and Hezbollah (2), the CIRA seems isolated in its struggles because of the small size of its structure. Additional Resources