Search Results

Introduction & Overview The Malorussian Liberation Army is a militant group active on the pro-Russian side of the Russo-Ukrainian War. The group’s origins are unclear, but it has been active at least since June 2023 as a military unit and even earlier as an online activist group. History & Foundations The Malorussian Liberation Army (MLA) established an online presence in the Russian net starting in June 2023, but its origins are rooted in a Russian online community known as Local Crew. This community began as an effort to unite different people who had got acquainted online and convince them to transpose their online presence into a real life network of decentralized activist groups (1). Starting in March 2017, with the first meeting in Moscow, the original group continued expanding with further meetups in St. Petersburg and other cities in Russia, which sometimes took place as sporting events (2). While it is difficult to establish exactly what the reach of the Local Crew network is, an interactive map available on their website purports to show members in tens of cities all over the world, including Europe and the Americas (3). Local Crew have also established a remarkably diverse range of topics their associates can discuss, with a decentralized network of online Discord and Telegram servers, many of which grouped under another umbrella network, Zloch (4). Although Zloch.ru itself seems to have gone offline, some of the Telegram channels linked to it survive, including those focusing on guns and gaming (5). The network even included a Wiki project at some point, but it is now offline, as well (6). The onset of the “Special Military Operation” in 2022 seems to have radically altered the equilibrium of this community. Throughout 2022, and starting just a few days after the beginning of the Russian invasion, the Local Crew YouTube channel started uploading several video montages glorifying the activity of the Russian military, while media of all kinds appeared on the Local Crew website promoting and supporting the SMO. In September 2022, an article was published on the Local Crew website, describing how best to prepare oneself regarding the possibility of being called up by Russian Armed Forces as part of the then ongoing mobilization drive. This article contains minute details on what equipment is preferrable, what personal effects should be brought and how they should be handled, and even suggestions for thematic literature (7). While Local Crew increased their “agitprop” activity, it was not until June 2023 that the group openly declared the formation of the MLA. Since then, the group has continued to operate on the internet, engaging mostly with Russian and Ukrainian speakers and spreading propaganda. It also occasionally releases content related to their military activity. Ideology & Objectives Local Crew have published a number of works on history(8), pop culture, philosophy (9), Russian translations of articles published in foreign languages (10), and even commentaries on urban planning (11). Since the beginning of the “Special Military Operation”, the content of their activities seems to have noticeably drifted to the right in support of the Russian Armed Forces. More recent pictures taken during their meeting have also shown many participants holding Russian flags from the Imperial era and Novorossiya flags (a proposed irredentist confederation spanning southern and eastern Ukraine). The Malorussian Liberation Army, the military offshoot of Local Crew, was created under the auspices of this new “course”, and is therefore solidly rooted in Russian nationalism and irredentism. To precisely understand what “Malorussia” is, it is necessary to understand the historical and cultural connotation of this term. “Malorussia”, also rendered as “Little Russia” is a historical geographical term that came in use during the High Middle Ages (11th – 15th century) and was the predominant term to describe what is now Ukraine up until the late 19th century. During this time, Imperial Russian identity was considered to be a Pan-Russian identity, itself subdivided into a trinity of White Russian, Great Russian, and Little Russian peoples inhabiting three homonymous regions as enshrined in the solemn proclamation of the Tsar as the “Emperor and Autocrat of All Russias. (12)” The ethnonym Little Russian became a contested term in the 19th century, when a nascent movement of Ukrainian nationalism opposed the idea that Ukrainians had much in common with Russia proper, and strove to abolish the concept of Little Russia so that it may be replaced with a more autonomous Ukrainian identity, one that would not exist under the umbrella of a great Pan-Russian identity uniting East Slavs, something which the proponents of a Little Russian identity supported, notwithstanding the peculiarities of their culture (13). After the end of World War I and the reorganization of Soviet Union during the 1920s, the Little Russian ethnonym gave way to Ukrainian identity (albeit in a more moderate, brotherly understanding of it than Ukrainian nationalists had envisioned), even if Russian nationalists and émigrés continued referring to the region as Little Russia (14). In essence, the Malorussian Liberation Army has reappropriated this antiquated ethnonym with the intention of reviving a subnational Little Russian identity that stresses the unity of East Slavs under a greater All-Russian identity. In a manifesto published on their Telegram channel in October 2023, the MLA declared the liberation of the “Little Russian Fatherland” from and the removal of “Ukrainian occupation” as one of their primary goals. They also advocate for the restoration of ties between Russia and Little Russia, the liberation of political prisoners, inquisitions into the crimes of the “Ukrainian and Bolshevist regimes”, and an end to the war (15). Political & Military Abilities At the time of their founding, the MLA claimed to have more than 4700 militants operating in Ukraine (16). At the time of writing, their website claimed that more than 5100 militants had joined the MLA (17). This would mean that the MLA is a brigade-size militant group; however, the actual numbers are likely much lower, possibly placing the actual strength of the MLA around a company-size or battlegroup-size formation of 100-150 militants at most.The MLA has published several pictures of heavy equipment they supposedly operate, such as tanks (18). They are also active as infantry with common light weapons (19). Regardless of their military capacity, the MLA are adept at engaging in memetic warfare and are very well versed in adapting cultural items from the net to create politically-laden propaganda. The dissemination of MLA-related content covers several social networks, including Telegram, Youtube, TikTok, and others. Media produced by the MLA includes memes recycling general formats to produce humorous renditions of the MLA’s ideology, short montage videos including heavily edited war footage and catchy songs, as well as visual material serving as propaganda to romanticize warfare in Ukraine and Russia’s military operations. The grassroot model adopted by Local Crew and the MLA is also a decentralized network that allows them to operate in multiple countries and access the relative national internet subspheres.Short videos and stills documenting their military activity have been released, but there is little indication that the group is as strong as it claims to be. Nevertheless, the MLA’s primary objective seems to be agitating Russian and Ukrainian netizens as part of a propaganda campaign aimed not only at delegitimizing the Ukrainian state and military, but also to boost the visibility of their own metapolitical identity into the mainstream of Eastern European internet discourse. International Relations & Alliances The MLA is understood to be fighting in Ukraine on the pro-Russian side, and is therefore likely to cooperate with the majority of other militias and units, while also being included in the chain of command and order of battle of the Russian Armed Forces. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The League of St George was founded in 1974 by former members of a group called Sir Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement. (1) This movement was launched in 1948 and was an amalgam of 51 right-wing organizations, most of them being right-wing book clubs. (2) The League of St George’s website states: “like [the] Union Movement, the League was to dedicate itself to Mosley’s concept of a united Europe … Europe a Nation. The League has never aimed to be a political party but more of a lobby group to influence and encourage established nationalist parties to embrace the Europe a Nation philosophy.” The League’s website also states that they believe they are the first British group since Mosley himself to establish links with other European nationalists. It is led by a President who is supported by a League Council in an advisory role. Full membership of the League of St George is by invitation only, and prospective members must answer the question: “what can you do for the League?” Among its activities, the League of St George publishes a quarterly publication called The Sentinel, and according to the League’s website: “articles on Mosley, National Socialism, History and the Holocaust have been featured in the past along with dozens of other subjects of interest to the European Racial Nationalist.” As well as this quarterly newsletter, the League of St George has a commercial arm called League Enterprises/ Steven Books, (3) which offers publications “not normally available through mainstream outlets, on Folk-culture, history and politics.” (1) However, when accessed for this piece on 20 February 2024, the Steve Books website stated that “[d]ue to unforeseen circumstances we are currently unable to accept new orders. We apologize for any inconvenience that this may cause and hope to be back to normal soon.” (4) Though the League of St George is ostensibly still in existence, it has seemed largely inactive since about 2016, when it was noted by the charity Hope Note Hate to be mostly irrelevant. History & Foundations The League of St George was started by former members of Oswald Mosley’s Union Movement. Mosley (1896-1980) was an English politician who founded and led the British Union of Fascists (BUF) from 1932 until 1940, and then founded its successor: the Union Movement, which he led from its founding in 1948 until his death. Both groups were known for distributing anti-Semitic propaganda, wearing Nazi-style uniforms, and holding hostile demonstrations throughout Jewish neighborhoods in East London. Mosley also served in the British House of Commons from 1918 until 1931: he served successively as a Conservative, an independent, and a Labour Party member, holding a Labour ministry 1929-30. Following this, he attempted to form a socialist party in 1930, but was defeated in his campaign for reelection to Parliament. The year after, he founded the BUF, garnering enthusiasm for the group with his considerable oratory skills and additional support from the newspaper publisher Viscount Rothermere, who created popular journalism in the UK and, along with his brother, built the most successful journalistic empire in UK history. (5) The BUF modeled its ideology on the Italian Fascist regime and Nazi Germany, and both of these movements financially supported Mosley’s British iteration. In fact, the BUF largely owes its founding to a trip Mosley took to Italy, where he became enamored with the system created by Benito Mussolini, and the Union was founded on his return to England. Mosley also had his own bodyguards, known as the ‘Biff Boys’, who expanded into what later became known as the Blackshirts, enforcers reminiscent of Mussolini’s national militia which had the same name. In addition to the Blackshirts, the BUF held demonstrations where Mosley displayed his oratorical skill, while he cultivated relationships with similar figureheads such as Mussolini himself, and Adolf Hitler. For instance, Mosley had Hitler present at the intimate 1936 ceremony held to marry his second wife, Diana Guinness – a fascist socialite – and the wedding ceremony itself took place at the house of the Nazi Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels. By 1936, the BUF was already a rather spent force politically, but still, the group garnered support from fascists for the march that would lead to the famous Battle of Cable Street in this year. In this march, 5,000 British Blackshirts marched through a Jewish community in the East End of London – then the largest Jewish community in Britain. Instead of heeding the call from local police to stay in their houses and allow the march to take place, 20,000 protesters took to the streets to prevent it. They were met with 6,000 uniformed police, who attempted to break their blockade and allow the BUF march. While underreported, there remain accounts of the neighboring Irish community fighting alongside Jewish protesters, despite tensions between the two communities in the past. (6) In 1940, Mosley was incarcerated along with other leaders from the BUF. The incarceration was made under wartime defense regulations in Britain that allowed the Government to arrest and detain enemy sympathizers, and eventually a total of 750 BUF members were interned. By July of 1940, the group’s activities had therefore ceased. On his release in 1948, Mosley attempted to resurrect the BUF, and his founding of the Union Movement is in large part a response to the futility of this attempt – unable to bring back the street presence of the Blackshirts, Mosley settled for drawing together a network of book clubs and other right-wing groups. The Union Movement was later renamed as the Action Party, and was active until about 1994; meanwhile, the League of St George was founded in 1974 as a splinter group of the Union Movement/Action Party, and took over the mantle of fascist book distribution. The founders of the League, Mike Griffin and Keith Thompson, made this split to follow what they saw as a purer form of Mosley’s ideology than that being proffered by the Union Movement. Ideology & Goals The ideology of the League of St George is drawn from Mosley’s own political philosophy. This centered on the creation of a ‘corporate state’, in which industries would be organized as corporations that operated as partnerships between employers and workers. Representation in Parliament would be occupational as opposed to geographical by constituencies, and members of particular occupations would therefore vote for candidates to represent their chosen industry. The system would be overseen by what Mosley dubbed a “modern dictatorship”, and in addition to favoring a highly planned economy under this system, Mosley was virulently anti-Semitic, an ideological cornerstone sustained in the BUF, Union Movement and League of St George respectively. (2) Perhaps more influential in the League’s ideology as a whole however, is another of Mosley’s political tenets: that of “Europe a nation” or European nationalism. European nationalism at first glance seems incongruous, given that nationalism is inherently linked to a single nation’s patriotic identity; furthermore, the European Union (EU) has mostly been posited as a prevention tactic against nationalism, and is seen as mostly a-national, anti-national or supranational. This mode of thinking about the EU originated as early as the 1950s, when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and then the European Economic Community (EEC) both emerged as ideas for preventing the oppressive nationalism that had led to the two world wars. (7) The followers of Oswald Mosley, both within the Union Movement and outside it, seem to have viewed the European Union as a defensive strategy against ‘Russian Communism’, and an antidote to loss of empire, ‘given away by the mad folly of politicians’. There was also an argument for them, that National Socialism could not prevail within one contained bastion of a country, namely Britain. Instead, it was necessary to look further afield to build this world. (8) Set against this backdrop, Mosley’s own European nationalism was centered on halting what he saw as the descent of the West into permanent decadence, by creating a ‘fascistized’ Europe which he proposed should be based on the ‘Four Power Bloc’ of fascist-run  Britain, France, Germany and Italy. His vision was not shared among other fascists. (9) The League of St George has continued Mosley’s ideas and mainly concentrated efforts on distributing the figure’s writings, along with other Nazi and fascist leaflets and propaganda. While other right-wing British groups have focused on specific issues, such as immigration or anti-Islam policies, the League has maintained its original philosophy, though it may simply appear that way as the group’s online footprint has remained the same, while its members have abandoned it for other ventures. Another facet to Mosley’s views that has lingered less so among his followers, is that he was a staunch supporter of Irish independence, with this view sitting uneasily alongside his determined positivity towards the idea of a British Empire; his Blackshirts included many Irishmen. Mosley’s views on Irish nationalism were what led to his split with the Conservative Party: he criticized the violence of the Black and Tans auxiliaries in the Irish Civil War, eventually quitting the Party over it. (8) Over time, this may have added to the distance between the League and other far-right groups, which were often more focused on English nationalism specifically, and had a tenser relationship with Irish politics, as seen in the 2021 visit of Tommy Robinson, aka Stephen Yaxley Lennon, to Ireland. However, also evident in this visit was some extent of tactics sharing between Irish and English far-right movements, and contacts, so this relationship is a complex one. (10) Approach to Resistance The League of St George has always mainly concentrated on distribution of fascist texts, particularly the writings of its figurehead Mosley, as well as other notable figures such as Hitler himself. In previous iterations of Mosley’s ideology, a street presence was always quite important, however the League have remained closer in methods to the Union Movement, which in its succession of the BUF concentrated on literature as opposed to demonstrations or the intimidation tactics of Mosley’s Blackshirts. This may have been in part due to a 1936 law passed banning political uniforms in Britain, which was aimed at preventing the Blackshirts from carrying out their hostile street fights and protests. (11) In addition to stocking a collection of fascist texts, the League also created a sound library on the Steven Books website; this is now defunct with the files inaccessible, but used to act as host to a variety of political talks, such as ‘Mosley - Earls Court’, and a musical file titled “BUF Marching Song.’ (12) Along with the sound library, there is a YouTube video from the 2013 Edinburgh Fringe Festival of the League of St George’s skinheads performing a song entitled ‘Argy Bargy.’ (13) It is notable that the League used more traditional tactics compared to the far-right groups that would succeed it in the UK. Groups like the British National Party, National Front and the later National Action would all generate more of a street presence and community than the League, likely in part due to it being founded and primarily run in a pre-internet time when social media could not be utilized for garnering popularity or organizing in-person demonstrations. International Relations & Potential Alliances As posited on the Steven Books website, “the most important job within the League’s structure is that of Overseas Officer for it is his task to establish the links, first in Europe and later worldwide, with like-minded Folk-Nationalists.” (3) The BUF enjoyed considerable support from other fascist states, namely Italy and Germany, during its founding and throughout World War II; furthermore, Mosley and his followers were committed to an idea of European nationalism that allowed for wider coordination and large-scale economic planning, and therefore alliances with their European neighbors were welcomed. However, during the emergence of the Union Movement and then successively the League of St George, this European nationalism began to exist less formally and more as a network of distributing fascist leaflets, books and audio recordings. This is likely simply due to a change of political environment: with the ending of World War II, the shift of Germany and Italy from fascism to democracy, and the advent of the first European economic union relationships, there was less traction available for a fascistic European identity and less financial or formal support on offer for British fascists wanting European ties. Rather than forming political ties with other groups, the League of St George seems to have faded into an obscure book and pamphlet publisher, with its members presumably folding into one of the many later iterations of far-right political organization in Britain. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Sâzmân-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin, or the Basij, is an Iranian paramilitary militia organized under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IGRC). Formed in the wake of the Iranian Revolution by Ayatollah Khomeini, Basij members, often called Basiji, are tasked with quelling domestic unrest and enforcing the decrees of the Ayatollah within Iran. The Basij has recently become infamous for its crackdown on protesters during the 2022-2023 Mahsa Amini Protests. History and Foundations The story of the Basij began on the 29th of November, 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the formation of a “people’s army of 20 million” to defend Iran against both domestic opposition and an American invasion he believed to be imminent (Schahgaldian 99). Just weeks earlier, on the 4th of November, the US Embassy in Tehran was stormed by student revolutionaries who took 66 US citizens hostage, which massively heightened tensions between the two countries (Schahgaldian 87-88). In the uncertain political landscape of the revolution, Khomeini saw the need for a massive paramilitary force loyal to the political and religious teachings of the Islamic Republican Party. In September 1980, Iraq made an incursion into the Iranian province of Khuzestan, kicking off the 8-year-long Iran-Iraq War. Basij units made up a considerable number of Iranian frontline forces and participated in some of the most brutal tactics of the war. Basiji were oftentimes used in human wave tactics where inexperienced fighters, often including child soldiers, would charge at well-defended Iraqi lines and quickly be cut down in a hail of gunfire (Arasli 16). Thousands of Basiji lost their lives in this manner in what was quickly dubbed a “Cult of Martyrdom” surrounding the Ayatollah’s regime (Dorraj 489-490). Alongside the war with Iraq, the Basij also spearheaded quashing a violent revolt of political opposition. In 1981, the National Council of Resistance (NCR), a coalition of opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the National Democratic Front, launched attacks on IRGC members. The IRGC fought back with a vengeance and by the end of 1982, the rebellion was mostly extinguished. Conservative figures state that approximately 3,000 rebels were executed by the Iranian government during the revolt, an average of 50 per day (Curtis and Hooglund 64). The effects of the 1981 rebellion on the Basij were palpable; from 1981 to 1982 they severely ramped up surveillance, purges, arrests, and home searches until December 1982, when the Ayatollah himself decreed an end to the wiretapping of civilians and put restrictions on the actions of the Basij (Curtis and Hooglund 65). By 1988, when the Iran-Iraq War finally ended, the IRGC, and by extension, the Basij, had won significant domestic political popularity for their massive sacrifices during the war (Arasli 16). Post-war Iran saw the rise of the Basij as a power in the Iranian economy. Following the war, the government faced massive challenges with reincorporating the hundreds of thousands of Basiji back into society. It was eventually decided that Basiji would participate in Iran’s first five-year development plan, working on reconstructing towns and cities impacted by the war. (Curtis and Hooglund 271). In 1992, the Basij Cooperative Foundation (BCF) was formed as a welfare organization for Basijis. Before this, in 1982, a small Basij welfare net had been established to provide things like no-interest loans and housing to Basijis who oftentimes come from the lower classes of Iranian society (Golkar 628-629). In 1994, parliament passed a law that gave Basij priority in buying government-owned stocks which had a massive impact as different Basij chapters bought into anything from agriculture to automobile manufacturing. The effects of the Basij’s influence on the Iranian economy continued as it quickly became a massive economic arm of the Iranian state. Basiji are oftentimes used as workers for government-sponsored infrastructure initiatives under the BCF-owned Construction Basij Organization (CBO), investing in rural communities throughout Iran to gain support for their political backers (Golkar 631). In 2007, the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, ordered a massive privatization initiative that allowed the Basij, who already had priority in buying government stocks, to gain an effective monopoly on government privatization. The move allowed the regime to get rid of major sources of budget strain while at the same time controlling the industries they privatized via their proxies (Golkar 633). Since the post-war reforms, the Basij has spearheaded a type of carrot-and-stick strategy for the Iranian regime; cracking down on dissent while at the same time attracting young people, oftentimes teenagers, to accept the regime’s political will through a myriad of welfare programs. While simultaneously expanding the economy of Iran, the Basij were tasked with enforcing the fundamentalist Islamic teachings of the Ayatollah. A 1992 law granted Basiji the power to citizen arrests, a power that has since been used to arrest “suspicious” individuals and, in particular, repress women and men who do not follow the Islamic dress code mandated by the state (Curtis and Hooglund 272). Given the authority to enforce the state’s desires, they have effectively become a secret police force masquerading as a militia. Even today, Iranians who do not follow the decrees of the Ayatollah are subject to arrest by Basiji militiamen. In 2009, opposition parties made accusations of fraud in the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a hardliner for the regime. Massive protests broke out throughout the country against the government in what became known as the “Green Movement” (Keath). The Basij were quickly deployed by the government to crack down on the protests. Basiji shot into crowds of protesters and conducted mass arrests, culminating in at least 150 casualties according to some sources (“Chaos prevails as protesters, police clash in Iranian capital”). The trend of brutally responding to protests continued in 2019 when in response to massive gas prices, protests erupted in what came to be known as “Bloody November”. The Basij cracked down on those protests with major voracity, killing more than 200 people and arresting thousands more (Martin 11). These killings fomented even more resistance against the regime, particularly in universities, which became strongholds for opposition protesters (“دانشجویان امیرکبیر چهارمین روز اعتراض‌ها؛ حمله بسیجیان به”). On September 13th, 2022, Mahsa Amini was taken into custody by the Gasht-e Ershad, or morality police in Tehran for not following the Islamic dress code. While in transit to a detention center, she was tortured by multiple policemen and fell into a coma. She died 3 days later on the 16th of September (“What happened to Mahsa/Zhina Amini?”). While her killers were not Basiji, the Gasht-e Ershad fulfilled a role very similar to the Basij, to enforce the fundamentalist teachings of the Ayatollah. With chapters of Basiji in every town and city, the strict enforcement of dress codes and the crackdown on dissent is a commonly shared experience in Iran. Her death led to a wildfire of dissent and resistance throughout the country (Strzyżyńska). The Mahsa Amini protests were responded to in the same way as the others. The Basij deployed across Iran, crushing protests and arresting more than 19,000 people (Loft). Killings during the protests topped any seen before, with 537 killed in protests by the Basij and other forces, and more than 300 executed by the government (“Report on 200 Days of Protest Repression/List of at Risk Protesters”). Objectives & Ideology As an organization within the IRGC, the Basij is inseparable from the Islamic fundamentalist ideology of the Ayatollah and the regime. As a force created during the Iranian Revolution, the Basij has not only served its role of guarding the regime by suppressing internal opposition but also indoctrinating the youth of Iran into the regime’s ideology (Schahgaldian 95). The Basij is not just a paramilitary organization, but a social club and symbol of allegiance to the Ayatollah. Members of the group disproportionately come from the poorer and more conservative sections of Iranian society, which are also the sections of society that the regime gains most of its support from. The Basij are not just a government organization or a militia, they are inexorably linked to the cultural and political divide of Iranian society (Abbasi). Consequently, many Basiji have used the ideological loyalty and the vast economic resources of the Basij to enter Iranian politics; those Basiji who have found themselves climbing the political ladder are known to be among some of the most conservative figures in the Iranian state and have only further campaigned for more government investment into the Basij (Golkar 641-642). Military & Political Capabilities While official estimates on the number of the Basij put them at around 20 million members, most estimates give the number of members at around three to five million split into at least 47,000 bases throughout the country. Around 20% of their numbers are made up of children and teenagers, with chapters being organized in schools and universities being common (Martin 4-10). They are principally an infantry-focused force and are often seen training with Kalashnikov pattern rifles. However, lethal weapons are not seen in most modern instances of Basiji in action, instead substituted for riot control weapons or simple clubs, used to crack down on protests or enforce the laws of the regime. While most Basiji have only acted in an internal enforcement role, there have been reports of the Basij stretching beyond their task of domestic security. The Basij have been known to contribute to volunteer fighters in Iranian-backed groups in Syria and Iraq. While this role would normally be delegated to the Quds Force, the IRGC’s foreign operations branch, it seems that the Basij are now also contributing to Iran’s regional goals. According to an Iraqi official in 2014, some 2,000 Basij had crossed the border to meet up with Iranian-backed militias (Chulov). Reports also show that around 50 student Basij had died in the Syrian Civil War (Majidyar). Regional involvement seems to be becoming part of the Basiji forte as more of its members involve themselves in the “Axis of Resistance” that Iran has built throughout the Middle East. Approach to Operations The Basij began in the 80s as a group dedicated to the domestic defense of the nation; when Iraq invaded Iran, hundreds of thousands of Basiji confronted Iraqi forces head-on in suicidal wave attacks. In 2008, the Basij’s “Resistance Districts” were reorganized into the IRGC Provincial Corps, which signaled a shift in the Basij into a more ideologically focused paramilitary and enforcement group (“The IRGC Provincial Corps”). Since then, the Basij has greatly increased its assets and economic hold on the country, transforming itself into a hallmark of both Iranian geo-strategic planning and Iranian society itself. International Relations & Alliances In 2016, the then-head of Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Ghassem Soleimani was quoted as saying: “Islamic movements such as Hezbollah of Lebanon and Palestinian HAMAS received inspiration and spiritual aid from Basij. This is why Iran’s flag would fly in those countries” (“Basij 'crucial in export of Revolution'”). As members of the IRGC, the Basij are tasked with the export of the regime’s ideology throughout the Islamic World. This has led the organization to have relationships with militias and insurgent groups aligned with the regime's ideology throughout Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. They have served as an inspiration for other groups throughout the world, most notably the Colectivos, a Venezuelan paramilitary group that fills a similar role to the Basij for the Venezuelan regime. The relationship between these two groups stretches beyond simple inspiration; in 2009 the commander of the Basij, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi visited Caracas to advise Venezuelan authorities on streamlining their counterintelligence capabilities (Humire 10-11). While tasked with the duty of domestic security, the Basij have become a force to be reckoned with throughout the region, going wherever the Ayatollah calls them to.

Insurgency Overview​​ The CMA is a mostly secular, Tuareg-Arab separatist political-military coalition seeking independence for Azawad – the Tuareg Berber name for the region they inhabit across the Sahara-Sahel region – northern Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria, northwestern Niger, western Libya, and southeastern Algeria. Founded in 2014 and formally merging in 2023, it was formerly composed of the Tuareg-led Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and Arab-led Arab Movement of Azawad – Dissident (MAA-D). The CMA is in conflict with the Malian government and its supporting armed groups, and with transnational Salafi Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and IS-GS. Allied with future JNIM co-founder Ansar Dine and briefly assisted by the Libyan government, the MNLA led the 2012 rebellion that kickstarted the Northern Mali conflict, before being sidelined by its more powerful Islamist ally. In the context of the ensuing Islamist insurgency, the MNLA formed the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) with other groups and began peace talks with the government. These continued until 2023 when war broke out between the CMA and the ruling military junta after the latter requested the UN withdraw from Mali. Controlling the city of Kidal for many years until its capture by the Wagner-supported Malian army in 2023, the CMA, now embedded in rural northern Mali, continues to play a key role in the conflict. At various times since 2012 the CMA and its components have also controlled territory across the Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions of Mali. It commands thousands of forces that engage in urban and desert warfare with the government and other armed groups and enforce strategic blockades. Its political wing effectively utilises international mass media and has organised numerous domestic protests. History & Foundations Background The Tuareg, who dominate the CMA, are a traditionally Muslim, tribal, nomadic-pastoralist Amazigh (Berber) ethnic group divided into regional kels (tribal confederations). The ‘noble’ Kel Ifoghas are the dominant Tuareg group in the desert Kidal region and have played a key role in the extensive Tuareg history of rebellion against French colonial encroachment on their traditional social and political dominance over Azawad as well as Malian state mismanagement of the region. Meanwhile, Ifoghas ‘vassal’ tribes have increasingly cooperated with the Malian government and developed lucrative smuggling operations in an attempt to overcome their traditional suzerainty.1 This perceived insubordination “has been a core issue in nearly every rebellion in northern Mali since independence.” (McGregor, 2016) Secular Tuareg groups fought against French West Africa between 1916–17, the newly independent Malian state between 1962–64, and Mali and Niger between 1990–95 and 2006–09. Repeated rebellion since the ‘90s led to the fragmentation of the Tuareg nationalist movement into multiple competing armed groups, some affiliated with the Malian military, and the development of ethnocentric self-defence militias. Successive Malian governments have relied on unstable alliances with these forces to counter rebels. The Northern Mali conflict, beginning in January 2012, marked a new phase in Tuareg nationalist history. (Lecocq and Klute, 2013) Emerging from campus activism in 2010, the mixed Tuareg Azawad National Movement (MNA), reignited demands for separatism, for which its leader Moussa Ag Acharatoumane spent some weeks in prison. By October 2010, the MNA had become the intellectual-political arm of the armed National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), with Ag Acharatoumane as its spokesman. The MNLA, a secular, separatist political-military organisation, was led by Secretary-General Bilal Ag Chérif and headquartered in the northern Malian town of Kidal. Former Libyan army officer, Colonel Mohamed Ag Najim, an Idnan Tuareg, was its military chief, assisted by Malian defector Colonel Assalat Ag Habi. Idnan and Taghat Mellit Tuareg, tributary ‘vassals’ of the Ifoghas, were well represented in the movement composed primarily of: (i) former insurgents from previous Tuareg rebellions (some of whom were integrated into the Malian army); (ii) Tuareg and Arab defectors from the Malian army; and (iii) Tuareg fighters who fought alongside both Muammar Gaddafi’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the National Transitional Council during the 2011 Libyan Civil War. (McGregor, 2017, p. 10; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, pp. 661, 663, 666) In October 2011, an MNLA meeting took place in Kidal to decide the political-military strategy for a new rebellion. Iyad Ag Ghali, an Ifoghas Tuareg veteran of Gaddafi’s Islamic Legion and noted rebel commander since the ‘90s, nominated himself for the candidacy of secretary-general, but was rejected by its young militants. In response, Ag Ghali created the Tuareg-dominated Islamist insurgent group Ansar Dine. Ag Ghali and other Ifoghas notables were then instrumental in the development of the MNLA-Ansar Dine alliance. Separately, Ansar Dine concluded an alliance with Salafi Islamist groups including the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Four main types of violent non-state actor exist in the multi-party Malian civil war – secular rebels, jihadist groups, ethnically-oriented self-defence militias, and pro-government paramilitaries, although these are fluid categories. Achieving cooperation between the multitude of non-state armed groups and their internal factions during the conflict is difficult due to differing objectives, ideologies and ethnic compositions. Even when political agendas match, personal, tribal and clan rivalries can hinder collaboration. Moreover, competition for power intersects with competition for control of legal and illegal trade routes across the Sahel-Sahara region. To complicate the conflict further, “as in Darfur, many of the factional “splits” are intended to place the leaders of self-proclaimed armed movements in the queue for post-reconciliation appointments to government posts.” (Bencherif and Campana, 2017, pp. 120, 128; McGregor, 2017, p. 8; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018; Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, pp. 664–665) Tuareg-Islamist Rebellion (2012) January–May 2012 On January 18th 2012, the MNLA and Ansar Dine triggered the rebellion by attacking the small city of Aguelhok in northern Mali, killing numerous soldiers camped there and executing those who surrendered. Attacks on military posts in Ménaka and Tessalit quickly followed. Fighting the Malian government extensively throughout early 2012, the MNLA, alongside the militarily superior Ansar Dine, cleared northern Mali of any government military presence within weeks. Utilising the instability that followed a March 2012 coup d'état that ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré, they overran the three largest cities in northern Mali – Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu – in three days. NGOs reported high levels of violence against civilians after their capture. (Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, p. 666; Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, pp. 659, 661–662, 664) On April 6th, following the capture of Douentza in central Mali, the MNLA ceased its offensive and declared Azawad’s independence from Mali, its goals apparently having been accomplished. MNLA Secretary-General Bilal Ag Chérif was made President of the Transitional Council of the State of Azawad. (Al Arabiya, 2012) This was followed by a joint declaration on May 26th by the MNLA and Ansar Dine announcing the formation of the Islamic Republic of Azawad. (BBC News, 2012) June–December 2012 Ag Chérif’s presidency was brief, however, as conflict over the future of the Azawadi state broke out in June 2012 between the Tuareg nationalist MNLA and the Islamist coalition of Ansar Dine, MOJWA and AQIM. The MNLA and Ansar Dine largely avoided direct confrontation and violence against civilians in the Kidal region in 2012 as both groups drew from Tuareg tribes and clans in the region. This is bar one incident on June 8th where the MNLA encouraged local women and youth to protest against Ansar Dine’s implementation of their radical interpretation of the Sharia, where a few people were wounded. In Gao, many anti-independence Songhaï and Arabs rallied to the ethnically diverse MOJWA2 following MNLA-perpetrated atrocities.3 As well as creating a perceived need for communal self-defence, these had stoked existing ethnic rivalries that MOJWA exploited for recruitment. Notably, they reactivated narratives from the ‘90s civil war between Tuareg rebels and the Songhaï Ganda Koy (Lords of the Land) militia of the persecution of “black” sedentary communities, including Songhaï, Fulani and Ikelan (black ex-slaves in the traditional Tuareg order), by “white” nomad Tuareg. On June 27th, MOJWA captured the city after clashing with the MNLA, leaving 20+ dead and 40+ wounded, including Ag Chérif. (AFP, 2012) Further clashes led to the capture of Ansongo and Ménaka in November. Lacking the military capabilities to confront AQIM, the dominant jihadist group in the Timbuktu region, the MNLA retreated to areas outside their control. The first incarnation of the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA), founded two days after the Azawadi independence declaration, claiming to consist of 500 mostly Arab fighters opposed to Tuareg and jihadist domination of Timbuktu, had occupied part of the region on April 26th before withdrawing the next day without incident, at AQIM’s request, to avoid civilian deaths. The group later split into a number of factions, including the pro-rebel MAA-Dissident and the pro-government MAA-Tabankort. AQIM captured Timbuktu on June 28th and Léré on November 28th without major violent confrontation. Islamists groups had expelled the MNLA from all major cities in southern Azawad by July, and the rest of its urban territory by December. Despite mass defections to the Islamists for better pay since the independence declaration, and the formation of the Azawad Popular Front (FPA) splinter group4, the MNLA sustained control of large areas of rural desert in northeastern Mali. (Lecocq and Klute, 2013, p. 431; Bencherif and Campana, 2017; McGregor, 2017, p. 10; Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, pp. 669–671) MNLA/CMA-Government Peace Talks (2013-2019) By 2013, the MNLA had renounced its internationally unrecognised claim to Azawadi independence, shifted its aims to autonomy for northern Mali, and began peace talks with the Malian government. It began supporting French and Chadian forces in restoring state authority to Islamist-controlled cities in the north and in operations against their mountain strongholds, particularly with intelligence, while still opposing the Malian army. In response, Islamists increasingly utilised remote violence, orchestrated a series of suicide bombings against MNLA checkpoints and bases, and murdered members of General Ag Gamou’s family, beginning a cycle of Tuareg-Fulani ethnic violence. (McGregor, 2016) A fierce international campaign of airstrikes forced many Islamists into the Ifoghas’ Mountains and across neighbouring borders, severely reducing their access to funds with which to pay their fighters, leading many to return to the MNLA. Others however, embedded themselves in local communities. After capturing several important towns in the Kidal Region, the MNLA initially refused to disarm or cede control to the Malian government, but in June, signed a peace deal that permitted the military to return to some cities. This led to both pro-MNLA and pro-army demonstrations in Kidal. The deal collapsed at the end of the year after the MNLA claimed the government failed to respect its terms and opened fire on unarmed protestors. Tuareg rebels clashed multiple times with the Malian army between 2013-2014, notably in mid-May 2014 during a prime ministerial visit to Kidal. This event precipitated the creation of pro-government militias including GATIA and MAA-Tabankort (see Relations & Alliances). (Al Jazeera, 2013; Reuters, 2013; McGregor, 2016; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, p. 667; Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, pp. 665, 671, 673) Meanwhile in recaptured Kidal, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) was formed in a May 2013 merger of the High Council of Azawad (HCA) and Azawad Islamic Movement (MIA). Founded by the amenokal (moral-spiritual chief) of the Ifoghas, Mohamed Ag Intalla, the political-military organisation was led by his brother, Alghabass Ag Intalla, former high-ranking member of the MNLA and Ansar Dine. It absorbed many former Ansar Dine members despite a rivalry between the Ag Intalla brothers and Ansar Dine/JNIM founder Iyad Ag Ghali over the Ifoghas leadership. (Bencherif and Campana, 2017, pp. 125, 129) As a means of facilitating peace talks with the government in 2014, most armed groups in northern Mali agreed to join either the rebel Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) or the pro-government Plateforme coalition, while Islamist groups were excluded. However, political negotiations served to exacerbate intra and inter-communal tensions in northern Mali. This engendered greater factionalisation, precipitated new local conflicts, and created more self-defence groups, further increasing the level of insecurity. Although initially composed of many groups, the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) consistently maintained three key members: the Tuareg-dominated (i) National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and (ii) High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) and (iii) the Arab Movement of Azawad – Dissident (MAA-D). The MAA-D consisted mainly of Bérabiche Arabs from Ber and Timbuktu, many of whom were Malian army deserters, including MAA-D military chief Colonel Hussein Ould al-Moctar ‘Goulam’. Other leaders include suspected drug traffickers Dina Ould Aya and Mohamed Ould Aweynat. Months of tense negotiations produced the Algiers Accord in June 2015, which sought to decentralise Mali, integrate former rebels into the army, and develop the northern economy, but it only widened the gap between its parties.5 Bamako’s strategy of instrumentalising tribal/clan antagonisms led to a number of groups leaving the CMA, many perceiving the alliance as promoting further violence rather than reconciliation. These include the Coalition for the People of Azawad (CPA), Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA), and Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Movements and Fronts II (CMFPR-II). The multi-ethnic CPA, led by former MNLA head of external relations Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, departed over the supposedly hardline position of Bilal Ag Chérif in government negotiations, while the CJA is almost entirely composed of ex-MNLA Kel Antessar Tuareg based around Timbuktu and Taoudeni.6 The CMFPR-II, made up of sedentary Songhaï, Bambara, Fulani, and Ikelan tribesmen from the Gao region, also left the coalition. Its leader, Ibrahim Abba Kantao, head of the Ganda Izo (Sons of the Land) self-defence movement, split from the pro-government CMFPR in January 2014 and had joined the CMA to avoid being left out of negotiations, despite Kantao being against the partition of Mali and many members viewing the Tuareg clans as rivals for resources and political authority. Pushed through by a frustrated international community, the accord is “widely regarded in the north as an imposed agreement that does not address the often subtle and deep-rooted grievances that fuel the ongoing conflict.” (McGregor, 2017, p. 8) Fighting continued due to repeated coups and constant violence, mostly involving jihadists, halting progress, preventing disarmament, and ravaging the economy. (Reuters, 2022) In an ongoing assassination war between the CMA and Islamist groups, the MNLA has suffered the greatest.7 (McGregor, 2017, p. 10) Nonetheless, “armed politics” was said to have taken the place of civil war in the Tuareg-government conflict by December 2015. (Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, p. 665) In 2016, Mohamed Ag Intalla suggested engaging in talks with “Malian jihadists” (i.e. JNIM) in exchange for them helping “get rid of jihadists from elsewhere” (i.e. IS-GS). (McGregor, 2017, p. 9) In September 2016, MNA founder and ex-MNLA spokesman Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, a Daoussahak Tuareg, split from the MNLA and founded the Ménaka-based Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) with Chamanamas Tuareg, Colonel Assalat Ag Habi. Most members were from these clans. The unilateral management of the CMA and the predominance of the recurring Imghad-Ifoghas conflict over Kidal were cited as reasons for their departure. The MSA would itself split along clan lines in 2017 into the MSA-D and MSA-C. Later that year, the CPA, CJA, CMFPR-II, MSA-C and FPA, along with other MNLA/MAA splinter and CMA/Plateforme dissident groups, formed the rival Coordination of Inclusivity Movements (CMI). (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019) The CMA and Plateforme (mainly GATIA) continued to clash throughout 2016. In spite of this, Ag Acharatoumane managed to broker the organisation of joint security patrols between the groups in September. A suicide bombing in Gao on January 18th 2017 temporarily halted the implementation of mixed patrols between the CMA, Plateforme and the Malian army. (Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, p. 673) An increase in violence from 2016 onwards, mainly attributed to IS-GS commander Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahraoui,8 against all parties to the conflict led the MSA-D to openly collaborate with French, Nigerien and GATIA forces on security and in aggressive operations against the group. In response, IS-GS attacked Daoussahak and Imghad communities. Meanwhile a number of Daoussahak notables accused Ag Acharatoumane of using GATIA to target those opposed to his increase in authority in the community, and rejoined the CMA with their fighters. The remainder of the MSA-D then joined Plateforme in July 2019. (McGregor, 2016, 2017, pp. 8–13; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, pp. 670–672, 676) CSP-PSD Formation & Breakdown (2020-present) In early 2020, a reconstituted Malian army, now integrated with forces from Plateforme and the CMA, began deploying to the Kidal and Timbuktu regions. They were met with small anti-state, pro-independence protests in Kidal city. DDR discussions between the government and the CMA nonetheless continued into 2021. The CMA and Plateforme also began discussions to reconcile their differences over the 2015 Algiers Accord, and in May 2021, agreed to form a new coalition later joined by the CMI – the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) – in order to mark their reconciliation, implement the accord, and jointly combat insecurity in northern Mali. In August 2020, a military coup led by Colonel Assimi Goïta forced Malian President Keïta to resign following months of mass anti-government protests over a recent election widely perceived as fraudulent. A transition to military rule quickly followed and was completed when Goïta assumed the presidency in mid-2021, a role he holds to this day. West African regional bloc ECOWAS imposed sweeping sanctions against Mali in January 2022 after the ruling military junta announced a five-year transition timeline. These were largely lifted in July 2022 after the Goïta administration adopted a two-year transition period before presidential elections scheduled for February 2024. However, in September 2023, this was extended and the election indefinitely postponed, while protests planned in response were banned. Tensions between the interim authorities and their international partners grew as hundreds of mercenaries from Russian-funded private military contractor Wagner Group were deployed across Mali and immediately began supporting the military in fighting JNIM at the end of 2021. Malian and Wagner counter-insurgency forces were swiftly implicated in a new wave of serious human rights violations that continue to the present day, including numerous massacres, extrajudicial executions and incidents of sexual violence. One massacre of 500 civilians in March 2022 could amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity, the UN suggested. The government suspended the broadcasts of French media outlets RFI and France24 for reporting on these exactions. In mid-February 2022, France and its European partners announced a full troop withdrawal within six months, citing Wagner’s presence. After thousands protested in Bamako against French presence and ECOWAS sanctions in April 2022, the transitional government withdrew from defence agreements with France and announced further political, economic and security cooperation with Russia. On Malian Independence Day on September 22th, hundreds marched again, carrying Russian flags and chanting anti-UN slogans. Jihadists attacked CSP members the HCUA, MSA-D and GATIA on multiple occasions between 2021 and 2023 in the Gao and Ménaka regions, killing hundreds and displacing tens of thousands of civilians. CSP forces supported the government in an offensive against IS-GS in the Ménaka region in June 2022. In August, the government and CSP met to address the stalled implementation of the Algiers Accord and continue DDR talks after the CMA decried its abandonment by the transitional authorities. Although they agreed to integrate 26,000 CSP fighters into the national army over a multi-year period, and senior CSP military officers into the military hierarchy, the CMA criticised the lack of clarity around the role of CSP group leaders in future integrated units. (Ahmed, 2022) Relations between the CSP-PSD and the post-coup Goïta administration sharply deteriorated thereafter. In December, the CSP-PSD withdrew from peace talks in response to the Malian military junta’s alleged refusal to negotiate or implement the 2015 agreement, and lack of action over the hundreds killed and displaced by jihadist and state violence in Ménaka, Gao and Timbuktu. (Reuters, 2022) NGOs suggested 2022 would be the deadliest year in Mali since 2012, owing to such violence and the impunity of those responsible. After France suspended development aid to Mali, Bamako banned French and French-funded NGOs and tightened state control of the rest. Intense fighting between rival jihadist groups IS-GS and JNIM over control of the north in the Ménaka, Gao and Timbuktu regions between September 2022 and July 2023 killed and displaced many civilians. While inter-jihadist violence abated in August 2023, both groups continued targeting civilians, in addition to pro-government and UN forces, and occasionally CSP members. After the CMA called on young Tuareg to join the fight against IS-GS in Gao in November 2022, more than 400 CSP vehicles gathered in the Kidal region the following March in preparation for operations against the group. JNIM founder Iyad Ag Ghali even toured northern Mali in early 2023, meeting local notables and CSP leaders to discuss cooperation against IS-GS. Throughout 2023, the interim authorities repeatedly blocked CSP attempts to implement the accord’s international mediation mechanism by declining Algerian proposals to host meetings. In February, the CMA’s three constituent groups formally merged into a single entity, a priority of Alghabass Ag Intalla since at least 2019. (Laplace, 2023) After the CMA fired at a military aircraft that flew over its stronghold of Kidal in April, the army arrested 12 CMA members in a rare operation in the Ménaka region. In mid-2023, Goïta consolidated his power through a cabinet reshuffle and a new constitution approved in a questionable referendum. The CSP, which did not allow the vote to proceed in their stronghold city of Kidal, lost two of the four ministries it held to loyalists. When the junta then requested the UN withdraw from Mali and transfer all its bases to the government by year’s end, major fighting erupted between the CMA and the military, now supported by Wagner, for the first time since 2015, over previously UN-held areas in the Timbuktu region. Wagner mercenaries committed numerous war crimes against civilians during this time, while the army launched airstrikes on CMA positions in the Kidal region. (ADF, 2023) From late 2023 into 2024, civilians in the Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao regions were repeated targets of state violence, including airstrikes, drone strikes and the burning of IDP encampments. In September, the CSP accused the junta and Wagner of multiple ceasefire breaches and repeated human rights violations. Later that month, the CMA issued the first ‘Azawadian National Army’ communication, declaring it at war with the junta and calling on civilians to “contribute to the war effort with the aim of defending and protecting the homeland, and thus regaining control of the entire Azawadian national territory.” (AfricaNews, 2023) Ben Bella of the CMA claimed fighters from Niger, Algeria and Libya were coming to their aid. (Ibrahim, 2023) Plateforme, including the MSA-D and most of GATIA, withdrew from the CSP over the declaration of war against Mali, while a GATIA faction led by Fahad Ag Almahmoud remained. Moussa Ag Acharatoumane claimed the conflict only benefited jihadists. (Baché, 2023) As the UN hastily withdrew between September and October, the CMA/CSP attacked Malian and Wagner personnel and temporarily seized a number of military camps and posts in the Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions. The CMA fired upon various Malian military aircraft attempting to capture bases in Kidal and Gao recently departed by MINUSMA, successfully shooting down multiple, including the Malian airforce’s only remaining Russian Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jet. Unconfirmed reports suggest this may have been achieved with rare American FIM-43 ‘Redeye’ MANPADs likely smuggled into Mali from Libya or Chad. (Abdul, 2023) Following its seizure of the town of Anefis in Kidal from the CSP in October, the army pressed onto the regional capital of Kidal, capturing the CMA stronghold with Wagner support on November 15th after clashes that occurred when the UN left their base earlier than planned. Hundreds of soldiers and police were then sent to enforce order, while GATIA leader General El Hadj Ag Gamou was appointed Governor of Kidal by Goïta’s military junta. Both CSP and jihadist groups still remain implanted in rural areas of the region. In December, the CSP began blockading the major northern cities of Kidal, Ménaka, Gao, Timbuktu and Taoudeni, now under government control, and the roads leading to Mauritania, Algeria and Niger. JNIM had already been blockading Timbuktu on-and-off since August in opposition to the Malian army’s deployment. On December 20th, the military recaptured Aguelhok, the only remaining vacated UN camp captured by the CSP. In January 2024, accusing Algeria of interfering in its affairs, the interim authorities then terminated the 2015 Algiers Accord and launched a new national peace initiative, which the CSP quickly rejected as sidelining international mediation. It claimed the junta’s decision “totally calls into question all [the] principles” enshrined in the accord, including the unity and sovereignty of Mali, and called on its components to “review and update their respective objectives to face this new situation.” (Jeune Afrique, 2024) Alongside near-constant jihadist attacks, fighting for control of the vast regions of northern Mali will thus continue for the foreseeable future. (International Crisis Group, 2024) Objectives & Ideology The CMA, and its main constituent the MNLA, are mostly secular, Arab-Tuareg nationalist political-military organisations seeking independence from or autonomy within Mali for Azawad. The MNA/MNLA was the first Tuareg separatist movement to explicitly declare its objective was independence,9 adopting a national flag. The CMA includes fighters from ethnic groups across the Sahara-Sahel region, including Amazigh (Tuareg), Arabs, Fulani and Songhaï. MNLA representatives asserted the Saharan peoples’ right to self-determination given their 50-year oppression under the Malian state and its anarchy following the 2012 coup. It pledged to restore security in the face of terrorist and criminal networks and build democratic state institutions, and rather cryptically, to “respect all the colonial frontiers that separate Azawad from its neighbours.” (Al Arabiya, 2012; FRANCE 24, 2012b; Lecocq and Klute, 2013, p. 430) Approach to Resistance The MNLA/CMA engages in urban and desert warfare as their primary methods of violent resistance. This has been supplemented by the occasional use of protests and road blockades. Unlike many Islamist groups, they eschew the use of suicide bombings and remote violence (landmines, IEDs, rocket attacks) and do not regularly utilise guerilla warfare. (Bencherif, Campana and Stockemer, 2023, p. 671) They have engaged in peace talks with the government and its allies in various capacities on and off since 2013. At the end of 2022, having withdrawn from peace talks, the CSP-PSD said they would only return to the table if talks were held under international mediation in a neutral country. (Reuters, 2022) Military & Political Abilities Political At its peak in 2012, the MNLA, along with its Islamist partners, controlled 800,000 sq. km. of Mali (two-thirds of its territory). Gao, the largest city they had conquered, was the self-declared capital of Azawad. Following its recapture, Kidal remained the stronghold of the MNLA and then the CMA in the years following. The young, educated MNLA political wing, represented by then Paris-based intellectual and propagandist, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, had significant media experience and expressed their demands across the English, French and Arabic-language Internet using the language of human rights and the indigenous right to self-determination. The MNLA’s tactic of projecting itself as a pro-Western, anti-AQIM secular force in the hope of receiving support from France and its allies mostly failed and its resources shrank. Although it successfully organised protests for Azawadi self-determination across Northern Mali in November 2011, the MNLA lost political legitimacy in its territory in 2012 as it was unable to develop administrative structures or maintain justice and security due to its ill-disciplined fighters destroying popular support through atrocities. In southern Mali, the general view is that the CMA is “feudal, anti-republican and anti-democratic.” (McGregor, 2016) The CMA presidency currently rotates every six months between the leaders of its constituent groups. CMA President and MAA-D leader Sidi Ibrahim Ould Sidati was assassinated in Bamako, Mali in April 2021. His successor in the MAA-D, Ibrahim Ould Handa, is the current president of the CMA, having succeeded the HCUA’s Alghabass Ag Intalla in July 2023. Upon their formal merger in 2023, a CMA representative expressed a desire to move to a fixed presidency structure. The current CMA press secretary is Ilad Ag Mohamed. (Lecocq and Klute, 2013, pp. 430–431; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, pp. 665–666; Laplace, 2023; Monteau, 2023) Military In June 2012, MNLA military chief Colonel Mohamed Ag Najim was claimed to be able to draw on a force of 9,000-10,000 across northern Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger (according to unverified MNLA sources). A reported 2,000 were stationed at the airport in Gao training young volunteers in military discipline and weapons use, and were in possession of large quantities of submachine guns of various calibres, and 30 functional tanks, and in the process of repairing 10 more and a helicopter. (FRANCE 24, 2012a) Despite many Malian and Libyan army veterans in its ranks, the MNLA has performed poorly on the battlefield. (McGregor, 2017, p. 10) The majority of CMA arms and ammunition have been obtained from Malian stockpiles. Arsenals captured during previous rebellions were supplemented with materiel from army deserters, officials and soldiers selling weapons, and attacks on military bases, including the MNLA’s early 2012 capture of Aguelhok, Gao and Timbuktu, and May 2014 raid on Kidal, where 50 new EU-provided 4x4 vehicles, 12 armoured vehicles and several tonnes of ammunition and weapons were captured. Tuareg fighters also brought a considerable amount of ammunition, small arms, light weapons, vehicles, and heavy weaponry to Mali from both government and revolutionary stockpiles after the end of the First Libyan Civil War. These included AK-pattern rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, vehicle-mounted ZU-23-2-pattern anti-aircraft auto-cannon, and mortar projectiles and artillery rockets (sometimes without launchers).10 This enabled the MNLA-Islamist coalition to fight a larger, more intense insurgency in 2012 than in previous conflicts. Materiel analysis has shown small amounts of ammunition have also been sourced from military stockpiles in Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, as well as a number of other west African countries. These are likely obtained in limited numbers by individuals and small criminal networks. The CMA also benefited from the proliferation of arms in non-state actor possession in northern Mali after the government armed pro-government militias and self-defence units. However, much of the heavy materiel was lost to Islamist forces in 2012 or destroyed by the Malian military and its supporters in the years following. Nonetheless, the abundance of professional smugglers and poorly accounted for arms in the southern Libyan Fezzan region continues to provide new materiel for combatants in northern Mali in spite of the erosion of Tuareg control over traditional trade routes since 2014. (Anders, 2015, pp. 171–178) International Relations & Potential Alliances Local/Regional Although briefly allied to Ansar Dine, the MNLA/CMA has repeatedly clashed with the Salafi Islamist group and its affiliates, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Oneness & Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), Al-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, and Ansaru, since 2012. The CMA continues to clash with Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), a MOJWA/Al-Mourabitoun splinter group formed in 2015, and Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), the product of a 2017 merger of Ansar Dine, AQIM, MOJWA and Al-Mourabitoun. JNIM, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, is a mix of Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani and Songhaï, while IS-GS is mostly Arabs and Fulani. Although once allied, the CMA is frequently in conflict with the pro-government Plateforme coalition of armed groups, of which the Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defence Group (GATIA), is the most powerful. GATIA is a paramilitary ethnic militia composed mostly of ‘vassal’ Imghad Tuareg locked in a struggle with the ‘noble’ Ifoghas. Many members are Malian/Libyan army veterans, including its leader, Malian General El Hadj Ag Gamou, now governor of Kidal. Plateforme also includes the Arab Movement of Azawad – Tabankort (MAA-T), dominated by wealthy Gao-based Lamhar Arab businessmen – many prominent drug traffickers11 and former key MOJWA military and civilian officials; the Coordination of Patriotic Resistance Movements and Fronts I (CMFPR-I), a coalition of Songhaï and Fulani self-defence movements from the Gao and Mopti regions; and the Movement for National Defence (MDP), a Fulani self-defence militia led by Liberian Civil War veteran of Charles Taylor’s forces, and one-time MNLA member, Hama Founé Diallo. Before their withdrawal in late-2023, many rebels viewed the deployment of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) forces as providing quiet support for government efforts to recapture the north through proxies including GATIA. Equally, others viewed the UN presence as vital to security. (McGregor, 2017, pp. 8–9, 11–13; Desgrais, Guichaoua and Lebovich, 2018, pp. 672–673) International Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi directly supported the MNLA until 2012. The CMA continues to receive informal support from Tuareg living across Mali’s immediate borders and from the international Tuareg diaspora. The main international opponent of the CMA remains the Malian government. French and Chadian forces, which led Malian counterinsurgency operations from 2012–2022, largely managed to avoid confronting the CMA and sometimes even collaborated with them. They were replaced by Wagner Group mercenaries supported by Russian and Turkish forces, following Goïta’s second coup in 2021, who engaged in major fighting with the coalition. Despite CMA opposition to their replacement, Wagner’s weakness, brutality against civilians, and focus on fighting the Islamist insurgency has served to empower the movement. Meanwhile, since 2023, Mali has increased cooperation on security and collective sanctions evasion with neighbouring West African states Niger, Burkina Faso and Guinea, all military-junta led following recent coups. This culminated in the first three’s creation of the Alliance of Sahel States in September, and the formation of a three-state confederation in December, with a stabilisation fund, investment bank, and apparently in the future, a common currency. However, given they are all facing serious domestic insecurity problems primarily caused by Islamist insurgencies, they would realistically be unable to assist one another in the event of an international conflict, something ECOWAS has threatened. In early 2024, as the MINUSMA withdrawal was nearing completion, the new confederation withdrew from ECOWAS over their respective post-coup sanctions. (International Crisis Group, 2024)

Introduction & Overview The Sinjar Resistance Units, also known as the YBŞ or the Yekîneyên Berxwedana Sengalê, is an ethnic Yazidi militia which was formed in 2014 (Al-Tamimi, 2021b) in order to protect the Yazidi community in Iraq following attacks upon their community by radical Islamist insurgents. As the second largest Yazidi militia after the HPÊ (Êzîdxan Protection Force), it has primarily been active in fighting against ISIL (Paraszczuk, 2015). Being a founding member of the Sinjar Alliance, a comprehensive command structure uniting all Yazidi forces, the YBŞ works alongside its all-female counterparts in the YJÊ ( Êzîdxan Womens Units - Much like the YPJ and YPG) and they both operate under the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and collaborate with the People's Defence Forces (HPG) of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Tomasevic, 2016). Some segments of the YBŞ later integrated into the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as part of an effort to assimilate into the regular Iraqi Armed Forces, and these units are formally designated as the 80th Regiment (Al-Tamimi, 2021a). History & Foundations Formed in response to waves of attacks aimed at the Yazidi community by ISIL in Iraq, the group took part in several major offensives against ISIL, such as the August 2014 Northern Iraq offensive -- in which they killed at least 22 IS fighters and destroyed several armoured fighting vehicles in the locality of the Sinjar Mountains (where they primarily operate from) (Haaretz, 2014). The group received training from their Kurdish counterparts in the YPG and were subsequently sent back to the Sinjar Mountains' frontline zone in order to combat ISIL and protect their community (Reuters, 2014). Sheikh Khairy Khedr, the group's commander, was killed in battle during the clashes in October 2014 after being struck by a mortar shell (Su, 2014). The YBS also participated in the founding of the Sinjar Alliance, which is an all-Yazidi organisation which aims to establish democratic confederalism within an autonomous Yazidi region in Sinjar (ÊzîdîPress, 2015). Under the Sinjar Alliance, the YBS took part in the November 2015 Sinjar offensive (KurdischeNachrichten, 2015) which succeeded in the joint Yazidi-Kurd forces capturing Sinjar and Gabara and 600+ ISIL casualties (Hanna and Payne, 2015). In an agreement with the central Iraqi government, the YBS joined the Popular Mobilisation Forces, also known as the “80th Regiment” (Al-Tamimi, 2021a) and the central government also demanded that the YBS withdraw from the Sinjar mountain areas which they had been stationed in. The Iraqi government requested this action to eliminate what they viewed as the PKK's presence in the Sinjar area. However, the YBS and other associated groups declined, asserting that they had no affiliation with the PKK (Al-Tamimi, 2021a). In 2018, Zeki Shingali, a prominent Yazidi Kurdish leader affiliated with the PKK, was assassinated by a Turkish airstrike following his attendance at a memorial service for the victims of the Sinjar massacre perpetrated by ISIL (ANF, 2018). Objectives & Ideology The group has a broadly left-wing ideological basis similar to many other ethnic minority organisations in the region such as the YPG and the YPJ which it is similar to in terms of both ideology and structure. It holds a belief in Yazidi regionalism which promotes an increase in political power, influence and self-determination for the Yazidi people in the Sinjar region. It aims to gain strength in its ethnically homogenous region (Sinjar) and this occupies an ideological space similar to nationalism albeit on a much smaller and more local/regional scale. The group also subscribes to Democratic Confederalism much like the aforementioned PKK and its associated organisations. Democratic confederalism is a political concept first theorised by the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. It focuses on a confederation based upon principles which are centred around autonomy, direct democracy, political ecology, feminism, multiculturalism and self-defence/government. Military/Political Abilities The group has fairly limited military abilities due to its small recruitment base as well as equipment inventory. With a reported membership of around 2000+ members (Paraszczuk, 2015), the group is fairly limited in operations and cannot conduct large-scale ground offences much like its Kurdish counterparts in the YPG and the broader SDF coalition, which numbers around 100,000 members (Mahmud, 2021). The group is frequently seen being armed with locally available AK-47s and the group is also known to possess vehicle mounted HMGs (Heavy machine guns) also known as technicals. The group has also received airstrike support on any operations it has been on from the United States Air Force which has greatly bolstered its ability to conduct any sort of offensive operations no matter how limited. In the 2015 Sinjar Offensive the US Air Force conducted over 250 airstrikes during the week-long operation including the preparatory strikes conducted against ISIL targets (Warren, 2015). Approach to Resistance Although the group utilises violence in order to protect its people in the Sinjar region and to conduct operations against ISIL, it is not a necessarily violent organisation unlike the aforementioned PKK. The group does not conduct offensive operations without support from other groups and it also does not conduct terrorist acts on foreign or domestic soil. As it is effectively an ethnic militia organisation which is dedicated to the protection of the Yazidi people in the Sinjar mountain region it is currently occupied with defending, policing and securing the region and it operates checkpoints within the region. (Aziz, 2020) International Relations & Potential Alliances Due to both the groups small physical size and stature within local politics it has to rely upon alliances and agreements in order to remain in the picture. As a part of the Sinjar Alliance the group is allied to the Êzîdxan Women's Units and it was also allied to the Êzîdxan Protection Force up until March 2017 when the Êzîdxan Protection Force left the Sinjar alliance and joined the Kurdish Peshmerga. The YBS is also a part of the Popular Mobilization Forces in a Unit designation known as the 80th Regiment (Al-Tamimi, 2021a). The Popular Mobilisation Forces is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organisation which is composed of approximately 67 different armed factions consisting of mainly Shia Muslims but also includes wide numbers of Sunni Muslim groups, Christian groups and also the Yazidi organisations such as the YBS.

Insurgency overview Harakat al-Jihād al-Islāmi fi Filastīn (حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين), also known as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a radical Sunni Islamic organization founded in the Gaza Strip with the aim of forming a Palestinian Islamic state. The PIJ was founded in the Gaza Strip in 1984 and its militancy has always been militarily, politically and financially supported by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Following the view of the organization, rather than a nationalist core, the Palestine question has mainly religious importance and Islam is indissolubly related to the State of Palestine. History and Foundations The first structure of the PIJ was established in the Gaza Strip in November 1981. At the time the Palestinian political context was entirely dominated by secularized nationalist forces and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), since 1974, was the sole representative of the Palestinian people internationally recognized. In this political scenario, a part of Palestinian society began to shift toward Sunni organizations, like the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Shiite Iranian opposition led by Khomeini (2). From the lines of the Muslim Brotherhood, Fathi Ibrahim Abdulaziz Shaqaqi and Abd Al Aziz Awda emerged. They came across fundamentalist Islamist ideas while they were university students in Egypt and later became the two co-founders of PIJ. In 1979 Shaqaqi was arrested in Egypt for his political Salafist activity and for the publication of a text in which he urged all Sunnis to support the Islamic Revolution that was overwhelming Iran. After prison and his return to Gaza, Shaqaqi established with Awda the first structure of PIJ (10).  The first archetype of the Awda and Shaqaqi organization, called al-Tāli'aʿ al-Islāmiyyah (the Islamic Vanguard) had an innovative view of the eternal battle against the Jewish state, perceived as a religious war. During the First Intifada (1987 - 1993) the PIJ strongly influenced Hamas, the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been pushed towards a religious perception of its armed struggle against Israel (2). In 1988 the leader of the PIJ was expelled from Gaza by Israeli authorities and founded an exile directorial unit in Damascus, from where the organization’s jihad continued. In 1993 the historic Oslo Agreement was signed: the PLO recognized the State of Israel, and the Jewish State allowed the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Both Hamas and PIJ categorically rejected the Oslo Agreement and clashed with PLO in PNA’s territories. Shaqaqi considered the treaty a deception that would allow Israel to lock out Palestinians from an economic and security point of view (8). In this context, the leader of the PIJ was killed by Mossad in Cyprus, after returning from a visit with Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in 1994. At the outbreak of the al-Aqsā intifada, the PIJ increased the frequency and intensity of its actions, especially through suicide attacks. This profoundly compromised the peace treaties in progress at the time (2). With the Second Intifada outbreak, the PIJ realized that, from a cost-calculation perspective, suicide attacks were the most cost-effective weapon. Due to this tactical consideration, the organization carried out a large number of terrorist actions against Israeli citizens until 2006 (2). PIJ boycotted the Palestinian Legislative Election both in 1996 and 2006 due to Palestinian democracy’s structural deficiencies (9). PIJ fighters repeatedly directly faced the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the various invasions of Gaza. Despite the harsh fighting, the IDF never managed to behead the leader of the organization.  The Gaza Strip wars of 2012, 2019 and 2022 managed to weaken PIJ and destroyed part of its infrastructure (1). On October 7th 2023, PIJ and al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, conducted the al-Aqsa Flood operation– a massive joint military offensive on Israeli territory. The October 7 attack hit the world not only for its significant qualitative and quantitative goals but also due to the brutality of the action, which resulted in over 1000 Israeli casualties and the taking of 250 prisoners (9). Israel violently responded with a full-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip. Due to the ongoing Israeli attack, the PIJ’s future is still unclear. Objectives and Ideology During the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood maintained a moderate line over the Palestinian conflict while the PIJ approach and tactic deeply changed at the end of the decade with Shaqaqi and Awda’s interest in the Iranian Islamic Revolution (2). From the victorious experience of the Khomeinist revolution, the PIJ understood that overthrowing the Israeli regime was not enough but above all, it is necessary to delineate a new Islamic state project: PIJ’s mission of Palestinian national liberation has to be read as part of the great Islamic revolution for the creation of a single Caliphate throughout the Middle East (10). In this political interpretation the right sources of legislation, like the Quran, the Sunna and Ulama’s consensus, will guarantee justice and freedom (8). Considering this perspective, the PIJ would follow a pan-Islamist approach. Already in the 1980s, the PIJ defined the fight against the Israeli state with the term jihad, giving priority to the religious aspect over the national one (2). Shaqaqi’s view on Islam went beyond the religious belief. Religion is considered a cultural and political system that should be the desirable core of the Palestinian national topic and the cultural war against the West. This vision led Shaqaqi to criticize secularized Arab nationalism on several occasions, mainly due to its detachment from Islam. This fragmentation would be a dangerous ideological issue because it would provoke a division in the Arab front and give a tactical advantage to the West (10). The failures of nationalist regimes with socialist and anti-religious tones, such as Nasser's Egypt or the Ba'athist Syrian regime, would confirm the PIJ’s disagreement toward secularized Arab nationalism. Despite that Shaqaqi has been an excellent example of pragmatism and reconciliation within the Palestinian framework (10). Military and Political Abilities The PIJ has always been a background actor due to the bulky Hamas presence. Despite that, the growth process has never stopped and nowadays PIJ is rightly considered a leading Palestinian resistance organization, the third largest in Palestine after Fatah and Hamas and the second one in Gaza. Although the US State Department has stated that PIJ can count on just 1000 units, other internal and external sources reported bigger numbers, with between 8000 and 10000 ready-to-fight militants (2). The PIJ, like most Palestinian organizations, has a military wing called the al-Quds Brigades (The Jerusalem Brigades). The al-Quds Brigades are divided into cells with their own commanders, with a concrete presence in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1). The Brigades presents a decentralized structure. Even if Israel manages to kill the military leader he would be immediately replaced by a lower-level command and the organization's efficiency would not be heavily weakened (1). The al-Quds Brigades adopted unconventional warfare tools, establishing a cyber unit called the Quds Banner. This branch aims to face and prevent eventual Israeli actions of espionage, surveillance, hacking and attacks on cyber infrastructures (1). In recent times, the al-Quds Brigades engaged mainly in rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip despite its participation in the “al-Aqsa Flood” military offensive on October 7th (2). Despite the overwhelming and ultra-sophisticated Israel military capacity, the organization never stopped to strengthen its ranks and as of now,  no Israeli military operation has managed to eliminate PIJ infrastructure (1). The PIJ is not just a paramilitary organization. Over the decades, the Palestinian group has increasingly developed widespread social infrastructures with intensity and efficiency. Islamic Jihad is present in Gaza through the control of some mosques, the publication of various newspapers and the presence in universities through student associations, the main one is called al-Rābita al-Islāmiyya (the Islamic Link) (2). Through these activities, PIJ recruits new members to employ in its armed resistance. University associations are particularly effective in pursuing this goal. In 2015 an Al-Quds University student member of al-Rābita al-Islāmiyya stabbed to death two Israelis and wounded two more. This event led to a new wave of lone-wolf attacks, mainly through knives, which took the name of Al-Quds Intifada or Knives intifada. In 2015, the PIJ was directly accountable for 5% of all lone-wolf attacks against Israel (2). Iran’s long-term missile development project has become a prime pillar of the Islamic Republic’s military posture and has primarily focused on Assad’s regime in Syria and other non-state actors in Iran’s sphere of influence, like Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip (6). Although the support for these regional actors began in the early 1980s, just in the last twenty years the Iranian regime has begun to provide relevant weapons systems, providing heavy-artillery rockets and strategic ballistic missiles as well as contributing to significantly develop their home-production capacity and technical know-how (6). Due to a fluctuating relationship with Hamas, PIJ is indeed more closely linked to Iran in the Gaza Strip and has been equipped with wide artillery-rocket technology (5). Iranian rocket proliferation fueled the struggles of Palestinian resistance and consisted in its core strategy during several military confrontations with Israel over the last decade. In 2012 both Hamas and PIJ struck Tel Aviv with Fajr-5 rockets, which have been smuggled to Gaza through the Egyptian border. Even if external supply was a key aspect, PIJ moved its focus to domestic production (6).  Moreover, several sources claim that Iran provided training to PIJ cadres in the production of key propellant components (5). Due to the massive Iranian aid, the Sunni group has overcome the primitive short-range artillery, developing in a few years long-range rockets (6). Recent leaks not independently verified would indicate that Teheran equipped PIJ with an unguided system, such as the Jihad and Imad and heavy artillery rockets, the Badr-3, which has been tested and developed on Iranian soil and has a range of up to 160 km (1).  The latter system is significantly less complex than other rocket artillery owned by Iranian armed forces. It is highly likely that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), considered the main organization responsible for Iranian missile proliferation efforts, designed the Badr-3 system with a simple design specifically to encourage local production by proxy allies. Similarly to the Badr-3 case, also the PIJ’s 225 mm precision-guided missile was first developed inside Iran and later optimized for proxy production in Gaza (5). It’s estimated that al-Quds Brigades possessed from 6000 to 8000 short- and long-range missiles before October 7th (1). Approach to Resistance The suicide attack strategy was raised around the 1993-2000 period, in the prelude of the Second Intifada. During these years the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Israel were engaged in the Oslo Agreement process, to obtain a nonviolent resolution. Both PA internal opponents, Hamas and PIJ entirely rejected the political process and carried out more than 30 suicide actions. (7) Suicide bombing attacks became a hallmark of PIJ’s milestones. The planning and the actuation of this tactic attained different goals, like obtaining revenge for unprecedented anti-Palestinian pogroms, reducing the casualties gap between the two sides, fighting Arafat’s political hegemony and convincing Palestinian society that armed terrorism was the correct way of struggle. Moreover, suicide attacks are cheap and easy to organize and overall deadly and efficient. Due to these features, suicide terrorism is one of PIJ’s preferred tactics (7). The method reached its peak and achieved a new dimension with the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Figure 2: Schweitzer Yoram, (2010), “The Rise And The Fall Of Suicide Bombing In The Second Intifada“. The massive use of suicide attacks led to the birth of the myths of the martyrs among Palestinian resistance, redacting martyr biographies with a clear propagandistic purpose (9). This wave of terrorism overcame the goal of causing death, suffering and destruction and became a psychological weapon against Israeli society’s morale in its daily life (7). Despite PIJ martyrdom, the organization keeps a pragmatic view over this practice: immediately preceding the Israeli military invasion of Jenin in 2002, the fighters decided to withdraw to preserve the continuity of the organization instead of being martyrized facing the enemy (9). International Relations and Potential Alliances PIJ is the closest actor connected to Iran in Palestine and a key organization in the so-called Axis of Resistance, the set of proxy groups and actors militarily and politically linked to the Islamic Republic. The Axis of Resistance, which was born from the mind of Qasem Soleimani, has the aim of cultivating Iranian regional interests in the Middle East and includes Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza Strip, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Shiite militias linked to Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces) in Iraq, the Houthi-Ansar Allah Movement in Yemen and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Despite the common system of alliances, PIJ has never sided with the Houthis in the Saudi and UAE aggression in the context of the Yemen civil war (2). Despite the obvious ideological affinities, the relations between Hamas and the PIJ have not always been linear. Disputes are however almost entirely practical rather than ideological. Nonetheless, Hamas and PIJ often conduct joint operations, like the October 7th terrorist attack against Israeli kibbutz (9). Furthermore, PIJ always cultivated strict ties and support with Jenin and Nablus Brigades in West Bank territories (1). Additional Resources

Introduction & Overview Fatah al-Intifada is an armed militant Palestinian faction which is active in the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Founded by Colonel Said al-Murugha, also known as Abu Musa, it officially represents itself as the ‘Palestinian National Liberation Movement - Fatah’, although it is not a part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); it split from the main Fatah organisation in 1983 due to wanting to correct “the course of the revolution”. This came about following internal disagreements over the direction of the Palestinian struggle. History & Foundations The group was created in 1983 following internal disagreements within the Fatah movement over the direction in which Yasser Arafat was taking the Palestinian struggle. The PLO, in agreement with the Israelis, had decided to relocate the fighters of the PLO after the Siege of Beirut in 1982 to Tunisia and other Arab countries (Schlaim, 2014, p.425). Colonel Abu Mousa returned to Damascus after the Siege of Beirut to announce an “intifada within the Fatah movement” (Al-Tamimi, 2018). This was done under the impression that Arafat and other executive decision makers within the PLO had betrayed the original mission of the Palestinian movement and that being relocated to Tunisia and elsewhere would be a mistake. In 1984, Abu Musa led Fatah al-Intifada to join the Palestinian National Alliance in Damascus but failed to gain a majority of Palestinian support in opposition to the PLO. Opposing the Oslo Accords in 1993, it has been unable to secure a mainline role in present day Palestinian politics. Moreover, the group has regularly backed Syrian initiatives to influence Palestinian politics (Al-Tamimi, 2018). Fatah al-Intifada has also fought alongside the Syrian government in the Syrian civil war, taking part in several battles such as the Siege of Eastern Ghouta and the Southern Damascus offensive (AGPS, 2018a). The group has begun to lay off fighters due to the decreasing intensity of the Syrian Civil War and a lack of funding (AGPS, 2018b). However, as of 2024, the group has been active in the recent escalation of the conflict in Gaza, sending fighters to fight against the IDF (Dostor, 2024). Objectives & Ideology The stated aims of the Fatah al-Intifada group are similar to other Palestinian liberation groups. This includes the “liberation of Palestine by both armed struggle and armed resistance” and also the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with “noble Jerusalem'' as its capital city (Al-Tamimi, 2018). The group also has socialist elements incorporated within its ideological basis and it has often taken a broader leftist orientation within Fatah. For instance, this can be demonstrated through Abu Musa’s visions – he notably claimed that the Lebanese Civil War was not a sectarian conflict (which was a relatively mainstream view), but that it was a form of class war instead (Khalidi, 1983). Military/Political Abilities Due to the group's relative inactivity since the Oslo Accords, its military abilities are relatively difficult to gauge. During the 1980s, the groups were involved in several attacks on Israel, including on Israeli civilians. It took part in the War of the camps in the 1980s which was a Syrian attempt to remove the PLO from its refugee camp strongholds. Additionally, more recently, it has been active in Syria as a Syrian government-backed group. It has participated in several of the aforementioned battles such as the Siege of Eastern Ghouta and the Southern Damascus offensive, in which several of its members have died in fighting against ISIS (AGPS, 2018a). Images of the group feature small arms such as AKMs and Ak-47s which highlight the group’s relative lack of funding as opposed to other groups which reduces its military capabilities significantly. As of 2024, the group has been active in the Gaza strip conflict in which similarly, images of the group feature small arms such as AK-47s. In regards to its political abilities, Fatah al-Intifada has severely reduced capabilities due to its distancing from mainline PLO oriented groups which occurred upon its founding in the 1980s (Al-Tamimi, 2018). Its military wing, Al-Asifah Forces, actively records its operations since October 7th and these videos (as seen below) circulate online. Approach to Resistance The group is violent and has attacked Israeli forces and other groups in the region such as ISIS. It is relatively small in size in comparison to other groups and is estimated to have 3000-3500 members (Eshel, 2005). Most of its military approaches are similar to those of other groups recently active in Gaza. The group seemingly uses explosive devices and Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), as seen below. International Relations & Potential Alliances The group has several alliances, most notably to the Syrian government which has used it as a proxy force in the Syrian Civil War. However, the group has reportedly fought against Hamas in the Yarmouk Camp for example and it has coordinated with the al-Qassam Battalions in Gaza. However the group reportedly holds no political meetings with any other Palestinian group in any of the regions it is active (Al-Tamimi, 2018).

Insurgency Overview The Young Army Cadets National Movement (Russian: Всероссийское военно-патриотическое общественное движение «Юнармия»), commonly known as "Yunarmiya", is a paramilitary youth organisation founded in 2016 by the Russian government. The movement is part of the general effort to revive patriotic sentiments and military readiness among the younger generation. History Although not directly through the Yunarmiya, Russia’s aim at those goals is not recent. During the Soviet era, basic military training was part of school curriculum, and numerous paramilitary programs have been instituted by the State. After the fall of the Soviet Union, which saw the decline of those programs, and Putin’s election in the early 2000s, new political youth groups were created such as Nashi, which aimed at fostering pro-Kremlin support and countering youth protest movements. This strategy paid off during and after the massive 2011 protests in Russia, where Nashi and other pro-Kremlin youth groups played a role in ensuring the regime's stability. (1) (2) (3) The context of geopolitical tensions caused by the 2014 annexation of Crimea, catalyzed further militarization within Russian society. It was within this environment of heightened nationalistic fervour and perceived threats from the West that the Yunarmiya was established on the initiative of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu in 2016 as a strategic effort to fortify Russian youth with not only a sense of patriotism but also basic military skills, to nurture a strong military ethos among its young population. (1) (2) (6) The Yunarmiya's formation was part of a broader Kremlin strategy to solidify national identity and ensure a cohesive societal front in support of state policies. This initiative was not merely a response to immediate geopolitical challenges but also a long-term vision to embed a robust patriotic spirit and readiness for defense among the next generation. (2) (3) Objectives and Ideology The Yunarmiya's official objectives are to enhance state policy in the field of youth education, fostering the development of children and young people in a manner consistent with specific moral values and guidelines, with a special emphasis on military and patriotic themes. This development includes spiritual, moral, social, physical, sporting and intellectual aspects. (6) The organization promotes interest in Russian history, geography, and the acquaintance with various ethnic groups within Russia. It also focuses on learning about Russian national heroes and military commanders. Additionally, the movement nurtures young generations in line with Russian nationalist values, opposing what it perceives as foreign influences contrary to these traditions. (1) (4) (5) This leads us to the Yunarmiya untold objectives, which are to make the youth docile and to prepare the next generation of soldiers. By following the ideological course directly set by the Kremlin, the organization impeaches the creation of slightly variant points of view. For instance, members of the movement have been seen with the flag of the Donetsk Republic during an official Yunarmiya parade. (2) (3) Military/Political Abilities The Yunarmiya provides military training programs, equipping Russian youth from 7 to 17 years old, boys and girls, with basic military skills and knowledge. This training is part of a broader objective to prepare the younger generation for potential future roles in the nation's uniformed services. (2) (3) Today, more than a million young Russians are part of the Yunarmiya movement, which is present in all 85 federal subjects of Russia, allowing for a centralized and controlled training of the youth, positioning it as an important indoctrination center. (2) (6) (8) It is worth noticing that branches have already been implanted in the disputed regions of Kherson, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Crimea, showing the efforts deployed to fully gain the population to Moscow’s views as well as Russia’s long-term objectives. (2) (8) Approach to Resistance As an organization linked to the government, the Yunarmiya does not actively engage in direct opposition or resistance tactics against Russian institutions. Instead, the movement uses its legitimacy to approach resistance in predominantly educational and formative ways, focusing on instilling a specific set of values and skills in the youth; it operates as a platform for propaganda aiming at patriotic and military education. (1) (2) (4) (5) The training also takes a more physical turn in the form of AK-47 maintenance, uniform wearing, performing manoeuvres, national heroes commemoration, etc. (1) (2) International Relations & Potential Alliances Internationally, the Yunarmiya's perception varies, reflecting broader attitudes towards Russian domestic policies and military ambitions. The organization aligns closely with the Russian government's objectives and is actively seeking foreign candidates with similar views, especially on the country’s right to defense readiness, traditionalism, and patriotic education. We mentioned that the movement has administrative structures in all of Russia, but it is also present abroad, notably in regions accepting of Moscow’s policy such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Transnistria, and Azerbaijan. More surprisingly, as of 2019, the Yunarmiya also had a branch in the United States of America. (1) (2) (5) (7) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives From a pro-group perspective, the Yunarmiya is seen as a crucial institution for fostering patriotism, military readiness, and national pride among Russian youth. Supporters view it as a positive influence in shaping a responsible, well-informed younger generation. On the other hand, critics might perceive the Yunarmiya as a tool for state-driven militarization of youth and for promoting a narrow, government-sanctioned set of values and ideologies, potentially at the expense of broader, more diverse educational objectives. (1) (4) (2) (5) There is a third perspective, a more apolitical one: the parents’ perspective. They appear to appreciate the movement, thinking that military training prevents them from taking drugs, drinking or hanging around in the streets. This could explain the enthusiasm around Yunarmiya, in a country that up until recently had one of the highest suicide rates among youth. (2) (3) (6) (7) Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Falun Gong (法轮功)(Dharma Wheel Practice) or Falun Dafa (法轮大法)(Great Dharma Wheel Practice) is a type of Chinese new religious movement that incorporates qigong or flowing exercise movements. Falun Gong is headed by Li Hongzhi (李洪志), who is described by followers as being godlike, however, others accuse him of being autocratic. There is very little information about Hongzhi’s early life, and many conflicting accounts of it exist (1)(9). The organization is considered a cult by the Chinese Communist Party and in 1999 the group was banned and a large crackdown was conducted against them (2)(3). At the height of the organization in the 90s there were estimated to be 70 million members and to this day by some estimates, there are still millions of members (16). Hongzhi and the group hold numerous controversial opinions, such as qigong being able to cure illnesses and grant special powers, that modern technology was invented as a result of extraterrestrials manipulating human scientists, that those same extraterrestrials are going through a program of replacing human beings with clones, and that wars and conflicts are caused by extraterrestrials (4). Besides its religious aspects, Falun Gong is also involved in news with The Epoch Times and theatre with Shen Yun. The Epoch Times has been criticized for spreading misinformation about the COVID-19 virus and Shen Yun is described by some as propaganda for Falun Gong. Epoch Times representatives deny any link to Falun Gong, but there are clear financial and organizational ties (1)(4). History and Foundations Falun Gong started as a private qigong group in 1989 and became public in 1992. This was towards the end of a period of intense popularity of qigong in China. Qigong is a type of exercise that incorporates flowing movement and breathing exercises; it is similar to tai chi. Between the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the 1990s, qigong and tai chi exploded in popularity throughout China, and thousands of qigong organizations were formed (6)(7). Falun Gong initially had the support of the CCP and was formally recognized as a qigong group in the state-run China Qigong Scientific Research Society (CQRS). Falun Gong was highly regarded as a qigong society and the group was lauded in numerous magazines, with Li Hongzhi appearing on magazine covers. In 1995, Li began spreading the teachings of Falun Gong overseas (6)(8)(9). By 1996 things began to fall apart in China for the group. Falun Gong left the CQRS and started facing media scrutiny, with some outlets denouncing it as spreading pseudoscience and superstitious beliefs. Officials in the CCP also began to view the group with suspicion (6). In 1999 Falun Gong was banned by the CCP. The government began to shut down Falun Gong exercise sites; previously they had begun to clandestinely collect information on the group, which made subsequent arrests easier to conduct. Soon the government launched a campaign to eradicate the group. Falun Gong was declared the most serious political threat to China since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (9). Crackdowns escalated and many Falun Gong members were arrested, with reports surfacing of them being beaten in custody. On 23 January 2001, five people who were allegedly connected to Falun Gong (Falun Gong denies any connection to the individuals) self-immolated themselves in Tiananmen Square with gasoline carried in Sprite bottles. This incident caused public perception of Falun Gong to drop in China, and due to the split between Falun Gong and the CCP Falun Gong began to publicly oppose the CCP internationally (10)(11). After the crackdowns and widespread loss of public support, most Falun Gong activities take place in the United States. The group is currently headquartered in a compound in New York state called Dragon Springs. This compound houses temples, private schools, and places for the Shen Yun dance troupe to rehearse (11)(12). Ideology and Objectives The ideology of Falun Gong is, on a surface level, very related to Eastern philosophical traditions such as Buddhism and Taoism. Qi (energy) cultivation plays a big part in the philosophy of Falun Gong, as it does in every qigong group. Simply put, there is a widely held belief in China and other East Asian countries that you can cultivate positive life energy through meditation, breathing exercises, and body posture exercises (6)(13). Besides the beliefs that all qigong societies hold, Falun Gong has some controversial beliefs as well -- these beliefs are the ones that make many people label Falun Gong as a cult. As mentioned previously, Li believes that extraterrestrials interfere with human society and that they create things like war and conflict in an attempt to destroy humanity. He believes that humans are the most perfect creatures to inhabit the universe and that the extraterrestrials covet our form. Li also believes that heaven is segregated by race and that homosexuality, feminism, and pop music are evil. He claims to be able to levitate and walk through walls and says that practicing Falun Gong’s form of qigong will grant you similar supernatural powers including advanced healing powers. Some people in Falun Gong believe that Donald Trump was sent from heaven to destroy the Chinese Communist Party. However, it should be noted that there are millions of people in Falun Gong, and it is possible that many of them see it just like any other qigong society (5)(6)(11)(12). Approach to Resistance and Capabilities Falun Gong has yet to ever use violence against others as a form of resistance. Their approach to resisting the CCP relies entirely on propaganda and dance. The propaganda wing of Falun Gong, Epoch Media Group, consists of The Epoch Times newspaper and New Tang Dynasty television. The Epoch Times, which is given out for free in newspaper form, and New Tang Dynasty focus on decrying the Chinese Communist Party and pushing for democracy in China. They are also very intertwined with the American hard right. Both outlets have been described as ultra-conservative and have featured articles and videos on conspiracies about COVID-19, the 1969 moon landing, and 9/11. Falun Gong tries to drum up support for its cause by claiming that thousands of its practitioners have died in prison and that the CCP harvests organs from live Falun Gong prisoners, but this is debated by experts (1)(5)(12)(14). Relations and Alliances Falun Gong, mainly through Epoch Media Group, has ties with the American hard right. They have produced a film about Chinese tech company Huawei with Steve Bannon, who was the chairman of Breitbart News and advisor to Donald Trump. Epoch Media Group has received donations from American anti-vaccine groups, evangelical Christians, and far-right media outlets (1)(15).

Insurgency Overview The Indian Posse (IP) is a Canadian street gang formed by brothers Danny and Richard Wolfe in 1988 in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Membership is exclusive to Indigenous people. The gang makes a majority of its profits from drug and sex trafficking, but they also partake in a number of other criminal enterprises including robbery, illegal gambling, car theft, and arms trafficking. The gang is known to frequently use violence to further their interests and its members have been responsible for arson and murder (1). The gang is also active throughout the Canadian prison system, where they aggressively pursue other inmates to recruit them (2). History and Foundations The founders of the Indian Posse, Richard Wolfe and his brother Danny were born in 1975 and 1976 to Richard Wolfe Senior and Susan Creely in Saskatchewan. The family belongs to the Cree First Nation. Both of the Wolfe parents were alcoholics and drug addicts during their children’s upbringing. Danny had fetal alcohol syndrome and was born prematurely. Creely was in a residential school as a child where she was raped by a teacher, leading to her addiction issues. Richard Jr. himself was raped three times at the age of seven (3). The Wolfe family moved to the North End of Winnipeg in 1979. Richard Senior then abandoned his family, leaving the Wolfe brothers to effectively raise themselves while their mother neglected them and spent all of her welfare checks on drugs and alcohol. They stole to provide for themselves, beginning with food but eventually escalating to cars by the age of 10. They were placed in foster care several times but repeatedly escaped (1). The IP was formed by the then-12-year-old Wolfe brothers in 1988, the last year they saw their father. By that time, he was homeless and barely acknowledged his children. The IP split off from another small gang that the Wolfe brothers were a part of, Scammers Inc. Shortly after starting the gang, the brothers started partaking in armed robberies and carrying firearms, which led to Richard’s first conviction in 1989 after a teacher found him with a handgun at school. By the early 90s, they took up prostituting women and dealing drugs. They established territory in predominantly Indigenous areas of Winnipeg’s North End where they built a profitable drug operation. Other local youths, faced with poverty and a lack of opportunities, began to join the Wolfe Brothers. In 1989, there were already hundreds of members (1). Despite the Wolfe brothers’ frequent prison stints throughout the 1990s, the IP continued to expand. In 1994, the IP made connections with other criminals in British Columbia and the United States to further its operations. By then, the gang had cemented itself as the dominant organized crime group in Winnipeg’s North End through intimidation and violence. This led to a crackdown by Winnipeg Police to try and shut down the gang (1). Richard Wolfe shot a pizza delivery man, Maciej Slawik, in 1995 with a shotgun. The owner of the pizza chain Slawik worked for owed the IP a $60,000 drug debt and Wolfe thought that the pizza boxes Slawik carried had his money in them. However, Slawik was not involved in crime and the boxes in fact contained pizza. Wolfe was arrested and convicted of attempted murder for the incident. He was sentenced to 19 years in prison (4). He then chose to leave the gang due to what he saw as unnecessary violence. The incident that brought him to this decision was when one of the IP’s rivals, the Nine Deuces, shot and killed a 13-year-old boy who was not a gang member and simply hung around the IP (1). The gang ostracized Richard, as the shooting of Slawik damaged their reputation. He was beaten by the IP in prison for his actions. Meanwhile, Danny was arrested and convicted for threatening to kill a couple who were testifying against his brother. He was incarcerated for three years due to this incident (4). With Richard’s departure from the gang, Danny supplanted him as its leader and the gang kept on growing. The IP soon controlled the crime in many predominantly Indigenous areas and reserves throughout Manitoba and neighboring Saskatchewan. Drugs were particularly profitable in reserves, as their remote locations allowed dealers to charge up to ten times as much as the usual price. The police in these reserves were ill-equipped to deal with organized crime and were easily bought off to look the other way from the gang’s activities (1). With the gang’s rapid expansion, it made some enemies including the Manitoba Warriors, another Indigenous gang. This feud culminated in a 1996 prison riot at the Headingley Correctional Institution in Manitoba, a prison where both of the Wolfe brothers had been incarcerated. The IP dominated Headingley, where it had free reign with drugs, sex, and violence. It would intimidate new inmates into joining the gang, even forcefully branding them with the IP initials. On April 25th, 1996, members of the Warriors attacked the IP (5). The prison’s guards were overwhelmed and the violence escalated into a full-scale riot that lasted for 24 hours and caused $8 million in damage to the prison. Eight guards were injured during the riot and four had their fingers cut off (1). Various Indigenous leaders attempted to mediate a truce between the two gangs to alleviate the violence their rivalry caused in the years after the Headingley riot but were ultimately unsuccessful. In the early 2000s, the Hells Angels approached Danny about becoming the IP’s drug suppliers, to which he declined (1). This led to a number of confrontations between the IP and the Angels and their puppet gangs. IP members fired a bazooka at the prison cell of Maurice Boucher, a Quebecoise high-ranking member of the Angels, in 2002 but failed to kill him (6). At this time, the gang’s profile was rising. Media coverage made them infamous and there was even a movie, Stryker, released in 2004 that centers around a young IP prospect (7). On September 20th, 2007, Danny Wolfe was confronted by a member of one of the IP’s rivals, the Native Syndicate, while at a Fort Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan bar. After noticing Wolfe’s IP tattoo, Native Syndicate member Bernard Percy Pascal told him he was in Native Syndicate territory and that he had to leave. After Wolfe threatened him with a pool ball in his sock, Pascal left the bar. However, Wolfe could not tolerate the fact that he was disrespected. Later that night, Wolfe, along with two others, tracked him down to the house of an elderly Indigenous couple who took in youth to keep them out of trouble. He broke into the house and began shooting those inside. He killed two people, one of which being Marvin Arnault, one of the owners of the house who was shot while jumping in front of his wife as she was shot at by Wolfe for calling the police. Wolfe injured three others during his rampage including Pascal, shooting him nine times (8). Danny was arrested and charged eight days later for the Fort Qu'Appelle incident while driving to Regina with his mother. The getaway driver, Gerrard Granbois, agreed to testify against Wolfe, guaranteeing his conviction. While awaiting trial, Wolfe escaped the Regina Correctional Centre on August 24th, 2008. After his escape, he went to Winnipeg where he robbed a bank. He spent his time free on parties, drugs, and sex. The cocky Wolfe even posted on Facebook “What’s up? I’m out!”. Canadian police took part in a manhunt across the prairies to look for Wolfe and was arrested after three weeks of freedom when his whereabouts were reported to the police by an anonymous source in exchange for a reward (1). On November 18th, 2009, Wolfe was convicted of two counts of murder and three counts of attempted murder. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with eligibility for a parole application after 25 years. He was stabbed to death in prison on January 4th, 2010 by a Native Syndicate Killers (a separate gang from the Native Syndicate) member (8). Soon after Danny’s death, Richard was released from prison on parole and claimed that he would change his ways. However in 2013, he broke up with his girlfriend and relapsed on drugs and alcohol in reaction to the death of his stepson. Wolfe was staying with a couple who wanted to help him get his life on track when on April 6th, 2014, he raped the woman and beat the man with a baseball bat, for which he was yet again imprisoned. He was held in solitary confinement, which caused him to fall into depression and led to his death from a heart attack at age 40 on May 27th, 2016 (9). Despite the Wolfe brothers’ demise, the gang is still active and continues to feud with its rivals, including the Terror Squad (10). Objectives and Ideology The Indian Posse is primarily concerned with providing its members, but primarily its leaders, with money and power. Sometimes this has come at the expense of its members further down the hierarchy. As the gang is mostly composed of young people, the IP claims to be a family that fulfills the role of an actual one for youths who lack supportive guardians, such as the Wolfe brothers. Many members see themselves as soldiers and their immoral acts as a means of survival. However, it is clear that the gang’s leaders are mostly only concerned with themselves, hence the constant infighting within the IP. That being said, the Wolfe brothers had strong ideological leanings. They saw their conditions as a product of colonialism and Canada as an illegitimate settler state whose land belongs to its First Nations. Richard displayed an upside-down Canadian flag in his cell. “Indian” is considered a derogatory term to Indigenous people, however, the gang’s use of the word is in an effort to reclaim it. The brothers harbored a deep resentment towards whites, for instance, Danny wrote a poem mocking the death of a white man who was killed during an IP robbery. Although they did not actively practice these traditions, the brothers believed in traditional Cree spirituality (1). However, their Red Power politics contradict the fact that the IP preyed on and damaged Indigenous communities. Military and Political Capabilities The Indian Posse is only open to Indigenous people, including various First Nations as well as Métis (descendants of French settlers and First Nations people). It is active throughout Canada but is dominant in areas of Western Canada (the provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan) with a large Indigenous population, including on reserves where economic conditions are particularly bad. In the late 1990s, the gang was estimated to have 500 members. The gang’s structure was inspired by biker and African-American gangs. It is governed by a ruling circle of ten who are supposed to make decisions as a collective, however in reality the Wolfe brothers were in control during their lives. Before he left the gang, Richard led the gang with Danny as his second-in-command. Richard was seen by his comrades as intelligent and level-headed, whereas Danny was emotional and extremely violent. This made him an effective enforcer and he was known to take on the gang’s enemies without fear. Although the gang has an organized structure, there is much dysfunction and infighting within the gang that has led to violence. In 2003, a faction known as the Cash Money Brothers split from the IP after Danny Wolfe had ordered an IP member to be shot over drug profits. A number of IP members went to Winnipeg intending to kill the leaders of the faction, but their plan was foiled when they were caught with their guns by local police (1). Approach to Resistance The Wolfe brothers took inspiration from West Coast African-American gangs in their structure and activities, the common use of drive-by shootings by the Indian Posse being an example of this. Los Angeles Crips member Sanyika Shakur’s autobiography Monster has been found by police many times while raiding IP members’ residences. Sanyika Shakur was an American gangster turned Black nationalist and author whose work gave readers a raw look into the violence of LA gang life. He was also friends with rapper Tupac Shakur, an idol of Danny’s. The Wolfe brothers were also hip-hop fans and that culture is emulated in the IP’s dress. The gang’s bread and butter are drugs and prostitution. Cocaine, marijuana, and heroin are trafficked by the IP and the girls the gang prostitutes are typically teenagers, but it has been known to traffic girls as young as 10. Its members have frequently engaged in theft as well, particularly in the gang’s early days, but it now typically serves as a source of supplementary income or a way for young members to prove themselves. The gang is very violent and besides guns, members will also use their hands and melee weapons as beatings are an essential tool for the gang to intimidate rivals and punish its members. Arson is another common practice in the IP, for instance, Danny Wolfe ordered a Royal Canadian Mounted Police station on Opaskwayak Cree Reserve Manitoba to be burnt down in 2007 (1). Prospective members are jumped in during a practice known as the “minutes of pain”, where the prospect is beaten on for five minutes. As new members gain the gang’s trust by completing orders, their rank in the gang is raised, as identified by their tattoos. A “full patch” member had to have served a prison sentence and was rewarded with full-body tattoos. Members have been known to have tattoos of traditional Indigenous imagery, cash signs, and shields. The gang’s color is red and members wear red bandannas, a practice started by the Wolfe brothers. Despite his own departure, Richard Wolfe implemented a rule in the gang’s early days that membership was for life and anyone who tried to leave would be killed. The IP also prohibits its members from taking hard drugs and speaking about the gang’s activities with outsiders (1). Although initially allowed in, women are prohibited from joining the gang. However, the Indian Posse Girls, an IP puppet gang, runs prostitution rings in Alberta (11). Alike to the Wolfe brothers, the IP’s recruits typically come from disenfranchised backgrounds and unstable upbringings. These conditions stem from the socioeconomic issues that surround Canada’s Indigenous communities, including poverty, addiction and mental health issues, and a lack of opportunity. These issues are a product of colonial practices, such as residential schools like the one the Creely was taken to. As is typical with street gangs, such factors create breeding grounds for criminal activity as economic opportunities and positive influences are few and far between. However, experts (such as the judge who tried Danny in his final convictions) have also commented that although the Wolfe brothers and other IP members have suffered the consequences of various social factors, they are nonetheless violent criminals who particularly victimize their own people, regardless of their claims to defend Indigenous people. The fact is that despite the poor conditions of Indigenous people in Canada and the many social problems that come with them, a majority of Indigenous people do not engage in criminal behavior and the Wolfe brothers and their comrades took advantage of those conditions to gain money and power and are responsible for the harm and destruction they have caused (1). International Relations and Potential Alliances The Indian Posse’s most violent conflicts have been with other Indigenous gangs, such as the Manitoba Warriors and the Native Syndicate. The rivalry between the IP and the Warriors stems from their difference of opinion on the Hells Angels. Whereas the Warriors were allied to and bought drugs from the Hells Angels to distribute, Danny Wolfe believed that the Angels were racist and refused to do their bidding despite the fact that the IP had been approached by the bikers to distribute their drugs. The Wolfe brothers were adamant that the IP remained independent and that they would never have to be beholden to anyone (6). Another Indigenous gang, Redd Alert, was formed to protect inmates from the aggressive and violent recruiting practices of the IP and the Warriors (2). The gang had connections with several other groups. In the early 2000s, Danny Wolfe became friends with Gerry Matticks, the boss of the Irish West End Gang based in Montreal, after helping the illiterate Matticks read and write letters. This connection proved useful as the West End Gang controlled the port of Montreal, a hub for drug smuggling. Danny also met with the American Indian Movement (AIM), a non-criminal organization that seeks to uphold the civil rights of Indigenous people in the United States. After this meeting, he claimed that he wanted the IP to become more like AIM. While in prison, Richard came under the protection of the Mafia, who ensured his survival after his departure from the IP (1). The IP has a hostile relationship with the police due to Canadian police’s history of anti-Indigenous racism and the cynicism and a lack of trust in the attitudes of many Indigenous people towards police (2) (12). Richard Wolfe claimed that he was taken by police on two “starlight tours”, a practice that has led to a number of deaths in Western Canada where an Indigenous person is taken to the outskirts of a city in the middle of the night during winter and abandoned there (1). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The English Defence League (EDL) is a right-wing group based in the UK that believes English society is under attack from Muslim extremists and seeks to use tactics such as protest, marching, and propaganda to counter what they see as an invasion of British culture and politics by Islam. The EDL was founded in Luton, England, in 2009 by Kevin Carroll and Stephen Christopher Yaxley-Lennon, a.k.a. Tommy Robinson. The group’s mission statement, which now appears to have been taken down from the internet, used to read that they were leading “the struggle against global Islamification.” They also believe in “rape jihad”, where they argue that rape is ingrained into Islamic texts and that Muslim people are coming to the UK to rape English women. They blame the Muslim community in England for many issues, such as organized sexual abuse of children, oppression of women, honor killing, homophobia, female genital mutilation, and anti-Semitism and intolerance of non-Muslims. Indeed, the group was formed by Carroll and Robinson in response to what they called “militant Islam.” (1) Robinson (often known in the UK media by his pseudonym, Tommy Robinson), has also used other names – such as Andrew McMaster and Paul Harris – to protect himself against violence. He led the EDL from its founding in 2009 to 2013, and has continued to participate in far-right politics in the UK, sometimes surging in prominence. (2) He was also present at the recent far-right clash at the Cenotaph war memorial in the UK, where a group of far-right extremists counter-protested against the Palestine solidarity march taking place in London on the same day. (3) The EDL itself went from being only a small group in 2009 to gathering thousands at marches only two years later. Yet, by 2018, the antifascist organization Hope Not Hate was referring to the EDL as being in a “lethargic and alcohol-fuelled almost comic collapse.”(4) The group went from looking like an organized street movement and talking about forming as a political party in the UK, (5) to disbanding in 2015 and now only exists as a splintered presence on Facebook and in various other far-right networks in the UK. However, with Robinson’s recent appearance at the far-right’s clash with police at the Cenotaph war memorial in London, it is possible that former and prospective EDL members could coalesce once again into a more codified movement in the coming years. History & Origins The story of the EDL’s founding centers on the founders’ opposition of Islam, and their determination to react against any Muslim presence in England, or the country’s political culture. After its founding in 2009, the EDL took part in vigilante marches in local communities around England, sometimes clashing with police, and according to Matthew Collins from the NGO Hope Not Hate, in a short few years the EDL “went from being concerned about extremism to radicalizing themselves.” (6) The group’s clashes with police and visible street presence at marches led to it having a public image of violence and extremism, to the extent that the group’s founders abandoned it, citing this as their reasoning. While both have been important figures in far-right politics in the UK, they felt that the EDL had become too radical for them in 2013, four years after its creation. A poll done the same year (2013) by the Mail on Sunday, a popular tabloid in the UK, discovered that 61% of its 1,121 survey participants thought that the existence of groups like the EDL raised the likelihood of terrorism. (7) There are no accessible member lists for the EDL but the group is thought to have had a membership of 30,000 at its peak in 2013, before it was abandoned by its founders. (8) It is possible that the EDL’s demise was due to a fundamental tension between its organizers’ slogans, and the behavior of its proponents at rallies. The slogan “not racist, not violent, just no longer silent” was drowned out at their rallies by racist chants, and overshadowed by the overlap in membership between the EDL and other groups like the British National Party and National Front. (4) All of the EDL’s former social media channels have been suspended and its members have scattered throughout other various far-right organizations and networks in Britain, with many taking to the streets in the recent far-right clashes with police at the Cenotaph war memorial, where Robinson also made his presence known. The EDL’s website has been offline since April 2020, after which the group created an online radio show on a website called BlogTalkRadio. They also created a Gab account in 2017, however this account has seemed to have been put on indefinite hold within a few years, and so the main contact points for former EDL members appear to be Tommy Robinson’s newsletter and the personal networks that were formed and remain after the group’s more organized activity in the 2010s. Objectives & Ideology The official goals of the EDL are to stand against what it calls ‘militant Islam’, which it equates to an invasion of the UK. During a 2009 homecoming parade for British soldiers in Luton to mark their return from Iraq, there was a disruption by Muslim extremists: the founding of the EDL was sparked by Carroll and Robinson’s reaction against this event. The Muslim protesters waved placards at the soldiers’ parade reading:  “Anglian Soldiers: Butchers of Basra” and “Anglian Soldiers: cowards, killers, extremists.” (6) Two people were arrested at the event. From here followed the anti-Islam ideology of the EDL, with Muslims being seen as an invading force into UK culture and politics. Many issues are blamed by the EDL on Muslim influence, such as the denigration of women, organized sexual abuse, and more. (1) The group sees itself as a defender of British values, including the army, with Robinson telling Channel 4 News in 2013 he was “extremely passionate about our troops”. He was later dismayed when the veterans’ charity, Help For Heroes, rejected donations raised by his sponsored walk. (6) EDL members or associates feel that human rights are threatened by the presence of a Muslim community in Britain. A YouGov survey of 1,600 EDL supporters found that these views also influenced their ideas about immigration: this was a top concern they chose, followed by the economy, and then “Muslims in Britain.” The researcher who conducted this survey, Matthew Goodwin, told Channel 4 News that the EDL’s concerns are more broadly focused on the direction that Britain is headed in, saying, “It’s a broader fear about society, rather than a fear of Muslim terrorists. It is much more nuanced.” (6)  This fear about the unfamiliarity of a developing society can be seen in many far-right ideologies, and in that sense, although the EDL’s focus on Islam is very specific, the grounding of its ideology is extremely rooted in the usual tenets of the extreme right. The group insists that it is not racist, or fascist; however, those bearing the EDL insignia have been seen doing Nazi salutes at rallies, and over the years the membership became steadily more extreme, moving towards fascism. Approach to Resistance The central tension in the EDL’s organizational methods is most clearly seen in its various tactics of resistance. Despite claiming to be non-violent, the group participated in multiple clashes with police throughout its years of being active on the streets of Britain. It is arguable that the group initially grew so rapidly because of its broad tent approach to ideology: with its framework less clearly defined, the EDL could become an umbrella under which many with anti-Islamic ideas could gather, combining those with less extreme views with a more radicalized right-wing contingent. This meant, however, that the tactics of marching or distributing propaganda online, could easily spill into acts of violence by those members with more extreme ideas. One such instance was that of Darren Osbourne in 2017, a British man who drove his car into a crowd outside a mosque in London, killing one person and wounding nine; Osbourne was later found to have been radicalized over the space of a few weeks by the writings of Yaxley, Robinson, and other far-right figures. Then, in 2015, 50 EDL supporters were collectively sentenced to more than 75 years in prison for violent disorder. (1) Whether violence or non-violent, the main tactic of the EDL was marching and  gathering a street presence in significant locations. As well as London, the members targeted their actions in locations with large Muslim communities, such as Bradford, Birmingham, and Newcastle. This tactic grew the EDL membership and made them, for a short few years, the most prominent far-right presence on UK streets since the 1970s when the National Front was using similar tactics. It is possible that this tactic began as a counter-protest action against extremist Muslim demonstrations, of which there were relatively few however. Online communication was also extremely important to the EDL, even when its presence on the ground was growing. According to a Guardian investigation in 2010, the EDL online division for army personnel had 842 at the time, perhaps illustrating the success of the group’s rhetoric of patriotism as well as its online reach. (9) At its peak the EDL maintained Facebook pages for 17 regional chapters around the country; their online outreach mainly utilized Facebook, Twitter, and the EDL website, which contained a user forum. Their Facebook pages were suspended in 2019, and EDL leadership recommended that members instead connect with each other on their website forum. By this time however, interest had waned in the EDL: the group’s main Facebook page only had 2,728 likes in March 2019, and was suspended by 2020. The EDL Twitter page was suspended in 2017, and the deplatforming of Robinson’s own Twitter followed a year later in 2018. Following the Twitter suspension in 2017, the group created a Gab account. However, as of January 2024, this account only has 1,100 followers. (10) While the more overtly hateful rhetoric remained in forums and on social media, the EDL’s leadership focused instead on their aims of peacefully protesting ‘militant Islam,’ and expressed desires to enter British politics on more official grounds as a political party. (1) This range of tactics allowed the EDL to reach a range of different audiences – online, offline and via the UK mainstream media – yet the disparate nature of the tactics arguably also led the group to struggle with internal coherence and led to their collapse, with the extremism of many of the EDL’s followers going beyond what its founders intended and proving uncontrollable. This eventually led to its dissolution and the scattering of its members throughout the various far-right networks and initiatives throughout the UK. International Relations & Potential Alliances Perhaps the most interesting alliance at play with those involved in the EDL, is that of the group’s relationship to football hooliganism. UK football hooligan culture is not inherently right-wing, however, there are crossovers between EDL involvement and some football hooligans. Some EDL members stated “you need an army for war” to encourage football supporters to take part in their rallies, perhaps for the purposes of intimidating the Muslim communities where they were being held. (11) This link was present from the beginning in 2009. Early on, as the EDL was being founded, there was also a group called the British Citizens Against Muslim Extremists, based in Birmingham, which was later absorbed as a local faction into the growing national organization of the EDL. This gradual splintering and absorption between the EDL and different anti-Muslim groups has been a hallmark of its development since 2009, and is now a continued feature of its limited, underground existence. Rather than existing as a force in British politics or protest today, the EDL is more a collection of personal relationships and online gatherings in the less moderated areas of the internet. Many of its members (such as they can still be called so) have dissipated into other right-wing networks in the UK, which they may have always had connections with. This includes the Nazi music and promotion network, Blood and Honour, which has documented links to the ruling Conservative Party in Britain, as well as the remains of the British National Party, the National Front and even UKIP. (3) While the EDL faded from British political news after 2018, it laid the modernizing groundwork for radical right-wing politics in the UK. The key principle of this was breaking with the more explicit racism of previous movements like the BNP, and focusing instead on a much narrower anti-Islamic platform that its leaders sought to prevent from widening into an anti-immigration stance. This distanced them from the rest of the UK far-right, but ensured them an increased reach amongst people who subscribed to Islamophobic views. (12) This narrow focus was reflected in the contrast between the BNP’s “Outlaw Homosexuality” stickers and the EDL’s LGBTQ+ division. The EDL was perhaps the first right-wing group to position the right to be queer as a ‘Western value’ that could be used as a wedge issue to radicalize more people against the Muslim community. It is debatable how genuine this view was among the EDL membership, but it simultaneously made them more palatable, and more distant from explicitly fascist far-right groups such as the National Front – though the EDL did release a 2011 manifesto sharing some wording with BNP propaganda. Therefore, while the EDL lacked codified alliances with both mainstream political parties and other extremist groups, they instead pioneered methods of presenting far-right ideas that have echoed through British politics since. The positing of anti-Islam ideas as protection of human rights has outlasted the group, with the 2018-19 UKIP leader, Gerard Batton, quoting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights during his speech at the 2018 ‘Day for Freedom’ rally in London. (12) The recent clashes at the Cenotaph in the UK mark the appearance offline of these informal relationships, as Robinson could be spotted there alongside other far-right figures. Robinson did not participate in clashes with police; he instead walked with the protesters to Whitehall and then departed. However, Robinson later stated on Twitter (now X), “If you want the EDL back, Rishi, I could easily organize that for you.” (3). Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Hoods Hoods Klan (HHK), also known as the Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans, is a Ukrainian anti-fascist and anti-racist unit part of the Resistance Committee founded in 2006. Originally football ultras supporting Arsenal Kyiv, they reformed into a battalion within the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) to fight against the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, even keeping the colours of their club as a battle standard. They were the first hooligan formation in Ukraine to declare themselves as anti-fascist officially. History Before the establishment of HHK, most of its founding members were active in the hardcore punk scene, participating in gigs and at various venues, where fights with right-leaning individuals were common. This shared background fostered a common culture and a sense of unity within the emerging hooligan supporter group, which began to rally around Arsenal Kyiv Football Club in the mid-2000s. Arsenal Kyiv, originally established in 1925 by workers of the Arsenal Factory and dissolved in the 1960s, was reformed in 2001. (1), (2) Thus, the HHK’s political combat traces back to its very creation. Historically, the Ukrainian ultra scene tends to be dominated by far-right ideologies; by openly claiming to be anti-racists, the Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans immediately became enemies with most of the other football-supporting formations, and notably with the supporters of Dynamo Kyiv, their eternal rivals. (3) As individuals, members of the HHK participated in the 2013 Euromaidan uprising. The Euromaidan movement, beginning in November 2013 in Ukraine, was a response to the government's decision to prioritise ties with Russia over European integration. This significant political protest centred in Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti square, evolved from demanding EU integration to broader calls for political reform and anti-corruption measures. The protests, initially focused on EU integration, quickly escalated into a broader call for political reforms, anti-corruption measures, and the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych. Despite facing violent crackdowns, the movement culminated in February 2014 with Yanukovych fleeing the country. (1) (4) The Euromaidan, while advancing Ukraine's democratic aspirations, indirectly contributed to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and heightened tensions in the Donbas region, leading to secessions and the War in Donbas, where individuals from the HHK also fought, notably in Donetsk. (5) (1) The HHK took its actual form in 2022. In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the group joined the Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) as a battalion, before getting deployed to the Eastern front, where they still fight today. (3) (6) Objectives and Ideology As mentioned above, the HHK was originally an ultra organisation, fervent football fans who embrace a deep sense of community, identity, and loyalty toward their local football club. More precisely, the HHK primarily engaged in football hooliganism, focusing on supporting their team, Arsenal Kyiv, and confronting rival fans and far-right activists. Their activities were centred around the football culture, with a notable stance against fascism, racism, and homophobia within the football community. Their involvement in physical confrontations was more about asserting dominance in the football fan scene than broader, organised, political objectives. (1) Although the geopolitical destiny of Ukraine held importance for some HHK members, it was only upon joining the TDF in response to the Russian invasion that the group’s focus shifted significantly. Their objective transformed into defending Ukrainian territory against Russian advances, viewing the Russian military as embodying the authoritarianism and imperialism they opposed and giving a direct application of their principles in a broader geopolitical conflict. Their transition from football hooliganism to active military action implied a truce with traditionally opposed far-right groups, which are also part of the TDF. However, the HHK maintains their official stance against fascism and racism. (1) (3) Arsenal Kyiv's professional team was dissolved in 2019, though their junior teams continue to compete in city competitions and it is unclear if the HHK maintains an active presence in the football scene while engaged in military activities. It seems that their focus has entirely shifted towards addressing the immediate concerns of the conflict in Ukraine, and yet they conserve the mention “Arsenal Kyiv Hooligans” on their Instagram page, now used to raise funds for their ongoing fights with the Russian forces. (2) (6) Military/Political Abilities: Having a background in football hooliganism, HHK members have partaken in violence as civilians. As mentioned above, some affiliates had previous military experience during the Russian invasion of Crimea and the following uprisings in Donbas. The HHK is part of the Resistance Committee, also known as the Black Headquarter, a coordination body for anarchist and anti-authoritarian fighting groups within the TDF. The commander of both those organisations, Yuriy Samoilenko, died on the front on September 10th 2022. Although The HHK is under the command of the Ministry of Defense which supplies arms and ammunition, all the rest (from kneepad to medi-kit, from bulletproof vests to vehicles) come from international donations. This support can be direct or passed through Operation Solidarity, a humanitarian organisation​ which — amongst other objectives — helps anti-authoritarian fighters during the Russo-Ukrainian war. (3) (7) Approach to Resistance Like most anti-fascist entities, their approach to resistance is primarily violent, from fist fights near stadiums during peacetime to active military training and engagement in the Ukrainian East. The group has built up an international reputation, particularly in left-wing militant circles, giving it legitimacy to engage in interviews and public statements. (1) International Relations & Potential Alliances As we have seen above, the HHK has formed alliances with various anti-authoritarian, anarchist, and anti-fascist groups within and outside Ukraine, especially through the Resistance Committee or Operation Solidarity. It is worth noticing that the HHK has made a truce with right-wing groups fighting alongside them against the Russian forces. (1) (3) Pro-Group and Anti-Group Perspectives Pro-group perspectives view the HHK as a valiant force defending their country against an oppressive invader and/or against fascism and imperialism. The anti-group perspectives are more diverse. First, supporters of the Russian invasion obviously criticise the HHK defence of Ukraine. Some far-right Telegram channels also describe them as “degenerates”. Finally, criticism has emerged from the international anti-authoritarian camp as well: the HHK’s truce with right-wing formations during this wartime has led to accusations of betrayal of antifascist principles and has negatively impacted their image. (8) (9) Works Cited (Chigaco Style) (1) - Kostick C. "Hoods Hoods Klan Interview." Independent Left. Published May 30, 2023. Accessed December 3, 2023.  https://independentleft.ie/hoods-hoods-klan-interview/ (2) - "Arsenal Kiev." Wikipedia. Accessed December 16, 2023. https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arsenal_Kiev. (3) - Popular Front. “Frontline Hooligan: Ukraine's Antifa Football Hooligans Fighting the Russian Invasion”. YouTube video, 28:17. Published June 16 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsodbPkjO3c. (4) - "The Maidan Protest Movement." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed December 15, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement. (5) - "The Crisis in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine." Encyclopædia Britannica. Accessed December 15, 2023. https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-crisis-in-Crimea-and-eastern-Ukraine. (6) - hoodshoodsklan. Instagram. Accessed December 1, 2023. https://www.instagram.com/hoodshoodsklan/. (7) - Popular Front. ”RIP Yuriy”. YouTube video, 0:37. Published, December 10 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_4-gQLNz30. (8) - "@antiglobahomo." Telegram. December 6, 2023. https://tgstat.com/channel/@antiglobahomo. (9) - Totale R. "No War but Class War: Against State Nationalism and Inter-Imperialist War in Ukraine." Libcom.org.Published May 15, 2022. Accessed December 5, 2023. https://libcom.org/article/no-war-class-war-against-state-nationalism-and-inter-imperialist-war-ukraine. Additional Resources