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ENOT Corps

Updated: Aug 5

ENOT Corps logo

Introduction & Overview


ENOT Corps was a Russian nationalist far-right private military contracting group. Gaining notoriety through participation in the Russian nationalist scene, ENOT quickly gained covert government support, which enabled its fighters to deploy to eastern Ukraine. A key component of Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, ENOT Corps remained in good standing with both the Kremlin and other far-right groups until 2018, when the group seems to have fallen out of favour with Moscow's political circles. This led to ENOT cutting ties with Kremlin-linked groups, resulting in the criminalisation of ENOT as an organisation and the consequent arrests of numerous fighters. By 2019, ENOT was formally shut down. Whilst numerous key members of the group are now in prison, one of the two primary founders, Igor Mangushev, was killed in 2023 in what looks to be a state-sanctioned execution in Russian-occupied Ukraine. 


History & Foundations


ENOT, which stands for "United Popular Communal Groups", was founded by an obscure and loose group of Russian nationalists. This group varies in their backgrounds but was united in their desire to mobilise other nationalists into fighting in conflicts involving Russia (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). However, over time, two key figures appeared. Roman Telenkevich, a 51-year-old Russian, was originally registered as an individual entrepreneur engaged in the trade of household electrical goods before his entry into military contracting through ENOT. Telenkevich had previously served in the Russian Air Force in the unit 93810 of the Air Force military transport aviation near Moscow (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). Igor Mangushev, the other primary founder of the group, served as a Russian army captain before his activity with ENOT, and interestingly seemed to have continued his service in tandem with these "extra-curricular" activities (Kirby, 2023). 


Mangushev gained notoriety in 2009 for his founding and managing of the Light Russia nationalist group (Tumanov, 2015). This group primarily conducted "anti-immigration" raids in collaboration with other far-right groups such as Alexey Khudyakov's "Shield of Moscow" (Vera Alperovich, 2016). In 2010, Mangushev met Telenkevich, who at the time was running the Moscow branch of the People's Cathedral (Polukhina, 2019). This marked the beginning of collaborative efforts which, by 2011, would result in the formal founding of ENOT Corps (Data Journalists, 2023). 


Even before their work as PMCs, ENOT had gained the attention of the FSB through their domestic activities on the nationalist scene (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). As with groups such as Rusich, RIM, Batman Battalion, and other volunteer pro-Russian paramilitaries, it seems that around this time, ENOT developed a symbiotic relationship with the Russian state security apparatus. Following this favourable development, ENOT's activity escalated in its severity. 


2014 saw ENOT participating in the hybrid war being waged against eastern Ukraine. ENOT was present during the Euromaidan, fighting alongside the Berkut police against protestors (Radio Liberty, 2019). The group also assisted in the seizure of Crimea (Coynash, 2020), fighting alongside Cossacks and Berkut police during the early stages of the annexation (Polukhina, 2019). With the seizure of Crimea, ENOT shifted its attention to the mainland, fighting alongside Russian separatists in the Donbas (Askew, 2023). In 2015, it seems that the group continued its campaign in Ukraine, primarily fighting for the city of Debaltseve (Coynash, 2020). This military activity was conducted under the guise of 'humanitarian' motivations; however, evidence points to ENOT operating in an almost exclusively combative capacity. Even on the rare occasions where ENOT did participate in the distribution of humanitarian aid in the area, in reality, this aid consisted of sights, bulletproof vests, and military equipment, which was then provided to pro-Russian separatists (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018).


ENOT fighters and their founder roman Telenkevich in the Donbas
ENOT fighters, and founder Roman Telenkevich, during the group’s time in the Donbas. https://ok.ru/video/306451649014

In addition to this frontline activity, 2015 saw ENOT expand its operations into new roles. It seems that ENOT was utilised by the Russian state to stomp out dissent amongst disgruntled or power-hungry separatist groups. In spring, ENOT was responsible for the purging of a Cossack formation following the formation challenging Igor Plotnitsky, leader of the LPR (Coynash, 2020). In September, ENOT also began holding military training camps in Russian territories. During this time, the group ENOT held a training camp for 300 young Russians (13-14 years old) in the Moscow region (Coynash, 2020). Alexei Milchakov and Jan Petrovsky from DShRG Rusich were valued instructors during this camp. Later, ENOT held another youth camp in Belarus. Yet again, the instructors were a rogues gallery of military officers, paramilitary fighters, and PMC operators, with the camp mustering such a turnout that the Belarusian authorities were concerned it could be an early military move from Russia (Goble, 2018). 


ENOT continued its activities for a few years, with the group continuing its occupation of Ukraine with decreased intensity and organising a youth camp in the Moscow region in 2017 (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). However, it seems that 2018 was the beginning of the end for ENOT. Initially, ENOT continued its operations in Ukraine, and even gained contracts in Syria as well as anti-migration/counter organised crime and drug trafficking work in Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh (Dyner, 2018). However, whilst Telenkevich was awarded for his efforts in Crimea by Sergei Aksyonov (installed leader of occupied Crimea), it seems this supposed recognition of duty was a mark of ENOT meeting its expiry date regarding its usefulness to the Russian state (Polukhina, 2019). 


Later that year, Telenkevich fell into conflict with Alexander Borodai (Prime Minister of the DPR at the time), leading to ENOT leaving the Union of Donbas Volunteers (Coynash, 2020). Following this, ENOT was rapidly labelled as a criminal organisation by the Russian state, with ENOT members beginning to be arrested. In August, the 'raccoon' kids training camp the group had been running in Siberia, was shut down under the pretence of child abuse and public anxiety (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). On the 7th of November, the FSB and local police arrested several members of ENOT (Goble, 2018). ENOT's capabilities, gained through fighting in Ukraine and Syria, combined with its ultranationalist objectives that were rapidly drifting away from the interests of the Kremlin, led to the Russian state deciding to put down what was, from its perspective, a rabid dog. In 2019, ENOT was formally shut down (Askew, 2023). 


Whilst Russian security forces initially went after lower-hanging fruit, the founding/key members of the group were far from untouchable. In June 2021, Vladimir Morosoz, ENOTs' treasurer and ideologue, was sentenced to 10.5 years in a maximum security prison (BBC NEWS, 2021). He is imprisoned on organised crime charges, including violent extortion. It seems ENOT had resorted to operating as a group of thugs to hire. Telenkevich was also sentenced to 13 years in prison in March of 2022 on similar charges (RFL, 2022). Supposedly, Telenkevich, working alongside other ex-ENOT employees under the cover of contractors for the Russian security forces, regularly robbed smugglers they were supposed to arrest, taking a percentage of captured goods for themselves.  


In February 2023, Igor Mangushev was killed. At the time, Mangushev was running an anti-drone squad in occupied Luhansk as part of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (Kirby, 2023). The event took place in Russian-occupied Ukraine, with the killing seemingly conducted through an execution-style shot to the back of the head (Askew, 2023), using a 9mm round at 45 degrees from the top of Mangushev's head (implying he was kneeling at the time of death) (Kirby, 2023). 


Objectives & Ideology


ENOT was driven, at least ideologically, by imperialism and ultranationalism. The group viewed Ukraine as a part of Russia (Askew, 2023). More specifically, Mangushev believed that Russia is less at war with Ukraine as a state and more as the idea of 'anti-Russia', and according to Mangushev, the defeat of this idea is essential regardless of how many Ukrainians have to die (Kirby, 2023). These beliefs, as well as Mangushev's belief in a 'Russian World' (Tumanov, 2015), can be seen throughout the group's social media output and real-world activities. 


Photo used by ENOT on their recruiting page featuring the Novorossiyan flag
The photo used by ENOT corp on a website registering their organisation. On the left is the the flag of Novorossiya, traditionally donned/flown by far-right imperialist groups. https://zoon.ru/msk/public_services/obschestvennye_organizatsii_enot_corp/

In addition to these nationalistic views, ENOT has also gained infamy for its proximity to Neo-Nazism and its ardent Christian Orthdoxy. Mangushev, and consequently ENOT, gained their foundations from the Neo-Nazi scene in Russia (Kirby, 2023), and during training camps, attendees were often subjected to far-right/neo nazi propaganda seminars (Coynash, 2020). ENOT has, at times, referred to itself as a 'Russian Orthodox community' (Goble, 2018). The group's events are titled things such as "International Youth Military-Patriotic Collection in Glory of the Holy Prince Dmitry Donskoy" or "Military-Tactical Game of St. Archangel Michael" and at one of these events, a chaplain was present to bless attendees (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). This Christian influence was also present during the group's military activities, with the medals handed out to ENOT operators for efforts in the Donbas being in the shape of crucifixes (Coynash, 2020). When they received their medals, fighters shouted, “I serve my fatherland, ENOT and the Orthodox Faith”.


Military/Political Abilities


During their peak period of operation, ENOT relied on receiving both contracts and support from businesses in the AOs they were deployed to monetarily support their operations (Askew, 2023). Whilst not outright PMCs, during its time in the Donbas war, ENOT carried out voluntary humanitarian convoys and 'self-defence' skirmishes (Polukhina, 2019). These activities were not contractually paid, but sponsors from the Donbas put a high price on humanitarian aid, earning ENOT a notable income. 


Unfortunately, this system of financing is possibly why the group was dismantled and why Mangushev was killed. Unlike other PMCs that have managed to generate heavy business and political ties, ENOT did not manage to find this level of sponsorship and consequent political protection. This would not necessarily have been a problem for ENOT had the group not been as outwardly critical of the Russian government as they were of those in the West (Goble, 2018). 


Militarily, ENOT's primary tool was deniability. The group's obscure/loose command structure and proxy-financing through regional sponsors meant that its activities were difficult to track and were a key component of hybrid operations in eastern Ukraine (Goble, 2018). This hybrid capability was exhibited during the annexation of Crimea, and was recognised by the Kremlin and awarded with a high degree of support (Coynash, 2020). In the context of more conventional operations, ENOT managed to gain a considerable amount of equipment over the years through its military contracting work, with Mangushev claiming the group was ready "to do business" (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). 


Approach to Resistance


ENOT's activities primarily fall into the category of private military contracting. Askew (2023) feels that these activities were a way to monetise the group's ideology. Through PMC work, ENOT was able to gain monetary support as well as further their objective of increasing Russian influence abroad and the resuscitation of the Russian Empire. Interestingly, ENOT always denied being a PMC group, and yet were open about their support for such activities (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). Mangushev felt that PMCs were a valuable way to organise the separatist cause, championing the idea that separatist groups should become PMCs, or should be monitored by PMCs (Tumanov, 2015). 


The training camps held by ENOT also operated to further the group's ideological objectives. Through these camps, hundreds of young Russian people were exposed to far-right beliefs and trained in combat skills under the idea that these children would grow up to become the next generation of patriots (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). 


International Relations & Alliances


Whilst the network of militant far-right groups in Russia is complex and overlapping, on a few occasions, the connections between these groups have become slightly less obscure. ENOT and Wagner troops regularly fought in similar theatres during the Donbas war, but the connection between the PMCs became much clearer when Mangushev collaborated with Prigozhin as a political strategist (Kirby, 2023). Rusich, another PMC with very close ties to Wagner, also have close ties to ENOT through their participation in training camps as instructors (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018). Social media posts of these collaborative efforts between Rusich and ENOT seem to indicate a close working relationship between the groups. 


ENOT Corp, Rusich and RIM members. Roman Telenkevich, ENOTs founder and Rusichs founder Alexey Milchakov also feature
Members of ENOT Corp, Rusich group, and the Russian Imperial Movement together at a training camp. Third from left, ENOT founder Roman Telenkevich. Fourth from left, Rusich founder Alexey Milchakov. 

ENOT's connections to the Russian state are heavily obscured, yet can still be proven. More specifically, ENOT seems to have regularly operated as an asset for the Russian intelligence community, with there being heavy links between ENOT and the FSB and GRU (Coynash, 2020). These links were so heavy that at times it seemed like the FSB/GRU were propping ENOT up by conducting key roles and training members of the PMC (Radio Liberty, 2019). Two key players of the organisation, Denis Karaban (GRU), Alexander Mrishchuk and Anton Baryakshev (FSB), turned out to be intelligence assets/officers (Coynash, 2020). 


Works Cited





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