Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO)

Insurgency Overview

The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) is an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) active in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The organisation, composed of Rohingya Muslims, was founded in 1982 with the goal of establishing rights and autonomy for the Rohingya people. It declared a ceasefire in 1998 before resuming its armed campaign in 2021 following the start of the ongoing Myanmar civil war (1). Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the RSO led a campaign against the Myanmar government as the persecution and displacement of the Rohingya rose (2). The RSO is currently fighting alongside the military, known as the Tatmadaw, along with other allied Rohingya EAOs, against the Arakan Army (AA), an EAO allied to the exiled National Unity Government (3). It is also an important force within Bangladesh’s Rohingya-populated refugee camps, where the RSO and other Rohingya EAOs hold significant power and fight for control. It is estimated that the RSO currently has between 3000 and 5000 members (4).

History & Foundations

The Rohingya have faced persecution and displacement since Myanmar, then known as Burma, became independent in 1948. Following independence, the Rohingya were considered foreigners and denied citizenship, which led to instances of ethnic cleansing. In response, the Rohingya began to form political and militant organisations to ensure their self-determination, which the government reacted to by launching counterinsurgencies in the 1950s. In 1962, General Ne Win seized power in a military coup and established the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Upon seizing power, Ne Win and the Tatmadaw began to crack down on Rohingya political organisations (2).

1964 saw the establishment of the Rohingya Independence Front, a political organisation seeking to create an independent Rohingya state. The group was renamed and restructured multiple times, becoming the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1973. The following year, the Tatmadaw launched Operation Dragon King, with the goal of registering citizens in what is now Rakhine State. However, the Tatmadaw displaced many Rohingya during the operation, resulting in further ethnic cleansing. Over 200,000 Rohingya were forced to flee the country during the operation, creating a humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Bangladesh. Members of organisations such as the RPF were targeted for arrest, leading to tensions within the group (2).

In 1982, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation split off from the RPF. Made up of the RPF’s most hardline Islamist members and led by secretary general Muhammad Yunus, the RSO rose to prominence as the main Rohingya militant organisation and established ties to Islamist groups in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India, and Malaysia. It was able to source an arsenal of Chinese-produced arms from Thai arms dealers and set up training camps in southeastern Bangladesh, where many Rohingya refugees had fled to from Myanmar (2).

This build up along the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border prompted the Tatmadaw to launch Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation in 1991, an offensive against the RSO. In the process, soldiers also sought to expel Rohingya civilians labelled as foreigners, a common label incorrectly placed on Rohingya. The RSO remained uninhibited, and over 250,000 Rohingya were displaced due to the operation. Additionally, the Tatmadaw accidentally crossed the border and attacked a Bangladeshi military outpost, harming relations between the two countries (2).

In April 1994, nine bombs targeting government buildings went off in Maungdaw township. Although no one was killed, the Tatmadaw blamed the bombings on the RSO. However, an investigation by the Human Rights Watch alleged that while the RSO had a plan to cross the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border and plant bombs in the township, the unit sent on the bombing mission was caught and killed by the Tatmadaw’s Border Guard Force, with 30 RSO fatalities. This led to a pause in ongoing repatriations of Rohingya refugees while the Tatmadaw interrogated, tortured, and disappeared Rohingya people in Maungdaw township, accused of being affiliated with the RSO (5).

In late 1998, the RSO merged with the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front to create the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, a political organisation advocating for the rights of the Rohingya. It did have an armed wing, the Rohingya National Army, that waged a brief insurgency in Myanmar. This merger, however, effectively saw the dissolution of the RSO (2).

In its wake, the RSO left a power vacuum within the Rohingya political sphere and created room for a new militant organisation to take its place. In 2013, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was formed. The group launched its armed campaign against the Tatmadaw in 2016, leading to renewed violence in Rohingya-populated regions in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw retaliated against the ARSA with indiscriminate violence and the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya villages, resulting in over 700,000 Rohingya fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh (6).

In 2021, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup d’état and established a military junta, known as the State Administration Council. Mass anti-junta protests broke out soon after, which were received with violent crackdowns from the Tatmadaw (7). EAOs across the country increased their own operations in response to the unrest, culminating in the ongoing Myanmar civil war. One of these EAOs was the RSO, which rearmed itself shortly after the coup (8). This time, the RSO was supported by Bangladesh, whose security forces sought to apply pressure against the Arakan Army, an EAO made up of the predominantly Buddhist Rakhine people and the strongest armed group in Rakhine State (4). The AA has allegedly carried out atrocities against Rohingya, such as sectarian killings and village burnings. Currently, the AA controls the vast majority of Rakhine State (9).

The RSO’s first operation after its reformation was an assault on a Tatmadaw post in March 2021, killing 22 soldiers. In a statement following the raid, the RSO claimed that it would continue its attacks until they achieved the “freedom of Rakhine” and repatriation of all Rohingya refugees (10).

Meanwhile, the RSO and the ARSA began to vie for power in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and in western Rakhine State. Maungdaw Township was a particularly significant region, long being a hotbed of sectarian violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists (8). Control of refugee camps is strategically important for both organisations as it allows them to launch offensives into Myanmar as well as control extortion rackets for cross-border trade. The ARSA’s reputation as alleged criminals with a practice of human rights abuses led to some Rohingya taking the side of the RSO over the ARSA (11).

January 2023 saw the first instance of open clashes between the RSO and the ARSA when the RSO attacked an ARSA meeting in the Konarpara Refugee Camp, near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. One RSO man was killed and the RSO offensive on the area, known as “no man’s land,” led to the clearing of the camps (11, 12).

More fighting between the RSO and the ARSA happened in July 2023 after the ARSA allegedly killed the warden of Kutupalong refugee camp for bringing forth witnesses to an International Criminal Court prosecutor. Clashes between the two groups followed, killing six (13).

In February 2024, the AA and RSO allegedly partook in a joint offensive to drive the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) out of a border post located in Dhekibuniya, a village in Rakhine State that it had captured from Myanmar’s Border Guard Police. The ARA were then driven out of Myanmar to Bangladesh by the RSO and AA (14).

In May 2024, the RSO was accused of abducting and forcibly conscripting Rohingya from refugee camps to fight for the Tatmadaw. An RSO spokesperson claimed that they were only taking individuals who had already been trained by the RSO, which some of the families of those abducted denied (15).

The Four Brothers Alliance was formed in early 2025. Made up of the RSO, ARSA, ARA, and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, another Rohingya Islamist insurgent group, the alliance formed amongst former rivals to counter the dominant AA by fighting alongside the Tatmadaw (16).

Objectives & Ideology

The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation advocates first and foremost for Rohingya self-determination. While it is nominally an Islamist group and has been accused of having ties with Al-Qaeda and other hardline foreign Islamist organisations in the past, the group’s goals are not necessarily religious (2). The RSO claims it strives for a system that allows the Rohingya, as well as the country’s other religious and ethnic minorities, autonomy within the existing state of Myanmar. It is not a separatist organisation and, in principle, seeks to help reestablish democracy in the country. Specifically, the RSO believes in the creation of a Rohingya-majority autonomous region in northern Rakhine State. It also hopes to achieve the enfranchisement of the Rohingya people, prioritizing rights to religious and cultural freedom, education, employment and resources, political participation, and repatriation of refugees (1).

Despite its claims to support the end of the military junta and the reestablishment of a civilian government, the RSO continues to collaborate with the Tatmadaw. While the two former rivals’ relationship is contradictory, the most significant player in Rakhine State at the moment is their common enemy, the Arakan Army. This may have persuaded the RSO to put aside some of their political goals in order to root out the AA, who are seen as posing an existential threat to the Rohingya (17).

Political & Military Capabilities

For the Rohingya ethnic armed organisations, control of refugee camps in Bangladesh is very important. Besides their strong military position along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, the camps also serve as prime recruiting grounds and allow the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and other groups to exert political control over the Rohingya diaspora (11). Bangladeshi authorities have been seen working in collaboration with the RSO within refugee camps, giving the organisation legitimacy (17).

Maintaining a positive opinion amongst the camp’s occupants is also important for the RSO. For this reason, the RSO attempts to present the image of an organised, highly trained, and well-armed fighting force (11). It is structured as a paramilitary organisation with cadres in various refugee camps and a central leadership. While initially following its rearmament the RSO was viewed positively by some within the Rohingya diaspora due to the ARSA’s reputation for thuggery in refugee camps, the diaspora has recently become more critical of its presence in the camps due to its allegiances and participation in forced recruitment on behalf of the Tatmadaw (15). The RSO has also been alleged to recruit child soldiers and perform extrajudicial killings, further damaging its reputation (17, 18).

Approach to Resistance

Although the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation is not one of Myanmar’s largest or strongest EAOs, with an estimated 3000 to 5000 members, it has been able to effectively utilize its various strategic advantages (4). A tactic often used by the RSO is to launch offensives into Myanmar from refugee camps in Bangladesh before retreating back into them, where its forces blend in with the local populace and cannot be followed by the Arakan Army, or formerly the Tatmadaw, who have a hostile relationship with Bangladesh. These strikes attack the western flank of AA’s territory, forcing it to divert attention away from the Tatmadaw to its east. Similar to other EAOs active in the civil war, the RSO is typically seen using common light arms such as AK-pattern rifles. While this equipment is not as advanced as what the Tatmadaw and the larger EAOs have access to, these arms are well-suited to the organisation’s fast-moving style of guerrilla warfare and the jungle-filled, mountainous geography of Rakhine State (11).

Relations & Alliances

Currently, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’s main opponent is the Arakan Army. The AA has been accused of carrying out numerous atrocities against the Rohingya, and it is seen as a significant threat by them. The AA controls and administers most of Rakhine State, making it difficult for the RSO or other Rohingya EAOs to establish a foothold in Myanmar. This also creates a perceived need for groups like the RSO, as there is no presence within Myanmar itself looking out for the Rohingya, given the Tatmadaw and the ARSA’s disregard for their human rights. However, the RSO allegedly approached the AA to form an alliance prior to the establishment of the Four Brothers Alliance, and the two groups did collaborate on an operation against the RSO’s current allies, the Arakan Rohingya Army, in February 2024 (3, 14).

The Alliance was formed by groups that were previously opposed to one another. However, with the AA’s dominance of Rakhine State and the warming of relations between Rohingya EAOs and the Tatmadaw, the rivals came together in order to fight against the stronger AA (16). While there is much ideological overlap between the Alliance’s members, there are some key differences. The RSO has claimed that the difference between itself and the ARSA is that while the ARSA is made up of ill-equipped thugs, the RSO is a highly trained military force (11). The groups’ power struggles within refugee camps and collaboration with the junta has also caused strain with the civilian Rohingya population. While the RSO’s current agreement with the Tatmadaw comes after a long period of conflict between the two, it is also a marriage of convenience, as the RSO’s ability to perform guerrilla offensives into AA territory proves to be a thorn in the side of the Army, one of the largest and strongest forces the Tatmadaw is up against in the Civil War. Prior to the formation of the Four Brothers Alliance, the RSO had an informal truce with the Tatmadaw (3).

Bangladesh has been dealing with the Rohingya crisis for decades and houses many large refugee camps populated by Rohingya, hosting over a million refugees (4). While the conflicts in these camps between Rohingya political groups have been a security issue for Bangladesh, the country has allegedly backed the RSO in order to contain the AA, and its law enforcement agencies have worked with the RSO in refugee camps to control the ARSA (6, 17). Another motivation for Bangladeshi officials to back the RSO is the repatriation of displaced Rohingya that the organisation hopes to achieve, which would alleviate the refugee crisis in Bangladesh (4).

Bibliography

(1) Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (2022). Manifesto of RSO. https://rsomedia.org/manifesto-of-rso/ 

(2) Lintner, B. (2001). Bangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation. South Asia Terrorism Portal. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/Article1.htm

(3) Ghoshal, D. (2024, September 6). On Myanmar’s frontline, Rohingya fighters and junta face a common enemy. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-frontline-rohingya-fighters-junta-face-common-enemy-2024-09-06/

(4) Ghoshal, D. and McPherson, P. (2024, November 25). In world’s largest refugee camps, Rohingya mobilise to fight in Myanmar. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/worlds-largest-refugee-camps-rohingya-mobilise-fight-myanmar-2024-11-25/ 

(5) Human Rights Watch (1996, September 1). Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus? https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/1996/en/21956 

(6) Bhattacharya, S. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army. Sri Lanka Guardian. https://slguardian.org/bangladesh-change-of-reign-in-arakan-army/ 

(7) Lipes, J. (2022, January 18). An outlawed group resurfaces, raising new fears of clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Radio Free Asia. https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-01182022191002.html 

(8) The Irrawaddy (2021, September 20). Rohingya Armed Groups Active Again in Western Myanmar. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-armed-groups-active-again-in-western-myanmar.html#google_vignette

(9) Mizzima (2024, February 10). RSO denounces Arakan Army and junta accusations, affirms Rohingya rights. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/10/7035 

(10) Alam, S. (2021, March 30). Rohingya militants said to kill 22 Myanmar troops. Anadolu Agency. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/rohingya-militants-said-to-kill-22-myanmar-troops/2192747 

(11) Ahasan, N. (2023, February 2). In Bangladesh’s borderland with Myanmar, 2 Rohingya militant groups fight for dominance. Benar News. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/rival-groups-02022023135725.html 

(12) Smith, B. (2023, 11 December). Competing armed groups pose new threat to Rohingya in Bangladesh. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/rohingya 

(13) Rahman, S. (2023, July 8). Seven Rohingya Refugees Killed in Violence in Bangladesh. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/seven-rohingya-refugees-killed-in-violence-in-bangladesh-/7172474.html 

(14) Antu, G. M. (2024, February 10). Bangladeshis fret over unconfirmed return of Rohingya militant Nabi Hossain amid Myanmar conflict. BD News. https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/6vxbpgnzrl 

(15) Rahman, S. (2024, May 17). Rohingya families torn apart by conscription. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/346776/rohingya-families-torn-apart-by-conscription 

(16) Rahman, S. (2025, February 16). Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan. Dhaka Tribune. https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan 

(17) Fortify Rights (2025, March). “I May Be Killed Any Moment”: Killings, Abductions, Torture, and Other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh. https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/I%20May%20Be%20Killed%20Any%20Moment%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report%20(ENG).pdf 

(18) United Nations General Assembly Security Council (2025, June 17). Children and armed conflict. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247