The Muslim Brotherhood
- Nimi Dave
- 6 days ago
- 19 min read
Introduction
The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), also known as Jami’ah Ikhwan Muslimin, Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen, or the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers, is a global Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928. Often seen as the first mainstream Islamist organisation and the precursor of modern Islamism, the MB has influenced countless offshoots, from political parties like Ennahda in Tunisia to transnational militant actors such as Al-Qaeda. According to academic Peter Mandaville, all contemporary Islamist groups “owe a debt to the project Hasan al-Banna initiated in 1928”. (1)
The MB positions itself as a non-violent movement focused on the re-Islamisation of society through grassroots reforms. At the height of its power, it briefly led Egypt following the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, but has since been outlawed and/or designated a terrorist group in many countries, including its country of origin. Known for their adaptability and organisational resilience, the group has survived long periods in exile, remaining active—primarily operating out of Türkiye and London—despite its current Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment since 2013.
History & Foundations
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a middle-class schoolteacher from Mahmuddiyah, a small town in Northern Egypt. Growing up during the height of British rule over Egypt, as the Ottoman Empire’s presence declined, al-Banna was witness to Egypt’s increasing westernisation and secularisation under British influence. While working in the Suez Canal town of Ismailiyah, where stark inequalities separated local Egyptians and British settlers, al-Banna began writing in frustration about the need for re-Islamisation. (2) He started teaching informal classes about Islam to students in local mosques and coffeehouses that eventually attracted parents and residents. (3) Heavily influenced by the glory of the Ottoman Empire, al-Banna sought to oppose British influence in Egypt and remind Muslims of the primacy and singularity of their Islamic identity. He encouraged all Muslims to implement Islam in every aspect of their life, believing that individual change was the best way to restore a true Islamic society. Al-Banna’s vision centred on two primary goals:
The liberation of the entire Muslim world from foreign domination
The establishment of an Islamic state in the Muslim world to implement the laws and social system of Islam (4)
He intended to achieve this by educating the next generation of Muslims in the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam.
By the 1930s, al-Banna’s movement had grown from small meetings in Ismailiyah to a national network of schools, hospitals, and welfare charities. The newly formed Muslim Brotherhood recruited heavily in universities, encouraging students to take the messages back to their villages. This, alongside an intricate organisational structure with an emphasis on local leadership, allowed the MB to grow rapidly. By the 1940s, the MB had expanded internationally; Egyptian scholars were travelling across the Arab world, Brothers were sent to Palestine to support the 1936 uprisings and the 1948 war (5), and offshoots were formed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. As the organisation grew, members created a paramilitary wing, the Secret Apparatus (Nizam al-Khass), which carried out strategic bombings and assassinations, culminating in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Fahmy al-Nuqrayshi in 1948. (6) In 1949, al-Banna was assassinated in a counter-attack by the Egyptian secret services. (7)
Al-Banna was crucial to the organisation, and so fuelled by anger at his death, the MB allied with the Free Officers movement—a group of revolutionaries in the Egyptian Armed Forces—to overthrow the reigning King Farouk. Though a seemingly unlikely pairing—an Islamist group and a nationalist group—both had “dedicated themselves to anti-colonialism and reformation of Arab and Muslim society”. (8) Leading this movement was the future president, General Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood two years before al-Banna’s death. (9)
Nasser had worked closely with Brotherhood member and infamous ideologue in the making, Sayyid Qutb, with whom he shared a vision for post-monarchist Egypt. (10) Yet once Farouk was overthrown and Nasser became president in 1952, he turned on the MB, seeing them as a rival to his power. An attempted assassination on Nasser’s life by a fringe MB member in 1954 (11) cemented their mutual hostility, and shortly thereafter, Nasser began a period of mass incarceration that characterised his regime during the 1950s and 1960s. High-ranking leaders, including Hassan al-Hudaybi (the Supreme Guide) and Sayyid Qutb, were jailed alongside thousands of members, while others fled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, preventing large-scale mobilisation during this time.
In prison, Qutb wrote some of his most influential and popular works, including Milestones, where he declared that most of the Muslim world was living in Jahiliyyah (the era of pre-Islamic ignorance) for not ruling by Shari’a (God’s law), saying of those who support secular laws, “This is not Islam, and they are not Muslims.” (12) Al-Hudaybi attempted to consolidate his authority over the group by publishing works countering Qutb’s ideology, but was unable to prevent more radical offshoots from forming. Eventually, in 1966, Nasser executed Qutb for his role in an alleged plot to assassinate him. (13) Nonetheless, Qutb’s works remained influential.
Following Nasser’s death in 1970, President Anwar Sadat eased restrictions on the MB after 20 years of repression, freeing members on the condition they renounce violence. Both sides made steps towards normalisation, and the MB helped Sadat counter the remaining Nasserists by drumming up support from conservatives and Islamists. This enabled the Brotherhood to regain influence, particularly on university campuses, and rebuild public trust. However, by the late ‘70s and ‘80s, Sadat’s increasingly authoritarian rule and peace treaties with Israel had spurred the growth of Islamic extremism. Several Qutbist Brotherhood members who graduated from university at the time would later form splinter groups that would ultimately become Hamas, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda.
When Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981, he appealed to moderate Islamists within the MB, allowing them to maintain a presence in university campuses, charitable spaces and mosques. (14) Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the MB grew in size, and more members began pushing for political involvement, even spawning a reformist wing. The reformists pushed for multi-party democracy, while conservatives prioritised religious outreach (da’wah). (15)
Mubarak’s 30-year presidency saw active political involvement by the MB, with many Brotherhood-affiliated candidates standing in elections, from student unions to the national parliament. (16) By also focusing on local action and social services, the MB earned political legitimacy from Egyptian society, something the state under Mubarak’s government was struggling to achieve. (17) Fearing their potential influence, Mubarak soon began reimprisoning members after years of mollifying them. By the 2005 parliamentary elections, independent MB members (the MB was still outlawed) formed the largest opposition bloc, leading to further crackdowns and the outlawing of all religious parties. Following the 2010 elections, which were widely hailed as fraudulent, the MB lost all but one of its seats (18), setting the stage for the Arab Spring revolts against government corruption, which would take place in 2011.
When protests against the Mubarak regime first broke out in 2011, mirroring large-scale anti-authoritarian demonstrations across the Arab world, Brotherhood leaders were initially cautious of supporting them for fear of repercussions; however, younger members pushed for support. (19) The MB quickly harnessed the public political momentum after Mubarak’s ousting, forming its own political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, which would win Egypt’s first democratic elections in 2012, electing Mohamed Morsi to the Egyptian presidency. Similar Islamist victories occurred in Tunisia and Morocco, both by offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood—Ennahda and the Justice and Development Party, respectively. However, once in government, the Brotherhood was unready for the political power it had amassed, falling into the familiar trap of authoritarianism. Morsi declared himself immune from judicial review and enshrined Islamic texts as the basis for legislation, despite running on a platform of social justice and anti-establishmentarianism. (20)
Mass protests on Morsi’s first anniversary in office prompted the army to suspend the constitution and arrest him, with army General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi taking over. The bloody aftermath—later known as the Raba massacre—during which over 1,000 counter-protestors were killed (21) remains a defining trauma for the MB. To this day, the MB asserts that Morsi (who died in 2019) is Egypt’s rightful, democratically elected leader. Since then, under al-Sisi’s presidency, the MB has faced its greatest repression yet owing to an army-led crackdown. Despite its designation as a terrorist organisation and the imprisonment of its Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie, the MB continues to operate mainly in exile, relying on support from Türkiye and Qatar. However, it has struggled to regain the influence or legitimacy it enjoyed before 2013.
Objectives & Ideology
“Islam is the solution”
The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamist socio-political organisation that bases its principles on the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah (the traditions and actions of Muhammad), emphasising the implementation of Shari’a. As put by al-Banna:
“Islam is a comprehensive system that deals with all aspects of life. It is a state and country or a government and a nation. It is moral character and the power of compassion and justice. It is a culture and law or science and judiciary, it is matter and wealth or earning and richness, it is jihad and call or army and ideal, as it is a truthful doctrine and worship.” (22)
The MB seeks to bring about Islamic governance under Shari’a law, stressing that Islam is a way of life beyond personal faith. This is often described as political Islam—a term rejected by the Brotherhood, who claim it creates false connotations that Islam is being co-opted for political power. The MB has undergone numerous ideological changes during its long history and produced several famous ideologues now seen as progenitors of the modern Islamist movement’s various strands. (23)
Hassan al-Banna was the group’s first and most influential ideologue. An anti-colonial pan-Islamist, he was heavily influenced by stories of the Ottoman Empire’s reach and influence. Despite living and dying under British rule, al-Banna rejected Western ideals, including secularism and Egyptian nationalism, though he maintained that nationalism was compatible with Islamic ideals. Al-Banna sought to create a true Islamic society from the bottom up, prioritising people living their lives as good Muslims, using education and social structures as tools to bring people back into the Islamic fold. (24)
This strategy persisted into the 1960s and 1970s, before a shift in ideology spearheaded by Sayyid Qutb started favouring a more fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur’an. Qutbism is still seen as one of the most significant ideological influences behind modern Salafi-Jihadism, with Qutb often described as the ideological architect behind al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other Islamist groups. (25) During his time in Nasser’s prisons, Qutb’s focus drifted from anti-imperialism to a different view of Islam. He argued that Islam did not just proscribe defensive war, but that jihad was an existential fight against apostasy, including apostate regimes.
This popularised the concept of takfirism, or designating other Muslims as apostates, thereby making them legitimate targets for violence under Shari’a law. While many Egyptians rejected this view, it encouraged many Brotherhood members (26) to adopt violent, offensive Islamism, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, (27) who would go on to lead al-Qaeda, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would found the Islamic State. (28) Although Qutb was never a formal leader of the Brotherhood, he was highly influential, and after his death, leaders attempted to steer members away from Qutb’s more radical school of thought.
One prominent figure that followed, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, emerged as the unofficial ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood (29) but declined opportunities for leadership twice. (30) Citing al-Banna as his main influence, al-Qaradawi built a large following from his base in Qatar, where he had fled after his imprisonment under Nasser. While he rejected Qutb’s extremism and defended aspects of international law, he controversially issued decrees permitting suicide attacks on Israel, including against civilian targets.
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, as the MB became increasingly politically engaged, it shifted its focus to political reform and began officially condemning the rise of Islamic extremist groups. This bore fruit in the form of Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi’s election to the presidency in 2012 and his attempts to implement Islamic governance in Egypt. Since the al-Sisi-led coup against Morsi in 2013, the MB has returned to resisting political repression and to reaffirming al-Banna’s original vision, albeit cleaving into two ideological camps: those who still see hope in political change and those disillusioned with the Egyptian government. This internal division has made any political headway difficult, and the failure to achieve lasting change after the 2011 uprisings has disenchanted many younger members.
Despite these challenges, the MB supposedly remains committed to non-violence. The Brotherhood’s official website continues to emphasise the holistic approach of the MB in the political, social, economic, and educational spheres, and stresses the importance of the “reunification” of the Muslim world. (31) Since the October 7th attacks by Hamas/AQB, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and others on Israel, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza (and attacks on Hamas and its regional allies in Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, HTS in Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen), calls for a greater unified Muslim community have been stressed. (32) Ultimately, it is the breadth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologies that has enabled the group’s longevity, even if such diversity produces internal divides. (33)
Political & Military Capabilities
Following its fall from the height of its political power in 2013, the MB suffered from significantly reduced capacity, owing to the dissolution of the Freedom and Justice Party in 2014, and the exile of the MB from Egypt. Subsequent terrorist designations from surrounding Arab states have made it further difficult for the group to operate freely. Though the group still has bases in Türkiye and London (with limited presence in Qatar), these are largely under-the-radar, and the group has no official political presence in either country. Additionally, recent diplomatic normalisation between Türkiye and Egypt has led to the closing of Brotherhood TV channels broadcasting from Istanbul and harsher restrictions on citizenship for Brotherhood members. (34) Similarly, improved diplomatic relations between the US, EU and Egypt have triggered greater scrutiny of the MB, making open movement more difficult amidst fear of proscription.
It is the group’s complex internal organisational structure that has allowed it to survive for so many years. Defined by regular elections and an elaborate pyramid-style hierarchy of numerous cells, messages seamlessly pass from leadership to the rank-and-file. Recruitment has historically targeted middle-class, politically conscious university students who often take the group’s message from cities back to more rural areas. This focus on recruitment has built a strong base at the bottom of the pyramid, ensuring a steady flow of new members without constant direction from the top.
The network is tightly interconnected, creating community and loyalty. New enlistees start as muhibb (lovers) while their commitment is tested. If they pass, they join 6–7 others in an usra (family), the bottom rung of the system. Five families form a shu’uba (division), and 3–4 divisions make a mantiqa (district). Members progress to mu’ayyad (supporters), who can pray, preach, and recruit, but not vote, followed by muntazib (affiliates), and muntazir (organisers), who must memorise the Qur’an and form their own usras. Only after completing these steps do members become akh-amil (working brothers), with voting rights and eligibility for leadership. (35)
At the top of the pyramid, ensuring political transparency, there are administrative regional officers, a legislative branch (the Shura Council), an executive guidance bureau with four-year terms, and a Supreme Guide voted in by the Shura Council. In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced major internal political turmoil driven by the loss of key leaders through imprisonment or death. After Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment in 2013, Mohamed Ezzat was unanimously voted in as acting Guide until his arrest in Cairo in 2020. London-based Ibrahim Mounir was then elected as acting Guide, but his restructuring efforts clashed with Istanbul-based leaders, prompting a failed coup attempt in 2022. (36) The Istanbul faction broke away thereafter, electing Mahmoud Hussein, the only remaining member of the old General Council, known for his work in finance and media, as their Guide. (37)
The London-based faction continued to recognise Mounir until he died in 2022, after which his favoured successor, Salah Abdel Haq, famed for his focus on reunification and addressing the membership crisis, replaced him. The London faction views itself as more legitimate due to its legal operation, while the Istanbul faction claims to be truer to the MB’s original mission by remaining based in the Arab world. Such divisions were once unthinkable for a movement famed for its internal cohesion, but political setbacks have deepened. The death in 2022 of Qatar-based ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a key figure in spreading the Brotherhood’s message to mass audiences, significantly weakened the group’s global influence. Leadership instability has led to “crisis promotions” of younger members and difficulty retaining a disillusioned membership. (38) Ultimately, the group’s capacity to act as a large-scale political force in exile is now severely limited.
The Muslim Brotherhood does not currently have a military wing. Historically, sometime between 1938–1940, the MB did form the Nizam al-Khass (Special Apparatus) as a counter-offensive to British colonialism, with members receiving varying levels of paramilitary training and carrying out attacks against British bases (39) — it was a smaller cell of the Nizam al-Khass that attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954 (40) — however, the military wing was largely stamped out in the imprisonment that followed the assassination attempt, and by the 1970s, violence had been completely disavowed.
Following Morsi’s ousting, some younger members pushed for armed resistance, leading to a year of deadly clashes with Egyptian security forces. However, this was never supported by the older leadership, who remembered the repression resulting from the violence during Nasser's time, and the brutal crackdown against the Syrian Brotherhood in 1982, limiting the scope of violent resistance by young Brotherhood members.
Approach to Resistance
The Muslim Brotherhood pledges to maintain its commitment to peaceful tactics and its opposition to violence as a means of political action. It continues to actively distance itself from radical Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and has reverted to societal, community-based change initiatives.
However, the MB’s approach to resistance is largely dictated by where it can and cannot operate. A movement in exile, it now relies on digital communications from Istanbul and London to keep its dwindling membership base in Egypt alive. This has precipitated a strategic shift towards the Internet as the primary method and medium of organisation and activism, with the MB posting regular messages on its websites Ikhwan Web (English) and Ikhwan Online (Arabic).
Due to leadership splits, two versions of IkhwanWeb exist, each releasing its own press statements and messaging. The Arabic and English sites offer notably different content, with the English site targeting outsiders with a more moderate tone, and the Arabic site aimed at members, offering more conservative advice on religious guidance and daily life. (41) The leadership divides are also visible in the different factions’ approaches to resistance. London-based Abdel Haq favours a more diplomatic approach to regaining power in Egypt and is willing to consider rapprochement with al-Sisi in exchange for an operation, whereas Istanbul’s Hussein is vehemently opposed to reconciliation. (42)
In Europe, the MB has prioritised slow, societal expansion and integration into communities, running schools, corner stores, and community centres. In 2025, two French civil servants authored a controversial state-ordered report declaring that the MB runs 139 places of worship, over 280 social organisations, and 815 Qur’anic schools within France. (43) The MB attempted a similar expansion in the UK via the creation and co-option of Muslim cultural, social and charitable organisations. (44) Yusuf al-Qaradawi expressed the aim of these projects as the creation of a “small society within the larger society [the West].”
International Relations & Alliances
Alliances
The Muslim Brotherhood maintains affiliates in several countries. Although most started as branches of the Egyptian movement, they now largely operate on their own and are simply linked ideologically.
Syria
Once the largest offshoot, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was all but crushed after the 1982 Hama massacre, where thousands of members were killed in a crackdown by Hafiz al-Assad. Since the overthrow of the Assad regime in 2024, there has been a modest resurgence of the SMB under the government’s new leadership by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). (45)
Jordan
In May 2025, the Jordanian government officially outlawed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood following allegations of members’ involvement in a terror plot threatening national security. (46) The group has not been formally recognised since 2015, but for decades had continued to function as a non-revolutionary loyal opposition. Its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, remains active, recently winning 31 of 138 seats in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Though the group had previously boycotted elections, it has been politically revived by the war in Gaza. (47)
Palestine
Emerging during the First Intifada in 1987, Hamas began as a militant offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, whose networks had been established as far back as the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when Egyptian Brothers were sent to fight there. (48) The two groups no longer have formal ties, with both favouring different tactics; however, having long made an exception for violence in the Palestinian context, the MB has released multiple statements in support of Hamas following the October 7th attacks and subsequent war in Gaza. (49)
International Relations
The MB maintains key allies and adversaries across the globe, receiving funding primarily from Türkiye and Qatar.
Qatar
Qatar has long held a strategic partnership with the Brotherhood. Ideologically aligned with the state’s Wahhabi beliefs, Qatar has historically been a primary funder of the MB, and has supported the group in numerous other ways, including through TV slots for preaching on its state-sponsored channel Al-Jazeera. This fuelled a blockade by the Arab Quartet (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) until Qatar scaled back open support for the MB, expelling some senior members and toning down messaging on Al-Jazeera following Saudi-led normalisation talks, though still maintaining discreet funding. (50)
Türkiye
Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been another ardent defender of the MB. Erdoğan, who was himself linked to the movement in the past, vocally opposed the ousting of Morsi, hosted exiled Brothers, and supported Qatar during the blockade. Yet, in recent years, he too has reduced his support, instead pursuing rapprochement with Egypt. Even so, Istanbul remains a key base for the MB, and Erdoğan continues to maintain ties to garner strategic influence amongst Muslim communities. (51)
Saudi Arabia
In the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was a firm ally of the MB, welcoming exiles fleeing Nasser’s repression and giving many teaching positions at universities, shaping the kingdom’s own Islamic school of thought. Over time, however, tensions emerged, particularly with the rise of Salafi-Jihadist movements. The Gulf War marked the first major rupture, when offshoots demanded political reform and the removal of American troops. The aftermath of 9/11 caused even greater strain, with external American pressure to clamp down on extremism. The final straw was the Arab Spring; the Brotherhood was seen as a destabilising, anti-monarchy force, and the Kingdom formally designated them a terrorist organisation in 2014, becoming the first state in the region to do so.
The West
In the West, the Muslim Brotherhood has never been formally designated a terrorist organisation, and in much of Europe, it has been allowed to operate freely as a civil society group. It has, however, remained under scrutiny, with a formal inquiry by the UK government in 2015 and a similar report in France in 2025. In the United States, where the Brotherhood once had sympathetic support from Barack Obama (52), it faces harsher scrutiny under Donald Trump, with US officials once again pushing for proscription, with the group only narrowly avoiding designation following a congressional subcommittee during Trump’s first term. (53)
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