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Introduction & Overview KillNet is a Russian nationalist hacker group known for its use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to target European infrastructure in support of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Originating in 2022 through the advertisement of a DDoS tool-for-hire of the same name, KillNet rapidly gained notoriety through its persistent self-promotion following operations.  KillNet is a part of a wider network of pro-Russian hacker groups. These groups work to perpetuate the Kremlin's narrative at home through the perpetuation of propaganda as well as to hinder Western activity which threatens Russian interests. It is unclear whether this support is an attempt to gain political favour from followers/potential sponsors or due to direct involvement from government bodies. Regardless, KillNet no longer seems to be active, and even during its peak of activity, it did not cause any major/permanent damage with its activities.  History & Foundations The name "KILLNET" can originally be attributed to a DDoS tool offered to threat actors on the dark web (Mascellino, 2022) . However, in January 2022, a user called KillMilk advertised the tool in a Telegram channel of the same name (Intel 471, 2024) . This marks the beginning of KillNet as both a weapon and a movement. KillMilk is believed to have been an active hacker since the age of 14 and launched their first attack against a foreign nation in 2019 (Flashpoint, 2025) .  In December 2023, KillMilk took a step away from KILLNET, whilst maintaining close ties (Antoniuk, 2025) . This departure was due to the identity of KillMilk being exposed as Nikolai Nikolaevich Serafimov, a convicted ex-drug dealer with a taste for luxury automobiles ( Gazeta.ru , 2024) . It seems that, despite his lead position within the network, KillMilk was more of a marketing specialist than a technical genius, using his skills to recruit and coordinate other hackers to carry out operations.  On January 23, 2022, the KillNet tool was made available on a subscription basis, advertised on the Killnet Telegram channel. (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Following this, the KillNet Telegram channel quickly began discussing taking on the Anonymous hacking group, (Vedere Labs, 2022) . This shift in activity from a hacker-for-hire service towards autonomous, aggressive activity seems to increase (at least on the surface) in tandem with the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia's movements were accompanied by KillNet attacks against Lithuanian police departments, airports, and the government (Goodin, 2022) . Within the first 48 hours of the invasion, KillNet had also launched an avalanche of attacks against Ukrainian targets (Intel 471, 2024) .  An advertisement for the original KILLNET tool. March 2022 saw KillNet keep its momentum and ambition, declaring open war on Anonymous ( ModnyMishka ) and carrying out further attacks against European states (Vedere Labs, 2022) . On the 3rd of March Killnet took down the Ukrainain news source "Korrespondent" and the Ukrainian branch of Vodafone, with the group claiming that the objective of the attacks was to prevent the distribution of propaganda (Vedere Labs, 2022) . The 20th of March also saw the release of the second version of the KillNet tool, but its domain was taken down shortly after (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Killnet claims they took it down themselves, but earlier had complained that it was banned in Russia and Europe, and this seems to have prompted a definitive change in branding from a criminal network to a hacktivist group. On the 15th of April 2022, KillNet carried out what they viewed as an anti-fascist operation, attacking the German Federal MoD as well as several German airports, Gatwick airport in the UK, and 8 Polish airports (Vedere Labs, 2022) . The 28th of April saw attacks against the Czech Republic, specifically against the servers of news broadcasters ( expatz.cz , 2022) , and on the 29th, KillNet attacked a range of Romanian public institutions, knocking their websites offline for a few hours (Marica, 2022) . These attacks continued on the 30th, with KillNet threatening to attack up to 300 Romanian websites, including newspapers, major public institutions, hotels, boarding houses, booking sites and political parties, specifically those associated with the Government (Chirileasa, 2022) . With this increase in activity came the creation of KillNet Legion, KillNet's digitally militant arm of various smaller hacker groups, which are given individual objectives (Intel 471, 2024) .  The new KillNet Legion was quickly put to work, with the network carrying out DDoS attacks against Moldova in May 2022. Italy's police anti-cybercrime arm managed to foil KillNet's efforts to disrupt the Eurovision voting system on the 16th of May (Kitson, 2022) . This attack came in response to predictions that Ukraine would win the contest due to Russia's invasion, as well as Russia's consequent ban from the contest. On the same day, Killnet officially declared war on the US, UK, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Italy came under further attack on the 19th of May, with KillNet launching attacks against the Italian superior council of the judiciary, its customs agency and its foreign affairs, education and cultural heritage ministries (David, 2022) . However, KillNet's rampant aggression and growing popularity within Russian nationalist/hacking circles would not remain unchecked. On the 21st of May, 5:20 PM, Anonymous declared war on KILLNET ( YourAnonOne ) Just a minute later, the same account claims that KillNet's website, killnet.ru , had been knocked out ( YourAnonOne ) . KillNet's activity also began to generate real-world repercussions, ending in a 23-year-old KillNet member being arrested for participating in attacks against Romania ( HHS.gov , 2023) .  Despite these setbacks, KillNet made good on its promise of war with Lithuania, carrying out various DDoS attacks against the state (Vail, 2022) . These attacks were seemingly in response to Lithuania's decision to block the transit of goods sanctioned by the European Union to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The primary target was the  Secure National Data Transfer Network, a core component of Lithuania's national cyber defence network designed to sustain an internet network during war or crisis (Goodin, 2022) . According to KillNet, the attacks were a testing ground for some new operational abilities (Flashpoint Intel Team, 2022) .  It is at this point that KillNet's activity begins to wind down. In July 2022, KillNet Legion was disbanded in order for Legion 2.0 to take its place in the future (Intel 471, 2024) . The group did manage to carry out an attack against Lockheed Martin in response to the company's provision of HIMARS systems to Ukraine (Yildrim, 2022) , as well as some DDoS operations against the websites of the Japanese government (Yildrim, 2022) . November saw a change of objective, with KillNet hacking Russia's biggest online drug market, publishing vendor information online (Yildrim, 2022) . KillNet also launched the Infinity Forum, an online space designed to create cooperation amongst pro-Kremlin hacker groups; however, by February 2023, KillMilk announced that the forum was being sold (Flashpoint, 2025) .  Late 2022/early 2023 saw the relative death throes of KillNet. Whilst in December 2022 and January 2023, KillNet attempted to shift its targeting towards medical organisations/services ( HHS.gov , 2023) , these operations failed to garner the previously achieved levels of support the group had received. This prompted a rebrand from 'KillNet' to 'Black Skills' in March 2023, shifting back from hacktivism to hacker-for-hire services as their main form of income (Flashpoint, 2025) . By April, the group announced they would be going back on this rebranding, calling it a mistake. Early December 2023 saw the retirement of KillMilk from KillNet (Antoniuk, 2025) . A threat actor called Deanon Club, a hacking group that had previously called KillNet 'clowns', took over KillNet, seemingly having created a bond during the groups' collaboration during their creation of the Infinity Forum (Antoniuk, 2025) .  Following this shift in leadership and failed rebranding, KillNet experienced considerable operational fragmentation. Whilst sporadic activity has been reported from the group, such as the claim in May 2025 that KillNet knocked out the Ukrainian drone counter-measure network ( MASH ) , on the whole, KillNet has remained relatively inactive.  A point of interest is Russia's and, consequently, KillNet's cyber-war relationship with France. Since WW2, France has actually been very cooperative with Russia compared to the rest of Europe. Because of this, many Russian nationalist hacker groups tend to leave France alone (Muncaster, 2022) . Therefore, whilst KillNet's attacks on European states have been extensive and widespread, France has, until recently, remained untouched.  This changed on the 31st of July when KillMilk stated on Telegram that KillNet would be targeting European states in response to supposed cyber attacks from said countries against Russia ( KillMilk ) . KillMilk states that the group will begin by attacking France using both ransomware and DDoS attacks. At the time of writing, no such attacks have been reported.  Objectives & Ideology Ideologically, KillNet is explicit in its pro-Russian nationalism. From the onset of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, KillNet has stated its support for Russia and has consequently had a general objective of attacking any states which attempt to support Ukraine (Lyons, 2022) . For example, Killnet has posted videos declaring support for the Russian state, encouraging the Russian people never to doubt their government (Vail, 2022) . KillNet has also stated that it only recruits Russian citizens; however, the veracity of this claim is dubious (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  (Russian propaganda posted and pushed by KILLNET reading: “Citizens of Ukraine! Surrender! Save your lives! You are being driven to certain death. Your president has rotten spiritually, morally, and mentally”.) - SOURCE Whether through attempts to gain political favour or through direct influence from the Kremlin, KillNet's activities tend to follow/reflect the news cycle in Russia (Flashpoint, 2025) . The goal of this symbiosis is to reinforce the Kremlin's domestic image in the cyber sphere. Through the execution of highly visible attacks, combined with extensive self-promotion of their activities, KillNet helps the Kremlin proxy-recruit nationalist hacker groups to carry out deniable operations in support of the state's interests. These groups then often target Western governments and agencies as they threaten Russian interests abroad (Vedere Labs, 2022) , as evidenced by the 27/6/22 KillNet attacks against Lithuania (Vail, 2022) . The nationalistic pursuits of KillNet seem to be the primary driver for their operational objectives; however, these objectives are not without a financial component. Whilst supposedly driven by their stance on Narcotics, KILLNET's attacks on dark net markets also seem to have had financial motives, with the group snatching crypto wallets in the process (Flashpoint, 2025) . Interestingly, KillNet is also associated with Solaris, a Russian darknet market. Around $50,000 was sent to KillNet from a Solaris-associated crypto wallet in October 2022 (TRMLabs, 2025) . KillNet then carried out attacks against Solaris' rival, RuTor. RuTor was then forced to pay $15,000 to KillNet to stop the attacks (TRMLabs, 2025) . The very foundations of the group are based on this premise of hackers-for-hire, with KillNet briefly returning to these roots during its rebrand as Black Skills (Flashpoint, 2025) . The original KILLNET DDoS tool charged $1350 a month for access (Mascellino, 2022) .  Military/Political Abilities In addition to ideological coordination with the government, KillNet also seems to coordinate its attack with the efforts of government/military bodies such as the FSB, GRU, SVR, and TsNIIKhM (Burgess, 2022) . Open collaboration isn't clear, however, KillNet activities tend to occur either in similar time frames, or in complement to cyber attacks more directly linked to the Russian state. However, compared to a lot of groups available to Russia, KILLNET is unsophisticated and unorganised (Avertium, 2022) . Whilst Russia is known for its disinformation approach, KillNet lies about deeds which can be easily disproven and seems to have a preoccupation with creating a reputation for itself.  A telegram message shared by KILLNET declaring that they will take actions to  support Russian military operations in Ukraine. ( https://t.me/WeAreKillnet_Channel/43 ) Senior members of KillNet possess expertise and experience in DDoS attacks, although most members use publicly available DDoS scripts and IP stressers (Intel 471, 2024) . Unsurprisingly, KillNet actors often use the DDoS tool of the same name. For $1350 a month, the tool gives an attacker the capacity for 500GB a second of DDoS spam (Mascellino, 2022) . The tool itself is supposedly comprised of a 700,000-node botnet which utilises blockchain technology (Intel 471, 2024) . The original Killnet software could perform Layer 3/4 or Layer 7 DDoS and included 15 computers (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  Whilst the group has been relatively successful in its activity using the KILLNET tool, is relatively structured in its operations, and possesses a wide range of personnel, it doesn't seem to develop its own tools outside of rare occurrences (Vedere Labs, 2022) . However, in addition to KILLNET, the group also occasionally uses DDoS tools such as CC-Attack, MDDoS, LOIC, KARMA, and Dummy, as well as the Crypto, DDG, and Instant IP Stressers (Intel 471, 2024) .  Approach to Resistance Distributed Denial of Service, or DDoS, attacks make up the vast majority of KillNet activity. Generally, KillNet targets vulnerable equipment inside a target country, enrols it into their botnets, and then uses that piece of equipment to launch DDoS attacks against a wider network ( Tylaz.net , 2022) . KillNet seems to have attempted to develop this strategy further through the KillNet Legion VERA 1.0 malware. This malware is supposed to assist in the creation of botnets; however, its full utility is unclear at the time of writing (Intel 471, 2024) .  Whilst KILLNET's DDoS attacks don't cause a massive amount of permanent damage, the outages they cause, combined with the targeting of key infrastructure, generate real-world effects on people's lives ( HHS.gov , 2023) . As seen with Killnet's threats against Romania, their attacks seem to want to hit a network of key pieces of infrastructure in order to cause panic/confusion and an infrastructural shutdown (Chirileasa, 2022) . The group seems to primarily target what they view as the military-industrial complex of the West, trying to disrupt production and target civilian personnel through the extraction of personal data, which could be used to further target them (Eich, 2022) . In order to target such a wide network, KillNet has also widened its attack vectors into ransomware, malware, spear phishing, and spoofing when necessary (Chirileasa, 2022) .  Backing/support for these operations is often generated through social media-based recruitment and self-promotion. Killnet uses Telegram and other social media, such as X to create material designed to recruit new members to their initiative. Through these avenues, they attempt to recruit pen testers, graphic designers, hackers, phishers, scammers, and DDoSers to support the Russian government and target those who oppose it ( Intel 471, 2024) . Financial support is also garnered here, with the group's Telegram channels directing people to crypto wallets for donations, and even to an OpenSea page where the group had created an NFT available for purchase (Intel 471, 2024) .  International Relations & Alliances KillNet is a part of a wider network of political hacktivists and hackers-for-hire fighting the cyber-war in support of Russia. This network features threat actors such as CoomingProject, Mummy Spider, Salty Spider, Scully Spider, Smokey Spider, Wizard Spider and the Xaknet Team (Lyons, 2022) . It is common for KillNet to work in collaboration with these other actors to carry out mutually beneficial operations. Xaknet has been a particularly close collaborator with the group, carrying out DDoS attacks alongside KillNet in March 2022 to target the central infrastructure of Western states (CISA, 2022) .  KillNet itself is more of a loose group of individuals in leadership positions, with these individuals (such as KillMilk) using social media channels to issue general orders/objectives to followers. However, the primary 'arm' of KillNet, which is used to carry out more specific and coordinated attacks, is known as the KillNet legion. Originally known as Cyber Special Forces Russian Federation, Legion is comprised of several groups “Jacky”, “Mirai”, “Impulse”, “DDOSGUNG”, “Sakurajima”, “Kratos”, “Rayd”, “Zarya”, “Vera”, and “Phoenix” (ReliaQuest, 2025). Set up to carry out DDoS attacks for KillNet, each of the six subdivisions under Legion has its own targets and objectives (Intel 471, 2024) . For example, on 11 May 2022, Sakurajima and Jacky were told to begin targeting German and Polish infrastructure, with no restriction on targets (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  Works Cited Antoniuk, D. (2025). Russian hacker group Killnet returns with new identity . [online] Therecord.media . Available at: https://therecord.media/russian-hacker-group-killnet-returns-with-new-identity [Accessed 7 Jun. 2025]. AVERTIUM, (2022). An In-Depth Look at Russian Threat Actor, Killnet . [online] Available at: https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/an-in-depth-look-at-russian-threat-actor-killnet . Burgess, C. (2022). New Five Eyes alert warns of Russian threats targeting critical infrastructure . [online] CSO Online. Available at: https://www.csoonline.com/article/572625/new-five-eyes-warns-of-russian-threats-targeting-critical-infrastructure.html Chirileasa (2022). Romania under cyberattack coming from Russia’s Killnet . [online] Romania Insider. Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-cyberattack-russia-killnet-2022 . Chirileasa (2022). Romania under cyberattack coming from Russia’s Killnet . [online] Romania Insider. Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-cyberattack-russia-killnet-2022 . David, B. (2022). Pro-Russian Hackers Hit Critical Government Websites in Italy . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/pro-russian-hackers-italy/ . David, B. (2022 1). Anonymous Declares Cyber-War on Pro-Russian Hacker Gang Killnet . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/anonymous-declares-war-on-killnet/ [Accessed 2 May 2025]. Eich, (2022). Killnet: Russian Hacktivists DDoS US Airports, Government Websites – Westoahu Cybersecurity . [online] Available at: https://westoahu.hawaii.edu/cyber/uncategorized/killnet-russian-hacktivists-ddos-us-airports-government-websites/ . expats.cz . (2022). Czech Television hit in another wave of cyber attacks . [online] Available at: https://www.expats.cz/czech-news/article/czech-television-hit-in-another-wave-of-cyber-attacks [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Flashpoint Intel Team (2022). Killnet, Kaliningrad, and Lithuania’s Transport Standoff With Russia . [online] Flashpoint. Available at: https://flashpoint.io/blog/killnet-kaliningrad-and-lithuanias-transport-standoff-with-russia/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. Flashpoint. (2025). Killnet: Inside the World’s Most Prominent Pro-Kremlin Hacktivist Collective . [online] Flashpoint. Available at: https://flashpoint.io/intelligence-101/killnet/ . Gazeta.ru . (2023). ‘От него устали, но боятся’: что известно о лидере хакерской группировки Killnet - Газета.Ru . [online] Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2023/11/21/17878753.shtml?updated [Accessed 7 Jun. 2025]. Goodin, D. (2022). Pro-Russia threat group Killnet is pummeling Lithuania with DDoS attacks . [online] Ars Technica. Available at: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/06/pro-russia-threat-group-killnet-is-pummeling-lithuania-with-ddos-attacks/ [Accessed 1 May 2025]. Groupsense, (2022). The Allies and Enemies of Killnet . [online] Groupsense.io . Available at: https://www.groupsense.io/resources/the-allies-and-enemies-of-killnet [Accessed 18 May 2025]. HHS.gov (2023). HC3: Analyst Note. [Online] Office of Information Security. Available at: https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/killnet-analyst-note.pdf . Intel 471. (2024). Why organizations should (and should not) worry about KillNet . [online] Available at: https://intel471.com/blog/killnet-xaknet-legion-ddos-attacks [Accessed 7 May 2025]. Kitson, N. (2022). Russian hackers declare war on 10 countries after failed Eurovision DDoS attack - TechCentral.ie . [online] TechCentral.ie . Available at: https://www.techcentral.ie/russian-hackers-declare-war-on-10-countries-after-failed-eurovision-ddos-attack/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Lyons, J. (2022). Five Eyes nations fear wave of Russian attacks against critical infrastructure . [online] Theregister.com . Available at: https://www.theregister.com/2022/04/21/five_eyes_russia/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Marica (2022). Romanian government websites targeted by cyberattacks . [online] Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-state-websites-cyberattack-2022 . Mascellino, A. (2022). Pro-Russian Hacker Group Killnet Hits Critical Government Websites in Lithuania . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/killnet-hacks-lithuania-government/ . Muncaster, P. (2022). Italian Police Foil Pro-Russia Attacks on Eurovision . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/italian-police-foil-prorussia/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. ReliaQuest. (2025). Killnet: The Hactivist Group That Started A Global Cyber War - ReliaQuest . [online] Available at: https://reliaquest.com/blog/killnet-the-hactivist-group-that-started-a-global-cyber-war/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. TRMLabs (2025). Spotlight on KillNet: The Cybercriminal Group Raising Funds for Russia’s War in Ukraine | TRM Blog . [online] Available at: https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/spotlight-on-killnet-the-cybercriminal-group-raising-funds-for-russias-war-in-ukraine [Accessed 18 May 2025]. Tylaz.net (2022). Killnet attacked several websites of state institutions in the Republic of Moldova (Online) Tylaz.net . Available at: https://www.tylaz.net/2022/05/01/killnet-attacked-several-websites-of-state-institutions-in-the-republic-of-moldova/ [Accessed 30 Apr.2025] Vail, E. (2023). Russia or Ukraine: Hacking groups take sides . [online] Therecord.media . Available at: https://therecord.media/russia-or-ukraine-hacking-groups-take-sides?msclkid=235244a7ba6611ec92f21c9bd3b8ee49 [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Vedere Labs, (2022). Killnet Analysis of Attacks from a Prominent Pro-Russian Hacktivist Group. [Online] Forescout. Available at: https://www.forescout.com/resources/analysis-of-killnet-report/ . Yildirim, M. (2022). Dark Web Profile: Killnet - Russian Hacktivist Group - SOCRadar . [online] SOCRadar® Cyber Intelligence Inc. Available at: https://socradar.io/dark-web-profile-killnet-russian-hacktivist-group/ .

Introduction & Overview ENOT Corps was a Russian nationalist far-right private military contracting group. Gaining notoriety through participation in the Russian nationalist scene, ENOT quickly gained covert government support, which enabled its fighters to deploy to eastern Ukraine. A key component of Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, ENOT Corps remained in good standing with both the Kremlin and other far-right groups until 2018, when the group seems to have fallen out of favour with Moscow's political circles. This led to ENOT cutting ties with Kremlin-linked groups, resulting in the criminalisation of ENOT as an organisation and the consequent arrests of numerous fighters. By 2019, ENOT was formally shut down. Whilst numerous key members of the group are now in prison, one of the two primary founders, Igor Mangushev, was killed in 2023 in what looks to be a state-sanctioned execution in Russian-occupied Ukraine.  History & Foundations ENOT, which stands for "United Popular Communal Groups", was founded by an obscure and loose group of Russian nationalists. This group varies in their backgrounds but was united in their desire to mobilise other nationalists into fighting in conflicts involving Russia (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . However, over time, two key figures appeared. Roman Telenkevich, a 51-year-old Russian, was originally registered as an individual entrepreneur engaged in the trade of household electrical goods before his entry into military contracting through ENOT. Telenkevich had previously served in the Russian Air Force in the unit 93810 of the Air Force military transport aviation near Moscow (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Igor Mangushev, the other primary founder of the group, served as a Russian army captain before his activity with ENOT, and interestingly seemed to have continued his service in tandem with these "extra-curricular" activities (Kirby, 2023) .  Mangushev gained notoriety in 2009 for his founding and managing of the Light Russia nationalist group (Tumanov, 2015) . This group primarily conducted "anti-immigration" raids in collaboration with other far-right groups such as Alexey Khudyakov's "Shield of Moscow" (Vera Alperovich, 2016) . In 2010, Mangushev met Telenkevich, who at the time was running the Moscow branch of the People's Cathedral (Polukhina, 2019) . This marked the beginning of collaborative efforts which, by 2011, would result in the formal founding of ENOT Corps (Data Journalists, 2023) .  Even before their work as PMCs, ENOT had gained the attention of the FSB through their domestic activities on the nationalist scene (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . As with groups such as Rusich, RIM, Batman Battalion, and other volunteer pro-Russian paramilitaries, it seems that around this time, ENOT developed a symbiotic relationship with the Russian state security apparatus. Following this favourable development, ENOT's activity escalated in its severity.  2014 saw ENOT participating in the hybrid war being waged against eastern Ukraine. ENOT was present during the Euromaidan, fighting alongside the Berkut police against protestors (Radio Liberty, 2019) . The group also assisted in the seizure of Crimea (Coynash, 2020) , fighting alongside Cossacks and Berkut police during the early stages of the annexation (Polukhina, 2019) . With the seizure of Crimea, ENOT shifted its attention to the mainland, fighting alongside Russian separatists in the Donbas (Askew, 2023) . In 2015, it seems that the group continued its campaign in Ukraine, primarily fighting for the city of Debaltseve (Coynash, 2020) . This military activity was conducted under the guise of 'humanitarian' motivations; however, evidence points to ENOT operating in an almost exclusively combative capacity. Even on the rare occasions where ENOT did participate in the distribution of humanitarian aid in the area, in reality, this aid consisted of sights, bulletproof vests, and military equipment, which was then provided to pro-Russian separatists (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . ENOT fighters, and founder Roman Telenkevich, during the group’s time in the Donbas. https://ok.ru/video/306451649014 In addition to this frontline activity, 2015 saw ENOT expand its operations into new roles. It seems that ENOT was utilised by the Russian state to stomp out dissent amongst disgruntled or power-hungry separatist groups. In spring, ENOT was responsible for the purging of a Cossack formation following the formation challenging Igor Plotnitsky, leader of the LPR (Coynash, 2020) . In September, ENOT also began holding military training camps in Russian territories. During this time, the group ENOT held a training camp for 300 young Russians (13-14 years old) in the Moscow region (Coynash, 2020) . Alexei Milchakov and Jan Petrovsky from DShRG Rusich were valued instructors during this camp. Later, ENOT held another youth camp in Belarus. Yet again, the instructors were a rogues gallery of military officers, paramilitary fighters, and PMC operators, with the camp mustering such a turnout that the Belarusian authorities were concerned it could be an early military move from Russia (Goble, 2018) .  ENOT continued its activities for a few years, with the group continuing its occupation of Ukraine with decreased intensity and organising a youth camp in the Moscow region in 2017 (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . However, it seems that 2018 was the beginning of the end for ENOT. Initially, ENOT continued its operations in Ukraine, and even gained contracts in Syria as well as anti-migration/counter organised crime and drug trafficking work in Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh (Dyner, 2018) . However, whilst Telenkevich was awarded for his efforts in Crimea by Sergei Aksyonov (installed leader of occupied Crimea), it seems this supposed recognition of duty was a mark of ENOT meeting its expiry date regarding its usefulness to the Russian state (Polukhina, 2019) .  Later that year, Telenkevich fell into conflict with Alexander Borodai (Prime Minister of the DPR at the time), leading to ENOT leaving the Union of Donbas Volunteers (Coynash, 2020) . Following this, ENOT was rapidly labelled as a criminal organisation by the Russian state, with ENOT members beginning to be arrested. In August, the 'raccoon' kids training camp the group had been running in Siberia, was shut down under the pretence of child abuse and public anxiety (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . On the 7th of November, the FSB and local police arrested several members of ENOT (Goble, 2018) . ENOT's capabilities, gained through fighting in Ukraine and Syria, combined with its ultranationalist objectives that were rapidly drifting away from the interests of the Kremlin, led to the Russian state deciding to put down what was, from its perspective, a rabid dog. In 2019, ENOT was formally shut down (Askew, 2023) .  Whilst Russian security forces initially went after lower-hanging fruit, the founding/key members of the group were far from untouchable. In June 2021, Vladimir Morosoz, ENOTs' treasurer and ideologue, was sentenced to 10.5 years in a maximum security prison (BBC NEWS, 2021) . He is imprisoned on organised crime charges, including violent extortion. It seems ENOT had resorted to operating as a group of thugs to hire. Telenkevich was also sentenced to 13 years in prison in March of 2022 on similar charges (RFL, 2022) . Supposedly, Telenkevich, working alongside other ex-ENOT employees under the cover of contractors for the Russian security forces, regularly robbed smugglers they were supposed to arrest, taking a percentage of captured goods for themselves.   In February 2023, Igor Mangushev was killed. At the time, Mangushev was running an anti-drone squad in occupied Luhansk as part of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (Kirby, 2023) . The event took place in Russian-occupied Ukraine, with the killing seemingly conducted through an execution-style shot to the back of the head (Askew, 2023) , using a 9mm round at 45 degrees from the top of Mangushev's head (implying he was kneeling at the time of death) (Kirby, 2023) .  Objectives & Ideology ENOT was driven, at least ideologically, by imperialism and ultranationalism. The group viewed Ukraine as a part of Russia (Askew, 2023) . More specifically, Mangushev believed that Russia is less at war with Ukraine as a state and more as the idea of 'anti-Russia', and according to Mangushev, the defeat of this idea is essential regardless of how many Ukrainians have to die (Kirby, 2023) . These beliefs, as well as Mangushev's belief in a 'Russian World' (Tumanov, 2015) , can be seen throughout the group's social media output and real-world activities.  The photo used by ENOT corp on a website registering their organisation. On the left is the the flag of Novorossiya, traditionally donned/flown by far-right imperialist groups.  https://zoon.ru/msk/public_services/obschestvennye_organizatsii_enot_corp/ In addition to these nationalistic views, ENOT has also gained infamy for its proximity to Neo-Nazism and its ardent Christian Orthdoxy. Mangushev, and consequently ENOT, gained their foundations from the Neo-Nazi scene in Russia (Kirby, 2023) , and during training camps, attendees were often subjected to far-right/neo nazi propaganda seminars (Coynash, 2020) . ENOT has, at times, referred to itself as a 'Russian Orthodox community' (Goble, 2018) . The group's events are titled things such as "International Youth Military-Patriotic Collection in Glory of the Holy Prince Dmitry Donskoy" or "Military-Tactical Game of St. Archangel Michael" and at one of these events, a chaplain was present to bless attendees (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . This Christian influence was also present during the group's military activities, with the medals handed out to ENOT operators for efforts in the Donbas being in the shape of crucifixes (Coynash, 2020) . When they received their medals, fighters shouted, “I serve my fatherland, ENOT and the Orthodox Faith”. Military/Political Abilities During their peak period of operation, ENOT relied on receiving both contracts and support from businesses in the AOs they were deployed to monetarily support their operations (Askew, 2023) . Whilst not outright PMCs, during its time in the Donbas war, ENOT carried out voluntary humanitarian convoys and 'self-defence' skirmishes (Polukhina, 2019) . These activities were not contractually paid, but sponsors from the Donbas put a high price on humanitarian aid, earning ENOT a notable income.  Unfortunately, this system of financing is possibly why the group was dismantled and why Mangushev was killed. Unlike other PMCs that have managed to generate heavy business and political ties, ENOT did not manage to find this level of sponsorship and consequent political protection. This would not necessarily have been a problem for ENOT had the group not been as outwardly critical of the Russian government as they were of those in the West (Goble, 2018) .  Militarily, ENOT's primary tool was deniability. The group's obscure/loose command structure and proxy-financing through regional sponsors meant that its activities were difficult to track and were a key component of hybrid operations in eastern Ukraine (Goble, 2018) . This hybrid capability was exhibited during the annexation of Crimea, and was recognised by the Kremlin and awarded with a high degree of support (Coynash, 2020) . In the context of more conventional operations, ENOT managed to gain a considerable amount of equipment over the years through its military contracting work, with Mangushev claiming the group was ready "to do business" (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) .  Approach to Resistance ENOT's activities primarily fall into the category of private military contracting. Askew (2023) feels that these activities were a way to monetise the group's ideology. Through PMC work, ENOT was able to gain monetary support as well as further their objective of increasing Russian influence abroad and the resuscitation of the Russian Empire. Interestingly, ENOT always denied being a PMC group, and yet were open about their support for such activities (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Mangushev felt that PMCs were a valuable way to organise the separatist cause, championing the idea that separatist groups should become PMCs, or should be monitored by PMCs (Tumanov, 2015) .  The training camps held by ENOT also operated to further the group's ideological objectives. Through these camps, hundreds of young Russian people were exposed to far-right beliefs and trained in combat skills under the idea that these children would grow up to become the next generation of patriots (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) .  International Relations & Alliances Whilst the network of militant far-right groups in Russia is complex and overlapping, on a few occasions, the connections between these groups have become slightly less obscure. ENOT and Wagner troops regularly fought in similar theatres during the Donbas war, but the connection between the PMCs became much clearer when Mangushev collaborated with Prigozhin as a political strategist (Kirby, 2023) . Rusich, another PMC with very close ties to Wagner, also have close ties to ENOT through their participation in training camps as instructors (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Social media posts of these collaborative efforts between Rusich and ENOT seem to indicate a close working relationship between the groups.  Members of ENOT Corp, Rusich group, and the Russian Imperial Movement together at a training camp. Third from left, ENOT founder Roman Telenkevich. Fourth from left, Rusich founder Alexey Milchakov.  ENOT's connections to the Russian state are heavily obscured, yet can still be proven. More specifically, ENOT seems to have regularly operated as an asset for the Russian intelligence community, with there being heavy links between ENOT and the FSB and GRU (Coynash, 2020) . These links were so heavy that at times it seemed like the FSB/GRU were propping ENOT up by conducting key roles and training members of the PMC (Radio Liberty, 2019) . Two key players of the organisation, Denis Karaban (GRU), Alexander Mrishchuk and Anton Baryakshev (FSB), turned out to be intelligence assets/officers (Coynash, 2020) .  Works Cited Askew, J. (2023).Everyone is talking about Wagner. But who are Russia’s other mercenaries?[online] Yahoo News. Available at: https://uk.news.yahoo.com/everyone-talking-wagner-russias-other-050053244.html?guccounter=2  [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025]. BBC News (2021).Суд в Туапсе приговорил идеолога ЧВК ‘ЕНОТ’ к 10,5 годам колонии - BBC News Русская служба_. [online] BBC News Русская служба. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57664017  [Accessed 13 May 2025]. Coynash, (2022). Russian military intelligence & FSB men reportedly led a unit involved in Crimea and Donbas invasion. [online] Human Rights in Ukraine. Available at: https://khpg.org/en/1577103087  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. Data Journalists. (2023).Private armies $100 billion business for the long arm of governments_. [online] Available at: https://www.datajournalists.co.uk/2023/09/03/private-armies-100-billion-business-for-the-long-arm-of-governments/?lang=en  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. Dyner, (2018) The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy [online] PISM. Available at: https://pism.pl/publications/The_Role_of_Private_Military_Contractors_in_Russian_Foreign_Policy . Goble (2018).Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries Kremlin_. [online] The Jamestown Foundation. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-nationalist-group-acting-as-a-private-military-company-worries-kremlin/ . Kirby, P. (2023). Notorious Russian nationalist Igor Mangushev shot dead in Ukraine.BBC  News_. [online] 8 Feb. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64566582 . NEWSru.com . (2017).Белорусские подростки приняли участие в сборах, проводившихся причастной к боям в Донбассе организацией_. [online] Available at: https://www.newsru.com/world/25sep2017/enotcorp.html  [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025]. Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya (2018).ФСБ начала задерживать участников ЧВК E.N.O.T.[online] Daily Storm. Available at: https://dailystorm.ru/obschestvo/fsb-nachala-zaderzhivat-uchastnikov-chvk-e-n-o-t . Polukhina (2019).‘Еноты’ в клетке_. [online] Новая газета. Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/22/79661-enoty-v-kletke  [Accessed 10 May 2025]. Radio Liberty, (2019).Russian active-duty military fought against Ukraine in ranks of private military company: Media report - Euromaidan Press_. [online] Euromaidan Press. Available at: https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/12/19/russian-active-duty-intelligence-operatives-fought-in-donbas-in-ranks-of-a-private-militry-company-media-report/  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. RFE/RL (2022).Суд приговорил главу ЧВК ‘Е.Н.О.Т.’ к 13 годам колонии строгого режима_. [online] Радио Свобода. Available at: https://www.svoboda.org/a/sud-prigovoril-glavu-chvk-e-n-o-t-k-13-godam-kolonii-strogogo-rezhima/31766276.html  [Accessed 13 May 2025]. Tumanov (2015).Послевоенные действия_. [online] Коммерсантъ. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2688561  [Accessed 11 May 2025]. Vera Alperovich. (2016).Transformation of the Russian Nationalist Movement:… / SOVA_. [online] Available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2016/08/d35252/  [Accessed 16 Jun. 2025].

Insurgency Overview The Army of God (AOG) is an anti-abortion underground terrorist group based in the United States that has been linked to bombings, kidnappings, and murder beginning in the 1980s. The AOG promotes violence in response to abortion and the use of biblical scripture as a means to justify their violent actions. The group’s members and operations are primarily based out of the East Coast of the United States. History & Foundations Anti-abortion violence began to increase after events such as Roe v. Wade  in 1973, as access to abortions increased and political discourse on the matter changed.  The exact date of formation of the AOG is not currently known. However, the first confirmed instance of the group taking part in anti-abortion violence occurred in 1982, when Dr. Hector Zevallos, who performed abortions, as well as his wife, were kidnapped by members of the AOG. They were later set free (9). The AOG has a website that included a manual detailing information about the group’s founding, motivations, and instructions on how to destroy “babykilling abortion mills.” However, the bulk of the manual remains missing due to claims that it is illegal to upload online (7). The AOG’s operations, or whether they remain active, are currently not known. The group began in the early 80s and seems to have halted activity in the 2000s, although an individual was arrested in 2018 for making bomb threats against clinics (10). Objectives & Ideology  The AOG believes in violence against doctors who specialize in performing abortions and other medical professionals involved with abortions, as they believe abortion is murder and claim those who carry out abortions are “baby killers.” Members tend to embrace right-wing politics. The AOG is also considered a religious extremist group. They cite passages from the Bible, particularly Genesis 9:6 (“Who so sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God he made he man”) or Mark 8:36 (“For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?”). These passages, along with a plethora of other scriptures and messages from the Bible, are used as a justification for the AOG’s actions. They view violence against abortion providers as “killing the killers” (7). The AOG formerly had a manual that was available online. Consisting of nine chapters, the first three are an intro and “special thanks” to various online users and real people. Chapters 4–6 detail instructions, and the remaining chapters serve as a call to arms to “stop the mass murder of infants.” The manual is said to have undergone three revisions (7), with the final one resulting from the FBI’s crackdown on the group around the mid-to-late 2000s, based on additions made to the manual section (7). People within or outside of the group who assault or murder abortion specialists were referred to as “heroes” on the website. Notable examples include Paul Hill, who murdered John Britton, a doctor who carried out abortions, in 1994; and Shelly Shannon, who shot George Tiller, another abortion provider, in 2009 (5).  Political & Military Abilities   The AOG does not have an armed or political wing in the traditional sense, operating more as a loose formation whose members often do not know one another. Past actions have shown they are capable of carrying out bombings, arson, and other forms of property damage.  Members are recruited through word of mouth or sharing the website/manual contents online or through physical copies.  Due to the leaderless structure and anonymous membership of the group, the total membership of the AOG is difficult to determine. Notable members include Eric Robert Rudolph, responsible for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta; Donald Spitz, a spokesperson for the group; and Paul Jennings Hill, who murdered John Britton (1, 2). Approaches to Resistance   The bulk of the AOG’s approach to resistance comes in the form of violence, mainly bombings and other forms of property damage, but the group has also been responsible for murder, attempted murder, and kidnapping. Most of their attacks are against either medical institutions, such as Planned Parenthood, or individuals in the medical field.  The AOG does not have a formal leader and operates on an individual basis, with members often not knowing each other. This approach is sometimes known as “compartmentalization,” and it is done to make it more difficult for law enforcement to monitor them (2). Relations and Alliances Since the AOG operates as a mostly anonymous group, it is difficult to say if they directly work with anyone outside of their inner ranks. The AOG website mentions and gives thanks to people who aided their operations or otherwise provided favors to the website hosts (7).   Works Cited  Feminist Majority Foundation Blog, (2.25.1997) extremist “Army of God” group takes credit for Atlanta bombings, promises to attack again, United States https://feminist.org/news/extremist-army-of-god-group-takes-credit-for-atlanta-bombings-promises-to-attack-again/ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (publish date unknown) Terrorist Organization Profile Army of God, United States https://web.archive.org/web/20120623065521/http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data%5Fcollections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=28   Clarkson, Frederick (9.15.1998) Anti-abortion movement marches on after two decades of arson, bombs, and murder, SPLC, United States https://www.splcenter.org/resources/reports/anti-abortion-movement-marches-after-two-decades-arson-bombs-and-murder/   4.)Henderon, Alex (4.7.2015) 6 modern day Christian terrorist groups our media convenently ignores, Salon, United States  https://www.salon.com/2015/04/07/6_modern_day_christian_terrorist_groups_our_media_conveniently_ignores_partner/   5.) Associated Press (11.7.2018) Rachelle ‘Shelley’ Shannon, activist who shot abortion doctor George Tiller, released from prison Associated Press, United States https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/7/rachelle-shelley-shannon-activist-who-shot-abortio/   6.) NY times (1.20.1985) 3 men charged in bombings of seven abortion facilities  NY Times, United States  https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/20/us/3-men-charged-in-bombings-of-seven-abortion-facilities.html   7.) ArmyofGod.com (link removed due to gragic imagery)  8.) Jennifer, Jefferis (12.2011) Armed for Life: The Army of God and Anti-Abortion Terror in the United States, JSOTR, United States  https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298546?seq=1   9.) Sheppard, Nathan (8.21.1982) Abortion doctor and wife are freed, NY Times, United States  https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/21/us/abortion-doctor-and-wife-are-freed.html   10.) Goudie, Chuck and Weidner, Ross (2.12.2018) Feds: Indiana man linked to "anti-abortion extremist organization" threatened clinic attacks, ABC & news, United States  https://abc7chicago.com/army-of-god-terrorism-domestic-anti-abortion/3049950/

Introduction & Overview The Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM, is a far-right ultranationalist and white supremacist political organisation, also possessing a paramilitary wing known as the Imperial Legion. Through its use of its ‘Partizan’ training camp, extensive transnational collaboration with other far-right organisations, and participation in numerous armed conflicts, RIM has gained notoriety for its network of fighters and political activists.  With the overall political objective of the restoration of the Russian monarchy and the implementation of Orthodox Christianity within Russia, RIM also holds intensely imperialist views. A component of these views is the fruition of the Novorossiya project, leading to RIM’s extensive involvement in the Donbas war, and eventually the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.  History & Foundations Originating in St Peterburg, RIM was founded in 2002 by Russian ultra-nationalist Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev (Huetlin, 2017) . Whilst Vorobyev's influence within RIM is considerable, RIM's activity in the military sphere is greatly reliant on the activity of Denis Gariev. Acting as lead instructor and organiser of RIM's paramilitary arm known as the Imperial Legion (Potter, 2022) , Gariev is also the founder of the RIM training camp known as "Partizan" (BBC News, 2022) .  Following the foundation of RIM in 2002, the Imperial Legion was founded in 2008 in an effort to further mobilise the organisation's paramilitary objectives (Potter, 2022) . This shift into a more militant pragmatism eventually led to RIM being registered as a terror organisation by the Russian government in 2013 (BBC News, 2022) . However, despite this categorisation, in Spring 2014, Stanislav Vorobyov joined Russian military instructors on a trip to Crimea. The objective of said trip was to develop local "Novorossiya" resistance movements ( Zaks.ru , 2015) .   Simultaneously, Gariev began mobilising volunteers through the Partizan training camp to enable the deployment of groups of fighters to the Donbas (Roth, 2017) . This participation in the 2014 Donbas war led to RIM's first combat losses in the fight for Slavyansk (Demchenko, 2020) . Despite these losses, the Imperial Legion can be traced through social media analysis as fighting through Nikishino in late 2014, and in early 2015, participating in the battle for Novogrigorievka and Logvinovo, with additional losses taken in Debaltsevo (Demchenko, 2020) .  By mid-2015, many Imperial Legion members had stopped fighting in the Donbas due to feeling the conflict had been co-opted by governmental and oligarchic interests from Russia, Ukraine and the West (Roth, 2017) .  Following this withdrawal, RIM increased the frequency of its training camps; however, outside of these camps, the movement's political weight waned considerably (Roth, 2017) . Between 2015 and 2017, additional RIM fighters died in the Donbas, evidencing their continued, if decreased, participation in the conflict (Demchenko, 2020) . It seems that, during this time, the training efforts of the Partizan camp places greater emphasis on transnational activity. In 2017, three members of the Nordic Resistance Movement carried out a string of bombings in Norway (Butt and Byman, 2020) . Two of the three attackers, Viktor Melin and Anton Thulin, had attended the Partizan training camp, with their participation in the camp being cited by the case’s prosecuting attorney as a catalytic component of their radicalisation into carrying out the attacks (Huetlin, 2017) . 2019 saw the last known activity of the Imperial Legion in the Donbas war, with Imperial Legion fighters finally withdrawing from LPR and DPR units (Demchenko, 2020) . According to RIM's telegram channel, a total of 12 legionnaires were killed during the Donbas war ( Rus Imperia ) . Again, this full withdrawal from the Donbas did not mark the end of RIM's activity, and instead, a redistribution of its efforts into other theatres. For example, RIM fighters were deployed to Libya to aid the Russian support of the Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, with at least two legionnaires dying in the process (Demchenko, 2020) . In response to this increasingly transnational activity, on the 6th of April 2020, RIM was declared a terrorist organisation by the US government and placed under numerous sanctions, specifically due to the organisation's efforts to train neo-Nazis abroad (Pamuk, 2020) . In fact, RIM was the first white supremacist group to be officially labelled "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" by the US State Department (Morrell, 2023) .  Following a period of decreased activity, RIM resurged to prominence in tandem with the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, the Telegram channel of the Partizan centre supported the invasion of Ukraine: "Do we welcome this war? Probably so! As an inevitable evil. Whether it will be able to resolve the issue of the civil war between the Russian people, which began 100 years ago, is doubtful." On March 8th, RIM's telegram states, "We decided to take part in the war with Ukraine." Finally, on the 29th of June, the Partisan training centre opened up again to train fighters for the war in Ukraine. This time, it is backed and sponsored by the Russian armed forces ( Rus Imperia ) .  Objectives & Ideology A message on RIM's telegram details a list of 7 requirements for those interested in joining the Imperial Legion/RIM ( Rus Imperia ) : Orthodox faith. Conservative views. (Remember, we are monarchists) Good physical shape. No bad habits. (alcohol-drugs,) Completion of a 5-day general course of special military training "Partisan". Completion of a 7-day training camp. Psychological test. This list hints towards a general outline for RIM's objectives and ideology, but in order for a full understanding of the group to be gained, a further exploration must be carried out. Firstly, RIM holds generally far-right views. With the objective of fighting against globalisation, multiculturalism, and liberalism (SFC, 2019) ; "the enemy" is considered to be the West, the LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, and jews (Potter, 2022) . In this context, RIM claims to defend the traditional values of Western civilisation, values which the enemy is apparently making a concerted and coordinated effort to destroy (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  RIM's primary ideological belief is that of orthodox monarchism. RIM seeks to restore the Russian monarchy (Huetlin, 2017) , primarily through what is known as a 'Romanov Restoration', the restoration of the Romanov family who suffered a regicide in 1918, to the crown (SFC, 2019) . Through this restoration of a monarchy, RIM seeks to implement two pillars of authority: political power vested in the tsar and holy power vested in the Russian Orthodox Church (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) . This drive for political authority through holy power is further evidenced throughout RIM's ardent Christian orthodoxy (Roth, 2017) . The group's telegram channel regularly posts biblical excerpts, as well as information on the historical ties between the Russian orthodox church and Russia's imperial age (RIM Telegram, 19th April 2025) .  These monarchic views are also closely linked to RIM's neo-Nazi views. Throughout its activities, RIM regularly espouses antisemitism, racism, homophobia, anti-abortion, chauvinism, sexual violence, anti-law enforcement, and anti-government beliefs, with said beliefs being commonly collectively known as 'Siege culture' (Morrell, 2023) . Additionally, RIM has a general belief that there is a global cabal of Jewish oligarchs that perpetuates globalisation, leading to massive increases in foreign migration and the corruption of Western culture to unleash conflict and wars all over the world (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  RIM's participation in Siege culture is further exemplified by its accelerationist objectives. RIM views societal collapse as inevitable and aims to prepare the Russian people to take advantage of this existential event in order to bring the Russian empire back to its former glory (Castner, 2022) . Through this event of societal collapse, Gariev himself has expressed the desire to lead a last crusade to save traditional Christian values from an alliance of leftists, LGBTQIA+ community members, and immigrants that supposedly poses an existential threat (Potter, 2022) . The Russian Imperial Movement believes wholeheartedly that there is a full-scale war about to start against Western civilisation, and regardless of its involvement in various other events, one of RIM’s primary objectives is to ensure victory for Russia once this war has passed (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  Victory in this conflict, to RIM, takes form in the reinstatement of the Russian empire, specifically the idea of Novorossiya (Demchenko, 2020) . In fact, the Imperial Legion was created in order to protect the population of this hypothetical region ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Such imperial/ultra-nationalist ambitions can even be seen in the group's flag/logo, featuring the black-gold-white tricolour of the Tsarist Empire (Potter, 2022) . Through the recreation of the Russian empire and Novorossiya, the interests of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians would be privileged ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Ethnic Russians in particular would receive additional privilege, with RIM believing that Russia should control any state in which a considerable number of ethnic Russians reside (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) . This attitude particularly applies to Ukraine, with RIM viewing the state as a bastardised component of the Russian empire invented by the Soviets, and in many cases, its people are ethnically Russian (Roth, 2017) .  This perspective regarding Russian ethnicity also extends into the realm of white supremacy. RIM has claimed to be "fighting for the predominance of the white race" (Hume, 2020) , and seeks to create a mono-ethnic state led by a Russian autocratic monarchy (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . As is common with ethnonationalism, genocidal intent is hinted at thoroughly by the Russian Imperial Movement. Gariev has previously stated: “We see Ukrainian-ness as rabies. A person is sick. Either quarantine, liquidation, or he’ll infect everyone" (Roth, 2017) Gariev has also stated that all Ukrainian separatists must be liquidated (Potter, 2022) . However, this is an even more concerning statement than initially thought when it is taken into account the fact that, in the eyes of RIM, all Ukrainians are inherently separatist through their very existence. Military/Political Abilities Militarily, RIM operates in a grey area. Whilst the group might not be directly under the control of the Russian military, Denis Gariev wrote all of the recruits he trains for societal collapse/conflict "are already part of the active army," (BBC News, 2022) . Similarly, Ruslan Starodubov, a member of the Imperial Legion, has stated “We don’t receive any support, but at the same time, we aren’t hampered” (Roth, 2017) . During armed operations, the imperial legion has fought actively alongside official government forces in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, and was able to move up to 30 million rubles of weaponry and equipment to Ukrainian separatists during the Donbas war (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Finally, in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Partisan centre now operates with the backing of the Russian armed forces ( Rus Imperia ) .  On the whole, the Kremlin does not directly support RIM, but it does nothing to combat the group’s violent activities, despite knowledge of their operations (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) . Whilst RIM opposes Putin in many ways, its activities as a conduit for terrorism in countries opposed to Russia seem to outweigh these issues in the risk-reward calculation made by the Kremlin (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Because of this benefit to Russia, the government turns a blind eye to both its criticisms and operations in a form of 'adversarial symbiosis' (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  Generally, RIM believes that Putin came to power through corrupt elites and oligarchs, and that he should step aside in order to give way to the tsar (Potter, 2022) . Gariev, in particular, has been an open critic of Putin in the past, viewing his government as corrupt and not doing enough to protect the interests of ethnic Russians (Roth, 2017) . Despite these criticisms, RIM agrees with Putin on several points, such as viewing the West and the LGBTQIA+ community as an enemy, and a commitment to traditional values (Potter, 2022) . There are also some clear connections between RIM and various politically or militarily powerful individuals. GRU Colonel V.V. Kvachkov has attended the Partizan centre numerous times in order to deliver lectures on various topics, including the execution of special military operations ( Rus Imperia and Rus Imperia ) . RIM has also worked with Rodina, a Russian extreme-right party founded in 2003 by Dmitry Rogozin. Rogozin served as Russia’s deputy prime minister from 2011 to 2018, overseeing the country’s defence industry (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) .  Approach to Violence The Russian imperial movement's primary objective, outside of its overarching political/military goals, is the creation and maintenance of an extremist network. RIM itself is a network, not just a movement, with each node comprised of smaller cells/groups/units of fighters and activists spread across various Russian cities, and in some cases, other countries ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Gariev himself has boasted that: "We are the only organisation that maintains close and professional connections with right-wing extremist movements around the world" (Potter, 2022) A key component of this network is the foundation of the World National-Conservative Movement. This movement, founded between RIM and the Rodina party, aims to bring together far-right activists in opposition to liberalism, multiculturalism, and tolerance (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Far-right extremist groups from up to 28 different countries attended the conference in 2015 (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . This network is then used to share experiences of political and information warfare, as well as to share military training efforts between nodes/groups (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) .  Of course, this network operates in tandem with RIM's other primary activity: the provision of training camps/courses to those who are considered a part of their network. RIM consistently trains neo-nazis and white supremacists from across Europe and has also recruited individuals from European countries in order to further their ability to train others (Pamuk, 2020) . The training camps themselves involve education on artillery reconnaissance, close combat (Potter, 2022) , sapper skills, combat medicine ( Zaks.ru , 2015) , bomb making, assaulting (Counter Extremism Project, 2020), city fighting, high-altitude training, military topography, radio communications, and smoothbore weapons ( Rus imperia ) .  Whilst initially the camps were advertised as a means to train civilians for upcoming "global chaos" (Huetlin, 2017) , since the beginning of the Russian invasion into Ukraine, the training offered by the Partizan centre has advanced notably. The newest ad for the training camp details things like FPV drones, dealing with combat stress, shotgun training, and other advanced courses ( Rus imperia ) . This seems to indicate that the courses have shifted away from training civilians to be prepared for societal collapse, and instead offer the ability for volunteers to prepare for a conventional war. The flow of fighters through these camps has operated as both a means for RIM to fight towards its objectives, but also as a self-perpetuating recruitment tool, with the Imperial Legion's participation in various conflicts giving the movement additional 'street cred' (Hume, 2020) .   International Relations & Alliances RIM has extensive connections with a wide range of movements, groups, and even private entities. Many founding members of Wagner are also members of the Russian Imperialist Movement (Castner, 2022) , with legionnaires operating in Libya seemingly doing so under sub-contracts through Wagner (Demchenko, 2020) . Additionally, the founders of DShRG Ruisch, Milchakov and Petrovsky, both took part in the Partizan training camp before they created Rusich (Potter, 2022) .  Outside of military collaboration, RIM has developed its network through mutually beneficial events. One such example was Stanislav Vorobyov 2019 attendance of the "II Congress of European Monarchists" in Austria, organised by the "Black and Yellow Alliance", advocating for the revival of the Habsburg Empire from the independent states of Central and Eastern Europe (Demchenko, 2020) . Similarly, in 2017, a US sect of RIM held a meeting with the ultra-right neo-Nazi group known as Traditionalist Worker Party, which was disbanded in 2018 (Demchenko, 2020) . Of course, RIM's work with the Rodina party has been essential for the perpetuation of their political power, with their collaborative event, World National-Conservative Movement, being a regular meeting place for extremist and far-right groups from the US and Europe (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) .   RIM also has heavy links with Matthew Heimbach, a notorious American white supremacist who has backed Hezbollah and the IRA and is the organiser of Unite the Right (SFC, 2019) . Similarly to RIM's ties with the Rodina Party, their connection with the Nordic Resistance Movement is an important one. The two groups' collaboration has led to a longstanding and close-knit relationship which has been utilised for mutually beneficial fundraising and recruitment objectives (Huetlin, 2017).  Works Cited Butt and Byman (2020). Right-wing Extremism: The Russian Connection. Survival , 62(2), pp.137–152. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1739960 . Counter Extremism Project. (2020). Russian Imperial Movement . [online] Counter Extremism. Available at: https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim . [Accessed 21 Apr. 2025]. Arsenault and Stabile. (2020). Confronting Russia’s Role in Transnational White Supremacist Extremism . [online] Just Security Available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/ . [Accessed 17 Apr. 2025]. Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke. (2020). The Russian Imperial Movement and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement . [online] ICCT. Available at: https://icct.nl/publication/russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links-transnational-white-supremacist-extremist  [Accessed 14 Apr. 2025]. Morrell (2023). Mapping Extremist Discourse Communities on Telegram: The Case of the Russian Imperial Movement - GNET . [online] GNET. Available at: https://gnet-research.org/2023/09/18/mapping-extremist-discourse-communities-on-telegram-the-case-of-the-russian-imperial-movement/ . [Accessed 23 Apr. 2025]. Hume (2020). German Neo Nazis Are Getting Explosives Training at a White Supremacist Camp in Russia . [online] VIce. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/german-neo-nazis-are-getting-explosives-training-at-a-white-supremacist-camp-in-russia/  [Accessed 23 Apr. 2025]. Potter (2022). Russische Rechtsextreme im Ukraine-Krieg: Neonazis für Noworossija . [online] Bell Tower. Available at: https://www.belltower.news/ukraine-krieg-russische-rechtsextreme-im-kampf-gegen-kiew-136285/  [Accessed 12 Apr. 2025]. Demchenko (2020). Організація російських імперців стала терористичною. Як вона воювала в Україні (рос.) . [online] Радіо Свобода. Available at: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30538763.html  [Accessed 10 Apr. 2025]. Zaks.ru  (2015). Координатор тренировочной базы ополченцев: Ни один наш боец не видел ни одного представителя Интербригад . [online] Zaks.ru  Available at: https://www.zaks.ru/new/archive/view/135459 . [Accessed 15 Apr. 2025]. Humeyra Pamuk (2020). U.S. designates Russian ultra-nationalist group as terrorist organization. [online] Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-designates-russian-ultra-nationalist-group-as-terrorist-organization-idUSKBN21O1UP/ . [Accessed 18 Apr. 2025]. The Soufan Center (2019). WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM: The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement [online] The Soufan Center. Available at: https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Report-by-The-Soufan-Center-White-Supremacy-Extremism-The-Transnational-Rise-of-The-Violent-White-Supremacist-Movement.pdf . [Accessed 18 Apr. 2025]. Huetlin, J. (2017). Russian Extremists Are Training Right-Wing Terrorists From Western Europe . [online] The Daily Beast. Available at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/russian-extremists-are-training-right-wing-terrorists-from-western-europe/  [Accessed 25 Apr. 2025]. [Accessed 14 Apr. 2025]. Castner (2022). The White Power Mercenaries Fighting For The Lost Cause Around the World . [online] Time. Available at: https://time.com/6180611/white-power-mercenaries-fighting-the-lost-cause/ . [Accessed 20 Apr. 2025]. Roth (2017). A right-wing militia trains Russians to fight the next war — with or without Putin. [online] Washinton Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-right-wing-militia-trains-russians-to-fight-the-next-war--with-or-without-putin/2017/01/02/f06b5ce8-b71e-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html . [Accessed 18 Apr. 2025]. BBC News (2022). Руни, православ’я та георгіївські стрічки. Що відомо про неонацистів у російській армії - BBC News Україна . [online] BBC News Україна. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-61668126  [Accessed 25 Apr. 2025]. [Accessed 19 Apr. 2025].

Introduction & Overview Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group Rusich, abbreviated to DShRG Rusich, is a Russian neo-Nazi imperialist paramilitary group. Having participated in both the Donbas War and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as operating in Libya, Syria, and CAR, Rusich is a well-armed, trained, and organised unit of around 100 operators. Rusich aims to perpetuate Neo-Nazi and imperialist ideology through the creation of a network of similarly ideologically driven individuals and groups and the training and recruitment of further personnel to fight in various conflicts. Rusich has primarily concentrated its efforts in Ukraine, actively fighting in the Donbas with some fluctuations, since 2014.  In addition to these more traditional fascist views, Rusich has a particular taste for paganism and the idea of becoming modern Vikings. This outlook is presented through the use of various nordic runes also commonly associated with nazism and excessively violent treatment of both dead and captured enemy personnel. Rusich's tactics can be described as 'in-field terrorism', with the group having a habit of posting images/videos of their activities, especially in the cases of the execution of war crimes and brutality.  History & Foundations The origins of DShRG Rusich can be traced back to 2011, when its founders, Alexey Milchakov and Yan Petrovsky, met in St Petersburg (Meduza, 2017 and Pigni, 2017) . Bonding over their love for weaponry, and similar nationalistic political affiliations, the two become close friends (Meduza, 2017) . However, before their collaborative activities in the form of Rusich, both Milchakov and Petrovsky had independently developed infamous reputations. Milchakov was originally, and is supposedly still, a member of the VDV (a key feeder branch for Wagner recruits) (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) , specifically the Pskov Airborne Division (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . DShRG Rusich leader Alexey Milchakov shouldering an RPG In 2012, Milchakov gained internet fame after cutting the head off of a puppy and eating it, all whilst nazi flags hung in the background. Milchakov posted the video of the act himself, adding to his existing social media gallery of fascist symbols and quotations (Verny, 2014) . Petrovsky, on the other hand, whilst a Russian national from Ikrustk, moved to Norway in his teens. Whilst there, he developed a keen interest in nationalism and the idea that the Norwegian and Russian people had close genetic ties which were being muddied by Liberalism and uncontrolled immigration (Meduza, 2017) . After finishing university, Petrovsky began working in a Norwegian tattoo studio. However, this was not just any normal studio. The studio, True Metal Tattoo studio in Oslo, is a known meeting place for eastern European Neo-nazis, and during a police raid in 2010, military equipment, fake documents, and weapons were found leading to the arrest of its employees (Meduza, 2017) . Petrovsky was found to be innocent of involvement in the procurement of said illicit material. Unfortunately, this incident seems to have acted as a catalyst for some very real extremist activity, leading to his return to Russia.  Following their development of a close friendship, Milchakov and Petrovsky became deeply involved in the nationalist scene in St Petersburg [[Pigni, 2017]]. Following the beginning of the Donbas war, the pair decided to mobilise. Together, they participated in the "Partizan" paramilitary training camp run by the Russian Imperial Movement (Potter, 2022) . Both of them then volunteered as part of a 'humanitarian convoy' organised by the Aid Coordination Center of Novorossiya (KTsPN), an offshoot of the Imperial Legion (Russian Imperial Movement's paramilitary arm), in June 2014 (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich) . The objective of this convoy was to run military equipment into Luhansk to support the LPR forces fighting in the area (Meduza, 2017) . These supplies were specifically delivered to Alexander Bednov's "Batman" battalion and Alexey Mozgovoy's "Prizrak" Brigade (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)) . Once in Ukraine, Milchakov and Petrovsky officially founded Diversionary Guerilla Reconnaissance Group Rusich under Bednov's "Batman" battalion (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . The group quickly began recruiting from the underground nationalist scene across numerous Russian cities, primarily St Petersburg and Moscow (Galeotti, 2022) . Alexey Milchakov near Luhansk, Eastern Ukraine With Rusich officially founded, the group got to work. Operating as a sabotage and assault reconnaissance unit Rusich acted as members of the Union of Donbas Volunteers through the application of regular and irregular tactics to support both the LPR and DPR forces in theatre (Kozhurin, 2022) . In Luhansk, Rusich worked as a sabotage group behind enemy lines and in Donetsk the unit fought in a more conventional capacity as part of the positional battle between Belokamenka and Novolaspa (Pigni, 2017) . A notable incident involving Rusich was the ambush of the Aidar 24th separate assault battalion, gaining notoriety due to gory photos of the aftermath being posted online. On the 5th of September 2014, Rusich managed to ambush the Ukrainian Aidar battalion near Schastya, Luhansk, killing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers in the process and leaving their vehicles destroyed (Kozhurin, 2022) .  On the 1st of January, 2015, Bednov was killed in an ambush rumoured to have been carried out by Russian forces in response to his decreased willingness to remain under Kremlin control (Sheldon, 2021) . Occurring near the city of Lutugino, the ambush also led to the death of a few escort fighters attributed to Rusich, with the ambush itself seemingly organised by contingents of the Wagner group (Korotkov, 2017) . Following this, Rusich briefly reorganised under the Prizrak brigade from March 2015 onwards (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . However, by September 2015, angered by the death of Bednov, Rusich withdrew from the Donbas entirely, claiming they couldn't continue fighting as they weren't sure whose interests they were presenting (Pigni, 2017) .  Following their departure from the Donbas theatre, Rusich redeployed across numerous countries under the pretence of private military contracting as a component of the Wagner group's web of sub-contractors. Shortly after their retreat from Luhansk, Rusich took part in the Russian offensive against ISIS to retake the Syrian city of Palmyra, however, their social media posts demonstrate a wider footprint spreading from Palmyra to Al Kawm (Sheldon, 2021) . Their involvement in Syria seems to have been sustained up until 2021 (Kozhurin, 2022) . More specifically, their social media indicates a primary objective consisting of the capture and defence of the al-Shaer gas fields, the same gas fields where Wagner-linked Russian security forces recorded themselves torturing and killing Hamdi Bouta in April 2017 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . These gas fields are of heavy interest to the Kremlin, with a large amount of Russian-financed oil and gas infrastructure having been set up in the Palmyra area (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . It seems that Rusich's activity in the area is simply a continuation of the long-standing Russian backing of the Syrian regime to sustain control of these resources [[Kozhurin, 2022]]. Simultaneously, posts from Rusich's telegram evidence activity in the Central African Republic https://t.me/dshrg2/3065 and Libya https://t.me/dshrg2/3054 .  Rusich then returned to Ukraine as a part of Russia's invasion in 2022. Operating as a part of the Union of Donbas Volunteers, the Rusich group headed for Kharkiv in an irregular capacity (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . Whilst a German intelligence report posits that Rusich was in Ukraine from April 2022 (Kozhurin, 2022) , an analysis of their social media from the time shows that the group had plans to be in Kharkiv from October 2021 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . In fact, images posted by the Rusich Instagram account show the group participating in training exercises on armoured vehicles as early as January 5th, 2021 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . The comments on these posts indicate that, even at this early stage, the group knew that it was going to be targeting Kharkiv. With this in mind, it seems that Rusich was used in a vanguard capacity to attack enemy forces behind their lines, similar to their operations during the Donbas war.  Objectives & Ideology A key component of Rusich's identity is ardent neo-nazism (Kozhurin, 2022) . The group's social media is a veritable smorgasbord of nazi symbolism such as tyr runes and the number 88 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) , however, of particular prevalence are the Valknut and kolovrat/'black sun' runes (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Appearing in both primary variations of their logo/symbol, these runes are a continuation of the groups seeming obsession with Nordic symbology, a common trend amongst neo-nazi circles (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . This infatuation with Nordic culture seems to be an attempt to present the group as modern Vikings (Galeotti, 2022) . This has led to the use of the Icelandic/nordic language during social media posts https://t.me/dshrg2/2820 , the posting of ancient Norse poems (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) , and fighters pretending to be Nordic volunteer fighters through posing for photos with Norwegian flags or claiming to be Norwegian, Swedish, or Icelandic in interviews (Sheldon, 2021) .  DShRG fighters with a valknut flag Amongst these more esoteric references to neo-nazi culture, more blatant displays of white nationalist fascism can be found throughout the group's social media postings. Rusich regularly posts photos of its members conducting Roman salutes https://t.me/dshrg2/2895 as well as making references to the KKK, white power, and racial holy war movements https://t.me/dshrg2/2579 . Additionally, in a video published in 2022, Milchakov openly admitted to being a nazi, stating, “I'm not going to go deep and say, I’m a nationalist, a patriot, an imperialist, and so forth. I’ll say it outright: I’m a Nazi” (Kozhurin, 2022) .   Rusich's particular brand of neo-nazism is also more imperialistic than that traditionally seen in extremist groups (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) . The group regularly makes references to historical/imperial Russia, even down to the group's name. "Rusich" could very well be a reference to the mythic Medieval fortress, or "sich", of "Rus". Rus is a term for the pre-imperial confederation of Norse peoples who hailed originally from Sweden and settled the territory that lies between the Baltic and the Black Sea (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . This works closely with Petrovsky's outspoken view that Russian and Norwegian people have close genetic ties, ties which not all individuals can realise and which must be defended (Meduza, 2017) . Rusich also seems to have a particular hatred for post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, for separating from wider Russia and, in the eyes of Rusich, dividing the population and muddying its gene pool (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . In the words of Petrovsky, "Our ideology unites, we are fighting for the reunification of the Slavs, the reunification of Northern Europe." (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) .  Rusich's 'real world' activity also impresses an idea of neo-nazi Russian imperialism. During a training camp for young Russians at the Svarog centre, Milchakov was pictured holding the flag of Imperial Russia https://t.me/dshrg2/2039 . This flag is also featured in the group's primary emblem (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Even the very foundations of the group, whilst largely composed of nationalistic motivations, hinged on participation within a group promoting the idea of 'Novorossiya', the name used for the Russian empire towards the end of its era (Laruelle, 2015) . Rusich's hatred for Ukrainians and the idea that the country should reintegrate into the Russian Federation can also be seen through the group's treatment of enemy wounded. Following their ambush against the Aidar battalion, a wounded Ukrainian soldier was forced to speak Russian whilst being interrogated, all whilst being further brutalised (Aseev, at al., 2018) .  Alexey Milchakov on 5 September after the Aidar Battalion ambush Whilst Rusich is an active participant in armed conflicts across numerous states, the group's social media output presents a clear objective in of itself. Milchakov has claimed that Rusich is far from just a combat team but instead a group of friends united by a common idea (Korotkov, 2017) . This idea is clearly articulated through the group's utilisation of its substantial social media following to garner support for individuals and groups who follow similar nationalistic ideologies (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . In this sense, Rusich has created a digital network of neo-nazi, imperialist, and nationalist individuals/groups which it supports both ideologically and monetarily through the sale of various forms of branded merchandise.  Military/Political Abilities The Rusich group's political and military ties/abilities are rather peculiar and often contradictory. Despite being an independent private/voluntary group, Rusich very clearly has at least some form of government backing. Through social media analysis, it's clear Rusich has had clear access to government facilities, vehicles, and aircraft for training and staging operations (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . Additionally, Milchakov seems to be more valuable to the Kremlin than other private contractors. Milchakov was one of the few Wagner/Private contractors not to be arrested upon their return from Syria following the exposure of the war crimes carried out by Russian forces in the area (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)) .   Interestingly, despite this clear government support, Rusich is simultaneously unafraid of openly criticising or encouraging the opposition of, government decisions. Through their social media channels, Rusich has called for the execution of prisoners and told its followers to lie about the number of captured/wounded in order to get away with doing so, despite explicit orders from the Kremlin to capture surrendering enemy troops (Townsend, 2022) . Rusich has also openly insulted the Russian command personnel for both their decisions on the battlefield https://t.me/dshrg2/3071 and for their apparent character https://t.me/dshrg2/2529 . Of course, all of these incidents must be considered in the context that Rusich actively retreated from the Donbas theatre due to feelings of betrayal by their own government following the death of Bednov at the hands of Russian troops (Meduza, 2017) . DShRG Rusich fighters with an NSV heavy machine gun In terms of military ability, Rusich may be a small unit, but it's capabilities are substantial. Utilising irregular tactics, Rusich leverages its membership of around 100 fighters (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) to carry out special operations-style missions to disrupt enemy activity. These operations are further facilitated by the wide range of arms available to the group. From extensive access to standard Russian/Soviet small arms, to the use of more specialised equipment such as precision rifles and even advanced UAVs such as Lancet loitering munitions, the Rusich group telegram channel presents a broad catalogue of the group's weaponry and equipment (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Through the use of extensive training activities, (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) , the group also seems to have developed advanced tactics, weaponising niche/advanced technology/equipment such as cell signal jammers during their operations https://t.me/dshrg2/2996 .  These findings combine to paint the picture of a well-trained, ideological, highly driven, well-backed/equipped, and militarily/politically active group specialising in special operations style manoeuvres. Approach to Action The Rusich group works in a primarily irregular capacity, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and ambushes against enemy troops, often behind enemy lines. These tactics were leveraged extensively by the group during the Donbas war (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . Of particular note is the ambush on the Aidar battalion (Rudenko, 2015) . The specific choice to execute the ambush on the day when the conflict's ceasefire was supposed to be implemented and the use of Ukrainian flags by Rusich to lull the enemy into a false sense of security demonstrates an underhanded and outright criminal approach to warfare (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) .  Complimenting this irregular approach to operations is Rusich's armoury of unconventional/specialist equipment. From cellular jammers  https://t.me/dshrg2/3015 to RPG-distributed mines https://t.me/dshrg2/2714 , Rusich makes use of a wide range of equipment in order to carry out specialist operations and to widen its spectrum of capabilities. Additionally, the Rusich group is able to modify equipment in order to further develop their capabilities https://t.me/dshrg2/3015 .  Rusich fighters with an ORSIS T-5000 sniper rifle and a late model SVD ‘Dragunov’ Whilst irregular warfare is the broad bracket under which Rusich's operations would fall, their activities can only be described more specifically as "in-field terrorism". The group's brutal treatment of captured or wounded enemies, in combination with their habit of posting intimate details of said treatment on social media, operates to strike fear into the enemy/local population and to garner the group a rather formidable reputation as ardent war criminals (Gonta, 2015) . Examples of such behaviour include the beheading of enemy bodies (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) , the mutilation of captured enemy soldiers (Gonta, 2015) , and the torture of prisoners and additional extortion of their families in exchange for their release (Townsend, 2022) . In response to Bellingcat's accusations of warcrimes against the group, Rusich responded; “the acts depicted do not constitute a war crime because a) we’re not military and b) we were happy to do it.”. International Relations & Alliances Due to Rusich's apparent objective of creating a network of similarly ideologically motivated individuals/groups, its ties to said individuals/groups are extensive, to say the least. Petrovsky himself has close ties with Soldiers of Odin, a far-right anti-immigration group originally founded in Finland, having participated in their street patrols to 'maintain law and order' around Norway in 2016 (Meduza, 2017) . Rusich, on the whole, regularly provides promotion and raises support for Russian anti-immigration activists through its telegram channel (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Militarily, the Rusich group have a range of ties with both government and volunteer/private units. In the context of private bodies, Rusich has close links to Wagner, seemingly operating as a sub-contracting unit in Syria and Ukraine (Sheldon, 2021 and Kozhurin, 2022) , as well as ENOT group, having fought alongside the PMC during the Donbas war (NewsRU, 2017) . In 2016, ENOT and Rusich held a collaborative youth camp which trained Belarusian children in military skills [[Sheldon, 2021]], with this same camp used again in 2022 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . Rusich has also held youth camps with the support of the private tactical medicine centre known as "Svarog Center", taking photographs with the young men there holding imperialist flags https://t.me/dshrg2/2039 . Outside of these private forces, many Rusich fighters are either active or ex-members of the VDV (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) and GROM (Gonta, 2015) . Milchakov spent time in early 2014 training sabotage detachments of the Pskov airborne division (Gonta, 2015) , most likely to assist Rusich's own guerilla warfare efforts in the Donbas war. These specialised arms of the Russian military seemingly provide a steady stream of highly trained and nationalistic/ideologically dedicated operatives ready for Rusich's recruitment efforts. There also seem to be strangely close ties between Rusich and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), with the group having regularly used their firing range during training (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) .  Rusich also has extensive experience collaborating with other volunteer groups. Rusich's collaboration with the Batman Brigade was a key component of the unit's contribution to Russian efforts in the Donbas (Korotkov, 2017) . In the early days of the Donbas war, Rusich also fought alongside the ultra-nationalist group known as the Sparta Battalion (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . These examples are, in fact, simply the larger 'players' of a much wider network known as the Union of Donbas Volunteers, or SDD. The organisation consists of groups of veterans of the Donbas War, with close ties to Putin's United Russia party [[Verny, 2014]].  Works Cited Odessa-journal.com  (2024). The Russian Federation sends a neo-Nazi sabotage group to spy on the Finnish border. [online] Odessa Jounral. Available at: https://odessa-journal.com/public/the-russian-federation-sends-a-neo-nazi-sabotage-group-to-spy-on-the-finnish-border  [Accessed 11 Apr. 2025]. Rondeaux and Dalton (2023). Putin’s Stealth Mobilization: Russian Irregulars and the Wagner Group’s Shadow Command Structure . [online] New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/reports/putin-mobilization-wagner-group/ . [Accessed 22 Apr. 2025] McGlynn, J. (2024). The Russian ultra-nationalists defying Putin . [online] New Statesman. 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Introduction & Overview Colectivos are armed, far-left paramilitary groups that reside in Venezuela’s poorest neighbourhoods and slums. Loyal to the Venezuelan government and the Bolivarian Revolution, they act mainly as government enforcers to maintain order and suppress dissent. Numbered in the hundreds, members of Colectivos are armed, funded directly by the government, and are usually seen travelling on motorcycles in large groups. History & Foundations The Colectivos emerged during a period of armed leftist rebellions against the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt in the 1960s. Some of these groups, like the Tupamaros (named after the former Uruguayan group with the same name), conducted bank robberies and engaged in car theft to fund their activities. Decades later, in 1998, they publicly endorsed Hugo Chavez’s candidacy for presidency (Infobae, 2017a) . Following his election a year later, most of these groups gave up their armed struggle and decided to support the new socialist government (Newman, 2019) . Chavez took advantage of this trend and decided to fund, organize, and arm these groups to protect his revolution and broader political ambitions. Later, these groups came to be referred to as the Bolivarian Circles, which were part of political groups set up by Chavez to garner grassroots support. During the events preceding the April 2002 coup that saw Chavez temporarily removed from power, the groups proved their loyalty to him and his government by engaging in violent acts against anti-government protestors participating in mass worker strikes. During the protests, members of the Bolivarian Circles shot at protestors that were marching towards the presidential palace and later exchanged fire with police officers. The incident resulted in 19 deaths and over a hundred injuries. After the incident, Chavez’s government began to refer to the groups as “Colectivos'' ('collectives' in English) and began the process of legitimisation by including these groups in the political process on a local level (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . This process included the covert arming of the groups with decommissioned and confiscated handguns from military bases by the director of Venezuela’s national intelligence agency (Briceño, 2019) . Following this explicit support and 'normalisation', political attacks grew rampant and violence grew steadily. In 2003, a Colectivo by the name of Coordinadora Simón Bolívar aided the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation (a communist guerrilla group) in a series of coordinated bombing attacks targeting the Spanish and Colombian embassies in Caracas (Medina, 2003) . Years later, in 2008, Colectivos once again participated in a series of coordinated bombings, this time targeting the headquarters of Venezuela’s largest business union, Fedecámaras. The perpetrator, an active member of the Metropolitan Police Department, was the sole victim of the bombing after one of his explosives detonated prematurely. Further blame was placed on a Colectivo called Frente Guerrillero Venceremos, following the discovery of pamphlets belonging to the group at the scene (El Universo, 2008) . A few weeks before this attack, another Colectivo attempted to blow up the George Washington statue in Caracas. The bomb detonated, but only caused minor damage (Infobae, 2017b) . In 2009, several canisters of tear gas were fired at the Vatican’s diplomatic headquarters by a Colectivo in response to them offering asylum to Nixon Moreno, an anti-government protestor accused of attempting to rape a police officer. Colectivo La Piedrita claimed responsibility, leaving pamphlets outside the building accusing the Catholic Church of treason against the Venezuelan people (CNN, 2009) . That same year, the group raided and tear gassed the headquarters of Globovision, a prominent television news network accused by Chavez of inciting violence and conspiring against his government (Reuters, 2009) . Despite the government's support for the Colectivos, this attack drew strong condemnation, leading them to imprison the leader of the group, Lina Ron, for three months. Following the incident, the U.S. embassy in Venezuela suggested to the American government that Lina Ron be added to a list of suspected terrorists for her involvement in the attack (Semana, 2011) . More recently, in 2017, colectivos stormed the National Assembly building armed with firearms and attacked opposition legislators with teargas and pipes, injuring 7 (Ramírez & Rawlins, 2017) . Today, there are hundreds of different Colectivos around the country, with some of the largest and most prominent ones being based in the capital city of Caracas (Infobae, 2017a) . In fact, in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood alone, there are reportedly over 46 different Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Some of the most prominent groups include La Piedrita, Alexis Vive, Los Tupamaros, and la Coordinadora Simón Bolívar. Objectives & Ideology Colectivos are known to be relatively homogeneous ideologically, with all of them uniformly endorsing the current government of Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution. Ideologies may vary on a smaller scale, with different forms or approaches to leftism, but the two major tenets of their beliefs are Bolivarianism (a mix of nationalistic and socialist ideals named after Simon Bolivar) and Chavismo (the socialist ideology of Hugo Chavez). Despite their strong support for the Venezuelan government, some Colectivos reportedly have ill-feelings towards Nicolas Maduro, Chavez’s hand-picked predecessor following his death in 2013. This stems from a variety of issues that include reduced funding, perceived government hostility towards the groups, and the belief that Maduro has corrupted Chavez’s revolution and led the country to deteriorate. Nonetheless, the groups remain loyal to the revolution and government because they prefer it over the pro-capitalist opposition government. However, it is reported that the government has lost control of many of these groups as they refuse to answer to them, instead opting to defend the revolution and government independently and on their own terms. Overall, the group's main objectives are to 'protect' (as they view it) Venezuela from foreign intervention and to uphold Chavez’s legacy and revolution. On the local level, the groups serve as security in certain neighbourhoods and are known to conduct a wide array of community service. Among these are after-school programs, sports events, and drug rehabilitation programs (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . This is notably the case following Chavez’s dissolution of the Metropolitan Police in 2011, as security in certain neighborhoods was turned over to the Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . To this day, police rarely enter or patrol these areas, often allowing the groups to govern themselves. One of these neighbourhoods is the 23 de Enero neighbourhood in Caracas, which is regarded as a hotbed for the armed groups. Here, Colectivos impose roadblocks to tax vehicles, controlling movement into the neighbourhood while also reportedly imposing protection taxes on residents. The groups also claim to combat crime, regularly executing drug dealers and thieves (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . However, despite the groups' alleged involvement in fighting crime and curbing the local drug trade, Colectivos have long been accused of trafficking both drugs and weapons, as well as participating in organized crime, a claim that has been reinforced by locals and investigative journalists alike (Briceño, 2019) (Infobae, 2020) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The Colectivos are also used by the government to help administer social programs, ultimately deciding who gets government assistance in certain neighbourhoods. However, the groups have often been accused of stealing medicine and food rations from these programs to sell on the black market. They have also been accused of using aid programs to discriminate politically, with residents of one neighborhood complaining that Colectivos would threaten to shoot and refuse to give food to those who spoke negatively about the government (Transparencia Venezuela, 2019) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The groups also reportedly provide intelligence and surveillance for the government (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) and patrol polling stations during election seasons, often engaging in threats and violence against voters. These incidents of voter intimidation are not uncommon. In 2021, Colectivos conducted a drive-by shooting on a voting center, killing a young man and injuring two others (Infobae, 2021) . That same day, Colectivos threatened voters and fired their weapons in the air at another voting center close to the site of the first shooting (Monitoreamos, 2021b) . On the national level, the groups are used by the government to stifle dissent, often targeting anti-government protests and members of the opposition. Maduro has publicly called on the groups to maintain order before, most notably during the 2019 electricity blackouts where he asked them to participate in “active resistance”, presumably against saboteurs and rioters (Diario las Américas , 2019) . Colectivos often work as security for public officials, serving as bodyguards for local politicians pertaining to the ruling PSUV party (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) (Gurney, 2014) (Kobelinsky, 2017) . It is also not uncommon for Colectivo members to hold positions in government, especially on the local level. One colectivo group, the ‘Tupamaros’, allegedly had close ties with the former mayor of Caracas, Juan Barreto, who ended up appointing a leader of the group as the city's deputy director of public safety (Gurney, 2014) . Approach to Resistance As previously stated, Colectivos regularly engage in political intimidation, often threatening opposition politicians and their supporters. This is regularly done by sending death threats to protestors to prevent them from taking the streets (Barráez, 2019) . Colectivos are also widely known for disrupting and sabotaging anti-government protests, something which they have admitted they are paid by the government to do (Voz de América, 2018) . The violence caused at these protests is large and indiscriminate, often coming through the form of shooting at protestors. During anti-government protests in 2014, for example, the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) reported that Colectivos were responsible for at least 437 violent attacks on protestors in the first quarter of the year, with most cases resulting in gunshot wounds. One of these attacks resulted in the murder of Genesis Carmona, a young college student and beauty pageant queen. The shooting led to widespread controversy around the country and - despite the government blaming it on the protestors - footage showed government supporters firing a barrage of shots at marchers seconds before Carmona was hit (La Vanguardia, 2014) . Three years later, during widespread anti-government protests that gripped the country, Colectivos killed 27 protestors and engaged in kidnapping and arbitrary arrests, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Following these incidents, the European Parliament asked the Venezuelan government to “immediately disarm and dissolve all uncontrolled armed pro-government groups and end their impunity" (European Parliament, 2014) . Venezuela's National Assembly followed suit a few years later, declaring their actions as “state terrorism” (Europa Press, 2019) . In 2018, the groups once again made national headlines after they shot at interim President Juan Guiado and his supporters at an opposition rally. The armed men later attacked journalists and stole one of the cars used to transport Guiado and his aides (Meléndez, 2020) (Reuters, 2020) . Two years later, in 2021, the Colectivos were believed to be behind an assault on the campaign center of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), a coalition of opposition parties, that left a legislator badly beaten (Monitoreamos, 2021a) . In 2022, several female students reported that Colectivos had grabbed them and ripped their fingernails out during protests at the University of the Andes in Merida state. The protests had been surrounding Diosdado Cabello’s visit to the university, a high ranking Venezuelan politician and one of Maduro’s closest associates (NTN24, 2022) . This attack was not an isolated incident, however, as Colectivos have repeatedly targeted university students in the past. Seven years prior, colectivos stormed the same university, firing shots at students and assaulting them (Diario las Américas, 2015) . While the Colectivos' attacks on anti-government protests are fairly common, their repression of workers on strike such as teachers and doctors has also been well documented. In 2016, Colectivos assaulted and kidnapped doctors who were protesting the dismissal of three of their colleagues for accepting medicinal donations from opposition politicians (Lozada, 2016) . Additionally, in 2023, Colectivos threatened and shot at teachers who were protesting for better salaries around the country (NTN24, 2023) (Barráez, 2019) . Their attacks on journalists have also been widely reported, notably in 2020 when Colectivos assaulted and robbed journalists covering the arrival of opposition leader Juan Guaido outside of the Simon Bolivar International Airport, near Caracas. Journalists present at the airport reported that police watched the incident take place, but did not intervene (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020) . Prior to that, in 2012, Colectivos shot up an opposition rally being attended by presidential candidate Henrique Caprilles and then proceeded to attack and rob several journalists at gunpoint (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012) . In 2021, men and women allegedly pertaining to local Colectivos were caught on video touring an occupied apartment building accompanied by officials from the Ministry of Housing. According to building residents, they were attempting to break into empty apartments with the intention of occupying them (800Noticias, 2021) . InSight Crime reports that these instances of illegal seizures of property are not uncommon, as many buildings and businesses that were temporarily shut down due to COVID around Venezuela were later occupied by Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2021) . UPDATES: During Venezuela's October 2023 opposition primaries, a voting center was teargassed (Meza, 2023) , and another was threatened, prompting officials to change locations (Alcalde, 2023) . The armed theft of electoral material was also reported at another voting center (Maduradas, 2023) . Colectivos were suspected to be responsible. Numerous unconfirmed videos of colectivos harassing voters around the country, some with firearms, have spread throughout social media. In February 2024, Colectivos blocked roads in the Petare neighbourhood of Caracas to demand that Police release detained members of the group that had been arrested on a variety of criminal charges. Armed with firearms, Colectivo members forced bus drivers to park their buses diagonally on the road, blocking the flow of traffic. They also threatened a garbage truck into emptying its contents, which they lit on fire, in front of the police station (Hernández, 2024). In July 2024, during Venezuela's presidential election day, several reports of Colectivos around the country attacking voting centers arose. In Táchira, a man was pronounced dead after a shooting outside of a voting center reportedly carried out by Colectivos (El Nuevo Siglo, 2024) . It was also reported that Colectivos assaulted several people and stole a media outlet's camera at a voting center in a school in Caracas (Hernández, 2024) . Dozens of other unconfirmed reports have since spread through social media platforms such as Telegram and X, showing masked men on motorcycles driving past voting centers and allegedly assaulting electoral witnesses. Following the release of election results declaring Maduro as the winner, mass protests erupted claiming electoral fraud. Reports of rampant mass violence by Colectivos in these protests were widespread and well documented. Videos of weapon-clad Colectivo members threatening protestors have gone viral, and reports of several beatings and shooting deaths have also been reported (Lozano, 2024) . In January 2025, in the days during and leading up to Maduro's controversial re-inauguration on the 10th, Colectivos were seen mobilising around the country to counter the expected presence of protestors. Colectivo leaders ordered mass mobilization, with many seen accompanying state security forces near expected anti-government rally spots. The president of a Colectivo in Apure state for example, ordered mandatory mobilization for all group members on the 10th, offering 10 liters of fuel per member and claiming that it was a direct order from President Maduro to "mobilize 10,000 motorcycles" in the region (Barráez, 2025) . Despite this however, there were reports of discontent among Colectivos with many groups having abandoned the government and refusing calls to mobilize. These reports stemmed from the absence of several Colectivos in meetings regarding mobilization efforts on the presdiential inauguration date, with only three of the dozens of groups in Caracas attending (Barráez, 2025) . Military Capabilities The colectivos are known to be extremely well armed and possess a variety of weapons, many of which they flaunt at protests and on social media. On top of their access to rifles such as FALs, AKs, and AR-15s, they are also known to be in possession of other firearms such as shotguns, submachine guns and handguns, as well as tear gas and grenades. The groups obtain these weapons through funds provided by the government, on the black market, or from working security for government officials (Gurney, 2014) . It is also not uncommon to see them openly brandish and carry firearms in day to day life, despite firearm ownership being illegal and punishable by up to 20 years in Venezuela (Infobae, 2017a) (BBC, 2014) . Moreover, it is important to note that, while not all Colectivos are armed equally or have access to the same firepower, most are at the minimum equipped with pistols (Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela, 2019) . Political Alliances & Opposition Venezuela’s Colectivos have been heavily influenced by Iran’s civilian Basij paramilitary force. In 2009, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, and then-Iranian defence minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, visited president Hugo Chavez in Caracas. Allegedly, Naqdi, who would later become the commander of the Basij, served as an advisor aiding in the training of Venezuela's own civilian militias, the Colectivos (Humire, 2015) . The groups have maintained somewhat close ties with Venezuelan security forces, with many members having received prior training from police (Torres & Casey, 2017) . Colectivos can often be seen working alongside law enforcement to conduct raids and provide security (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) . The most notable occurrence of this was when colectivo members participated in the 2018 operation to kill rebel commander Oscar Perez alongside Venezuelan troops and state security forces (Fiorella & Leroy, 2018) . One Colectivo, called ‘Tres Raíces’, even has several of its members serving in the country’s National Intelligence Service and local police. This has often allowed them to evade justice and prosecution for murders and kidnappings that members of the group have been linked to (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Due to these close ties with the government and national security forces, the groups are able to operate with impunity. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, police once left a protest when Colectivos arrived and refused to help those that the group attacked. The British Embassy in Caracas also reported that the members of the group are rarely arrested for breaking the law, and if they are, they are almost immediately let go (Transparencia Venezuela, 2020) . In 2018, members of the Colectivo ‘La Piedrita’ participated in military exercises alongside Venezuelan troops. They openly brandished firearms and their leader, Valentin Santana, met with several government officials and high ranking members of the military, despite having two active arrest warrants for homicide (Meléndez, 2018) . Despite this, however, the relationship between Colectivos and police is not always positive, and clashes between them have occurred on more than one instance, often due to animosity between both groups over who holds rightful authority. This stems from the fact that security forces are barred from entering certain neighborhoods by Colectivos, instead being forced to cooperate with them in order to enter these areas. In 2014, a gunfight between Venezuelan police and members of the Colectivos ‘5 de Marzo’ and ‘Escudo de la Revolución’ resulted in five dead Colectivo members (Pachico, 2014) . That same year, security forces killed the leader of the ‘5 de Marzo’ Colectivo, who happened to be a former police officer (Rísquez, 2018) . The Colectivos are also known to sometimes clash with each other over territory and drug routes (Infobae, 2017a) . In 2008, it was revealed that several Colectivos from Caracas had been in contact with the FARC, a communist guerrilla group based in Colombia, and had received training from them (Stone, 2011) . In regards to the group's funding, the government's initial payments to the Colectivos came through the form of slush funds and direct payment from politicians to members of the group. Nowadays, Colectivos are often paid with food and supplies rather than money (Gurney, 2014) . While most Colectivos were originally reliant on this government funding, budget cuts have meant that many groups have had to rely on other means to obtain funds, both through legal and illegal means (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . One Colectivo, for instance, runs an official bodyguard service while others run casinos and various small businesses (Rísquez, 2018) . The groups are also known to control illegal gold mines around the country and allegedly tax miners and local communities (Rendon et al., 2020) . Drug and weapons trafficking is also common, from which a sizable portion of their income is believed to derive from (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Works cited (APA-style) 800Noticias. (2021, January 9). +video: Colectivos Intentaron Invadir un edificio en el recreo . https://800noticias.com/video-colectivos-intentaron-invadir-un-edificio-en-el-recreo Alcalde, C. (2023, October 23). Retraso en difusión de resultados de primarias opositoras en Venezuela por “bloqueo” de transmisión de votos . Voz de América. https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/venezolanos-votan-en-la-primaria-presidencial-de-la-oposicion/7321389.html Barráez, S. (2019, November 20). Las amenazas de muerte de los colectivos chavistas a los opositores antes de la Marcha del 16N: “Los Tenemos ubicados, Desde Este momento son objetivos militares.” infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2019/11/20/las-amenazas-de-muerte-de-los-colectivos-chavistas-a-los-opositores-antes-de-la-marcha-del-16n-los-tenemos-ubicados-desde-este-momento-son-objetivos-militares/ Barráez, S. (2025a, January 5). Los colectivos Chavistas abandonan a Maduro antes de su ilegal juramentación del 10 de enero: “Que Se Las Arreglen Solos.” infobae. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2025/01/05/los-colectivos-chavistas-abandonan-a-maduro-antes-de-su-ilegal-juramentacion-del-10-de-enero-que-se-las-arreglen-solos/ Barráez, S. (2025, January 7). OFRECEN combustible Y Lanzan amenazas: Nicolás Maduro pretende Mantener a los colectivos de motorizados en la calle . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/venezuela/2025/01/07/ofrecen-combustible-y-lanzan-amenazas-nicolas-maduro-pretende-mantener-a-los-colectivos-de-motorizados-en-la-calle/ BBC. (2014, September 22). Venezuela’s Maduro launches civilian Disarmament Plan . BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29308509 Briceño, M. T. (2019, May 11). Historia criminal de los “colectivos” Chavistas: Cuba, El Podemos Español, armas y drogas de los últimos guardianes de nicolás maduro . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2019/05/11/historia-criminal-de-los-colectivos-chavistas-cuba-el-podemos-espanol-armas-droga-y-ultima-proteccion-de-nicolas-maduro/ CNN. (2009, January 19). Tear gas fired at Vatican Diplomatic Center in Venezuela . https://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/01/19/venezuela.tear.gas/index.html Committee to Protect Journalists. (2012, March 6). Globovisión journalists attacked in Venezuela . https://cpj.org/2012/03/globovision-journalists-attacked-in-venezuela/ Committee to Protect Journalists. (2020, February 13). Pro-government groups attack reporters covering Juan Guaidó’s return to Venezuela . https://cpj.org/2020/02/pro-government-groups-attack-reporters-covering-ju/amp/ Diario las Américas . (2019, March 12). Maduro llama a Los colectivos a la “resistencia activa.” https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/maduro-llama-los-colectivos-la-resistencia-activa-n4173593 Diario las Américas. (2015, March 2). Colectivos armados entran en Universidad Venezolana disparando a Los Estudiantes . https://www.diariolasamericas.com/colectivos-armados-entran-universidad-venezolana-disparando-los-estudiantes-n2979778 El Nuevo Siglo. 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Venezuela: Peaceful and respectful dialogue only way out of the crisis, meps say: News: European parliament . https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20140225IPR36958/venezuela-peaceful-and-respectful-dialogue-only-way-out-of-the-crisis-meps-say?quizBaseUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fquizweb.europarl.europa.eu Fiorella , G., & Leroy, A. (2018, May 16). "¡nos vamos a entregar! ¡no sigan disparando! ": Reconstruyendo Las últimas Horas de óscar pérez . bellingcat. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/americas/2018/05/13/nos-vamos-a-entregar-no-sigan-disparando-reconstruyendo-las-ultimas-horas-de-oscar-perez / Gurney, K. (2014, November 24). Venezuela’s leftist collectives: Criminals or revolutionaries? InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/venezuela-leftist-collectives-criminals-or-revolutionaries/ Hernandez, O. (2024, July 29). Centro de Votación en venezuela ES escenario de vandalismo . CNN. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/video/vandalismo-elecciones-venezuela-conteo-votos-edmundo-maria-corina-machado/ Hernández, E. (2024, February 5). Colectivos trancaron la redoma de Petare para exigir liberación de delincuentes detenidos . El Nacional. https://www.elnacional.com/venezuela/colectivos-trancaron-la-redoma-de-petare-para-exigir-liberacion-de-delincuentes-detenidos/ Humire, J. M. (2015, March 18). “Iran and Hezbollah in the Western Hemisphere" . U.S. House of Representatives Document Repository. https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA07/20150318/103177/HHRG-114-FA07-Wstate-ModellS-20150318.pdf Infobae. (2017a, April 29). Los 5 colectivos Chavistas Más temidos por la población civil de venezuela . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2017/04/29/los-5-colectivos-chavistas-mas-temidos-por-la-poblacion-civil-de-venezuela/?outputType=amp-type Infobae. (2017b, October 26). Atentado contra Estatua de los Eeuu en Venezuela . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/2008/02/13/364139-atentado-contra-estatua-los-eeuu-venezuela/ Infobae. (2020, January 11). Radiografía de los colectivos chavistas: Qué bandas armadas controlan Cada zona de Venezuela y quiénes son Sus Líderes . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2020/01/11/radiografia-de-los-colectivos-chavistas-que-bandas-armadas-controlan-cada-zona-de-venezuela-y-quienes-son-sus-lideres/ Infobae. (2021, November 21). Colectivos chavistas atacaron a balazos un centro de votación en San Francisco, Zulia: Hay un muerto y dos heridos . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2021/11/21/colectivos-chavistas-atacaron-a-balazos-un-centro-de-votacion-en-san-francisco-zulia-hay-un-muerto-y-dos-heridos/ Kobelinsky, F. (2017, April 23). Quiénes son y cómo operan los colectivos chavistas, El Grupo de Choque de Nicolás Maduro . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2017/04/23/domingo-quienes-son-y-como-operan-los-colectivos-chavistas-el-grupo-de-choque-de-nicolas-maduro/?outputType=amp-type La Vanguardia. (2014, February 20). Muere la miss Herida de Bala en las protestas de venezuela . https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20140219/54402350627/confirman-muerte-de-reina-de-belleza-herida-de-bala-en-protestas-en-venezuela.html?facet=amp Lozano, D. (2024, July 30). Al Menos 12 muertos en Venezuela por la represi . ELMUNDO. https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2024/07/30/66a81395e85eceeb188b459c.html Lozada, M. (2016, October 17). Colectivos golpean a médicos durante protesta en hospital central de Maracay . Efecto Cocuyo. https://efectococuyo.com/salud/colectivos-golpean-a-medicos-durante-protesta-en-hospital-central-de-maracay/ Maduradas. (2023, October 22). 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Insurgency Overview The Arakan Army (AA), also known as the Arakha Army, is an ethnic armed organization (EAO) based in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Formed in 2009 and led by General Twan Mrat Naing, the Army is predominantly made up of ethnic Rakhine. As a member of the government-aligned Northern Alliance, it has played a major role in the ongoing Myanmar Civil War and is one of the country’s largest EAOs with over 15,000 troops. It controls the entirety of the Rakhine State along the country’s western coast and parts of Chin State to its north. Along with its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), the Army seeks self-determination for the Rakhine people by increasing federal autonomy within Myanmar. It has been accused of atrocities and war crimes, particularly against Rohingya Muslims, who are a minority in Rakhine State (1) . AA troops capturing the Tatmadaw’s Western Regional Military Command in September 2024. History & Foundations Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, Myanmar has been a hotbed for various insurgent groups and ethnic armed organizations, groups formed by the country’s numerous ethnic minorities to fight for increased sovereignty. In 1962, General Ne Win established an oppressive military dictatorship that would rule the country in various forms until 2011. Secessionist sentiment began to grow amongst the Rakhine people living in what was then known as Arakan State, one of the poorest regions in Myanmar, as they watched other EAOs wage low-level insurgencies during this period. They began to form their own EAOs, including the Arakan Liberation Party and the Arakan Independence Army. In 1989, the junta changed place names across the country to replace those created by the British. Burma was renamed Myanmar and Arakan State was renamed Rakhine (2) . On April 10, 2009, the Arakan Army was formed. Initially based out of the northern Kachin State, the Army created a headquarters and began to train its forces with the help of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). It started out with a mere 27 soldiers (2) . Its first combat engagement was in 2011 when fighting between the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, and the KIA, a regional EAO, broke out over control of key territory where the government planned to build hydroelectric dams. The Arakan Army took up arms alongside the KIA. Earlier that year, the military junta was dissolved and a civilian government took its place. Led by former Tatmadaw general Thein Sein, the government began to gradually implement reforms and increase freedoms (3) . Eventually, the Army was able to relocate to Rakhine State in 2014 and began its own campaign against the Tatmadaw a year later. By this point, it had expanded to 1,500 troops (4) . In 2016, it formed the Northern Alliance, along with the KIA and several other EAOs, as a coalition to fight against the Tatmadaw. From 2015 to 2018, the AA engaged the Tatmadaw in a series of intermittent clashes in northern Rakhine State and neighboring Chin State (5) . In January 2019, the AA attacked several police posts near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. During the raids, the Army killed 13 police officers and captured two border posts. The Tatmadaw responded with increased deployments and operations against the AA in the area (6) . What followed over the next two years was the most intense period of fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA up until that point. While the AA continued to attack Tatmadaw and police outposts, the military carried out regular strikes on AA positions. The conflict resulted in the displacement of thousands of civilians (7) . During the conflict, the AA and two other members of the Northern Alliance, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance was formed because, at the time, the KIA was in peace talks with the government while the rest of the Northern Alliance continued their fight (5) . In November 2020, the Tatmadaw and the AA brokered a ceasefire once the Army had managed to solidify control of most of northern Rakhine State and began to autonomously administer the area without the presence of the central government (8) . In February 2021, after a decade of democracy, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by then-leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the year, discontent began to rise. The junta brutally cracked down on protesters, empowering EAOs and the exiled civilian government to take up arms against the Tatmadaw. By the end of 2021, the country was embroiled in an all-out civil war. The existing ceasefire between the AA and the Tatmadaw soon fell apart and renewed fighting began in July 2022 after the Tatmadaw ordered an airstrike on an AA base in Karen State, killing six AA soldiers (9) . This time, however, things were different. The Tatmadaw was in a tough position, being under attack from numerous EAOs and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed forces of the exiled civilian National Unity Government. Despite the AA’s hostile relationship with the previous government, it found itself in a de facto alliance with the PDF. After a few months of fighting in the familiar northern Rakhine State and southwestern Chin State, the AA and Tatmadaw came to yet another tedious and short-lived ceasefire in November 2022 (1) . This ceasefire was broken with the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023, a joint operation carried out by the Northern Alliance along with several other EAOs and paramilitaries. The operation was the Alliance’s most coordinated offensive to date, starting with attacks on Tatmadaw positions in Kachin and Shan state along the Myanmar-China border, in which the AA participated. The AA started its own offensive in Rakhine State the next month, leaving the Tatmadaw overextended (10) . Junta forces responded with indiscriminate strikes on rebel-controlled areas. In May 2024, the Tatmadaw and allied militias massacred 76 villagers alleged to have ties to the AA in the village of Byian Phyu. Before being killed, many were tortured and raped while Tatmadaw forces burnt down most of the village (11) . Throughout 2024, the Army launched its first major offensives in the southern portion of the state. The AA captured the Tatmadaw’s Western Command headquarters, its major military headquarters for the region, after four months of fighting. This was a major blow for the junta (12) . By December 2024, the AA had consolidated control of the entirety of mainland Rakhine State, while its allies in Operation 1027 had also seen major territorial gains. In early 2025, the AA extended its operations into neighboring regions, capturing multiple junta bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady. These actions have positioned the AA as a dominant force in western Myanmar, seriously threatening the Tatmadaw’s authority (14) . Meanwhile, the AA were fighting a very different enemy. The Rohingya are an ethnic group who are also predominantly from Rakhine State, where they are a majority in the northern region where the Army’s power is concentrated. The Rohingya have long been an extremely persecuted minority in Myanmar. They are not granted citizenship, thus making them a stateless people, and their rights are heavily restricted (14) . Sectarian violence between the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhine exploded in 2016 after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) began its insurgency against the Tatmadaw. Following its attacks on border posts, the Tatmadaw began to indiscriminately attack Rohingya villages. Many human rights violations were committed by the military, such as the destruction of households, rapes, extrajudicial killings, and other acts of violence that have left hundreds of thousands of Rohingya displaced (15) . In recent years, the AA has committed numerous atrocities against Rohingya civilians under the justification of alleged ties to insurgent groups such as the ARSA, who the AA alleges have collaborated with the junta (16) . The Army is alleged to have killed thousands of Rohingya and displaced many more. Dozens of Rohingya villages were burned down by the AA in 2024 (17) . In one incident in August 2024, over 150 Rohingya were killed by AA drone and artillery strikes while fleeing the war near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, which the AA denies (18) . March 2025 ARSA engagement against the AA. Objectives & Ideology Besides seeking Arakan sovereignty, the Arakan Army is not particularly ideologically motivated. The Army is not secessionist; it seeks to obtain more autonomy for Rakhine State within Myanmar. It calls this ideology “the Way of the Rakhita.” Similar to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), it has begun to set up its own administration and public works in Rakhine State. While the AA has been successful in capturing and controlling a large swath of territory, it is unclear whether it could maintain a semi-autonomous state in the absence of conflict (2) . Early in its existence, the AA espoused Rakhine nationalism, but it has changed its tune in recent years. While the Army is largely made of ethnic Rakhine and exists to further their interests, it uses the name Arakan instead of Rakhine to represent all of the people living in Rakhine State, formerly known as Arakan State, instead of just the Rakhine (19) . This differentiates the AA from other EAOs, as many are explicitly nationalist and fight along ethnic lines. That being said, the AA’s complicated relationship with Rakhine’s Rohingya population calls their claims of tolerance into question. While the organization alleges to have begun a process of reconciliation with the Rohingya, many are skeptical of its intentions, given past atrocities (20) . Political & Military Capabilities The Arakan Army controls tens of thousands of square kilometers in and around Rakhine State and has managed to administer its territory independently of the central government since 2020. This is done through the ULA. Before the conflict, Rakhine State had a population of over three million, most of whom are ethnically Rakhine with a significant Rohingya minority (8) . Along with the KIA and the UWSA, the AA is one of the largest EAOs operating in Myanmar. While it claims to have over 30,000 troops, the real number is likely between 15,000 to 20,000 (21, 22) . Many of its soldiers are young men in their 20s, though it has recruited many women as well (7) . The Army is well-trained and heavily armed, receiving training and equipment from other more seasoned EAOs such as the KIA and the UWSA. It has acquired small arms such as various AK-pattern rifles from its allies and captured larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles, from the Tatmadaw (23) . AA troops smoking in a muddy trench. Approach to Resistance The Army employs a mix of guerrilla warfare and conventional assaults against the Tatmadaw. Initially relying on hit-and-run tactics and ambushes in periodic skirmishes, it has transitioned to prolonged sieges and urban warfare, successfully capturing many towns and military bases. Over the course of the ongoing civil war, the AA has managed to take control of trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw. It has leveraged strategic ceasefires and alliances to its advantage, allowing it to consolidate its power and coordinate large-scale offensives (1) . Multi-front attacks like Operation 1027 have been effective because while the AA and its allies fight from their strongholds, the Tatmadaw is stretched far across the country (10) . The AA has been accused of numerous war crimes against Rohingya civilians and Tatmadaw soldiers. In its defense, the group claims that these are the actions of individual soldiers and are not ordered by the Army’s leadership (4) . Relations & Alliances The AA has received support from the neighbouring Indian and Chinese governments, with the intention of protecting these countries’ significant investments in Myanmar. Indian government officials allegedly met with AA leaders in late 2024, despite the past targeting of Indian infrastructure projects in Myanmar including roads and ports (24) . Meanwhile, China has allegedly supplied the AA with arms, a claim that Chinese officials deny (23) . Part of the stated goal of Operation 1027 has been to root out illegal gambling operations and scam centres along the China-Myanmar border. Typically, China has not allowed significant military action from EAOs along its border, but because of the benefit to Chinese security, it is alleged that the operation has received approval from Chinese officials (10) . On the other hand, the AA’s relationship with Bangladesh, which its territory borders, is much more strained. While both parties have expressed their intentions to maintain positive diplomatic relations, AA troops have attacked Bangladesh border guards (25) . The displacement of Rohingya who have largely fled to Bangladesh has also put stress on the relationship (21) . The AA has forged connections with other EAOs involved in the civil war, most notably as a part of the Three Brotherhood and Northern Alliances. While not formally aligned with the National Unity Government, the two organizations have found themselves in a de facto alliance against the Tatmadaw, and the portions of their territories that border each other have been peaceful. Recently, the NUG and AA have begun to normalize their relations (26) . The AA has also received material support from the UWSA, which is not directly active in the civil war. The AA seeks to establish a similar arrangement to the self-administered zone controlled by the UWSA in Wa State (5) . Meanwhile, the AA has intermittently clashed with Rohingya insurgent groups. It claims that Rohingya insurgent groups, including the ARSA, RSO, and Arakan Rohingya Army, fight alongside the Tatmadaw. The conflict between the groups has fueled the anti-Rohingya violence perpetuated by the AA (20) . Works Cited (1) Hlaing, K. H. (2023, April 21). Understanding the Arakan Army. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2023/understanding-the-arakan-army/ (2) Linn, K. (2019, February 28). ‘Way of Rakhita’: dream or nightmare? Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/way-of-rakhita-dream-or-nightmare/# (3) Human Rights Watch (2012, March 20). “Untold Miseries”: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/03/20/untold-miseries/wartime-abuses-and-forced-displacement-burmas-kachin-state (4) Mathieson, D. (2017, June 11). Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2017/06/shadowy-rebels-extend-myanmars-wars/ (5) Bynum, E. (2020, February 12). Dueling Ceasefires: Myanmar’s Conflict Landscape in 2019. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. https://acleddata.com/2020/02/12/dueling-ceasefires-myanmars-conflict-landscape-in-2019/ (6) The Irrawaddy (2019, January 8). President Convenes Top-Level Security Meeting in Wake of AA Attacks. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/president-convenes-top-level-security-meeting-wake-aa-attacks.html (7) Anonymous (2020, November 18). Why more women are joining Myanmar’s Arakan Army insurgency. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/18/myanmar-women-army-arakan-rakhine-female-soldiers-peace (8) Bhattacharyya, R. (2024, December 28). 5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/5-factors-that-catapulted-arakan-army-to-unprecedented-success-against-the-myanmar-military/ (9) Hlaing, K. H. (2022, October 3). Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Return to War on the Military. United States Institute for Peace. https://web.archive.org/web/20231129000026/https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/insurgents-myanmars-rakhine-state-return-war-military (10) Head, J. and Luo, L. (2023, November 9). A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67305690 (11) Wei, B. (2024, June 4). Arakan Army: Myanmar Junta Killed 76 in Village Massacre. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arakan-army-myanmar-junta-killed-76-in-village-massacre.html (12) The Guardian (2024, December 21). Myanmar rebels claim control over major western military headquarters. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/21/myanmar-rebels-claims-control-over-major-western-military-headquarters (13) Martin, M. (2025, February 20). Arakan Army Posed to “Liberate” Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Center For Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/arakan-army-posed-liberate-myanmars-rakhine-state (14) Wende, R. L. (2022, March 23). Young people in Myanmar's Rakhine State tackle ethnic divisions. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/young-people-myanmars-rakhine-state-tackle-ethnic-divisions (15) Bhattacharya, S. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army. Sri Lankan Guardian. https://slguardian.org/bangladesh-change-of-reign-in-arakan-army/ (16) Mizzima (2024, February 10). RSO denounces Arakan Army and junta accusations, affirms Rohingya rights. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/10/7035 (17) Human Rights Watch (2024, August 12). Myanmar: Armies Target Ethnic Rohingya, Rakhine. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/12/myanmar-armies-target-ethnic-rohingya-rakhine (18) Peck, G. (2024, August 10). Ethnic armed group suspected of deadly attack in Myanmar on Rohingya trying to flee fighting. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/rohingya-rakhine-maungdaw-bangladesh-refugees-edb7b9df01ae4c20795c9c149c9bbcc0?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share (19) Narinjara News (2024, April 12). Rebranding Arakan Army to represent all people in Rakhine State: AA spokesperson. https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/66195139a777fb8405e3315b (20) Bhattacharyta, R. (2024, October 30). Rohingya Community Is Divided Over Arakan Army’s Plan for ‘Inclusive Administration’. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/rohingya-community-is-divided-over-arakan-armys-plan-for-inclusive-administration/ (21) Davis, A. (2024, February 1). Myanmar junta in a make-or-break Rakhine fight. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2024/02/myanmar-junta-in-a-make-or-break-rakhine-fight/# (22) Naing, I. (2025, January 10). As Arakan Army gains ground in Myanmar, peace remains elusive. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/as-arakan-army-gains-ground-in-myanmar-peace-remains-elusive-/7931879.html (23) Corr, A. (2020, May 28). China’s diplo-terrorism in Myanmar. LICAS News. https://spotlight.licas.news/china-s-diplo-terrorism-in-myanmar/index.html (24) Lone, W. and Ghoshal, D. (2024, September 23). India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say. The Print. https://theprint.in/world/exclusive-india-extends-unprecedented-invite-to-myanmars-anti-junta-forces-sources-say/2280218/ (25) Mizzima (2015, August 27). Arakan Army attack Border Guard Bangladesh patrol. https://www.mizzima.com/news-domestic/arakan-army-attack-border-guard-bangladesh-patrol (26) The Irrawaddy (2023, April 10). Myanmar’s Civilian Govt Seeks Closer Ties With Arakan Army on 14th Anniversary. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-civilian-govt-seeks-closer-ties-with-arakan-army-on-14th-anniversary.html

Insurgency Overview The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN, from the Spanish Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional ) is an armed Indigenous insurgent organization based in Chiapas, Mexico, the country’s southernmost and poorest state. The EZLN, also referred to as the Zapatistas, launched an uprising against the Mexican state on January 1, 1994, in the process wresting control over a considerable area of Chiapas from the Mexican government. The Zapatistas are not only a militant organization, but also maintain a regime of Indigenous political autonomy in the zones under their control. The Zapatistas refer to these areas collectively as “Rebel Zapatista Autonomous Municipalities” ( Municipios Autónomos Rebeldes Zapatistas ), or “MAREZ.” Additionally, though the EZLN never gave up its arms, the armed struggle was only an initial strategy of resistance employed by the group. In the decades since the 1994 uprising, the Zapatistas have turned to civil resistance strategies, while the armed conflict has largely remained frozen since a ceasefire declared in 1994. Guided by a syncretic ideology which mixes the movement’s Indigenous roots with far-left political theory and Catholic liberation theology, the Zapatistas have defended and gradually expanded the MAREZ, which operate on principles of Indigenous rights, women’s rights, direct democracy, and other characteristics of the Zapatista model of “good government.” The EZLN are opposed, on the other hand, to the Mexican state, neoliberalism, capitalism, globalization, and what they consider the legacies of colonialism built into the Mexican social order since the Spanish conquest (Hayden 2002) . Although firmly rooted in the historical and cultural context of the Indigenous peoples of Mexico, the Zapatista insurgency is not a strictly local conflict. The Zapatistas have turned into far-reaching symbols of resistance and rebellion with global brand recognition, particularly for the international left and alter-globalization movements. This is due in no small part to the enigmatic figure of Subcomandante Marcos, the eminently quotable pipe-smoking masked revolutionary who led the Zapatistas in battle before becoming the public spokesperson for the movement in its negotiations with the Mexican state and its public relations campaigns. As quintessentially Latin American a revolutionary as Che Guevara, stylized images of Marcos can be found on T-shirts and tote bags from Seattle to Sydney, while his books and communiqués can be found in numerous languages in bookstores around the world. However, it is necessary to distinguish Marcos from the EZLN writ large, and Marcos has made increasingly infrequent public appearances in recent years. Today, the EZLN and the MAREZ remain in a position of relative stability, maintaining a steady ceasefire with the Mexican state, which no longer poses an immediate threat to their political autonomy and internal operations. The main threats faced by the EZLN now come in the form of paramilitary violence in the MAREZ, which have been on the uptick in recent years (Art of the Commune 2021; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . Despite these problems, the EZLN continues to fight for what it sees as the rights, dignity, and autonomy of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas and Mexico. History & Foundations 2.1 - Background On January 1, 1994, the same day that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) formally went into effect, masked and armed members of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation descended from the Indigenous highlands of Chiapas and occupied four of the state’s key cities, including its largest, San Cristóbal de las Casas. But the Zapatista uprising of January 1, 1994, was only the public unveiling of a movement years in the making. Behind it lies a history of 500 years of colonial dispossession in the largely Maya zones of the Chiapas hinterland, as well as a more recent history of left-wing insurgency in urban Mexico during the late twentieth century. In the summer of 1983, in the remote Lacandon Jungle of Chiapas, two revolutionary currents converged when disaffected Maya peasants began meeting with a small core of urban intellectual guerrilla militants from the National Liberation Front ( Frente de Liberación Nacional , FLN), who had recently arrived in Chiapas fleeing state repression in the cities. The Maya wanted to put an end to the historical injustices of colonialism and its legacies in the majority-Indigenous highlands of Chiapas. The Marxist guerrilla, for its part, came with dreams of whipping the traditional grievances of the Maya into proletarian revolutionary fervor. Subcomandante Marcos on horseback in 1996 (photo by Jose Villa). Instead of converting the Maya to Marxism, however, the guerrilla—who came with 12 militants and dwindled to four during their time in the mountains—were themselves transformed by their encounter with the Indigenous communities. According to Subcomandante Marcos and Comandante Elisa, both members of the small FLN cadre that arrived in 1983, their ragtag team of urban intellectual revolutionaries didn’t succeed in converting the Indigenous people to Marxism so much as the Maya convinced the guerrillas to reform themselves as the revolutionary vanguard of an Indigenous people’s army (Hayden 2002, 148) . The guerrilla soon gave up their initial objective of seizing state power in favor of defending local Indigenous communities from the aggressions of cattle barons and large landowners backed by the power elite of Chiapas and Mexico City. The presence of an educated, urban core of intellectual revolutionaries also proved organizationally expedient for the Maya militants, many of whom did not speak Spanish and had difficulty coordinating through the numerous Indigenous languages spoken across Chiapas. The vanguard led by Marcos and the Maya militants established a strategic partnership to learn from each other and advance their mutual goals. Founded on November 17, 1983, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation was the product of this revolutionary encounter (Muñoz Ramírez 2003) . As the EZLN organized itself, setting up clandestine training camps in the jungles of Chiapas and assembling an arsenal, officials in the halls of power of Washington and Mexico City were hashing out the details of a comprehensive new neoliberal trade policy, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Combined with the 1992 modification of Article 27 of the 1991 Mexican Constitution, which strengthened private property rights and allowed the privatization of ejidos —agrarian parcels of communal land owned by the state and administered collectively by local farmers—NAFTA presented serious threats to the economic lifeways of smallholder farmers, especially Indigenous ones in primarily agricultural states such as Chiapas. It seemed that the new trade deal would spare no room for the Indigenous peasants who already suffered so much under the old system—now their economic and vital sustenance was at stake. As the date of NAFTA’s implementation in Mexico grew nearer, Indigenous communities across the Chiapas Highlands made ready for war. This was the context within which, in the early 1990s, the EZLN began planning its public unveiling (Hayden 2002) . 2.2 – The Zapatista Uprising & its Aftermath On New Year’s Day, 1994, the EZLN went public by coming down from the mountains and occupying several key municipalities of Chiapas in the early hours of the morning. Tourists on holiday to visit the Maya ruins of southern Mexico woke to the spectacle of Maya men and women marching, masked and armed, down the central avenues of San Cristóbal de las Casas. By the break of dawn, the city hall had been occupied, land records destroyed, and prisoners freed. Hours later, knowing that state retribution would be swift, the rebels abandoned San Cristóbal. Meanwhile, the Mexican Army and police were already engaged in firefights with rebel divisions which had taken other cities in Chiapas, namely Altamirano and Ocosingo. By the end of the first week of the uprising, the EZLN had been driven out of the towns they had initially occupied. Skirmishes continued in the Lacandon Jungle for several more days until the Mexican government called a ceasefire on January 12, 1994. By the end of the bloodshed, about 145 people lay dead, most of them rebels (UCDP 2023) . Twelve days into the uprising, a crowd of 100,000 demonstrated in Mexico City in support of the Zapatistas and a peaceful resolution to the uprising. The Zapatistas and their cause were already a phenomenon, not only sweeping the nation but also attracting international interest to a state which had long been one of the most neglected and overlooked corners of Mexico. Contradictorily, most of the news circulating in and about Chiapas during the early days of the movement was propagated digitally, using technology that the EZLN itself did not have ready access to in the mountains and jungles of Chiapas, where most Indigenous communities were without telephones and internet. Nevertheless, the EZLN demonstrated their technical ingenuity and media savvy by quickly capitalizing on the use of media, both traditional and digital, to spread their messages and attract support. This led some commentators to describe the movement as the first “post-modern revolution” (Burgess 2016; Carrigan 1995; Cleaver 1998) . Meanwhile, despite the ceasefire, the Mexican state continued to deny the legitimacy of the autonomy claimed by the EZLN and the de facto autonomous municipalities they operated in. Indeed, for some in the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party; Partido Revolucionario Institucional ) government, the rebel zones were perceived as an affront to the sovereign authority of the Mexican state. In short order, Chiapas became the most militarized state in Mexico. These tensions resulted in the so-called Zapatista crisis of 1995. During initial peace talks with the government in early 1995, it appeared that a favorable conclusion to the conflict might soon be reached. However, the newly elected President Ernesto Zedillo—the last in an unbroken 71-year line of PRI presidents—soon broke from his predecessor’s moves towards peace, instead choosing to publicly reveal the identity of Subcomandante Marcos and issuing arrest warrants against him and numerous other known EZLN leaders, branding them as terrorists. As state forces, with the support of the US military, moved in to apprehend the “terrorists” and besiege EZLN camps in the Lacandon Jungle, it appeared that the Zedillo government was veering towards a military solution to the Chiapas conflict (Willson 1998) . Zedillo’s advisors, however—and the escape of Marcos from under the nose of the Mexican military—managed to convince Zedillo that a military solution to the conflict threatened to escalate retaliatory violence and turn the EZLN into real terrorists. Cooler heads in the government emphasized that Marcos maintained an open negotiating track and a pacificist orientation. By April 1995, the peace talks were back on course. However, the events of early 1995 demonstrated clearly to both the Mexican state and the EZLN that the prospect of violent escalation in Chiapas hung dangerously in the balance. It was in this context that both parties moved to accelerate the peace process, which culminated in the signing of the San Andrés Accords on February 16, 1996 (Baronnet et al. 2011; Hayden 2002) . The San Andrés Accords were designed to guarantee respect, rights, dignity, and autonomy to the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas. In their spirit, they echo the list of demands first proclaimed by the EZLN on the first day of 1994, which called for the recognition of Indigenous rights, including the right to autonomy and self-determination according to the cultures and customs of each community. Initially, the signing of the San Andrés Accords seemed to indicate a breakthrough in the peace process. However, the Zedillo government soon made it apparent they did not intend to keep their promises and respect the principals of the San Andrés Accords. Since its signing, none of its points has been effectively adopted by the Mexican state. The EZLN therefore turned to other strategies to advance its agenda. In October 1996, the EZLN convoked Mexico’s first ever nationwide Indigenous congress, the National Indigenous Congress (CNI), which convened in Mexico City to discuss how to advance Indigenous rights against the intransigence of the Mexican state, as demonstrated by the government’s failure to respect the San Andrés Accords. Since 1996, there have been five national congresses of the CNI, constituting one of the most important platforms for the advancement of the EZLN agenda outside of Chiapas. 2.3 – Mexican Standoff: Consolidation & Recent Developments In the decades since the signing of the San Andrés Accords, the Chiapas conflict has gone cold; there has been no more fighting, at least not between the EZLN and the Mexican state, and the MAREZ have been able to operate with relatively autonomy. However, despite the failures of their most radical goals outside of Chiapas following the San Andrés Accords, the EZLN, especially through their spokesman Subcomandante Marcos, remained active voices on the national political scene well into the 2000s. Activities such as the March of the Color of the Earth and the Other Campaign, both taking place in the early-mid-2000s and drawing mass domestic and international support, confirmed the EZLN’s staying power as political actors of national consequence. In Chiapas, however, the situation has remained relatively stable and slow to develop, at least until the escalation of paramilitary violence in recent years. In 2019, the Zapatistas announced the expansion of the MAREZ to include 11 new autonomous zones in Chiapas (Oikonomakis 2019; “Zapatista rebels extend control” 2019) . Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whom the Zapatists are openly critical of, welcomed the expansion, as long it was achieved nonviolently. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the MAREZ closed their doors to outsiders. Since then, little news has come out of the MAREZ save for the occasional EZLN communiqué, usually referring to the escalating situation of paramilitary violence in the MAREZ and elsewhere in Chiapas. However, EZLN-affiliated media channels continue to operate, and the EZLN still occasionally issues communiqués and press releases informing the outside world as to their activities and the situation in Chiapas. Despite the frozen nature of the conflict, whereby the Mexican government tends to leave the EZLN and the MAREZ to their own devices, evidence recently surfaced that the Zapatistas are one of the most heavily surveilled groups in Mexico, suggesting that the state still considers them a threat and treats them accordingly (Goodman 2022) . Additionally, the paramilitary violence increasingly perpetrated against the Zapatistas and their allies has always evinced clear links to the Mexican state, suggesting that perhaps the latter has merely adapted its oppositional strategy towards the EZLN (Romero 2023) . The Zapatistas, for their part, are constantly alert to the threat of surveillance and infiltration by bad actors, which is partly responsible for their notoriously hermetic nature. Historically, outsiders have been able to visit the caracol of Oventik—what some have referred to as the de facto capital of the MAREZ—with relative ease, but further access to the MAREZ is heavily restricted, and all visitors are subject to strict monitoring by Zapatista officials (Vidal 2018) . Due to the unstable paramilitary situation in Chiapas, the caracoles have been closed for over a year and visitors are not allowed in, with rare exceptions. As the 30th anniversary of the Zapatista uprising approaches, the EZLN has not yet announced whether there will be commemorative events open to the public or the press, as there were for the 20th anniversary. Objectives & Ideology 3.1 – Ideological Background & Influences Ideologically, the Zapatistas are difficult to pin down. They have been called Marxists, anarchists, libertarian socialists, Indigenists, Magonists (referring to the Mexican anarcho-communist Ricardo Flores Magón), and more. The Zapatistas have even inspired comparisons to the Kurds of Rojava in Northern Syria based on apparent ideological and organizational similarities (Geerdink 2021; Stanchev 2015) . Although some of these labels may be generally applicable, and while clearly aligned with the far-left ideologies in general, the ideology of the Zapatistas—what some have called Zapatismo or neo-Zapatismo—is best described as a syncretic mix of various influences and elements, drawing from both the Indigenous cultures of Mexico and various strands of radical leftism (Duterme 2011) . At its core, the EZLN is an Indigenous movement comprised almost exclusively of Indigenous Mexicans from numerous communities of southern Mexico, mainly subgroups of the Maya such as the Tzotzil, Tzeltal, Ch’ol, Zoque, Tojolabal, and many others. The central demands and objectives of the EZLN are for the recognition of Indigenous rights, dignity, and autonomy; an end to more than five centuries of colonial oppression of Indigenous peoples; and an end to neoliberalism and globalization in Chiapas and beyond. In the poetic terms of the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, a communiqué issued by the EZLN on the second anniversary of the Zapatista uprising, “In the world we want everyone fits. In the world we want many worlds to fit” (EZLN 1996) . The Zapatistas take their name from Emiliano Zapata, one of the principal figures of the Mexican Revolution, who led the insurgent Liberation Army of the South to fight for agrarian form and land redistribution. Following his assassination by the Mexican state, Zapata became a larger-than-life symbol of the spirit of the Mexican Revolution, particularly for the poor, landless, and Indigenous peasants whose cause he upheld. Zapata’s movement was encapsulated in the slogan “Land and Liberty” ( Tierra y Libertad ), a phrase attributed to the Mexican anarchist Ricardo Flores Magón, who was one of the main ideological reference points for the leftist elements of the Mexican Revolution. By adopting Zapata’s name, the EZLN positioned themselves as the legitimate ideological successors of Zapata. As Subcomandante Marcos writes in the Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, “Zapata is alive, and in spite of everything, the struggle continues” (EZLN 1996) . In tandem with their Indigenous roots, the Zapatistas are vocal critics of neoliberalism and globalization, which Marcos has termed the forces of the “Fourth World War” (Subcomandante Marcos 1997) . The Zapatistas view neoliberalism and globalization as the newest manifestations of a long tradition of colonial oppression and dispossession targeting Indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups. These commitments have led to their being associated with the alter-globalization movement, which advocates for global interconnection and solidarity while criticizing the negative economic, political, and ecological effects of neoliberal globalization (Engler 2019) . The ideological overlap between the Zapatistas and other Latin American radical movements and figures is also demonstrated by Marcos’ adoption of the name “Galeano” after the 2014 murder of Teacher Galeano, a Zapatista schoolteacher. Teacher Galeano himself took the name from Eduardo Galeano, a Uruguayan leftist critic and poet who wrote the highly influential book Open Veins of Latin America , and who maintained a written correspondence with Marcos in the early days of the Zapatista movement, even visiting the MAREZ (Hayden 2002) . Furthermore, images and artwork depicting Latin American revolutionary leaders such as Che Guevara—and, of course, Emiliano Zapata himself—are common sights in the public art of the MAREZ. The Zapatistas therefore situate themselves, in part, within a tradition of Latin American revolutionary struggle (Christ 2020) . The ideological orientation of the Zapatistas is perhaps most simply and eloquently encapsulated in one of their many slogans: “Below and to the left” ( abajo y a la izquierda ). The former term refers to both the grassroots and Indigenous nature of the movement—the EZLN has repeatedly referred to Indigenous peoples as the “subsoil” of the Mexican nation in a semantic move that both identifies them with the earth (as in the Zapatista phrase “people of the color of the earth”) and as a socioeconomically downtrodden underclass of Mexican society (Hayden 2002) . The latter term situates the EZLN within a legacy and international community of leftist politics. In other words, the Zapatistas are both distinctively Mexican, homegrown, and Indigenous; and, at the same time, leftist and internationalist in their outward political orientation. 3.2 – Objectives & Demands In March 1994, the EZLN issued a communiqué which details 34 demands made of the Mexican national government and the state of Chiapas on behalf of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas, proclaiming: “The indigenous peoples of the state of Chiapas, having risen up in arms in the EZLN against misery and bad government, hereby present the reasons for their struggle and their principal demands” (EZLN 2022, 639) . These demands range from free and democratic elections at all levels of politics to the implementation and safeguarding of specific Indigenous rights and forms of autonomous self-government, in addition to many other points. Notably, the EZLN’s list of demands includes a section specifically representing the “Indigenous women’s petition,” the points of which closely parallel those of the EZLN Women’s Revolutionary Law, which was issued on January 1, 1994, in tandem with the launching of the Zapatista uprising (EZLN 1994) . The Women’s Revolutionary Law specifically establishes the rights of Zapatista and Indigenous women, which include such guarantees as the rights to political participation, education, freedom from gendered violence, and bodily autonomy, among others. As the law reads, “In their just fight for the liberation of our people, the EZLN incorporates women in the revolutionary struggle regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation, requiring only that they meet the demands of the exploited people and that they commit to the laws and regulations of the revolution” (1) . In the context of Chiapas and Mexico writ large, where conservative, patriarchal gender and sexual norms have long predominated, these demands represent a radical shift in women’s social position (Geerdink 2021) . Women have gone on to play a central role in the Zapatista movement, including as officers and spokespeople. A key example is Comandanta Ramona, the first Zapatista to appear in public in Mexico City, where she presided over the 1996 CNI gathering (Rovira 2000) . Estimates place the number of women in the EZLN at about one third of combatants and half of the support base (Kampwirth 2002) . A sign indicating that one has entered a Zapatista autonomous zone, reading “here, the people command and the government obeys.” As the EZLN gave up the armed struggle in the wake of the 1994 ceasefire and the 1996 signing of the San Andrés Accords, its focus shifted towards legal means of establishing Indigenous rights and autonomy. One of the specific goals of the EZLN in its negotiations with the Mexican government has long been the promulgation of a Law of Rights and Culture of Indigenous Peoples, which the EZLN first proposed in July 1998 in the Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle (EZLN 1998) . This demands was reiterated in 2005 in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle, the most recent major manifesto of the EZLN (EZLN 2005) . In the words of Subcomandante Marcos: "You can rest assured that we want to get rid of our masks and our weapons as quickly as possible. We want to conduct politics in the broad light of day. But we won’t take off our masks just in exchange for promises. The rights of the Indians must be recognized. If the government refuses, not only will we take up arms again, but so will other movements, far more radical, intolerant, desperate, and violent than ours. Because here, as elsewhere, the ethnic question can easily create fundamentalist movements ready for all kinds of murderous madness. On the other hand, if things go as we hope and Indian rights are finally recognized, Marcos will cease to be subcomandante, leader, myth… People will realize that the Zapatistas’ main weapon was not the gun, but words. And when the dust raised by our uprising settles, people will discover a simple truth: In this whole struggle and thinking process, Marcos was just one more fighter. That’s why I say, “If you want to know who Marcos is, see who’s hidden behind the mask, then take a mirror and look at yourself. The face you see there will be face of Marcos, because we are all Marcos” (Hayden 2002, 141) . Political & Military Capabilities 4.1 – Military Capabilities & Organization EZLN militants in uniform. Note that they carry sticks and machetes, but no guns. During the 12 days of active combat that followed the Zapatista uprising on January 1, 1994, the EZLN proved itself to be an effective and well-organized fighting force, despite its significant technological and logistical limitations compared to their state adversaries. Like most guerrilla groups, the EZLN never aimed to stand up to a modern army in conventional warfare. Instead, their strength rested in their mobility, local support base, and knowledge of the terrain. However, during the Mexican Army’s counteroffensive in early January 1994, the EZLN was forced to retreat to the highlands. Most of the 145 killed during the uprising were rebels (UCDP 2023) . The choice to refrain from armed struggle since 1994 was a pragmatic one—although the EZLN appears to be a capable defensive force, the militants knew that in open battle they were no match for the Mexican Army. In terms of equipment, EZLN militants are lightly armed, if not poorly equipped. Common weapons in the hands of insurgents include assault rifles such as AK-47s and M16s, submachine guns, hunting rifles, and shotguns. As a lightly armed militant force, the EZLN does not possess the advanced technological and military capabilities of modern militaries and some other insurgent organizations, such as advanced weaponry, heavy artillery, or armored vehicles. In fact, guns are apparently in such short supply that EZLN militants have sometimes been observed carrying carved blocks of wood in place of rifles—symbolic, perhaps, but not functional (Hayden 2002; Korykhalova and Myasoedov 2017) . Organizationally, the EZLN is under the command of the Revolutionary Indigenous Clandestine Committee – General Command, or CCRI-CG ( Comité Clandestino Revolucionario Indígena – Comandancia General ). In their initial field operations, EZLN battalions were commanded by officers referred to as comandantes and subcomandantes . Subcomandante Marcos, despite his symbolically subordinate title meant to downplay his authority, was charged with coordinating the high-level military strategy of the EZLN prior to and during the 1994 uprising. He was also charged with leading the assault on a police station in San Cristobal to seize weapons during the 1994 uprising (Hayden 2002) . Although since 1994 the EZLN has stepped back from the armed struggle, Subcomandante Marcos has emphasized that it retains its military character. In a May 1999 interview, he noted that “the EZLN is still a political-military force. But it is a political-military force whose principal actions are not military, they are political-social” (AP Archive 2015) . 4.2 – Political Capabilities & Strategy More important than the EZLN’s military capabilities is their media-savvy approach to public relations, particularly as mediated by the internationally famous Subcomandante Marcos. Many, including Marcos himself, would argue that “the Sup,” as he is affectionately known, is not so much a person as a symbol and mouthpiece of the Zapatista cause, the conduit through which their collective will is eloquently expressed (Hayden 2002) . What is clear is that Marcos’ approach to media strategy has been instrumental in mobilizing support both domestic and international for the Zapatista movement, which may have factored into the Mexican government’s willingness to call a ceasefire and negotiate instead of responding to the Zapatista uprising with a military crackdown (Burgess 2016; Cleaver 1998) . The Zapatistas have shown themselves to be capable organizers on the national stage of Mexican politics. As part of their nonviolent strategy of resistance and popular mobilization, the Zapatistas have organized several nationwide marches and campaigns in defense of their political objectives. In 2001, for instance, one day after the inauguration of neoliberal president Vicente Fox, the EZLN announced the “March of the Color of the Earth,” which saw a caravan of 1,111 Zapatistas walk 3,000 kilometers from Chiapas to Mexico City. The objective of the march, which culminated in a gathering of thousands in the Zócalo, the heart of Mexico City, was to meet with the Mexican Congress of the Union to discuss constitutional reform on behalf of Indigenous rights and in defense of the San Andrés Accords, which the Mexican government had failed to respect (Hernández Navarro 2021) . Subcomandante Marcos during the March of the Color of the Earth. The Zapatistas also organized the Other Campaign ( la Otra Campaña ), which again sought to mobilize popular support for the recognition and implementation of Indigenous rights and autonomy. Beginning in January 2006, the EZLN sent Subcomandante Marcos to travel across Mexico speaking on behalf of the Zapatistas and their agenda. This movement also had the objective of establishing connections with other activists and organizations across different segments of Mexican society, especially those representing marginalized groups. Over several months, Marcos met with LGBT activists, women’s rights defenders, human rights advocates, students, environmentalists, workers, teachers, and various other people. The greater objective of the campaign was to lobby the Mexican government to legally enshrine the recognition and protection of Indigenous rights. As with the EZLN’s prior efforts, the Other Campaign did not achieve this goal, but it did illustrate once again the ability of the movement to rally considerable domestic and international support and to establish relations of solidarity with other groups (Baronnet et al. 2011) . 4.3 – Political Autonomy within the MAREZ According to the organization’s constitution, the EZLN is officially without political power or influence over the internal political procedures of the MAREZ, which instead operate according to a parallel civil political process. There are three general levels of government in the MAREZ: local, municipal, and regional (Baronnet et al. 2011; Oikonomakis 2019; Stanchev 2015; Vidal 2018) . Local government consists of groups of families residing in particular locales who choose to involve themselves in the political process, regardless of their affiliation with the EZLN. Those who directly participate in the internal operations of the EZLN are referred to as the “support base” ( base de apoyo ), but they do not enjoy greater political power or prestige than non-affiliates. This level of government aims to manage affairs and resolve problems at the local level. For problems of a greater scale, local governments elect representatives to express the will and interests of their communities at the municipal level. Municipal government takes place at the level of a central hub, typically a larger town in a region of villages, where representatives from various local governments meet to coordinate with each other and resolve problems of a municipal nature. Representatives are encouraged to consult with their constituencies at the local level to ensure maximal representation of the popular will at the municipal level. The highest level of the political process in the MAREZ takes place through the Councils of Good Government ( juntas de buen gobierno ), which represent confederated groups of autonomous municipalities. The Councils of Good Government consist of elected representatives sent from the municipal governments. They are responsible for coordinating organizational efforts and resolving disputes between municipalities throughout the MAREZ. Each level of government in the MAREZ is supposed to comply with the seven organizing principles collectively referred to as “govern while obeying” ( mandar obediciendo ; Korykhalova and Myasoedov 2017) : Suggest, do not impose. Represent, do not replace. Build, do not destroy. Obey, do not dictate. Go down, not up. Convince, do not conquer. Serve others, not yourself. These principles form the basis of the Zapatista concept of “good government” ( buen gobierno ), in contrast to the “bad government” ( mal gobierno ) of the Mexican state. The Zapatistas claim that cultivating the principles of good government in the MAREZ is essential to realizing their goals of securing the rights and dignity of Indigenous peoples and all other marginalized groups. In line with their promotion of Indigenous autonomy in the MAREZ, the Zapatistas encourage economic self-sufficiency within the autonomous zones. One of the most significant economic initiatives of the EZLN has been its promotion of coffee cooperatives. Chiapas is the biggest coffee producer in all of Mexico, which itself is one of the biggest producers in the world (Pérez-Grovas et al. 2001) . The organization of the Zapatista coffee cooperatives, some of which distribute to the United States and Europe through affiliate solidarity networks in both regions, represents an attempt to bring economic organization in the MAREZ in line with Zapatista political principles. Likewise, the MAREZ have also implemented autonomous programs of education, healthcare, and ecological sustainability to bring other facets of social organization in line with Zapatista ideological principles (Baronnet et al. 2011) . Approach to Resistance 5.1 – Armed Struggle Excluding the 12 days of combat which followed the Zapatista uprising of 1994, the EZLN has been involved in relatively few combat engagements, instead opting for strategies of nonviolent struggle and civil resistance (Hayden 2002, 138) . However, the EZLN has pointedly declined to surrender its weapons, declaring that as long as the San Andrés Accords remain unratified by the Mexican state, the conditions for peace have not been met. Consequently, the Chiapas conflict can be described as a frozen conflict; although the EZLN and the Mexican state remain nominally at war with each other, there is no active conflict between the two groups. For now, the EZLN maintain their pacifist stance in line with the precepts of the peace process that resulted in the San Andrés Accords. 5.2 – Civil Resistance Following the ceasefire and the signing of the San Andrés Accords, the EZLN switched from the armed struggle to pacifist strategies of civil resistance. During the period of intense militarization in Chiapas in the mid-1990s, Zapatista communities organized marches and sit-ins meant to obstruct the operations of Mexican state forces in EZLN-claimed territory. Following the withdrawal of the Mexican military, marches by and in support of the Zapatista movement became common fixtures in both local and national politics, especially during key events such as the issuing of the declarations of the Lacandon Jungle, as well as EZLN political initiatives such as the founding of the CNI and campaigns such as the March of the Color of the Earth and the Other Campaign, both of which attracted mass popular support by peaceful means. These tactics are typical of the EZLN’s adoption of a civil resistance strategy following the abandonment of the armed struggle (Hayden 2002) . A peaceful march in support of the EZLN in 2012. 5.3 – Media & Propaganda From the earliest days of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN, and particularly Subcomandante Marcos as its spokesperson and chief public relations liaison, has demonstrated mastery over the use of media as its most powerful weapon. The media-savvy leadership of Marcos allowed the EZLN to garner considerable domestic support across a broad range of social sectors, from Indigenous peasants to students, the urban left, and even members of the political class (the so-called “radical chic” crowd). Equally important is the success with which the Zapatistas were able to attract international interest in their movement, especially through Marcos, who frequently gave multiple interviews per day on key occasions during the early years of the Zapatista movement. Indeed, some have supposed that the romantic mystique of Marcos as the quintessential Latin American guerrilla hero proved instrumental to the EZLN’s ability to attract considerable international support and interest. The EZLN and its leadership therefore capitalized on Marcos’ symbolic value to bolster their image (Burgess 2016; Cleaver 1998) . The media expertise of the Zapatistas has led some to refer to their efforts, even their initial violent seizure of San Cristóbal and other municipalities during the 1994 uprising, as an exercise in political theater (Carrigan 1995; Hayden 2002) . In this sense, the Zapatista uprising was designed as spectacle meant to capture the world’s attention in dramatic fashion to achieve the widest possible circulation of the Zapatistas’ message, for the world to hear their cry of ¡Ya basta! (“Enough is enough!”). The EZLN has also made use of radio and internet pages to disseminate their messages. Enlace Zapatista , the official website of the EZLN, maintains an archive of the EZLN’s communiqués and periodically issues new announcements from the group. Radio Zapatista , which once hosted the official radio station of the EZLN, called Radio Insurgente, also maintains a website where they post official announcements and other news related to the Zapatista movement. Finally, a host of affiliate organizations and media outlets which form part of the Zapatistas’ international solidarity network also act in similar roles for the EZLN’s media and propaganda efforts. 5.4 – Institutional Political Participation In the early years of the Zapatista movement, the EZLN pointedly rejected any possibility of participating in legal political processes at the national level. Given the history of fraudulent elections and corruption in Mexican politics, and the nature of what the Zapatistas term the “bad government” of the Mexican state, the EZLN rejected the legitimacy of the formal political process. Instead, they preferred to maintain their strategy of civil resistance while continuing to voice their demands for the adoption of legal recognition of and protection for Indigenous rights and autonomy (Hayden 2002) . However, in 2017, during a CNI congress held in San Cristóbal de las Casa, the EZLN formally broke with their record of abstaining from electoral politics by endorsing the first Indigenous woman ever to run for president in Mexico, the Nahua traditional healer and human rights advocate María de Jesús Patricio Martínez (Tucker 2017) . The affectionately nicknamed Marichuy ran as an independent candidate in the 2018 presidential election, losing to Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whom the EZLN has since extensively criticized. Despite her loss of the presidential bid, the EZLN’s decision to explicitly endorse Marichuy’s run marked a shift in the group’s willingness to engage in national politics on the electoral level. 5.5 – International Solidarity & Outreach Since the earliest days of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN has recognized the strategic value of cultivating international relationships of solidarity with ideological allies on the global stage. The EZLN has hosted several series of international gatherings in the MAREZ, inviting foreign activists to dialogue on themes of mutual concern, such as opposition to neoliberalism and globalization. The EZLN refers to these gatherings as encuentros , or “encounters.” These encounters began in July 1996 during the First Intercontinental Encounter For Humanity and against Neoliberalism, during which 4,000 people—Zapatistas and visitors invited from all around the world—gathered in the Lacandon Jungle to discuss resistance to capitalism, neoliberalism, and globalization. The second such encounter occurred in August 1997 and drew a similarly large and diverse crowd. Since then, there have been numerous such encounters organized around different themes and concerns that have taken place in Chiapas at the convocation of the EZLN (Hayden 2002; Baronnet et al. 2011) . One of the most recent examples of Zapatista efforts in international solidarity and outreach is the Journey for Life, a Zapatista world tour which began its first phase in 2021 (Marquardt 2021; Subcomandante Galeano 2021; “Zapatista World Tour” 2021) . On the 500th anniversary of the conclusion of the Conquest of Mexico, a small crew of seven Zapatistas set sail from the Gulf of Mexico, their heading set for Spain. This delegation included four women, two men, and one transgender person, a 4-2-1 formation which earned it the moniker “Squadron 421” in homage to the Mexican Air Force’s 201st Fighter Squadron, which aided the Allies in the Pacific Theatre of World War II. This expedition was conceived as a symbolic reversal of the conquest of Mexico; now it was the Maya who would “conquer” Europe. Squadron 421 spent four months traveling through Europe, holding encuentros with various activist groups, before returning to Mexico in September 2021. That same month, a second phase of the Europe chapter of the Journey for Life saw another delegation of 170 Zapatistas calling themselves “the Extemporaneous” continue the encuentros in Europe (Subcomandante Moisés 2021) . The Journey for Life aims to eventually visit five continents, but so far only the Europe chapter has been completed. Relations & Alliances 6.1 – Other Guerrillas The EZLN can be regarded as the most successful—indeed, probably the only successful—movement in a line of Mexican guerrilla organizations that adopted strategies of armed struggle beginning in the 1960s. Most were obliterated by the Mexican state in its punitive dirty war against the Mexican left throughout the 1960s and 70s, which found maximum expression in such atrocities as the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, during which over 350 students were gunned down by the Mexican Army in the heart of Mexico City. By the end of the 1970s, most Mexican guerrillas had either been destroyed or disbanded under the onslaught of state repression. By continuing the armed struggle, the ragtag group of 12 FLN militants who fled to the jungle of Chiapas in the summer of 1983 proved a rare exception. In the years that followed, the successes of the Zapatista movement and the de facto autonomy of the Zapatista territories ever since have established the EZLN as the one Mexican guerrilla that not only survived but thrived in the wake of the Mexican Dirty War (Hayden 2002) . Given the EZLN’s background in armed struggle, the Zapatistas are rumored to have established alliances with other left-wing militant organizations throughout Mexico. One alleged ally is the Popular Revolutionary Army ( Ejército Popular Revolucionario , EPR), one of Mexico’s few extant guerrillas, which carried out attacks throughout the 1990s and 2000s. While the EZLN denies any affiliation with the EPR, the EPR claims to support the Zapatistas (Henriquez 1996) . There is no direct evidence of direct cooperation between the two groups, nor are there clear affiliations between the EZLN and other guerrillas currently or historically active in Mexico. 6.2 – The Mexican State Although the ideological rhetoric of the Zapatistas is mainly directed at general abstractions such as neoliberalism, globalization, and “bad government,” in concrete terms the primary opponent of the Zapatistas has always been the Mexican state. However, since January 1994, the EZLN has ceased to engage in armed struggle, and the two parties maintain a truce whereby Mexican forces do not venture into the MAREZ. The PRI, which ruled Mexico as a de facto one-party state for 71 years until being dethroned in 2000, was one of the primary reference points for the Zapatista critique of “bad government,” as the party’s electoral history was marred with corruption and fraud, while its economic policies increasingly favored foreign business interests—the passing of NAFTA being a keystone example of such collusion, according to the Zapatistas. The PRI government, with the support of opposition parties and anti-EZLN paramilitary groups in Chiapas, was responsible for the general hostility on the part of the state to EZLN demands during the first six years of the Zapatista movement. When the PRI was finally unseated from power in the presidential election of 2000, the Zapatistas refocused their criticisms on the new government of the neoliberal Vicente Fox, whose National Action Party ( Partido de Acción Nacional , PAN) maintained its predecessors’ anti-EZLN stance. The EZLN has never enjoyed good relations with the Mexican state in the years since, accusing them of aiding and abetting the right-wing paramilitaries which have long threatened and attacked Zapatista communities and allies in Chiapas (Hayden 2002; Mazzei 2009; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . The Zapatistas are vocal critics of the current president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, for his support for the Tren Maya, a railway in southwest Mexico which is designed to connect Maya archaeological sites to tourism hubs on the Caribbean coast, and which is scheduled to begin operation in December 2023 (Jiménez 2020) . The EZLN charges the government with ecocide and ethnocide, accusing it of catering to tourists at the expense of the natural environmental and local Indigenous groups, who they claim will not benefit from the railway’s construction. They also protest the fact that the Mexican Army has been deployed along the construction route for “security” purposes (Ribeiro 2023) . 6.3 – The Catholic Church A key figure in the early history of the Zapatistas is Bishop Samuel Ruiz García, the Diocese of San Cristóbal de Las Casas between 1959 and 1999 and a proponent of liberation theology, a mainly Latin American branch of Catholic doctrine that stresses interpretations of the Bible based in social justice and anti-capitalism. Liberation theology has long exerted a powerful influence on the religious life of the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas, as elsewhere in Latin America, being that it provides a religious justification for challenging capitalism and organizing to improve their material conditions. For the first several years of the Chiapas conflict, Bishop Ruiz served as the primary intermediary and negotiator in the peace talks between the EZLN and the Mexican state. He was an ideal choice for the position of mediator, given his popularity with the Indigenous peoples of Chiapas and his respectable position vis-à-vis both the Church and the Mexican state. However, Bishop Ruiz resigned from his role as peace mediator in 1998, accusing the Mexican government of failing to abide by the spirit of the San Andrés Accords, which he helped produce. Others in the Vatican have sought to distance themselves from the EZLN, as liberation theology was never a mainstream perspective in the Catholic Church, and Bishop Ruiz’s successors have never enjoyed his popularity in Chiapas or his close relationship with the Zapatistas (Hayden 2002) . 6.4 – Civil Society Since the beginning of the Zapatista uprising, the EZLN has engaged in outreach with friendly segments and affiliate organizations within Mexican civil society. A key early example is the Indigenous Christian pacifist group known as Las Abejas, or “the Bees.” Comprised of Tzotzil Maya peace activists who adhere to liberation theology, Las Abejas was formed in 1992 in the municipality of Chenalhó, Chiapas, following a land dispute that left one person dead and several innocent Indigenous people imprisoned without just cause. After the community organized a peaceful march on San Cristóbal de las Casas which led to the release of the prisoners, Las Abejas organized itself as a civil society promoting the use of pacifist means in conflict resolution. During the Zapatista uprising several years later, Las Abejas came out in support of the Zapatistas’ demands for Indigenous rights, though not without criticizing their violent means (Lifson 2005) . Other Mexican civil organizations to which the Zapatistas maintain ties—or which at least could be classified as ideological allies sympathizing with the principles and objectives of the EZLN—include the National Indigenous Congress ( Congreso Nacional Indígena ), the Bartolomé de las Casas Human Rights Center ( Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas ), and formerly the Chiapas Media Project (now the Mexican NGO ProMedios de Comunicación Comunitaria ). 6.5 – Narcos & Paramilitaries Currently, the main threats to Zapatista communities are the armed narcotrafficking and paramilitary groups which have, in recent years, begun to encroach on the MAREZ. Although Chiapas has long been regarded as one of the safest states in Mexico, having been spared the violence of the drug wars ongoing elsewhere in the country, there are signs that this is beginning to change. Especially concerning to the EZLN is the recent and ongoing uptick of paramilitary violence inflicted against MAREZ communities and Zapatista allies (Art of the Commune 2021; Romero 2023; Santos Cid 2023) . Their committed pacifism notwithstanding, Las Abejas’ declaration of solidarity with the Zapatistas’ principles and aims established them as ideological allies—and therefore put them in the crosshairs of the Zapatistas’ enemies. On December 22, 1997, right-wing paramilitaries allied with the Mexican government against the Zapatistas and their sympathizers entered the Tzotzil village of Acteal and massacred 45 members of Las Abejas as they prayed in the village church. The Mexican Army, which operated a base just down the road from Acteal, failed to show up until hours after the shooting ended—even as survivors of the massacre ran down the road and begged them to intervene. This event, the bloodiest of the Chiapas conflict, has since become known as the Acteal massacre, and marked a turning point in the escalation of anti-Zapatista paramilitary violence in the Chiapas conflict. The annual commemoration of the anniversary of the massacre on December 22 has since become a focal point of pro-Zapatista solidarity in the state of Chiapas (Hayden 2002; Las Abejas de Acteal 2023; Lifson 2005; Rico 1997) . Shortly after the Acteal massacre, journalists revealed that the right-wing paramilitary group responsible for the killing, which called itself Máscara Roja, or “Red Mask,” had direct ties to Chiapas government officials affiliated with the PRI government in Chiapas. Few among the Zapatistas and their supporters were surprised when the news broke that the paramilitary killers behind the Acteal massacre received direct support from PRI officials. Although initially it seemed that some of the killers and their government collaborators would be brought to justice, it was perhaps even less surprising when their sentences were overturned. In 2020, the Mexican government formally admitted responsibility for the Acteal massacre, but the killers still enjoy impunity (Varzi 2020) . Even today, Las Abejas continue to face targeted violence at the hands of anti-Zapatista paramilitaries. As recently as 2016, members of Las Abejas regularly received death threats and beatings, and on July 5, 2021, Simón Pedro Pérez López, an activist with Las Abejas, was murdered by an unknown assailant, presumably in retaliation for his political activism with Las Abejas (Las Abejas de Acteal 2023) . Similarly, other right-wing paramilitaries such as the inaptly named Paz y Justicia (“Peace and Justice”) and the Chinchulines have also threatened the EZLN and their allies and sympathizers in civil society. These groups form part of a historical legacy of “White Guards,” vigilante and paramilitary groups which long terrorized Indigenous peasants in Chiapas on behalf of White and Mestizo landowners who coveted Indigenous land or coerced labor (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2000; Romero 2023) . Like the White Guards before them, contemporary paramilitary groups enjoy the tacit (and sometimes direct) support of the Mexican state, from which they typically enjoy impunity for their aggressions against Zapatista communities and allies. A banner reading “The Zapatistas are not alone!” displayed during a march against paramilitary violence and militarization in Chiapas. 6.6 – The Lacandon Maya Despite their largely positive reputation among Indigenous communities in general, EZLN activities in the Lacandon Jungle—one of Mexico’s largest and most pristine natural areas—have put them at odds with a local Indigenous population, the Lacandon Maya. Whereas the EZLN encourage degrees of settlement and economic exploitation of the sparsely populated jungle, particularly as a response to displacement at the hands of anti-Zapatista paramilitaries in Chiapas, the small Lacandon Maya community is opposed to these initiatives, and a persistent conflict between the two has ensued. The Montes Azules Biosphere Reserve, which is also a zone of ecological protection, is at the heart of this conflict. The Lacandon Maya, who number about 1,000, have accused EZLN militants of intimidation tactics meant to displace them from their land to make it available to settlement by Zapatista-affiliated groups. Several third-party organizations have also called attention to the tense situation in the Lacandon Jungle. In part, the issue is one of land titling; most members of both parties do not have formal title to the land they claim as their own, and with no formal government presence in the area, it is difficult to resolve disputes in an objective and transparent way. The situation is complicated by the fact that although the Lacandon accuse the EZLN of ecological unsustainable practices, the EZLN itself claims to uphold principles of sustainability in the Lacandon Jungle and has historically opposed state and corporate development projects in this ecologically sensitive area (SIPAZ 2019; Stevenson 2002; Weinberg 2007) . 6.7 – Global Solidarity Networks One of the unique aspects of the Zapatista movement has been its ability to garner international popular support and to establish links of ideological solidarity—and sometimes direct aid and cooperation—with activist networks abroad, as well as high-profile activists and public intellectuals. The global solidarity network of the EZLN has been instrumental in mobilizing international interest in the Zapatista movement and constitutes an important extension of the EZLN’s innovative and strategic use of media to garner support for their movement. Given the proximity of the United States to Mexico and the close historical and cultural ties between parts of both countries, the US is home to an outsize number of solidarity networks that provide aid and outreach on behalf of the EZLN. Some of the US-based solidarity organizations which have collaborated, directly or indirectly, with the Zapatistas include Schools for Chiapas , the Chiapas Support Committee , Sexta Grietas del Norte , and the Institute for Social Ecology . The long list of public luminaries who have voiced their support for the Zapatistas includes names such as Noam Chomsky, Oliver Stone, Naomi Klein, Elena Poniatowska, and José Saramago, among many others. The EZLN has even received the direct support and personal visits of high-profile musicians such as Rage Against the Machine and Manu Chao, both of whom have incorporated Zapatista themes in their work (Hayden 2002; Burgess 2016; Culshaw 2007; Rage Against the Machine 2017) . Most recently, a statement signed by 1,000 Mexican and international leading figures sought to bring attention to the paramilitary threat facing the EZLN in Chiapas (Santos Cid 2023) . A poster in solidarity with the EZLN against paramilitary attacks signed by the CGT, a Spanish anarcho-syndicalist organization. Works Cited (MLA-style) AP Archive. 2015. “Mexico: EZLN Leader Subcomandante Marcos Interview.” YouTube, 3:17. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMl00VrPExc. Art of the Commune. 2021. “Brief chronology of paramilitary violence in Chiapas.” Chiapas Support Committee , November 8, 2021. https://chiapas-support.org/2021/11/08/brief-chronology-of-paramilitary-violence-in-chiapas/. 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EZLN. 1994. “Zapatista Women’s Revolutionary Law.” El Despertador Mexicano , January 1, 1994. chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://schoolsforchiapas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Zapatista-Womens-Revolutionary-Laws.pdf. ———. 1996. “Fourth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Radio Zapatista , December 25, 2005. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=20287&lang=en. ———. 1998. “Fifth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Radio Zapatista , December 25, 2005. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=20289&lang=en. ———. 2005. “Sixth Declaration of the Lacandon Jungle.” Enlace Zapatista , June 2005. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/sdsl-en/. ———. 2022. “EZLN Demands at the Dialogue Table.” In The Mexico Reader , edited by Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson, 638–645. Durham: Duke University Press. Geerdink, Fréderike. 2021. “The inspiring ‘arms of struggle’ of Kurdish and Zapatista women.” Medya News , October 25, 2021. https://medyanews.net/the-inspiring-arms-of-struggle-of-kurdish-and-zapatista-women-article/. Goodman, Amy, host. 2022. “Massive Leak of Military Docs Reveals Mexico Armed Cartels, Surveilled Journalists & Zapatistas.” Democracy Now! WestLink. New York City: WBAI, October 12, 2022. https://www.democracynow.org/2022/10/12/mexico_military_drug_cartels_ayotzinapa_ministry. Hayden, Tom, ed. 2002. The Zapatista Reader . New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press/Nation Books. Henriquez, Elio. 1996. “We know nothing about the EPR nor are we in any way associated with it: Marcos.” La Jornada , July 2, 1996. https://struggle.ws/mexico/reports/marcos_no_lonk_epr_jul96.html. Hernández Navarro, Luis. 2021. “The March of the Color of the Earth.” Chiapas Support Committee , March 20, 2021. https://chiapas-support.org/2021/03/20/the-march-of-the-color-of-the-earth/. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 2000. “Mexico: Background information on the white guards (guardias blancas) (1998 to July 2000).” Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada , August 2, 2000. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad6c30.html. Jiménez, Abraham. 2020. “EZLN celebra 26 años y reitera rechazo a proyectos de AMLO.” Milenio , January 1, 2020. https://www.milenio.com/politica/ezln-celebra-26-anos-reitera-rechazo-proyectos-amlo. Kampwirth, Karen. 2002. Women and Guerrilla Movements: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas, Cuba . University Park: Penn State University Press. Korykhalova, Elena and Oleg Myasoedov. 2017. “People Without Faces (documentary about Zapatistas, Russia-Mexico, 2016).” YouTube, 59:21. https://youtu.be/NqlZOa7DMiU. Las Abejas de Acteal. 2023. “Abejas de Acteal presionan en caso Simón Pedro Pérez López.” IBERO Puebla , April 24, 2023. https://web.iberopuebla.mx/noticias_y_eventos/noticias/abejas-de-acteal-presionan-en-caso-simon-pedro-perez-lopez. Lifson, Anna H. 2005. “Las Abejas y los Zapatistas: Una Comparación y Contraste de Dos Movimientos Indígenas en Chiapas, México.” Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection . Marquardt, Franca. 2021. “The Zapatistas’ ‘Journey for Life’ and its Implications for a Global Solidarity.” December 7, 2021. https://radiozapatista.org/?p=40598&lang=en. Mazzei, Julie. 2009. Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces? How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and Challenge Democracy in Latin America . Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Muñoz Ramírez, Gloria. 2003. 20 y 10: El fuego y la palabra . Barcelona: Virus. Oikonomakis, Leonidas. 2019. “Zapatistas announce major expansion of autonomous territories.” ROAR Magazine , August 19, 2019. https://roarmag.org/essays/zapatistas-announce-major-expansion-of-autonomous-territories/. Pérez-Grovas, Victor, Edith Cervantes, and John Burstein. 2001. “Case Study of the Coffee Sector in Mexico.” Make Trade Fair , July 2001. http://www.maketradefair.com/en/assets/english/MexicoPerez-.pdf. Rage Against the Machine. 2019. “Rage Against The Machine - Interview with Marcos (from The Battle Of Mexico City).” YouTube, 9:24. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5WekxAV9-0. Ramsey, Geoffrey. 2012. “How Mexico's Guerrilla Army Stayed Clear of Organized Crime.” InSight Crime , January 9, 2012. https://insightcrime.org/news/analysis/how-mexicos-guerrilla-army-stayed-clear-of-organized-crime/. Rico, Maite. 1997. “Un grupo paramilitar asesina a 46 campesinos indefensos en una remota aldea de Chiapas.” El País , December 24, 1997. https://elpais.com/diario/1997/12/24/internacional/882918016_850215.html. Romero, Raúl. 2023 “¿A quiénes sirven los paramilitares en Chiapas?” La Jornada , June 17, 2023. https://www.jornada.com.mx/2023/06/17/opinion/013a1pol. Rovira, Guiomar. 2000. Women of Maize: Indigenous Women and the Zapatista Rebellion . London: Latin American Bureau. Santos Cid, Alejandro. 2023. “Mexico’s Zapatistas warn Chiapas is on ‘the verge of civil war.’” El País , June 1, 2023. https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-06-01/mexicos-zapatistas-warn-chiapas-is-on-the-verge-of-civil-war.html. SIPAZ. 2019. “Chiapas: Delimitation Conflict in Lacandon Jungle.” October 16, 2019. https://sipazen.wordpress.com/2019/10/16/chiapas-delimitation-conflict-in-lacandon-jungle/. Stanchev, Petar. 2015. “From Chiapas to Rojava: seas divide us, autonomy binds us.” ROAR Magazine , February 17, 2015. https://roarmag.org/essays/chiapas-rojava-zapatista-kurds/. Stevenson, Mark. 2002. “Unusual battle lines form around jungle.” The Miami Herald , July 14, 2002. https://www.latinamericanstudies.org/mexico/lacandones.htm. Subcomandante Galeano. 2021. “The Journey for Life: To What End?” Enlace Zapatista , July 20, 2021. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2021/07/20/the-journey-for-life-to-what-end/. Subcomandante Marcos. 1997. “The fourth world war has begun.” Le Monde diplomatique , September 1997. https://mondediplo.com/1997/09/marcos. Subcomandante Moisés. 2021. “The Extemporaneous and a National Initiative.” Enlace Zapatista , July 18, 2021. https://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/2021/07/18/the-extemporaneous-and-a-national-initiative/. Tucker, Duncan. 2017. “‘Mexico needs healing’: the first indigenous woman to run for president.” The Guardian , June 12, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/mexico-maria-de-jesus-patricio-martinez-indigenous-woman-president. UCDP – Uppsala Conflict Data Program. “EZLN.” Accessed September 6, 2023. https://ucdp.uu.se/actor/767. Varzi, Changiz M. 2020. “23 Years of Impunity for Perpetrators of Acteal Massacre.” North American Congress on Latin America , December 22, 2022. https://nacla.org/news/2020/12/21/23-years-impunity-acteal-massacre. Vidal, John. 2018. “Mexico’s Zapatista rebels, 24 years on and defiant in mountain strongholds.” The Guardian , February 17, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/feb/17/mexico-zapatistas-rebels-24-years-mountain-strongholds. Willson, Brian S. 1998. “U.S. military aids Mexico's attacks on Zapatista movement.” The Gainesville Iguana , March 1998. http://www.afn.org/~iguana/archives/1998_03/19980305.html. 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Insurgency Overview Combat 18, abbreviated as C18, is an international neo-Nazi terror group. Founded in 1992 in England as an offshoot of the far-right British National Party (BNP), the group has since spread internationally to Northern Ireland, Canada, Germany, Sweden, Australia, Greece, and elsewhere. Initially serving as its paramilitary wing, C18 soon split from the BNP and began a campaign of far-right propaganda, doxxing, harassment, and terrorist attacks. It targeted immigrants, Jewish people, and other ethnic minorities as well as left and right-wing political rivals (1) . These actions serve to achieve the group’s goal of overthrowing the “Jewish cabal” it believes is controlling governments across the world and creating white ethnostates in the wake. Besides its neo-Nazi ideology, the group also uses Nazi symbols, including the Totenkopf, or death’s head. The 18 in its name is in reference to Adolf Hitler’s initials, as one and eight are the first and eighth letters of the alphabet, AH. While the group has a central leadership, it is structured as a network of independent cells (2) . C18 has developed relationships with various right-wing and fascist groups across the world and has been designated as a terrorist group and banned in various countries, including Canada and Germany (3) (4) . Combat 18 graffiti on a statue of Polish boxing coach Feliks Stamm. History & Foundations In 1982, former National Front leader John Tyndall formed the British National Party in an attempt to bring together the United Kingdom’s divided far-right. The BNP participated in elections across the country. The party also organized public demonstrations, clashing with left-wing and anti-fascist counter-protesters such as the Anti-Nazi League. In order to provide muscle against counter-protesters, the BNP formed a paramilitary wing in 1992. It was led by Charlie Sargent, a football hooligan and convicted drug dealer, and Harold Covington, a prolific American neo-Nazi known for his association with the Northwestern Territorial Imperative white separatist movement. However, it attracted the BNP’s more hardline, violence-prone members, which quickly created a divide between the two organizations. Tyndall grew concerned over the group’s influence within the BNP as well as their activities, which hurt the BNP’s reputation and chances of electoral success. Besides attacks on public targets such as left-wing bookstores and newspapers, its members would often get into fights with other BNP members. The group held its own meeting without BNP leadership present and decided to form an independent organization, Combat 18. This drove Tyndall to ban C18 members from the BNP (1) . Following the split from the BNP, C18 ramped up its campaign of violent extremism as its ranks swelled full of football hooligans. While many of their attacks consisted of little more than drunken fights with random minorities outside of pubs and football matches, there was simultaneously a more organized effort within C18 to confront its enemies. Steve Sargent, Charlie Sargent’s younger brother, started a newspaper, Redwatch, containing addresses, phone numbers, and personal information of potential targets, which led to harassment campaigns and sometimes violent attacks. Typically, targets included anti-fascists, socialists, supporters of other left-wing causes, such as the anti-apartheid movement. C18 met their opposition on the streets and clashed with left-wing activists at demonstrations. Journalists for left-wing publications were also threatened (2) . Some of these more sophisticated plots were easily foiled by law enforcement, such as Danish C18 member Thomas Nakaba’s 1997 mail bomb plot orchestrated by Notorious C18 thug Will “The Beast” Browning. Nakaba attempted to mail three bombs to targets: Anti-Fascist Action, leaders of a rival group known as the British Movement, and Sharron Davies, a former Olympic swimmer married to a Black man. He was followed by police officers while he posted packages containing the bombs and was arrested the next morning (1) . But C18 also took on its own. At a 1994 neo-Nazi event in Belgium, C18 members attacked Flemish nationalists for their support of Irish republicans. Browning attacked two high-level BNP members, Eddie Butler and Tony Lecomber. Butler was beaten and thrown into a manhole while Lecomber was slashed across the face (1) . At the same time, C18 strengthened their ties to loyalists in Northern Ireland. Members were caught trafficking small arms for paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) multiple times in the early 1990s (2) . In 1995, English football hooligans travelled to Dublin, Ireland for what was supposed to be a friendly football match between England and the Republic of Ireland. Following far-right and loyalist chants from English fans, the match descended into violence and had to be cancelled in the first half. A riot followed in which twenty people were injured and forty were arrested. Irish police were informed about the presence of twenty hooligans donning C18 memorabilia before the match, but did not act on the information (5) . Following the 1993 death of Ian Stuart Donaldson, the frontman of C18-affiliated neo-Nazi punk band Skrewdriver and Charlie Sargent’s former roommate, C18 took control of Blood and Honour, Donaldson’s music promotion company, and its affiliate record label, ISD Records. This created a significant source of income for the organization. In the span of two years, the label made 200,000 GBP (7) . Tensions within C18 grew as Sargent wanted to grow C18 into a mainstream far-right organization like the BNP instead of the clandestine terror group the rival faction, led by Browning, desired. Browning’s faction also disputed Sargent and his loyalists over profits from ISD Records, and Browning accused Sargent of being a police informant. Browning managed to take over C18’s leadership from Sargent in 1997. In retaliation, Sargent organized a plot to murder a messenger for Browning, 28-year-old Christopher Castle. Castle was stabbed in the back at Sargent’s home in Essex, England by former Skrewdriver guitarist Martin Cross while Browning waited outside in a car. Castle was killed and Sargent and Cross were convicted for his murder (7) . After consolidating his power, Browning made several trips to Scandinavian countries to connect with far-right leaders there and establish a C18 presence in the region. This was followed by a series of crimes by C18 affiliates, including a bank robbery and a car bombing (1) . Meanwhile, several splinter groups formed from C18 in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including the White Wolves, the Racial Volunteer Force, and the National Socialist Movement. Following Browning’s coup of C18 and Sargent’s imprisonment, Sargent’s loyalists flocked to the NSM. Two former C18 members, Eddie Stanton and David Myatt, headed the group. Myatt, an important ideological figure within the contemporary extreme-right, previously was alleged to have led the Order of Nine Angels, a neo-Nazi/satanic organization responsible for terrorism, human sacrifice, and sexual abuse (2) . In 1998, Myatt converted to Islam and was arrested during a crackdown by UK law enforcement agencies. Others arrested included Steve Sargent and two serving British soldiers, who were alleged to have trained other C18 members using their military expertise (7) . In 1999, neo-Nazi David Copeland sent out three nail bombs across London. These attacks targeted areas frequented by Black, Bangladeshi, and LGBTQ Londoners, respectively. The bombings killed three people and an unborn child while injuring 140. While the White Wolves claimed responsibility for the attacks before his arrest, Copeland was found to be an NSM member. He claimed he was inspired by The Turner Diaries and hoped his actions would trigger a race war. However, Browning wrote him off as mentally ill (1) . Charlie Sargent was released from prison in 2013. However, he quickly found himself incarcerated yet again the next year as he was found to have violated his parole by associating with several of his former C18 comrades, including Eddie Stanton, who posted a photo of the two online, and plotting to attack former political rivals. He got into a brawl outside an Essex pub along with several other C18 members, for which he was arrested and sent back to prison (8) . Throughout the 2010s, C18 cells continued terrorist attacks across the world. Three men that police claimed were members of C18 were arrested in Perth, Australia for shooting at a mosque in 2010. Nobody was killed (9) . In 2012, C18 members firebombed a building of Romani families in Czechia, and in 2018, Greek police arrested eleven C18 members in Athens, foiling an alleged bombing plot (3) (10) . In 2019, Walter Lübcke, a German politician, was murdered outside of his house by Stephan Ernst, an alleged C18 member. C18 was banned in Germany in 2020 due to Lübcke’s murder. The organization unsuccessfully challenged the ban in court (4) . Following the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand, the Canadian government also designated C18 along with Blood and Honour as terrorist groups in June 2019 in an effort to clamp down on far-right extremism (3) . The two groups had their assets frozen by the UK government in January 2025 (11) . Images of the 2018 arrest of 16 members of a C18 cell in Spain. Objectives & Ideology Combat 18’s ideology revolves around the existence of what it and other white supremacist groups call the Zionist Occupied Government, or ZOG. The ZOG is an antisemitic conspiracy theory claiming the existence of a Jewish cabal controlling countries worldwide. This means that instead of wanting to establish influence within existing governments and using the state to reach its goals, C18 plans to use terror attacks to topple governments and eliminate racial and political enemies. Some C18 members have said that extermination is their preferred solution to rid their hypothetical post-revolution ethnostate of enemies, while others have advocated for deportation (1) . C18 cemented its importance in the contemporary extreme-right movement by becoming a blueprint for today’s clandestine terror groups like The Base and the Atomwaffen Division, marking a split within the far-right from the populist white nationalism of groups like the BNP and the National Front. Many of C18’s core principles come from Harold Covington, who was greatly influenced by American white separatist movements of the 1970s and 80s. Covington was an advocate for the Northwestern Territorial Imperative, an idea popular with white separatist movements advocating for the creation of a white ethnostate in the Northwestern United States. When he came to the UK to set up C18, he brought these ideas with him and spread them internationally. Charlie Sargent also cited Robert Matthews, founder of The Order, as an influence (1) . The Order followed the instructions detailed in white supremacist novel The Turner Diaries to start a white supremacist revolution to overthrow the US government, starting with a series of bank robberies to fund its activities. The group also murdered Alan Berg, a Jewish radio show host. Another thing C18 took from The Order was the concept of leaderless resistance, where a network of autonomous cells act independent of one another to avoid infiltration (2) . Political & Military Capabilities In its early days, Combat 18 primarily recruited from white, working-class areas of London, Essex, and Northern England. At the time of the group’s founding, these areas had little economic opportunity for their young residents living in dilapidated council estates. This, combined with waves of migration that caused racial tension within low-income communities, created the perfect storm for white supremacist groups to build their ranks with the allure of brotherhood and violence. During the mid-1990s, C18 had some 200 core members in the UK. Their relatively small numbers were often backed up in street fights by football hooligans and skinheads, which the group recruited from. New members were often friends of existing members and the recruitment process was informal (2) . In the late 1990s and early 2000s, C18 started to expand abroad. By then, it already had strong connections with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. Will Browning cultivated relationships with white supremacist groups in Central and Northern Europe, where C18 established a presence and recruited members (1) . Meanwhile, the group began to use the internet to share its literature and propaganda even further, with cells popping up as far as Greece and Australia (10) (9) . Approach to Resistance Although a detailed plan for a white supremacist revolution lies at the core of the group’s ideology, many within Combat 18’s rank-and-file during its heyday in the 1990s were not as ideologically motivated as, say, Myatt or Covington. This was due to C18’s recruiting practices. Many got involved with the group for their shared penchant for violence and drinking, while their racist beliefs were secondary. Oftentimes, its leaders have not been its most violent members. Charlie Sargent, for instance, is known to have orchestrated many attacks but did not personally participate in them, for which Will Browning was critical of Sargent (1) . However, in the 2000s the group saw a shift from street fights to more coordinated attacks while many of the group’s top brass were imprisoned. C18 has effectively used its close links to far-right elements in various subcultures to bolster its ranks and spread its message of white supremacy. In the 1990s, it maintained a presence in the football hooligan, skinhead, and white power rock scenes of the UK where there were many likeminded individuals capable of violence. Meanwhile, C18 produced media for both ideological and practical reasons. While many of the bands affiliated with Blood and Honour and ISD records had far-right themes in their music, the group produced several magazines, including Redwatch, publishing the beliefs of its leaders and the personal information of potential targets. The group moved to far-right forums and websites in the early 2000s, allowing it to build relationships with white supremacists worldwide (1) . Relations & Alliances Combat 18’s relationship with the BNP has been a complicated one. While the two organizations split in 1993 and the BNP banned C18 members from its ranks, they maintained a working relationship. BNP leaders were known to meet and organize with C18, despite attacks on BNP members by the likes of Will Browning. Charlie Sargent saw the BNP as a failed movement that had lost touch with its base and become infiltrated by informants. He claimed that electoral politics is a futile venture for national socialists, as he believed the state to be corrupted by the ZOG (1) . Early on in its existence, C18 allied itself with loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. It had a particularly strong relationship with the Ulster Defence Association, but also had connections with the rival Ulster Volunteer Force. UDA members Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair, former leader of West Belfast’s infamous C Company, and Eddie Whicker of the UDA’s London branch are two prominent UDA members with ties to C18 (1) . While Charlie Sargent was not a football fan and found himself bored at the many matches he attended with other C18 members, he still saw the value in his hooligan firm allies. In particular, C18 has enjoyed support from the notorious Chelsea Headhunters. The Headhunters have long been a right-wing firm and both share the Nazi Totenkopf as a symbol. C18 has joined the Headhunters and other firms at football matches in exchange for their support in street demonstrations and fights (1) . Many of C18’s demonstrations have erupted into brawls with left-wing, antifascist groups such as Anti-Fascist Action, the Anti-Fascist League, the Anti-Nazi League, and the Anti-Racist Alliance. C18 has also targeted members of the groups in attacks and harassment campaigns, as well as journalists from left-wing publications such as Searchlight. Searchlight played a major role in exposing the group’s activities to the general public, which resulted in death threats from C18 (1) . Works Cited (1) Lowles, N. (2001). White Riot . Milo Books. (2) Ryan, N. (1998, February 1). Combat 18: Memoirs of a street-fighting man. The Guardian . https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/combat-18-memoirs-of-a-streetfighting-man-1142204.html . (3) Public Safety Canada (2019, June 21). Currently listed entities: Combat 18 . Government of Canada. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx#60 . (4) BBC (2020, January 23). Germany bans Combat 18 as police raid neo-Nazi group. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51219274 . (5) The Independent (1995, April 4). Irish police did not accept help. https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/irish-police-did-not-accept-help-1614349.html . (6) Lowles, N and Ryan, N. (1998, January 25). Neo-Nazi gang war fear after murder. The Independent . https://www.independent.co.uk/news/neonazi-gang-war-fear-after-murder-murder-1140723.html . (7) Syal, R. and Gilligan, A. (1999, March 7). MI5 swoops on Army 'neo-Nazis'. Sunday Telegraph . https://web.archive.org/web/20030312203105/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/htmlContent.jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F1999%2F03%2F07%2Fnarm07.html . (8) Lowles, N. (2014, November 27). Go directly to jail: Do not pass Go. Hope Not Hate . https://hopenothate.org.uk/2014/11/27/go-directly-jail-not-pass-go/ . (9) Robinson, C. (2010, June 4). Alleged Combat 18 members in court over mosque shooting. Perth Now . https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/wa/alleged-combat-18-members-in-court-over-mosque-shooting-ng-2013ddaf82b453f2e5bd055b6fc8f82c . (10) The Associated Press (2018, March 6). Greek anti-terrorism police arrest 5 in neo-Nazi crackdown. https://apnews.com/general-news-9858bf9a18cf4e68b002ad3bb37dbd98 . (11) Sanford, D. (2025, January 8). Far-right group Blood and Honour has assets frozen by government. BBC . https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cqjzj4zrppko .

Insurgency Overview The Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) is the armed wing of the Chin National Organization (CNO), a Chin ethnic armed organization. The Chin are an ethnolinguistically diverse demographic indigenous to the Chin State of western Myanmar. The CNDF was founded in 2021 as a response to the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Myanmar by the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, in February 2021. The main objective of the CNDF is armed resistance against Myanmar’s governing military junta through guerrilla tactics, similar to other active resistance groups operating within the Chin State and the country as a whole, and as a response to the junta’s overthrowing of the democratic government. History & Foundations Settlement in Chin State dates back to the 14th and 15th centuries, with different Chin chiefs leading, even when Britain arrived and indirectly ran the area. Once Britain granted independence to the whole nation, Chin State opted for a more democratic government. Civil unrest ended the state’s democratic rule in the 1960s. Protests began in the 1980s, resulting in countless deaths and imprisonments by the nation’s military. A ceasefire was later signed; however, stability has not returned to Chin State, and hunger, poverty, forced labor, and military conscription remain issues today. Past and current actions such as these by the Myanmar government have fueled grievances among the Chin people, leading to a resistance movement that continues today. The CNDF and CNO were both founded in April 2021. They mostly consist of the ethnic Chin people of Chin State, which is located in western Myanmar, bordering the Indian states of Manipur and Mizoram. These organizations are headquartered in Falam Township, part of the Falam District in the northern part of Chin State. The CNO manages various services within Chin State, such as its judiciary, financial, home and external affairs, health, and education departments. According to William Chin, a spokesman for the CNO, “The formation of the CNO and the CNDF mainly aims to build up a federal democracy-based union, ensure the autonomy of Chin nationals, and build up a sustainable and peaceful human society political space” (10) . Recruiting is handled at the local level, similar to other groups engaged in operations against the military junta, who came into power after overthrowing the democratically elected government, throwing the nation into further civil unrest. Recruits are trained similarly to other ethnic militias in Myanmar. Training camps, with areas for running drills, target shooting, and other obstacles are part of the process, and they even train snipers in separate courses. Foreign military personnel, such as a United States former service member, have also trained recruits (14) . Objectives & Ideology Both the CNDF and CNO oppose the junta government, combining armed resistance in the form of guerilla operations with political pressure from the general public through campaigns and protests. Increased presence also helps to drive up recruitment and involvement in both parts. Democracy on a federal level is also a key objective of the group, along with the defense of Chin State and its people (12) . They aim to secure stability and security for the population of Chin State and address social issues such as poverty, homelessness, and hunger, as Chin State is one of the poorest areas in Myanmar. Political & Military Abilities Most of the CNDF’s armaments consist of captured gear, such as those captured from military forces or law enforcement during raids or ambushes. This gives the CNDF similar combat capabilities to the junta forces. The CNDF, in combination with allies, reuses this gear against junta forces when successful raids are carried out against enemy outposts. Anti-junta resistance groups are mostly armed with small arms, light vehicles such as technicals or transport vehicles, and anti-vehicle/air weapons such as MANPADS (Man Portable Air-Defense System) or shoulder-fired anti-tank launchers, such as the Russian RPG-7. Other weapons include 40mm grenade launchers such as the American M79, and various captured fragmentation grenades (2, 19) . Possession of MANPADS is especially concerning for the junta air force, as these weapons give groups like the CNDF and its allies a way to counter airstrikes. Weapons commonly used by the CNDF include the MA pattern of rifles chambered in 5.56x45, like the MA-1 standard issue rifle or the MA-2 light machine gun, as these were produced locally. CNDF personnel have also used captured rifles in 7.62x51, such as the BA-72, a copy of the German G3, or the BA-63, a clone of the G3’s light machine gun variant. Small caliber marksman-style weapons are also among the weapons captured, as well as handguns such as the MA-5 Mk1 and Mk2, and older style revolvers, like the S&W Victory, or Webley pattern revolvers left behind by the British. Interestingly, there are some examples of crudely made or “homemade” firearms being put into use (16) . On top of using captured weapons, the CNDF and its allies also capture ammunition, uniforms, helmets, and similar personal equipment from deceased or captured junta fighters. Photos show other captured weapons such as hand grenades, anti-tank landmines, heavy machine guns like the 14.5mm KPV, mortars, captured artillery guns, and various other munitions (2) . Utilizing the terrain is a key component in the CNDF’s military tactics, taking advantage of thick jungle or urban environments. The junta has recently enacted stricter conscription laws, resulting in some recruits being poorly trained, armed, and lacking motivation (4) . This gives resistance groups like the CNDF an advantage when engaging with poorly trained enemy forces. Approach to Resistance The CNDF employs tactics similar to other resistance groups, such as ambush tactics, hit-and-run attacks, and other methods to counter, disrupt, and harass junta forces. Ambush attacks are very common, especially against junta supply and transport convoys, as we have seen. The bulk of CNDF military activities consist of ground operations, as they do not possess any aerial support or aquatic vessels to counter those of the junta government. The resistance campaign has resulted in over half of Chin State coming under Chin State resistance control (18) . This has compounded the increasing unpopularity of the junta as well as the increased unity of the Chin people. The CNO also manages local affairs, similar to a local government or legislative figure. Relations & Alliances The CNDF and CNO wish to cooperate with the National Unity Government (NUG), an entity formed in part by the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) and other local political and armed forces based out of Chin State (10) . The CNDF often partners and collaborates with other ethnic Chin groups such as the Chin Defense Force (CDF), Chin National Front (CNF), and People’s Defense Force (PDF), which also conduct operations against junta forces (3, 6) . The CNO and CNDF are a part of the Chin Brotherhood, an alliance formed in December 2023 as a means of increasing interoperability between local Chin ethnic armed organizations and as a response to the Chinland Council, which was viewed as ineffective and not representative of the goals of unity and cooperation shared by various actors operating in Chin State (20) . Works Cited (1) Lwin, Saw (4.3.2024) Myanmar Junta’s Free Rein in Mindat Ends as Chin Defense Force Resume’s Battle, Myanmar, The Irrawaddy https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-juntas-free-rein-in-mindat-ends-as-chin-defense-force-resumes-battle.html . (2) CMO/CNDF’s Official Telegram Channel https://t.me/cnocndf . (3) Unknown, (12.23.2024) Approximately 170 Myanmar Junta personnel surrender during battle for Midat and Falam, Myanmar, Mizzima News https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/12/23/17617 . (4) Unknown, (6.7.2024) Forced recruitment pushes young people into ranks of the resistance, Vatican City, Agenzia Fides, https://www.fides.org/en/news/75075-ASIA_MYANMAR_Forced_recruitment_pushes_young_people_into_the_ranks_of_the_resistance . (5) Hein, Ye Myo ( 11.3.2022) Understanding People’s Defense Force in Myanmar, Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace (USIP) https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/understanding-peoples-defense-forces-myanmar . (6) The Irrawaddy, (4.11.2023) Two Dozen Myanmar Junta Troops Killed in Chin State Camp Raid Myanmar, The Irrawaddy, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/two-dozen-myanmar-junta-troops-killed-in-chin-state-camp-raid.html . (7) MyanmarNow, (7.26.2021) Around 800 Falam villagers flee as junta troops go on rampage, MyanmarNow, Myanmar https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/around-800-falam-villagers-flee-as-junta-troops-go-on-rampage/ . (8) MyanmarNow (10.19.2021) Chin resistance fighters destroy half a military convoy amid buildup of junta forces MyanmarNow, Myanmar, https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/chin-resistance-fighters-destroy-half-a-military-convoy-amid-buildup-of-junta-forces/ . (9) Kim, Ngo Zam (6.12.2024) 5 members of the Chin Nying Naung troops were killed during the Battle of Titin, Mizzima News, Myanmar https://bur.mizzima.com/2024/06/12/24427 . (10) Benezer, Salai (4.23.2021) Chin people form CNO, CNDF, Burma News International, Myanmar https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/chin-people-form-cno-cndf . (11) Editor of Khonumthung Media Group (4.19.2023) CNDF Capture Burma army military camp near Falam Town, Khonumthung Media Group, Mizoram, India https://khonumthung.org/english/cndf-capture-burma-army-military-camp-near-falam-town/ . (12) Official website of the CNO/CNDF, Chin State, Myanmar https://cnocndf.org/about . (13) UNICEF Website, New York https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/chin-state . (14) Mizzma (12.21.2022) Chin National Defense Force being trained by U.S. armed forces veteran, Mizzima News, Myanmar https://mizzima.com/article/chin-national-defence-force-being-trained-us-armed-forces-veteran#:~:text=The%20VAKOK%20Battalion%20of%20the%20Chin%20National,they%20are%20having%20to%20train%20with%20a . (15) Zofa Journal (3.26.2024) CNDF Chuan Pasaltha Training Na A buat saih March 26th, 2023, Zofa Journal, Kalemyo, Sagaing, Myanmar. https://www.facebook.com/100094742018321/videos/cndf-chuan-pasaltha-training-na-a-buat-saihmarch-26th2023-zofa-journalchinland-r/705611041649215/ . (16) Aung, Nora (5.31.2022) Myanmar Resistance groups get creative to manufacture weapons, The Irrawaddy, Myanmar https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-resistance-groups-get-creative-to-manufacture-weapons.html . (17) MyanmarNow (7.13.2022) Fighting breaks out on border separating Chin State and Sagaing Reigon, MyanmarNow, Myanmar https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/fighting-breaks-out-on-border-separating-chin-state-and-sagaing-region/ . (18) Ourwarstoday2 (1.27.2025) Chin State on the brink, Ourwarstoday2, United States https://www.instagram.com/p/DFUx9tGOWWK/?igsh=MW5pYXYxZXNsODJ3OQ== . (19) Afa, Azad (7.15.2024) CNDF Sniper Training, Azad_Afa, Myanmar https://www.instagram.com/p/C9b99qpShh2/?img_index=2&igsh=eXJ6M29haHI4ZDFy . (20) Burma News International (BMI) (1.2.2024) Chin Brotherhood Alliance emerges as three organizations skip Chinland council conference, pledging enhanced political and military cooperation, BMI, Myanmar. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/chin-brotherhood-alliance-emerges-three-organizations-skip-chinland-council-conference-pledging .

Overview Quwwāt al-Ḥashd ash-Shaʿbī  ( قوات الحشد الشعبي ), also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), is a paramilitary umbrella organization in Iraq that was officially established in 2014 as a consequence of the collapse of the official Iraqi army (Rudolf, 2020) to combat the ISIS insurgency that was sweeping the country (El-Dessouki, 2017). Within the PMF, several militias operate based on sectarian, religious, and political affiliations. Despite the defeat of the parastatal form of the Islamic State in Iraq in 2018, the PMF remains largely active in the country, contributing to tensions and security issues within Iraqi society. The PMF is not a unitary phenomenon; rather, it fully reflects the hybrid nature of Iraqi reality. The binary opposition between concepts such as state and non-state, formal and informal, and national and transnational fails to effectively capture the complexities of security and political issues within Iraqi society. (Haddad, 2020). History and Foundation Besides most observers recalling the organization’s origin to the Daesh counter-insurgency period, PMF emerged significantly earlier, during the second term office of Prime Minister Maliki (2006-2010 and 2010-2014), whose legitimacy is highly debated (Haddad, 2020). In 2010, Maliki’s National Coalition, the Shi’ite  coalition supported by the U.S. and backed by Iran, managed to secure the electoral victory. The country knew a vigorous shift toward authoritarianism and centralization that led in late 2012 to mass protests in the Sunni governorates. In this context of sectarian tensions and instability, Maliki pushed for the formation of paramilitary irregular forces tied to himself, following Saddam Hussein’s Fedayeen examples (Haddad, 2020).  When in June of 2014 most of international coalitions were failing to counter the Islamic State insurrection in the Levant, the major Shi’ite  religious leader of Iraq, the Grand Ayatollah and marja’ Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa,  an Islamic legal ruling, to contrast ISIS (El-Dessouki, 2017). As a response to this fatwa , called “The collective duty of Jihad”, the PMF was formally recognized (Al-Jbour, 2021). According to al-Sistani’s call to action, all Iraqi citizens able to fight should take up arms and face ISIS’ threat. Even if the PMF predates Sistani’s edict, today’s PMF is a direct product of the fatwa , which provided social, political, and religious legitimization to a pre-existing organization that used this political capital for further institutionalization. Sistani triggered a chain reaction that made the PMF mainstream and expanded the hybridity of the Iraqi state (Haddad, 2020).  At the time, the Islamic State had taken over Mosul, the second-largest city in Iraq, and was committing a wide range of war crimes, including sectarian mass killings and bombings of Shi’ite  religious sites. Furthermore, the fatwa  did not allow the creation of autonomous armed groups; all volunteers had to be organized and incorporated within the legal framework of Iraq's official army and security forces. The groups under the PMF umbrella successfully coordinated with the Iraqi army and Kurdish Peshmerga to halt ISIS’s offensive toward Baghdad and to confront the Daesh threat in the Diyala, Babil, and Salah al-Din provinces (El-Dessouki, 2017). With the liberation of ISIS-controlled areas in 2017, the PMF received material and political support from government branches. Iranian-backed PMF factions used this new legitimization to pursue their aims, such as supporting the establishment of the new Tehran-Beirut corridor. After Daesh's defeat, many volunteers laid down their arms and returned home, as the purpose of the fatwa seemed fulfilled. Nonetheless, some of them remained active. Over the years, the PMF has undergone several attempts at reform and reorganization of its status within the Iraqi state, emerging during times when authorities were weak and unable to manage the country’s security and military issues (El-Dessouki, 2017).  On the 2nd of January 2022, following U.S. President Donald Trump’s authorisation, an airstrike targeted the convoy of Iranian Quds Forces Major General Qasem Soleimani near Bagdad airport. The assassination of Soleimani had as a collateral of beneficial damage the death of one of the highest-ranking security officials of Iraq, the Chief of Staff of PMF Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Rudolf, 2020). Since October 2023, following Hamas’s attack in southern Israel, a new group called the Islamic Resistance of Iraq has emerged from Telegram communications and propaganda. This umbrella group includes various prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militias that were already part of the PMF, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah , Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba , Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada , and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya  (Malik & Knights, 2024). These groups focus on both national and transnational rocket and missile attacks, targeting Israel and U.S. facilities in Iraq and Syria (Menmy, 2023). Objectives and Ideology The PMF has become a hybrid entity within a hybrid state context, existing and operating in undefined areas with blurred boundaries. The organization is neither fully autonomous nor completely integrated into existing institutions, nor is it part of the Iraqi armed forces or an Iranian proxy. It’s important to consider the main ideological and organizational divisions within the so-called PMF (Haddad, 2020). Most PMF factions and key leaders are officially and ideologically connected to the Islamic Republic of Iran, promoting its role as the defender of Shi’ite  Islamic identity and its pan-Shiism. Many Shi’ite  factions incorporated within the PMF have declared their loyalty to Iranian religious and political authority in a bid to establish a Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iraq (El-Dessouki, 2017). The PMF faces two potential models: the Lebanese Hezbollah model, which entails controlling Iraqi institutions without destroying them, or the IRGC model, its source of inspiration and dominant military institution with crucial political, economic, and cultural influence in Iran and in the region (El-Dessouki, 2017). Military and Political Abilities PMF includes large, medium, and small-scale armed groups, some already active before the organization’s official foundation. Considering both operatives and logistical staff, the organizations count approximately 164 thousand members. At the time of ISIS’ defeat in 2018, the members were divided into 67 Shi’ite  factions, 43 Sunni factions, and nine factions representing the several different ethnic groups in Iraq, like Turkmens, Kurds, Christian Babylon, Yazidi, and Shabak (Chamoun, 2020). In 2020, Iranian-aligned factions occupied 80% of organizational and administrative leadership positions, excluding Sunni and minority factions from the entireness of high or middle-level roles within the administrative structure of PMF (Al-Jbour, 2021). More powerful actors and factions correspond to the political elite, and they play a key role in electoral competition and the economy. (Haddad, 2020).  Moreover, Shi’ite  militias are the better-motived and organized ones, equipped and trained with armored vehicles, IEDs, RPGs, rockets, missiles, and Abrams tanks (El-Dessouki, 2017). Besides that, internal jurisprudential orientations are present among the over 110 thousand Shi’ite  members. The 67 factions are divided into 44 following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 17 following Iraqi marja’ Ali al-Sistani, and six other factions following another Shi’ite   marja’ (Al-Jbour, 2021). Looking at the 2019 Budget of Iraq, it’s possible to notice that over 128 thousand employers work among PMF’s lines, and this workforce is founded with 2.17 billion dollars (Al-Jbour, 2021). Approach To Struggle Considering PMF's non-monolithic nature, it is fundamental to consider the organization's internal divisions, both ideologically and organizationally. These differences fuel competition among factions and shape different aims and related approaches. PMF factions often act as a “Pretorian guard” of their reference political elite (Haddad, 2020) and pursue their strategic goals with different levels of autonomy. The Iranian-aligned factions, also known as fasa’il  or “resistance factions”, pursue Iran's regional interests in Iraq and are loyal to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Most of these groups, except for the Badr  Organization, which has been active since the 1980s (El-Dessouki, 2017), were established between 2003 and 2014 and primarily targeted U.S. forces (Haddad, 2020).  Fasa’il  are responsible for the deaths of at least 603 U.S. troops in Iraq (Rudolf, 2020) and have faced repeated accusations of criminal behavior and human rights violations. The more prominent groups among the fasa’il include Kata’ib Hezbollah , the Badr  Organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq , Kata’ib al-Imam Ali , Kata’ib Jund al-Imam , and Kata’ib Sayyid   al-Shuhada  (Haddad 2020). Fasa’il  factions are indeed the most relevant and powerful actors within PMF. Armed militias linked to PMF, like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq  and Kata’ib Hezbollah , are often accused of persecuting civil activists, journalists, and media figures. On July 6th, 2020, in the Zayouna district of Bagdad, the academic researcher Hisham al-Hashimi was executed by a masked individual in front of his house. Hashimi was a well-respected academic figure and security expert on both Sunni and Shi’ite  groups, including Iran-backed organizations within Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon (Menmy, 2024). Later, a former officer in the Iraqi interior minister, reportedly connected to Kata’ib Hezbollah , confessed to the murder (Menmy, 2024). On the other hand, a second category called “State hashd ” has considerably fewer ideological aims because these factions have been created to protect Iraqi sovereignty and face Islamic State insurgency. They are better integrated within the Iraqi State structure compared to fasi’il , who are often precepted as opponents (Haddad, 2020). Lastly, the genocidal action of IS against minorities pushed various religious and ethnic communities, like Yazidis and Christians, to create self-defense auxiliaries, also called “Minority hashd ”, tied to PMF (Haddad, 2020). International Relations and Potential Alliances Shi’ite  factions serve the important role of advancing Iranian foreign interests in the region, specifically building and protecting a corridor able to directly connect Iran and the Levant to arm proxies like Hezbollah ( Mansour & Jabar, 2017 ). The Iranian-aligned factions within PMF claim to be the representative of the “Axis of the Resistance” in Iraq, which is historically and precariously forced into a balance between the United States and Iran (Haddad, 2020). The Islamic Republic of Iran and its IRGC have been directly involved in the Iraqi scenario since the Iran-Iraq War, when the Pâsdârân  established the Badr Organization and other prominent proxies that later will retag in PMF, with the primary goal of overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s Regime (El-Dessouki, 2017). During the Daesh  offensive, PMF militias were mainly coordinated from Teheran, and Soleimani itself covered a leading role during 2015’s Tikrit counter-offensive (El-Dessouki, 2017). Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the chief of staff of PMF killed by the U.S. in 2020, openly admitted to receiving funding and training from IRGC’s Quds Forces and Hezbollah, providing explosive experts and even support airstrikes (El-Dessouki, 2017). In 2024, after the beheading of Hezbollah’s leadership, the killing of Hassan Nasrallah, and the dismantling of part of the missile and rocket stockpile by Israel, Iran lost its jewel crown in the Levant.  Alternatively to The Party of God, Iran could shift its focus on the Iraqi Hashd and use PMF’s Shi’ite militias as a partial strategic replacement for Hezbollah (Salem, 2024). After 2011, Teheran and Iraqi PM Maliki agreed on using PMF factions such as Asaib al-Haq  and Kata'ib Hezbollah  (Al-Salhy, 2013), directly participating in the Syrian Civil War backing the Ba’athist government of Bashar al-Assad (Mansour & Jabar, 2017 ). Despite this intervention, PMF did not intervene to defend its Syrian ally during the HTS December offensive, which rapidly brought about the collapse of the Assad regime. According to Iranian sources, both Teheran and Bagdad were ready to deploy Iraqi militias, but a lack of adequate air support and the threat of U.S. and Israeli retaliation airstrikes prevented these forces from crossing into Syria (Malik, 2025). Ac ademic Bibliography (APA) 1.     Al-Jbour, A. (2021). The Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq: Regional Dynamics and Local Variables.  Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://www.academia.edu/48814325/The_Popular_Mobilization_Forces_in_Iraq_Regional_Dynamics_and_Local_Variables   2.     Chamoun, M. (2020).  The PMF As An Insurgency? & The Case For a Counterinsurgency Approach to the Popular Mobilization Forces . https://www.academia.edu/43462240/The_PMF_As_an_Insurgency_and_The_Case_For_A_Counterinsurgency_Approach_to_the_Popular_Mobilization_Forces   3.     El-Dessouki, A. (2017). The internal and external roles of Iraqi popular mobilization forces.  African Journal of Political Science and International Relations. https://www.academia.edu/85040027/The_internal_and_external_roles_of_Iraqi_popular_mobilization_forces 4.     Haddad, F. (2020). Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units: A Hybrid Actor in a Hybrid  State. Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Peace: How Militias and Paramilitary Groups Shape Post-Conflict Transitions. https://www.academia.edu/42930481/Iraq_s_Popular_Mobilization_Units_A_Hybrid_Actor_in_a_Hybrid_State 5.     Rudolf, I. (2020). The Future of the Popular Mobilization Forces after the Assassination of Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis.  Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). https://www.academia.edu/43994644/The_Future_of_the_Popular_Mobilization_Forces_after_the_Assassination_of_Abu_Mahdi_Al_Muhandis 7.2. Online Bibliography (APA) 1.     Al-Salhy, S. (2013, April 10). Iraqi Shi’ite Militants Start To Acknowledge Role In Syria.  Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/iraqi-shiite-militants-start-to-acknowledge-role-in-syria-idUSBRE9390OF/ 2.     Mansour, R. & Jabar, F.A. (2017, April 28). The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future.  Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2017/04/the-popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraqs-future?lang=en¢er=middle-east 3.     Menmy, D.T. (2023, November 8). Who is the Islamic Resistance in Iraq?  The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/news/who-islamic-resistance-iraq 4.     Menmy, D.T. (2024, January 2). Iraq Annuls Conviction of Killer of Prominent Researcher.  The New Arab. https://www.newarab.com/news/iraq-annuls-conviction-killer-prominent-researcher   5.     Salem, P. (2024, January 7).  The Middle East’s changing strategic landscape . Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/middle-easts-changing-strategic-landscape    6.     Malik, H. & Knights, M. (2024, June 20). Profile: The Islamic Resistance of Iraq.  The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/profile-islamic-resistance-iraq 7.     Malik, H. (2025, January 21). PMF Non-Deployment to Save Assad: Sudani’s View Contradicted by Iran . The Washington Institute. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/pmf-non-deployment-save-assad-sudanis-view-contradicted-iran

The Storm-Z insignia. Storm-V unit insignia replace the Z with a V but are otherwise identical. Overview In the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the mounting manpower needs of the war effort led the Russian military complex to look everywhere for men who could be easily swayed into joining the war. Russian prisons became the most fertile grounds to recruit men willing to do anything to escape their imprisonment. The “Shtorm” series of penal units is the result of this recruitment drive. Shtorm units continue to operate despite some reforms to this day. History & Foundations Throughout modern military history, penal battalions have been formed by various military forces to resolve manpower shortages whenever the war effort demanded more men than could be recruited by ordinary means. Penal units were sometimes formed by undisciplined and insubordinate regular soldiers who had been punished by military law, but at various points they could also be supplemented with civilian inmates, from petty criminals to murderers and sex offenders. The Soviet Union established such units during World War II, with hundreds of thousands serving (and dying) in these units until the final defeat of the Third Reich. After the war’s end, these units were disbanded, and no trace remained of them in the Soviet military tradition. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military establishment came under intense pressure to provide the manpower necessary for a conventional war fought against a regular army; the decision not to implement the mass mobilization of Russian society further exacerbated the needs of the armed forces. The first actor to intercept this need for manpower was PMC Wagner, the now infamous mercenary group that played a key role in the second year of the conflict. Starting in July 2022, PMC Wagner was given free rein in recruiting from Russian prisons, and it was thus able to bolster its presence in Ukrainian battlefields with cheap and disposable manpower. One year later, it was estimated that almost 50,000 former convicts had served in Ukraine (1) . The most significant factor driving penal enlistment was the promise that a six-month tour in Ukraine would qualify one for a full presidential pardon (2) . After the Wagner Group managed to deliver several major operational victories (including the capture of Bakhmut), notwithstanding the heavy casualty rate, penal recruitment was considered a successful experiment, and the Russian government founded the Shtorm-Z detachments. The exact date of founding is unknown, but these detachments were deployed in Ukraine by April 2023, when their existence became known (3) . Throughout 2023, Storm-Z detachments were deployed wherever needed, often to plug the gaps in Russian battle lines (4) . Storm Gladiator, a unit created under the Storm-Z program, was noted for its effectiveness during the operations that were carried out on the Ukrainian front in late 2023 (5) . Due to the high rate of casualties, the unit was reportedly disbanded in early 2024, with its surviving members reassigned to other Storm-Z units, possibly in the capacity of petty officers and trainers (6) . In June 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a new law implementing the creation of Storm-V detachments, which remain units staffed primarily by convicts (7) . According to the new provisions, Storm-V soldiers are treated as contract soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces and receive full pay, but they no longer receive full pardons for their crimes and instead can only hope to be paroled (8) . Storm-V units have seen action in the 2023–24 Battle of Avdeevka and have been deployed in the ongoing Battle of Chasiv Yar (9) . Ideology & Objectives Russian penal units are part of the war effort of the Russian state, and as such, they theoretically contribute to the objectives set by the Russian military as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War. As penal units are staffed mostly by convicts, it is difficult to establish exactly to what extent ideology or genuine support for the so-called Special Military Operation plays a role. Available open-source information contributes to a mixed picture of these units: footage shows hopeless soldiers in despair when faced with the abysmal conditions of the battlefield (10) , while other sources depict individuals willing to do anything to restore their social standing and escape Russian prisons. For example, Storm Gladiator’s chief of staff was reportedly identified as a former FSB officer who was imprisoned in 2019 on charges of extortion and bribery (11) . Additionally, regular Russian soldiers can also be sent to Storm-Z/V detachments as a punishment for drunkenness, insubordination, or other breaches of the military code (12) . Political & Military Abilities Storm-Z/V detachments are formed from Russian convicts who are desperate to escape their detention. As such, these penal soldiers often lack the motivation and the morale to hold their own on the battlefield, and many surrender whenever given the chance (13) . Further compounding their tactical inferiority when compared to regular military units is the limited training they receive, reportedly between just 10 to 15 days (14) . While Russia is a country that retains a conscription-based model of military recruitment, and therefore it is likely that many penal recruits have had at least some prior experience in the military, years may have passed since they last served, and such little training highlights the disregard for the individuals who join Storm-Z/V units. Storm-Z/V detachments are equipped as light infantry with few or no motor vehicles available to them, and are mostly employed as small fireteams in highly saturated urban environments (15) . Works Cited (1) - Camut, N. Over 20,000 Wagner troops killed, 40,000 wounded in Ukraine: Prigozhin-linked channel. In: Politico.eu , 20.07.2023. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ukraine-war-over-20000-wagner-troops-were-killed-prigozhin/ (2) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/ (3) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. In: TRADOC G2, 12/15/2023. Available at: https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2023/12/15/tradoc-russian-assault-groups-evolution-in-ukraine/ (4) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. In: ISW, 06/04/2023. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2023 (5) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. In : Radio Free Europe /RL, 05.02.2024. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-recruited-convicts-fierce-assault-units-storm-gladiator-/32806371.html (6) - Ibidem. (7) - Ibidem. (8) - Fokht, E. et al. “If you sign up now, get ready to die, mate.” Life on the Ukrainian front for Moscow’s new ‘Storm V’ convict soldiers. In: BBC News Russian, 28.01.2024. Available at: https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/new-deal-russian-convicts-fighting-in-ukraine (9) - Fornusek, M. Ukraine reports heavy battles in Bakhmut direction as Russia pulls in reserves. In: The Kyiv Independent, 27.04.2024. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-reports-heavy-battles-in-bakhmut-direction-as-russia-pulls-in-reserves/ (10) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit. (11) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. Cit. (12) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/   (13) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit. (14) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. Cit. (15) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit.