From Island of Peace to Sea of Violence: How Narcoterrorism Engulfed Ecuador
Authors -
26 December 2024
Introduction
Ecuador was once mostly known as the world's leading exporter of bananas and a prime destination for adventure-cum-ecotourism—an island of peace in a violence-ridden region. Now it has the highest murder rate in mainland Latin America (up from the fourth-lowest in 2018) and can claim the status of “cocaine superhighway to the US and Europe”, according to InSight Crime, which investigates organized crime in the Americas. By 2021, cocaine was Ecuador’s sixth-largest export, worth nearly $1 billion (0.9% of GDP).
"Ecuador as an island of peace is a misnomer," explains Daniel Pontón, professor of security and defense at Ecuador's National Institute for Higher Studies. Since 2019, its government has struggled to tackle rampant terroristic violence, restore security to its citizens, and fully assert state sovereignty. In the past three years, numerous deadly prison riots have taken place during which hundreds of inmates have been killed with knives and guns; politicians, judges, prison chiefs and journalists have been targeted with assassinations; and public institutions have been attacked with explosives. Meanwhile, money from drug trafficking has infiltrated the state to a systemic level, and now holds influence over key government officials. Since 2022, however, Ecuador has begun to take seriously the endemic corruption that plagues the country.
Ecuador remains in the midst of a profound security crisis, with homicides surging by 245% between 2020 and 2022, and many inside and outside the country decrying its descent into a narco-state. Although the causes of Ecuadorian gang violence are complex, four factors are key to understanding its rise: widespread poverty; the prevalence of drugs and guns; and regional migration. Unlike its cocaine-producing neighbors Colombia and Peru, Ecuador lacked well-armed guerrilla movements in the second half of the 20th century, and thus did not evolve the security infrastructure to effectively combat organized violence when these groups moved into the country. Mexican and Colombian cartels, Balkan (particularly Albanian, but also Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin), Italian, Russian and ‘Mocro’ mafia clans, and other international organized criminal groups now vie for control over various parts of Ecuador alongside local gangs including Los Choneros, Los Lobos, Los Lagartos and Los Tiguerones. “It is very disorganized. A handful of gangs have connections to international mafias. But the rest are not sure what they are doing or of their position in global markets,” says Renato Rivera-Rhon, Director of the Ecuadorian Organized Crime Observatory (OECO), “That’s why we see the degree of violence that we do: these organizations are attempting to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their global superiors.”
Tracing the rise of gangs and narcoterrorism in Ecuador from the 1970s to the 2020s, with a focus on Ecuador’s social, political and economic context, this analysis explores the country’s emergence as a key player in the international drugs trade, alongside its escalating issues with violence. It investigates the transition of local street gangs into Mexican cartel proxies, and the rise of endemic corruption (narcopolitics), before assessing domestic and international efforts to respond to Ecuador’s ongoing state of emergency. (Bargent, 2019; The Economist, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b; Clapp, 2024; IRC, 2024; Quesada, 2024)
Poverty, Violence & The Political Economy of Ecuador
Although Ecuador’s most recent episode of violence is unprecedented in its scale and severity, the country is no stranger to the dual crises of poverty and organized criminal violence. The roots of the current situation can be traced back to the 1990s, when Ecuador was facing significant inflation and instability, and the economy was formally dollarized. Although dollarization unquestionably spurred economic growth, it also made Ecuador an ideal location for money laundering—the US dollar being the preferred physical medium of exchange for international criminal actors. Paired with its widespread poverty and proximity to the cocaine production hubs of Colombia and Peru—countries both beset by violent insurgency—Ecuador’s narcoterrorism crisis was perhaps inevitable without drastic intervention.
In 2007, at the beginning of his decade-long term, left-wing populist President Rafael Correa implemented a series of social spending and education reforms largely funded by oil revenues. When oil prices crashed in 2008, Ecuador’s oil-dependent economy collapsed, leading to an increase in drug trafficking and gang violence. Crime continued to escalate, culminating in a police riot in 2010, during which Correa was taken hostage. In response, he introduced judiciary reforms, including a more punitive penal code, and invested oil surpluses in the police, offering rewards to officers who captured high-profile criminals. This had an immediate effect on the prison population, which increased from 10,000 to 40,000, with many of the most-wanted ending up behind bars. Homicides, which had peaked at 20 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000, were drastically reduced to 5.6 by the end of his term in 2017. Nonetheless, public sector corruption had become rampant under Correa, with the ex-president handed an eight-year prison sentence in 2020. He has lived in Belgium since 2017, however. (BBC News, 2020)
Gang members in an Ecuadorian prison staffed by the military
Correa’s successor Lenín Moreno attempted to grapple with the economic crisis by implementing austerity measures that cut back on public spending. However, this led to political turmoil and fueled massive indigenous-led protests in 2019 against the elimination of fuel subsidies that had kept both fuel and product prices low for consumers for 40 years. Already precarious before the COVID-19 pandemic, Ecuador’s economic and political situation significantly worsened due to the global paralysis that ensued, exacerbating its longstanding issues with extreme poverty and limited opportunity. Government attempts to inject funds into the economy were further complicated by the country's dollarization. According to Ecuador’s National Institute for Statistics and Census, poverty surged to 32% in 2020, with extreme poverty reaching 14.9%. (National Institute for Statistics and Census, 2020, 2023)
Domestic gangs as well as international criminal syndicates exploited this situation for recruitment, money laundering and other activities. While trading in illegal drugs remains their primary source of income, Ecuadorian gangs are also involved in extortion, human trafficking and smuggling, like many criminal syndicates in Latin America. However, as one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, Ecuador is additionally subject to wildlife trafficking and illegal fishing and logging by gangs. Along Ecuador’s borders with Peru and Colombia, illegal logging of balsa trees by timber mafias has led to substantial deforestation, with around 15% of the Ecuadorian Amazon already lost. Illegally sourced balsa wood increased by over 1000 cubic meters between 2019–2020. Meanwhile in the remote northern Amazonian province of Imbabura, Los Lobos control most of the illegal gold mining, and charge a 10% tax on everything extracted. (Cárdenas and Jones, 2022; InSight Crime, 2022; Mistler-Ferguson, 2022)
As Ecuador’s role in the global narcotics trade became increasingly important from 2016 onwards, violent crime linked to drug gangs drastically increased along with it. The deteriorating security situation is reflected in the murder rate, which surged from 6.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019 to 25.6 in 2022, before soaring again to 45 in 2023, following successive waves of gang violence since 2020. This represents more than 8,000 violent deaths in 2023 in a nation of 18 million people, positioning Ecuador within the top-ten most dangerous countries worldwide. Desperate to flee the poverty and violence, Ecuadorians were the second-highest nationality by number in 2022 to cross Panama’s treacherous Darien Gap on their way north. (InSight Crime, 2023b; The Economist, 2023b, 2024b; Quesada, 2024; Reuters, 2024a)
Ecuador’s Role in International Drug Trafficking
Strategically positioned between the two leading coca leaf growers and cocaine producers Peru and Colombia, Ecuador served primarily as a transit country in the international cocaine supply chain during the 1970s–90s. Despite neighboring both countries, Ecuador had largely escaped the ongoing violence of the FARC and Shining Path insurgencies and cartel rivalries across its borders since the 1970s until recently. As a result, the Ecuadorian state “never developed the infrastructure or material capacity to address existential security threats stemming from revolutionaries or illicit gangs”, in the words of Dr Christopher Sabatini, Senior Research Fellow at Chatham House.
In the 1990s, after the Peruvian government’s temporary victory over the revolutionary communist party and guerrilla group Shining Path allowed it to begin reasserting state authority over cocaine-producing areas in Peru, Shining Path and other Peru-based criminal organizations shifted to using Ecuador’s ports to export their product. Meanwhile, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a powerful Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group active since 1964, effectively monopolized the Ecuadorian cocaine trade into the 2010s. From the 1970s–1990s, it permitted Colombia’s Medellín, Cali and Norte del Valle Cartels to also use Ecuador as a transhipment point for trafficking drugs and as a hub for smuggling precursor chemicals needed to process the coca leaf into cocaine. The trafficking process was relatively peaceful as there was minimal state interference and little competition. High-ranking FARC members even claim to have financed Rafael Correa’s successful 2007 presidential campaign.
Colombian military assaults against the FARC as well as mass aerial spraying of coca crops increasingly pushed the group and coca cultivation across the Ecuadorian border. When Colombia tightened its port security in 2009, the poorly monitored port at Guayaquil in Ecuador took on an increasingly important role in the movement of Colombian and Peruvian cocaine to the North American and European markets. Between 2000–2015, the US implemented ‘Plan Colombia’, a $1-trillion-dollar aid and assistance project in collaboration with the Colombian government, to combat drug cartels and left-wing insurgents. This resulted in the development of a more active Colombian criminal and paramilitary diaspora in Ecuador, a process rapidly accelerated in 2016 when the Colombian government signed a peace agreement with the FARC, and most of its members demobilized.
FARC dissident factions (1), such as Front 48, which did not sign the accord, and other Colombian drug trafficking organizations operating primarily in the Nariño and Putumayo departments in southwest Colombia, began using the port of Tumaco, just across the Ecuadorian border, as a key logistics hub. The National Liberation Army (ELN), a Colombian far-left guerilla group founded in 1964, began using the country as a safe haven. Regional and international mafias from Mexico, Albania, Morocco and the Netherlands, in particular, also expanded their operations in Colombia and Ecuador to fill the power vacuum. This rapid influx was facilitated by Ecuador’s porous borders, lax visa requirements for foreigners (until 2020), and syndicates’ ability to launder money through Ecuador’s dollarized tourist economy and export drugs through its highly developed transport and export infrastructure. Mexican cartels now have a large presence in the country and fund local Ecuadorian gangs who act both as transportistas for Colombian cocaine and other illicit goods, and proxies in the Mexican gang war. Ecuadorian gangs have become more powerful, organized and violent as a result.
Colombian cocaine is currently trafficked through Ecuador’s lawless border provinces of Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos onto its coastal cities for export. As demand for cocaine in Europe and North America increased, Ecuador’s largest city Guayaquil, capital of Guayas province, developed into the primary shipping port for these markets. Much of the cocaine moved through Ecuador to Europe is hidden in shipping containers containing bananas or manufactured products, while North America-bound drugs are run up the Pacific coast by motorboat, submarine and Cessna aircraft. By 2019, more than a third of the product of Colombia’s record coca leaf harvest was being exported through the country. This realignment quickly brought a wave of violence to Ecuador, and Guayaquil is now considered its most dangerous city.
The busiest cocaine-trafficking route in the world today is the route from the port of Guayaquil to the port of Antwerp in Belgium, claims Dutch investigative journalist Chris Dalby of InSight Crime. According to the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, of the 110 tons of cocaine seized in Antwerp in 2020, 60% came from Ecuador. From there, it is largely moved on to the Netherlands for wider distribution across the lucrative European market, where cocaine prices are high and demand continues to grow. In this way, Ecuadorian ports have become “one of the most valuable pieces of infrastructure you can control if you are a drug-trafficking group in Latin America,” says Will Freeman of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s World Drug Report 2022 lists Ecuador as having the third-highest level of cocaine seizures in the world after Colombia and the US.
Six tons of cocaine destined for Belgium seized by Ecuadorian police in Guayaquil in February 2022
In addition to trafficking, Ecuador has more recently become a hub for drug cultivation and processing. Colombian cartels have outsourced these operations to domestic criminal gangs, who then transport the product mainly on to Central America and Europe. By 2022, satellite images revealed that half of Colombia’s coca plants had relocated south to regions bordering Ecuador—half of them within 10 miles of the border. (Bargent, 2019; InSight Crime, 2022, 2023b; Blasco, 2023; The Economist, 2023b, 2024a, 2024b; Clapp, 2024; Duarte, 2024; Quesada, 2024; Sabatini, 2024)
How Streets Gangs Became Cartel Proxies
There are approximately 1,500 organized criminal syndicates operating in Ecuador. (Duarte, 2024) Local gangs are thought to exchange cocaine shipments for weaponry from their Mexican and Colombian patrons. These arms are increasingly sophisticated and often US-made, and include machine guns, rifles and grenades. The Ecuadorian military, comparatively, lacks modern equipment and is poorly trained. In recent years, Mexican cartels’ notorious proclivity for gory violence has influenced these gangs. This has led to several public hangings, decapitations and immolations, as well as the adoption of the practice of hanging dead bodies from bridges with notes attached, all largely committed with impunity, primarily as a method of intimidation.
One of the largest and most sophisticated ‘mega-gangs’ in Ecuador is Los Choneros, which has built a strong relationship with Mexico's Sinaloa Cartel and other international criminal organizations. The group was initially identified by the government as an armed wing of an unnamed Colombian drug cartel (likely either the Medellín or Cali Cartel) that controlled Pacific maritime trafficking routes to Mexico and the US. As one of the earliest Ecuadorian gangs to partner with an international group, they seem to have gained first-mover advantage. Through its relationship with the Sinaloans, Los Choneros’ current leader José Adolfo ‘Fito’ Macías Villamar has turned from small-time gangster to kingpin.
Ecuadorian National Police Gang Timeline released in January 2024
Formed in Chone, a beach town in Ecuador’s western province of Manabí by Jorge Busmarck ‘Teniente España’ Véliz España, Los Choneros emerged in the late ‘90s as a drug trafficking organization. In the years following, its members were also involved in robberies, kidnapping, extortion, contract killings and contraband smuggling centered on its stronghold in the coastal city of Manta. Los Choneros were able to maintain an effective criminal hegemony over the region from the mid-2000s to the mid-2010s. This was achieved through fierce territorial conflict and the elimination of rival gang leaders. This included the leadership of established group Los Queseros and newer outfit Los Corvicheros, formed by traders who exchanged the sale of cheese and fish for drugs respectively. Confrontations with Los Queseros had culminated in their leader Carlos Vera Cedeño successfully ordering the assassination of Teniente España’s wife, after which Los Choneros responded by murdering dozens of Los Queseros members, including Cedeño, but sparing his wife. A series of leadership changes followed Los Queseros’ eventual killing of Teniente España in 2007 as police operations and further assassinations carried out by multiple rivals unseated successive bosses. Jorge Luis ‘Rasquiña’ Zambrano González reemerged as leader in the early 2010s, having initially assumed command of Los Choneros after Teniente España’s death.
The arrest of Los Choneros’ leadership in 2011 spread the gang’s reach into the Ecuadorian prison system and transformed it into one of the most violent gangs in the country. As more gang members were arrested in targeted police operations over the next decade, the gang gained a permanent presence in jails across the country, while maintaining its presence in the streets. Los Choneros’ subsequent migration from their historical stronghold of Manta to the drug trafficking capital of Guayaquil caused clashes with Los Lagartos over control of criminal economies. Historically based in Guayaquil, Los Lagartos was originally a prison gang operating as contract killers since at least 2011 that transitioned into one of Ecuador’s main prison gang alliances when it was joined by micro-trafficking and smuggling gangs Los Cubanos, led by William ‘El Cubano’ Poveda Salazar, and Los Gorras, led by Giovanny ‘Gorras’ Mantilla Ceballos, in 2019 in order to fight their common enemy of Los Choneros. Los Cubanos had been confronting Los Choneros in prison battles since 2009, leading to the deaths of El Cubano’s brothers Kléber ‘Shrapnel’ and Walter ‘Cayman’ Salazar over the following decade. The Choneros-Lagartos rivalry was the source of many episodes of gruesome violence in prison and on the streets from both sides.
Alleged Los Lagartos members at a police station in Guayaquil on January 11th 2024
Although the successive deaths of Los Lagartos’ leaders since 2019 has weakened the group, several smaller gangs have grown to rival Los Choneros power in recent years, partially as a product of government anti-gang measures. In 2019, President Lenín Moreno introduced a new, more punitive penal code, invested oil surpluses in the police, and began rewarding police officers for capturing high-profile criminals. As a result, although the most wanted ended up behind bars, prison violence, perpetrated particularly by Los Choneros, escalated. In response, Moreno declared a penitentiary crisis, deployed the army to suppress prison gang conflict, and distributed Los Choneros’ leadership and most violent members throughout the prison system in an attempt to disrupt their operations. However, this strategy massively backfired. The mass relocation led to the formation of many smaller gangs aligned with Los Choneros, multiplying their presence in the country. Within weeks of the prison crisis declaration, Los Choneros members had killed El Cubano, as well as Gorras’ brother Ricardo, and several other Los Lagartos members. Nonetheless, Gorras consolidated Los Lagartos’ constituent gangs, and under his leadership, enabled it to reach the height of its power as both a prison and street gang, leading to some of the worst violence in their rivalry with Los Choneros. However, the unexpected death of Gorras from COVID-19 in June 2020 left the Lagartos alliance without a central leader, leading to its fragmentation into smaller gangs. Los Choneros exploited Los Lagartos’ weakness in August by attacking their section of the Litoral Penitentiary—territory held by the gang for more than a decade—forcing them into a truce that would see their members lay down their weapons and cede control to Los Choneros in September in exchange for transfer to a safe prison block. Los Lagartos’ organizational capabilities were significantly diminished thereafter.
Jorge Luis Zambrano González (aka Rasquiña), leader of Los Choneros
Following the murder of Los Choneros leader Rasquiña (above) in December 2020, several of its derivative gangs broke away in an attempt to take advantage of its weakened state, causing an unprecedented surge in vicious gang violence. Los Choneros has steadily lost power to an alliance of these and other rival groups in the years since, as splinter gangs including Los Lobos (based in Pastaza), Los Tiguerones (in Esmeraldas) and Los Chone Killers (in Guayas) captured drug trafficking routes and criminal economies once controlled by the gang. However, such alliances are volatile and are largely motivated by internal competition over routes, networks and recognition. Los Lobos (The Wolves), which has more than 8,000 members across Ecuador’s prisons and cities, led the Ecuador Nueva Generación Cartel—formed in 2021 inspired by the new alliance’s alleged partnership with Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG)—until it fell apart in the second half of 2023, with Los Tiguerones (The Great Tigers) and Los Chone Killers realigning themselves with Los Choneros. Nonetheless, “they’ve achieved new legitimacy. They’ve come back as allies and partners, not subordinates to [Los] Choneros”, according to Rivera-Rhon from the OECO.
Ecuador Nueva Generación Cartel banner
Los Lobos, led by Alexander ‘Ariel’ Quesada following the suspected death of Wilmer ‘Pipo’ Chavarría in a 2021 prison riot, nonetheless remains a formidable rival of Los Choneros. As well as controlling El Turi prison housing nearly 1,600 inmates in Cuenca in the Amazonian province of Pastaza, Los Lobos maintain a strong presence in numerous other prisons including Litoral in Guayaquil, where they also dominate cocaine trafficking in the streets. Operating mainly in the cities of Cuenca and Latacunga and the coastal town of Machala, Los Lobos engage in cocaine processing, micro-trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, robbery, murder-for-hire, and illegal gold mining in addition to trafficking cocaine between Colombian and Mexican cartels. Following the deaths of most of Los Choneros’ leadership, Los Lobos began pursuing its allies including Los Fatales and Los Aquilas.
Los Lobos has also been in a feud with its former ally R7 since 2022, supposedly sparked by Ariel’s aggressive demeanor towards R7 leader Marcelo Anchundia, leading to dozens of deaths. In April 2022, Ariel and Anchundia both requested transfers after riots in El Turi prison involving both gangs claimed 20 lives. Ariel again ordered an attempt on Anchundia’s life after the latter’s transfer to Bellavista prison, leading to riots which left 44 prisoners dead. Several transfers followed before Anchundia was found hanged in his cell in November 2023.
Historical Overview
Before Alexander Dugin introduced "neo-Eurasianism" in connection with his movement, the origins of Eurasianism as a philosophical doctrine can be traced back to the early 20th century. It emerged among Russian émigrés in the aftermath of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution (Riasanovsky, 1998). Initially, they were strongly anti-Bolshevik, but over time, Eurasianism evolved to align more closely with aspects of the Soviet model, particularly Marxism, while retaining a strong emphasis on nationalism (Shlapentokh, 1997).
The main tenets of Eurasianism included the unity of the Slavic and non-Slavic peoples of the USSR (Shlapentokh, 1997). The political ideology of Eurasianism presupposes the importance of Russian and Eurasian civilization, reflecting its dominance within global political actors. Central to its objective is to propagate a strong Russian sovereignty and the preservation of a distinct Russian cultural and political identity.
Over the years, Eurasianism experienced a resurgence, particularly in the 1980s, as a hardline conservative response to Mikhail Gorbachev’s liberal domestic and foreign policy reforms (Akgül, 2005). The revival of Eurasianism was driven by intellectuals who criticized Gorbachev's policies, which they deemed as a threat to Russian sovereignty and traditional values, renewing their interest in Eurasianist ideas as a counterbalance to the perceived Westernization of Russian society. By 1991, Alexander Dugin redefined and expanded the philosophy, creating what he termed "neo-Eurasianism" (Shlapentokh, 2007). Dugin (2014) sought to shape this second wave of Eurasianism, drawing inspiration from the German Conservative Revolution, whose prominent figures included Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jünger, and Oswald Spengler. These thinkers, while fascinated by modern technology and its societal impact, rejected the Enlightenment's core values and institutions, such as liberal democracy, individualism, egalitarianism, and parliamentary governance (Herf, 1986).
Much like Dugin's movement, the German Conservative Revolution was largely an intellectual project, one that embraced modern tools to reinforce a conservative and revolutionary philosophy. Dugin adopted these values into neo-Eurasianism, positioning it as a rejection of modern liberal ideals in favor of a traditionalist, conservative worldview (Dugin, 2014).
Dugin’s earlier involvement with the National Bolshevik Party (NBP) in the 1990s, a group infamously known online as "Nazbols," blended Left-wing ideology with elements of Eurasianism. He later emphasized that neo-Eurasianism became the ideological foundation for the rise of today’s patriotic, nationalistic, and anti-liberal movements. According to Dugin, these movements trace their origins to the early 1990s, during Boris Yeltsin's leadership of the Russian Federation. Dugin states,
“After that, the Eurasianists became the core of the National Bolshevist movement. It wasn’t until the late 1990s that an independent neo-Eurasianist movement, with its own political program, was formed. It based itself not only on older sources but also on new elements taken from Western anti-modern sources, including some from the school of postmodernism. In early 2000 it gained some level of social recognition and received its first positive responses from within the political circles around Vladimir Putin.” (2014, pg. 19-20)
Dugin’s intellectual movement is deeply multifaceted, inspired by numerous theoretical works. The neo-Eurasian Movement upholds a discipline to rejuvenate traditional values in Russia. It also attempts to reject Western Liberalism and Unipolarity in the global sphere by introducing Multipolarity.
Moreover, Dugin’s journey in developing the neo-Eurasian Movement has deep roots in his involvement with the NBP. His recognition dates back to working alongside Eduard Limonov, a Russian writer and poet. In addition, Egor Letov, a Russian punk rock singer would be the core founder of the NBP, alongside Dugin and Limonov (Rogatchevski, 2007) (Figure1). Their movement was a critical response to the wave of liberalization in Russia, condemning Yeltin’s brutal crackdown on pro-Soviet and nationalist demonstrators from the 1993 Russian Constitutional Crisis, better known as the Black October.
Figure 1: Limonov (left), Letov (center), and Dugin (right) hold a conference representing their movement, with the NBP flag displayed in the background.
The NBP’s objective was to overthrow the Russian government and propagate radical change. Their group was diverse, with members ranging from intellectuals who criticized Yeltsin’s regime, to the more mundane individuals and hooligans. However, by the late 90s, Yeltsin adopted a policy that strengthened Russian sovereignty which directed the country with nationalism and authoritarianism.
In turn, this would lead to the split of the NBP with Dugin and Limov’s political differences and disagreements (Shlapentokh, 2007, pg. 217). Dugin on the one hand advocated ideals to cooperate with the state. He believed this approach promised to fulfill his philosophy by evolving his country to become more openly authoritarian and nationalistic. Though, Limonov would still hold his values in the absolute overthrow of the government.
The breakdown of the NBP was a significant moment for Dugin that would alter his life’s path. By abandoning the party, Dugin started to construct his theories on neo-Eurasianism by taking advantage by actively disseminating his ideas through a multi-media approach (Umland, 2017), working as a university professor for political science and military schools, and investing surmountable time for his new organization and ideological movement, the neo-Eurasian Movement, International Eurasian Movement, also known as the Eurasia Party or the Fourth Political Theory.
The Neo-Eurasian Mission
Neo-Eurasianism’s core belief centers on restoring Russia as a dominant power within a multipolar world order. While Dugin’s direct influence on the Kremlin has been widely debated, his ideas have undeniably shaped discussions within Russian political circles. Rather than distancing his movement from pro-Putin entities, Dugin aligns himself with elements of the presidential administration that support a more assertive geopolitical stance (Kipp, 2002, p. 92). In post-Yeltsin Russia, Dugin shifted his approach from revolutionary rhetoric to political pragmatism. He advocated for a "gradual and mild shift of the Russian political elite to Eurasian positions" (Kipp, 2002, p. 100), recognizing that evolutionary change, rather than radical resistance, would better serve his vision. His strategy focused on moving the Kremlin away from Yeltsin’s pro-Western stance toward a distinctly Eurasian one. Thus, a key goal of the neo-Eurasian movement is to influence Russia's political leadership, redirecting its policies toward a Eurasianist framework.
Dugin’s influence is far-reaching, shaping both Russian military strategies and policy decisions, particularly in framing the "Atlantic" world led by the Unipolar United States as Russia's enemy (Burbank, 2022). His ideological footprint was especially evident in the early stages of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, where his role in hybrid warfare helped sow dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian government and reinforced the pro-Russian separatist movements in eastern Ukraine (Shekhovtsov, 2017).
Dugin's involvement dates back to the 2014 conflict in Ukraine, where he maintained contact with insurgent groups like the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) (Fitzpatrick, 2014). He also played a key role in organizing volunteers from Russia to support the DPR which helped to build a network of influence in the region (Lauruelle, 2014). Notably, Dugin even guided separatist leaders, including Ekaterina Gubareva, wife of Pavel Gubarev, the former head of the DPR, during a Skype call, reassuring them of the Kremlin’s backing for their cause (Shynkarenko, 2014).
Dugin is deeply committed to the project of creating a "New Russia/Novorossiya," as seen by his support for both the DPR and LPR and the current war. He has consistently criticized the Ukrainian government, which he portrays as being influenced by Nazi ideology while rejecting Western hegemony and praising Putin’s defiance of Kyiv and Washington.
Moreover, Dugin employs a multimedia approach to disseminate his ideas. From appearances on Russian television to interviews with figures like Tucker Carlson, he has cultivated a significant presence both in traditional media and online platforms. He is also reportedly the director of Geopolitika, a Russian journal that vehemently criticizes Western political institutions (Lister & Pennington, 2022).
Dugin's intellectual approach to geopolitics ties his philosophy of neo-Eurasianism and integrates it into his movement. He combines elements from Heidegger's philosophy, traditionalism, and various sociological theories. Notably, Dugin frames Eurasianism not merely as a political philosophy but as an episteme, an intellectual knowledge. He believes that Eurasian episteme serves as a cultural symbol, or logo, rooted in a counter position to Western ideologies, ultimately rejecting universal truths (Millerman, 2022). This perspective underscores the overall ideology of neo-Eurasianism, a critical perspective of Western values, including conventional notions of democracy, human rights, and individualism. He attempts to embody a worldview that acknowledges the diverse developmental trajectories of all societies, civilizations, and cultures.
Dugin penetrates an idea by persuading his audiences that the Global West exerts substantial influence over international politics (Dugin, 2023). He perceives the West's trajectory as inherently dangerous to diverse cultures and their customs, harboring anxieties that Western impositions will undermine the identities of other groups (Składanowski & Borzęcki, 2018). Dugin is deeply inspired by figures like the Italian philosopher Julius Evola and French intellectual René Guénon, a key figure in the traditionalist school of thought. Both thinkers emphasize esotericism, spirituality, and a staunch critique of modernity, which deeply informs Dugin’s worldview (Shekhovtsov, 2015).
One important aspect of Dugin's adoption of the traditionalist school is the critique of how liberal societies often view history as a linear progression. He sees countries like the United States tend to interpret the world in a binary way, where civilization supremacy is seen with contemporary norms compared to a past characterized as a hideous reality no one wishes to revisit. Philosophers like Guénon, Evola, Dugin, and the earlier mentioned German Conservatives challenge this notion of history, expressing extreme skepticism towards Enlightenment ideals and rationalism while embracing a more relativistic world perspective.
Moreover, neo-Eurasianism embodies thoughts from traditionalism and applies them to his geopolitical advice to political circles and his broader audiences. His advocacy for multipolarity, voiced also by figures like President Putin and China’s leader, Xi Jingping , is evident in his notable work, The Fourth Political Theory (2012), which attempts to chart a course that rejects liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. He does not affiliate himself with any of these political ideologies, which he considers products of modernity. Instead, Dugin positions himself as a representative of traditionalism, advocating for a world that honors diversity in culture, religion, spiritualism, and collectivism. Neo-Eurasianism aims to resist the pressures to conform imposed by dominant powers, particularly criticizing the United States and Western Europe as a threat to global stability, reflecting a dangerous omnipresence of unipolar political actors.
Dugin’s Influence
The perception of Alexander Dugin as a fascist stems from his reputation as an ultra-nationalist, which is reinforced by his inflammatory rhetoric that reflects an alignment with extreme nationalist sentiments.
For instance, Dugin expressed controversial views on the Russian social media platform VKontakte, stating, “Ukraine needs to be eliminated from idiots. The genocide of idiots is evident to anyone. Ukraine needs to be cleansed of idiots. Evil cretins, close to the voice of Logos, are mortally dangerous and… at the same time incredibly stupid. I do not believe that these are Ukrainians. Ukrainians are a wonderful Slavic people. They are some kind of bastards that appeared from the sewer manholes.” (Figure 2)
Figure 2: Dugin’s comments on certain Ukrainians deserving of genocide. Source: https://vk.com/wall18631635_3911
These remarks illustrate Dugin’s broader perspective, where he frames contemporary Ukraine as a corrupted entity unworthy of its Slavic heritage. In the wake of the 2014 conflict, he propagates a narrative that calls for the eradication of what he perceives as ‘pseudo-Ukrainians,’ whom he accuses of being influenced by neo-Nazi ideologies and betraying their ancestral roots. This troubling stance underscores the dangerous intersection of nationalism and dehumanization in Dugin's thought, revealing the potential implications for his political influence in the region - especially with the separatist fighters in Ukraine.
Dugin’s neo-Eurasianism movement in Ukraine traces back to 2008, when the Eurasian Youth Movement, its youth wing, emerged in reaction to Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Dugin played a pivotal role in shaping the group, fostering anti-Western sentiments, and blaming the Global West for influencing Ukraine and promoting color revolutions. The Eurasian Youth Movement was predominantly made up of pro-Kremlin supporters, with a strong emphasis on instilling patriotism in its members. This mission closely aligned with Dugin’s broader ideological goals, including the international spread of his neo-Eurasianist vision.
Furthermore, The Eurasian Youth Movement is widely believed to have been funded by Russian authorities (Atsungur, 2013). This financial support was instrumental in fueling the movement’s anti-liberal and anti-Western stance, reinforcing resistance to the growing influence of Westernization in Ukraine. From Dugin’s perspective, this shift was seen as a form of "Nazification" and a dangerous departure from Russian influence.
The Eurasian Youth Movement played a key role in solidifying resistance in Eastern Ukraine, including groups like the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR). Notably, some of the DPR’s significant leaders attended Eurasian Youth Movement camps in Russia in the early 2000s (Figures 3, 4, & 5). These camps also served as a recruiting ground for individuals tasked with disrupting key events, such as the 2014 Ukrainian presidential elections, when groups were mobilized to besiege the Ukrainian parliament (Kijev ostromához…, 2014). One of the key figures behind these efforts, Bakhtiyarov, has been a close associate of Dugin since the 1990s.
Figure 3: ESM summer camp with leading figures of the Donetsk uprising, Andriy Purgin, Oleg Frolov, Oleg Bakhtiyarov, and Kostyantyn Knyrik.
Figure 4: A member of the summer camp poses with an assault rifle in front of the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) flag. Source: https://ua-ru.info/news/22715-smi-vooruzhennyy-zahvat-vlasti-gotovili-v-donecke-esche-s-2009-goda.html
Figure 5: Students at the Eurasian Youth Union summer camp in Russia engaged in training on the use of conventional weapons. Source: https://ua-ru.info/news/22715-smi-vooruzhennyy-zahvat-vlasti-gotovili-v-donecke-esche-s-2009-goda.html
Figure 6: Purgin, a prominent leader of the Donetsk People's Republic, gathers at a rally displaying support for the neo-Eurasian Movement flag. Source: https://vdmironov.livejournal.com/114179.html
Is Dugin Putin's Brain?
Dugin's connections with influential political figures from Eastern Ukraine and the support he has received from Russian authorities reflect his strong rapport with the Kremlin. However, it is worth noting that Dugin's advisory role to President Putin is indirect. As an illustration, at the founding congress of Eurasia, Dugin expressed considerable appreciation for the Kremlin's administrative leadership (Dunlop, 2001). He also extended his support to institutions such as the Moscow Patriarchate and the Central Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Russia, along with other prominent organizations. It was also reported that General Igor Rodionov, affiliated with the General Staff Academy and serving as defense minister then, spoke highly of Dugin (p. 94). During this period, Dugin published Foundations of Geopolitics (1997), a controversial work advocating for annexing territories and alliances aimed at rebuilding Russia. This book has been used as a textbook in Russian military academies (Clover, 2016). The timing is significant, as Rodionov’s tenure as defense minister coincided with the introduction of Foundations of Geopolitics to these academies, highlighting a unique alignment of perspectives.
Dugin has also established close ties with influential Russian advisors to the Kremlin, including Gleb Pavlovsky, who was an associate of Vladimir Putin from 1996 to 2011 (Kipp, 2002; Gaddy, 2013). While there is no direct evidence of Dugin's involvement with the Kremlin, it is crucial to emphasize that figures like Pavlovsky played an important role in promoting Dugin's rise to fame. They facilitated his networking opportunities, such as helping him to appear on popular television programs and engage with various influential figures, including former KGB operatives and Chechen criminal leaders like Akhmed Nukhanov, who helped him establish the Eurasia Party (Rutland, 2016).
To this day, Dugin's relationship with Putin is widely debated and complicated. Despite his perceived pro-Putin stance in Western media, it is misleading to characterize him as a close ally of the president. Dugin has openly criticized Putin's policies, particularly regarding the intervention in Crimea, and the ongoing war in Ukraine since 2022. His criticism often focuses on what he perceives as Putin's overly cautious approach, advocating often more radical and aggressive measures to strengthen Russia. Ultimately, labeling Dugin as "Putin's brain" is a flawed simplification, as he does not share a close personal relationship with the president. However, his influence should not be underestimated. Dugin's neo-Eurasian philosophy has had a notable impact on the Kremlin, as evidenced by his eerie predictions regarding the annexation of Crimea, and the escalation of conflict in Ukraine. These insights have shaped the logistical and foundational rationale behind the Kremlin's recent actions.
Conclusion
Alexander Dugin has solidified his influence by embedding his political philosophy into Russian state ideology. His ties to influential Russian elites and hardliners have significantly shaped their worldview, fostering a logic of supremacy in Russia's geopolitical positioning within global politics. Dugin's strong admiration for Orthodox Christianity and traditionalism underscores his right-wing persona, while also funneling a staunch opposition to Western influence and liberalism (or what he might call the "Atlantic mentality").
The core ideology of Dugin is neo-Eurasianism, a vision of a Eurasian empire harking back to Soviet territories, including his controversial support to dismantle Georgia, and annex Ukraine. He argues that Ukraine poses a substantial threat to Eurasian stability (Clover, 2016), and his stance has reinforced nationalistic circles, impacting Russian military strategy as a robust countermeasure to NATO and U.S. policies. His ideas deeply reflect Russian political discourse, especially among those who seek Russian dominance in Eurasia.
Notably, Dugin's influence has also begun to spread in the West. He has appeared on numerous media such as Tucker Carlson's show, and on popular radical circles, such as the left-wing Infrared movement, which resonates with younger audiences. He has engaged with notable journalists, including Pepe Escobar, and in the past, interviewed figures like Matteo Salvini. Given Dugin's rising profile and the rising traction of his philosophy, his approach is finding broader appeal. The Kremlin's influence from his ideas reflects a deeper reinforcement of these views in both Russian international and domestic policy.
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