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Insurgency Overview The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN, from the Spanish Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional ) is an armed Indigenous insurgent organization based in Chiapas, Mexico, the country’s southernmost and poorest state. The EZLN, also referred to as the Zapatistas, launched an uprising against the Mexican state on January 1, 1994, in the process wresting control over a considerable area of Chiapas from the Mexican government. The Zapatistas are not only a militant organization, but also maintain a regime of Indigenous political autonomy in the zones under their control. The Zapatistas refer to these areas collectively as “Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities” ( Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas ), or “MAREZ.” Additionally, though the EZLN never gave up its arms, the armed struggle was only an initial strategy of resistance employed by the group. In the decades since the 1994 uprising, the Zapatistas have turned to civil resistance strategies, while the armed conflict has largely remained frozen since a ceasefire declared in 1994. Guided by a syncretic ideology which mixes the movement’s Indigenous roots with far-left political theory and Catholic liberation theology, the Zapatistas have defended and gradually expanded the MAREZ, which operate on principles of Indigenous rights, women’s rights, direct democracy, and other characteristics of the Zapatista model of “good government.” The EZLN are opposed, on the other hand, to the Mexican state, neoliberalism, capitalism, globalization, and what they consider the legacies of colonialism built into the Mexican social order since the Spanish conquest (Hayden 2002) . Although firmly rooted in the historical and cultural context of the Indigenous peoples of Mexico, the Zapatista insurgency is not a strictly local conflict. The Zapatistas have turned into far-reaching symbols of resistance and rebellion with global brand recognition, particularly for the international left and alter-globalization movements. This is due in no small part to the enigmatic figure of Subcomandante Marcos, the eminently quotable pipe-smoking masked revolutionary who led the Zapatistas in battle before becoming the public spokesperson for the movement in its negotiations with the Mexican state and its public relations campaigns. As quintessentially Latin American a revolutionary as Che Guevara, stylized images of Marcos can be found on T-shirts and tote bags from Seattle to Sydney, while his books and communiqués can be found in numerous languages in bookstores around the world. However, it is necessary to distinguish Marcos from the EZLN writ large, and Marcos has made increasingly infrequent public appearances in recent years. Today, the EZLN and the MAREZ remain in a position of relative stability, maintaining a steady ceasefire with the Mexican state, which no longer poses an immediate threat to their political autonomy and internal operations. The main threats faced by the EZLN now come in the form of paramilitary violence in the MAREZ, which have been on the uptick in recent years (Art of the Commune 2021; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . Despite these problems, the EZLN continues to fight for what it sees as the rights, dignity, and autonomy of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas and Mexico. History & Foundations 2.1 - Background On January 1, 1994, the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formally went into effect, masked and armed members of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation descended from the Indigenous highlands of Chiapas and occupied four of the state’s key cities, including its largest, San Cristóbal de las Casas. But the Zapatista uprising of January 1, 1994, was only the public unveiling of a movement years in the making. Behind it lies a history of 500 years of colonial dispossession in the largely Maya zones of the Chiapas hinterland, as well as a more recent history of left-wing insurgency in urban Mexico during the late twentieth century. In the summer of 1983, in the remote Lacandon Jungle of Chiapas, two revolutionary currents converged when disaffected Maya peasants began meeting with a small core of urban intellectual guerrilla militants from the National Liberation Front ( Frente de Liberación Nacional , FLN), who had recently arrived in Chiapas fleeing state repression in the cities. The Maya wanted to put an end to the historical injustices of colonialism and its legacies in the majority-Indigenous highlands of Chiapas. The Marxist guerrilla, for its part, came with dreams of whipping the traditional grievances of the Maya into proletarian revolutionary fervor. Subcomandante Marcos on horseback in 1996 (photo by Jose Villa). Instead of converting the Maya to Marxism, however, the guerrilla—who came with 12 militants and dwindled to four during their time in the mountains—were themselves transformed by their encounter with the Indigenous communities. According to Subcomandante Marcos and Comandante Elisa, both members of the small FLN cadre that arrived in 1983, their ragtag team of urban intellectual revolutionaries didn’t succeed in converting the Indigenous people to Marxism so much as the Maya convinced the guerrillas to reform themselves as the revolutionary vanguard of an Indigenous people’s army (Hayden 2002, 148) . The guerrilla soon gave up their initial objective of seizing state power in favor of defending local Indigenous communities from the aggressions of cattle barons and large landowners backed by the power elite of Chiapas and Mexico City. The presence of an educated, urban core of intellectual revolutionaries also proved organizationally expedient for the Maya militants, many of whom did not speak Spanish and had difficulty coordinating through the numerous Indigenous languages spoken across Chiapas. The vanguard led by Marcos and the Maya militants established a strategic partnership to learn from each other and advance their mutual goals. Founded on November 17, 1983, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation was the product of this revolutionary encounter (Muñoz Ramírez 2003) . As the EZLN organized itself, setting up clandestine training camps in the jungles of Chiapas and assembling an arsenal, officials in the halls of power of Washington and Mexico City were hashing out the details of a comprehensive new neoliberal trade policy, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Combined with the 1992 modification of Article 27 of the 1991 Mexican Constitution, which strengthened private property rights and allowed the privatization of ejidos —agrarian parcels of communal land owned by the state and administered collectively by local farmers—NAFTA presented serious threats to the economic lifeways of smallholder farmers, especially Indigenous ones in primarily agricultural states such as Chiapas. It seemed that the new trade deal would spare no room for the Indigenous peasants who already suffered so much under the old system—now their economic and vital sustenance was at stake. As the date of NAFTA’s implementation in Mexico grew nearer, Indigenous communities across the Chiapas Highlands made ready for war. This was the context within which, in the early 1990s, the EZLN began planning its public unveiling (Hayden 2002) . 2.2 – The Zapatista Uprising & its Aftermath On New Year’s Day, 1994, the EZLN went public by coming down from the mountains and occupying several key municipalities of Chiapas in the early hours of the morning. Tourists on holiday to visit the Maya ruins of southern Mexico woke to the spectacle of Maya men and women marching, masked and armed, down the central avenues of San Cristóbal de las Casas. By the break of dawn, the city hall had been occupied, land records destroyed, and prisoners freed. Hours later, knowing that state retribution would be swift, the rebels abandoned San Cristóbal. Meanwhile, the Mexican Army and police were already engaged in firefights with rebel divisions which had taken other cities in Chiapas, namely Altamirano and Ocosingo. By the end of the first week of the uprising, the EZLN had been driven out of the towns they had initially occupied. Skirmishes continued in the Lacandon Jungle for several more days until the Mexican government called a ceasefire on January 12, 1994. By the end of the bloodshed, about 145 people lay dead, most of them rebels (UCDP 2023) . Twelve days into the uprising, a crowd of 100,000 demonstrated in Mexico City in support of the Zapatistas and a peaceful resolution to the uprising. The Zapatistas and their cause were already a phenomenon, not only sweeping the nation but also attracting international interest to a state which had long been one of the most neglected and overlooked corners of Mexico. Contradictorily, most of the news circulating in and about Chiapas during the early days of the movement was propagated digitally, using technology that the EZLN itself did not have ready access to in the mountains and jungles of Chiapas, where most Indigenous communities were without telephones and internet. Nevertheless, the EZLN demonstrated their technical ingenuity and media savvy by quickly capitalizing on the use of media, both traditional and digital, to spread their messages and attract support. This led some commentators to describe the movement as the first “post-modern revolution” (Burgess 2016; Carrigan 1995; Cleaver 1998) . Meanwhile, despite the ceasefire, the Mexican state continued to deny the legitimacy of the autonomy claimed by the EZLN and the de facto autonomous municipalities they operated in. Indeed, for some in the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party; Partido Revolucionario Institucional ) government, the rebel zones were perceived as an affront to the sovereign authority of the Mexican state. In short order, Chiapas became the most militarized state in Mexico. These tensions resulted in the so-called Zapatista crisis of 1995. During initial peace talks with the government in early 1995, it appeared that a favorable conclusion to the conflict might soon be reached. However, the newly elected President Ernesto Zedillo—the last in an unbroken 71-year line of PRI presidents—soon broke from his predecessor’s moves towards peace, instead choosing to publicly reveal the identity of Subcomandante Marcos and issuing arrest warrants against him and numerous other known EZLN leaders, branding them as terrorists. As state forces, with the support of the US military, moved in to apprehend the “terrorists” and besiege EZLN camps in the Lacandon Jungle, it appeared that the Zedillo government was veering towards a military solution to the Chiapas conflict (Willson 1998) . Zedillo’s advisors, however—and the escape of Marcos from under the nose of the Mexican military—managed to convince Zedillo that a military solution to the conflict threatened to escalate retaliatory violence and turn the EZLN into real terrorists. Cooler heads in the government emphasized that Marcos maintained an open negotiating track and a pacificist orientation. By April 1995, the peace talks were back on course. However, the events of early 1995 demonstrated clearly to both the Mexican state and the EZLN that the prospect of violent escalation in Chiapas hung dangerously in the balance. It was in this context that both parties moved to accelerate the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the San Andrés Accords on February 16, 1996 (Baronnet et al. 2011; Hayden 2002) . The San Andrés Accords were designed to guarantee respect, rights, dignity, and autonomy to the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas. In their spirit, they echo the list of demands first proclaimed by the EZLN on the first day of 1994, which called for the recognition of Indigenous rights, including the right to autonomy and self-determination according to the cultures and customs of each community. Initially, the signing of the San Andrés Accords seemed to indicate a breakthrough in the peace process. However, the Zedillo government soon made it apparent they did not intend to keep their promises and respect the principals of the San Andrés Accords. Since its signing, none of its points has been effectively adopted by the Mexican state. The EZLN therefore turned to other strategies to advance its agenda. In October 1996, the EZLN convoked Mexico’s first ever nationwide Indigenous congress, the National Indigenous Congress (CNI), which convened in Mexico City to discuss how to advance Indigenous rights against the intransigence of the Mexican state, as demonstrated by the government’s failure to respect the San Andrés Accords. Since 1996, there have been five national congresses of the CNI, constituting one of the most important platforms for the advancement of the EZLN agenda outside of Chiapas. 2.3 – Mexican Standoff: Consolidation & Recent Developments In the decades since the signing of the San Andrés Accords, the Chiapas conflict has gone cold; there has been no more fighting, at least not between the EZLN and the Mexican state, and the MAREZ have been able to operate with relatively autonomy. However, despite the failures of their most radical goals outside of Chiapas following the San Andrés Accords, the EZLN, especially through their spokesman Subcomandante Marcos, remained active voices on the national political scene well into the 2000s. Activities such as the March of the Color of the Earth and the Other Campaign, both taking place in the early-mid-2000s and drawing mass domestic and international support, confirmed the EZLN’s staying power as political actors of national consequence. In Chiapas, however, the situation has remained relatively stable and slow to develop, at least until the escalation of paramilitary violence in recent years. In 2019, the Zapatistas announced the expansion of the MAREZ to include 11 new autonomous zones in Chiapas (Oikonomakis 2019; “Zapatista rebels extend control” 2019) . Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whom the Zapatists are openly critical of, welcomed the expansion, as long it was achieved nonviolently. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the MAREZ closed their doors to outsiders. Since then, little news has come out of the MAREZ save for the occasional EZLN communiqué, usually referring to the escalating situation of paramilitary violence in the MAREZ and elsewhere in Chiapas. However, EZLN-affiliated media channels continue to operate, and the EZLN still occasionally issues communiqués and press releases informing the outside world as to their activities and the situation in Chiapas. Despite the frozen nature of the conflict, whereby the Mexican government tends to leave the EZLN and the MAREZ to their own devices, evidence recently surfaced that the Zapatistas are one of the most heavily surveilled groups in Mexico, suggesting that the state still considers them a threat and treats them accordingly (Goodman 2022) . Additionally, the paramilitary violence increasingly perpetrated against the Zapatistas and their allies has always evinced clear links to the Mexican state, suggesting that perhaps the latter has merely adapted its oppositional strategy towards the EZLN (Romero 2023) . The Zapatistas, for their part, are constantly alert to the threat of surveillance and infiltration by bad actors, which is partly responsible for their notoriously hermetic nature. Historically, outsiders have been able to visit the caracol of Oventik—what some have referred to as the de facto capital of the MAREZ—with relative ease, but further access to the MAREZ is heavily restricted, and all visitors are subject to strict monitoring by Zapatista officials (Vidal 2018) . Due to the unstable paramilitary situation in Chiapas, the caracoles have been closed for over a year and visitors are not allowed in, with rare exceptions. As the 30th anniversary of the Zapatista uprising approaches, the EZLN has not yet announced whether there will be commemorative events open to the public or the press, as there were for the 20th anniversary. Objectives & Ideology 3.1 – Ideological Background & Influences Ideologically, the Zapatistas are difficult to pin down. They have been called Marxists, anarchists, libertarian socialists, Indigenists, Magonists (referring to the Mexican anarcho-communist Ricardo Flores Magón), and more. The Zapatistas have even inspired comparisons to the Kurds of Rojava in Northern Syria based on apparent ideological and organizational similarities (Geerdink 2021; Stanchev 2015) . Although some of these labels may be generally applicable, and while clearly aligned with the far-left ideologies in general, the ideology of the Zapatistas—what some have called Zapatismo or neo-Zapatismo—is best described as a syncretic mix of various influences and elements, drawing from both the Indigenous cultures of Mexico and various strands of radical leftism (Duterme 2011) . At its core, the EZLN is an Indigenous movement comprised almost exclusively of Indigenous Mexicans from numerous communities of southern Mexico, mainly subgroups of the Maya such as the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Ch’ol, Zoque, Tojolabal, and many others. The central demands and objectives of the EZLN are for the recognition of Indigenous rights, dignity, and autonomy; an end to more than five centuries of colonial oppression of Indigenous peoples; and an end to neoliberalism and globalization in Chiapas and beyond. In the poetic terms of the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, a communiqué issued by the EZLN on the second anniversary of the Zapatista uprising, “In the world we want everyone fits. In the world we want many worlds to fit” (EZLN 1996) . The Zapatistas take their name from Emiliano Zapata, one of the principal figures of the Mexican Revolution, who led the insurgent Liberation Army of the South to fight for agrarian form and land redistribution. Following his assassination by the Mexican state, Zapata became a larger-than-life symbol of the spirit of the Mexican Revolution, particularly for the poor, landless, and Indigenous peasants whose cause he upheld. Zapata’s movement was encapsulated in the slogan “Land and Liberty” ( Tierra y Libertad ), a phrase attributed to the Mexican anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón, who was one of the main ideological reference points for the leftist elements of the Mexican Revolution. By adopting Zapata’s name, the EZLN positioned themselves as the legitimate ideological successors of Zapata. As Subcomandante Marcos writes in the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, “Zapata is alive, and in spite of everything, the struggle continues” (EZLN 1996) . In tandem with their Indigenous roots, the Zapatistas are vocal critics of neoliberalism and globalization, which Marcos has termed the forces of the “Fourth World War” (Subcomandante Marcos 1997) . The Zapatistas view neoliberalism and globalization as the newest manifestations of a long tradition of colonial oppression and dispossession targeting Indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups. These commitments have led to their being associated with the alter-globalization movement, which advocates for global interconnection and solidarity while criticizing the negative economic, political, and ecological effects of neoliberal globalization (Engler 2019) . The ideological overlap between the Zapatistas and other Latin American radical movements and figures is also demonstrated by Marcos’ adoption of the name “Galeano” after the 2014 murder of Teacher Galeano, a Zapatista schoolteacher. Teacher Galeano himself took the name from Eduardo Galeano, a Uruguayan leftist critic and poet who wrote the highly influential book Open Veins of Latin America , and who maintained a written correspondence with Marcos in the early days of the Zapatista movement, even visiting the MAREZ (Hayden 2002) . Furthermore, images and artwork depicting Latin American revolutionary leaders such as Che Guevara—and, of course, Emiliano Zapata himself—are common sights in the public art of the MAREZ. The Zapatistas therefore situate themselves, in part, within a tradition of Latin American revolutionary struggle (Christ 2020) . The ideological orientation of the Zapatistas is perhaps most simply and eloquently encapsulated in one of their many slogans: “Below and to the left” ( abajo y a la izquierda ). The former term refers to both the grassroots and Indigenous nature of the movement—the EZLN has repeatedly referred to Indigenous peoples as the “subsoil” of the Mexican nation in a semantic move that both identifies them with the earth (as in the Zapatista phrase “people of the color of the earth”) and as a socioeconomically downtrodden underclass of Mexican society (Hayden 2002) . The latter term situates the EZLN within a legacy and international community of leftist politics. In other words, the Zapatistas are both distinctively Mexican, homegrown, and Indigenous; and, at the same time, leftist and internationalist in their outward political orientation. 3.2 – Objectives & Demands In March 1994, the EZLN issued a communiqué which details 34 demands made of the Mexican national government and the state of Chiapas on behalf of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas, proclaiming: “The indigenous peoples of the state of Chiapas, having risen up in arms in the EZLN against misery and bad government, hereby present the reasons for their struggle and their principal demands” (EZLN 2022, 639) . These demands range from free and democratic elections at all levels of politics to the implementation and safeguarding of specific Indigenous rights and forms of autonomous self-government, in addition to many other points. Notably, the EZLN’s list of demands includes a section specifically representing the “Indigenous women’s petition,” the points of which closely parallel those of the EZLN Women’s Revolutionary Law, which was issued on January 1, 1994, in tandem with the launching of the Zapatista uprising (EZLN 1994) . The Women’s Revolutionary Law specifically establishes the rights of Zapatista and Indigenous women, which include such guarantees as the rights to political participation, education, freedom from gendered violence, and bodily autonomy, among others. As the law reads, “In their just fight for the liberation of our people, the EZLN incorporates women in the revolutionary struggle regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation, requiring only that they meet the demands of the exploited people and that they commit to the laws and regulations of the revolution” (1) . In the context of Chiapas and Mexico writ large, where conservative, patriarchal gender and sexual norms have long predominated, these demands represent a radical shift in women’s social position (Geerdink 2021) . Women have gone on to play a central role in the Zapatista movement, including as officers and spokespeople. A key example is Comandanta Ramona, the first Zapatista to appear in public in Mexico City, where she presided over the 1996 CNI gathering (Rovira 2000) . Estimates place the number of women in the EZLN at about one third of combatants and half of the support base (Kampwirth 2002) . A sign indicating that one has entered a Zapatista autonomous zone, reading “here, the people command and the government obeys.” As the EZLN gave up the armed struggle in the wake of the 1994 ceasefire and the 1996 signing of the San Andrés Accords, its focus shifted towards legal means of establishing Indigenous rights and autonomy. One of the specific goals of the EZLN in its negotiations with the Mexican government has long been the promulgation of a Law of Rights and Culture of Indigenous Peoples, which the EZLN first proposed in July 1998 in the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN 1998) . This demands was reiterated in 2005 in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, the most recent major manifesto of the EZLN (EZLN 2005) . In the words of Subcomandante Marcos: "You can rest assured that we want to get rid of our masks and our weapons as quickly as possible. We want to conduct politics in the broad light of day. But we won’t take off our masks just in exchange for promises. The rights of the Indians must be recognized. If the government refuses, not only will we take up arms again, but so will other movements, far more radical, intolerant, desperate, and violent than ours. Because here, as elsewhere, the ethnic question can easily create fundamentalist movements ready for all kinds of murderous madness. On the other hand, if things go as we hope and Indian rights are finally recognized, Marcos will cease to be subcomandante, leader, myth… People will realize that the Zapatistas’ main weapon was not the gun, but words. And when the dust raised by our uprising settles, people will discover a simple truth: In this whole struggle and thinking process, Marcos was just one more fighter. That’s why I say, “If you want to know who Marcos is, see who’s hidden behind the mask, then take a mirror and look at yourself. The face you see there will be face of Marcos, because we are all Marcos” (Hayden 2002, 141) . Political & Military Capabilities 4.1 – Military Capabilities & Organization EZLN militants in uniform. Note that they carry sticks and machetes, but no guns. During the 12 days of active combat that followed the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994, the EZLN proved itself to be an effective and well-organized fighting force, despite its significant technological and logistical limitations compared to their state adversaries. Like most guerrilla groups, the EZLN never aimed to stand up to a modern army in conventional warfare. Instead, their strength rested in their mobility, local support base, and knowledge of the terrain. However, during the Mexican Army’s counteroffensive in early January 1994, the EZLN was forced to retreat to the highlands. Most of the 145 killed during the uprising were rebels (UCDP 2023) . The choice to refrain from armed struggle since 1994 was a pragmatic one—although the EZLN appears to be a capable defensive force, the militants knew that in open battle they were no match for the Mexican Army. In terms of equipment, EZLN militants are lightly armed, if not poorly equipped. Common weapons in the hands of insurgents include assault rifles such as AK-47s and M16s, submachine guns, hunting rifles, and shotguns. As a lightly armed militant force, the EZLN does not possess the advanced technological and military capabilities of modern militaries and some other insurgent organizations, such as advanced weaponry, heavy artillery, or armored vehicles. In fact, guns are apparently in such short supply that EZLN militants have sometimes been observed carrying carved blocks of wood in place of rifles—symbolic, perhaps, but not functional (Hayden 2002; Korykhalova and Myasoedov 2017) . Organizationally, the EZLN is under the command of the Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee – General Command, or CCRI-CG ( Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – Comandancia General ). In their initial field operations, EZLN battalions were commanded by officers referred to as comandantes and subcomandantes . Subcomandante Marcos, despite his symbolically subordinate title meant to downplay his authority, was charged with coordinating the high-level military strategy of the EZLN prior to and during the 1994 uprising. He was also charged with leading the assault on a police station in San Cristobal to seize weapons during the 1994 uprising (Hayden 2002) . Although since 1994 the EZLN has stepped back from the armed struggle, Subcomandante Marcos has emphasized that it retains its military character. In a May 1999 interview, he noted that “the EZLN is still a political-military force. But it is a political-military force whose principal actions are not military, they are political-social” (AP Archive 2015) . 4.2 – Political Capabilities & Strategy More important than the EZLN’s military capabilities is their media-savvy approach to public relations, particularly as mediated by the internationally famous Subcomandante Marcos. Many, including Marcos himself, would argue that “the Sup,” as he is affectionately known, is not so much a person as a symbol and mouthpiece of the Zapatista cause, the conduit through which their collective will is eloquently expressed (Hayden 2002) . What is clear is that Marcos’ approach to media strategy has been instrumental in mobilizing support both domestic and international for the Zapatista movement, which may have factored into the Mexican government’s willingness to call a ceasefire and negotiate instead of responding to the Zapatista uprising with a military crackdown (Burgess 2016; Cleaver 1998) . The Zapatistas have shown themselves to be capable organizers on the national stage of Mexican politics. As part of their nonviolent strategy of resistance and popular mobilization, the Zapatistas have organized several nationwide marches and campaigns in defense of their political objectives. In 2001, for instance, one day after the inauguration of neoliberal president Vicente Fox, the EZLN announced the “March of the Color of the Earth,” which saw a caravan of 1,111 Zapatistas walk 3,000 kilometers from Chiapas to Mexico City. The objective of the march, which culminated in a gathering of thousands in the Zócalo, the heart of Mexico City, was to meet with the Mexican Congress of the Union to discuss constitutional reform on behalf of Indigenous rights and in defense of the San Andrés Accords, which the Mexican government had failed to respect (Hernández Navarro 2021) . Subcomandante Marcos during the March of the Color of the Earth. The Zapatistas also organized the Other Campaign ( la Otra Campaña ), which again sought to mobilize popular support for the recognition and implementation of Indigenous rights and autonomy. Beginning in January 2006, the EZLN sent Subcomandante Marcos to travel across Mexico speaking on behalf of the Zapatistas and their agenda. This movement also had the objective of establishing connections with other activists and organizations across different segments of Mexican society, especially those representing marginalized groups. Over several months, Marcos met with LGBT activists, women’s rights defenders, human rights advocates, students, environmentalists, workers, teachers, and various other people. The greater objective of the campaign was to lobby the Mexican government to legally enshrine the recognition and protection of Indigenous rights. As with the EZLN’s prior efforts, the Other Campaign did not achieve this goal, but it did illustrate once again the ability of the movement to rally considerable domestic and international support and to establish relations of solidarity with other groups (Baronnet et al. 2011) . 4.3 – Political Autonomy within the MAREZ According to the organization’s constitution, the EZLN is officially without political power or influence over the internal political procedures of the MAREZ, which instead operate according to a parallel civil political process. There are three general levels of government in the MAREZ: local, municipal, and regional (Baronnet et al. 2011; Oikonomakis 2019; Stanchev 2015; Vidal 2018) . Local government consists of groups of families residing in particular locales who choose to involve themselves in the political process, regardless of their affiliation with the EZLN. Those who directly participate in the internal operations of the EZLN are referred to as the “support base” ( base de apoyo ), but they do not enjoy greater political power or prestige than non-affiliates. This level of government aims to manage affairs and resolve problems at the local level. For problems of a greater scale, local governments elect representatives to express the will and interests of their communities at the municipal level. Municipal government takes place at the level of a central hub, typically a larger town in a region of villages, where representatives from various local governments meet to coordinate with each other and resolve problems of a municipal nature. Representatives are encouraged to consult with their constituencies at the local level to ensure maximal representation of the popular will at the municipal level. The highest level of the political process in the MAREZ takes place through the Councils of Good Government ( juntas de buen gobierno ), which represent confederated groups of autonomous municipalities. The Councils of Good Government consist of elected representatives sent from the municipal governments. They are responsible for coordinating organizational efforts and resolving disputes between municipalities throughout the MAREZ. Each level of government in the MAREZ is supposed to comply with the seven organizing principles collectively referred to as “govern while obeying” ( mandar obediciendo ; Korykhalova and Myasoedov 2017) : Suggest, do not impose. Represent, do not replace. Build, do not destroy. Obey, do not dictate. Go down, not up. Convince, do not conquer. Serve others, not yourself. These principles form the basis of the Zapatista concept of “good government” ( buen gobierno ), in contrast to the “bad government” ( mal gobierno ) of the Mexican state. The Zapatistas claim that cultivating the principles of good government in the MAREZ is essential to realizing their goals of securing the rights and dignity of Indigenous peoples and all other marginalized groups. In line with their promotion of Indigenous autonomy in the MAREZ, the Zapatistas encourage economic self-sufficiency within the autonomous zones. One of the most significant economic initiatives of the EZLN has been its promotion of coffee cooperatives. Chiapas is the biggest coffee producer in all of Mexico, which itself is one of the biggest producers in the world (Pérez-Grovas et al. 2001) . The organization of the Zapatista coffee cooperatives, some of which distribute to the United States and Europe through affiliate solidarity networks in both regions, represents an attempt to bring economic organization in the MAREZ in line with Zapatista political principles. Likewise, the MAREZ have also implemented autonomous programs of education, healthcare, and ecological sustainability to bring other facets of social organization in line with Zapatista ideological principles (Baronnet et al. 2011) . Approach to Resistance 5.1 – Armed Struggle Excluding the 12 days of combat which followed the Zapatista uprising of 1994, the EZLN has been involved in relatively few combat engagements, instead opting for strategies of nonviolent struggle and civil resistance (Hayden 2002, 138) . However, the EZLN has pointedly declined to surrender its weapons, declaring that as long as the San Andrés Accords remain unratified by the Mexican state, the conditions for peace have not been met. Consequently, the Chiapas conflict can be described as a frozen conflict; although the EZLN and the Mexican state remain nominally at war with each other, there is no active conflict between the two groups. For now, the EZLN maintain their pacifist stance in line with the precepts of the peace process that resulted in the San Andrés Accords. 5.2 – Civil Resistance Following the ceasefire and the signing of the San Andrés Accords, the EZLN switched from the armed struggle to pacifist strategies of civil resistance. During the period of intense militarization in Chiapas in the mid-1990s, Zapatista communities organized marches and sit-ins meant to obstruct the operations of Mexican state forces in EZLN-claimed territory. Following the withdrawal of the Mexican military, marches by and in support of the Zapatista movement became common fixtures in both local and national politics, especially during key events such as the issuing of the declarations of the Lacandon Jungle, as well as EZLN political initiatives such as the founding of the CNI and campaigns such as the March of the Color of the Earth and the Other Campaign, both of which attracted mass popular support by peaceful means. These tactics are typical of the EZLN’s adoption of a civil resistance strategy following the abandonment of the armed struggle (Hayden 2002) . A peaceful march in support of the EZLN in 2012. 5.3 – Media & Propaganda From the earliest days of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN, and particularly Subcomandante Marcos as its spokesperson and chief public relations liaison, has demonstrated mastery over the use of media as its most powerful weapon. The media-savvy leadership of Marcos allowed the EZLN to garner considerable domestic support across a broad range of social sectors, from Indigenous peasants to students, the urban left, and even members of the political class (the so-called “radical chic” crowd). Equally important is the success with which the Zapatistas were able to attract international interest in their movement, especially through Marcos, who frequently gave multiple interviews per day on key occasions during the early years of the Zapatista movement. Indeed, some have supposed that the romantic mystique of Marcos as the quintessential Latin American guerrilla hero proved instrumental to the EZLN’s ability to attract considerable international support and interest. The EZLN and its leadership therefore capitalized on Marcos’ symbolic value to bolster their image (Burgess 2016; Cleaver 1998) . The media expertise of the Zapatistas has led some to refer to their efforts, even their initial violent seizure of San Cristóbal and other municipalities during the 1994 uprising, as an exercise in political theater (Carrigan 1995; Hayden 2002) . In this sense, the Zapatista uprising was designed as spectacle meant to capture the world’s attention in dramatic fashion to achieve the widest possible circulation of the Zapatistas’ message, for the world to hear their cry of ¡Ya basta! (“Enough is enough!”). The EZLN has also made use of radio and internet pages to disseminate their messages. Enlace Zapatista , the official website of the EZLN, maintains an archive of the EZLN’s communiqués and periodically issues new announcements from the group. Radio Zapatista , which once hosted the official radio station of the EZLN, called Radio Insurgente, also maintains a website where they post official announcements and other news related to the Zapatista movement. Finally, a host of affiliate organizations and media outlets which form part of the Zapatistas’ international solidarity network also act in similar roles for the EZLN’s media and propaganda efforts. 5.4 – Institutional Political Participation In the early years of the Zapatista movement, the EZLN pointedly rejected any possibility of participating in legal political processes at the national level. Given the history of fraudulent elections and corruption in Mexican politics, and the nature of what the Zapatistas term the “bad government” of the Mexican state, the EZLN rejected the legitimacy of the formal political process. Instead, they preferred to maintain their strategy of civil resistance while continuing to voice their demands for the adoption of legal recognition of and protection for Indigenous rights and autonomy (Hayden 2002) . However, in 2017, during a CNI congress held in San Cristóbal de las Casa, the EZLN formally broke with their record of abstaining from electoral politics by endorsing the first Indigenous woman ever to run for president in Mexico, the Nahua traditional healer and human rights advocate María de Jesús Patricio Martínez (Tucker 2017) . The affectionately nicknamed Marichuy ran as an independent candidate in the 2018 presidential election, losing to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whom the EZLN has since extensively criticized. Despite her loss of the presidential bid, the EZLN’s decision to explicitly endorse Marichuy’s run marked a shift in the group’s willingness to engage in national politics on the electoral level. 5.5 – International Solidarity & Outreach Since the earliest days of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN has recognized the strategic value of cultivating international relationships of solidarity with ideological allies on the global stage. The EZLN has hosted several series of international gatherings in the MAREZ, inviting foreign activists to dialogue on themes of mutual concern, such as opposition to neoliberalism and globalization. The EZLN refers to these gatherings as encuentros , or “encounters.” These encounters began in July 1996 during the First Intercontinental Encounter For Humanity and against Neoliberalism, during which 4,000 people—Zapatistas and visitors invited from all around the world—gathered in the Lacandon Jungle to discuss resistance to capitalism, neoliberalism, and globalization. The second such encounter occurred in August 1997 and drew a similarly large and diverse crowd. Since then, there have been numerous such encounters organized around different themes and concerns that have taken place in Chiapas at the convocation of the EZLN (Hayden 2002; Baronnet et al. 2011) . One of the most recent examples of Zapatista efforts in international solidarity and outreach is the Journey for Life, a Zapatista world tour which began its first phase in 2021 (Marquardt 2021; Subcomandante Galeano 2021; “Zapatista World Tour” 2021) . On the 500th anniversary of the conclusion of the Conquest of Mexico, a small crew of seven Zapatistas set sail from the Gulf of Mexico, their heading set for Spain. This delegation included four women, two men, and one transgender person, a 4-2-1 formation which earned it the moniker “Squadron 421” in homage to the Mexican Air Force’s 201st Fighter Squadron, which aided the Allies in the Pacific Theatre of World War II. This expedition was conceived as a symbolic reversal of the conquest of Mexico; now it was the Maya who would “conquer” Europe. Squadron 421 spent four months traveling through Europe, holding encuentros with various activist groups, before returning to Mexico in September 2021. That same month, a second phase of the Europe chapter of the Journey for Life saw another delegation of 170 Zapatistas calling themselves “the Extemporaneous” continue the encuentros in Europe (Subcomandante Moisés 2021) . The Journey for Life aims to eventually visit five continents, but so far only the Europe chapter has been completed. Relations & Alliances 6.1 – Other Guerrillas The EZLN can be regarded as the most successful—indeed, probably the only successful—movement in a line of Mexican guerrilla organizations that adopted strategies of armed struggle beginning in the 1960s. Most were obliterated by the Mexican state in its punitive dirty war against the Mexican left throughout the 1960s and 70s, which found maximum expression in such atrocities as the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, during which over 350 students were gunned down by the Mexican Army in the heart of Mexico City. By the end of the 1970s, most Mexican guerrillas had either been destroyed or disbanded under the onslaught of state repression. By continuing the armed struggle, the ragtag group of 12 FLN militants who fled to the jungle of Chiapas in the summer of 1983 proved a rare exception. In the years that followed, the successes of the Zapatista movement and the de facto autonomy of the Zapatista territories ever since have established the EZLN as the one Mexican guerrilla that not only survived but thrived in the wake of the Mexican Dirty War (Hayden 2002) . Given the EZLN’s background in armed struggle, the Zapatistas are rumored to have established alliances with other left-wing militant organizations throughout Mexico. One alleged ally is the Popular Revolutionary Army ( Ejército Popular Revolucionario , EPR), one of Mexico’s few extant guerrillas, which carried out attacks throughout the 1990s and 2000s. While the EZLN denies any affiliation with the EPR, the EPR claims to support the Zapatistas (Henriquez 1996) . There is no direct evidence of direct cooperation between the two groups, nor are there clear affiliations between the EZLN and other guerrillas currently or historically active in Mexico. 6.2 – The Mexican State Although the ideological rhetoric of the Zapatistas is mainly directed at general abstractions such as neoliberalism, globalization, and “bad government,” in concrete terms the primary opponent of the Zapatistas has always been the Mexican state. However, since January 1994, the EZLN has ceased to engage in armed struggle, and the two parties maintain a truce whereby Mexican forces do not venture into the MAREZ. The PRI, which ruled Mexico as a de facto one-party state for 71 years until being dethroned in 2000, was one of the primary reference points for the Zapatista critique of “bad government,” as the party’s electoral history was marred with corruption and fraud, while its economic policies increasingly favored foreign business interests—the passing of NAFTA being a keystone example of such collusion, according to the Zapatistas. The PRI government, with the support of opposition parties and anti-EZLN paramilitary groups in Chiapas, was responsible for the general hostility on the part of the state to EZLN demands during the first six years of the Zapatista movement. When the PRI was finally unseated from power in the presidential election of 2000, the Zapatistas refocused their criticisms on the new government of the neoliberal Vicente Fox, whose National Action Party ( Partido de Acción Nacional , PAN) maintained its predecessors’ anti-EZLN stance. The EZLN has never enjoyed good relations with the Mexican state in the years since, accusing them of aiding and abetting the right-wing paramilitaries which have long threatened and attacked Zapatista communities and allies in Chiapas (Hayden 2002; Mazzei 2009; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . The Zapatistas are vocal critics of the current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, for his support for the Tren Maya, a railway in southwest Mexico which is designed to connect Maya archaeological sites to tourism hubs on the Caribbean coast, and which is scheduled to begin operation in December 2023 (Jiménez 2020) . The EZLN charges the government with ecocide and ethnocide, accusing it of catering to tourists at the expense of the natural environmental and local Indigenous groups, who they claim will not benefit from the railway’s construction. They also protest the fact that the Mexican Army has been deployed along the construction route for “security” purposes (Ribeiro 2023) . 6.3 – The Catholic Church A key figure in the early history of the Zapatistas is Bishop Samuel Ruiz García, the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas between 1959 and 1999 and a proponent of liberation theology, a mainly Latin American branch of Catholic doctrine that stresses interpretations of the Bible based in social justice and anti-capitalism. Liberation theology has long exerted a powerful influence on the religious life of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas, as elsewhere in Latin America, being that it provides a religious justification for challenging capitalism and organizing to improve their material conditions. For the first several years of the Chiapas conflict, Bishop Ruiz served as the primary intermediary and negotiator in the peace talks between the EZLN and the Mexican state. He was an ideal choice for the position of mediator, given his popularity with the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas and his respectable position vis-à-vis both the Church and the Mexican state. However, Bishop Ruiz resigned from his role as peace mediator in 1998, accusing the Mexican government of failing to abide by the spirit of the San Andrés Accords, which he helped produce. Others in the Vatican have sought to distance themselves from the EZLN, as liberation theology was never a mainstream perspective in the Catholic Church, and Bishop Ruiz’s successors have never enjoyed his popularity in Chiapas or his close relationship with the Zapatistas (Hayden 2002) . 6.4 – Civil Society Since the beginning of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN has engaged in outreach with friendly segments and affiliate organizations within Mexican civil society. A key early example is the Indigenous Christian pacifist group known as Las Abejas, or “the Bees.” Comprised of Tzotzil Maya peace activists who adhere to liberation theology, Las Abejas was formed in 1992 in the municipality of Chenalhó, Chiapas, following a land dispute that left one person dead and several innocent Indigenous people imprisoned without just cause. After the community organized a peaceful march on San Cristóbal de las Casas which led to the release of the prisoners, Las Abejas organized itself as a civil society promoting the use of pacifist means in conflict resolution. During the Zapatista uprising several years later, Las Abejas came out in support of the Zapatistas’ demands for Indigenous rights, though not without criticizing their violent means (Lifson 2005) . Other Mexican civil organizations to which the Zapatistas maintain ties—or which at least could be classified as ideological allies sympathizing with the principles and objectives of the EZLN—include the National Indigenous Congress ( Congreso Nacional Indígena ), the Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center ( Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas ), and formerly the Chiapas Media Project (now the Mexican NGO ProMedios de Comunicación Comunitaria ). 6.5 – Narcos & Paramilitaries Currently, the main threats to Zapatista communities are the armed narcotrafficking and paramilitary groups which have, in recent years, begun to encroach on the MAREZ. Although Chiapas has long been regarded as one of the safest states in Mexico, having been spared the violence of the drug wars ongoing elsewhere in the country, there are signs that this is beginning to change. Especially concerning to the EZLN is the recent and ongoing uptick of paramilitary violence inflicted against MAREZ communities and Zapatista allies (Art of the Commune 2021; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . Their committed pacifism notwithstanding, Las Abejas’ declaration of solidarity with the Zapatistas’ principles and aims established them as ideological allies—and therefore put them in the crosshairs of the Zapatistas’ enemies. On December 22, 1997, right-wing paramilitaries allied with the Mexican government against the Zapatistas and their sympathizers entered the Tzotzil village of Acteal and massacred 45 members of Las Abejas as they prayed in the village church. The Mexican Army, which operated a base just down the road from Acteal, failed to show up until hours after the shooting ended—even as survivors of the massacre ran down the road and begged them to intervene. This event, the bloodiest of the Chiapas conflict, has since become known as the Acteal massacre, and marked a turning point in the escalation of anti-Zapatista paramilitary violence in the Chiapas conflict. The annual commemoration of the anniversary of the massacre on December 22 has since become a focal point of pro-Zapatista solidarity in the state of Chiapas (Hayden 2002; Las Abejas de Acteal 2023; Lifson 2005; Rico 1997) . Shortly after the Acteal massacre, journalists revealed that the right-wing paramilitary group responsible for the killing, which called itself Máscara Roja, or “Red Mask,” had direct ties to Chiapas government officials affiliated with the PRI government in Chiapas. Few among the Zapatistas and their supporters were surprised when the news broke that the paramilitary killers behind the Acteal massacre received direct support from PRI officials. Although initially it seemed that some of the killers and their government collaborators would be brought to justice, it was perhaps even less surprising when their sentences were overturned. In 2020, the Mexican government formally admitted responsibility for the Acteal massacre, but the killers still enjoy impunity (Varzi 2020) . Even today, Las Abejas continue to face targeted violence at the hands of anti-Zapatista paramilitaries. As recently as 2016, members of Las Abejas regularly received death threats and beatings, and on July 5, 2021, Simón Pedro Pérez López, an activist with Las Abejas, was murdered by an unknown assailant, presumably in retaliation for his political activism with Las Abejas (Las Abejas de Acteal 2023) . Similarly, other right-wing paramilitaries such as the inaptly named Paz y Justicia (“Peace and Justice”) and the Chinchulines have also threatened the EZLN and their allies and sympathizers in civil society. These groups form part of a historical legacy of “White Guards,” vigilante and paramilitary groups which long terrorized Indigenous peasants in Chiapas on behalf of White and Mestizo landowners who coveted Indigenous land or coerced labor (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000; Romero 2023) . Like the White Guards before them, contemporary paramilitary groups enjoy the tacit (and sometimes direct) support of the Mexican state, from which they typically enjoy impunity for their aggressions against Zapatista communities and allies. A banner reading “The Zapatistas are not alone!” displayed during a march against paramilitary violence and militarization in Chiapas. 6.6 – The Lacandon Maya Despite their largely positive reputation among Indigenous communities in general, EZLN activities in the Lacandon Jungle—one of Mexico’s largest and most pristine natural areas—have put them at odds with a local Indigenous population, the Lacandon Maya. Whereas the EZLN encourage degrees of settlement and economic exploitation of the sparsely populated jungle, particularly as a response to displacement at the hands of anti-Zapatista paramilitaries in Chiapas, the small Lacandon Maya community is opposed to these initiatives, and a persistent conflict between the two has ensued. The Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, which is also a zone of ecological protection, is at the heart of this conflict. The Lacandon Maya, who number about 1,000, have accused EZLN militants of intimidation tactics meant to displace them from their land to make it available to settlement by Zapatista-affiliated groups. Several third-party organizations have also called attention to the tense situation in the Lacandon Jungle. In part, the issue is one of land titling; most members of both parties do not have formal title to the land they claim as their own, and with no formal government presence in the area, it is difficult to resolve disputes in an objective and transparent way. The situation is complicated by the fact that although the Lacandon accuse the EZLN of ecological unsustainable practices, the EZLN itself claims to uphold principles of sustainability in the Lacandon Jungle and has historically opposed state and corporate development projects in this ecologically sensitive area (SIPAZ 2019; Stevenson 2002; Weinberg 2007) . 6.7 – Global Solidarity Networks One of the unique aspects of the Zapatista movement has been its ability to garner international popular support and to establish links of ideological solidarity—and sometimes direct aid and cooperation—with activist networks abroad, as well as high-profile activists and public intellectuals. The global solidarity network of the EZLN has been instrumental in mobilizing international interest in the Zapatista movement and constitutes an important extension of the EZLN’s innovative and strategic use of media to garner support for their movement. Given the proximity of the United States to Mexico and the close historical and cultural ties between parts of both countries, the US is home to an outsize number of solidarity networks that provide aid and outreach on behalf of the EZLN. Some of the US-based solidarity organizations which have collaborated, directly or indirectly, with the Zapatistas include Schools for Chiapas , the Chiapas Support Committee , Sexta Grietas del Norte , and the Institute for Social Ecology . The long list of public luminaries who have voiced their support for the Zapatistas includes names such as Noam Chomsky, Oliver Stone, Naomi Klein, Elena Poniatowska, and José Saramago, among many others. The EZLN has even received the direct support and personal visits of high-profile musicians such as Rage Against the Machine and Manu Chao, both of whom have incorporated Zapatista themes in their work (Hayden 2002; Burgess 2016; Culshaw 2007; Rage Against the Machine 2017) . Most recently, a statement signed by 1,000 Mexican and international leading figures sought to bring attention to the paramilitary threat facing the EZLN in Chiapas (Santos Cid 2023) . A poster in solidarity with the EZLN against paramilitary attacks signed by the CGT, a Spanish anarcho-syndicalist organization. Works Cited (MLA-style) AP Archive. 2015. “Mexico: EZLN Leader Subcomandante Marcos Interview.” YouTube, 3:17. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMl00VrPExc. Art of the Commune. 2021. “Brief chronology of paramilitary violence in Chiapas.” Chiapas Support Committee , November 8, 2021. https://chiapas-support.org/2021/11/08/brief-chronology-of-paramilitary-violence-in-chiapas/. 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Duterme, Bernard. 2011. “Enfoques sociológicos de la rebelión zapatista.” Centre tricontinental : Le Sud en mouvement , June 25, 2011. https://www.cetri.be/Enfoques-sociologicos-de-la?lang=fr. Engler, Mark. 2019. “The Seattle Protests Showed Another World Is Possible.” The Nation , November 29, 2019. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/seattle-wto-protests/. EZLN. 1994. “Zapatista Women’s Revolutionary Law.” El Despertador Mexicano , January 1, 1994. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://schoolsforchiapas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Zapatista-Womens-Revolutionary-Laws.pdf. ———. 1996. “Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Radio Zapatista , December 25, 2005. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=20287&lang=en. ———. 1998. “Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Radio Zapatista , December 25, 2005. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=20289&lang=en. ———. 2005. “Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Enlace Zapatista , June 2005. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/sdsl-en/. ———. 2022. “EZLN Demands at the Dialogue Table.” In The Mexico Reader , edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson, 638–645. Durham: Duke University Press. Geerdink, Fréderike. 2021. “The inspiring ‘arms of struggle’ of Kurdish and Zapatista women.” Medya News , October 25, 2021. https://medyanews.net/the-inspiring-arms-of-struggle-of-kurdish-and-zapatista-women-article/. Goodman, Amy, host. 2022. “Massive Leak of Military Docs Reveals Mexico Armed Cartels, Surveilled Journalists & Zapatistas.” Democracy Now! WestLink. New York City: WBAI, October 12, 2022. https://www.democracynow.org/2022/10/12/mexico_military_drug_cartels_ayotzinapa_ministry. Hayden, Tom, ed. 2002. The Zapatista Reader . New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books. Henriquez, Elio. 1996. “We know nothing about the EPR nor are we in any way associated with it: Marcos.” La Jornada , July 2, 1996. https://struggle.ws/mexico/reports/marcos_no_lonk_epr_jul96.html. Hernández Navarro, Luis. 2021. “The March of the Color of the Earth.” Chiapas Support Committee , March 20, 2021. https://chiapas-support.org/2021/03/20/the-march-of-the-color-of-the-earth/. 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Lifson, Anna H. 2005. “Las Abejas y los Zapatistas: Una Comparación y Contraste de Dos Movimientos Indígenas en Chiapas, México.” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection . Marquardt, Franca. 2021. “The Zapatistas’ ‘Journey for Life’ and its Implications for a Global Solidarity.” December 7, 2021. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=40598&lang=en. Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Muñoz Ramírez, Gloria. 2003. 20 y 10: El fuego y la palabra . Barcelona: Virus. Oikonomakis, Leonidas. 2019. “Zapatistas announce major expansion of autonomous territories.” ROAR Magazine , August 19, 2019. https://roarmag.org/essays/zapatistas-announce-major-expansion-of-autonomous-territories/. Pérez-Grovas, Victor, Edith Cervantes, and John Burstein. 2001. “Case Study of the Coffee Sector in Mexico.” Make Trade Fair , July 2001. http://www.maketradefair.com/en/assets/english/MexicoPerez-.pdf. Rage Against the Machine. 2019. “Rage Against The Machine - Interview with Marcos (from The Battle Of Mexico City).” YouTube, 9:24. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5WekxAV9-0. Ramsey, Geoffrey. 2012. “How Mexico's Guerrilla Army Stayed Clear of Organized Crime.” InSight Crime , January 9, 2012. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-mexicos-guerrilla-army-stayed-clear-of-organized-crime/. Rico, Maite. 1997. “Un grupo paramilitar asesina a 46 campesinos indefensos en una remota aldea de Chiapas.” El País , December 24, 1997. https://elpais.com/diario/1997/12/24/internacional/882918016_850215.html. Romero, Raúl. 2023 “¿A quiénes sirven los paramilitares en Chiapas?” La Jornada , June 17, 2023. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2023/06/17/opinion/013a1pol. Rovira, Guiomar. 2000. Women of Maize: Indigenous Women and the Zapatista Rebellion . London: Latin American Bureau. Santos Cid, Alejandro. 2023. “Mexico’s Zapatistas warn Chiapas is on ‘the verge of civil war.’” El País , June 1, 2023. https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-06-01/mexicos-zapatistas-warn-chiapas-is-on-the-verge-of-civil-war.html. SIPAZ. 2019. “Chiapas: Delimitation Conflict in Lacandon Jungle.” October 16, 2019. https://sipazen.wordpress.com/2019/10/16/chiapas-delimitation-conflict-in-lacandon-jungle/. Stanchev, Petar. 2015. “From Chiapas to Rojava: seas divide us, autonomy binds us.” ROAR Magazine , February 17, 2015. https://roarmag.org/essays/chiapas-rojava-zapatista-kurds/. Stevenson, Mark. 2002. “Unusual battle lines form around jungle.” The Miami Herald , July 14, 2002. https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mexico/lacandones.htm. Subcomandante Galeano. 2021. “The Journey for Life: To What End?” Enlace Zapatista , July 20, 2021. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2021/07/20/the-journey-for-life-to-what-end/. Subcomandante Marcos. 1997. “The fourth world war has begun.” Le Monde diplomatique , September 1997. https://mondediplo.com/1997/09/marcos. Subcomandante Moisés. 2021. “The Extemporaneous and a National Initiative.” Enlace Zapatista , July 18, 2021. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2021/07/18/the-extemporaneous-and-a-national-initiative/. Tucker, Duncan. 2017. “‘Mexico needs healing’: the first indigenous woman to run for president.” The Guardian , June 12, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/mexico-maria-de-jesus-patricio-martinez-indigenous-woman-president. UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program. “EZLN.” Accessed September 6, 2023. https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/767. 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Insurgency Overview Combat 18, abbreviated as C18, is an international neo-Nazi terror group. Founded in 1992 in England as an offshoot of the far-right British National Party (BNP), the group has since spread internationally to Northern Ireland, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Australia, Greece, and elsewhere. Initially serving as its paramilitary wing, C18 soon split from the BNP and began a campaign of far-right propaganda, doxxing, harassment, and terrorist attacks. It targeted immigrants, Jewish people, and other ethnic minorities as well as left and right-wing political rivals (1) . These actions serve to achieve the group’s goal of overthrowing the “Jewish cabal” it believes is controlling governments across the world and creating white ethnostates in the wake. Besides its neo-Nazi ideology, the group also uses Nazi symbols, including the Totenkopf, or death’s head. The 18 in its name is in reference to Adolf Hitler’s initials, as one and eight are the first and eighth letters of the alphabet, AH. While the group has a central leadership, it is structured as a network of independent cells (2) . C18 has developed relationships with various right-wing and fascist groups across the world and has been designated as a terrorist group and banned in various countries, including Canada and Germany (3) (4) . Combat 18 graffiti on a statue of Polish boxing coach Feliks Stamm. History & Foundations In 1982, former National Front leader John Tyndall formed the British National Party in an attempt to bring together the United Kingdom’s divided far-right. The BNP participated in elections across the country. The party also organized public demonstrations, clashing with left-wing and anti-fascist counter-protesters such as the Anti-Nazi League. In order to provide muscle against counter-protesters, the BNP formed a paramilitary wing in 1992. It was led by Charlie Sargent, a football hooligan and convicted drug dealer, and Harold Covington, a prolific American neo-Nazi known for his association with the Northwestern Territorial Imperative white separatist movement. However, it attracted the BNP’s more hardline, violence-prone members, which quickly created a divide between the two organizations. Tyndall grew concerned over the group’s influence within the BNP as well as their activities, which hurt the BNP’s reputation and chances of electoral success. Besides attacks on public targets such as left-wing bookstores and newspapers, its members would often get into fights with other BNP members. The group held its own meeting without BNP leadership present and decided to form an independent organization, Combat 18. This drove Tyndall to ban C18 members from the BNP (1) . Following the split from the BNP, C18 ramped up its campaign of violent extremism as its ranks swelled full of football hooligans. While many of their attacks consisted of little more than drunken fights with random minorities outside of pubs and football matches, there was simultaneously a more organized effort within C18 to confront its enemies. Steve Sargent, Charlie Sargent’s younger brother, started a newspaper, Redwatch, containing addresses, phone numbers, and personal information of potential targets, which led to harassment campaigns and sometimes violent attacks. Typically, targets included anti-fascists, socialists, supporters of other left-wing causes, such as the anti-apartheid movement. C18 met their opposition on the streets and clashed with left-wing activists at demonstrations. Journalists for left-wing publications were also threatened (2) . Some of these more sophisticated plots were easily foiled by law enforcement, such as Danish C18 member Thomas Nakaba’s 1997 mail bomb plot orchestrated by Notorious C18 thug Will “The Beast” Browning. Nakaba attempted to mail three bombs to targets: Anti-Fascist Action, leaders of a rival group known as the British Movement, and Sharron Davies, a former Olympic swimmer married to a Black man. He was followed by police officers while he posted packages containing the bombs and was arrested the next morning (1) . But C18 also took on its own. At a 1994 neo-Nazi event in Belgium, C18 members attacked Flemish nationalists for their support of Irish republicans. Browning attacked two high-level BNP members, Eddie Butler and Tony Lecomber. Butler was beaten and thrown into a manhole while Lecomber was slashed across the face (1) . At the same time, C18 strengthened their ties to loyalists in Northern Ireland. Members were caught trafficking small arms for paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) multiple times in the early 1990s (2) . In 1995, English football hooligans travelled to Dublin, Ireland for what was supposed to be a friendly football match between England and the Republic of Ireland. Following far-right and loyalist chants from English fans, the match descended into violence and had to be cancelled in the first half. A riot followed in which twenty people were injured and forty were arrested. Irish police were informed about the presence of twenty hooligans donning C18 memorabilia before the match, but did not act on the information (5) . Following the 1993 death of Ian Stuart Donaldson, the frontman of C18-affiliated neo-Nazi punk band Skrewdriver and Charlie Sargent’s former roommate, C18 took control of Blood and Honour, Donaldson’s music promotion company, and its affiliate record label, ISD Records. This created a significant source of income for the organization. In the span of two years, the label made 200,000 GBP (7) . Tensions within C18 grew as Sargent wanted to grow C18 into a mainstream far-right organization like the BNP instead of the clandestine terror group the rival faction, led by Browning, desired. Browning’s faction also disputed Sargent and his loyalists over profits from ISD Records, and Browning accused Sargent of being a police informant. Browning managed to take over C18’s leadership from Sargent in 1997. In retaliation, Sargent organized a plot to murder a messenger for Browning, 28-year-old Christopher Castle. Castle was stabbed in the back at Sargent’s home in Essex, England by former Skrewdriver guitarist Martin Cross while Browning waited outside in a car. Castle was killed and Sargent and Cross were convicted for his murder (7) . After consolidating his power, Browning made several trips to Scandinavian countries to connect with far-right leaders there and establish a C18 presence in the region. This was followed by a series of crimes by C18 affiliates, including a bank robbery and a car bombing (1) . Meanwhile, several splinter groups formed from C18 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including the White Wolves, the Racial Volunteer Force, and the National Socialist Movement. Following Browning’s coup of C18 and Sargent’s imprisonment, Sargent’s loyalists flocked to the NSM. Two former C18 members, Eddie Stanton and David Myatt, headed the group. Myatt, an important ideological figure within the contemporary extreme-right, previously was alleged to have led the Order of Nine Angels, a neo-Nazi/satanic organization responsible for terrorism, human sacrifice, and sexual abuse (2) . In 1998, Myatt converted to Islam and was arrested during a crackdown by UK law enforcement agencies. Others arrested included Steve Sargent and two serving British soldiers, who were alleged to have trained other C18 members using their military expertise (7) . In 1999, neo-Nazi David Copeland sent out three nail bombs across London. These attacks targeted areas frequented by Black, Bangladeshi, and LGBTQ Londoners, respectively. The bombings killed three people and an unborn child while injuring 140. While the White Wolves claimed responsibility for the attacks before his arrest, Copeland was found to be an NSM member. He claimed he was inspired by The Turner Diaries and hoped his actions would trigger a race war. However, Browning wrote him off as mentally ill (1) . Charlie Sargent was released from prison in 2013. However, he quickly found himself incarcerated yet again the next year as he was found to have violated his parole by associating with several of his former C18 comrades, including Eddie Stanton, who posted a photo of the two online, and plotting to attack former political rivals. He got into a brawl outside an Essex pub along with several other C18 members, for which he was arrested and sent back to prison (8) . Throughout the 2010s, C18 cells continued terrorist attacks across the world. Three men that police claimed were members of C18 were arrested in Perth, Australia for shooting at a mosque in 2010. Nobody was killed (9) . In 2012, C18 members firebombed a building of Romani families in Czechia, and in 2018, Greek police arrested eleven C18 members in Athens, foiling an alleged bombing plot (3) (10) . In 2019, Walter Lübcke, a German politician, was murdered outside of his house by Stephan Ernst, an alleged C18 member. C18 was banned in Germany in 2020 due to Lübcke’s murder. The organization unsuccessfully challenged the ban in court (4) . Following the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand, the Canadian government also designated C18 along with Blood and Honour as terrorist groups in June 2019 in an effort to clamp down on far-right extremism (3) . The two groups had their assets frozen by the UK government in January 2025 (11) . Images of the 2018 arrest of 16 members of a C18 cell in Spain. Objectives & Ideology Combat 18’s ideology revolves around the existence of what it and other white supremacist groups call the Zionist Occupied Government, or ZOG. The ZOG is an antisemitic conspiracy theory claiming the existence of a Jewish cabal controlling countries worldwide. This means that instead of wanting to establish influence within existing governments and using the state to reach its goals, C18 plans to use terror attacks to topple governments and eliminate racial and political enemies. Some C18 members have said that extermination is their preferred solution to rid their hypothetical post-revolution ethnostate of enemies, while others have advocated for deportation (1) . C18 cemented its importance in the contemporary extreme-right movement by becoming a blueprint for today’s clandestine terror groups like The Base and the Atomwaffen Division, marking a split within the far-right from the populist white nationalism of groups like the BNP and the National Front. Many of C18’s core principles come from Harold Covington, who was greatly influenced by American white separatist movements of the 1970s and 80s. Covington was an advocate for the Northwestern Territorial Imperative, an idea popular with white separatist movements advocating for the creation of a white ethnostate in the Northwestern United States. When he came to the UK to set up C18, he brought these ideas with him and spread them internationally. Charlie Sargent also cited Robert Matthews, founder of The Order, as an influence (1) . The Order followed the instructions detailed in white supremacist novel The Turner Diaries to start a white supremacist revolution to overthrow the US government, starting with a series of bank robberies to fund its activities. The group also murdered Alan Berg, a Jewish radio show host. Another thing C18 took from The Order was the concept of leaderless resistance, where a network of autonomous cells act independent of one another to avoid infiltration (2) . Political & Military Capabilities In its early days, Combat 18 primarily recruited from white, working-class areas of London, Essex, and Northern England. At the time of the group’s founding, these areas had little economic opportunity for their young residents living in dilapidated council estates. This, combined with waves of migration that caused racial tension within low-income communities, created the perfect storm for white supremacist groups to build their ranks with the allure of brotherhood and violence. During the mid-1990s, C18 had some 200 core members in the UK. Their relatively small numbers were often backed up in street fights by football hooligans and skinheads, which the group recruited from. New members were often friends of existing members and the recruitment process was informal (2) . In the late 1990s and early 2000s, C18 started to expand abroad. By then, it already had strong connections with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Will Browning cultivated relationships with white supremacist groups in Central and Northern Europe, where C18 established a presence and recruited members (1) . Meanwhile, the group began to use the internet to share its literature and propaganda even further, with cells popping up as far as Greece and Australia (10) (9) . Approach to Resistance Although a detailed plan for a white supremacist revolution lies at the core of the group’s ideology, many within Combat 18’s rank-and-file during its heyday in the 1990s were not as ideologically motivated as, say, Myatt or Covington. This was due to C18’s recruiting practices. Many got involved with the group for their shared penchant for violence and drinking, while their racist beliefs were secondary. Oftentimes, its leaders have not been its most violent members. Charlie Sargent, for instance, is known to have orchestrated many attacks but did not personally participate in them, for which Will Browning was critical of Sargent (1) . However, in the 2000s the group saw a shift from street fights to more coordinated attacks while many of the group’s top brass were imprisoned. C18 has effectively used its close links to far-right elements in various subcultures to bolster its ranks and spread its message of white supremacy. In the 1990s, it maintained a presence in the football hooligan, skinhead, and white power rock scenes of the UK where there were many likeminded individuals capable of violence. Meanwhile, C18 produced media for both ideological and practical reasons. While many of the bands affiliated with Blood and Honour and ISD records had far-right themes in their music, the group produced several magazines, including Redwatch, publishing the beliefs of its leaders and the personal information of potential targets. The group moved to far-right forums and websites in the early 2000s, allowing it to build relationships with white supremacists worldwide (1) . Relations & Alliances Combat 18’s relationship with the BNP has been a complicated one. While the two organizations split in 1993 and the BNP banned C18 members from its ranks, they maintained a working relationship. BNP leaders were known to meet and organize with C18, despite attacks on BNP members by the likes of Will Browning. Charlie Sargent saw the BNP as a failed movement that had lost touch with its base and become infiltrated by informants. He claimed that electoral politics is a futile venture for national socialists, as he believed the state to be corrupted by the ZOG (1) . Early on in its existence, C18 allied itself with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. It had a particularly strong relationship with the Ulster Defence Association, but also had connections with the rival Ulster Volunteer Force. UDA members Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair, former leader of West Belfast’s infamous C Company, and Eddie Whicker of the UDA’s London branch are two prominent UDA members with ties to C18 (1) . While Charlie Sargent was not a football fan and found himself bored at the many matches he attended with other C18 members, he still saw the value in his hooligan firm allies. In particular, C18 has enjoyed support from the notorious Chelsea Headhunters. The Headhunters have long been a right-wing firm and both share the Nazi Totenkopf as a symbol. C18 has joined the Headhunters and other firms at football matches in exchange for their support in street demonstrations and fights (1) . Many of C18’s demonstrations have erupted into brawls with left-wing, antifascist groups such as Anti-Fascist Action, the Anti-Fascist League, the Anti-Nazi League, and the Anti-Racist Alliance. C18 has also targeted members of the groups in attacks and harassment campaigns, as well as journalists from left-wing publications such as Searchlight. Searchlight played a major role in exposing the group’s activities to the general public, which resulted in death threats from C18 (1) . Works Cited (1) Lowles, N. (2001). White Riot . Milo Books. (2) Ryan, N. (1998, February 1). Combat 18: Memoirs of a street-fighting man. The Guardian . https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/combat-18-memoirs-of-a-streetfighting-man-1142204.html . (3) Public Safety Canada (2019, June 21). Currently listed entities: Combat 18 . Government of Canada. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#60 . (4) BBC (2020, January 23). Germany bans Combat 18 as police raid neo-Nazi group. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51219274 . (5) The Independent (1995, April 4). Irish police did not accept help. https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/irish-police-did-not-accept-help-1614349.html . (6) Lowles, N and Ryan, N. (1998, January 25). Neo-Nazi gang war fear after murder. The Independent . https://www.independent.co.uk/news/neonazi-gang-war-fear-after-murder-murder-1140723.html . (7) Syal, R. and Gilligan, A. (1999, March 7). MI5 swoops on Army 'neo-Nazis'. Sunday Telegraph . https://web.archive.org/web/20030312203105/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F1999%2F03%2F07%2Fnarm07.html . (8) Lowles, N. (2014, November 27). Go directly to jail: Do not pass Go. Hope Not Hate . https://hopenothate.org.uk/2014/11/27/go-directly-jail-not-pass-go/ . (9) Robinson, C. (2010, June 4). Alleged Combat 18 members in court over mosque shooting. Perth Now . https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/wa/alleged-combat-18-members-in-court-over-mosque-shooting-ng-2013ddaf82b453f2e5bd055b6fc8f82c . (10) The Associated Press (2018, March 6). Greek anti-terrorism police arrest 5 in neo-Nazi crackdown. https://apnews.com/general-news-9858bf9a18cf4e68b002ad3bb37dbd98 . (11) Sanford, D. (2025, January 8). Far-right group Blood and Honour has assets frozen by government. BBC . https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqjzj4zrppko .

Insurgency Overview The Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) is the armed wing of the Chin National Organization (CNO), a Chin ethnic armed organization. The Chin are an ethnolinguistically diverse demographic indigenous to the Chin State of western Myanmar. The CNDF was founded in 2021 as a response to the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Myanmar by the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, in February 2021. The main objective of the CNDF is armed resistance against Myanmar’s governing military junta through guerrilla tactics, similar to other active resistance groups operating within the Chin State and the country as a whole, and as a response to the junta’s overthrowing of the democratic government. History & Foundations Settlement in Chin State dates back to the 14th and 15th centuries, with different Chin chiefs leading, even when Britain arrived and indirectly ran the area. Once Britain granted independence to the whole nation, Chin State opted for a more democratic government. Civil unrest ended the state’s democratic rule in the 1960s. Protests began in the 1980s, resulting in countless deaths and imprisonments by the nation’s military. A ceasefire was later signed; however, stability has not returned to Chin State, and hunger, poverty, forced labor, and military conscription remain issues today. Past and current actions such as these by the Myanmar government have fueled grievances among the Chin people, leading to a resistance movement that continues today. The CNDF and CNO were both founded in April 2021. They mostly consist of the ethnic Chin people of Chin State, which is located in western Myanmar, bordering the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram. These organizations are headquartered in Falam Township, part of the Falam District in the northern part of Chin State. The CNO manages various services within Chin State, such as its judiciary, financial, home and external affairs, health, and education departments. According to William Chin, a spokesman for the CNO, “The formation of the CNO and the CNDF mainly aims to build up a federal democracy-based union, ensure the autonomy of Chin nationals, and build up a sustainable and peaceful human society political space” (10) . Recruiting is handled at the local level, similar to other groups engaged in operations against the military junta, who came into power after overthrowing the democratically elected government, throwing the nation into further civil unrest. Recruits are trained similarly to other ethnic militias in Myanmar. Training camps, with areas for running drills, target shooting, and other obstacles are part of the process, and they even train snipers in separate courses. Foreign military personnel, such as a United States former service member, have also trained recruits (14) . Objectives & Ideology Both the CNDF and CNO oppose the junta government, combining armed resistance in the form of guerilla operations with political pressure from the general public through campaigns and protests. Increased presence also helps to drive up recruitment and involvement in both parts. Democracy on a federal level is also a key objective of the group, along with the defense of Chin State and its people (12) . They aim to secure stability and security for the population of Chin State and address social issues such as poverty, homelessness, and hunger, as Chin State is one of the poorest areas in Myanmar. Political & Military Abilities Most of the CNDF’s armaments consist of captured gear, such as those captured from military forces or law enforcement during raids or ambushes. This gives the CNDF similar combat capabilities to the junta forces. The CNDF, in combination with allies, reuses this gear against junta forces when successful raids are carried out against enemy outposts. Anti-junta resistance groups are mostly armed with small arms, light vehicles such as technicals or transport vehicles, and anti-vehicle/air weapons such as MANPADS (Man Portable Air-Defense System) or shoulder-fired anti-tank launchers, such as the Russian RPG-7. Other weapons include 40mm grenade launchers such as the American M79, and various captured fragmentation grenades (2, 19) . Possession of MANPADS is especially concerning for the junta air force, as these weapons give groups like the CNDF and its allies a way to counter airstrikes. Weapons commonly used by the CNDF include the MA pattern of rifles chambered in 5.56x45, like the MA-1 standard issue rifle or the MA-2 light machine gun, as these were produced locally. CNDF personnel have also used captured rifles in 7.62x51, such as the BA-72, a copy of the German G3, or the BA-63, a clone of the G3’s light machine gun variant. Small caliber marksman-style weapons are also among the weapons captured, as well as handguns such as the MA-5 Mk1 and Mk2, and older style revolvers, like the S&W Victory, or Webley pattern revolvers left behind by the British. Interestingly, there are some examples of crudely made or “homemade” firearms being put into use (16) . On top of using captured weapons, the CNDF and its allies also capture ammunition, uniforms, helmets, and similar personal equipment from deceased or captured junta fighters. Photos show other captured weapons such as hand grenades, anti-tank landmines, heavy machine guns like the 14.5mm KPV, mortars, captured artillery guns, and various other munitions (2) . Utilizing the terrain is a key component in the CNDF’s military tactics, taking advantage of thick jungle or urban environments. The junta has recently enacted stricter conscription laws, resulting in some recruits being poorly trained, armed, and lacking motivation (4) . This gives resistance groups like the CNDF an advantage when engaging with poorly trained enemy forces. Approach to Resistance The CNDF employs tactics similar to other resistance groups, such as ambush tactics, hit-and-run attacks, and other methods to counter, disrupt, and harass junta forces. Ambush attacks are very common, especially against junta supply and transport convoys, as we have seen. The bulk of CNDF military activities consist of ground operations, as they do not possess any aerial support or aquatic vessels to counter those of the junta government. The resistance campaign has resulted in over half of Chin State coming under Chin State resistance control (18) . This has compounded the increasing unpopularity of the junta as well as the increased unity of the Chin people. The CNO also manages local affairs, similar to a local government or legislative figure. Relations & Alliances The CNDF and CNO wish to cooperate with the National Unity Government (NUG), an entity formed in part by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and other local political and armed forces based out of Chin State (10) . The CNDF often partners and collaborates with other ethnic Chin groups such as the Chin Defense Force (CDF), Chin National Front (CNF), and People’s Defense Force (PDF), which also conduct operations against junta forces (3, 6) . The CNO and CNDF are a part of the Chin Brotherhood, an alliance formed in December 2023 as a means of increasing interoperability between local Chin ethnic armed organizations and as a response to the Chinland Council, which was viewed as ineffective and not representative of the goals of unity and cooperation shared by various actors operating in Chin State (20) . Works Cited (1) Lwin, Saw (4.3.2024) Myanmar Junta’s Free Rein in Mindat Ends as Chin Defense Force Resume’s Battle, Myanmar, The Irrawaddy https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-juntas-free-rein-in-mindat-ends-as-chin-defense-force-resumes-battle.html . (2) CMO/CNDF’s Official Telegram Channel https://t.me/cnocndf . (3) Unknown, (12.23.2024) Approximately 170 Myanmar Junta personnel surrender during battle for Midat and Falam, Myanmar, Mizzima News https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/12/23/17617 . (4) Unknown, (6.7.2024) Forced recruitment pushes young people into ranks of the resistance, Vatican City, Agenzia Fides, https://www.fides.org/en/news/75075-ASIA_MYANMAR_Forced_recruitment_pushes_young_people_into_the_ranks_of_the_resistance . (5) Hein, Ye Myo ( 11.3.2022) Understanding People’s Defense Force in Myanmar, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace (USIP) https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar . (6) The Irrawaddy, (4.11.2023) Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid Myanmar, The Irrawaddy, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/two-dozen-myanmar-junta-troops-killed-in-chin-state-camp-raid.html . (7) MyanmarNow, (7.26.2021) Around 800 Falam villagers flee as junta troops go on rampage, MyanmarNow, Myanmar https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/around-800-falam-villagers-flee-as-junta-troops-go-on-rampage/ . (8) MyanmarNow (10.19.2021) Chin resistance fighters destroy half a military convoy amid buildup of junta forces MyanmarNow, Myanmar, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/chin-resistance-fighters-destroy-half-a-military-convoy-amid-buildup-of-junta-forces/ . (9) Kim, Ngo Zam (6.12.2024) 5 members of the Chin Nying Naung troops were killed during the Battle of Titin, Mizzima News, Myanmar https://bur.mizzima.com/2024/06/12/24427 . (10) Benezer, Salai (4.23.2021) Chin people form CNO, CNDF, Burma News International, Myanmar https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/chin-people-form-cno-cndf . (11) Editor of Khonumthung Media Group (4.19.2023) CNDF Capture Burma army military camp near Falam Town, Khonumthung Media Group, Mizoram, India https://khonumthung.org/english/cndf-capture-burma-army-military-camp-near-falam-town/ . (12) Official website of the CNO/CNDF, Chin State, Myanmar https://cnocndf.org/about . (13) UNICEF Website, New York https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/chin-state . (14) Mizzma (12.21.2022) Chin National Defense Force being trained by U.S. armed forces veteran, Mizzima News, Myanmar https://mizzima.com/article/chin-national-defence-force-being-trained-us-armed-forces-veteran#:~:text=The%20VAKOK%20Battalion%20of%20the%20Chin%20National,they%20are%20having%20to%20train%20with%20a . (15) Zofa Journal (3.26.2024) CNDF Chuan Pasaltha Training Na A buat saih March 26th, 2023, Zofa Journal, Kalemyo, Sagaing, Myanmar. https://www.facebook.com/100094742018321/videos/cndf-chuan-pasaltha-training-na-a-buat-saihmarch-26th2023-zofa-journalchinland-r/705611041649215/ . (16) Aung, Nora (5.31.2022) Myanmar Resistance groups get creative to manufacture weapons, The Irrawaddy, Myanmar https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-resistance-groups-get-creative-to-manufacture-weapons.html . (17) MyanmarNow (7.13.2022) Fighting breaks out on border separating Chin State and Sagaing Reigon, MyanmarNow, Myanmar https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/fighting-breaks-out-on-border-separating-chin-state-and-sagaing-region/ . (18) Ourwarstoday2 (1.27.2025) Chin State on the brink, Ourwarstoday2, United States https://www.instagram.com/p/DFUx9tGOWWK/?igsh=MW5pYXYxZXNsODJ3OQ== . (19) Afa, Azad (7.15.2024) CNDF Sniper Training, Azad_Afa, Myanmar https://www.instagram.com/p/C9b99qpShh2/?img_index=2&igsh=eXJ6M29haHI4ZDFy . (20) Burma News International (BMI) (1.2.2024) Chin Brotherhood Alliance emerges as three organizations skip Chinland council conference, pledging enhanced political and military cooperation, BMI, Myanmar. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/chin-brotherhood-alliance-emerges-three-organizations-skip-chinland-council-conference-pledging .

Overview Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī  ( قوات الحشد الشعبي ), also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), is a paramilitary umbrella organization in Iraq that was officially established in 2014 as a consequence of the collapse of the official Iraqi army (Rudolf, 2020) to combat the ISIS insurgency that was sweeping the country (El-Dessouki, 2017). Within the PMF, several militias operate based on sectarian, religious, and political affiliations. Despite the defeat of the parastatal form of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2018, the PMF remains largely active in the country, contributing to tensions and security issues within Iraqi society. The PMF is not a unitary phenomenon; rather, it fully reflects the hybrid nature of Iraqi reality. The binary opposition between concepts such as state and non-state, formal and informal, and national and transnational fails to effectively capture the complexities of security and political issues within Iraqi society. (Haddad, 2020). History and Foundation Besides most observers recalling the organization’s origin to the Daesh counter-insurgency period, PMF emerged significantly earlier, during the second term office of Prime Minister Maliki (2006-2010 and 2010-2014), whose legitimacy is highly debated (Haddad, 2020). In 2010, Maliki’s National Coalition, the Shi’ite  coalition supported by the U.S. and backed by Iran, managed to secure the electoral victory. The country knew a vigorous shift toward authoritarianism and centralization that led in late 2012 to mass protests in the Sunni governorates. In this context of sectarian tensions and instability, Maliki pushed for the formation of paramilitary irregular forces tied to himself, following Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen examples (Haddad, 2020).  When in June of 2014 most of international coalitions were failing to counter the Islamic State insurrection in the Levant, the major Shi’ite  religious leader of Iraq, the Grand Ayatollah and marja’ Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa,  an Islamic legal ruling, to contrast ISIS (El-Dessouki, 2017). As a response to this fatwa , called “The collective duty of Jihad”, the PMF was formally recognized (Al-Jbour, 2021). According to al-Sistani’s call to action, all Iraqi citizens able to fight should take up arms and face ISIS’ threat. Even if the PMF predates Sistani’s edict, today’s PMF is a direct product of the fatwa , which provided social, political, and religious legitimization to a pre-existing organization that used this political capital for further institutionalization. Sistani triggered a chain reaction that made the PMF mainstream and expanded the hybridity of the Iraqi state (Haddad, 2020).  At the time, the Islamic State had taken over Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, and was committing a wide range of war crimes, including sectarian mass killings and bombings of Shi’ite  religious sites. Furthermore, the fatwa  did not allow the creation of autonomous armed groups; all volunteers had to be organized and incorporated within the legal framework of Iraq's official army and security forces. The groups under the PMF umbrella successfully coordinated with the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga to halt ISIS’s offensive toward Baghdad and to confront the Daesh threat in the Diyala, Babil, and Salah al-Din provinces (El-Dessouki, 2017). With the liberation of ISIS-controlled areas in 2017, the PMF received material and political support from government branches. Iranian-backed PMF factions used this new legitimization to pursue their aims, such as supporting the establishment of the new Tehran-Beirut corridor. After Daesh's defeat, many volunteers laid down their arms and returned home, as the purpose of the fatwa seemed fulfilled. Nonetheless, some of them remained active. Over the years, the PMF has undergone several attempts at reform and reorganization of its status within the Iraqi state, emerging during times when authorities were weak and unable to manage the country’s security and military issues (El-Dessouki, 2017).  On the 2nd of January 2022, following U.S. President Donald Trump’s authorisation, an airstrike targeted the convoy of Iranian Quds Forces Major General Qasem Soleimani near Bagdad airport. The assassination of Soleimani had as a collateral of beneficial damage the death of one of the highest-ranking security officials of Iraq, the Chief of Staff of PMF Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Rudolf, 2020). Since October 2023, following Hamas’s attack in southern Israel, a new group called the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has emerged from Telegram communications and propaganda. This umbrella group includes various prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that were already part of the PMF, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah , Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba , Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada , and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya  (Malik & Knights, 2024). These groups focus on both national and transnational rocket and missile attacks, targeting Israel and U.S. facilities in Iraq and Syria (Menmy, 2023). Objectives and Ideology The PMF has become a hybrid entity within a hybrid state context, existing and operating in undefined areas with blurred boundaries. The organization is neither fully autonomous nor completely integrated into existing institutions, nor is it part of the Iraqi armed forces or an Iranian proxy. It’s important to consider the main ideological and organizational divisions within the so-called PMF (Haddad, 2020). Most PMF factions and key leaders are officially and ideologically connected to the Islamic Republic of Iran, promoting its role as the defender of Shi’ite  Islamic identity and its pan-Shiism. Many Shi’ite  factions incorporated within the PMF have declared their loyalty to Iranian religious and political authority in a bid to establish a Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iraq (El-Dessouki, 2017). The PMF faces two potential models: the Lebanese Hezbollah model, which entails controlling Iraqi institutions without destroying them, or the IRGC model, its source of inspiration and dominant military institution with crucial political, economic, and cultural influence in Iran and in the region (El-Dessouki, 2017). Military and Political Abilities PMF includes large, medium, and small-scale armed groups, some already active before the organization’s official foundation. Considering both operatives and logistical staff, the organizations count approximately 164 thousand members. At the time of ISIS’ defeat in 2018, the members were divided into 67 Shi’ite  factions, 43 Sunni factions, and nine factions representing the several different ethnic groups in Iraq, like Turkmens, Kurds, Christian Babylon, Yazidi, and Shabak (Chamoun, 2020). In 2020, Iranian-aligned factions occupied 80% of organizational and administrative leadership positions, excluding Sunni and minority factions from the entireness of high or middle-level roles within the administrative structure of PMF (Al-Jbour, 2021). More powerful actors and factions correspond to the political elite, and they play a key role in electoral competition and the economy. (Haddad, 2020).  Moreover, Shi’ite  militias are the better-motived and organized ones, equipped and trained with armored vehicles, IEDs, RPGs, rockets, missiles, and Abrams tanks (El-Dessouki, 2017). Besides that, internal jurisprudential orientations are present among the over 110 thousand Shi’ite  members. The 67 factions are divided into 44 following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 17 following Iraqi marja’ Ali al-Sistani, and six other factions following another Shi’ite   marja’ (Al-Jbour, 2021). Looking at the 2019 Budget of Iraq, it’s possible to notice that over 128 thousand employers work among PMF’s lines, and this workforce is founded with 2.17 billion dollars (Al-Jbour, 2021). Approach To Struggle Considering PMF's non-monolithic nature, it is fundamental to consider the organization's internal divisions, both ideologically and organizationally. These differences fuel competition among factions and shape different aims and related approaches. PMF factions often act as a “Pretorian guard” of their reference political elite (Haddad, 2020) and pursue their strategic goals with different levels of autonomy. The Iranian-aligned factions, also known as fasa’il  or “resistance factions”, pursue Iran's regional interests in Iraq and are loyal to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Most of these groups, except for the Badr  Organization, which has been active since the 1980s (El-Dessouki, 2017), were established between 2003 and 2014 and primarily targeted U.S. forces (Haddad, 2020).  Fasa’il  are responsible for the deaths of at least 603 U.S. troops in Iraq (Rudolf, 2020) and have faced repeated accusations of criminal behavior and human rights violations. The more prominent groups among the fasa’il include Kata’ib Hezbollah , the Badr  Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq , Kata’ib al-Imam Ali , Kata’ib Jund al-Imam , and Kata’ib Sayyid   al-Shuhada  (Haddad 2020). Fasa’il  factions are indeed the most relevant and powerful actors within PMF. Armed militias linked to PMF, like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq  and Kata’ib Hezbollah , are often accused of persecuting civil activists, journalists, and media figures. On July 6th, 2020, in the Zayouna district of Bagdad, the academic researcher Hisham al-Hashimi was executed by a masked individual in front of his house. Hashimi was a well-respected academic figure and security expert on both Sunni and Shi’ite  groups, including Iran-backed organizations within Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon (Menmy, 2024). Later, a former officer in the Iraqi interior minister, reportedly connected to Kata’ib Hezbollah , confessed to the murder (Menmy, 2024). On the other hand, a second category called “State hashd ” has considerably fewer ideological aims because these factions have been created to protect Iraqi sovereignty and face Islamic State insurgency. They are better integrated within the Iraqi State structure compared to fasi’il , who are often precepted as opponents (Haddad, 2020). Lastly, the genocidal action of IS against minorities pushed various religious and ethnic communities, like Yazidis and Christians, to create self-defense auxiliaries, also called “Minority hashd ”, tied to PMF (Haddad, 2020). International Relations and Potential Alliances Shi’ite  factions serve the important role of advancing Iranian foreign interests in the region, specifically building and protecting a corridor able to directly connect Iran and the Levant to arm proxies like Hezbollah ( Mansour & Jabar, 2017 ). The Iranian-aligned factions within PMF claim to be the representative of the “Axis of the Resistance” in Iraq, which is historically and precariously forced into a balance between the United States and Iran (Haddad, 2020). The Islamic Republic of Iran and its IRGC have been directly involved in the Iraqi scenario since the Iran-Iraq War, when the Pâsdârân  established the Badr Organization and other prominent proxies that later will retag in PMF, with the primary goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s Regime (El-Dessouki, 2017). During the Daesh  offensive, PMF militias were mainly coordinated from Teheran, and Soleimani itself covered a leading role during 2015’s Tikrit counter-offensive (El-Dessouki, 2017). Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the chief of staff of PMF killed by the U.S. in 2020, openly admitted to receiving funding and training from IRGC’s Quds Forces and Hezbollah, providing explosive experts and even support airstrikes (El-Dessouki, 2017). In 2024, after the beheading of Hezbollah’s leadership, the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, and the dismantling of part of the missile and rocket stockpile by Israel, Iran lost its jewel crown in the Levant.  Alternatively to The Party of God, Iran could shift its focus on the Iraqi Hashd and use PMF’s Shi’ite militias as a partial strategic replacement for Hezbollah (Salem, 2024). After 2011, Teheran and Iraqi PM Maliki agreed on using PMF factions such as Asaib al-Haq  and Kata'ib Hezbollah  (Al-Salhy, 2013), directly participating in the Syrian Civil War backing the Ba’athist government of Bashar al-Assad (Mansour & Jabar, 2017 ). Despite this intervention, PMF did not intervene to defend its Syrian ally during the HTS December offensive, which rapidly brought about the collapse of the Assad regime. According to Iranian sources, both Teheran and Bagdad were ready to deploy Iraqi militias, but a lack of adequate air support and the threat of U.S. and Israeli retaliation airstrikes prevented these forces from crossing into Syria (Malik, 2025). Ac ademic Bibliography (APA) 1.     Al-Jbour, A. (2021). The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq: Regional Dynamics and Local Variables.  Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://www.academia.edu/48814325/The_Popular_Mobilization_Forces_in_Iraq_Regional_Dynamics_and_Local_Variables   2.     Chamoun, M. (2020).  The PMF As An Insurgency? & The Case For a Counterinsurgency Approach to the Popular Mobilization Forces . https://www.academia.edu/43462240/The_PMF_As_an_Insurgency_and_The_Case_For_A_Counterinsurgency_Approach_to_the_Popular_Mobilization_Forces   3.     El-Dessouki, A. (2017). The internal and external roles of Iraqi popular mobilization forces.  African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. https://www.academia.edu/85040027/The_internal_and_external_roles_of_Iraqi_popular_mobilization_forces 4.     Haddad, F. (2020). Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units: A Hybrid Actor in a Hybrid  State. Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions. https://www.academia.edu/42930481/Iraq_s_Popular_Mobilization_Units_A_Hybrid_Actor_in_a_Hybrid_State 5.     Rudolf, I. (2020). The Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces after the Assassination of Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.  Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). https://www.academia.edu/43994644/The_Future_of_the_Popular_Mobilization_Forces_after_the_Assassination_of_Abu_Mahdi_Al_Muhandis 7.2. Online Bibliography (APA) 1.     Al-Salhy, S. (2013, April 10). Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Start To Acknowledge Role In Syria.  Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iraqi-shiite-militants-start-to-acknowledge-role-in-syria-idUSBRE9390OF/ 2.     Mansour, R. & Jabar, F.A. (2017, April 28). The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future.  Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/04/the-popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraqs-future?lang=en¢er=middle-east 3.     Menmy, D.T. (2023, November 8). Who is the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?  The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/news/who-islamic-resistance-iraq 4.     Menmy, D.T. (2024, January 2). Iraq Annuls Conviction of Killer of Prominent Researcher.  The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/news/iraq-annuls-conviction-killer-prominent-researcher   5.     Salem, P. (2024, January 7).  The Middle East’s changing strategic landscape . Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/middle-easts-changing-strategic-landscape    6.     Malik, H. & Knights, M. (2024, June 20). Profile: The Islamic Resistance of Iraq.  The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq 7.     Malik, H. (2025, January 21). PMF Non-Deployment to Save Assad: Sudani’s View Contradicted by Iran . The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/pmf-non-deployment-save-assad-sudanis-view-contradicted-iran

The Storm-Z insignia. Storm-V unit insignia replace the Z with a V but are otherwise identical. Overview In the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the mounting manpower needs of the war effort led the Russian military complex to look everywhere for men who could be easily swayed into joining the war. Russian prisons became the most fertile grounds to recruit men willing to do anything to escape their imprisonment. The “Shtorm” series of penal units is the result of this recruitment drive. Shtorm units continue to operate despite some reforms to this day. History & Foundations Throughout modern military history, penal battalions have been formed by various military forces to resolve manpower shortages whenever the war effort demanded more men than could be recruited by ordinary means. Penal units were sometimes formed by undisciplined and insubordinate regular soldiers who had been punished by military law, but at various points they could also be supplemented with civilian inmates, from petty criminals to murderers and sex offenders. The Soviet Union established such units during World War II, with hundreds of thousands serving (and dying) in these units until the final defeat of the Third Reich. After the war’s end, these units were disbanded, and no trace remained of them in the Soviet military tradition. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military establishment came under intense pressure to provide the manpower necessary for a conventional war fought against a regular army; the decision not to implement the mass mobilization of Russian society further exacerbated the needs of the armed forces. The first actor to intercept this need for manpower was PMC Wagner, the now infamous mercenary group that played a key role in the second year of the conflict. Starting in July 2022, PMC Wagner was given free rein in recruiting from Russian prisons, and it was thus able to bolster its presence in Ukrainian battlefields with cheap and disposable manpower. One year later, it was estimated that almost 50,000 former convicts had served in Ukraine (1) . The most significant factor driving penal enlistment was the promise that a six-month tour in Ukraine would qualify one for a full presidential pardon (2) . After the Wagner Group managed to deliver several major operational victories (including the capture of Bakhmut), notwithstanding the heavy casualty rate, penal recruitment was considered a successful experiment, and the Russian government founded the Shtorm-Z detachments. The exact date of founding is unknown, but these detachments were deployed in Ukraine by April 2023, when their existence became known (3) . Throughout 2023, Storm-Z detachments were deployed wherever needed, often to plug the gaps in Russian battle lines (4) . Storm Gladiator, a unit created under the Storm-Z program, was noted for its effectiveness during the operations that were carried out on the Ukrainian front in late 2023 (5) . Due to the high rate of casualties, the unit was reportedly disbanded in early 2024, with its surviving members reassigned to other Storm-Z units, possibly in the capacity of petty officers and trainers (6) . In June 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a new law implementing the creation of Storm-V detachments, which remain units staffed primarily by convicts (7) . According to the new provisions, Storm-V soldiers are treated as contract soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces and receive full pay, but they no longer receive full pardons for their crimes and instead can only hope to be paroled (8) . Storm-V units have seen action in the 2023–24 Battle of Avdeevka and have been deployed in the ongoing Battle of Chasiv Yar (9) . Ideology & Objectives Russian penal units are part of the war effort of the Russian state, and as such, they theoretically contribute to the objectives set by the Russian military as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War. As penal units are staffed mostly by convicts, it is difficult to establish exactly to what extent ideology or genuine support for the so-called Special Military Operation plays a role. Available open-source information contributes to a mixed picture of these units: footage shows hopeless soldiers in despair when faced with the abysmal conditions of the battlefield (10) , while other sources depict individuals willing to do anything to restore their social standing and escape Russian prisons. For example, Storm Gladiator’s chief of staff was reportedly identified as a former FSB officer who was imprisoned in 2019 on charges of extortion and bribery (11) . Additionally, regular Russian soldiers can also be sent to Storm-Z/V detachments as a punishment for drunkenness, insubordination, or other breaches of the military code (12) . Political & Military Abilities Storm-Z/V detachments are formed from Russian convicts who are desperate to escape their detention. As such, these penal soldiers often lack the motivation and the morale to hold their own on the battlefield, and many surrender whenever given the chance (13) . Further compounding their tactical inferiority when compared to regular military units is the limited training they receive, reportedly between just 10 to 15 days (14) . While Russia is a country that retains a conscription-based model of military recruitment, and therefore it is likely that many penal recruits have had at least some prior experience in the military, years may have passed since they last served, and such little training highlights the disregard for the individuals who join Storm-Z/V units. Storm-Z/V detachments are equipped as light infantry with few or no motor vehicles available to them, and are mostly employed as small fireteams in highly saturated urban environments (15) . Works Cited (1) - Camut, N. Over 20,000 Wagner troops killed, 40,000 wounded in Ukraine: Prigozhin-linked channel. In: Politico.eu , 20.07.2023. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ukraine-war-over-20000-wagner-troops-were-killed-prigozhin/ (2) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/ (3) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. In: TRADOC G2, 12/15/2023. Available at: https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2023/12/15/tradoc-russian-assault-groups-evolution-in-ukraine/ (4) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. In: ISW, 06/04/2023. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2023 (5) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. In : Radio Free Europe /RL, 05.02.2024. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-recruited-convicts-fierce-assault-units-storm-gladiator-/32806371.html (6) - Ibidem. (7) - Ibidem. (8) - Fokht, E. et al. “If you sign up now, get ready to die, mate.” Life on the Ukrainian front for Moscow’s new ‘Storm V’ convict soldiers. In: BBC News Russian, 28.01.2024. Available at: https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/new-deal-russian-convicts-fighting-in-ukraine (9) - Fornusek, M. Ukraine reports heavy battles in Bakhmut direction as Russia pulls in reserves. In: The Kyiv Independent, 27.04.2024. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-reports-heavy-battles-in-bakhmut-direction-as-russia-pulls-in-reserves/ (10) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit. (11) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. Cit. (12) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/   (13) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit. (14) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. Cit. (15) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit.

Insurgency Overview The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is an ethnic armed organization in Myanmar. Established in 1989, the UWSA is the military wing of the United Wa State Party (UWSP). The UWSP governs the autonomous Wa State within Myanmar. In a country with numerous decades-long insurgencies, the UWSA is the largest of Myanmar’s various ethnic militias. Over 30,000 strong, it is well-armed and highly organized. The UWSA’s mandate is to defend and expand Wa state, securing its sovereignty and economy (1) . The UWSA is also a drug trafficking organization, having produced and trafficked large quantities of opioids and methamphetamines since its inception. The UWSA and its leaders have been sanctioned and designated as major drug traffickers by American law enforcement organizations. Wa State is nestled in a mountainous region along the Myanmar-China border. Although it has not seceded from Myanmar, it has been granted complete independence from the central government. In the ongoing Myanmar Civil War, the UWSA has stayed neutral and Wa State is one of the few stable areas of the country (2) . UWSA forces entering Hopeng in January 2024, a contested town in southern Shan State. History & Foundations For millennia, the Wa people have inhabited the mountainous area along what is today the border region between Myanmar, China, and Thailand. During British colonial rule over Myanmar, then known as Burma, the Wa states were left unadministered, as they were extremely rural and inaccessible. Well into the twentieth century, the Wa lived as independent tribes spread across the mountainous region. When British emissaries approached them with promises of modern technology and governance, the Wa rejected these offers, preferring to stay independent (1) . Burma achieved its independence in 1948. The next year, nationalist Kuomintang forces fled across the Chinese border into Burma following the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. Equipped and funded by the CIA, the Kuomintang established its presence in the region and began to produce opium, a practice that dates back centuries in Myanmar, and created the foundations for the drug hotbed now known as the Golden Triangle (1) . The Kuomintang forced local farmers to produce large quantities of opium, increasing the supply of the drug. When they approached the Wa, the nationalists found they would not be easily swayed. The Kuomintang traded their CIA-supplied arms to Wa clan leaders in exchange for opium, allowing the Wa to strengthen their power and expand their territory. This allowed these leaders to become warlords, though they remained small and disorganized. One of these minor warlords was the future leader of the United Wa State Army, Bao Youxiang (2) . Following Burma’s independence, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) began an insurgency against the newly independent democratic government and the Kuomintang. The CPB established itself in Wa territory in the late 1960s, successfully recruiting many members from the existing Wa militias, including Bao Youxiang. It maintained control over the region until a mutiny led by the Wa resulted in the party’s collapse in 1989. The CPB’s leaders were exiled to China. In its wake, Youxiang and other leaders of the mutiny established Wa State and the UWSA in an effort to maintain their independence from outside forces. China supported the Wa in their efforts to rid their territory of the orthodox Maoist CPB as the Chinese Communist Party progressed ideologically (1) . Following the mutiny, the UWSA made peace with Burma’s ruling military junta, which had seized power in 1988 and renamed the country Myanmar in 1989. This peace was maintained under the condition that the Wa were granted complete autonomy. The UWSA fought alongside government forces against the Mong Tai Army (MTA), a competing narco-militia led by the notorious drug lord Khun Sa. Following the MTA’s defeat in 1996, the UWSA took control of an area directly south of the Wa’s ancestral lands along the Thai border, allowing the UWSA’s drug production and trafficking operations to explode (3) . Wei Xuegang, a major player in the UWSA and one of the group’s founders, was assigned to manage Southern Wa State in 1996. Xuegang is the son of a Kuomintang member who fled to Burma following its defeat and became active in the opium trade (2) . As a young man, he joined the MTA and developed a close relationship with Khun Sa. He left the MTA for the UWSA in 1989. After the fall of Khun Sa, Xuegang became Southeast Asia’s top drug kingpin, managing key logistics for the UWSA’s drug trafficking operation. A modest, unassuming man, Xuegang drew little attention to himself, not giving law enforcement agencies much to work with. He spoke Chinese, helping the Wa establish worldwide trafficking networks (4) . In 1995, Bao Youxiang was appointed the leader of the UWSA and UWSP, taking over from the previous leader Zhao Nyi Lai, whose health was deteriorating. Facing increasing pressure from the US, China, and other international powers, Youxiang promised to cease opium production by 2005. He destroyed poppy fields and relocated opium farmers to more fertile regions where they could grow other crops. However, as the UWSA showed to the world that they were moving away from drug trafficking, in reality it was just adapting to a changing market. It began to switch its focus to Yaa Baa, a methamphetamine pill that was exploding in popularity across Southeast Asia. Meaning “madness drug,” Yaa Baa is a combination of methamphetamine and caffeine (1) . Wei Xuegang was indicted in the US for drug trafficking in 2005 (1) . By this point, he had already transitioned to becoming a mostly legitimate businessman. In 1998, he started the Hong Pang Group, now known as the Thawda Win Company, a conglomerate of businesses in construction, mining, agriculture, and other sectors. He remains a fugitive and his current whereabouts are unknown (4) . In 2009, the UWSA fought against government forces during the Kokang incident. The government moved into the Kokang region north of Wa State to dismantle the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s (MNDAA) drug production facilities, leading to a standoff that resulted in skirmishes between ethnic militias and government forces. Although the MNDAA was defeated, the UWSA withdrew. Wa State remained unaffected; however the incident soured relations between the Wa and the government (6) . Myanmar began another attempt at transitioning to democracy in 2011. After a decade of a tedious civilian government, the various insurgencies in Myanmar escalated from a low-intensity conflict to a full-blown civil war in 2021. The military deposed the country’s democratically elected government in a coup d’etat and the country’s ethnic armed organizations took sides (5) . The UWSA has largely stayed out of the war while supplying various sides and becoming a diplomatic middleman. It is a member of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, a group of armed organizations seeking to negotiate with the ruling military junta (1) . After years of diplomatic attempts from the Thai government to deal with the UWSA’s military presence and drug trafficking along the Myanmar-Thailand border, tensions rose in November 2024 when Thai forces were deployed to the area. This occurred in response to alleged encroachments by UWSA bases into Thailand. As of January 2025, Wa and Thai officials are currently in talks to resolve the issue (7) . A UWSA military propaganda video. Objectives & Ideology The United Wa State Army has been extremely pragmatic in preserving Wa sovereignty and self-determination. The group seeks to preserve Wa culture while maintaining its control over Wa State. Its ideology and activities revolve around this. Its authoritarian, socialist government mirrors that of its closest ally, China, to maintain their positive relations, which the Wa rely on to ensure the continued existence of Wa State. However, their focus is ultimately on Wa nationalism, not a particular strain of socialism. The UWSA does not seek to secede from Myanmar, as it is currently able to maintain its independence without jeopardizing its stability (1) . The UWSA’s purpose is to ensure Wa State’s independence and safeguard its drug trafficking operation, which Wa State has relied on to fund the UWSA and support its economic independence from the rest of Myanmar. There is a strong sense of militarism in Wa culture stemming from the tribal period. Today, this is exemplified by the UWSA’s elaborate military parades and compulsory military service (2) . Political & Military Capabilities Wa State is a de facto sovereign nation. It has its own public works, government, economy, and military, the latter being the United Wa State Army. Wa State is a one-party socialist state with a population of roughly one million ruled by the United Wa State Party. It is very difficult for outsiders to enter and the government is typically hostile toward foreign media and NGOs. Wa State has borrowed certain things from its ally China, such as its government style, language, and currency. Currently, it is the most stable region in Myanmar (2) . The UWSA is extremely well-armed and funded, as it has armed itself with the proceeds of the drug trade throughout its history. Most of its weapons are supplied from China, though the CCP denies this (3) . The UWSA possesses modern, military grade-weapons in its arsenal, including small arms, artillery, missiles, armored vehicles, tanks, drones, and even helicopters. There are roughly 30,000 soldiers in the Army, with 10,000 auxiliary troops. One male from each household is required to serve in either the UWSA or the Wa State administration (2) . There are dozens of methamphetamine factories in Wa State, concentrated in the southern exclave. The UWSA used to produce drugs in its own facilities, but its drug production is now handled by ethnic Chinese criminal groups in Wa territory protected by the UWSA in exchange for a portion of their profits. Drugs have long been trafficked across the Thai border, where they are then distributed by criminal networks across Southeast Asia and worldwide. However, since the UWSA transitioned from opium to methamphetamines, it has primarily trafficked within Asia, where it dominates a $60 billion market and avoids Western attention. Today, the UWSP claims it has transitioned to legitimate industries, such as mining and agriculture. The world’s third largest tin mine is in Wa State. It also benefits from its close relationship with China as a political ally and trading partner (2) . Approach to Resistance The UWSA has been quick to adapt to changing trends in the drug trade. Long before heroin was made largely obsolete by fentanyl and synthetic opioids, the UWSA had already transitioned to producing methamphetamines. This also allowed the UWSA to present to the world the claim that the Wa had quit the drug trade, legitimizing Wa State and deflecting attention from Western law enforcement agencies. The $60 billion methamphetamine trade in Southeast Asia is extremely profitable, with anywhere from two to six billion Yaa Baa pills being produced annually in Wa State. The UWSA has also become involved in arms trafficking to other ethnic armed organizations, as well as human trafficking and online scams (2) . Since securing its territory and sovereignty, the UWSA has sparingly engaged in conflict with other groups and serves a primarily defensive purpose (3) . It is a tool for the UWSP to secure its independence and legitimacy. It also serves as muscle for the drug trade in Wa State. It has positioned itself as neutral in the ongoing Myanmar civil war, allowing it to influence diplomatic relations between the war’s various factions to the benefit of Wa State (5) . The UWSA benefits from military and economic advantages due to Wa State’s geography. It borders both China and Thailand, making it easy for arms to come in and drugs to go out. This area is difficult to access, as it is extremely isolated and mountainous, giving the UWSA a strong defensive position. This may also explain why the Wa are so fiercely independent and have retained their traditional ways for much longer than other ethnic groups in Myanmar. The land in Wa State is not ideal for growing most crops due to the poor soil and cold climate, but it is perfect for opium production. While most crops would go bad by the time they reached larger markets given Wa State’s remote location, opium keeps for much longer. These factors, as well as the impressive profit margins, are why many poor farmers opted to grow the opium poppy instead of other crops (2) . UWSA troops with various small arms, including self-produced and Chinese-sourced rifles. Relations & Alliances The UWSA has been backed by China since 1989, which has been crucial to arming the UWSA and ensuring Wa State’s continued existence. In exchange, China is able to control drug trafficking and insurgency on its border, fostering stability and preventing smaller factions from frequently erupting into violence. The UWSA also does not traffic drugs produced in Wa State to China, explaining why the methamphetamine epidemic that has hit many countries in Southeast Asia has not reached China. The Wa and China have enjoyed a stable relationship, and Wa leaders have been seen many times with high-ranking members of the CCP (2) . The Wa have had a tense but mutually beneficial relationship with the Myanmar government in its various forms over the years. Their agreement to not secede and to maintain peace in exchange for sovereignty has held up with few exceptions, such as the Kokang incident. Meanwhile, the UWSA has also fought alongside the Myanmar military in an operation to remove Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army from southern Shan State. However, the UWSA has declined the government’s requests to sign the National Ceasefire Agreement and disarm, as the operation sees its arsenal as critical to its independence (3) . The government has also largely overlooked the UWSA’s drug operation. This has caused antagonism from countries in Southeast Asia where its drugs have been trafficked, such as Thailand (7) . As the UWSA’s drug trafficking operation began to move massive amounts of heroin into the United States and globally, it began attracting attention from the CIA and DEA. The CIA already had an interest in the Wa due to the communist insurgency in their land from 1948 to 1989, and the organization unsuccessfully tried to recruit Wa warriors to fight against the CPB. The DEA also had informants inside the UWSA’s ranks, including high-ranking commander Saw Lu, who became an informant during the early 1990s. However, this caused tension between the CIA and the DEA, as the former believed it should be handling the UWSA given the geopolitical implications (2) . The DEA has helped sanction and indict key leaders, such as Bao Youxiang and Wei Xuegang, limiting their economic activities (1) . It has also collaborated with Myanmar’s central government and other countries in the region, such as Thailand and Laos, to combat drug trafficking in Southeast Asia. However, following the UWSA’s transition from opioids to methamphetamines in the early 2000s, the group has gone under the radar of American law enforcement agencies. Since the UWSA is only trafficking within Southeast Asia, it is not of particular interest to the US, compared to other drug trafficking organizations that pose a more direct threat (2) . The UWSA has aligned itself with and against Myanmar’s various other armed ethnic organizations to its own strategic benefit. However, it has mostly avoided engaging in conflict with other groups, preferring to focus on its economic activities. Currently, it leads the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee, consisting of the UWSA and six other ethnic armed organizations, four of which are in the Northern Alliance currently fighting against the ruling military junta in the civil war. Formed in 2017, before the civil war, the Committee exists to negotiate with the now-exiled central government of Myanmar (1) . Works Cited (1) - Lintner, B. (2019). The United Wa State Army and Burma’s Peace Process. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/04/united-wa-state-army-and-burmas-peace-process . (2) - Winn, P. (2024). Narcotopia: In Search of the Asian Drug Cartel That Survived the CIA. PublicAffairs. (3) - Lintner, B. (2019, September 18). Why Myanmar’s Wa always get what they want. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2019/09/why-myanmars-wa-always-get-what-they-want/ . (4) - Zaw, A. (2020, March 9). Shadowy Drug Lord Wei Hsueh-kang’s Influence Still Felt in Myanmar’s Wa Region and Beyond. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/commentary/shadowy-drug-lord-wei-hsueh-kangs-influence-still-felt-myanmars-wa-region-beyond.html . (5) - Davis, A. (2022, February 22). Wa an early winner of Myanmar’s post-coup war. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2022/02/wa-an-early-2er-of-myanmars-post-coup-war/ . (6) - The Euro-Burma Office (2009). The Kokang Clashes – What Next? https://euroburmaoffice.s3.amazonaws.com/filer_public/b5/e5/b5e5f9ca-6754-4d38-b52b-94c1a1a05c56/6_analysis_no_1_kokang.pdf . (7) - The Irrawaddy (2024, November 26). Tensions High on Myanmar Border as Thai Troops Demand UWSA Withdrawal. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/tensions-high-on-myanmar-border-as-thai-troops-demand-uwsa-withdrawal.html .

Insurgency Overview The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a Sudanese government-funded and operated paramilitary force. The RSF grew out of the Janjaweed militias, which fought for the Sudanese government during the War in Darfur, and they engaged in anti-democratic operations during the 2019 Sudanese political crisis (Al Jazeera 2019) . The actions carried out by the RSF during the war in Darfur have been qualified as crimes against humanity for the rape and displacement of ethnic & religious minorities (Loeb 2015) . Nominally administered and commanded by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of the Sudanese government, they are commanded by the Sudanese Armed Forces during military operations. During the Khartoum Massacre, The RSF used heavy weaponry to disperse a protest and sit-in, killing over 100 people and wounding many more. The massacre in Khartoum occurred due to protests which opposed the creation of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) headed by the RSF commander Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemetti” (formally the deputy leader of the TMC but known as the de facto real leader) (Tharoor 2019) . History & Foundations While not created for a specific political purpose, the RSF are the effective officialization of the pre-existing Janjaweed militias. This has made them an ‘official uniformed force’ (Dabanga Sudan 2014) and they have resumed activities constituting crimes against humanity (Hashim 2022) . The RSF was officially formed in August of 2013 under the previously mentioned NISS, following a restructuring of the Janjaweed militias in Sudan. This reformation of the Janjaweed followed attacks carried out by the Sudanese Revolutionary Front against the government of then-president Omar al-Bashir (SudanTribune 2014) . Objectives & Ideology Officially, the group has stated that its role is counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations (Rapid Support Forces 2022) . Nonetheless, the validity of these self-proclaimed objectives has been highly disputed, notably as the group has been accused of human rights violations and of enabling coup d’états by the country’s ruling political elite (TRT World 2021) . The forces which fall under the Rapid Support Forces umbrella do not have an overarching ideological basis, though they have been used by their leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as a tool to remain in power by cracking down on pro-democracy protests and other ‘anti-government’ activities (Henry 2019) . Military & Political Abilities The group has effective and embedded military and political capabilities. Due to the formation of the Janjaweed militias and the then officialization of the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces, their ability has only developed. The group has an extensive armoury of equipment, including both light and heavy weaponry. Images of the group regularly feature small arms, such as AK-47s or PKM machine guns, as well as truck-mounted DShK heavy machine guns. The group has also been photographed receiving training from “white-skinned men in camouflaged green uniforms” where witnesses said they “speak Russian” (صوت الهامش 2019) . The group is therefore rumoured to be receiving training from the PMC Wagner Group who has been active in large portions of conflict-stricken Africa (Gadret 2022) . This possible training by former Russian and ex-soviet state military advisors could be adding expertise that could henceforth increase the lethality and effectiveness of the group as a fighting force. Approach to Resistance The group is known to be extremely violent (in comparison/relation to other regional groups) which have led to accusations of ethnic cleansing and rape/terror (Mwatana for Human Rights 2022) . Additionally, the group has taken on a more organised and military-style appearance since its formalisation under the Rapid Support Forces. This has led to the group being used as a counter-insurgent force in Yemen as a part of the Saudi coalition fighting against the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement. The RSF’s experience in Sudan as a counterinsurgency force has been the main driving force behind its use in Yemen and the capabilities which the force holds to conduct these operations have been used extensively. The Saudi-led military force has been seeking to aggressively hold and clear large areas of territory in northern Yemen and – due to a lack of willingness to use its military – it has been quick to use the RSF’s counterinsurgency capabilities (Heras 2017) . International Relations & Alliances The officialization of the RSF has allowed the group to gain access to a wider set of contacts through their commander and the wider Sudanese government. This has come in varying forms, including the European Union funding the Sudanese government to control migration coming through Sudan and across the Sahara towards the Libyan coast (International Organisation for Migration 2016) . Although the EU has denied that the RSF has received any of the $155 million funding (European Commission 2017) , there have been accusations that due to the RSF's role in securing the border, they will in part receive funding indirectly (Dabanga Sudan 2016) . Sudan had spent several years trying to strengthen ties with Iran and its government with a military cooperation agreement being signed in 2008 (SudanTribune 2008) . Additionally, Iranian naval and logistical bases in Port Sudan were constructed in 2013 (Bodansky 2013) . However, with the Iranian refusal to help during the economic troubles which hit Sudan following South Sudanese independence in 2011, the Sudanese government began seeking support elsewhere (Al-Monitor 2015) . This included seeking support from the Qatari government (SudanTribune 2013) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gulf News 2015) which deposited large amounts of currency into the Sudanese central bank. This ‘buying’ of support from the Sudanese government has led directly to the RSF being utilised in the Yemen war and is evident in the forces’ extensive international contacts and their relations through the central Sudanese government. Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. 2019. “Who Are Sudan’s RSF and Their Commander Hemeti?” Www.aljazeera.com. 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/6/who-are-sudans-rsf-and-their-commander-hemeti Al-Monitor. 2015. “Sudan Gets $2.2B for Joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen War.” Www.al-Monitor.com. November 23, 2015. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html Bodansky, Yossef. 2013. “Iran and Sudan Begin to Execute Moves to Dominate Central & Western Africa.” OilPrice.com. July 2, 2013. https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Iran-and-Sudan-Begin-to-Execute-Moves-to-Dominate-Central-Western-Africa.html. Dabanga Sudan. 2014. “‘Sudan Regime Revived Janjaweed to Attack Civilians’: Activists.” Radio Dabanga. June 27, 2014. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-regime-revived-janjaweed-to-attack-civilians-activists. ———. 2016. “EU: ‘No Support to Sudan’s RSF.’” Radio Dabanga. September 6, 2016. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/eu-no-support-to-sudan-s-rsf. European Commission. 2017. “Parliamentary Question | Answer to Question No E-007564/16 | E-007564/2016(ASW) | European Parliament.” Www.europarl.europa.eu. February 10, 2017. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-007564-ASW_EN.html. Gadret, Barthélemy. 2022. “What Is Wagner Doing in Africa?” The Best of Africa. January 27, 2022. https://thebestofafrica.org/content/what-is-wagner-doing-in-africa. Gulf News. 2015. “Saudi Arabia Deposits $1b in Sudan Central Bank.” Gulfnews.com. August 13, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/saudi-arabia-deposits-1b-in-sudan-central-bank-1.1566103. Hashim, Mohanad. 2022. “Darfur: Why Are Sudan’s Janjaweed on the Attack Again?” BBC News , April 26, 2022, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-61217999. Henry, Jehanne. 2019. “‘They Were Shouting “Kill Them.”’” Human Rights Watch. November 17, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum. Heras, Nicholas A. 2017. “Sudan’s Controversial Rapid Support Forces Bolster Saudi Efforts in Yemen.” Jamestown. October 27, 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-efforts-yemen/. International Organisation for Migration. 2016. “EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process).” International Organization for Migration. February 26, 2016. https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process. Loeb, Jonathan. 2015. “‘Men with No Mercy.’” Human Rights Watch. September 9, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan. Mwatana for Human Rights. 2022. “Yemen: Sudanese Forces of the Coalition Commit Sexual Violence in Hajjah - Yemen | ReliefWeb.” Reliefweb.int. October 23, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sudanese-forces-coalition-commit-sexual-violence-hajjah. Rapid Support Forces. 2022. “Rapid Support Forces.” RSF. 2022. https://rsf.gov.sd/. SudanTribune. 2008. “Darfur Mission, a Test for Europe’s Capacity to Act in Africa Conflicts.” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. March 4, 2008. https://sudantribune.com/article26294/. ———. 2013. “Qatar to Deposit $1 Billion in Sudan’s Central Bank: Report.” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. October 2, 2013. https://sudantribune.com/article47301/. ———. 2014. “What about the Leaked Sudanese Regime Documents?” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. September 30, 2014. https://sudantribune.com/article51298/. صوت الهامش. 2019. “قوات روسية تدرب مليشيا الدعم السريع وترافقها للخرطوم - Russian Forces Train the Rapid Support Militia and Accompany It to Khartoum.” صوت الهامش. صوت الهامش. January 2, 2019. https://www.alhamish.com/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%AA/. Tharoor, Ishaan. 2019. “Analysis | the Warlord Wrecking Sudan’s Revolution.” Washington Post , June 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/06/18/warlord-wrecking-sudans-revolution/. TRT World. 2021. “Who Are Rapid Support Forces, the Coup Enablers in Sudan?” Who Are Rapid Support Forces, the Coup Enablers in Sudan? October 26, 2021. https://cms.trtworld.com/magazine/who-are-rapid-support-forces-the-coup-enablers-in-sudan-51078. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview ​​ Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and militant group. It is led by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah since 1992. As an organisation it has several wings, one being the paramilitary wing (known as the Jihad Council) and it has a political wing present within the Lebanese parliament (known as the ‘Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc’ party) (Levitt p15, 2013) . Established 3 years after the end of the 1982 Lebanon War by Shia clerics, it modelled itself after the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini and it adopted the name 'Hezbollah' following training received by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps instructors (Shatz, 2004) . Listing several objectives in its 1985 manifesto, it took on an overtly anti-imperialist tone calling for the expulsion of "to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land" (Hezbollah, 1988) . Hezbollah has also participated in multiple conflicts from its inception and even organised volunteers to fight alongside the Bosniak army during the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 (Fisk, 2014) . Hezbollah has participated in Lebanese politics since 1990. When a national unity government was formed in 2008, they, along with allied parties, gained enough seats (11 out of 30) to attain a veto power, henceforth enabling them to have serious control over the flow of Lebanese politics (CFR, 2008) . In the 2018 Lebanese general election, the Hezbollah political wing held 12 seats and its alliance won the general election and gained a majority of 70 out of 128 seats in the parliament (Reuters Staff, 2018) . Maintaining strong support within Lebanon’s Shia community (BBC Middle East, 2005) and support amongst Lebanon’s Christian communities (Zirulnik, 2012) , it has also participated in Syria’s Civil war since 2012 on the side of the Syrian Government under Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah militias have been deployed to Syria and Iraq in order to train local militias (Hashem, 2014) as well as fight against Islamic State forces (Sly and Haidamous, 2015) . Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries, as well as by the European Union (Kanter and Rudoren, 2013) and most of the Arab League with some exceptions, that being Lebanon and Iraq (Wedeman, 2017) . The Gulf Cooperation Council also designated the organisation as a terrorist group through a unanimous decision and said it would “take measures against the group’s interest in the Gulf countries” (Al-Tamimi, 2013) . Interestingly, Russia has not designated the group as a terrorist organisation but rather as a "legitimate socio-political force" (Reuters Staff, 2015) which may indicate its attempts to draw closer relations with Iran, who have consistently supported Hezbollah with both arms, funding and training through the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp) (Goldberg, 2002) . History & Foundations Hezbollah evolved into a formidable paramilitary force in Lebanon during the 1980s, influenced directly by Israel's 1982 invasion of the nation. Shortly after its inception, Hezbollah engaged in prolonged guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, with Iranian financial and ideological support (BBC Middle East, 2010) . This newly-formed group extended its operations beyond Lebanon's borders, targeting Western interests such as the U.S. embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks, resulting in significant casualties and global attention. These events solidified Hezbollah's reputation as a 'determined and formidable group', drawing both international condemnation and support from select nations. Hezbollah strategically positioned itself within Lebanon's socio-political landscape, becoming a major player and laying the groundwork for future conflicts that would profoundly impact the nation's history. Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah continued to grow in power, solidifying its position in Lebanon's political and security landscape, while extending its influence further afield. The group's actions continued to involve protracted battles with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, prompted by Hezbollah's persistent attacks. Israeli military offensives in 1992 ("Operation Accountability") and 1996 ("Operation Grapes of Wrath") responded to these attacks, resulting in civilian casualties and extensive displacement. However, these campaigns failed to weaken Hezbollah's resolve. Instead, the organisation balanced its roles as an armed force and a political actor, leveraging its military strength to bolster its political standing within Lebanon's complex political framework. As the decade progressed, Hezbollah's support in Lebanon grew, granting it significant influence and representation in the Lebanese parliament and administration. By openly supporting the Assad administration in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah expanded its regional influence, albeit amid global controversy (Fanack, 2015) . The 1990s saw Hezbollah's military activities, political ambitions, and regional involvement intertwine, shaping Lebanon's socio-political structure and impacting the broader Middle East. In the 2000s, Hezbollah's complex and significant role in the Middle East continued to evolve. The organisation entered the new millennium with unwavering determination, eventually leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, partly due to Hezbollah's persistent resistance (Leung, 2003) . This withdrawal showcased Hezbollah's resilience and established its reputation as a formidable regional adversary. Hezbollah's use of hit-and-run tactics, such as ambushing Israeli patrols and launching rockets at Israeli settlements, severely strained Israel's military capabilities. Simultaneously, the group's social welfare initiatives, including support for hospitals, schools, and the families of "martyrs," garnered support within the Lebanese Shiite community, strengthening its domestic base. Tensions with Israel persisted, culminating in a full-scale conflict in 2006, triggered primarily by Hezbollah's capture of Israeli troops. This conflict resulted in extensive damage to Lebanon's infrastructure and civilian population. Hezbollah demonstrated its military capabilities by firing thousands of rockets into Israeli territory, forcing mass evacuations. Its use of advanced weapons, including anti-ship missiles, showcased its ability to counter Israeli aggression, raising concerns regionally and globally. The 2006 war further solidified Hezbollah's reputation as a fervently anti-Israel resistance group, drawing both criticism and support. While Saudi Arabia denounced Hezbollah's actions, some Arab states viewed them as part of the larger Arab-Israeli confrontation and offered implicit support. The conflict also exposed the limitations of Israel's military strength, prompting a reevaluation of its tactics (Nasrallah, 2006) . Hezbollah's political influence in Lebanon continued to grow, shaping the nation's governance and societal structure. Its increased involvement in the Syrian civil war further stoked regional tensions and global attention. Hezbollah played a pivotal role in supporting the Assad regime, contributing to its territorial gains and the shifting tide of the war. However, this military engagement sparked international criticism and strained relations with certain Arab nations, who saw Hezbollah's involvement in Syria as unwarranted interference. As the decade concluded, Hezbollah's multifaceted actions in the 2000s underscored the intricate interplay between its military endeavours, domestic political ascent, and regional involvement, significantly impacting the Middle East's geopolitical landscape. These events emphasised Hezbollah's dual identity as a political actor and an armed non-state entity, a defining feature that would continue to shape its identity in the years ahead. In the 2010s, Hezbollah maintained and expanded its influence, further shaping the Middle East's complex geopolitical landscape. Its dual status as a political organisation and an armed non-state actor remained central to its prominence in Lebanon and the region. Hezbollah deepened its involvement in the Syrian civil war, solidifying its regional power by steadfastly supporting the Assad government (Chulov, 2013) . Despite international scrutiny and tensions with some Arab states, Hezbollah retained its strong presence in Lebanon's domestic politics. However, its growing influence and alignment with Iran led to criticism and hostility from various Lebanese political factions, causing internal tensions. Furthermore, Hezbollah's conflicts with Israel escalated, occasionally resulting in clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. Tensions increased due to allegations of Hezbollah attempting to acquire precision-guided missiles, which raised security concerns for Israel. The 2010s highlighted the complex nature of Hezbollah's actions, reshaping power dynamics and security in the Middle East. The 2020s continued to witness Hezbollah's influence, building on its established prominence and multifaceted role in the region. The organisation's diverse activities continued to impact regional geopolitics, raising concerns about stability and security. Hezbollah's sustained involvement in the Syrian civil war, coupled with its support for the Assad government, solidified its status as Iran's reliable partner. This dedication drew increased international scrutiny and strained relations with some Arab states. Hezbollah maintained a strong presence in Lebanon's domestic politics, exerting political influence and participating in governance. However, its expanding influence and alignment with Iran caused tensions and challenges within Lebanon. Moreover, Hezbollah's conflicts with Israel intensified, with occasional clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. Heightened hostilities resulted from the organisation's alleged efforts to acquire precision-guided missiles, raising concerns for Israeli security. The complexities of Hezbollah's actions in the 2020s underscored its multifaceted nature and its pivotal role in reshaping power relations and security in the Middle East. Objectives & Ideology Hezbollah's ideology has been described as Shi’ite radicalism and it follows the Islamic Shi’a theology which was developed by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Jamail, 2006) . Although the group had originally been formed in order to transform Lebanon into an Islamic Republic (much like other groups in the region), this was abandoned in order to create a more inclusive country (BBC Middle East, 2010) . The group has several stated goals, with one of its most well-known being the elimination of the State of Israel. It has argued that continued hostilities against Israel are justified as retaliation for what they claim is Israeli occupation of Lebanese core territory (Mitnick, 2006) . Also due to the fact that Hezbollah considers Israel to be an illegitimate invading force, they frame their resistance of Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory and also any actions they carry out against Israeli forces as acts of defensive jihad, further legitimising (amongst Islamist circles) their actions (Memri, 1999) . Regarding Israel and Judaism, there have been accusations that Hezbollah is anti-semitic in nature. This involves statements from Hezbollah's secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in which he denies the holocaust and has stated that “God imprinted blasphemy on the Jews’ hearts” (Weinthal, 2012) . There have also been efforts by Hezbollah-aligned attorneys -- as well as other legal organisations within Lebanon -- to remove what they consider ‘Israeli influence’ in the education system of Lebanon. For example, this has involved pressuring schools to drop chapters of Anne Frank's Diary, an effort which has been deemed a “blatant expression of holocaust denial” and an “intimidation campaign” (JTA, 2009) . However, in response, Hezbollah's Al-Manar television asked how long Lebanon would “remain an open arena for the zionist invasion of education” (JTA, 2009) . Military & Political Abilities Hezbollah has extensive military and political abilities which rival many of the local regions' states and its integration into the Lebanese state has proven beneficial for the organisation in terms of both its military and political abilities. This is due to the fact that as it is now a legitimate party within Lebanon it has utilised its position in several ways in order to enhance the aforementioned abilities. Hezbollah's political abilities have been enhanced by its integration into the Lebanese state through its holding of 13 seats in Lebanon's parliament. Hezbollah has been described as “the most powerful political movement in Lebanon” (Byman, 2008) and it has formed several political alliances within the country. One of these alliances is with the March 8 Alliance, which Hezbollah joined in March of 2005. This Alliance is a coalition of political parties and other independent candidates in Lebanon, formed in 2005, and is marked by its pro-Syrian government stance. The origins for the name of the alliance is a reference to a mass demonstration called for by large political parties in downtown Beirut, in response to the Cedar Revolution (which called for the removal of pro-Syrian government influences as well as the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon). This demonstration, however, thanked Syria for their help in stopping the Lebanese Civil War and the aid which the Syrian government provided in supporting Lebanese resistance to Israeli occupation years prior. Simultaneously, it instead opposed the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon (Mouawad, 2005) . The March 8 Alliance holds 61 out of the 128 seats in the Lebanese Parliament and also holds 16 out of the 24 seats in the Cabinet of Lebanon. This allows Hezbollah to exercise a significant degree of authority and sway in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah's military abilities are extensive and consist of several ‘wings’, much like the military branches found in state forces. It does not reveal the numbers of armed fighters which fight for the organisation, although the Gulf Research Centre, a Dubai-based think tank, has estimated that Hezbollah's armed wing comprises around 1,000 full time fighters and a further 6,000-10,000 volunteers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006) . It has been described as being militarily greater than the Lebanese army (Voice Of America, 2013) . In terms of equipment, Hezbollah has an extensive arsenal, including small arms from Eastern-bloc firearms such as AK-47s, AKMs and also AK-74s, to NATO firearms such as M16 rifles which have been sourced from Syria. The group has also acquired platforms such as the ORSIS T5000 sniper rifle, which is Russian in origin (Frantzman, 2023) and Iranian drone platforms. These Iranian drone platforms are actually more likely to be domestically-produced copies of Iranian technology provided to the group by the Iranian military and government, which enable Hezbollah to produce drones within Lebanese territory (The Associated Press, 2022) and these drones have been known to penetrate Israeli air defence systems (Hambling, 2016) . Hezbollah also possesses large quantities of unguided and guided rockets numbering from around 15,000 on the eve of the 2006 Lebanon War, in which they fired around 4,000 at Israel during the 34 day conflict. However, as of 2018, they have expanded their rocket arsenal which is now estimated to number at 130,000 (Shaikh and Williams, 2018) . Following the October 7th attacks in Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah has shown support for the latter by firing shells across the Israel-Lebanon border, as well as demonstrating solidarity and attempting to infiltrate Israel. According to some experts, Iran and Hezbollah likely advised and trained Hamas on how to attack Israel. However, Hamas claims that neither Iran nor Hezbollah was involved in planning its 2023 operation (CFR, n.d.) . Hezbollah has indicated a willingness to further support Hamas, which could escalate tensions and lead to more significant regional instability. However, how far Hezbollah will engage in this conflict remains uncertain, as deeper involvement could risk their political position within Lebanon. Approach to Resistance Hezbollah is extremely violent in its pursuit of the destruction of the state of Israel and the furthering of Iranian interests in the region. It has been involved in several instances of armed conflict with Israel such as the South Lebanon conflict from 1982-2000. The group has also allegedly utilised suicide attacks on some occasions, including the 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buanos Aires which killed 29 people in Argentina. This attack was attributed to the group given that Hezbollah operatives were revealed to have been apart of the atack (Alegra, 2023) . Hezbollah also provided fighters to muslim forces during the Bosnian war in order to defend muslim communities from Serbian attacks (Fisk, 2014) . They have also been implicated in the assassination of various figures in and around the Middle East, such as the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister who was killed alongside 21 other people by a roadside bomb in Beirut (BBC Middle East, 2020) . They have also operated widely outside of the Middle East and Lebanon, with Hezbollah operating openly in South America in Paraguay. In particular, there are allegations that the Venezuelan government has aided them in the form of money laundering amongst other methods of support (StratFor, 2018) . International Relations & Potential Alliances Hezbollah has several significant international relations. It has close relations with Iran and Hezbollah regards the Iranian spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, as “its ultimate authority” (Halliday, 2006) . The group also has close ties to the Syrian government under Bashar Al-Assad and, since 2012, the group has helped the Syrian government during the Syrian Civil War in the fight against rebel groups (Al Jazeera, 2014) . They also have relations with several other Islamic movements such as Hamas (CRS, 2006) and they also have an alleged relationship with al-Qaeda -- a claim made by Israeli and US military intelligence. Nevertheless, due to the disagreements between the Sunni and Shia religious sects, this seems unlikely and Hezbollah has released statements claiming that these allegations were propagated by US intelligence to “mislead international public opinion so as to sway it against Hezbollah and cover up Israel's crimes against the Palestinian people” (People's Daily, 2006) . Multiple nations such as the USA, the UK, Israel, and organisations such as the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League have declared the group as a terrorist organisation, whereas some nations such as France have only declared the military wing a terrorist organisation whilst viewing the political wing as a legitimate sociopolitical organisation (JNS, 2013) . Similarly, Russia has also refused to label the entirety of Hezbollah a terror organisation and instead considers it a legitimate sociopolitical organisation (Times Of Israel, 2015) . Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. “Hezbollah in Syria’s War.” Www.aljazeera.com , 2 May 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/5/2/the-role-of-hezbollah-in-syrias-war. Al-Tamimi, Sultan. “GCC: Hezbollah Terror Group.” Arab News , 3 June 2013, www.arabnews.com/news/453834. Alegra, Shlomo. “Hezbollah’s Deadly Attacks: Targeting Americans and Israelis.” Blogs.timesofisrael.com , 13 Aug. 2023, blogs.timesofisrael.com/hezbollahs-deadly-attacks-targeting-americans-and-israelis/. BBC Middle East. “Huge Beirut Protest Backs Syria.” News.bbc.co.uk , 8 Mar. 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4329201.stm. ---. “Rafik Hariri Tribunal: Guilty Verdict over Assassination of Lebanon Ex-PM.” BBC News , 18 Aug. 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-53601710. ---. “Who Are Hezbollah?” News.bbc.co.uk , 4 July 2010, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4314423.stm. Byman, Daniel. “Hezbollah: Most Powerful Political Movement in Lebanon - Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations , 29 May 2008, web.archive.org/web/20130617010638/www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-most-powerful-political-movement-lebanon/p16378?breadcrumb=%2F. CFR. “Hezbollah (A.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah) - Council on Foreign Relations.” Web.archive.org , Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Sept. 2008, web.archive.org/web/20080913091527/www.cfr.org/publication/9155/hezbollah.html?breadcrumb=%2F. CFR. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations , Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah. Chulov, Martin. “Hezbollah’s Role in Syrian Conflict Ushers New Reality for Its Supporters.” The Guardian , 24 May 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/24/hezbollah-syria-new-reality-supporters. CRS. Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict . 21 July 2006, sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf. Fanack. “Hezbollah and the Price of Supporting Al-Assad.” The MENA Chronicle | Fanack , 27 July 2015, fanack.com/politics/features-insights/hezbollah-supporting-al-assad~47565/. Fisk, Robert. “It’s No Wonder Today’s Jihadis Have Set out on the Path to War In.” The Independent , 8 Sept. 2014, www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/after-the-atrocities-committed-against-muslims-in-bosnia-it-is-no-wonder-today-s-jihadis-have-set-9717384.html. Frantzman, Seth J. “What Does Hezbollah’s ‘Attack Video’ on Israel Reveal? - Analysis.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com , 17 July 2023, www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-750376. Goldberg, Jeffrey. “In the Party of God - Are Terrorists in Lebanon Preparing for a Larger War?” The New Yorker , 6 Oct. 2002, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/10/14/in-the-party-of-god. Halliday, Fred. “A Lebanese Fragment: Two Days with Hizbollah Fred Halliday - OpenDemocracy.” Web.archive.org , 20 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20060820114015/www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/hizbollah_3757.jsp. Hambling, David. “How Did Hezbollah’s Drone Evade a Patriot Missile?” Popular Mechanics , 29 July 2016, www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/a22114/hezbollah-drone-israel-patriot-missile/. Hashem, Ali. “Hezbollah Arrives in Iraq.” Www.al-Monitor.com , 26 Nov. 2014, www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iran-iraq-shiites-isis.html#Hezbollah. Hezbollah. “The Hizzballah Program: An Open Letter.” International Institute for Counter Terrorism , The Jerusalem Quarterly, 1 Jan. 1988, www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf. International Institute for Strategic Studies. “International Institute for Strategic StudiesHezbollah a Force to Be Reckoned With.” IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies , 18 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20080607095136/www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/hezbollah-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with. Jamail, Dahr. “Hezbollah’s Transformation.” Web.archive.org , 20 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20060720154531/www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html. JNS. “Jewish Leaders Applaud Hezbollah Terror Designation by France - Algemeiner.com.” Www.algemeiner.com , 4 Apr. 2013, www.algemeiner.com/2013/04/04/jewish-leaders-applaud-hezbollah-terror-designation-by-france/. JTA. “Hezbollah Pressures School into Dropping ‘Anne Frank.’” The Forward , 9 Nov. 2009, forward.com/news/breaking-news/118631/hezbollah-pressures-school-into-dropping-anne-fran/. Kanter, James, and Jodi Rudoren. “European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations.” The New York Times , 22 July 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/middleeast/european-union-adds-hezbollah-wing-to-terror-list.html. Leung, Rebecca. “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team of Terrorists.’” Www.cbsnews.com , 18 Apr. 2003, www.cbsnews.com/news/hezbollah-a-team-of-terrorists/. Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah : The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God . Georgetown University Press, 2013, p. 15. Memri. “Secretary General of Hizbullah Discusses the New Israeli Government and Hizbullah’s Struggle Against...” MEMRI , Middle East Media Research Institute, 23 June 1999, www.memri.org/reports/secretary-general-hizbullah-discusses-new-israeli-government-and-hizbullah%E2%80%99s-struggle. Mitnick, Joshua. “Behind the Dispute over Shebaa Farms.” Christian Science Monitor , 22 Aug. 2006, www.csmonitor.com/2006/0822/p10s01-wome.html. Mouawad, Jad. “Hezbollah Leads Huge Pro-Syrian Protest in Central Beirut.” The New York Times , 8 Mar. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/international/middleeast/hezbollah-leads-huge-prosyrian-protest-in-central.html. Nasrallah, Sayyed. “Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on the Divine Victory Rally in Beirut on 22-09-2006.” English.alahednews.com.lb , 22 Sept. 2006, www.english.alahednews.com.lb/709/447. Peoples Daily. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Denies Link with Al-Qaeda.” En.people.cn , 18 June 2006, en.people.cn/200207/01/eng20020701_98923.shtml. Reuters Staff. “Factbox: Hezbollah and Allies Gain Sway in Lebanon Parliament.” Reuters , 22 May 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-election-parliament-factbox-idUSKCN1IN1OJ. ---. “Russia Says Hezbollah Not a Terrorist Group: Ifax.” Reuters , 15 Nov. 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-terrorgro-idUSKCN0T412520151115. Shaikh, Shaan, and Ian Williams. “Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah | Missile Threat.” Missile Threat , 2018, missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/. Shatz, Adam. “In Search of Hezbollah | by Adam Shatz | the New York Review of Books.” Www.nybooks.com , 29 Apr. 2004, www.nybooks.com/articles/17060. Sly, Liz, and Suzan Haidamous. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Acknowledges Battling the Islamic State in Iraq.” Washington Post , The Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/lebanons-hezbollah-acknowledges-battling-the-islamic-state-in-iraq/2015/02/16/4448b21a-b619-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html. Stalinksy, Steven. “Hezbollah’s Nazi Tactics - the New York Sun.” Web.archive.org , 26 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20171010024529/www.nysun.com/foreign/hezbollahs-nazi-tactics/36717/. StratFor. “Hezbollah in South America: The Threat to Businesses.” Stratfor , 5 Feb. 2018, worldview.stratfor.com/article/hezbollah-south-america-threat-businesses. The Associated Press. “Hezbollah Claims It’s Making Drones and Missiles in Lebanon; Chief Offers Export Opportunity.” Defense News , 16 Feb. 2022, www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2022/02/16/hezbollah-claims-its-making-drones-and-missiles-in-lebanon-chief-offers-export-opportunity/. Times Of Israel. “Russia Says Hezbollah, Hamas Not Terror Groups.” Www.timesofisrael.com , 16 Nov. 2015, www.timesofisrael.com/russia-says-hezbollah-hamas-not-terror-groups/. Voice Of America. “Hezbollah Upsets the Balance in Lebanon.” Voice of America , 21 June 2013, web.archive.org/web/20130621233109/www.voanews.com/content/lebanon-syria-hezbollah/1682124.html. Wedeman, Ben. “Arab League States Condemn Hezbollah as ‘Terrorist Organization.’” CNN , 19 Nov. 2017, edition.cnn.com/2017/11/19/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-arab-league/index.html. Weinthal, Benjamin. “Analysis: Hezbollah’s Lethal Anti-Semitism.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com , 12 Nov. 2012, www.jpost.com/International/Analysis-Hezbollahs-lethal-anti-Semitism. Zirulnik, Ariel. “In Hezbollah Stronghold, Lebanese Christians Find Respect, Stability.” Christian Science Monitor , 21 Dec. 2012, www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1221/In-Hezbollah-stronghold-Lebanese-Christians-find-respect-stability. Additional Resources

Group Overview Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), known more commonly as Tahrir al-Sham, is an active militant Sunni Islamist group active in the Syrian Civil War. The group was formed in early 2017 as a merger between multiple Islamist groups, including the Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq, amongst others (Hummel 2017). The group is led by former members and leaders of multiple organisations such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Davison 2017). History & Foundations Initially formed as a jihadist and Salafist response to the Assad regime, HTS quickly formed a unified anti-Assad front. Interestingly, one of the precursor organisations to HTS -- Jabhat al-Nusra -- was al-Qaeda’s affiliate organisation in Syria. Their leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, had established his own source of funding through donors in the Persian Gulf and became a renowned insurgent leader. In July 2016, following the split of al-Qaeda from the Islamic State, Al-Nusra'a leadership announced a ‘rebranding’ of the organisation into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and severed ties with al-Qaeda. However, many analysts speculated that this was just a severing of public relations and that the group would continue to have a secret relationship with al-Qaeda (Hassan 2017). The following year, the organisation (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) rebranded itself into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and due to non-communication between the new HTS leadership and al-Qaeda, the split was viewed as illegal. Hence, the new Salafist organisation was publicly criticised for sowing fitna (division) by emphasising Syrian nationalism over the wider Salafist goal (Hummel 2018). Objectives & Ideology HTS has multiple objectives which are more locally focused on Syria and include the establishment of Islamic rule, as well as the toppling of the Assad Regime and the expelling of Iranian militias (Joscelyn 2017). Following the end of the Siege of Fu’a and Kafriya in 2018, HTS managed to remove Iranian-backed militias from the Syrian territory in which they operate (Al Jazeera 2018). One of HTS’s leaders, Abu Jaber, as well as several other of the leadership present within the group are known to hold Salafist Jihadist beliefs. This has influenced the group’s operations. However, a focus upon jihadism and the overthrow of a perceived anti-Islamist government within Syria has become the focus of HTS's objectives, much like the other AQ-aligned groups which are currently undertaking similar efforts in their own regions, such as AQIS (Al-Qaeda in Sinai Peninsula). Insurgent Abilities The military abilities of HTS are quite extensive due to the large number of recruits they claim to hold (12,000-15,000 militants), which has allowed them to conduct large-scale attacks. This has also allowed the jihadist group to participate directly in numerous large theatres of the Syrian civil war, such as the aforementioned siege of al-Fu’ah and Kafriya (or even the Daraa offensive in 2017). The group's tactics are very similar to other jihadist organisations and include suicide bombings. In 2017, Tahrir al-Sham suicide bombers attacked the headquarters of the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate in Homs and killed dozens of people, including the head of military intelligence in the region (Miles 2017). The group also produces its own 120 mm and 160 mm mortar cannons which it uses both offensively and defensively. Additionally, the group possesses numerous small arms and has been known to utilise flatbed trucks with attached heavy machine guns (known as technicals). This specific equipment has also been used by the group to shoot down a Syrian Fighter jet (Reuters 2019). Approach to Resistance The militant actions of the group involve violence to a significant extent, notably in order to achieve the group's stated aims of removing Iranian influence from Syria and toppling the Assad regime in Damascus. This has resulted in the group attacking the Syrian Army directly, and even engaging in battles against Syrian allies such as Russian forces. Russian warplanes have responded by targeting HTS positions (IWS 2021). The group has also been accused of carrying out attacks on civilians, which has led to the group being referred to as ‘Hetesh’ -- which is meant as a negative nickname, similar to the label ‘Daesh’ which was applied to ISIL as they were seen as no different (Tweedie 2017). International Relations & Potential Alliances HTS has a strenuous relationship with Al-Qaeda as it is claimed the group is operating as a secret arm of AQ within Syria, despite previous claims of separation. However, Ayman al-Zawahiri has opposed the split of HTS from AQ, saying that it was done without his consent and several prominent members of AQ’s leadership have claimed that the military leader of HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, is a tool of foreign powers (Katz 2018). There is a speculated alliance between HTS and Turkey, with the Turkish government designating HTS as a terrorist organisation whilst at the same time actively allowing it to fight alongside the TFSA (Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army). This has been speculated to be an attempt by the Turkish government to divide the elements of HTS from their more militaristic and dogmatic principles, and to bring it under Turkish control to combat the Assad regime and other Turkish-opposed groups in Northern Syria (Yüksel 2019). Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. 2018. “Thousands Set to Be Evacuated from Two Syrian Towns.” Www.aljazeera.com. July 18, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/18/syria-buses-arrive-to-evacuate-two-rebel-besieged-shia-towns. CSIS. 2018. “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) | Center for Strategic and International Studies.” Www.csis.org. 2018. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/past-projects/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir-al-sham. Davison, John. 2017. “Syria Islamist Factions, Including Former al Qaeda Branch, Join Forces: Statement.” Reuters , January 28, 2017, sec. World News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUSKBN15C0MV. Hassan, Hassan. 2017. “Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda: The Riddle, the Ruse and the Reality.” The National. November 1, 2017. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/jabhat-al-nusra-and-al-qaeda-the-riddle-the-ruse-and-the-reality-1.672221. Hummel, Kristina. 2017. “The Formation of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Wider Tensions in the Syrian Insurgency.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 22, 2017. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-formation-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-wider-tensions-in-the-syrian-insurgency/. ———. 2018. “How Al-Qa`ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate: The inside Story.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 15, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/. IWS. 2021. “Russian Warplanes Responded to HTS Attacks in Idlib Countryside + Video.” Islamic World News. November 23, 2021. https://english.iswnews.com/21439/russian-warplanes-responded-to-hts-attacks-in-idlib-countryside-video/. Joscelyn, Thomas. 2017. “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Leader Calls for ‘Unity’ in Syrian Insurgency | FDD’s Long War Journal.” Www.longwarjournal.org. February 10, 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/02/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-leader-calls-for-unity-in-syrian-insurgency.php. Katz, Rita. 2018. “Has Al-Qaeda Replanted Its Flag in Syria?” News.siteintelgroup.com. March 28, 2018. https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/434-has-al-qaeda-replanted-its-flag-in-syria-1. Miles, John Irish, Stephanie Nebehay, Tom. 2017. “Bombings, Air Strikes in Syria Rattle Geneva Peace Talks.” Reuters , February 25, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN16405J. Reuters. 2019. “Jihadist Group Claims It Shot down Syrian Warplane over Idlib.” Haaretz , August 15, 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/2019-08-15/ty-article/syrian-warplane-crashes-after-being-targeted-by-rebels-war-monitor-says/0000017f-ef89-da6f-a77f-ff8f118b0000?v=1667224698742. Tweedie, James. 2017. “Al-Qaida-Linked Hetesh ‘Stockpiling Chemical Weapons.’” Morning Star. October 29, 2017. https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f-2nd-syria-chemical-weapons. Yüksel, Engin. 2019. “Key Characteristics of Turkish Use of Syrian Armed Proxies | Strategies of Turkish Proxy Warfare in Northern Syria.” Www.clingendael.org. November 2019. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/strategies-of-turkish-proxy-warfare-in-northern-syria/4-key-characteristics-of-turkish-use-of-syrian-armed-proxies/. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview PEGIDA, short for "Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West," first emerged on October 20, 2014, in Dresden, Germany. This group of demonstrators quickly gained attention with slogans such as "Non-violent & united against religious wars on German soil," "Against religious fanaticism and every kind of radicalism. Together without violence," and "No Sharia in Europe." By late 2014 and early 2015, PEGIDA rallies attracted over 20,000 supporters, with similar movements springing up in other German cities (2,5) . Primarily, PEGIDA positions itself as an alliance opposed to the perceived spread of Islamism in Germany and Europe. Its demonstrations, which have remained largely peaceful, aim to protest what supporters see as the federal government’s misguided policies on immigration and integration. Beyond opposition to Islamism, many participants view PEGIDA’s protests as a way to express broader dissatisfaction with the political system and a growing distrust of institutions such as political parties, the media, churches, and associations. These concerns are often centered around fears of cultural change, particularly the perceived threat of foreign influence, with Islamism acting as a focal point for these anxieties. (2) History & Foundations Lutz Bachmann is regarded as the founder of the PEGIDA movement, having launched a Facebook group called “Peaceful Europeans Against the Islamization of the West” on October 11, 2014, focused on “rescuing the West”. This initiative was a response to violent clashes in early October between Kurds and Salafists in Hamburg and Celle amid the struggle over control of the Syrian city of Kobane. The group quickly gained thousands of followers and began holding Monday protests in Dresden with Bachmann, attracting participants that included members of right-wing extremist parties, after the first public gathering in front of Dresden’s Frauenkirche on October 20, 2014, which initially was attended by only 350 people (1,2) . This number of attendees grew to 500 by October 27 and doubled to 1,000 by November 3 and continued to climb, reaching over 3,000 by November 17. Around this time, PEGIDA began drawing attention from both regional and national media, which fueled further interest and increased turnout. On November 24, 5,500 people participated, and by December 1, this number rose to 7,500. In December, participation reached five-figure counts, with 15,000 attending on December 8 and 17,500 on December 22. Given the focus on Dresden, the cold season, and the proximity to Christmas, the demonstrations showed a remarkable capacity to mobilize. (5) The initial demonstrations in October were promoted primarily via Facebook, drawing participants mainly from the organizers' extended social networks. These events gained traction through a “virtual snowball” effect, spreading among friends and acquaintances. By the fourth demonstration, the crowd began to include a noticeable number of football fans. Attendance, which typically consisted of young to middle-aged, predominantly male, and physically fit individuals, started to diversify slightly after November 10, when it surpassed 2,000. Poster promoting PEGIDA’s 10th Anniversary protest in Dresden via the group’s telegram channel . From the beginning, a few neo-Nazis were present, and their visibility increased as the gatherings grew larger. Among the organization’s members, two have political experience, including Thomas Tallaker, a city council member in Meissen from Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). However, most members are more closely tied to Dresden’s business community, operating small service-sector companies. They maintain extensive connections within Dresden’s party and club scenes, as well as among bouncers and football hooligans. (5,20) In 2016, Lutz Bachmann was convicted to a trial for inciting and use of hate speech against refugees. The charges that led to the trial, as well as an infamous selfie that showed Bachmann with a Hitler haircut and mustache, led him to temporarily step down from the movement (21) . The anti-Islamist movement has held its 250th and, according to its own statements, last rally after ten years. Hundreds of participants gathered in Dresden, as well as several counter-demonstrators. PEGIDA co-founder Bachmann had announced on social media that the rally held on October 20th of this year, would be the last of the ten-year-old movement, citing logistical and financial problems as reasons, despite his Telegram group being active with over 9000 subscribers. Groups on the latter mentioned channel, as well as on Facebook, share daily news and opinions, including support for the AfD party. (10,15) Objectives & Ideology PEGIDA  is primarily an alliance that campaigns against what it perceives as the growing threat of Islamism in Germany and Europe. The demonstrations, which have remained peaceful to date, aim to highlight what the group views as misguided policies by the federal government. For participants, these protests also express a broader mistrust in societal institutions, including political parties, associations, churches, and mainstream media. The movement taps into general dissatisfaction with the political system and fear of cultural encroachment, which it frames through concerns about Islamism as a focal point. Officially, PEGIDA justified its stance by opposing support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) (2,4) . The "Six Points" of the PEGIDA organizers from January 12, 2015 (5) : 1. We demand the creation of an immigration law that regulates the necessary, quality-based immigration and halts the currently widespread, uncontrolled quantity-based immigration. This should be modeled after the policies in Canada or Switzerland.     2. We demand the inclusion of both a right and a duty to integrate. This duty to integrate, if it truly comes into effect, will automatically alleviate many of people’s fears regarding Islamization, foreign infiltration, and the loss of our culture. 3. We demand consistent deportation and re-entry bans for Islamists and religious fanatics who have turned their backs on our country to fight in holy wars. 4. We demand the possibility of direct democracy at the federal level based on public referendums. 5. We demand an end to warmongering against Russia and a peaceful coexistence among Europeans without the increasing loss of authority of national parliaments within the EU states due to the absurd controls from Brussels. 6. We demand more resources for the internal security of our country! This includes an immediate stop to police staff reductions and equipping the police with the necessary, up-to-date resources to meet growing demands. These points were extended by December 2015, where the following stance was published (3) : 1) PEGIDA is in favour of accepting war refugees and politically or religiously persecuted people. This is a human duty!  2) PEGIDA is in favour of including the right to and the duty of integration in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (so far only the right to asylum has been enshrined there)!  3) PEGIDA is FOR decentralised accommodation for war refugees and persecuted people, instead of in partly inhumane homes!  4) PEGIDA is in favour of a pan-European distribution key for refugees and a fair distribution on the shoulders of all EU member states! (Central registration authority for refugees, which then distributes the refugees among the EU member states similar to the German Königstein key)  5. PEGIDA is in favour of a reduction in the care key for asylum seekers (number of refugees per social worker/caregiver - currently approx. 200  6. PEGIDA is FOR an asylum application procedure based on the Dutch or Swiss model and, until this is introduced, FOR an increase in funding for the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) in order to massively reduce the duration of the application and processing procedure and enable faster integration!  7) PEGIDA is in favour of increasing funding for the police and AGAINST job cuts in the police force!  8) PEGIDA is in favour of exhausting and implementing the existing laws on asylum and deportation!  9) PEGIDA is in favour of a zero-tolerance policy towards asylum seekers and migrants who have committed criminal offences!  10) PEGIDA is in favour of resistance against a misogynistic, violent political ideology, but not against Muslims living and integrating here!  11) PEGIDA is in favour of immigration along the lines of Switzerland, Australia, Canada or South Africa!  12) PEGIDA is in favour of sexual self-determination!  13) PEGIDA is in favour of the preservation and protection of our Christian-Jewish occidental culture!  14) PEGIDA is in favour of the introduction of referendums based on the Swiss model!  15. PEGIDA is AGAINST the supply of weapons to anti-constitutional, banned organisations such as the PKK  16. PEGIDA is AGAINST allowing parallel societies/parallel courts in our midst, such as Sharia courts, Sharia police, justices of the peace, etc.  17. PEGIDA is AGAINST this insane ‘gender mainstreaming’, also often called ‘genderisation’, the almost obsessive, politically correct gender neutralisation of our language!  18 PEGIDA is AGAINST radicalism, whether religiously or politically motivated!  19. PEGIDA is AGAINST hate preachers, regardless of which religion they belong to! A study on PEGIDA done by Patzelt, W. J. in 2015 revealed that 54% of PEGIDA participants are motivated to attend these Monday demonstrations due to "dissatisfaction with politics." "Criticism of the media and the public" motivates 20%. "Fundamental reservations about immigrants and asylum seekers" are cited by 15% of respondents, while "protest against religious or ideologically motivated violence" accounts for 5%. The remainder falls under other reasons. According to Vorländer's findings, the "dissatisfaction with politics" reported by 54% of respondents includes a "generally perceived distance between the people and politicians" (23%), "dissatisfaction with the political system of the Federal Republic" (18%), and "general dissatisfaction with politics" (15%). The demonstrators are particularly dissatisfied with asylum policy (20%) as well as immigration and integration policy (14%). Following at a distance are dissatisfaction with economic and social policy (6%) and with foreign and security policy (4%) (6) . Some of the frequent chants of the demonstrations include language that was used by the National Socialist movement, such as referring to the press by “lying” and “system press” and ”traitor to the people” for politicians (18,20). The Wirmer flag (also known commercially as the flag of the German resistance on July 20th or the Stauffenberg flag) is frequently seen in the PEGIDA rallies, to the extent that it is now also referred to as the “PEGIDA flag” (16,17) . Josef Wirmer, a key figure in the German resistance during World War II, designed a flag intended to represent Germany following the planned 1944 assassination of Hitler. This flag was later considered in 1948-49 by the Parliamentary Council as a potential federal flag and served, in a modified form, as the CDU party flag from 1953 to around 1970, also influencing the FDP's symbols. After this period, it largely faded from public view (17,14) . In 1999, Reinhold Oberlercher of the neo-Nazi German College repurposed the flag as a symbol for his proposed "Fourth Reich," bringing it into use among right-wing extremist groups. Horst Mahler further popularized it within the Reich Citizens' movement in 2003. Over time, the flag’s use by far-right groups became associated with extremist and populist circles (14). Military & Political Abilities Although PEGIDA has no direct political affiliation, Germany’s parties Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) are particularly focused on winning over PEGIDA supporters, they are competing with the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) for their support, the only political party with whom PEGIDA has held a formal discussion with. PEGIDA and the AfD share ideological common ground, such as the former’s stance on asylum and immigration (5,20). From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section (9) . In a study done by the TU Dresden regarding the political positions of the PEGIDA participants claims that they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are likely much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD (page 8 of work 5) . Approach to Resistance While PEGIDA’s organizers have emphasized a commitment to weekly peaceful demonstrations, some events associated with the group have escalated into conflicts. For example, at the very first rally in October 2014, clashes occurred when some participants attacked counter-demonstrators. Later that December, tensions flared when PEGIDA’s march was halted by a blockade on Terrassenufer, leading some attendees to attempt a forced passage, with police and event stewards stepping in to maintain order. Additionally, reports emerged of incidents involving violence against migrants, such as an attack at Dresden's Centrums Galerie following a December rally. Another disturbance took place on January 5, when a group of protesters broke away from the planned march route, pushing toward the city center before being stopped by police. (9) According to authorities figures, there were over 900 crimes since the first demonstration in October 2014 to November 2015, ranging from physical assaults to the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations. There have also been planned attacks on refugee homes, which has led to a believed connection between the increase of these attacks and the PEGIDA movement, due to the group’s use of hate speech, racial slurs and violence inciting, such as setting up mock gallows to ‘hang’ Angela Merkel for her pro-refugee stance (23) . International Relations & Alliances PEGIDA has also gained momentum in other parts of Europe, boosted by the refugee crisis. Affiliate groups protested across in the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Ireland and the U.K., among other countries. The Freedom Party of Austria, under Heinz-Christian Strache, has endorsed PEGIDA since December 2014. By January 2015, small gatherings of PEGIDA supporters, ranging from 15 to 200 people, were held in multiple Norwegian cities. Around 200 PEGIDA supporters assembled in Copenhagen, Denmark, on January 19, and about 80 to 100 participants rallied in Malmö, Sweden, on February 9. In Linköping, Sweden, on March 2, four PEGIDA supporters faced approximately 300 counter-protesters (8,11) . The Belgian PEGIDA branch, linked to members of the far-right Vlaams Belang party and the separatist group Voorpost, is regarded as a hub for racist and neo-fascist, Islamophobic views. In Prague, approximately 2,000 people gathered in a series of opposing demonstrations, bringing together both supporters and opponents of PEGIDA (22) . In the UK, around 300 PEGIDA supporters were met by 1,500 counter-demonstrators at their first rally in Newcastle upon Tyne on February 28, 2015. A similar scene unfolded in Edinburgh on March 21, where a large counter-demonstration opposed a small PEGIDA turnout. Prominent English Defence League activist Tommy Robinson was one of the organizers of the British PEGIDA branch (13) . Many PEGIDA Facebook groups can be seen with followers in the Netherlands, the Baltics and Poland, which has over 4000 followers at the time of writing. The German political parties CDU and CSU, in particular, are competing with the AfD (Alternative for Germany) for support from PEGIDA’s followers. Saxony’s AfD chairwoman, Frauke Petry, acknowledged these "content overlaps" to the press after a meeting with PEGIDA's organizing team on January 7, which remains PEGIDA’s only formal engagement with a political party to date. This alignment is unsurprising, as PEGIDA’s demands on asylum and immigration closely mirror those in the AfD’s platform. AfD’s vice-chairman, Alexander Gauland, has gone so far as to label PEGIDA a "natural ally." While a long-term political partnership between AfD and PEGIDA is not yet established, there is clear potential for the movement to push Germany’s political discourse significantly rightward (7) . From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section. (9) Bibliography The Economist (2015) ‘The uprising of the decent’, The Economist , 8 January. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/01/08/the-uprising-of-the-decent . LPB BW (no date) ‘Pegida’, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg . Available at:   https://www.lpb-bw.de/pegida . Menschen in Dresden (2014) Pegida Positionspapier , 12 December. Available at:   https://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf . Deutschlandfunk (2024) ‘Letzte Pegida-Kundgebung: Mehrere Gegendemonstrationen’, Deutschlandfunk , 2024. Available at:   https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/letzte-pegida-kundgebung-mehrere-gegendemonstrationen-100.html . Patzelt, W. J. (2015) Was und wie denken PEGIDA-Demonstranten? Analyse der PEGIDA-Demonstranten am 25. Januar 2015, Dresden. Ein Forschungsbericht , Dresden, 2 February. Available at:   https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/phil/powi/polsys/ressourcen/dateien/forschung/pegida/patzelt-analyse-pegida-2015-01.pdf?lang=en . Technische Universität Dresden (2023) Pressemitteilung der TU Dresden zur Präsentation des Abschlussberichts: PEGIDA – Ein Phänomen und seine Wirkungen , Dresden, 12 October. Available at:   https://tu-dresden.de/ressourcen/dateien/aktuelles/news/Downloads/praespeg?lang=en . Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2023) Lutz Bachmann kündigt Ende von PEGIDA an , Frankfurt, 28 October. Available at:   https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/lutz-bachmann-kuendigt-ende-von-pegida-an-110045780.html .  Westcott, L. (2016) ‘Anti-Islam organization PEGIDA exporting hate across Europe’, Newsweek , 9 February. Available at:   https://www.newsweek.com/anti-islam-organization-pegida-exporting-hate-across-europe-426805 . Spiegel Staff (2015) ‘Anti-Muslim PEGIDA movement rattles Germany’, Spiegel International , 14 January. Available at:   https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/anti-muslim-pegida-movement-rattles-germany-a-1009245.html . on violence and context  Oltermann, P. (2015) ‘Germany’s PEGIDA anti-Islam movement unravelling’, The Telegraph , 28 January. Available at:   https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11375165/Germanys-Pegida-anti-Islam-movement-unravelling.html . Deutsche Welle (2015) ‘PEGIDA Denmark takes cue from Germany’, DW , 18 January. Available at:   https://www.dw.com/en/pegida-denmark-takes-cue-from-germany/a-18201808 . The Telegraph (2015) ‘Anti-Islamist movement PEGIDA surfaces in Spain’, The Telegraph , 14 January. Available at:   https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11345766/Anti-Islamist-movement-Pegida-surfaces-in-Spain.html .  BBC News (2015) ‘Pegida: Anti-Islam march in Newcastle draws hundreds’, BBC News , 28 February. Available at:   https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-tyne-31657167.(uk) Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2015) ‘Sind sie das Volk? PEGIDA – Die “Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes”’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung , 1 May. Available at:   https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/rechtspopulismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes/ . Bachmann, Lutz ‘Pegida-Unterstutzer’, Discussions available at    https://t.me/s/lutzbachmann Fichtner, U. (2015) ‘PEGIDA und die Wirmer-Fahne: “Ich bin entsetzt”’, Spiegel Politik , 30 July. Available at:   https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-und-die-wirmer-fahne-ich-bin-entsetzt-a-1046072.html . Das Versteckspiel (no date) ‘Wirmer-Flagge, Wirmer-Fahne’, Die Symbolwelt der neuen Bewegung von rechts . Available at:   https://dasversteckspiel.de/die-symbolwelt/neue-bewegung-von-rechts/wirmer-flagge-wirmer-fahne-232.html . Schulze, F. (2015) ‘Die “Lügenpresse”: Ein Begriff und seine Geschichte’, Publikative , 1 January. Available at:   http://www.publikative.org/2015/01/01/die-luegenpresse-ein-begriff-und-seine-geschichte/ . Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2023) ‘PEGIDA’, Dossier Rechtsextremismus . Available at:   https://www.bpb.de/themen/rechtsextremismus/dossier-rechtsextremismus/500835/pegida/ . Social Europe Support (2015) ‘Undertsanding PEGIDA in context”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Pegida-eBook.pdf Deutsche Welle (2016) ‘PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann denies xenophobic remarks’, DW , 19 April. Available at:   https://www.dw.com/en/pegida-leader-lutz-bachmann-denies-xenophobic-remarks/a-19199027 . Reuters Staff (2016) ‘Anti-Islam movement PEGIDA stages protests across Europe’, Reuters , 6 February. Available at:   https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-islam-movement-pegida-stages-protests-across-europe-idUSKCN0VF0PQ . Benjakob, O. (2019) ‘How the German far-right appropriates ideals of non-violent resistance’, openDemocracy , 13 February. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/how-german-far-right-appropriates-ideals-non-violent-resistance/ In the study by the TU Dresden, the political positions of the PEGIDA participants: they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are probably much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD. (page 8 of work 5 )

Insurgency Overview The American Nazi Party (ANP) was a neo-Nazi organization founded in 1959 by George Lincoln Rockwell, a veteran Naval Pilot, whose paranoia and racism fueled his obsession with what he believed was a Jewish international conspiracy to destroy the white race.  In 1950, anti-Semitic and far-right propaganda led Rockwell to read Hitler’s Mein Kampf  and experience what he described as a “spiritual awakening.”  For years, he tried to secretly promote his newfound Nazi beliefs in far-right organizations and right-wing propaganda, but in 1958 he was exposed after an explosion at a Jewish synagogue revealed his connections to neo-Nazi’s associated with the terrorist attack.  In response, Rockwell hoisted a Swastika banner at his home for all to see and went public as a Nazi. He started the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS) which transitioned to the American Nazi Party.  In 1962, he co-founded an international organization of National Socialists named the World Union of National Socialist (WUNS).  As leader of the ANP, Rockwell and his Stormtroopers aimed at using provocation through street demonstrations and propaganda to garner mass publicity and support in hopes of becoming a large political movement.  Rockwell sought to exploit fears of the white Christian majority by emphasizing social tensions surrounding race riots and economic instability and offering the solution of the ANP.   ANP’s solution involved deporting black Americans to Africa and sending “Jewish-traitors and their collaborators” to the gas chambers. In the mid to late 60s, Rockwell began to tone down the Nazi imagery and shift strategy from the dogmatic German-Nordic Nazism of Hitler to a pan-white movement based on “white unity.”  This caused a rift within the ANP that would eventually lead to its dissolution. In 1967, Rockwell decided the party should  be rebranded as the National Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP).  The same year a disaffected ANP officer, John Patler, assassinated Rockwell from the rooftop of a laundromat.    Following Rockwell’s death, Matt Koehl succeeded him as the party’s leader.  He moved the NSWPP away from politics and reoriented it into a spiritual and insular movement based on “Aryan purity” and neo-paganism.  This shift caused the party to split and fracture, forming new organizations such as William Pierce’s National Alliance.  In 1982, Koehl moved the small, but loyal remaining party members to Wisconsin and rebranded as the New Order.  Koehl died in 2014.  Since then, the party has continued in isolation and obscurity, preferring to avoid communication with the media about its leadership and activities. History & Foundations George Lincoln Rockwell was born on March 9, 1918, in Bloomington, Illinois.  His parents were famous vaudeville performers.  His father, George Lovejoy “Doc” Rockwell, was a fun and charming man, but showed little affection to his children.  His mother, Claire Shade Rockwell, was sweet but passive.  Following their divorce, Rockwell would spend summers with his father in Boothbay Harbor, Maine and the rest of the year in Atlantic City, New Jersey with his mother and domineering aunt. (1)   As a teenager, Rockwell began to turn his frustrations with his aunt outward.  For example, during his senior year he rebelled against a teacher he didn’t like by refusing to do any classwork.  Later, at Hebron Academy, a college preparatory school, Rockwell organized a group of boys to terrorize a teacher until he quit his job. (1)   At Brown University,  he developed an interest in advertising, illustration, and media.  He revived the college campus humor magazine, Sir Brown! and honed his skills as an illustrator and cartoonist while working as arts editor for the school magazine.  This was also the time during which he began developing a fascination with esoteric political tracts and conspiracy theories.  By his second year at Brown, he began to complain the university was a haven for “intellectual dishonesty” and “infected” with communism. (1)   In 1941, Rockwell joined the Navy as a pilot, serving in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.  He primarily flew on transport and reconnaissance missions.  While in service he married his first wife, Judith Aultman.  By 1945, he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander and received special decorations for his service.  (1)   Following the war, Rockwell enrolled at Pratt University, a prestigious art college in New York City.  While there, he won a prestigious illustration competition sponsored by New York Society of Illustrators and received a $1,000 cash prize and national notoriety.  Despite the success, he dropped out and pursued advertising in Maine.  His pursuits appeared promising, but his temper would consistently sabotage every opportunity for success. (1,2)   In 1950, the US Navy called him back up for service at the start of the Korean War.  He relocated his family to San Diego, California to serve as a pilot instructor. By this time, his marriage was in shambles.  He felt his wife was too “strong-willed.”  He began to develop insomnia, staying up late and following far-right politics.  He attended John Birch Society meetings and obsessed over Senator Joe McCarthy and the Red Scare.  He started to develop a paranoia that communist were infiltrating every American institution.  This paranoia led him down an anti-Semitic, anti-communist rabbit-hole directly to Hitler’s Mein Kampf  and a “spiritual awakening.”  In private, he started identifying as a Nazi (1)   In 1952, he was transferred to Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and promoted to Commander.  His first marriage ended in divorce.  With nothing to do, he spent all his free time reading the anti-Semitic literature of Gerald L. K. Smith and Conde McGinley, Hitler’s Mein Kampf,  and The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.  He then met his second wife, Thora Hallgrimmson.  They quickly married and spent their honeymoon in Berchtesgaden where they visited the site of Hitler’s Eagles Nest.  (1)   In 1954, Rockwell returned to Maine with his new wife and child before relocating to Washington, D.C. to start a magazine designed for the wives of U.S. Servicemen called U.S. Lady .  He believed his magazine could subliminally influence women into accepting traditional gender roles and avoid “race-mixing.”  The magazine was relatively successful but due to arguments he was forced out.  Following this failure, Rockwell began freelancing as an independent contractor for right-wing publications.  During these years, he faced enormous financial and emotional pressure.   In 1958, he involved himself in John G. Crommelin’s campaign for governor of Alabama.  Crommelin, a white supremacist and former Naval officer, shared Rockwell’s anti-Semitism.  In fact, Rockwell borrowed a lot of Crommelin’s anti-Semitic theoretical framework.  His campaign was a magnet for far-right extremists like Connie Lynch, Edward Fields, James K. Warner, Matt Koehl, Emory Burke, Gordon Winrod, Wallace Allen, and George Bright.  With these men, Rockwell co-founded the National States’ Rights Party, a far-right, white supremacist organization based in Georgia.  (1)   The same year, Rockwell was introduced to DeWest Hooker and Harrold Arrowsmith Jr.  Hooker, a wealthy businessman, was being investigated by the FBI for his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic beliefs, but more importantly for the recruitment of New York City youth into his National Youth League (NYL) to picket “Jewish-Communism.” Hooker convinced Rockwell that mainstream right-wing groups secretly shared sympathies with Nazism but were too afraid to be open about it.  He persuaded Rockwell that if he went public as a full-blown Nazi, many would follow his lead.  Arrowsmith, a retired millionaire and extreme anti-Semite, offered to be Rockwell’s financial backer to start the National Committee to Free America from Jewish Domination (NCFAJD).  Arrowsmith put a down payment on a house in Arlington, VA and lent him a second-hand printing press for printing and distributing anti-Semitic propaganda.  (1,2)   Rockwell’s first operation with NCFAJD was to picket the White House with anti-Semitic signs and hand out anti-Semitic literature with youth from Hooker’s NYL.  The literature claimed that the United States government was secretly being forced by “the Jews” to send marines to protect Israel’s puppet regime in Lebanon. (1,2)   On October 12, 1958, fifty sticks of dynamite went off at the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation synagogue in Atlanta, Georgia.  Wallace Allen, one of the founders of The Columbians, the first openly neo-Nazi organization in postwar America, was indicted in connection to the bombing.  Rockwell had been using his printing press to supply the National States’ Rights Party (of which Allen was a member) with literature and propaganda.  Police found a cache of letters from Rockwell to Allen with ambiguous but suggestive phrases. News reports identified Rockwell as a suspect and radical Nazi.  Arrowsmith no longer wanted anything to do with him. His house began to be assaulted with bricks and cherry bombs and his wife and children left for Iceland.  (1)   Rockwell hit rock bottom.  His 2nd wife asked for a divorce.  His reputation was destroyed.  And he was unable to find work.  He began to drink heavily and became suicidal.  His father became ashamed of him.  His brother reached out with an ultimatum that he either go to therapy or their relationship would be over.  Rockwell made his choice and the only family member that didn’t ostracize him was his mother.  Alone in a dilapidated house with no running water or electricity, he sank into complete despair.  In that despair, he experienced another “spiritual awakening” that convinced him that he was the successor to Hitler’s Third Reich and called to start his own Nazi party to become America’s Führer.   Thus, he created the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS), which later rebranded as the American Nazi Party.  He displayed a large, well-lit Nazi banner for all to see and began recruiting young, disaffected men into his ranks of Stormtroopers, including several from Hooker’s National Youth League.   In 1960, the Navy revoked his commission in the Naval Reserves.  He had been charged with espousing race and religious hatred.  He used the situation to publicize what he felt was persecution by “high-ranking Jews” in which he specifically named Anna M. Rosenburg, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.  He became ineligible for his pension with only six months from military retirement.  (1)   The ANP began holding demonstrations and handing out leaflets in Washington, D.C.  Eventually, riots broke out between Stormtroopers and the enraged Jewish community, particularly members of the Jewish War Veterans.  Rockwell and his Stormtroopers were arrested for disorderly conduct and received their first major publicity.  Rockwell was ordered to be cross-examined in a psychiatric hospital for 30 days to see if he was mentally fit to stand trial.  The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith presented violent illustrations he had published in his college magazine, Sir Brown!  as evidence of his insanity.  He was released after 10 days and determined fit to stand trial.  (1,2)   Rockwell sought more notoriety and publicity.  He began planning a demonstration in New York City, home to the nation’s largest Jewish population (many survivors of the holocaust) and national news media.  Rockwell saw New York City as the “pulsing heart of Marxism in the USA.” (2)  Jewish community organizers fought to keep Rockwell from speaking, but the ACLU came to Rockwell’s defense on the grounds of free speech.  In response, a riot of over 200 anti-Nazi protesters broke out in the rotunda of the supreme court building of NYC.  While Rockwell won the right to speak, he no longer felt it was necessary since he had already got the publicity he needed. (1)   In 1961, Rockwell and a handful of Stormtroopers drove a Hate Bus to New Orleans to mock the Freedom Riders struggle to integrate public transportation in the South.  He also held music fundraisers he called “Hate-o-nannies” and began indoctrinating recruits in chapters nationwide such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas. (1)   In 1962, the ANP toured America in hopes of increasing their publicity and gaining new supporters.  It was largely a failure.  Quarantine, the strategy of persuading local media and Jewish organizations to ignore Rockwell (what he termed the ‘paper curtain’) was relatively successful in keeping the ANP’s tour largely unnoticed.  In fact, when Rockwell attempted to speak in NYC on Hitler’s Birthday, April 20th, which coincided with Good Friday and the second day of Passover, the Jewish War Veterans and other organizations finally agreed on the strategy and ignored Rockwell. (1,2)   Image of Rockwell holding a press conference Source: Internet Archive, American Nazi Party Rockwell began to look for new tactics to break through the Quarantine.  When the Nation of Islam (NOI) held a National Convention at the Chicago Temple of Islam, Rockwell exploited Elijah Muhammad’s desire for racial segregation by delivering a speech on the “Lincoln Plan”, a plan where the US government would spend $50 billion dollars over the course of 10 years to establish a settlement for black Americans in Africa.  When he described Muhammad as the “Adolf Hitler of the black man,” he made national headlines once again. (1,2)   Despite travel bans, Rockwell entered Gloucestershire, England for a meeting with National Socialists leaders from seven nations and laid out plans for a National Socialist world revolution in the Cotswold Agreement.  This laid the foundations for the World Union of National Socialist (WUNS) of which Rockwell became the supreme commander.  At this meeting he met for the first time with Savitri Devi, a Nazi mystic, Bruno Ludtke, an ex-SS officer, and Colin Jordan, leader of the British National Socialist Movement (NSM).  All three would have a profound influence on Rockwell. (1)   By 1963, Rockwell would discover the lucrative college lecture circuit.  It held no fertile ground for ANP recruitment but earned him a steady income for the first time in his life.  He would continue to give lectures at universities until his death in 1967.  He was able to sell out to crowds of 2-3 thousand students, but only as a spectacle with no actual political power. (1)   Rockwell hated Martin Luther King Jr.  He believed King was a communist and part of the communist agenda.  When stormtrooper, Roy James, punched King in the face in Birmingham, Alabama, Rockwell awarded him the “Order of Adolf Hitler Silver Medal.”  In 1963, Dr. King was about to make his infamous “March on Washington.”  Rockwell planned to hold a counterdemonstration, but only gathered around 90 men and women… “several of them undercover police, feds, and Jewish community organizers.” (1)   There is exactly one way for us to win…and that is to fight on racial grounds; to think, to act, above all, to vote as whites and nothing else. -George Lincoln Rockwell   In 1965, Rockwell ran for governor in Virginia.  His campaign focused on anti-Segregation and toned down the Nazi imagery to be more palatable to a wider public.  Stormtroopers became “campaign aides” and dropped the Nazi uniform for suits and ties.  Race riots were erupting across American cities and Rockwell believed “white unity” should be the central motif of the movement.  While 6,500 votes were inconsequential in the race for governor, Rockwell saw it as a win.  (1)   Image of Rockwell during his Gubernatorial Campaign Source: Internet Archive, American Nazi Party With a budget of $1500, with a total press blackout, and with a ‘Kosher conservative’ [splitting the vote] …I got 7,000 people to vote for a Nazi . -George Lincoln Rockwell   In 1966, Stokely Carmichael, leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, coined the term “Black Power” to describe a growing movement of militant black Americans.  Rockwell decided to promote “White Power” as a counter-slogan for militant whites.  By mid-summer, the slogan gained nationwide popularity amongst racists.  Rockwell believed this new concept of “race unity” was “fundamental to success.” (1)   Rockwell’s “white unity” was based on pan-white inclusion, which stood in stark contrast to Hitler’s Aryanism, which was exclusively German-Nordic.  He came to the belief that Hitler’s strategic mistake had been the exclusion of Slavs, Poles, Greeks, Turks, etc.  Rockwell believed that “the dark peoples of the earth, led by the Jews” outnumbered “Whites” by “7:1.”  He preached that the entire “white race” was in a fight for its survival.  This shift in strategy caused a rift in the ANP between hard-core Nazis and those open to pan-white inclusion.  The more dogmatic ‘Aryan Unity’ faction within ANP was led by Matt Koehl and included William Pierce, Frank Drager, and Alan Welch.  Others, such as John Patler (formerly Patsalos), son of Greek immigrants, welcomed the change. (1,2)   In 1966, Martin Luther King Jr. was preparing to march for open housing in Chicago, one of the largest and most segregated cities in America.  Rockwell led a ‘White Power’ faction to counter King’s march with the white working class, mostly Polish and Italian Americans, that made up the area.  He passed out “White Power” T-shirts and coalesced under a “White Power” banner.  The crowd responded to King’s demonstration by throwing rocks and shouting racist vitriol. (1)   I’ve been in many demonstrations all across the South…[and] I have never seen—even in Mississippi and Alabama—mobs as hostile and hate-filled. -Martin Luther King Jr.   After the demonstration, King said it was one of the most violent and hateful responses he’d ever experienced.  Rockwell’s counterdemonstration in Chicago was captured on television and received tremendous publicity, but the victory was largely illusory.  Many who participated in the demonstration admitted they were caught up in the heat of the moment and embarrassed by their behavior towards King’s march.  Leaders of the community strongly rejected Rockwell’s message.  (1)   On January 1st, 1967, Rockwell rebranded his party as the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP).  He was no longer concerned with Nazi dogmatism and felt confident in this shift in strategy.  He also got rid of John Palter, an ANP officer and long-time loyalist to Rockwell and the party.  Patler had become erratic and a source of tension.  On August 25, 1967, the disaffected Patler shot Rockwell from the roof of a laundromat.  Rockwell was pierced in the aorta while backing out of the parking lot and died at the scene.  Patler was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The ANP tried to give Rockwell a Nazi burial, but were consistently denied.  There was a standoff at Culpepper National Cemetery and Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s successor, used the conflict to gain publicity.  Koehl eventually had Rockwell cremated and thus George Lincoln Rockwell became the first martyr in the American neo-Nazi mythos. (1)   Under Koehl’s leadership, the NSWPP shifted away from Rockwell’s political doctrine.  Koehl’s vision of National Socialism was less political and primarily spiritual.  He was profoundly influenced by Savitri Devi’s “Esoteric Hitlerism”, which reveres Hitler as a messianic figure.  He moved the party away from the political theatrics of Rockwell, preferring an insular organization centered around Aryan purity and neo-paganism.  This shift in orientation led most party members to split from the group and join or found their own organizations such as the National Alliance, led by William Luther Pierce and the National Socialist Liberation Front led by Joseph Tomassi.  Koehl was left with a small but loyal following and in 1982 moved the headquarters to Wisconsin to maintain a low profile.  Following relocation, the party rebranded as the New Order.  Koehl passed away in 2014.  The party continues but remains obscure, avoiding media and information on its leadership or activities. (1) Objectives & Ideology I am, and must be…the Apostle of Adolf Hitler, who was the greatest world savior in two thousand years…like Saint Paul…I once misunderstood, hated and fought.  I must, like the early Christians, drive out the ‘evil spirits’ of materialism, greed, selfishness, short-sightedness and cowardice, and stand defiant, even in the midst of the ‘lions of the Coliseum’, if that be my fate, to give the world once more that ‘Polar Star’ of direction, purpose, hope, loyalty, and love which can no longer be supplied by the infiltrated religions. -George Lincoln Rockwell   George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party’s heritage can be traced back to the 1930s, when pro-fascist, pro-German groups like the German-American Bund, Silver Shirt League, and the Christian Front were preaching anti-Semitic and ultranationalist ideas in the pre-war era.  During this time, anti-Semitism had made its way into the cultural mainstream via popular anti-Semitic publications, such as The International Jew: The World’s Foremost Problem  by Ford Motor Company founder Henry Ford.  Ford’s book and newspaper, The Dearborn Independent , spread anti-Semitic propaganda and promoted the fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion , which claimed there was a Jewish conspiracy for world domination.  While serving in the Korean War, Rockwell was heavily influenced by anti-communists like Senator Joe McCarthy and anti-Semitic propagandists like Gerald L. K. Smith and Conde McGinley which led him down a far-right political rabbit hole until he reached Hitler’s Mein Kampf .  Rockwell’s political theories attempted to stitch together the fears brought by the Red Scare of the 50s and the racial tensions of the 60s with his anti-Semitic and racist beliefs.  Rockwell’s National Socialist convictions were not just political but spiritual.  He claimed to have reoccurring dreams of meeting Hitler’s ghost and was further encouraged by Savitri Devi and Bruno Ludtke that his spiritual destiny was to bring National Socialism to the world and save the Aryan race.  (1)   In his book, “White Power,” Rockwell describes ANP’s thesis:   1. Western Society is sick. 2. The youth are spiritually empty. 3. This is not natural, but an effort conspired by “liberals” and “Chart-Foragers” aka Jews. 4. Those leading the nation are purposefully causing its collapse. 5. Those leading the nation are Jews. 6. There is an international Jewish conspiracy to smash Western Civilization because Jewish people are inherently paranoid and thrive in degeneracy and chaos. 7. There are two segments using the “divide and conquer” strategy in order to conquer the world.  The first segment, “Friends of the Captain”, promote conspiracy by “gathering up gold by fake speculation and unfair merchandising” …then buying media outlets and using them to brainwash people and promote a class war. 8.  The other segment, “friends of the crew” promote violent class war from below. (3)   Rockwell goes on to describe the “ideal” society his party intended to create:   1. White America 2. White World Solidarity 3. A new social order based on racial values. 4. An “honest economy” that ends both economic freeloading (welfare) and economic exploitation. 5. White self-defense where all white citizens are allowed to keep and bear arms and “maintain vigilance against enemies internal and external.” 6. A government led by the strongest, smartest, and wisest men. 7. Spiritual rebirth centered around racial idealism. 8. Promotion of Aryan culture. 9. A healthy, clean, wholesome environment where pollution is eliminated, and resources conserved. 10. A better race where the best qualities are emphasized, and weaknesses and flaws eliminated (eugenics). (3)   The American Nazi Party had a five-phase plan.  Fortunately, they never succeeded beyond phase one.   Phase 1: Use provocative and shocking tactics to garner media attention and maximize publicity to raise awareness of the party.   Phase 2: Gain political legitimacy by running for office and presenting the party’s ideas to the mainstream.   Phase 3: Build a mass movement amongst disaffected white working-class and middle-class Americans.  Rockwell believed race-wars and economic collapse were imminent and hoped to exploit these chaotic conditions to “use political power to fight and win back American heritage and enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the White Christian people.”    We will build our trained, hardcore Nazis into nationwide mass organizations…inflamed with a holy zeal as fired the American Revolutionist. -George Lincoln Rockwell (1)   Phase 4.  Achieve political power.  Rockwell believed he would gain millions of ANP supporters that would elect him as President of the United States in 1972 along with stacking the Senate and House of Representatives with people from his party.     Phase 5: “The Final Settlement” (1,2,3,4) The Final Settlement:   Rockwell’s ultimate goal was to purge all Jews, leftist, queers, and non-whites from American society.   I’m going to completely separate the black and white races and preserve the white Christian domination in this country, and I’m going to have the Jew Communists and any other traitors gassed for treason. -George Lincoln Rockwell (4)   Rockwell believed Elijah Muhammed’s Nation of Islam would help organize and direct the ‘Lincoln Plan’ to send black Americans to a settlement in Africa.  The plan would utilize $50 billion dollars supplied by the US government and payed out over the course of ten years to settle and colonize part of Africa.  Those who refused to “voluntarily” leave for Africa would be stripped of citizenship, placed in concentration camps, and become wards of the state.  (4)   I’d also purge the queers.  I despise them worst of all…They’re the ultimate symbol of a decaying civilization. -George Lincoln Rockwell (4) Military & Political Abilities  Rockwell enlisted a small “revolutionary cadre of fighters” or “Stormtroopers” to implement ANP’s plans.  While membership figures were never released, it is evident he never received the financial or numerical support to carry through with his objectives.  Rockwell only gave the illusion that ANP was a large and growing movement.    Stormtroopers, Party Members, and Supporters   No reliable sources place membership above 200 active members and a few thousand supporters. (1) However, Rockwell would claim in Playboy Magazine to have 500 stormtroopers, 1,500 party members, and 15,000 correspondents (including thousands more abroad in the WUNS movement). (4)   Weapons   Rockwell claimed he and the stormtroopers only carried rifles and handguns for self-defense purposes.  He claimed the party didn’t participate in terrorism not for moral reasons but because it didn’t serve the interest of the party.   “I feel that terrorism is a valid weapon in guerilla warfare…if it would work.  A hundred years ago, I’d have been a Klansmen with a rope and gun and the whole business…but today, it plays directly into the hands of Martin Luther [King]…it manufactures martyrs…” (4)   Funding:   Tony Ulasewicz, New York City Police Department monitored Rockwell from 58’ to 67’. He once visited Rockwell at his home and reported:  [Rockwell’s] glowing, published accounts of his party’s progress had been nothing more than a pack of lies…I noticed that bullet holes punctured the walls of his house…I also saw a stack of unpaid bills high on the table.  Rockwell’s electricity had been turned off, and he used kerosene lamps to light the place…whatever Hitler’s ghost had promised Rockwell, it hadn’t yet arrived.   According to the Anti-Defamation League, ANP’s annual income was no more than 20k.  In fact, Stormtroopers had to find jobs and turn over their paychecks to the party.  They were constantly on the verge of bankruptcy.  Rockwell was selling his own valuables at local pawnshops to pay court-mandated child support payments.  He lost a battle with the IRS and had ANP’s headquarters on Randolph Street in Arlington confiscated along with its belongings.   The ANP’s most notable contributors were the following:   Harrold Arrowsmith Jr., a retired millionaire, provided him with $20k of support by putting a down payment on a house in Arlington, Virginia, providing a secondhand printing press, and $2500 in cash.  The relationship ended abruptly following the Atlanta synagogue bombing. (1)   Mr. and Mrs. Floyd Fleming of Arlington, VA bought ANP a new house on North Randolph Street (which got confiscated by the IRS).  They spent about $30-$50k on the party despite earning a modest income as sign painters. (1)   Mr. and Mrs. Robert Surrey of Dallas, TX “used…money for bails and fines for Stormtroopers…[and] raised better than $20k in a three-year period for the party.”  Rockwell cryptically mentioned ANP’s “backers in Dallas” in public statements.  He probably meant to give the allusion that oil money from right wing reactionaries such as the multi-millionaire oil baron and reactionary H. L. Hunt were donating to the party.  To the contrary, the Surrey’s were middle-class.  (1)   Ray York of California, introduced to Rockwell by the Surreys, contributed around $25k in cash, services, and rent-free use of his property. (1)   Other income came from ANP’s newsletter, Nazi and White Power merchandise (literature, stickers, shirts, etc.), initiation fees, small donations, and fundraising events like the racist music jamborees they called “Hate-o’-nannies.”.(4)   From 1963 to 1967, Rockwell began to earn a steady income on the college lecture circuit reportedly earning around $350 a lecture by the time of his death. (1)   Rockwell’s mom also sent money when asked. (1) Approach to Resistance Rockwell’s strategy was to exploit the chaos of what he believed was a coming ‘race war’ and ‘economic collapse’ to implement ANP’s platform.  He thought he could win a mass following by provoking his enemies by antagonizing them in street demonstrations and passing out hate literature.  Once he gained people’s attention, he planned to run for political office and use that platform to legitimize his party’s ideas.  Rockwell believed with enough publicity, ANP would gain mass public support, attract financing from wealthy right-wing reactionaries, and establish political power for his party.   He was wrong.  His party’s publicity peaked in the early 60s and never gained legitimacy or a mass following.  He never gained any significant political power and spent his entire career on the fringe of the far-right. (1)   Rockwell struggled to break through what he termed the “paper curtain” which he believed was a conspiracy by Jewish controlled institutions in media, banking, government, and commerce to silence him.  In reality, Jewish organizations were organizing around the “Quarantine Strategy” developed by Dr. Solomon Anthill Fineberg of the American Jewish Committee (AJC).  The strategy had been used years before to deal with anti-Semites like Gerald L. K. Smith.  The strategy consisted of two components:   1. Coordination amongst major American Jewish community organizations to minimize public confrontation between the anti-Semite and their opponents to deny them a dramatic event and invite publicity. 2. The dissemination of back-ground information and tactics on the anti-Semite to media outlets to convince them the rabble-rouser had nothing newsworthy to say. (1)   Rockwell needed the publicity to get his contributions in…just the threat of him coming was good for a couple grand. Tony Ulasewicz, NYPD   The quarantine strategy worked.  The ANP were literally starving for attention.   [stormtroopers] ARE EATING STALE BREAD AND 10-CENT-A-POUND MEAT INTENDED FOR DOGS!…they can’t fight because they are hungry and COLD…we have no money for the heat bill. -George Lincoln Rockwell     White Power Strategy   In 1965, Rockwell toned down the Nazi symbolism for a “cleaner” image focused on “white unity” as the central motif.  The strategic focus on white unity was meant to exploit racial tensions around desegregation.  Rockwell’s emphasis on “white unity” broke with the dogmatic teachings fundamental to Nazi belief of German-Nordic racial superiority.  It also differed from the Ku Klux Klan whose members were anti-Catholic Protestants and Nativists.  While this strategy had profound influence on the future of neo-Nazism and racists groups in the United States and elsewhere, it ultimately led to a rift in the party which contributed to its dissolution following Rockwell’s death.  The American public remained uninterested.  They decided that Martin Luther King’s dream was more noble than Rockwell’s white nationalist movement.  (1,3)   Holocaust Denial   “I don’t believe for one minute that any 6,000,000 Jews were exterminated by Hitler.  It never happened.  The photographs you’ve seen passed off as pictures of dead Jews are frauds, pure and simple.” George Lincoln Rockwell (4)   Rockwell introduced Holocaust Denial into the American anti-Semitic Zeitgeist.  He believed that pre-war, pro-fascist organizations like Christian Front, the German-American Bund, and Silver Shirt Legion, which had hundreds of thousands of followers, were evidence of his party’s potential.  He believed the memory of the Holocaust was holding his movement back.  His solution was to attempt to distort historic memory and remove the stigma from Nazism by sharing what today some might call “alternative facts”.  Many of these “facts” and “arguments” were introduced to Rockwell by his mentor, the ex-SS officer Bruno Ludtke.  Ludtke sent Rockwell writings from Harry Barnes, Charles Tansill, Fred Utley, David Hoggan’s The Myth of the Six Million  and an article published anonymously in a German-language Argentinian magazine, Der Web.  These writings came to mark Holocaust denial of the 20th century.  They included conspiracy theories of “supposed Zionist control of Allied interrogation of German war prisoners, inflation of mortality data for purpose of increasing reparations, fabrication of confessions, eliciting confessions by torture, and manipulating prewar census data to create the illusion of genocide.”  (1)   Rockwell promoted these ideas in an interview with Alex Haley in Playboy Magazine.  In the interview, he bragged about having published an article for Sir! , a popular men’s magazine, titled “When Nazis Tried Human Vivisection” (1958) under the name Lewcor (Rockwel backwards).  He admitted everything in the article was completely made up.  For Rockwell, this was proof the media were out to discredit the Nazis.  He is considered the father of American Holocaust denial. (4)   Alliances & Relationships Christian Identity   Rockwell saw Christianity as weak, feminine, and Jewish, but long entertained the idea of a Christian front with a pseudo-Christian exterior and National Socialism at its core.  In 1964, Rockwell met with Wesley Swift to discuss merging elements of National Socialism with Christian Identity. (1)   Christian Identity is the 20th century American variation of 19th century British Israelism.  British Israelism is the belief that “the British are lineal descendants of the ‘ten lost tribes of Israel” which dates as far back as the 17th century.  John Wilson, a 19th century millenialist, turned it into a religious movement and Joseph Wild, a Congregationalist minister in Brookyln made it popular in the United States by the last quarter of the 19th century.  It experienced a resurgence in the 20s amongst white supremacist and anti-Semites because it saw white, Anglo-Americans as “true Israelites” and “God’s Chosen People.” (1)   During the 1930s, Gerald Winrod and Wesley Swift shaped the first churches recognized as Christian Identity around a doctrine of racial purity which became successful in parts of California and the southeastern US.  Richard Butler, a former Lockheed aerospace engineer and member of the fascist Silver Shirt Legion saw Nazi politics and Christian Identity as inseparable.  Christian Identity holds that Jews are not the Biblical Israelites, but the “literal spawn of Satan”.  It pitted Aryans as the true Israelites engaged in an apocalyptic struggle with Satanic Jews. (1)   Rockwell sent one of his trusted ANP officers, Ralph Perry Forbes, to join CI as a minister in California.  Forbes built a large congregation and enshrined Rockwell into CI as “God’s latter-day apostle to America and all the lost sheep of the nations of true Israel.”  Thus, CI became a haven for American Nazis and their ideological descendants. (1)     World Union of National Socialist (WUNS)   WUNS was an international network of Nazi organizations whose members included:   United States: GLR’s American Nazi Party United Kingdom: Colin Jordan’s British National Socialist Movement West Germany: Bruno Ludtke’s underground movements Canada: The Canadian Nazi Party France: Yves Jeanne’s French National Socialist Movement Argentina: Horst Eichmann’s (Adolf Eichmann’s son) Argentine National Socialist Party Japan: The Greater Japan Patriotic Society Chile: Former SS colonel Franz Heinz Pfeiffer’s Chilean National Socialist Party South Africa: Ray K. Rudman’s South African Anglo-Norman Union   Including chapters in Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Rhodesia, Iceland, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico (1)   The WUNS movement was stifled by legal and logistical challenges due to strict laws surrounding Nazi activities post-World War 2, but it planted seeds and influenced neo-Nazi and far-right extremist groups around the world.  (1)     Schisms   ANP/NSWPP split off into several factions.  Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s chief lieutenant and formal successor, retained the party name and headquarters, but later moved to the mid-west and changed the party to the New Order, embracing Esoteric Hitlerism as a religion and losing interest in the political movement.  Other schisms of ANP include the National Socialist Front, National Socialist Party of America, National Alliance, Northwest Front, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Christian Defense League.  (1)   Former Members of ANP   David Duke-Founder of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan organization. Frank Collin-founder of National Socialist Party of America Harold Covington-founder of Northwest Front James Mason-former convict, author of Siege, promoter of Fascist Terrorism, and former associate of cult leader Charles Manson Kurt Saxon-author of The Poor Man’s James Bond Joseph Tommasi-founder of the National Socialist Liberation Front William Pierce-author of the Turner Diaries Arthur Jones-Republican candidate for Illinois’s 3rd congressional district in the November 2018 midterm elections Tom Metzger (ANP affiliate)-founder of the White Aryan Resistance (WAR) (1) Works Cited 1. Simonelli, Frederick J.  The American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party . Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1999.   2. This Time the World (pink) Rockwell, George L. This Time the World .  Arlington, Virginia: Stormtrooper Publications, 1961.   3. Rockwell, George L. White Power . Arlington, Virginia: The National Socialists White People’s Party, 1967.   4. Haley, Alex. “Interview: George Lincoln Rockwell.”  Playboy , April 1966. Additional Resources

Movement Overview: The 4B movement is a primarily online feminist movement in South Korea which seeks to withhold sex, dating, marriage and childbearing from men, and convince other women to do the same. The name of the movement comes from the fact the names of sex ( bisekseu - 비섹스), dating ( biyeonae  -   비연애), marriage ( bihon  - 비혼) and giving birth ( bichulsan - 비출산) all begin with a B sound in Korean. The movement is also referred to as the 4 Nos, since women who adhere to it say “No,” to these four things. Like many movements that are born on the internet, 4B is more of a collection of shared ideals than a hierarchical group with leadership; there isn’t even an official website for the movement (8) . Most of the people professing ideas of the movement would likely refer to themselves simply as “feminists” and not necessarily say that they are in an organized group. It has been claimed that the movement has anywhere from 5,000 to 50,000 members, but due to the online nature of the movement it is impossible to put a concrete number down (3)(4)(6) . History & Foundations Compared to many Western countries, South Korea is very patriarchal. In addition, looks and beauty are obsessed over in South Korea, and 24% of all cosmetic surgeries on Earth take place in South Korea, with the cosmetic surgery industry being worth over 10 billion dollars. In South Korea, similarly to many East Asian countries, one must usually attach a picture of one’s face to job applications so becoming “prettier” can even be a necessity for employment (1) . If women do end up getting a job, they don’t have much to look forward to, as the gender pay gap in South Korea is the highest in the developed world (5) . As with most societies, beauty standards are generally harsher for women than they are for men in South Korea, which leads to 46% of female college students having had a cosmetic procedure done (1) . Seoul, for example, is reportedly littered with cosmetic surgery advertisements such as TV screens and billboards hawking procedures to achieve South Korea’s female beauty standards of “round doe-like eyes, flawless porcelain skin, a slim sub-110-pound body, and a small V-shaped face.” (2) . These beauty standards being more harshly enforced on women than men can be highlighted by a Gallup Korea poll which found that 31% of South Korean women in their 30s had plastic surgery compared to 4% of their male counterparts (2) . In addition to beauty standards and other non-physical forms of discrimination, South Korea is well above the worldwide average on physical abuse of women as well. The rate of intimate partner violence in the country is 41.5% compared to 30% in the rest of the world (5) . The rate of women victims of murder, robbery, arson, and rape rose 16 percentage points from 72.5% in 1995 to 88.7% in 2014. A Statistics Korea survey showed 67.9% of women responding that they felt “fearful” of crime in 2010. By 2014, the percentage was up to 79.6% (7) . In 2016, a young woman was murdered by a man in a public bathroom. Despite the fact that the man was quoted as saying that he killed the woman because “women always ignored [him],” police did not classify the murder as a hate crime. This caused widespread indignation among South Korean women and catalyzed many online feminist groups, including the birth of 4B as a named movement (6)(7) . Objectives & Ideology 4B doesn’t necessarily have a wide societal end goal, because it is seen more as not fighting the patriarchy, but swearing off men for good (5) . Once a woman makes this decision, they have already achieved their objective.  The ideology of 4B is firmly feminist, but some adherents are much more radical about their feminism than others. There is internal debate in the movement about whether people who follow 4B can be friends with men at all, or be friends with other women who date men (5) . Capabilities The biggest capability 4B has is the ability to organize women online for in-person protests. The online sphere serves to spread the message of 4B and galvanize women to its cause. However, since 4B is not a hierarchical movement, at the end of the day the capabilities are very reduced beyond encouraging women to get out and protest. Approach to Resistance In 2018, after a woman was sentenced to 10 months in prison for posting a nude photo of a male art model to the internet, between 20-55,000 women took to the streets of Seoul. Spy-cams (where someone is secretly filmed in a voyeuristic manner) and revenge porn are common crimes in South Korea, but most men are not punished to the levels that this woman was, and many South Korean women pointed to this incident as an example of the hypocrisy between how men and women are treated in South Korea.  The number of spy-cam crimes rose from 1,100 in 2010 to more than 6,500 in 2017. Organizers said that women live in constant fear of being secretly filmed in South Korea. The prevalence of these crimes have made the country, like Japan, mandate that all smartphone cameras make a loud shutter sound that can not be turned off. Some of the protestors shaved their head as a demonstration against the societal expectation of how a South Korean woman should look (6)(10) . Relations & Alliances The 4B movement is closely related to the Escape the Corset movement. Escape the Corset is a larger and less radical movement that seeks to change South Korea’s societal expectation around female beauty standards. Women who espouse the movement often cut their hair short and don’t wear makeup (6) . Besides Escape the Corset, 4B is generally associated with the broader feminist movement in South Korea, albeit the more radical set. Standing against 4B, there has been a long-standing anti-feminist movement in South Korea that predates 4B. The anti-feminists say that women’s pay gaps are exaggerated (despite being the widest in any country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), and women’s issues receive too much attention (11) .  Men have shown up to feminist protests as counter protestors, with the New York Times reporting, “Dozens of young men, mostly dressed in black, taunted the protesters, squealing and chanting, “Dozens of young men, mostly dressed in black, taunted the protesters, squealing and chanting, “Thud! Thud!” to imitate the noise they said the “ugly feminist pigs” made when they walked. “Out with man haters!” they shouted. “Feminism is a mental illness!”” Man on Solidarity, one of the largest of these groups, has a YouTube channel with over 450,000 subscribers (12) . Another big sticking point for anti-feminists is the fact that military service is mandatory for men in South Korea but isn’t required for women, but feminists argue that women are often forced to drop out of the workforce when they give birth (9)(11) . Works Cited: https://www.hmsreview.org/issue-7/2022/8/a-look-at-south-korean-plastic-surgery https://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/sjfgss/article/view/2118 https://www.asianews.it/news-en/South-Korean-radical-feminism:-No-dating,-sex,-marriage-or-children--48879.html https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3041058/why-south-korean-women-are-turning-their-backs-sex-marriage-and https://theweek.com/culture-life/what-is-south-korea-4b-movement https://www.thecut.com/2023/03/4b-movement-feminism-south-korea.html https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/744756.html https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/12/defying-patriarchy-south-koreas-4b-movement-and-womens-rejection-of-future-maker-role/ https://www.vice.com/en/article/south-korea-incel-gender-wars-election-womens-rights/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44751327 https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/02/27/why/WHY-2030-generation/20220227143213424.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/01/world/asia/south-korea-men-anti-feminists.html Additional Resources