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Insurgency Overview The Moro Islamic Liberation Front, also known as the MILF, is a Filipino militant group dedicated to the self-determination of the Moro people through both political and insurgent action. Formed as a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977, the group engaged in a brutal conflict with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) across the island of Mindanao until a peace agreement was finally agreed on in 2014. Today the MILF continues as a political group, seeking to further the autonomy of the Moro people. History & Foundations Mindanao has hosted Moro insurgent groups since the Spanish annexed the Philippines in the 16th century. Throughout the American annexation in 1898, the Japanese occupation in 1942, and the eventual creation of an independent Philippine state, Moro independence groups have continued to fight what they see as foreign occupation. The MILF sees all of these conflicts as a part of the greater “Moro Jihad,” with three distinct phases, the first being against the Spanish, the second against the Americans, and the third against the Philippines. As a result, they view themselves as the continuation of a century-spanning legacy of mujahideen fighters (Zahir). On the 22nd of September 1972, the Defense Minister of the Philippines, Juan Ponce Enrile, was ambushed during a car ride in Manila. Communist infiltrators were blamed for the attack and the following day, the 23rd, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law (Ortega). Today, increased scrutiny has been placed on this event, with many believing that the ambush was a false flag operation, designed to give Marcos dictatorial powers (Montalván). Crackdowns soon followed and Moro political groups were suppressed. In the political vacuum that ensued, the MNLF, a militant offshoot of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), rose to power. Led by a former student organizer, Nur Misuari, the MNLF consolidated various separatist insurgent and militia groups and began their war against the AFP in October of that year (“MMP: Moro National Liberation Front | FSI”). In 1976, the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement which attempted to broker peace between the MNLF and the Philippine Government (Cagoco-Guiam). While its Moro signatories hoped it would usher in a new age of Moro autonomy, it became almost immediately apparent that no major changes would be made and hostilities flared up again soon after (“MMP: Moro National Liberation Front | FSI”). In the wake of these events, a group of MNLF members split off from the larger organization. Led by their founder, Salamat Hashim, they denounced Misuari as an autocrat and tyrant whose whims were leading the MNLF to destruction. They called for the creation of a Moro autonomous zone, in opposition to the separatist policies of Misuari’s MNLF (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). This “New MNLF'' would change its name to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 1984, in an effort to rally the diverse Moro militia groups that made up the MNLF around the flag of Islam (Bale 16). The MILF laid dormant for much of the early years of its existence until its first attack in 1986 on a Catholic wedding in the city of Salvador (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Attacks continued throughout the 80s but the MILF was always overshadowed by the larger and more popular MNLF. The coalition built by Misuari was simply too powerful for the MILF to compete with. In 1996, the “Mindanao Final Agreement” was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government, and with it, Misuari was given control of the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (“Mindanao Final Agreement - Peace Accords Matrix”). The new peace agreements fractured the MNLF, and while Misuari had come to rule the autonomous zone, many militia groups in his coalition opted to continue fighting. Most of these groups eventually joined the MILF, greatly increasing its size and power throughout Mindanao (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). This, alongside support from other Mujahideen movements throughout the world, secured the MILF as the predominant insurgent cause amongst the Moro (Bale 17). Misuari’s decision to come out of the jungle created the very same type of power vacuum that propelled the MNLF to notoriety, which would then be filled by the MILF. In March of 2000, a militia unit associated with the MILF raided the municipality of Kauswagan, taking hundreds hostage. In response, the President of the Philippines, Joseph Estrada, declared war against the MILF (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Keeping with traditional Moro strategies used against the Spanish, the MILF relied heavily on fortified strongholds hidden deep in the jungle (Lalkovič 18). In response to this, Philippine forces used a combination of strategic strikes, force consolidation, communications disruption, and maneuver warfare to crush MILF strongholds (Ileto 160-162). All of these efforts culminated in Operation Terminal Velocity, where Philippine forces demolished Camp Abubakar, the central stronghold and command post of MILF forces throughout Mindanao (Ileto 126-139). Throughout the campaign, the MILF failed to adopt guerilla warfare tactics, relying on their strongholds to hold up against the artillery and airpower of the enemy. The MILF would no longer hide in bunkers waiting for the enemy to attack with overwhelming force, instead opting to become guerillas. In 2003, Salamat Ibrahim died of natural causes and was replaced by Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. Ebrahim broke the policy of his hardline predecessor by beginning peace talks with the Philippine government (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Despite a multitude of political hurdles, the “Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro” was signed in 2014, establishing the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (“THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO” 4). Today a tenuous peace exists between the two parties, with clashes occasionally occurring between a multitude of MILF affiliated groups and Philippine forces (Uday). Despite this, the group seems to be adjusting to more peaceful political action, endorsing Leni Robredo in her bid for the presidency during the 2022 election (Pedrajas). They continue to advocate for Moro autonomy and reconciliation through their political wing, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP). Objectives and Ideology Since its very beginning, the MILF has been committed to the establishment of an Islamic state. Educated throughout the Middle East, the leaders of the MILF sought to replicate a similar level of conservatism in their home country (Bale 16). They have been active in anti-drug operations, both with vigilante-style reprisals on drug users (Umel and Maitem) and collaborating with the government in its war on drugs (Glang). Today the group seeks to further Moro autonomy and reconcile with the Philippine government through the UBJP (“Philippines election: Moro Islamic Liberation Front endorses candidate”). However, in 2022, the UBJP failed to secure critical municipal seats in the autonomous region and even had some MILF members break ranks and vote for other parties (Xu and Bertrand). The UBJP losing control of the autonomous region could have untold consequences for their future as a peaceful organization as well as the stability of the region. Military and Political Abilities The MILF inherited from their predecessors a very decentralized organization. Even during their zenith, most of the recruitment, training, and logistical responsibilities belonged in the hands of individual units rather than having any sense of standardization (Lalkovič 15). Their weaponry ranged from surplus AFP Vietnam-era M16s and M60s to World War II rifles, Libyan-provided RPGs, as well as handmade guns of every variety. This led to a major problem with splintering and failure to cooperate with ceasefire orders as these units could simply ignore the orders of their commanders (Lalkovič 15-16). Another failure of the decentralized system was the absence of effective communications equipment, something that Philippine forces exploited during the 2000 campaign to sever the connection between MILF central command and their subordinate units, destroying any coordination between them (Ileto 69). For those reasons, despite their estimated size of 15,690 fighters in 1999, the actual force that MILF central command could effectively command was far smaller (Ileto 68). Approach to Resistance Despite its origins as a militant group, the MILF has effectively transitioned into a peaceful political organization, electing to use its political arm, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) as a way to achieve its goals. Most militant factions of the organization have either laid down their arms and been given amnesty or have splintered from the MILF, joining more radical groups such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) or Abu Sayyaf (ISIS - East Asia). International Relations and Alliances Throughout its tumultuous history, the MILF has held relationships with various other Islamist groups and governments. Gaddafi’s Libya was heavily involved in supporting both the MNLF and MILF, supplying arms to both groups, and even mediating the 1976 Tripoli Agreement that oversaw autonomous divisions for Muslims in the Southern Philippines (Bautista). During the 1990s certain MILF units and leaders associated with Al-Qaeda integrated themselves into AQ logistic networks and received training from AQ operatives (Bale 17). The MILF has also had tenuous relations with its splinter groups, and has particularly been criticized for some of its members retaining relationships with Abu Sayyaf despite the group denouncing them in the 2000s (“MMP: Moro Islamic Liberation Front | FSI”). Some MILF members, however, have taken it upon themselves to actively fight the Maute Group, the IS group responsible for the Battle of Marawi in 2017 (Fernandez). The most important relationship that the MILF currently has is with the Philippine government. Since 2014 tensions have occasionally flared up, with splinter groups attacking Philippine forces causing dialogues to go sour, but despite this, the MILF continues to negotiate, condemn, and denounce hardline elements in its ranks; even as it loses its grip on the autonomous region.

Insurgency Overview The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a paramilitary republican organization active throughout the island of Ireland since 1986. Since the Irish War of Independence, passing through the Troubles, until nowadays, at least five different organizations have distinguished themselves as the "Irish Republican Army", Óglaigh na hÉireann in Gaelic. Each claimed to be the only one entitled, directly descending from the ancient Fenian army of the Irish War of Independence. History and Foundations CIRA was formed in 1986 following a split from the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the main Republican group in the Troubles. The reasons for the split, similar to the one that led to the separation of the PIRA in 1969 from the Original IRA (OIRA), are rooted in disagreement with the organization’s policy of abstention (3).  Following the rise in popularity due to the 1981 hunger strikes, Gerry Adams, a leading member of Sinn Féin (SF) and the PIRA, convinced himself to capitalize on the electoral success, trying to start a new phase of participatory politics. (5). Since the 1921 partition of Ireland, the political arm of the IRA had always refused to take seats in the Dublin and Stormont Parliaments. However, In September 1986, the PIRA General Army Convention (GAC), the most important body of the organization, decided to suspend the policy of "abstentionism.” Immediately after the resolution was passed, several members of the Army’s Executive Council, a wider level of GAC, left the PIRA (5). According to dissident militants, provisional (provo) leadership was no longer carrying out the anti-British campaign, giving up the "Brits out" line (7). The newborn split group ultimately took the name of Continuity IRA, while another split faction called Republican Sinn Féin (RSF), headed by Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, emerged from Sinn Féin’s lines (5). The organization became militarily active only in 1996, bombing the Killyhevlin Hotel, in Fermanagh County (6). The inactivity between the group's creation and the beginning of military activities is due to the fear of reprisals by the PIRA and as well for a general lack of resources, such as weapons and money. Despite initial logistical difficulties, the CIRA launched a series of bombing actions in collaboration with other republican groups, such as the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). This new attack campaign forced the British army to use military helicopters in the South Armagh, known as Bandit County. The usage of helicopters for military operations was a common practice during the Troubles, and which had been interrupted by peace treaties (6). On August 15th 1998, the most devastating attack of the Troubles took place. It is still unclear whether the CIRA or the RIRA orchestrated the attack. At 3:10 PM a car bomb exploded in downtown Omagh, Tyrone County, despite warnings and vain attempts to evacuate the area. The explosion caused 31 deaths and 220 injuries. Although Continuity IRA has consistently denied any link to the massacre, several clues have thus been suggested that the CIRA played a significant, even though unattributed, role in the attack (3). The attack was condemned without any hesitation by all Irish and British political forces, including Sinn Féin (SF) (6). Even though the Real IRA is now considered the main Omagh bombing suspect, evidence from Michael McKevitt's trial, the former RIRA leader, suggests that the Continuity IRA provided logistical and practical support for the attack (8). During the 2000s, the CIRA experienced a period characterized by internal splits and conflicts. In 2006, another split group started a series of pipe bomb attacks against the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) (1). The police force active in Northern Ireland, (NI) strongly hostile to the republican forces and historically composed of a solid Protestant majority (7). With constancy and attention, the organization continued to grow and develop new units throughout Ireland. These cells, called Active Service Units (ASU), are established not only in major centers such as Derry, Belfast and Dublin, but also in counties like Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Louth and Limerick (6). In 2007, Sinn Féin recognized the PSNI as a legitimate police force and this event served as justification for the majority of the paramilitary activities carried out by Continuity IRA and Real IRA. However, 2010 was a crucial year for the organization: a power shift shook the CIRA leadership. The core of the group saw a shift from the south of the island to Northern Ireland and a generational renovation, with the formation of a younger Council. This led to a more decentralized organization and the various ASUs became more independent from the Continuity Army Council (3). Objectives and Ideology Despite the political and mediatic disaster following the Omagh tragedy, the Continuity IRA still emerges as the only Republican paramilitary group that has never declared a cease-fire (3). The organization pursues republican guerrilla warfare according to an historical, traditional and, overall, determinist approach. CIRA's path is militant republicanism and views it as the only way forward (8). Following the republican tradition, CIRA categorically rejects the British presence on the island and does not recognize the authority of the PSNI. Paramilitary actions are strategically confined to Northern Ireland, and they target police stations and government buildings, which are attacked by bomb and arson blitzes (8). The justification for the armed struggle is based on military targets blaming: the PSNI and the British Army are portrayed by the CIRA as occupying forces and, for this reason, as legitimate targets. According to this logic, republican dissidents would not use violence as common criminals but as a self-defense tool (7). One of CIRA's pillars is the historic fight against petty crime and drug dealers, through which the organization has attempted to build an alternative to state presence (7). Even if the intensity of CIRA's activity was significantly lower than past Republican standards, an amount of popular support is always necessary for the continuity of the armed campaign. Ahead of the 2010 elections in Northern Ireland, the Economic and Social Research Council estimated that population support for nationalist dissidents was 8.2% among the Ulster. This data goes up to 15% in the 26-35 age group, and those who sympathize with or justify Republican political violence mostly identify themselves as left-wing and nationalist, which seems to be the main basis for dissidents’ support (7). Paramilitary attacks toward Northern Ireland’s security forces have the main objective of destabilizing the post-Good Friday Agreement (GFA) context and provoking a repressive overreaction that would make London's colonial regime publicly evident. By destabilizing the Northern Irish context post-GFA the paramilitary organization would fulfil a double goal: the delegitimizing of SF, which recognized the PSNI, and the demonstration that Ulster is still going through civil war today as it was in the last century (7). Military and Political Abilities As a result of the Balkan Wars, the CIRA was able to supply itself with weapons and equipment, necessary to conduct its armed struggle through and beyond the various ceasefires (6). The Omagh bombing proved disastrous for the already limited popular support for the post-GFA armed struggle. Unlike the Real IRA, which declared a cease-fire and reorganized under the New IRA banner, the CIRA never abandoned its arms, despite its very limited military capacity (6). By the late 1990s, the IRA tended to have only a dozen volunteers: a policy of cautious growth was adopted, recruiting only individuals radically aligned with the party's political line. (6). By 2006, following splits and internal clashes, CIRA had about fifty active members. Republican Sinn Féin is considered the political wing of the movement, even though the party denies any connection with the CIRA and does not support armed struggle in its media. The Northern Irish legislature strictly prohibits the publication of material in support of any form of terrorism or armed group (7). Despite this, Saoirse and other newspapers linked to Republican dissident groups regularly publish the various statements of CIRA (7). Approach to Resistance Tiger kidnapping, extortion, drug dealer protection, robbery, fuel theft, cigarette smuggling, and drug trafficking are the main activities CIRA uses to self-finance. The group also receives donations from flankers residing in the United States. Republican paramilitaries continue to be viewed by Belfast institutions as a serious threat to Northern Irish society. In reports by the Independent Monitoring Commission, the Continuity IRA is considered directly or indirectly responsible for numerous violent attacks against PSNI property or members. Shootings and bomb attacks against police stations and law enforcement agencies are reportedly traced to members of the organization (4). It is also reported that paramilitaries continue to improve and develop their organizational and military capabilities through the continuous purchase of new weaponry. This is done through the recruitment of new members, mainly young males without a paramilitary background, who are trained in the manufacture of IEDs. The Continuity IRA is still considered one of the main dangers in Northern Ireland (4). Although a process of normalization has been underway for years, Catholic and Protestant communities are still "segregated" and the so-called "culture of violence" is still present in Northern Ireland. Songs, murals, and commemorations celebrating the events of the troubles. Marches, often organized indirectly by paramilitary groups, serve mainly to mobilize youth in working-class neighborhoods. Because of the unclear structure of the groups and little informal support for Republican dissidents, attempts to dismantle these recruitment mechanisms are arduous. (7). International Relations and Potential Alliances The RSF is considered a stable political interlocutor, if not the political arm of the CIRA. The party is in charge of issuing communiqués on behalf of CIRA and manages the welfare system related to the families of political prisoners. RSF considers CIRA's actions legitimate and in continuity with the tradition of militant republicanism (8). In 2012, various radical republican groups, such as the RIRA and Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD), decided to converge into a single armed republican front, named the New Irish republican army (New IRA) (2). However, The IRA chose not to converge with the newly formed organization, toward which, however, it feels no animosity (8). On the contrary, the two groups are in all likelihood in constant contact and possible joint operations cannot be ruled out (2). Furthermore, frequent and active cooperation between CIRA and INLA is well reported, mostly during the 90s (3). The provisionals have had dealings with various entities such as ETA, RAF, PLO, Red Brigades, and Qaddafi's Libya; currently, there are known ties between NIRA and Hezbollah (2), the CIRA seems isolated in its struggles because of the small size of its structure. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Resistencia Mapuche Lavkenche (Mapuche Lafkenche Resistance) (RML), is a militant organization operating in the Araucania and Bio Bio regions of Chile since 2020. The group follows a doctrine of armed resistance against the Chilean state as well as the forestry and logging industries that operate in the area. Their main objective is the expulsion of these industries, which according to them operate in conjunction with the state and the local and national elites in their territory. This is all in the scope of achieving the autonomy of the Mapuche people (1). Their praxis centers around armed actions and sabotage. In 2022 the Congress of Chile listed the RML as a terrorist organization, alongside the CAM, WAM, and RMM (2). History and Ideology The Mapuche Conflict is a long-term movement that can be traced back to the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors in the 16th century. However, while it has developed through centuries, the RML is a contemporary case of the new types of militant and armed Mapuche organizations that have popped up over the years. This group, like others, was initiated by the original Mapuche incendiary attacks and the founding of the CAM (Coordinadora Arauco Malleco) in 1997 and 1998 respectively (3). The organization does not have a proper founding date, but its earliest action was an attempted sabotage of a bridge on the 13th of April 2020 (4). The attack was made by detonating a car bomb, all while participating in armed attacks against police forces on the same route (5). However, the explosive detonated before the vehicle reached the bridge so it did not damage critical infrastructure (6). After the attack, the group published a communique, a recurrent practice of the organization, which can help us outline their ideological background. The group's ideology can be understood as being composed of two categories: anticapitalism and indigenism. These can be extrapolated from the communiques published by the organization. Anticapitalism is a recurring topic when they refer to their relation with the industries present in the territory they claim as their own, summarized in their words as an “unrestricted compromise of expelling from our territory the forestry industries and any other capitalist expression that threatens the Mapuche way of life and their people.” (7) Their demand for the forestry industry to leave the area is continually stated, as can be seen in other communiques published on July 2021 (8), December 2021 (9), November 2022 (10), and September 2023 (11), just to list a few examples. The indigenist aspect of the group’s ideology can also be extrapolated from their arguments and demands, in one of the messages published they declare: “If they want war, they will have it and if they want peace they will have to give back the territories usurped by blood and fire from our ancestors” (12). The narrative built centers not only on a recuperation of the territory but also of customs and a sense of identity that is connected to the land, for this reason, their name the land the “Walmapu” (surrounding territory in Mapudungun) and constantly refer to traditional figures and call for the Mapuche people to return to their way: “We make a call, also, to the alluded communities to ponder on their actions and retake their own way as Mapuche, based on the norms traced by our Kuifikeche (ancestors) that obliges us not to compromise with the usurper Winka (non-mapuche)” (13). Because of this the group consciously builds a counter-narrative, as stated in a communique: “today those who, in light of our actions, attempt to show themselves as victims are the same that have justified the territorial dispossession creating a false truth, believing themselves owners of a history that does not belong to them”. (14) As of recently, during September of 2023, the group got involved in a highly mediatic controversy, when Chilean authorities claimed to have detained members of the MLR, revealing that two of the alleged members were part of the Chilean police, Carabineros (15). These claims were quickly denied by the group, stating that it was a manipulation scheme from the media that aimed to damage the group’s image (16). It is also important to remark that the organization (probably before their formal organization) conducted activities in the same territory. Additionally, the group claims that Lemuel Fernandez, a Mapuche killed by the police in 2019 (17), is one of their own (18). Approach to Resistance The MLR has stated that their actions are decided through a process that corresponds with the traditional Mapuche way, discussed between the communities (this is called nütram, which translates to dialogues), which are composed of different “lov”, the traditional familial structure (19). Most of the actions that have been taken by the group are incendiary attacks against infrastructure, however, the specific objectives may vary. In 2020 they attacked an antenna that belonged to Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil (Directorate General of Civil Aviation) and in 2021 they claimed attacks against 31 cabins (typically used for tourism) in Contulmo. In 2022 they destroyed around 35 units of machinery connected to the forestry industry and in 2023 they claimed more incendiary attacks, the first one in April targeting agricultural land in Lebu and then in August, where they burned more cabins next to Lake Lanalhue (20). Alliances & Relations The group hasn’t conducted attacks with other militant groups active in the area, but they have shown solidarity with them and published some communiques together. For example, in July 2021, they published a communique about the death of Pablo Marchant, a member of the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), sending their condolences to his family and claiming that in light of those developments, they will follow the steps of Pablo and other weichafe (warriors) that have been killed during the conflict. They also renewed their support for the armed struggle against the Chilean state and forestry industries present in the region. This communique was also signed by the Weichan Auka Mapu (WAM) (21).

Insurgency Overview The Eastern Security Network (ESN) is the paramilitary branch of the Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB),a separatist organization that operates primarily in the south eastern provinces of Nigeria. The group is purported to be a defensive organization whose aim is to protect the ethnic Igbo people, who make up the Biafran identity, against violence from either state forces or other ethnic groups. The Eastern Security Network exists as a part of IPOB and the goal of both organizations is to restore an independent state of Biafra (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). History and Foundations The group was established in December of 2020 by Nnamdi Kanu, the leader of ESN and IPOB, after escalating incidents of violence between the IPOB and Nigerian state forces. The Eastern Security Network and Indigenous Peoples of Biafra are groups composed primarily of ethnic Igbo people, who aim to restore their cultural homeland. At the time of their inception, Kanu claimed that the creation of the ESN was intended to protect Igbos from the Fulani — another prominent ethnic group in Nigeria (Campbell, 2021). Half a year after the establishment of the ESN in June of 2021, security personnel informed Cable News that IPOB had recruited over 50,000 foot soldiers into the ESN. This operative also claimed that ESN had been stockpiling weapons, many of which had been stolen from police armories during previous protests. The individual stated that “they (ESN) have been bringing in arms through Cameroon in partnership with the Ambazonia Governing Council, a separatist movement in Southern Cameroon. IPOB sends at least 2,000 men and women to Cameroon for training on weapon handling every week” (Yusuff, 2021). This information however, was never confirmed by individuals from the ESN or IPOB. Objectives and Ideology The purported objective of the ESN is to act as a defensive force and protect the ethnic Igbo people from discrimination or violence from the Nigerian state or other ethnic groups in the regions. However, as the ESN is a part of IPOB, their broader objective is the same — to establish an independent Biafran State (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). While the ESN may be aimed at secession through military force, there are reasons that highlight the need for defensive forces to protect Igbo people — as claimed by Kanu and IPOB. There have been incidents, recorded by Amnesty International, of extrajudicial killings as well as the Nigerian military firing live ammunition with little to no warning in order to disperse crowds (Brody, 2020). Between August 2015 and 2016, before the established of the ESN, the investigations of Amnesty International showed the Nigerian military consistently firing live ammunition on crowds, as well as mass killings by security forces — including at least 60 protestors who were shot dead over two days while participating in events that mark Biafra Remembrance Day in May of 2016 (Amnesty, 2016). The IPOB gatherings and protests documented by Amnesty International that led to these killings were largely peaceful, leaving no doubt of the illegitimacy of the use of military force. Military & Political Capabilities The ESN and IPOB have been engaged in guerilla conflict with Nigerian state forces since 2021 — with Nigeria claiming that the group(s) are responsible for a number of attacks in recent years (Nwonwu, 2023). Police blamed ESN for an armed assault on the Imo State Police Headquarters and correctional facility in April of 2021 which led to the escape of more than 1,800 inmates. Muhammadu Buhari, the then president of Nigeria, denounced the attack as an “act of terrorism” and ordered security forces to apprehend the fleeing convicts (Owolabi, 2021). IPOB and ESN denied responsibility for this attack, and accused the Nigerian government of staging attacks in order to blame them. According to police reports from the incident, the attackers used a range of weaponry, including General-Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs), Sub-Machine Guns (SMGs), AK47 rifles, Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) (Sahara Reporters, 2021). Shortly after this incident, the media and publicity secretary for the organization, Emma Powerful, stated the group “produces their own arms locally.” This came as a response to state claims the IPOB was planning to attack local banks in order to acquire money and purchase weaponry. He went on to caution banks in the Biafran region, stating that the Department of State Services may have been planning to sponsor attacks in order to blame IPOB and ESN (Akpan, 2021). These claims were never backed up. While the group claims their arms are produced locally, there are incidents of conflict or seizures by the Nigerian state forces that would suggest otherwise. In July of 2023 troops raided an enclave in Asaba, the Delta State capitol. The troops exchanged gunfire with ESN forces before they fled. The troops captured one of the fleeing individuals and recovered small weaponry including AK47 rifles, semi automatic rifles, and a G3 rifle (Oyero, 2023). Several months after this incident, in October of 2023, Nigerian state forces reportedly recovered several locally made artillery projectile launchers as well as 48 rounds of 7.62mm NATO ammunition (David, 2023). There has been an ongoing back and forth of blows between the ESN and Nigerian forces, but as recently as December of 2023, a commander of IPOB and the ESN — Uchechukwu Akpa — was arrested at his hideout in Awgu Government Area of Enugu state, along with three other operatives. Akpa was purported to be the second-in-command to a previously captured ESN leader, was taken into custody after sustaining a gunshot injury in an attempt to flee. It remains to be seen what will happen to Akpa and the ESN’s leadership structures in light of his apprehension (Leadership News, 2023). Approach to Resistance The ESN has claimed to be solely a defensive organization, whose purpose is to protect the indigenous Igbo people from discrimination by the Nigerian government or other ethnic groups (Campbell, 2021). However, there have been numerous incidents of violence carried out by the group that conflict with their alleged purpose. The group is also subject to IPOB, being simply a wing under the umbrella organization that is led by Kanu. In 2021, IPOB threatened to deploy the ESN after 14 days if governors of southeast Nigeria did not, in compliance with the 1969 Statutory Law of Nigeria, ban open grazing – a practice that was attributed primarily to members of the Fulani ethnic group. (Njoku, 2021). After this statement was made, the ESN did not wait for the promised 14 days but instead attacked a Fulani camp in Isuikwuato, Abia State, where the operatives killed livestock, chased away herdsmen, and burned down their houses. Kanu shared a video after the incident which showed these actions and contained audio of members speaking out against the Fulani. (Sahara, 2021). In January of 2021, shortly before this incident, another conflict took place between the ESN and the Nigerian army. The government deployed troops with the directive of destroying ESN bases, which were perceived as a threat to the state's authority. Fighting broke out in the town of Orlu, in Imo State, and the conflict lasted for a week before Kanu declared a ceasefire, stating that he was redirecting ESN efforts against “Fulani raiders” and noting that they had withdrawn from the city (Campbell, 2021). A more recent instance of conflict comes from October of 2023, when a group of suspected ESN members attacked motorists at the Ezzamgbo Junction in Ohaukwu Local Government Area and burnt several vehicles. Ebonyi State Police stated that a group of armed men in a Sienna car set fire to three commuter buses, four motorcycles, and one tricycle while shooting into the air to intimidate residents. No injuries were sustained during this attack. This attack was thought to be an attempt to enforce the Monday sit-at-home protest order that IPOB implemented — a demand that local residents stay at home every Monday to protest in support of IPOBs cause (Ogbonnaya, 2023). While the  IPOB and the ESN tend to frame their conflicts as defensive, they have been blamed for numerous attacks and violent incidents over the years, though they are difficult to prove. In September of 2023, 8 security personnel were killed in a gunfight in the country’s southeast. This was just one of the most recent examples of what has grown into a string of attacks in recent years that are blamed on IPOB and the ESN (Asadu, 2023). Primarily through the military activities of the ESN, IPOB was Ranked as the 10th deadliest terror organization of 2023 according to the Global Terrorism Index — though this was based on attacks attributed to the group, and not ones they themselves have claimed. The Institute for Economics and Peace, which creates the Global Terrorism Index, attributed 40 attacks and 57 deaths to IPOB in 2022, a significant increase from 26 attacks and 34 deaths in 2021, though again all through attacks that IPOB has denied or failed to claim responsibility for (Johnson, 2023). While it is not possible to know the exact scope of the ESN and IPOB’s military capacity, their tactical abilities remain a formidable force against the Nigerian state.

Insurgency Overview The Sandinista National Liberation Front, or Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) is a left-wing political party in Nicaragua. Named after Augusta César Sandino, an anti-imperialism Nicaraguan fighter from the 1920s, the group has grown from an armed resistance at its foundation in 1961 into the country's dominant political party (Bodenheimer, 2019). The group was established as an opposition force to the dictatorship of the Somoza family, spending more than a decade organizing political support — primarily from students, workers, and peasants — and launching attacks against Nicaraguan forces. In the mid-1970s the retaliation from the Somoza family left two of the FSLN founders dead and split the group into three factions with somewhat differing approaches to resistance. The groups then reunited under Daniel and Humberto Ortega during the Nicaraguan revolution of 1978-79 which ended in the toppling of the Somoza dictatorship (Britannica, 2023). The Sandinistas then governed Nicaragua until 1990, during which period they faced armed resistance from the CIA-backed Contras. In 1990, the Sandinistas lost elections to a coalition funded by the United States, which was headed by Violeta Chamorro. Chamorro was the daughter of a wealthy Nicaraguan cattle rancher who received much of her early education in the United States. She returned to Nicaragua after the death of her father in 1950, where she married the editor of the newspaper La Prensa. After getting more involved with the newspaper and Nicaraguan politics, being exiled to Costa Rica and returning, Violetta became a member of the Sandinista ruling junta in 1979-80. However, she soon became disillusioned with the party and split away before getting involved with the National Opposition Union (UNO). Chamorro and the UNO received funding from the US, as part of the CIA’s campaign to destabilize the FSLN regime (Kansas). Since then, Daniel Ortega, who remains the current leader of the FSLN, has been reelected in 2006, 2011, and 2016 (Bodenheimer, 2019). Since his 2016 reelection, Ortega has demonstrated increased corruption and authoritarianism — such as violent protest repression, the jailing of opposition leaders, and the shuttering of numerous NGOs and media outlets (POLITICO, 2022). Along with the increased accusations of corruption, Ortega's popularity has waned significantly. As of polling in June 2023, popular support for the FSLN and Ortega is only 15% and even within that percentage, party members are divided about Ortega himself. About 35% of the Sandinista supporters disapprove of Ortega and his government, illustrating the internal ruptures within the party (Dialogue, 2023). History and Foundations The FSLN was founded in 1961 by Tomás Borge, Carlos Fonseca, and Silvio Mayorga, with Fonseca usually being seen as the soul of the organization, as well as the mastermind behind the ideology of the group. Fonseca was inspired by the success of the Cuban revolution and by resistance leaders such as Che Guevara and Augusta César Sandino (Bodenheimer, 2019). Sandino, whom the FSLN was named after, was a guerrilla resistance fighter against the US occupation of Nicaragua in 1926. He then led a group of several hundred resistance fighters against the Nicaraguan National Guard and US Marines in opposition to the US occupation. After the end of the occupation in 1933, Sandino was invited to meet with the Somoza authorities in order to attempt to reach a peace agreement, where he was instead abducted and executed on Somoza’s orders (Britannica, 2024). At the time of the FSLN’s founding, Fonseca, Mayorga, and Borge were living in exile in Honduras as previous members of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. The ideological transition that led to the founding of FSLN began after the success of the Cuban revolution. Fonseca had traveled to Havana just months after the revolution and he, as well as other leftist students, were inspired to attempt to bring a similar revolution to Nicaragua (Bodenheimer, 2019). Objectives and Ideology The initial goals of the FSLN upon its founding were 1: to achieve Nicaraguan liberation and sovereignty — highlighted by the realities of U.S imperialism and 2: to create a socialist state which the founders believed would serve to end the exploitation of the Nicaraguan workers and lower classes (Bodenheimer, 2019). Initially, the FSLN followed Guevara’s “foco theory” of guerilla warfare, which emphasized the use of mobility, surprise, and covering terrain in order to make up for the resistance's lack of arms and numbers. The goals of this type of combat were generally to disrupt the regime's communication, transport, and supply networks. At the outset, the group aimed to stir up support primarily among peasants, students, and workers. For several years, they struggled to garner the types of grassroots support they hoped to find, which eventually led to a change in tactics. In January of 1965, Carlos Fonseca was deported to Guatemala, where he was introduced to the concept of “protracted people's war” by Luís Turcios Lima — a member of the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), an offshoot of the Guatemalan Communist Party. The idea of “protracted people's war” came from Asian guerrilla theorists Mao Zedong and Vo Nguyen Giap. The following year, a contingent of the FSLN led by Oscar Turcios fought in Guatemala with the Rebel Armed Forces on the Zacapa Front. Following these events, the FSLN had gained a great deal of practical experience and the seeds of a new ideological framework. Back in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were primarily concerned with organizing a viable support network through the peasant classes. However, in May of 1967, their activities were discovered by the regime, and a counter-strike was launched which led to the destruction of one-third of the organization's forces — a column that had been led by Silvio Mayorga (Nolan, 1986). Military & Political Capabilities Over the years following the 1967 counter-strike, the FSLN went through a significant organizational and ideological shift. The group shifted to a more distributed leadership structure, with power being decentralized among the seven members of their National Directorate. While this divide also sewed the seeds of internal division that would come to fruition later, it also served to foster resilience within the movement. The group adopted the “Prolonged Popular War” or Guerra Popular Prolongada (GPP) as a strategic doctrine. The GPP was loosely based on the Vietnamese and Chinese revolutions and called for the “accumulation of forces in silence. The group’s military activity dropped off and their focus turned toward recruitment and guerrilla training, where groups were sent to the north central mountain zone in order to build a support base in preparation for renewed military engagements. From 1970 through 1974 the organization stuck to its ideals and did not engage in guerrilla warfare, but rather focused on building a rural peasant network. In this period the urban side of the FSLN worked with other groups, such as the Revolutionary Student Front (FER) and the Christian Revolutionary Movement (MCR), in order to free Sandinista prisoners, spread propaganda, and gather supplies for the guerrillas. This period of silent accumulation ended on December 27, 1974, when the home of a powerful Somoza supporter was seized in Managua. Following this event, President Anastasio Somoza accepted the FSLN’s demands but retaliated with a campaign of violence and destruction perpetrated by the Nicaraguan National Guard. For a while, the guerrilla fighters and the national guard traded blows but eventually, the superior weaponry and manpower of Nicaraguan forces won out, forcing the main guerrilla force to flee into the remote jungles of eastern Nicaragua. During this period four major commanders of the FSLN, including Carlos Fonseca and Silvio Mayorga, were killed and Tomás Borge was captured (Nolan, 1986). Approach to Resistance After the seeming defeat of the guerrilla fighters and the death of Fonseca in 1976, the FSLN split into three different factions, or tendencias, that disagreed over whether the group should again attempt to accumulate forces and support in silence, or ally with other political groups amidst the growing rebellion. The groups remained estranged until 1978 when the factions united again under the Terceristas, the third faction that was headed by Daniel and Humberto Ortega. This reunification of the different factions left the FSLN united, with around 5,000 fighters. The FSLN called for a national uprising in September of that year, which catalyzed the Nicaraguan Revolution. By the spring of 1979, the revolution was in full swing, with the FSLN maintaining various rural strongholds while most cities were facing significant uprisings. By late June, the FSLN was engaged in combat for Managua, and on July 19th, they took control of the capital city. The National Guard and previous governmental strongholds collapsed, with many of the former members fleeing the country to Guatemala, Honduras, or Costa Rica (Bodenheimer, 2019). Once the FSLN gained power, they set up a National Directorate, which comprised three members from each of the factions, to lead the country. Their efforts to unify and rebuild the country were complicated by the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the ensuing US involvement in Nicaragua. International Relations and Partnerships In 1981, Reagan and the CIA began to fund exiled paramilitary forces in Honduras in an attempt to destabilize the FSLN’s new regime. This was the beginning of the Contras (counter-revolutionaries) engagement with the FSLN (Bodenheimer, 2019). In response to this, the FSLN established a Sandinista Popular Army of 50,000 men headed by Humberto Ortega and a secret police force to guard against espionage that was led by Tomás Borge. At the same time, the FSLN was experiencing internal conflict due to ideological differences which would lead to the resignations of many non-Marxist members of the leadership, primarily instigated by issues of political rights. The internal disintegrations combined with the pressure from the Contra’s resistance pushed the FSLN farther and farther to the left until they became dependent on the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba (Britannica, 2023). By 1984 and with US support, the Contras numbered 15,000 and were engaging in significant sabotage acts against Nicaragua. However, that same year, the US Congress passed a law that banned future funding to the Contras. The CIA remained undeterred and instead began to fund the Contras through the illegal sale of arms to Iran. This later became known as the Iran-Contra affair. The internal difficulties of the FSLN, embargos from countries like Venezuela and Mexico, and the entanglement with the Contra’s and US aggression pushed the government toward a more authoritarian approach to maintaining order (Bodenheimer, 2019). In 1990, under strong international pressure, Nicaragua held free elections and the FSLN lost to a U.S. assembled coalition led by Violeta Chamorro — the then-presidential candidate for the 14-party National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositor) (Britannica, 2023). Following these elections, the Sandinistas had once again become an opposition party, and many members were left disillusioned with the reality of the party’s government and leadership. In the wake of their loss, Daniel Ortega was the rallying point for the FSLN and his consolidation of power led him to run for president again in 1996, 2001, and 2006. Ortega was successfully re-elected in 2006, though not before being found guilty of embezzlement in 2003 and sentenced to 20 years in jail (this sentence was overturned in 2009). Along with Ortega's sentence being overturned in 2009, the Supreme Court also lifted constitutional limits on presidential terms which allowed Ortega to be re-elected in 2011. Further barriers were lifted after this allowing for a following reelection in 2016. Ortega’s position has strayed further and further into authoritarianism as time has progressed, with significant repression of student protests, reports of media harassment, the jailing of political opponents, and accounts of torture and illegal detentions. As of September 2018, Ortega's government has outlawed protest in the country (Bodenheimer, 2019). Following these events, in January of 2019, the FSLN was expelled from the Socialist International — an international organization of political parties seeking to establish socialist democracies — for violations of human rights and democratic values. The foreign minister of Spain, Joseph Borrell Fontelles, stated on twitter that “socialism is incompatible with tyranny, in regards to the expulsion of the FSLN (Havana, 2019). As of 2023, Nicaragua scored only 19/100 in the Freedom House Scale that ranks how free different countries are. Nicaragua has 5 out of 40 possible political rights and 14 out of 60 possible civil liberties, according to Freedom House. Between February and May of 2023, at least 50 outspoken critics of the current government — including political rivals — received prison sentences in trials that have been denounced as unfair (Freedom, 2023). Recent polling has illustrated a significant decline in popularity of Ortega and the FSLN. As of June 2023, support for the FSLN and Ortega among the population was 15%. Even within Sandinista supporters, only 65% supported Ortega and the current government (Dialogue, 2023).

Note: This is not the official flag of the FARIP, but rather a substitute containing the flag of Colombia (as this is the country they were active in). Insurgency Overview The Indigenous Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Pacific (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Indígenas del Pacífico: FARIP) was a Colombian guerrilla organization founded in 1987 as an offshoot of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia: FARC). Between its foundation in 1987 and its dissolution in 1996, the FARIP operated within several Indigenous communities of the Pacific region of Colombia. The Colombian Pacific is a sparsely populated region of lowland rainforests and mangrove swamps located west of the Cordillera Occidental, the westernmost arm of the Colombian Andes. Four Colombian departments are located primarily or partially within the Pacific region: from north to south, these are Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, and Nariño. Demographically, this region is primarily populated by Afro-Colombians and various Indigenous ethnic groups. Due to the prevalence of ethnic and racial lines of difference in this poor and underdeveloped region of Colombia, the formation of several guerrilla groups in this region during the acceleration of the Colombian conflict in the 1980s occurred along those same ethnic and racial lines. When the FARIP formed in Chocó in 1987, it was consolidated as an explicitly Indigenous guerrilla, recruiting from several Indigenous populations in the Colombian Pacific. This ethnic character differentiated the FARIP from other guerrillas based in the Colombian Pacific, which were either multiethnic or Afro-Colombian in composition (“Alerta en Chocó” 1996; Arocha 1999, 105; “El territorio fue la primera víctima” 2022; “Un manifiesto para la paz” 2023). Ideologically, the FARIP presented itself as a territorial defense force fighting on behalf of the Indigenous populations of the Colombian Pacific (“Alerta en Chocó” 1996; Arocha 1999, 105; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2022, 54). However, what began as an organization ostensibly oriented towards the defense of Indigenous territories quickly transformed into an armed group in the style of other Colombian guerrillas, quickly investing in cocaine production and oil exploitation along the Pacific coast—two of the primary sources of income for most armed groups in the Colombian conflict, whether through direct control or the extortion of existing operations (Rangel Suárez 2000). During its nine years of existence, the FARIP carried out several armed actions and assassinations in its zone of operation, often in coordination with allied guerrilla groups such as the FARC and the ELN. When its support base of Indigenous communities eventually turned against the FARIP due to the detrimental consequences of the group’s activities in the region, the group voluntarily disarmed and disbanded in 1996, partly through the intervention of Colombia’s foremost Indigenous civil society organization: the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia: ONIC) (Comisión de la Verdad 2022b, 97). History & Foundations The FARIP was founded in Chocó in 1987 following the recruiting efforts of the 34th Front of the Northwestern Block of the FARC, a unit based in Chocó and neighboring Antioquia that commanded a fighting force of several hundred soldiers as of the mid-1980s. The FARC, historically the largest and most powerful left-wing guerrilla in Latin America, was not an explicitly Indigenist organization, but some of its divisions did include Indigenous militants. These elements made efforts to radicalize the Indigenous communities inhabiting their areas of operation, particularly in the Colombian southwest, including in the Pacific (Bonilla Montenegro 2021, 220). The FARC was also, however, known for targeting and abusing Indigenous communities in its zones of control, which also extended to the treatment of Indigenous soldiers within FARC ranks (Andrés Barahona 2011; María González 2013). The emergence of the FARIP was the result of Indigenous recruits’ split from the FARC in protest over the abuse they suffered at the hands of non-Indigenous militants (Comisión de la Verdad 2022a, 222). Despite this split, the FARIP was logistically supported by the 34th Front through the provision of munitions and training. Both groups also carried out several armed actions in conjunction, such as the seizure of the municipal seat of Riosucio. Similar relations were maintained with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional: ELN), another nominally left-wing guerrilla operating in the region (Comisión de la Verdad 2022b, 95). When the FARC began recruiting among the Indigenous communities of Chocó, they appealed to locals’ fears concerning their territorial autonomy in the face of a planned government megaproject: the Atrato-Truandó Interoceanic Canal, which would have connected the Colombian Pacific with the Caribbean coast, but which was never completed (Comisión de la Verdad 2022b, 64). After the construction project was approved by the Colombian Congress in 1987, state actors began displacing Indigenous communities living along the planned canal route; the FARIP formed in the context of local resistance to these processes of dispossession. This and other threats to Indigenous territorial autonomy provided the primary rationale for the recruitment efforts of the FARIP. However, the presence of the FARIP had the effect of “deepening the existing tensions in the context of the extractive processes” taking place in the north of Chocó, particularly when the group began carrying out acts of violence (ibid., 96). The public opposition to the FARIP that manifested as a result of such consequences would ultimately prove their downfall, resulting in their disarmament and disbanding in 1996 (Comisión de la Verdad 2022b, 97). Objectives & Ideology As an offshoot of the FARC, an ostensibly left-wing guerrilla that has its historical roots in the peasant movement of the 1960s, the Marxist-Leninist ideology of Colombia’s foremost guerrilla may have constituted the ideological basis of the FARIP—a link also suggested by this group’s retention of the “revolutionary” moniker in its name. However, the Marxist-Leninist ideological stratum borrowed from the FARC was likely of less importance to the militants of the FARIP than the specifically Indigenous ethnic component of the organization, which appealed to local Indigenous communities’ concerns regarding territorial autonomy and their frustration with the discrimination experienced at the hands of both other guerrilla groups and the Colombian state (Comisión de la Verdad 2022a; 2022b). In this sense, the FARIP was of Indigenist ideology, advocating for the territorial autonomy of the Indigenous populations of the Pacific through violent opposition. Political & Military Capabilities Figures vary widely as to the size of the FARIP at its height. In 1996, the group was reported to include 60 Indigenous militants in the vicinity of the Baudó and Juradó rivers, both along the Pacific coast of Chocó (“Alterta en Chocó” 1996). Another source estimates up to 1,000 members active in Chocó and the border zones of the neighboring departments of Antioquia, Risaralda, and Valle del Cauca (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2014, 276). At its height, the FARIP’s zone of operation may have extended as far as Colombia’s Caribbean coast via the municipality of Urabá (Comisión de la Verdad 2022a, 222). It is unknown how well-armed and well-trained the FARIP was at its height. Still, it was at least capable of carrying out armed attacks in coordination with other guerrillas, as well as engaging in extortion, illicit economic activities such as coca cultivation and cocaine production, and the occasional targeted assassination. Unlike other guerrillas like the FARC and the M-19, the FARIP did not make the transition to electoral politics upon its disbandment. Like the FARC and other armed groups, the FARIP is known to have engaged in the forced recruitment of minors, including children as young as 10 (“Alerta en Chocó” 1996; Supúlveda López de Mesa 2008, 260). The forced recruitment of child soldiers is characteristic of various armed groups involved in the Colombian conflict (Comisión de la Verdad 2022a; Hurtado 2023). Approach to Resistance The FARIP forms part of the tradition of left-wing guerrillas in the Colombian conflict, deriving from the lineage of groups such as the FARC and the ELN, both of which were characterized by hierarchical command structures, military tactics, terrorism, extortion, “revolutionary taxes” (i.e., extortion), kidnapping, and the direct or indirect control of valuable economic resources, both legal and illicit. The FARIP engaged in all of these activities to varying extents. Relations & Alliances The first affiliation of the FARIP was with the 34th Front of the Northwestern Block of the FARC, a cell that historically operated primarily in the departments of Chocó and Antioquia. Despite emerging as a breakoff from the FARC, both groups continued to act as allies, coordinating their efforts logistically and strategically (Comisión de la Verdad 2022b, 95). The FARIP also maintained links to the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación: EPL), which was also active in the Colombian Pacific in the 1980s and 1990s. One report indicates that the two groups coordinated their extortion activities (“Alerta en Chocó” 1996). Several EPL dissident organizations active in the Pacific, such as the People’s Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo: ERP) and the Guevarista Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionary Guevarista: ERG), also maintained relations with the FARIP. They may have also acted in coordination with the Afro-Colombian guerrilla Benkos Biohó, another Pacific-based organization with an ethnic basis (Arocha 1999). Though there is no evidence of direct interaction between the two groups, the most direct point of reference to which the FARIP might be compared is Colombia’s first Indigenous guerrilla, a group known as the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame: MAQL). Founded in 1984 and demobilized in 1991, the MAQL was the first modern Indigenous guerrilla group in Latin America (Ibeas Miguel 2009). Representing various Indigenous communities of southern Colombia, the MAQL operated throughout the department of Cauca, though in the interior highland zones and not in the Pacific lowlands of the department. Like the FARIP, the MAQL emerged as a “self-defense group” (autodefensa) in a context of Indigenous dispossession at the hands of both the Colombian state and other actors in the Colombian conflict, including left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitaries, and narcotrafficking groups. Although both guerrilla groups have disappeared, the impulse towards autonomous self-defense felt by various Indigenous groups in different parts of Colombia has not—for the situation of violence against Colombia’s Indigenous population has not diminished (Hurtado 2023; Prensa Colombia 2020; Villa 2020). Today, groups like the Indigenous Guard (Guardia Indígena), organized by Indigenous civil society organizations such as the ONIC and the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca: CRIC) constitute nonviolent alternatives of autonomous self-defense—and the best means that many Indigenous communities today have of defending themselves (Wallis 2019).

Insurgency Overview The Núcleos Antagónicos de la Nueva Guerrilla Urbana (Antagonic Nuclei of the New Urban Guerrilla) is an organization active since 2011 formed by collectives, individuals and groups (1) that subscribed to the ideas of insurrectionary anarchism. Their militant actions usually involve the placement of explosive and incendiary devices, as well as direct armed attacks. The group underwent an internal restructuration after three of its cells left the informal organization without providing a reason in 2019. These cells were the Celula Karr-kai, Fuerzas Por El Desborde de La Civilización, and Columna Insurreccional “Ira y Complot” (2). Since that year, there have been no news or updates regarding the group’s campaign. History & Foundations The first mention of the group can be traced back to an online post from the 13th of May 2011 where they claimed responsibility (alongside another group called Circulo Iconoclasta Michele Angiolillo) for the placement of an incendiary device inside of a bank which was deactivated by the Chilean police force (3). The post concluded with the statement “there is no hierarchical organization here, [but rather] only the will to fight against everything that stands in the way of our freedom” (4). While no exact founding date can be found for the group, this is not surprising given the ideological nature of the organization. Indeed, the individuals who were part of this group subscribed to the idea of ‘informal organization’, which – in the words of the main theorist of contemporary insurrectionary anarchism Alfredo Bonnano – implies that “affinity groups and comrades that see themselves in an informal kind of projectuality come together in action, certainly not by adhering to a program that has been fixed at a congress. They realize the project themselves, in their analyses and actions. It can occasionally have a point of reference in a paper or a series of meetings, but only in order to facilitate things, whereas it has nothing to do with congresses and such like.” (5) This mode of organization is considered by insurrectionary anarchists as an alternative to the organization structures from the beginning of the 20th century – syndicate, party, vanguard, etc. The group also puts an emphasis on specific actions and doesn't have an organizational objective, per se. As a result, the groups tend to be small in numbers as they are dependent on the affinity between individuals or, as Bonanno states: “the comrades who recognise themselves in an informal organization are automatically a part of it. Their measure of communication with other group members is through paper or by other means, but, more importantly, they do so by participating in the various actions, demonstrations and encounters that take place from time to time. The main verification and analysis therefore comes about during moments of struggle.” (6) It is precisely because of these ideological characteristics that the history of the group can be seen from the outside as a series of attacks. The group consistently claimed responsibility for four attacks a year during 2016-2018. Even though the nature of the attacks were violent, the group claimed that, in order to avoid injuring innocents, they chose specific times and objectives (7). In 2019, the group claimed 3 attacks. By the end of the year, they released a written work titled “Sobre fantasmas insurreccionales y banderas falsas. Análisis de la revuelta en Chile” (On Insurrectionary Ghosts and Fake Flags. Analysis of the Revolt in Chile) (8). This work is centered mainly on the characteristics of the revolt as a phenomenon in Chile and the ways it has historically developed, but also offered also some insight into the groups actions and ideological characteristics. Furthermore, they expressed their view that there is now a need to lay low in terms of the usage of violence, not giving the state reasons to increase their security measures. Approach to Resistance & Capabilities The actions of the Antagonic Nuclei are described by the group itself as minimal violence (‘violencia minoritaria’) arguing that, even though they value the use of violence as a mean to achieve political aims, using it indiscriminately and out of proportions would only be of use to the Chilean state as an excuse to increase the repression (9). In essence, their attacks can be split into three categories: explosive attacks, IED attacks, and incendiary attacks (10). The group also used to adhere to protests and riots but we are not able to assert the scope and impact of their participation (11). The explosive attacks mainly involve the usage of IEDs which were not always successfully detonated, as admitted by the group itself (12), and targeted a broad array of institutional infrastructure like banks (13), police offices (14), political party offices (15) and a restaurant, which – according to the group – was a meeting place for right-wingers (16). On the other hand, the incendiary attacks operate similarly although the device is of a different nature and the objectives tend to be smaller, targeting places such as public transportation (17). Nonetheless, there has been an attempted attack on a bank branch, where the device contained gasoline and 190 grams of butane, and was wired with a battery, a lightbulb and a clock. However, due to the clock failing, the bomb did not detonate (18). The simulated attacks, as insinuated by their name, acted more as a show of force, as they stated in one of their public messages claiming responsibility for a coordinated simulated attack: “With both actions our objective is to make clear that their structures are vulnerable, the civil advance of security is not an impediment to attacks, [...] Social war advances with the necessity to reinvent and to make sequels that remain and fissure every glimpse of power and property out of our impacts. Know that our objectives were crowded places exclusively because the artifacts were simulated. Our attack is against the control mechanisms, our message is their vulnerability and our purpose is to devastate every sign of the material civilization and their embodiment in physical structures.” (19) This particular attack consisted of the placement of two devices, fire extinguishers connected with wires to a clock device, one inside a shopping mall and another inside a public transport bus, according to the group they were put in highly concurred places only because they wouldn’t cause any harm (20). Relations & Alliances The group expressed solidarity with anyone who shared their points of view, which essentially translates to every other insurrectionary anarchist in Chile and the world (21). Furthermore, they are known to frequently operate alongside different anarchist cells in the country (22). Additional Resources Images of some of the group's weaponry, as seen in their publications.

Insurgency Overview Sun Yee On (新義安), or the New Righteousness and Peace Commercial and Industrial Guild, is the largest and ostensibly most powerful triad society in the world (1). By some estimates, the organization has more than 55,000 members across the world, making it nearly twice as large as the Hong Kong Police Force (2)(3). Like most triads, the Sun Yee On is based in Hong Kong, but also operates in mainland China. Triads are Chinese organized crime groups, most often based in Hong Kong. Unlike many Western organized crime groups, such as the Italian mafia, triads are not necessarily organized in a strict hierarchy. A member of another triad, the 14K, said, “I was not required to pay any percentage of profits to the 14K leadership [...] Triad members do favors for each other, provide introductions and assistance to each other, engage in criminal schemes with one another, but triads generally do not have the kind of strictly disciplined organizational structure that other criminal groups like the Italian mafia have…” (4). The Sun Yee On is slightly more organized than the 14K, but it is still a very decentralized hierarchy, with Red Poles, or lieutenants, having a lot of autonomy in what they do in their respective areas (5). The Sun Yee On was founded in 1919 by Heung Chin, in Teochew (also called Chaozhou), mainland China. In the early 1950s, Heung was deported to Taiwan, and his eldest son Heung Wah-yim allegedly took over the triad (6). The Sun Yee On takes part in a wide variety of criminal and legal money-making ventures, similar to many organized crime groups around the world. The three largest triads in Hong Kong are the 14K, Wo Group (whose largest faction is the Wo Shing Wo) and the Sun Yee On. History & Foundations Early predecessors to the modern triads were mutual-aid societies of lower-class people who banded together for protection during the Qing dynasty. Between 1685 and 1849, the population of Qing China quadrupled from 102 million to 413 million; this rapid increase led to much strife for the lower class, and many were not able to own enough land to survive off subsistence farming. Many farmers were forced to migrate to coastal cities to make a living, but as migrants, they were socially isolated. This led them to join secret societies, generally made up of fellow migrants from the same region. In exchange for protection, migrants were often recruited to perform criminal activities for the secret societies, including smuggling, extortion, robbery and trafficking (7). In 1992, a U.S. Senate subcommittee report stated that one of the purposes of early triads was to overthrow the Qing dynasty and restore the Ming, a view mentioned by other sources including the South China Morning Post. Others, such as Chinese scholar S. Cai, reject this notion, stating that the precursors to triads were about surviving difficult times as a group and not for political reasons such as the overthrow of the Qing (4)(7)(8). Triads exploded in popularity during the British colonial period in Hong Kong (1841-1997). Similar to during the Qing Dynasty, many people were oppressed by foreign overlords and desired to band together for protection. In 1987 a lieutenant in the Hong Kong police estimated that 160,000 people, or 3% of the total population of Hong Kong, were in a triad (9). Ideology & Objectives Like any criminal enterprise, the Sun Yee On first and foremost should be viewed as a money-making organization. Their objective is the enrichment of themselves like any other business, the difference being that they are willing to break the law in order to do so. Also similar to most criminal organizations, honor and loyalty are key components of Sun Yee On ideology. The Sun Yee On is the most traditional of all the Hong Kong triads, with the leadership position being hereditary instead of electoral like the 14K or Wo Shing Wo (5). Membership in the Sun Yee On is also the hardest to obtain out of all the Hong Kong triads. It can take years to get Sun Yee On membership, which is much longer than it takes to achieve membership in the 14K or Wo Shing Wo (5). Approach to Resistance & Capabilities Like most triads, the Sun Yee On engages in a wide variety of criminal activity. One of the more popular Sun Yee On activities is running protection rackets. In this favorite of organized crime, businesses are forced to pay protection money or face the wrath of the criminal organization. In the later years of British rule in Hong Kong, it was alleged that 80% of all restaurants in the colony had received demands for protection money (9). In addition to the protection rackets, the Sun Yee On takes part in extortion, murders, robberies, drug trafficking, kidnappings and prostitution (9). The Sun Yee On doesn’t only take part in illegal activities either. In 2012, for example, 102 Sun Yee On members were arrested in Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China. The triad members were involved in real estate and car rentals, as well as selling bottled water and gas (10). Many organized crime groups take part in legal activities as this helps with money laundering as well as giving plausible deniability to what members do for a living. Besides showing how the triad makes money through legal means, this also highlights how they are active in mainland China. The triads, and by extension the Sun Yee On, are infamous for their brutality, especially in retaliation to perceived snitches or people who have broken their oath to the triad. Triads are known for their penchant for using meat cleavers to lop off the limbs of those who have fallen in their bad graces (11). Relations & Alliances The Sun Yee On’s main rival is the 14K, another Hong Kong-based triad, the Wo Shing Wo is another rival (1)(5). As mentioned earlier, triads are much more decentralized than other types of organized crime, so rivalries are not necessarily as ingrained in the Sun Yee On. This is not necessarily to say that fights among different triad societies do not break out, in 2021 for example 15 members of the Sun Yee On and Wo Shing Wo were arrested following a brawl outside of a pub. (12) Like many organized crime groups, territory is a significant part of the triads. The territory controlled by triads is not necessarily off limits to other triads; it is possible to ask permission and pay a fee to operate in one triad’s territory even if you are in another triad. This shows how there is not necessarily constant hatred or rivalry between triad groups. At the end of the day triads can be seen as businesses, and making money can trump a rivalry (5). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin or YPJ for short) have attracted much attention over the last decade. Formed in 2012, the YPJ is an all-female fighting unit that took part in the war against the Islamic State and continues to take part in the Syrian Civil War, defending the territory of Northern Syria, primarily from Turkey and its proxies but also against the Assad government. The goal of the YPJ is to promote gender equality and promote Kurdish cultural rights. History & Foundations The Democratic Unity Party (PYD), a Kurdish political party launched in 2003, was created by Syrian Kurds who had been influenced or worked with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK - who has been waging a war against Turkey since the 1980s). The PYD promotes Kurdish cultural rights and political autonomy and until 2011, it operated underground as its activity was suppressed by the Arab nationalist Syrian regime. When the Syrian Civil War began, the PYD chose to go a third path, siding neither with the opposition nor the Syrian government. Instead, it would focus on protecting Kurdish inhabited areas and consolidating its control over the movement. In 2012, the YPG, or People’s Protection Units, was formed with the aim of defending Kurdish areas as the PYD began exercising political control over Kurdish inhabited territory. YPG units were mixed, with women playing a prominent role alongside men. A year later, the YPJ formed as a way of further putting into practice the PYD’s ideological commitment to women’s equity. (1) Throughout the war against ISIS, the YPJ gained international fame. Images of keffiyeh clad, Kalashnikov wielding women fighting the Islamic State resonated heavily with western onlookers. The idea of women fighting against fundamentalists appealed to Europeans and Americans, who often associate the authoritarianism of Middle Eastern governments with misogynistic policies. From early stages such as Kobani and rescuing Yazidi genocide survivors in 2014 to the final battle at Baghouz in 2019, the YPJ played a heavy role in the Islamic State’s defeat.. The US began backing the YPG and YPJ in 2015 to help complete its anti-ISIS objectives; under the banner of the Global Coalition, the YPJ became one of the biggest factions of the Syrian Democratic Forces. The SDF expanded the US backed anti-IS mission in Syria to include non-Kurdish elements; through this, many Arab and Syriac Christian women found their way into the ranks of the YPJ or other SDF aligned groups. (2) Apart from the war with ISIS, the YPJ has seen action combatting the Turkish military and its Syrian proxies. It also has combatted the Ba’athist forces of Bashar al-Assad and its Iranian allies on previous occasions, including at the Battle of al-Hasakah in 2015.(3) In certain cases, such as in the very conservative Deir Ez-Zor area, the SDF has been careful to not use the YPJ in combat roles for fear that such a move could further strain its relationship with locals. In these instances, such as during the 2023 tribal uprising in the area, the YPJ did not participate in offensive actions but still played a support role.(4) Objectives & Ideology The PYD subscribes to democratic confederalism, a brand of libertarian socialism crafted by the PKK’s imprisoned founder Abdullah Ocalan. Democratic confederalism can be summarized as a focus on establishing and fostering local governance, cultural rights and autonomy (this element earning it Arab, Christian, and Yazidi allies), communal economics, environmentalism, and women’s equity.(5) As far as the YPJ is concerned, the focus on women’s liberation is, of course, the most vital. Kurds in Turkey are particularly conservative, making opportunities for women difficult. In this light, the PKK and its different wings can be viewed as revolutionizing its own community while at the same time fighting for its larger self-determination. Ocalan first made this appeal to women in the 1990s and some have speculated that it had more to do with the need for numbers than ideology; regardless, his message has resonated both with Kurds and other regional populations.(6) His quote “that society cannot be free until women are free” is often repeated, and the YPJ’s slogan of “women, life, liberty” became the motto of the 2022 protests in Iran against the mandatory hijab law and the Islamic Republic.(7) Military & Political Abilities At first, the YPJ could only muster small arms and Toyota pickups for its military operations. As the west intervened to counter ISIS, they received weapons from the US, including M4s and light vehicles such as MRAPs and Humvees. Notably, the US does not supply the YPJ or any other element of the SDF with anti-tank or anti-air weapons which could be used to level the balance of power with Turkish military forces. The group still has a stockpile of RPGs and Kornet anti-tank missile launchers.(8) In a 2021 interview, commander Newroz Ahmed reported the YPJ’s strength to be 5,000 members, though others have reported much higher numbers.(9) The group is criticized for its recruitment of child soldiers; a UN report estimated it and the YPG had the greatest number of child recruits of any faction in Syria at around 280.(10) Its experience and leadership capability is further degraded by Turkish drone strikes. In the summer of 2022, three prominent YPJ fighters, including Jiyan Tohildan, were killed by a drone. Politically, women have greater autonomy and rights under the PYD system than anywhere else in the region. Most political entities are required to have one male and one female co-chair and 40 percent women’s representation is mandated.(11) As mentioned earlier, this system is made flexible in certain areas to prevent angering more conservative populations. Approach to Resistance The YPJ operates as a conventional light military force. Since the defeat of the Islamic State, it has focused more on counter-terrorism, however it also stands prepared to engage with Turkey or its proxies in the event of attacks. In the event of a collapse of the Autonomous Administration, the YPJ would likely become a guerilla force to combat any Turkish military effort as its conventional means of combating Ankara would be degraded fairly quickly. Turkey accuses the YPJ of taking part in terrorist activities across the border, however no proof of this exists.(12) International Relations and Potential Alliances The YPJ is seen as an extension of the PKK by Turkey and thus deemed a terrorist group by Ankara.(13) Turkey has regularly carried out drone strikes on YPJ members, notably killing three of its most notable commanders in the summer of 2022. Unless there is a wider peace process, it is unlikely Turkey will ever come to view the YPJ as anything but an enemy. The YPJ relies heavily on US assistance, as does the SDF as a whole. American air power helped pave the way for the defeat of ISIS; Washington’s training and equipment continues to be vital to anti-ISIS operations to this day. While the US can be counted on as far as countering ISIS and Axis of Resistance elements (Assad, Iran, and their proxies), America is more than willing to allow Turkey to degrade the YPJ’s abilities so long as it does not interfere with its own goals. While Iran and Assad are antagonistic, Russia plays a more neutral, albeit far from friendly role with the SDF. Assad continuously labels the SDF as separatists, despite their insistence that they seek greater autonomy under the Syrian system rather than secession.(14) Moscow backs its ally Assad in all disputes with the SDF, but seems to indicate they prefer a situation where the SDF is eventually incorporated into the Syrian Army rather than destroyed all-together.(15) Russia also vetoes certain Turkish military actions as it controls the airspace over a fair amount of the AANES’ territory, though they use the same power cynically when seeking concessions out of Ankara. As far as other Kurdish parties are concerned, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are the most relevant to the YPJ and SDF. The two parties control the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, the only other area where Kurds enjoy some form of autonomy. The KDP has strong ties with Turkey and its Syrian branch is starkly opposed to the PYD and its activities. Ideologically the two are opposed as well; the PYD seeks inclusion and decentralization whereas the KDP is nationalistic and wants an independent Kurdistan. By contrast, the PUK is more favorable to the PYD; it provides material and logistical support to the SDF, particularly in the field of anti-terrorism. It sees the armed Kurdish movement in Syria as a way of countering the KDP’s influence.(16) The position of the YPJ, SDF, and AANES long-term is not promising. They have no political backer willing to recognize them or broker a favorable deal with the Assad regime. What happens to the YPJ’s many fighters in the future will be unclear, though many will likely continue to resist. Regardless of whatever comes its way, the YPJ’s impact on women’s issues in the Middle East will likely be felt for some time.

Introduction & Overview The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) is a separatist/secessionist organization operating in Nigeria that aims to restore the Republic of Biafra, which was an independent state in Eastern Nigeria primarily made up of members of the Igbo ethnic group. The Republic of Biafra seceded from Nigeria prior to the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 before rejoining the nation after being defeated by the Nigerian military (Britannica, 2023). The IPOB was founded in 2012 by Nnamdi Kanu, a British-Nigerian political activist and radio host, to further the cause of contemporary Biafran independence. In 2017 the Nigerian government deemed IPOB a terrorist organization under the Nigerian Terrorism Act. Since 2021, IPOB, along with other Biafra separatist groups, have been fighting a guerilla conflict in the southeastern part of the country against the Nigerian government (Nwonwu, 2023). History & Foundations Nigeria was first established as a colony of the United Kingdom in 1912 and declared independence in 1960. The country has consistently experienced internal division and fragmentation throughout its independent history. It is home to more than 500 languages and about 250 ethnic groups, though the country is mainly composed of four primary groups: the Hausa, the Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo. The most significant historical conflict centered on Biafran independence was the Nigerian Civil War, which lasted from 1967 through 1970 and was caused by an attempt at secession from the primarily Igbo southeastern provinces of the country, known as the Biafra Republic. During this conflict, France, South Africa, and Portugal supplied arms and support to the rebel groups while the USSR, Great Britain, and most African governments supported the Nigerian state. It is reported that somewhere between 500,000 and 2 million people died during this conflict, mostly due to starvation. While the Nigerian state emerged as the winner of the conflict, the struggle weakened the government, and a succession of military coups followed -- two in 1966 and 1975, then again in 1983, 1985, 1993, and 1996--. In 1999, however, the country transitioned into democracy (Unesco). There has been division and resistance to the Nigerian state as a whole since its inception, but contemporary resistance groups can be traced back to the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), which was founded in 1999 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2005). Nnamdi Kanu, the founder, and leader of Indigenous Peoples of Biafra, was a part of this group until 2009, when a conflict with MASSOB’s former leader led to him leave the group. Kanu then emerged as the leader of the newly formed IPOB in 2012 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). The group then rose to prominence in the mid-2010s and has become a powerful player in the Biafra independence movement (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). Though exact membership numbers are unavailable, the group has gained and maintained significant popularity, especially among Igbo youth. The group has received more media attention in recent years for experiencing frequent political crackdowns and violent engagements with state forces (Johnson, 2023). Objectives & Ideology As previously stated, the objective of IPOB is to restore the defunct Republic of Biafra, establishing “a separate homeland for the Igbo people.”, as said by MASSOB when discussing the objectives of pro-Biafran organizations, including MASSOB and IPOB. This desire stems from the feeling of political, social, and cultural marginalization by the Nigerian state (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). IPOB has criticized the government of Nigeria for political alienation, inequitable resource distribution, ethnic marginalization, heavy military presence, and extrajudicial killings in the South-Eastern and South-Central regions of the country (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). IPOB has purported itself to be a nationalist movement, trying to restore Biafran independence and identity. There have been no direct claims that Biafra is synonymous with the Igbo ethnic identity, though in some statements, such as the one in the previous paragraph, the separatist groups seem to conflate the two quite easily. The group has also expressed anti-Fulani and anti-Muslim sentiments (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). Military & Political Abilities Kanu, the leader of IPOB, is also the director of Radio Biafra, which is an unlicensed radio station that claims to promote “Biafran awareness, culture, and identity” (RadioBiafra). The station has been described by different sources as a pirate station and it has been reported broadcasting content ranging from hate speech and misinformation to seditious messages urging violent struggle against Nigeria (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). The Nigerian state has claimed that IPOB are responsible for several attacks in recent years. In April of 2021, there was an armed assault on the Imo State Police Headquarters and a correctional facility, where several inmates were released. The police claimed the IPOB was responsible. IPOB however denied this attack and has accused the Nigerian state of staging attacks to blame IPOB or the Eastern Security Network (ESN), which is the paramilitary organization of IPOB (Sahara, 2021). That same April, Emma Powerful, the media and publicity secretary of IPOB stated that the group “produces their own arms locally.” This was part of a statement given by Powerful in response to claims that IPOB was planning to attack a series of banks to acquire money to purchase arms. Emma Powerful rejected this claim, denouncing it as propaganda, and stated that members of IPOB were peaceful and the group did not wish to inflict pain on the people whose freedom they were fighting for. Powerful also urged banks in the Biafran region to be careful of the Department of State Services, as they may have been planning to sponsor attacks and blame them on the IPOB (Samuel, 2021). No evidence exists to back up his claims. The group has also imposed stay-at-home protests at different times, urging residents to stay at home every Monday to draw attention to their struggle for independence. Local residents have reported that this protest has led to personal difficulties for some residents who live in poverty and have to work. There have also been reports from locals of residents being attacked and killed for going out on stay-at-home protest days (Asadu, 2022). As recently as September of 2023, 8 security personnel were killed in a gunfight in the country’s southeast. This was just one of what has become a string of attacks over the past years, many of which are blamed on IPOB (Asadu, 2023). Some arrests and seizures have been made by Nigerian state forces. In July of 2023, troops raided an enclave in Asaba, the Delta State capitol. The troops reportedly exchanged gunfire with the gunmen before they fled. The troops captured one of the fleeing members and recovered some small weaponry including AK47 rifles, semi-automatic rifles, and a G3 rifle (Oyero, 2023). Then, in October 2023, the Nigerian state forces reportedly recovered several locally made artillery projectile launchers as well as 48 rounds of 7.62 mm NATO ammunition (David, 2023). Approach to Resistance While IPOB has regularly claimed to be a peaceful, non-violent organization, many doubt this claim. Numerous attacks and violent incidents over recent years have been blamed on IPOB, though they are difficult to prove. They have engaged in protests in attempts to bring media attention to the Biafran independence struggle and disrupt local economies as a way of resisting the Nigerian state. There was an incident In 2021, where IPOB threatened deployment of the ESN if the governors of southeast Nigeria did not ban open grazing (Njoku, 2021). The ESN however, did not wait 14 days, but instead attacked a Fulani camp in Isuikwuato, Abia State, where the operatives killed livestock and burned down local houses (Sahara, 2021). Shortly before this incident, in January 2021, a conflict arose between the ESN and the Nigerian army. The government deployed the army to destroy ESN bases, as they were perceived to be a threat to the state's authority. Fighting erupted in the town of Orlu, in Imo State, and lasted for a week until the Kanu declared a ceasefire, stating that he was redirecting ESN efforts against “Fulani raiders” and noting that the forces had withdrawn from the city (Campbell, 2021). While IPOB has not claimed responsibility for any violent attacks there are clear incidents of conflict between the ESN and the Nigerian State forces, even if IPOB tends to frame these as defensive engagements. The Institute for Economics and Peace ranked IPOB as the 10th deadliest terror organization of 2023 according to the Global Terrorism Index, though this ranking was based on attacks attributed to the group, and not ones they have claimed (Johnson, 2023). 2022 was the purportedly deadliest year in history for IPOB with 40 attacks and 57 deaths recorded, an increase from 26 attacks and 34 deaths in 2021, though again, all unclaimed or denied (Institute, 2023). International Relations and Alliances There are no clear ties or connections between IPOB and any other international groups or governments. They appear to be closely aligned and perhaps allied to the previously mentioned Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), which was the group Kanu split from before forming IPOB a couple of years later (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2016). Another active separatist group in the area is the Biafra Nations League, though direct connections between them and IPOB could not be found (Sahara, 2023). The source(s) of funding for IPOB remains unclear. There have been different allegations from members of the Nigerian state in regard to where the group receives its funding from, but none have been proven. In 2021 Emma Powerful, the media and publicity secretary, stated that the group was funded by IPOB members in 120 different countries, though this claim has also not been verified (Okafor, 2021). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Nineveh Plain Protection Units (Classical Syriac: ܚܕܝ̈ܘܬ ܣܬܪܐ ܕܫܛܚܐ ܕܢܝܢܘܐ) (Arabic: وحدات حماية سهل نينوى) or NPU is an ethnic-Assyrian, Christian militia based in the Nineveh Plain, Northern Iraq. The militia is the armed wing of the Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM), an Assyrian-Christian political party that holds one seat in the Kurdish Parliament under the Rafidain List.(1) Founded towards the end of 2014,(2) The NPU were instrumental to the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq’s North and played a key role in many strategically important battles against the organisation. The NPU remains active in Iraq today, providing protection to strategically important areas in the Nineveh Plain, and protecting its sizable Christian population. They are also engaged in a long-term rivalry with the Babylon Brigades, a pro-Iran militia depicted as, and led by an Assyrian Christian, but composed mainly of non-Christian personnel. History & Foundations The NPU was founded towards the end of 2014 after many of Northern Iraq’s native Assyrian-Christians were forcibly displaced by the rise of ISIS. Both displaced and non-displaced Assyrian Christians came together to form the NPU under the leadership of former Iraqi General Behnam Abush(3) and received funding from the Iraqi State and private donors (mostly the Assyrian diaspora in Australia, Europe, and the United States).(2) Despite registering approximately 2000 fighters with the Iraqi state, this number was cut down to 600 active fighters due to a lack of government funding, with all of those 600 receiving training from the US military. Varying sources indicate that the movement boasts up to anywhere between 2000 and 4000 reserve fighters.(4) After their foundation, the NPU played a crucial role in the fight against ISIS. In an interview between researcher Aymenn al-Tamimi and a senior member of the militia, the aforementioned militia member states that the NPU saw its first major taste of combat in 2016, liberating the villages of Badanah and Telsukf.(5) Both of these battles were conducted with American air-support, showing an apparent working relationship between the two forces.(6)(7) In addition, the senior member of the militia stated in the interview that the PMU were active in the battles for Bakhdida (also known as Qaraqosh), Karamlesh, and Bartella. After the liberation of these areas, and still to this day, the NPU has been responsible for the security of these towns and districts. Since the liberation of Mosul from ISIS, the NPU have been engaged in a rivalry with the 50th Brigade of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, known as the Babylon Brigades (Arabic: كتائب بابليون). The Babylon Brigades are a pro-Iran militia with links to the Badr Organisation that presents itself as a Christian militia, despite the fact that the majority of its members are Shi’a Arabs and Shi’a Shabak.(8) In March 2023, the Babylon Brigades attempted to take over the aforementioned town of Bakhdida, which was and has since returned to being under the control of the NPU. During this attempted power-grab, seven members of the NPU were kidnapped by the Badr Organisation affiliate.(9) The Babylon Brigades previously were caught looting ancient Christian artefacts from Assyrian churches, and its leader, Rayan al-Kildani, was designated by the US Treasury Department for serious human rights abuses. The US Treasury stated: "The 50th Brigade is reportedly the primary impediment to the return of internally displaced persons to the Nineveh Plain. The 50th Brigade has systematically looted homes in Batnaya, which is struggling to recover from ISIS’s brutal rule. The 50th Brigade has reportedly illegally seized and sold agricultural land, and the local population has accused the group of intimidation, extortion, and harassment of women."(10) Despite the Iranian backing of the Babylon Brigades, the NPU has retained a key position of security in the Nineveh Plain, mostly due to its positive perception amongst the local Assyrian communities. Objectives & Ideology The NPU’s ideology can broadly be defined as ‘Assyrian Minority Interests’. The militia is set on defending the Nineveh Plain from all of its adversaries, and ensuring that internally displaced Christians can return to their homes, as testified to in the interview with Al-Tamini, where the senior militia member states the objectives of the organisation revolve around “holding the land in the areas of the [Nineveh] plain…ensuring security, and helping the displaced people to return to their areas.”(5) Furthermore, the NPU is a pan-sectarian militia, with its fighters coming from all branches of Christianity practised by the Assyrians in the Nineveh Plain. Unlike many other of the militias that formed in Iraq after the rise of ISIS, the NPU tends to be apolitical and more interested in securing safety and a homeland for its Christian members. Military & Political Abilities The NPU’s military capability is limited by the poor quality of the equipment the soldiers have at their disposal. A significant portion of their weaponry is either supplied by the fighters themselves or obtained as used equipment from the Iraqi military.(11) Due to this and the relatively small manpower of 600, the group's military ability is limited to protecting a select few towns and districts. Although the NPU did actively fight against ISIS during 2016 and 2017, its role was mostly limited to complementing a larger Iraqi or Kurdish force’s advance. On the political front, the affiliated Assyrian Democratic Movement (ADM) holds one of the Christian minority-reserved seats under the Rafidain List in Erbil’s Kurdistan Parliament.(1) Approach to Resistance The NPU’s approach to resistance is defined by its trust towards and reliance upon the Iraqi state. The group did not seek to grow beyond the budget allocated to it by Iraq and received most of its weapons from the state. During the battle with ISIS, the NPU maintained an obedience towards the Iraqi Army, following orders and fighting when required. Following the fall of ISIS, the group continued to serve under the command of the Iraqi military, with hope and trust that the best way to secure a future for the Assyrian Christians in the Nineveh Plain is through the Iraqi state. The militia reports to a council of military officers affiliated with the National Security Service of Iraq.(4) This approach seems to be working for both the militia and the Assyrian communities of Iraq, with “NPU-administered areas [seeing] the highest rates of return among Christian Assyrians.”(4) International Relations and Potential Alliances The NPU does not have any official relations with foreign actors. The group is broadly allied with the United States, as it received training from them in 2014, but does not receive on-going funding from the country. The group receives some non-military funding from the Nineveh Plain Defense Fund, a US-based charity with links to the American Assyrian diaspora, but relies on Federal Iraq for the majority of its funding.

Introduction & Overview The Tiger Forces are an elite formation of the Syrian Arab Army that was formed in 2013 by drawing select personnel from other special forces units and reorganizing them under the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, the most prominent Syrian intelligence service. The Tiger Forces were renamed as the “25th Special Mission Forces Division” in 2019 and placed under Syrian Arab Army command, but they continue operating as a brigade-size special force. They are regarded as one of the most effective military formations loyal to the Baathist regime, having served on almost all fronts while going from strength to strength. History & Foundations The history of the Tiger Forces is directly bound to that of the Syrian Civil War, as they were founded in the midst of the conflict. While the unit was formally created on the orders of the Air Force Intelligence Directorate, the Tiger Forces’ history is closely tied to that of their commander and leader, Major-General Suheil Salman al-Hassan (1), himself nicknamed “The Tiger”. The biography of Major-General al-Hassan is the subject of much speculation; he is said to have attended the Homs Military College, which he left with the rank of lieutenant in 1991 (2). A native of Latakia’s Alawite region (3), he joined the spec-ops unit of the Syrian Arab Air Force, where he oversaw the training of paratrooper units; at some point around 2005 or 2006, he was moved to the Air Force Intelligence Directorate HQ in Damascus, where he worked on infiltrating and dismantling Al-Qaeda cells in Syria (4). By that time, he had become a colonel (5). When the Syrian Civil War broke out, al-Hassan is reported to have embedded with regular army units together with his trusted men, acting as a sort of “political commissar” ensuring that rank-and-file soldiers carried out orders and reportedly executing those deemed unreliable (6). He is also reported as having given ‘shoot-to-kill’ orders against civilian protestors in the Daraa province, as well as overseeing the increased use of ‘barrel bombs’ in the Hama province in 2012 (7), while taking control of critical operations in the area (8). It is during this period that he developed an awe-inspiring reputation amongst Syrian Arab Army personnel, which has evolved throughout the years into an almost ‘mythological’ aura, compounded by regime propaganda but also by a genuinely eccentric personality. Indeed, he is known to write poetry and to broadcast his verses over loudspeakers towards enemy lines, while also ruthlessly carrying out operations (9). A Facebook post by the Tiger Forces captioned: "Trust in God.. Trust in God.. There is no power or strength except in God.. In the name of God from every direction." According to some sources, al-Hassan was tasked with the creation of a special forces unit in 2013 (10), although OSINT analyses have recorded few mentions of the group in that year, with most SOCINT information becoming more available throughout 2014 and 2015 (11). It is likely that the Tiger Forces emerged firstly as a moniker (a nickname) for all troops commanded by Colonel Suheil “the Tiger” al-Hassan, rather than as a structured military unit. By 2014, al-Hassan was in charge of all Syrian government forces in the Hama region and repelled a rebel offensive (12). His complete control generated hostility amongst other military officers, and it has been reported that several assassination plots masterminded by military intelligence officers were foiled in the Hama region (13). By 2015, the Tiger Forces had taken heavy casualties during a rebel offensive across the Idlib and Hama provinces, and al-Hassan’s formation was relieved from the frontlines to undergo a radical reorganization (14). It was during this time that “the Tiger” passed over a promotion to brigadier-general to remain close to his men (something which, be it fact or fiction, is likely to have played into his perceived aura of a mythical warrior), but was eventually promoted to major-general anyway, a rank which he still holds (15). A Facebook post by the Tiger Forces glorifying Major-General Suheil Salman al-Hassan. Starting in 2015, a series of reforms within the Syrian military was implemented under the supervision of the Russian Armed Forces, which had joined the Syrian Civil War to support the Baathist regime in the same year (16). It is during this time that the Tiger Forces acquired their current shape and their order of battle, while “the Tiger” al-Hassan has forged close ties with the Russian military and has become one of the most prominent members of the “Russophile” faction of the Syrian armed forces, as opposed to the “Persophile” faction, headed by the Republican Guard’s commander, Bashar al-Assad’s brother Maher al-Assad (17). In this context, Tiger Forces have incorporated a number of other preexisting formations, as well as others which have been founded anew, among which are the Cheetah Forces, the Panther Forces, the Taha Group, the Raqqa Hawks Brigade, the Termah Regiment, the Shawaheen Hawks, and others (18). As many as 24 sub-units are thought to have been part of the Tiger Forces at some point or another (19), but despite their titular names (“regiment”, “brigade”), it is thought that the total numbers of fighters at this time was about 8000, equivalent to two brigades (20). In 2019, the Tiger Forces were reformed as the 25th Special Mission Forces Division, and its subunits were reorganized under a conventional structure of seven regiments (21). It was also subordinated directly to the high command of the Syrian Arab Army, while it previously was under the Air Force Intelligence Directorate (22). Ideology & Objectives As a military formation, the Tiger Forces have little ideological depth. In general, they can be understood as Baathist loyalists who brutally oppose any deviation from the status quo of the Assad regime. Their social media frequently post Baathist propaganda, while also revering Bashar al-Assad. A Facebook post by the Tiger Forces, reading: "Ask us about the righteousness of the Levant and its hands. She tells you about tigers and their hurricanes. And that star will appear to you bright. This land knows its men." Their commander, “The Tiger”, has been generally described as a hardliner (23). In fact, the cult-like aura of hero-worship that surrounds him is a major factor in what sets the Tiger Forces apart from other Syrian military formations. He is often depicted (both through the group’s propaganda and directly by its soldiers) as a selfless commander who does not shy away from leading his men at the frontlines (24). The objectives of the Tiger Forces are certainly overlapping with those of the regime they serve – essentially seeking the complete eradication of any military opponent and the restoration of Syrian statehood. As evidenced by the solid political connection of the Tiger Forces with foreign actors (chiefly Russia and, to a lesser extent, Iran), they are also growing their political weight inside the Syrian establishment, something that may be exploited in the future. A Facebook post by the Tiger Forces stating: "the third stage of the process of destroying the enemy on the entire geography of Idlib." Political & Military Abilities The Tiger Forces participated in most major government offensives as well as defensive operations ever since they were formed. They were amongst the units which spearheaded an attack on Aleppo’s prison in 2014, ultimately clearing it of rebel troops (25). In the same year, the Tiger Forces were deployed during the Hama campaign that had bled out other Syrian Arab Army units; their operations were able to quickly regain all territory lost to rebels and even reversed the situation, forcing them to defend and retreat (26). The Siege of Kuweires Airport was laid in 2013 by rebel forces, until ISIS eliminated the rebels and continued besieging the military base hosting an airstrip and the cadets of the Military Aviation Institute. Here, it was not until 2015 that the Tiger Forces were deployed. Once present, the group successfully eliminated the ISIS forces and lifted the siege, finding only 300 survivors of the 1100 original personnel of the base (27). Moreover in 2018, the Tiger Forces participated in the closing of the Ghouta Pocket in the outskirts of Damascus (28). Prior to the 2019 refounding, the Tiger Forces operated as ad hoc battlegroups varying in size, from company to battalion size augmented by auxiliary forces of the Syrian Arab Army or other militias (29). In this sense, they were hardly ever deployed entirely in one area, and were instead sent to different fronts where the presence of skilled commanders and battle-hardened veterans could turn the tide, while conscripts and militiamen were entrusted with defensive operations or other low complexity operations (30). The Tiger Forces’ direct connection to their Russian allies has provided them with privileged access to prime materiel, such as modern T-90 tanks and various models of BMP APC (organized in an armoured unit), as well as their own artillery detachment, mostly relying on rocket launcher platforms (31). The Tiger Forces are almost always in contact with the Russian Air Force in Syria, and are often able to enjoy close air support (32). Other weapons they have been equipped with are PKP LMGs, various RPG models (7,18,22), rare AK-104/105 carbines, VSK-94 and Golan S-01 marksman rifles (33). Quite notably for the Syrian war theatre, which has not seen any airborne landing operations, the Tiger Forces train their own paratroopers and seem to have at least some airborne capability using helicopters (34). A video release by the Tiger Forces entitled "Parachute landing with full equipment, airdrop commandos." In general, the Tiger Forces enjoy a secure position in Syria’s hierarchy of political and military power. This is not only because of their sheer military prowess, but also thanks to the direct relations between “the Tiger” al-Hassan and high-ranking Russian military officers (35). In this sense, it is clear that, from the point of view of the Syrian regime, they represent a double-edged sword insofar as they are highly needed to bring about a favourable end to the civil war, but they are also a Russian fifth column inside Syria (36). Their political weight is also likely to increase in any post-war scenario, adding to Baathist fears and suspicions (37). This tension has already led to some political friction, such as an instance where the companies of one of the most prominent financial patrons of the Tiger Forces were essentially expropriated (38). International Relations & Alliances Officers of the Tiger Forces are known to have liaised and met with Qasseim Soleimani, the late commander of the Jerusalem Brigade (often nicknamed Quds Force in the West) (39). Major-General al-Hassan was also able to garner Iranian support to establish further Tiger Forces subunits (40). Nevertheless, the Tiger Forces have become one of the favourite partners of the Russian military in Syria, who have prioritized them over other formations when supplying military grade equipment (41). “The Tiger” al-Hassan received a Russian military award in 2016, and was subsequently presented with a ceremonial sword by General Gerasimov, one of the highest ranking generals in the Russian military (42). He was also present during one of Vladimir Putin’s visits to Syria as the only military officer on that occasion, and was praised by him directly (43). “The Tiger” has also worked directly with General Surovikin, the current commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (44). Additional Resources