Misanthropic Division
- William Jukes-Bennett
- Oct 19
- 14 min read
Introduction & Overview

Efforts to solidify Misanthropic Divisions' true nature have been relatively unsuccessful. It seems as if, rather than a unit or clear structure of fighters (as is often assumed), Misanthropic Division is in reality a network/group to which any pro-Ukrainian combatant can claim membership as long as they follow the group's far-right ideology.
Founded in 2013, Misanthropic Division promotes far-right/neo-nazi ideology and provides both material and monetary support to units/groups which it deems to be in line with its own views. Gaining notoriety through their involvement in the 2014 Euromaidan protests alongside Right Sector, Misanthropic Division continued its praxis throughout the separatist conflict in the Donbas and the eventual Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Whilst Misanthropic Divisions' foundations, and the majority of the group's activity, can be found in Ukraine, a key component of the group's efforts is international recruitment for Ukrainian volunteer groups. With close ties to the Azov Brigade, the Misanthropic Division uses cells across Europe to radicalise and recruit existing members of far-right communities into joining a range of international volunteer combatant groups.
History & Foundations
Formed in 2013 (https://t.me/c/1565564438/43654), Misanthropic Division (henceforth referred to as MD) found its roots in the Kharkiv football hooligan scene (Sova Center, 2016), a common trend amongst far-right groups. Initially, consisting of only 14 people (Sova Center, 2016), MD made their first appearance in December of 2013 during the events of Ukraine's Euromaidan, operating as a component of the Right Sector (Ukraine's far-right party) (Reft and Light, 2016). Of the 14 initial members of the groups, two individuals quickly developed prominence amongst MD's activities.
MD's primary founder is a man by the name of Dmytro Pavlov (Sova Center, 2016). The apparent leader of MD, Pavlov, is originally from Belarus (Sova Center, 2016 1), and has extensive ties to Eastern European neo-Nazi networks (an unsurprising fact in the light of Pavlov's nom de guerre; "Misanthropic Fuhrer") (Sova Center, 2016). The other notable individual, Serhiy "People Hater" Lynnyk, was another key component MD's initial activities alongside the Right Sector (Sova Center, 2016). Following MD's involvement in combat operations, Lynnyk fought alongside the Azov brigade and has since become a prominent propagandist for MD, posting about his combat experiences on the MD webpage/telegram (Reft and Light, 2016).
Following its initial involvement in the Euromaidan, MD continued working alongside Right Sector. On the 15 of March, 2014, pro-Russian activists from the Oplot organisation attacked Ukrainian right-wing groups in the Kharkiv Right Sector office (Reft and Light, 2016). Both sides of the clash were heavily armed, leading to the attack descending into a gunfight, resulting in the deaths of two pro-Russian activists. MD claimed responsibility for these deaths (Yudina, 2020). Once officially founded, MD increased recruitment drives and began its participation in the Donbas war as a component of the Azov brigade (Ukraine Crusade, 2015).
Despite its infancy, MD's influence rapidly spread outside of Ukraine. Following the foundation of the Kyiv branch, other branches began to pop up across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017). For example, a branch was founded in Switzerland by a man known as Bjorn Sigvald. A native of Geneva, Sigvald seemed to work closely with MD to organise and further recruit for the Swiss branch of the group, with some members being active members of the Swiss military (Renversé, 2020).
This activity did not go unnoticed. On the 21st of March, 2015, Italian national Saverio Fontana, a prominent recruiter for MD, was spotted in Newcastle (UK) at a neo-Nazi rally where the MD banner was being displayed (FOIA Research, 2019). Shortly following this, the UK branch of MD organised a protest outside of the US embassy in London, demanding the release of neo-Nazi Gary Yabrough from prison, and consequently leading to considerable scrutiny from both the press and law enforcement entities (Libcom, 2015). MD's activity during this period also led to further pressure in the east, with Russia declaring the group as an extremist organisation on the 17th of July, banning their activity (euronews, 2021).
MD continued their activity in both Ukraine and wider Europe, orchestrating and participating in various political actions alongside various other groups, such as the British National Party (Libcom, 2015). In March 2016, MD claimed responsibility for the disruption of the Equality festival in Lviv due to its pro-LGBT nature. Around 200 individuals in sportswear and masks blocked the entrance into the event following a bomb threat, and as the event's attendees were evacuated, their vehicles were attacked with stones and metal bars (Reft and Light, 2016).
Following this prominent action, MD announced that it would be ceasing activity; however, in August, the group announced that they would be resuming their operations (Sova Center, 2016). This period of inactivity led to a curious development. In July 2016, confirmation of Russian citizens in MD activities came in the form of a criminal case opened by the Russian state. The case, opened against the group's leader (Pavlov) and two Russian nationals, led to the Russians being arrested and shipped to Moscow, with Pavlov remaining safe in Ukraine (Sova Center, 2016).
MD's return from hiatus is marked by a reinsertion into the often asymmetrical zeitgeist of Ukraine's defence in the face of Russian invasion. On the 16th of October, 2016, Arsen "Motorola" Pavlov was killed by an explosion in the elevator shaft of his apartment block in Donetsk (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022). The infamous leader of the 'Sparta' separatist battalion, Pavlov had previously openly admitted to war crimes, including a recorded phone call where the pro-Russian warlord claimed to have killed POWs (BBC, 2016). Misanthropic Division quickly claimed responsibility for the assassination (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022); however, it's unclear how true this claim really is.

Misanthropic Division's connection to the attack was made using a video posted on a small YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2xD70pZt9R8Xq0K5tLkieg). In the video, four masked men claim that they would next target Igor Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko, leaders of separatist groups in the Donbas, in a continued campaign of assassinations (BBC, 2016). Silhouetting the armed huddle of supposed MD fighters are the banners of both Misanthropic Division and Phoenix Division, an MD splinter group (Украинская правда, 2016). The video was quickly picked up by and distributed across Russian media (Romanyuk, 2016).
However, Misanthropic Divisions' official channels refuted any involvement with the death of Pavlov (BBC, 2016). Instead, MD claimed that a member of the Chernihiv rifle battalion, as well as Phoenix Division, by the name of Dim Kravtsov was the original creator of the video (Romanyuk, 2016). It seems that, based on Facebook posts in far-right circles, this confusion was down to infighting between MD and Phoenix Division (Romanyuk, 2016). In reality, Pavlov's death probably had nothing to do with MD. According to reports to the BBC, an ethnic Abkhaz commander fell out with Pavlov before his death and may have been the real culprit (BBC, 2016). Despite these reports, Phoenix division reposted the video on its own channels, reiterating its supposed veracity, and prompting MD to threaten the sub-group online (Romanyuk, 2016).
Whilst MD's activity in the Donbas has continued with the 2022 Russian invasion, the group has largely folded into Azov and disavows militant actions (MMP, 2022). However, MD has also continued its actions in the West of Ukraine. For example, on June 23rd, 2018, a group of young men, later claiming to be a part of the MD-linked group "Sober and angry youth", attacked a Roma settlement in Lviv, stabbing one man to death and injuring three others (including a 10-year-old boy) (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025). The group's primary modern activity consists of fundraising through merchandise sales on the Walknvt and Runic Storm webstore (MMP, 2022).

Objectives & Ideology
As can be assumed by the group's name, MD carries a firmly nihilistic worldview (MMP, 2022). Operating off of semi-Nietzschean ideas, MD believes that the modern world is meaningless and that a return to nature and primitivism is essential (Ukraine Crusade, 2015). This interest in nature/primitivism is further exemplified by MD's unique brand of Germanic neo-paganism, Slavic neo-paganism and neo-Nazi ideology (Sova Center, 2016). Viewing such ideologies as a key component of their ancestral heritage, MD posture in a way which rejects modern society and instead calls for a return to ancient belief systems which place increased value on naturalism (Ukraine Crusade, 2015).
Interestingly, MD's neo-Nazi/National Socialist beliefs seem to contradict their attitudes towards primitivism almost inherently. Whilst MD seems to take an almost anarcho-primitivist perspective towards the ideal lifestyle a follower should lead, the group is simultaneously supportive of strong centralised state power (Reft and Light, 2016) and the use of eugenics to purge society of "weakness, defects, and ugliness" to achieve the "Ubermensch" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015).
Similarly, MD carries extensive white supremacist attitudes. As mentioned earlier, the idea of "blood"/ancestry is extremely important to MD (Reft and Light, 2016), with the group stating that its core political objective is the preservation of "white Europe" (Sova Center, 2016) and "European culture and identity" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015). This objective is sought to be achieved in part through the complete cessation of all non-European immigration into Ukraine (Reft and Light, 2016) as well as the defence of Ukraine and Europe from "Asiatic hordes" (as was stated by the group in the wake of a French MD volunteer fighter being killed in the Donbas) (Harp, 2022). These perspectives on immigration are also ingrained into MD's recruitment process, only accepting European/Eurodescendant men (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) as well as holding reservations against Chechens or Crimean Tatars joining Right Sector (Reft and Light, 2016).
Despite the clear contradiction between naturalistic beliefs and ideas such as eugenics or ethno-nationalism, MD makes no efforts to hide its extreme-right convictions. MD members can regularly be seen conducting nazi salutes, donning swastikas, and reciting racist idioms (BBC, 2016). The group's flag features two Totenkopf symbols, with the Phoenix Division flag featuring a red Schwarze Sonne-style bird (Reft and Light, 2016). These views are expressed through the group's telegram channel in tandem with a range of commonly associated beliefs such as anti-communism, traditionalism, homophobia, sexism, and anti-semitism (MD TELEGRAM).
As with many far-right militant groups, MD is also a proponent of Siege culture and accelerationism. For example, the leader of MD's German branch stated that reading Charles Mason's "Siege" was a considerable component of his radicalisation (Biermann, 2021). The accelerationist solutions proposed by Mason can also be seen throughout MD's communications online, believing that the white race must destroy the current system in order to rise from the ashes (Sova Center, 2016), with these beliefs forming into the misanthropy around which the group has centred its branding (Ukraine Crusade, 2015).
Military/Political Abilities
In reality, MD's military/political abilities remain unclear. Due to the group's constantly shifting nature, its various splinter groups/units, and sprawling web of cells which seem to operate semi-autonomously, even MD's central hub seems to be slightly confused in relation to its own actions (as evidenced by the infighting caused by Phoenix Division's supposed assassination of 'Pavlov" in 2016).
Whilst in 2016 the Ukrainian branch of MD claimed to have around 50 members, there is no real way of verifying this information (Reft and Light, 2016). Additionally, it seems that the nature of existing 'active' members of MD is unclear. Some may claim to be members of MD due to their simple purchase of the group's merchandise and adherence to their ideological perspective, whilst others may claim membership through active participation in combat activities on the front lines of Ukraine.
This wide bracket of 'membership' seems to have worked in MD's favour, allowing the group to organise protests across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017), recruit volunteer combatants (Collins, 2017), and then generate monetary support for said fighters (particularly those within Azov) (MMP, 2022). Despite this wide range of activity, MD has largely toned down its "extracurricular" activities, instead further incorporating into the Azov brigade and operating as a more regular support/recruitment hub (Biermann, 2021).

Approach to Resistance
MD's key role in the fight against the Russian invasion is that of recruitment. Operating as a worldwide front and recruitment network for Azov and its sub-units, MD makes use of members both in Ukraine and throughout Europe to recruit fighters at home and abroad (Harp, 2022). These recruitment drives are primarily conducted using existing networks created by the national socialist black metal scene throughout Europe (Belltower, 2020). For example, the Swiss branch of MD travelled with French neo-Nazi black metal group Peste Noire to deliver supplies to fighters in Kyiv (Renversé, 2020).
However, these recruitment efforts did not stop at the borders of Europe. Notorious MD recruiter, Italian national, and ex-Azov fighter Saverio Fontana was also spotted in Brazil, apparently staying there for 10 months (Martins, 2016). During raids later conducted by Brazilian authorities, connections were found between far-right groups in Brazil and Misanthropic Division, with Fontana apparently travelling city to city on a tour of recruitment with promises of pay and military training (Deutschlandfunk, 2017). The group's efforts to recruit fighters also continue digitally, with users in the group's Telegram chat regularly recommending that other users join volunteer units in Ukraine (primarily Azov's international brigade) (MD TELEGRAM).
Due to Misanthropic Division's paramilitary/irregular activities, the group also utilises a highly decentralised/cell-based structure. MD does not seem to have a clear/rigid leadership structure despite efforts to bring such a structure to light (Yudina, 2020). In fact, MD's true nature is unclear. It seems like, as opposed to a unit or clear structure of fighters, MD is a network/clique that anyone can claim to be a part of as long as they promote the group's binding ideology (Harp, 2022). Sukhov claims that Misanthropic Division began as an informal organisation of neo-nazi Russian fighters who were on Ukraine's side and became a component of Azov (Sukhov, 2015). However, Roussinos claims that MD is a group of Western volunteers fighting alongside Azov (Roussinos, 2022). The reality is most likely a combination of both ideas, with the group recruiting anyone willing to take on the MD mantle and fight for Ukraine/a white Europe.
Regardless of its true nature, Misanthropic Division has spread far and wide, with branches known to be active in at least 19 countries (Sova Center, 2016), such as Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Germany, Spain, the USA (Reft and Light, 2016), the Czech Republic, and Portugal (Yudina, 2020). This network of cells allows MD to not only generate humanitarian support for its fighters in Ukraine (Renversé, 2020) but also to instil its violent approach to resistance into an unknown number of foreign actors. In fact, the MD's approach to resistance is almost entirely centred around violence. Recruiters explicitly search for those with a desire to fight and go to war, and incite those unwilling to fight to carry out crimes such as armed robbery to support the group's activities (Biermann, 2021). This is unsurprising considering the group operates under the slogan "Kill for Odin" (Redaktion, 2019).
These extremist activities are not only encouraged but actively rewarded by those in charge of MD's online presence. Telegram subscribers are rewarded for carrying out hate crimes through the offer of free MD merchandise [https://t.me/c/1565564438/38379] or through outright "bounties" that are placed on targets such as Russian soldiers [https://t.me/mdchatmd/1084704]. Similarly, tattoos are seemingly treated as medals/ranks, with tattoo artists being sent to leading/prominent members in order for them to receive a tattoo of the group's logo (Biermann, 2021) as a reward for their dedication to the movement.
International Relations & Alliances
Whilst there is a clear connection between MD and Azov, its true extent is unclear (Harp, 2022). With extensive references/connections to Azov from the very inception of the group's Telegram channel (MD TELEGRAM), in 2015, MD published a manifesto in which it pledged "immediate support" for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) Azov has also stated that, during its early days, Azov gained at least partial funding through the sale of merchandise using advertisements on the MD Instagram and Facebook pages (MMP, 2022). This support primarily consists of recruitment efforts (Biermann, 2021) as well as the embedding of fighters identifying as MD members within the Azov battalion (Reft and Light, 2016). However, whilst linked to Azov, geolocated posts/images of MD members and MD fighter death announcements don't line up with Azov's movements enough to show that said fighters are under the control of Azov as a single unit (Harp, 2022).
Similar to Azov, MD has had links to Right Sektor since its inception. With MD's founding members beginning their political careers as members of Right Sektor, the group has previously espoused similar levels of support for Right Sektor as that demonstrated for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015). Despite this initial closeness, MD eventually disavowed Right Sektor due to its supposed "Jewish collaborationism" (Reft and Light, 2016).
Additionally, MD has made connections with countless other political movements on both the national and international stage. Through collaboration with far-right groups such as National Action (UK) (Rawlinson, 2018), Restrukt (Russia) (Reft and Light, 2016), and NPD (Germany) (Redaktion, 2019), MD has gained a relatively notable number of international volunteers whilst also fomenting violent unrest in the host states of these groups. MD has collaborated with Ukrainian groups such as the UPA and the Social Nationalist Assembly to gain similar national support for their activities (Reft and Light, 2016). Interestingly, the Social Nationalist Assembly seems to be the only group with which MD is officially associated, and is also the party largely responsible for the creation of both the Right Sektor and the Azov brigade (Reft and Light, 2016).
Works Cited.
- BBC. (2016) ‘Motorola’: Ukraine rebels accuse Kiev over commander’s death. [online] BBC News. 17 Oct. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37676607.
- Belltower News. (2020). Ukraine: Wie ein rechtsextremes Freiwilligenregiment mit Black Metal Nachwuchs rekrutiert. [online] Available at: https://www.belltower.news/ukraine-wie-ein-rechtsextremes-freiwilligenregiment-mit-black-metal-nachwuchs-rekrutiert-102385/ [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Biermann (2021). Fascism: The Brown Internationale. [Online]. Available at: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/fascism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english/seite-2 [Accessed 13 August 2025].
- Collins. (2017). Russian court sentences members of a neo-Nazi terror group also active in the UK – HOPE not hate. [online] HOPE not hate. Available at: https://hopenothate.org.uk/2017/06/22/russian-court-sentences-members-neo-nazi-group-also-active-uk/ [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Deutschlandfunk (2020). Ukraine-Krise - Brasilianische Neonazis kämpfen gegen pro-russische Rebellen. [online] Die Nachrichten. Available at: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/ukraine-krise-brasilianische-neonazis-kaempfen-gegen-pro-100.html [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- euronews. (2021). Factbox: Groups that Russia has declared extremist. [online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/06/us-russia-politics-navalny-extremism-factbox [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- Faerseth. (2015). Ukraine’s far-right forces | Hate Speech International. [online] Hate Speech. Available at: https://www.hate-speech.org/ukraines-far-right-forces/ [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- FOIA Research. (2019). Misanthropic Division | FOIA Research. [online] Available at: https://www.foiaresearch.net/organization/misanthropic-division [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Harp (2022). Foreign Fighters in Ukraine Could Be a Time Bomb for Their Home Countries. [Online]. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2022/06/30/ukraine-azov-neo-nazi-foreign-fighter/ [Accessed 13 August 2025].
- Human Rights in Ukraine. (2022). Russian mercenary who committed war crimes in Donbas receives special honour in Russia. [online] Available at: https://khpg.org//en/1608809646 [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].
- Libcom. (2015). Neo-Nazi groups to protest outside US embassy. [online] Available at: https://libcom.org/article/neo-nazi-groups-protest-outside-us-embassy [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH. [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH. [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025). Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2018 [Online] OHCHR. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraineMay-August2018_EN.docx [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Publico (2020). Publico: мост, связавший португальских и украинских неонацистов (Publico, Португалия). [online] ИноСМИ. Available at: https://inosmi.ru/20200719/247777577.html [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Rawlinson. (2018). Neo-Nazi groups recruit Britons to fight in Ukraine. [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/neo-nazi-groups-recruit-britons-to-fight-in-ukraine [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].
- Redaktion (2019). Kommunalwahlen 2019: NPD, rechte Tarnlisten und Einzelbewerber – SACHSEN-ANHALT RECHTSAUSSEN. [online] Lsa-rechtsaussen.net. Available at: https://lsa-rechtsaussen.net/kommunalwahlen-2019-npd-rechte-tarnlisten-und-einzelbewerber/ [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].
- REFT & LIGHT ❬2016❭ Misanthropic Division: A Neo-Nazi Movement from Ukraine and Russia. [Online]. Available at: https://reftlight.euromaidanpress.com/2016/09/30/misanthropic-division-a-neo-nazi-movement-from-ukraine-and-russia/ [Accessed 13 August 2025].
- Renversé (2020). Björn Sigvald : le néo-nazi genevois parti combattre en Ukraine. [online] Renverse.co. Available at: https://renverse.co/infos-locales/article/bjorn-sigvald-le-neo-nazi-genevois-parti-combattre-en-ukraine-2739#nb10 [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Romanyuk. (2016). Fake: Motorola Fascist Killer Video. [online] StopFake. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-motorola-fascist-killer-video/ [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].
- Roussinos. (2022). The truth about Ukraine’s far-Right militias. [online] UnHerd. Available at: https://unherd.com/2022/06/the-truth-about-ukraines-nazi-militias/. [Accessed 15 August 2025].
- Sova Center. (2016). Завершено расследование уголовного дела участников... / COBA. [online] Available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2017/03/d36501/ [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- Sukhov. (2015). Foreigners Who Fight And Die For Ukraine: Russians join Ukrainians to battle Kremlin in Donbas. [online] Kyiv Post. Available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/foreigners-who-fight-and-die-for-ukraine-russians-join-ukrainians-to-battle-kremlin-in-donbas-386999.html [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].
- Tribune de Genève. (2017). Tamedia Publications romandes S.A. [online] Available at: https://www.tdg.ch/des-soldats-sympathisants-d-un-reseau-neonazi-800021880473 [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025].
- Ukraine Crusade (2015). 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL. [online] Available at: 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025].
- Yudina (2020) The New Exile Strategy of Russian Nationalists. [Online]. Available at: https://www.illiberalism.org/the-new-exile-strategy-of-russian-nationalists/ [Accessed 13 August 2025].
- Украинская правда (2016). Люди, назвавшие себя убийцами ‘Моторолы’, записали обращение. [online] Украинская правда. Available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/10/17/7123860/ [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].







Comments