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Insurgency Overview Guardians of the Dawn was a conglomerate of Pro-Assad, Syrian Nationalist, Christian militias which banded together under one title in 2015. The main objective at the time was the defense of Christian villages and its inhabitants from rebel forces, and to aid the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and being incorporated in the Syrian Air Force Intelligence Directorate. (1, 5) The various militia groups under Guardians of the Dawn had been fighting since the start of the civil war in 2012 against anti-Assad rebels which harassed Christian areas of Syria. Each group within Guardians of the Dawn operates in different areas, such as Homs, Damascus, and areas near Saidnaya (1). Past 2018, their movements and current standing are unknown, but it is possible they fled the nation after the 2024 fall of the Assad regime, joined into other units, or disbanded otherwise. History and Foundations Pro-Assad Christian militias formed and began fighting in 2012 when opposition rebel groups began kidnapping and holding victims for ransom, attacking Christian churches, religious sites, and Christian-majority towns, such as Saidnaya, north of Damascus. (2,6) According to the group's founder, Fadi Abd al-Massih Khouri in a blog post, the group was founded in 2015 on September 11th, and began operations the next day, providing aid to those who were under attack within the local area. (1) Recruiting for the group was mostly done online, especially over Facebook, or possibly locally. The name “Guardians of the Dawn” reportedly popped up around March 2016 online for the first time. (1) Objectives and Ideology The Group’s mandate consists of defending the Christians of Syria from attacks, as well as villages/towns, and religious sites, from anti-Assad rebels or other attacking forces. Besides being Christians, they are also described as a Syrian Nationalist militia, with their motto reportedly being “A homeland that we do not protect is one we do not deserve to live in,” with Usud al-Cherbum calling themselves “ mujahideen of the cross.” (1) A Facebook post in 2016 by Junud al-Massih, a Christian Pro-Assad group, posted a photo with caption: “Syria is beautiful in its Assad. At your service in soul and blood, my lord President Bashar al-Assad. We begin with 5 groups on the ground and today we have become more than 15 armed Syrian Christian factions.” (1,4) Political and Military Capabilities Military abilities mostly consist of anti-rebel operations, and the employment of small unit tactics in offensive and defensive capacities. There are photographs of members using at least one tank, along with many light, unarmored vehicles notably pickup trucks for transport and some possibly having weapons such as heavy machine guns . (5) Political abilities are limited, with leader Fadi Abd al-Massih Khori running as a parliamentary candidate in the April 2016 elections, but did not succeed. There are no reports suggesting they are involved with local or nationwide politics. (1, 5) They are mostly armed similar to how other groups are, with small arms and shoulder fired munitions, along with some vehicles ( breakdown below). Approaches to Resistance Guardians of the Dawn’s main approach works as a security force of sorts; when called upon they will defend territory or people from attacks. Christian regions and neighborhoods of Syria are their main concern, and where most of their focus remains, especially areas under government control. Almost all of their equipment consists of small arms, such as AK type 3s, AKM, AKMS, AK-74, Chinese type 56 and 56-2, RPG-7s, with fighters commonly equipped with web gear or vests, both carrying pouches for ammo and supplies.They also appear to have one tank in their ranks, what looks to be a T-62 either captured from adversarial forces or given by the government. (1,4,5) They do not necessarily act as one cohesive force with one headquarters, but rather as separate groups under one cause or banner. They seem to have operated in a loose, cell like structure similar to other groups of their magnitude. They are made up of many different groups under one banner. (1) International Relations and Alliances Guardians of the Dawn aligned themselves notably with the government’s air intelligence directorate and other pro government militias. In return, the government would arm the group with weapons and intelligence to combat the rebel, likely small arms and other supplies to carry out operations with. (3) Guardians of the Dawn is reported to be made up of the following groups upon its inception, among others: -Ararat Group -Usud al-Wadi -Usud al-Hamidiya -Intervention Regiment- militia for group’s founder, Fadi Abd al-Massih Khouri -Usud Dwel’a -Usud al-Cherubim- one of the more active and documented militias (1) Apart from the Air Force Directorate, the Guardians of the Dawn has also aided the Syrian Arab Army in some operations, including a 2015 when Usud al-Cherubim helped to secure hills around the Christian locality surrounding Maarouneh, nearby Damascus. Reports also claim they took part in the Hama offensives in 2016, 2017, and 2018. Although not officially part of the SAA or the regime, they acted as more as an auxiliary force. (1) On the other hand, they oppose rebel factions such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and other groups like Islamic State (IS) among others. Their operations against said groups consisted of offensive operations, such as those in Hama in the mid to late 2010s. (5,6) Bibliography Aymenn Al-Tamimi (12.14.2016) Usud Al-Cherubim: A Pro-Assad Chritstian Militia, Syria Comment, University of Oklahoma Center for Middle East Studies, United States https://joshualandis.com/blog/usud-al-cherubim-pro-assad-christian-militia/ Starr, Stephen (07.09.2014) Christian militias lend muscle to Syrian regime in ongoing battle against rebels, The Irish Times, Ireland https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/christian-militias-lend-muscle-to-syrian-regime-in-ongoing-battle-against-rebels-1.1859569 Enabbaladi.net (03.27.2017) Three raids without control over Qamhana…who is guarding it?, Enabbaladi.net, Syria https://www.enabbaladi.net/139313/ Aymenn Al-Tamimi (02.19.2016) Liwa Usud al-Hussein: A new Pro-Assad Militia in Latakia, Syria Comment, University of Oklahoma Center for Middle East Studies, United States https://joshualandis.com/blog/liwa-usud-al-hussein-a-new-militia-in-latakia/ Andresen,Pascal (11.04.2017) In this sign will they conquer? Christian militias in the Syrian conflict, bell?ngcat, Netherlands https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/11/04/sign-will-conquer-christian-militias-syrian-conflict/ Istar Broadcasting Corporation (02.28.2015) Christians in Syria form militia to fight Islamic State, Istar Broadcasting Corporation, Iraq https://www.ishtartv.com/en/viewarticle,37070.html

Insurgency Overview Babbar Khalsa (BK), or Babbar Khalsa International, is a Sikh separatist armed organisation with members in India, Europe, and North America. The group was formed in 1978 by Sukhdev Sing Babbar in India with the goal of establishing an independent Sikh state, known as Khalistan, in the Punjab region of India. It was inspired by Sikh militant groups of the early 20th century and was formed following sectarian clashes in Punjab in the 1970s. The group is alleged to have been supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), the country’s foreign intelligence agency (1). BK has been responsible for many high-profile assassinations and bombing attacks, most notably the Air India Flight 182 bombing in 1985 in which 329 people were killed (2). Common targets of the group’s attacks are Indian politicians and law enforcement agents. The group is a major militant faction within the larger Sikh nationalist movement known as the Khalistan movement and has a presence in several countries with a significant Sikh diaspora, from which it receives much of its support. For this reason, BK has been designated as a terrorist organisation and sanctioned by the European Union, Canada, the United States, and others. It is still an active militant group; however, its activities have been heavily hampered by law enforcement crackdowns in India and abroad (3). History & Foundations In 1849, the Sikh Empire, encompassing the modern-day Punjab region, was defeated by the British and absorbed into the British Empire. The early Sikh nationalist movement, now referred to as the Khalistan movement, coincided with the Indian independence movement in the early 20th century, which resulted in India and Pakistan’s independence and partition in 1947 (3). One of these early groups was the Babbar Akali movement, which Babbar Khalsa later took inspiration from (1). Another major factor in the rising Sikh national consciousness was the Green Revolution in the 1960s. During this period, the benefits of improvements in agricultural technology across India were not seen in Punjab, which led to economic stagnation and wealth inequality (3). As the Sikh diaspora established itself abroad, pro-Khalistan organizations popped up in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States along with India. Post-independence Sikh emigration was driven by religious persecution and pogroms. However, they failed to gain much traction and Sikh political parties, such as Akali Dal, were unsuccessful in seceding from India (3). One of these Sikh immigrants was Talwinder Singh Parmar, who moved to Canada in 1970. He would go on to become a Canadian citizen and help form Babbar Khalsa (2). Babbar Khalsa was formed in 1978 following the eruption of tensions between Sikhs. Tensions had been growing between mainstream Sikhs and the Sant Nirankaris, a heterodox Sikh sect, since the 1950s. During this time, the Nirankaris grew in numbers and began practices deemed iconoclastic by many Sikhs, such as when the movement’s leader, Gurbachan Singh, declared himself to be the reincarnation of a guru, the central spiritual figures within Sikhism, while disparaging the religion’s central text (4). Sikhs also claimed that the Nirankaris were being supported by the Indian government in order to cause internal division and hamper the Sikh nationalist movement. At the time, the government was predominantly Hindu and anti-Sikh beliefs were prevalent. These sectarian attitudes were also held by some of the Hindu civilian population, who supported the Nirankaris as well (5). On April 13, 1978, Gurbachan Singh held a gathering of over 50,000 of his followers in Amritsar, a major city in Punjab. 200 Sikhs led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a major Sikh political figure, protested this congregation. After their leader confronted Singh and was shot by his bodyguard, the tensions erupted into violence. While it is disputed who attacked first, both groups were armed and 16 people were killed; 13 Sikhs and three Nirankaris, some unarmed. The local police were present, but traditional Sikh critics claim they were acting on behalf of the Nirankaris. This paved the way for further sectarian violence in Punjab, especially when the Nirankaris put on trial for the 13 Sikh deaths were acquitted. The deceased were seen as martyrs and nationalist attitudes rose in popularity amongst Sikhs. Bhindranwale cemented his place within the Sikh nationalist political sphere and the clashes laid the foundations for the following insurgency in Punjab (4). In the cloud of this political upheaval, Babbar Khalsa was formed. Sukhdev Singh Dasuwal and Talwinder Singh Parmar, the founders of BK, wanted revenge for the Sikhs killed in the clashes, and in their eyes, radical means were justified to make up for the senseless killing (6). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, BK targeted Nirankaris and their sympathizers in Punjab. Sectarian violence, not an independent Khalistan, was the group’s primary motivation in its early years (6). Several prominent Nirankari leaders were assassinated, as well as political and law enforcement officials who opposed BK. However, some of the group’s victims were ordinary Narinkaris with no official positions, such as was the case in a May 1982 incident when four were killed after BK gunmen opened fire indiscriminately at a group of Narinkaris (7). This coincided with the beginning of the larger Punjab Insurgency, which BK participated in. Spearheaded by Bhindranwale, the Khalistan movement’s most popular figure at the time, the early years of the insurgency were characterized by mass protests by Sikhs that were often violently broken up by Indian police. In many cases, protesters were beaten, arrested, tortured, and killed. This led to increasingly hostile attitudes amongst Sikhs toward the authorities and the belief that a more militant approach was necessary (3). In 1981, the group expanded abroad and subsequently split into two factions, with Sukhdev Singh Babbar leading BK domestically in India, and Tainder Singh Parmar in Canada, the United States, and Europe. The split occurred after Babbar, the group’s official leader, demanded no criminal activity occur outside of India. Parmar, however, resided in Canada, where he continued to recruit, procure funds and weapons, and command terrorist activity (8). Bhindranwale took up residence in the Golden Temple complex, Sikhism’s holiest site, in 1982. He led the Khalistan movement from the temple in Amritsar and occupied it with armed militant followers. BK had also been using the temple as a refuge since the 1970s. Following increased tensions and failed negotiations between Sikh leaders and Indian government officials, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi launched Operation Blue Star on June 1, 1984. The goal of the operation was to remove Bhindranwale and clear militants from the fortified complex. BK militants fought with Bhindranwale’s forces against the Indian military and police. The operation was heavy-handed, with Indian forces facing Sikh fighters with tanks and other heavy weaponry, and lasted until June 10. While the operation achieved its goal and Bhindranwale was killed, thousands of Sikh civilians were also killed during the attack on the temple. This drastically raised the stakes of the insurgency, with militant nationalist attitudes increasing amongst Sikhs (6). In retaliation for the civilians killed during the operation, two of her bodyguards, both Sikh, murdered Prime Minister Gandhi later that year. Anti-Sikh riots followed and thousands of Sikhs were killed during the sectarian violence, with estimates putting the death toll as high as 17,000. Politicians incited while police ignored and participated in the violence, deepening resentment between Sikhs and Hindus (6). Meanwhile in Canada, Parmar continued his campaign. He travelled the country with Sikh preacher Ajaib Singh Bagri, radicalizing members of Canada’s Sikh diaspora and raising funds for BK. In 1985, Parmar allegedly organized a plot to bomb two Air India flights with the help of Inderjit Singh Reyat, a Sikh Canadian and British national who helped Parmar by building bombs, and several other radicalized Sikhs. On June 22, Air India Flight 182 took off from Toronto to Mumbai with stops in Montreal, London, and Delhi. The group had planted a bomb on the plane, which detonated while the plane was off the west coast of Ireland. The plane went down and all of the 329 passengers and crew died in the attack. A second bomb destined for Air India Flight 301 from Tokyo to Delhi mistakenly exploded during transit at the Tokyo airport, killing two baggage handlers. Only Reyat was convicted for the attack, serving a total of 15 years in prison over manslaughter charges for building the bombs. The Air India Flight 182 bombing was the deadliest act of aviation terrorism until the September 11, 2001 attacks (2). By 1985, the Punjab Insurgency was in full swing. Tensions were boiling and many Sikhs faced persecution and brutality at the hands of Indian state forces, creating an increasingly large number of radicalized Sikhs (3). BK coordinated itself with other militant pro-Khalistani groups such as the Khalistan Liberation Force, the Khalistan Commando Force, and the All-India Sikh Students’ Federation. Together, they launched effective attacks against Indian political figures and law enforcement personnel throughout the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s (9). In particular, politicians affiliated with the Indian National Congress (INC), the party Prime Minister Gandhi led, as well as high-ranking police, were targeted, such as in the killings of INC General Secretary in Punjab Joginder Pal Pandey in 1987 and Deputy Superintendent of Police Harpal Singh in 1986 (10) (11). Babbar was killed in August 1992 after he was set up by a BK member turned police informant who organized a meeting with Babbar and other BK leaders. There, the militants were met by armed police and a firefight ensued, killing Babbar. This caused a wave of retaliatory attacks targeting police from BK (12). Later in October 1992, Parmar was captured by the Punjab Police and held for nine days, during which he was interrogated and tortured. He was then extrajudicially killed and the police staged a shootout to cover up the killing (13). The deaths of Babbar and Parmar, combined with a larger police crackdown against BK and other Khalistani militant groups, led to a decline in their stature. While many Sikhs still held nationalist beliefs, the insurgency dwindled and many pro-Khalistani Sikhs turned away from militarism to achieve their goals as the Indian government made concessions. During the insurgency, more than 20,000 people were killed, with civilians making up most of the dead (3). However, BK continued its campaign on a smaller scale. In 1995, BK militants killed INC politician and Chief Minister of Punjab Beant Singh in a targeted suicide bombing. The 2000s saw two movie theatre bombings in India conducted by BK that killed 6. These attacks were partially orchestrated internationally, from Germany and Pakistan. During this period, the BK leadership resided and coordinated the group’s operations from outside of India (14). During the 2010s, many of BK’s members were arrested while attempting to carry out foiled plots abroad. In 2012, four individuals allegedly affiliated with BK carried out an organized assasination attempt on retired Indian Lieutenant General Kuldeep Singh Brar in London, England. Brar, who commanded Operation Blue Star, survived the knife attack and all four perpetrators were arrested and sentenced (15). In 2017, BK’s leader in the United States, Balwinder Singh, pleaded guilty for his role in a planned terror attack in India that was set to take place in 2013. He helped plan an attack on an Indian government official, funding a co-conspirator, facilitating his travel to India from the United States, and providing him with materials to carry out the attack. The target would be determined once the attacker was in Asia. The co-conspirator was caught while trying to board a flight from San Francisco to Bangkok with night vision goggles provided by Singh. The plan failed and Singh was arrested (15). In 2025, sanctions were levied by the UK government against a British-Sikh businessman, Gurpreet Singh Rehal, and a number of companies and associations he was associated with, for his affiliations with BK. The UK Treasury claimed that Singh had used his business ventures to fund, arm, and recruit for BK (16). Objectives & Ideology During Babbar Khalsa’s early years, the group’s motivations were primarily sectarian and the goal of an independent Khalistan was secondary. Its founders wanted revenge against the Nirankaris for the 1978 Sikh-Nirankari clashes. However as the Punjab Insurgency developed and the Sikhs’ primary antagonist became the Indian government, it became a hardline separatist organization (1).  BK is a part of the Khalistan movement, a decentralized network of violent and non-violent political and militant organizations that seek to create an independent Sikh nation, known as Khalistan. The nation would be located in Punjab, a state in northern India bordering Pakistan with a Sikh majority. Some experts consider Sikhism an ethnic religion, as Sikhs are ethnically Punjabi and speak the Punjabi language. The movement has been active since the early 20th century and has been inspired by the persecution of Sikhs by the Indian government. Today, the Sikh diaspora is a major source of support for the movement as well as Sikhs in Punjab. There is much ideological diversity in the movement. While some individuals and groups within the movement approach their goals through nonviolent or electoral means and some Sikh activists are reformists as opposed to separatists, BK is a militant separatist organization. It believes in an independent Khalistan that is to be achieved through armed struggle with the Indian state (3). Political & Military Capabilities As a hardline militant group, Babbar Khalsa does not have any connections to political parties or other nonviolent groups and its actions are exclusively in service of its militant campaign. This can possibly be explained by the fact that the group’s goals began as sectarian and during its heyday in the Punjab Insurgency, nonviolent means were largely dismissed as a solution to the conflict as the Indian government was, and still is, very reluctant to engage with pro-Khalistan political parties or activists (6). While it is hard to determine the group’s size due to its clandestine nature, today it exists in small cells amongst Sikhs in Punjab and their diaspora. These small networks, albeit less significant than its stature prior to its leaders’ deaths, have made it difficult for Indian authorities and other law enforcement to stamp out the remaining members of the group (3). There is also a distinction between the factions operating in India and abroad, as they operate independently of one another (8). The group is also able to establish funding, recruitment, and training networks through the diaspora. During the Punjab Insurgency, the group enjoyed pockets of sympathy throughout the province; however, this waned as the conflict carried on (3).  Approach to Resistance Initially, Babbar Khalsa’s actions were sectarian in nature, but they have evolved with time. During the Punjab Insurgency, BK’s strategy shifted to targeted attacks against Indian political and law enforcement figures (9). During the occupation of the Golden Temple by BK and other allied groups, it attempted a paramilitary style operation, but the militants failed to hold the temple during Operation Blue Star (6). Subsequently, the modus operandi for its operations became bombings and assassination attempts. Many of these were well organized and BK prioritized higher-ranking officials when selecting targets (9). However, its operations still held a vindictive streak after Operation Blue Star. In particular, the Air India Flight 182 bombing was inspired by a desire to get revenge for the operation by its perpetrators, despite the fact that its victims were exclusively innocent civilians uninvolved in the operation (2). In recent years, attacks have often been planned and carried out by BK members within the Sikh diaspora outside of India (9). Relations & Alliances The two major Indian political parties, the INC and the governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), have long had a very hostile relationship with Babbar Khalsa and the larger Khalistan movement. Many INC politicians have been targeted by BK, and in more recent years, the nationalist BJP have used BK and other Sikh militant organisations to paint all Sikhs, especially those sympathetic to the Khalistan movement, in a negative light (17). During the Golden Temple occupation and the Punjab Insurgency, BK effectively allied itself with other militant Sikh factions, including Khalistan Liberation Force, the Khalistan Commando Force, the All-India Sikh Students’ Federation, the International Sikh Youth Federation, and Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale’s forces, to carry out joint operations (6). Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency has been accused of backing and funding BK in an attempt to increase tensions within India due to the two countries’ territorial disputes (1). The group has long had a presence amongst the Sikh diaspora abroad, especially since the deaths of Babbar and Parmar, after which its members primarily organized attacks outside of India (3). Besides India, Canada, the UK, the US, Japan, Malaysia, and the European Union have all designated BK as a terrorist group. The UK has sanctioned the group’s finance networks in the case of Gurpreet Singh Rehal (16). OSINT A 2025 Punjab police press release regarding the arrest of an alleged BK member as well as the seizure of explosives and other equipment to be used in bomb attacks: The aftermath of a failed 2024 assasination attempt carried out by Narain Singh Chaura, an alleged BK militant, at the Golden Temple. The target was former Punjab deputy chief minister Sukhbir Singh Badal: Pro-Khalistan activists in Calgary, Canada hoist a sign depicting Talwinder Singh Parmar. The sign promotes a non-binding referendum over the issue of Khalistan that was held in 2024. Canada has the world’s largest Sikh population outside of India: Works Cited (1) South Asia Terrorism Portal. Babbar Khalsa International . https://www.satp.org/terrorist-profile/india-punjab/babbar-khalsa-international-bki   (2) Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. (2010). Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy . https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2010/bcp-pco/CP32-89-4-2010-eng.pdf (3) Jetly, R. (2008). The Khalistan Movement in India: The Interplay of Politics and State Power. International Review of Modern Sociology, 34 (1), 61-75. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41421658   (4) Bharti, V. (2018, November 18). Sikh-Nirankari conflict peaked with 1978 clash. The Tribune . https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/punjab/sikh-nirankari-conflict-peaked-with-1978-clash-685446/ (5) Chima, J. S. (2010). The Sikh Separatist Insurgency in India . SAGE Publications. (6) Fair, C. C. & Ganguly, S. (2008). Treading on Hallowed Ground: Counterinsurgency Operations in Sacred Spaces . Oxford University Press. (7) Government of India. (1984). White Paper on the Punjab Agitation. https://elibrary.sansad.in/items/03194fb6-26ea-4df7-9c1d-b4801ed03ac1   (8) Jerryson, M. (2020). Religious Violence Today: Faith and Conflict in the Modern World . Bloomsbury Publishing (9) Khalistan Extremism Monitor. Babbar Khalsa International . https://www.khalistanextremismmonitor.org/Groups/Babbar-Khalsa-International-(BKI)   (10) L.A. Times (1987, January 20). Sikhs Kill Party Leader . https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-01-20-mn-5969-story.html   (11) Sandhu, A. (2019). Panjab: Journeys Through Fault Lines . Penguin Random House.  (12) Mahadedan, P. (2007, January). Counter Terrorism in the Indian Punjab: Assessing the ‘Cat’ System . South Asia Terrorism Portal. https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume18/article2.htm (13) CBC News. (2007). Air India Flight 182.   https://web.archive.org/web/20120107104739/http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/airindia/timeline_investigation.html   (14) Suman, R. K. (2014, August). Seeking information under RTI Act, 2005 . https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/RTI_ISVIdiv_280814_0028_106.PDF   (15) U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Nevada. (2016, November 29). Reno Man Pleads Guilty To Conspiracy To Provide Material Support To Terrorists  [Press release]. https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/reno-man-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-provide-material-support-terrorists   (16) HM Treasury. (2025, December 4). Reno Man Pleads Guilty To Conspiracy To Provide Material Support To Terrorists  [Press release]. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-imposed-on-a-person-and-organisation-involved-in-terrorism-in-landmark-action   (17) Mehra, T & Clarke, C. P. (2023, October 17). The India-Canada rift: Sikh extremism and rise of transnational repression?  International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://icct.nl/publication/india-canada-rift-sikh-extremism-and-rise-transnational-repression

Introduction The Greek group commonly referred to in English as “Sect of Revolutionaries” (Greek: Σέχτα Επαναστατών, often transliterated as Sekta Epanastaton) emerged in Greece in the wake of the December 2008 unrest that followed the killing of Alexis Grigoropoulos. (1) During their active years (2009-2010), they conducted four high-profile and symbolic assassinations using guns and small-scale IEDs, specifically targeting policemen and journalists. Across the most credible official and quasi-official sources, the group is consistently characterised as part of the post‑2008 wave of left-wing/anarchist urban militancy, notable for targeted lethal violence rather than large-scale and property-focused sabotage. (2) However, their first proclamation explicitly states that they’re non-ideological and apolitical, claiming that “we’re not doing politics, we’re doing guerrilla warfare”. (3) This article will attempt to place the Sect of Revolutionaries in the social context in which they were conceived, where they can be placed within the Greek anarchist network, outline the Giolias case, and conclude with an analysis of three competing hypotheses about their current status. History On the 3 rd  of February 2009, they attacked the police station of Korydallos, aiming to kill policemen. On the 17 th  of February, they opened fire on the cars of the ALTER TV station. On the 17 th  of June, they killed Deputy Chief Warden of the EKAM Antonis-Nektarios Savvas with 24 gunshot wounds, while he was guarding a key witness to the Revolutionary People’s Struggle’s trial (RPS, often transliterated Epanastatikós Laïkós Agónas, or ELA, and not to be confused with the adjacent anarchist organisation Revolutionary Struggle). In July of 2010, they claimed responsibility for the murder of journalist Socratis Giolias, which is, however, still disputed. (4) As of the writing of this article, no arrests have been made. Timeline of Actions Absence of Ideology: Nihilism in Greece Alexandros Grigoropoulos - ( Image source ) If organisations like 17 November (17N), Revolutionary Struggle (RS), or Conspiracy Cells of Fire (CCF) represent Greece’s Metapolitefsi-era armed underground at its most programmatically political – issuing proclamations that frame violence as a revolutionary necessity – then the Sect of Revolutionaries sits at the same clandestine end of the spectrum while rejecting that legitimating work. Often described as “nihilist” and most likely inspired by Russian anarchists like Sergey Nechayev (5) , the Sect presents itself as anti-political: closer to an armed guerrilla underground (αντάρτικος χώρος) that shares tactics and idiom with parts of the broader movement milieu (κινηματικός χώρος), yet diverges sharply in its stated rationale, emphasising escalation, insurrection, and destruction instead without a coherent ideological spine. Ideologically articulated armed struggle has been a persistent feature of Greek terrorism throughout the Metapolitefsi era (1975 onwards), while an explicitly “nihilist”/anti-political current remained marginal and only appeared in small cells (e.g., the self-styled “Nihilist Faction/Φράξια Μηδενιστών”, who claimed bombings including the 28 May 1996 IBM office bombing in Athens). (6) The visibility of such cells was likely obfuscated by 17N’s prominence and the Greek state’s then-lack of counterterrorism frameworks, but it increased sharply after the December 2008 unrest. Beyond the lack of established literature, this study is complicated by the semantic layers that have been grafted onto the term “nihilism” over time, due to the events of late 2008. On December 6 th , 2008, special guard police officer Epaminondas Korkoneas murdered Alexandros Grigoropoulos in Exarchia, the most well-established anarchist neighbourhood in Athens. He was 15 years old and born in an affluent family. The rioting that ensued was called the worst Greece has seen since the restoration of democracy in 1974 (7) . The event became a catalyst for protesters to express frustration with underlying issues in the Greek society at the start of the Great Recession, such as widespread state inefficiency and corruption, as well as increased unemployment. (8) Best symbolised by a graffiti on a wall in Athens saying ‘we are the image from the future’ (9) , the December 6 protests are now an annual event, labelled an “endemic” or an “anniversary”, depending on one’s political standing, being pro or against the Greek state’s status quo.          After 2008, the term “nihilist” acquired a second meaning in the Greek press: a moral vocabulary of condemnation (nihilists as people “without identity,” acting out “blind hatred”), rather than a precise philosophical classifier. The 2009 M. Giannakou’s reaction, quoted in Greek reporting about attacks against her house claimed by the “CCF-Nihilist Faction” is an example: “nihilists with blind and unjustified hatred.” (10) A third meaning appears in academic examinations of later organisations: “nihilistic” becomes shorthand for anti‑civilisational or anti‑human rationalisations in nodes of eco‑extremist milieus. The “Iconoclastic Sect” is explicitly placed within a violent ecological scene and described as having “nihilistic ideology” aimed at destroying human civilisation & technology, with its bombing of Agios Dionysios church on December 27 th , 2018, claimed as an opening move. (11) Taken together, these overlapping uses mean that “nihilism” in the Greek insurgencies context is less of a stable ideological category, and yet more than a contested label, whose meaning must be specified on a case-by-case basis and grounded in the particular actors, texts, and moments to which it is applied. The graffiti reads “we’re the image from the future” - ( Image Source ) Political & Military Capabilities The Sect of Revolutionaries declared “war against the state,” rejecting all political and material institutions. Its stated aim was total “destruction of the state” and establishment of a new society. (12) Militarily, the group was lightly organised but well-armed. It publicly displayed an arsenal (AK-47 rifles, semiautomatic pistols, grenades) and warned that “our guns are full and… ready to speak”. (13) Ballistic analysis tied at least two 9mm pistols used in all four operations (a police-station attack, the Alter TV shooting, the killing of an anti-terror police officer and the Giolias murder) to the same cell. (14) This implies access to trafficked military-grade weapons, likely via Balkan criminal networks. (15) After the murder of journalist Giolias, the Sect published a photo of their stash of weapons, which involved 6 Glocks of Austrian origin (heavy, usually used by police forces), 3 Kalashnikovs, Tokarev (pistols used by the underworld), two Zastavas of 9 and 7,65 mm, Browning Parabellum, Magnum Smith, and a semi-automatic Scorpion. (16) However, the Sect’s membership and overall resources remain unconfirmed; no public leader or cell size has been officially identified. The U.S. State Department formally designated the Sect of Revolutionaries a terrorist organisation in 2011, underscoring its threat. (17) The exact number and identities of Sect members are unknown, as is any support network beyond anarchist sympathisers. Approach to Resistance The Sect followed a classic urban guerrilla cycle: target selection, armed assault, escape, then public communique. It targeted symbolic figures (police, journalists) in a hit-and-run fashion. Each attack was followed by a claim letter sent to the media via symbolic means, often with photos of weapons and revolutionary rhetoric. In practice, cells appeared to scout and ambush targets, often from cover. For example, in two key assassinations (Nektarios Savvas, the policeman, and Sokratis Giolias, the journalist), gunmen fired approximately 15 – 20 rounds at point-blank range. (18) In the Giolias case, the Sect members donned a (stolen) police uniform and used subterfuge (rang Giolias’ bell and told him his car was being stolen) to lure him outside. (19) Explosive devices were also used: their first known strike was a gun-and-grenade assault on Korydallos police station, but the grenade failed to detonate. After attacks, the Sect routinely issued communiqués (left on CDs or letters for newspapers like Ta Nea to find, the first one notably left on Alexandros Grigoropoulos’ grave, inside a bouquet of flowers) claiming responsibility and threatening further violence. These proclamations boasted of readiness to escalate to bombings and arson. The group then went dark. All known operations occurred from February 2009 to July 2010, and afterwards it disappeared. Investigators found no leaks or captures, suggesting strict cell secrecy and exfiltration after each strike. Media reports note the killers usually fled by motorcycle or on foot, leaving insufficient forensic traces. Relations & Alliances The Sect had no known official alliances beyond Greece’s anarchist milieu, but evidence links it closely to other militant anarchists – notably the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF). Investigations later revealed coordination between these groups. Apart from this, no ties to foreign terrorist cells are documented. Authorities suspect an overlap with other anarchist cells. In 2015, Greek police decrypted encrypted messages between a CCF (“Jason” or in Greek, “Ιάσονας”) and colleagues, in which they instructed that if a bomb attack killed its target, responsibility should be claimed under the name “Sect of Revolutionaries”. Counterterrorism analysts thus view the Sect as possibly a “special ops” unit or cover identity within the broader Greek anarchist network, or within the CCF, speculating that the Sect comprises one or two of CCF’s leading members, plus at least two more members. (20) For example, both Sect and CCF used identical pistol calibres and incitement styles. Speculation at the time said that they may even be linked to the murder of a Golden Dawn member in New Irakleio, a member of a Greek neo-Nazi organisation and at-the-time political party. However, Sect attacks never explicitly cited or cooperated with foreign cells; they targeted domestic “service” figures (police, politicians, “corrupt media”). In sum, the Sect is seen as part of Greece’s homegrown anarchist insurgency, likely intersecting with CCF and similar guerrilla cells, but operating as assassins autonomously in 2009 & 2010. The Giolias Case Socratis Giolias - ( Image Source ) On 19 July 2010, two gunmen killed Giolias outside his home, then escaped. A report based on witness testimonies, internal police documents, depositions, multiple newspaper articles, and Troktiko’s blog posts (Giolias’ blog that evolved into a mainstream internet news outlet at the time in Greece), said that Giolias had been about to publish the results of an investigation into corruption and had received several threats in the two years prior to the murder. (21) Eight days later a communique (sent to Ta Nea ) claimed the hit for the Sect. Ballistic tests showed the murder weapons had been used in previous Sect attacks (linking the incident to their known arsenal). The Sect’s statement threatened further attacks on “servants of the system”. However, the claim letter arrived unusually late and in a different format than other Sect communiques. Meanwhile, Giolias’s family accused private figures instead of the Sect. Depositions (reported in Protothema ) reveal Giolias had confided fears that his former colleague Makis Triantafyllopoulos “would kill me…and make it look like the ‘Sect’”. (22) His wife testified that Giolias repeatedly warned: “Triantafyllopoulos will kill me”. No independent evidence has supported this scenario; Triantafyllopoulos denies involvement. Investigators focused on sect involvement (ballistics, sect claim) but also noted that a senior cybercrime officer (Manolis Sfakianakis) had falsely told Giolias that police were coming to raid his home. The officer often shared police intelligence with Giolias, the report reads. (23) Sfakianakis was later charged (in 2019) only with breach of duty for misleading Giolias, but the case was dismissed in 2020.          In the speculation realm, the Sect doesn’t have the motives required to murder a journalist who was about to publish an anti-state probe on corruption. In theory, they should have been motivated to stand behind him. Moreover, the fourth Sect communique published after the Giolias murder has stylistic differences from the previous ones. All use the first plural to display collectivity, directly address the audience when needed, and hubristic, street-like, and dehumanising language when ideologically fitting, use ideological “jargon” from adjacent communities, and use typographic emphasis such as capital letters, quotation marks, hyphens and punctuations to make the message “hit” like spoken word. However, the previous ones read in simpler, sharper sentences, with implied irony and cynicism. The Giolias’ one is a lengthy narrative of the existential vicissitudes of everyday life. The language in Giolias’s work uses more subordination (longer sentences with dependencies), cataloguing (series with commas), and more ellipses for dramatisation and rhythm. And while the Sect communiques usually used vocabulary focused on the specifics of each action they took, the Giolias’ one uses more general and metaphorical language. In short, the fourth communique reads as if it were written by someone who imagines what the Sect thinks like, rather than how the Sect actually speaks. However, in the absence of official or professional reports, all the above are best treated at the case’s own, isolated hypothesis level and are best left there. Any new evidence can render the above null. Current Status: Competing Hypotheses The Sect has been effectively dormant since 2011. No member has been identified as apprehended, and their weapons were never recovered. If the overlap hypothesis holds, several Sect members should already be serving time for CCF-related crimes. The murder of journalist Sokratis Giolias remains officially unsolved: the Sect claimed responsibility and ballistic evidence implicates them, but alternative theories persist. Below is a short analysis of competing hypotheses, according to what this article has discussed so far. It is by no means conclusive, as any new evidence surfacing could render it all null. Hypothesis 1: Voluntary Disbandment (Backlash or Resource Constraints) Statement:  Facing the intense fallout from the Giolias assassination (July 2010), the Sect leadership chose to halt operations, either due to operational risk, public pressure, or lack of capability. Supporting Evidence:  The assassination of Sokratis Giolias was a watershed event (the first journalist killed in decades), and after that, the Sect never struck again. It is plausible that the group feared exposure or backlash in civil society, prompting a strategic withdrawal. Additionally, forensic experts noted that the Sect’s declared arsenal (as shown in the Giolias communique) still included unused weapons and no explosives, suggesting they lacked bomb-making expertise. (24) This could indicate an inability to escalate, possibly demotivating further action. Internal fatigue or realisation of limited impact might have led to a voluntary stand-down. Nihilism itself, lacking a concrete motivational spine, might have played a role, even if the Sect declared long-term plans in its first communique. Counter-Evidence & Uncertainties:  There is no direct evidence of a dissolution statement. The main evidence is inference from inactivity. The idea of a “deliberate pause” is speculative, but criminal-terror groups seldom publicly announce a ceasefire for fear of seeming defeated. It could be coincidental that after 2010, they simply had nothing else planned or resources to continue. The theory also doesn’t explain why other anarchist groups continued attacks while the Sect did not, implying that if a terrorist like the Sect wanted to find motivation, they would. The lack of expertise in making bombs likely hints at amateurism, but the group had succeeded in two high-profile murders, implying some capability. In short, while plausible psychologically, this hypothesis lacks solid documentation. Likelihood: Low.  The immediate stop in activity after a high-profile killing suggests the Sect may have judged that continuing would bring too much heat. However, the absence of corroborating evidence makes this a weaker explanation. The fact that sect materials still surfaced suggests no formal shutdown. Nonetheless, this hypothesis cannot be ruled out given the abruptness of the pause. Hypothesis 2: Sect was an alias of the CCF Network, or a subset of it Statement:  The Sect of Revolutionaries was never a standalone cell, but an operational name used by certain nodes/members of the CCF. Supporting Evidence:  Greek counterterrorism sources long suspected an overlap between the Sect and CCF. In 2015, police decrypted communications from a top CCF leader “Jason”, instructing that if a bomb attack succeeded (killing a police commander), responsibility should be claimed, “as the Sect of Revolutionaries”. This strongly links the two groups, indicating the Sect name served as a cover for certain operations. Counter-Evidence & Uncertainties : The modus operandi of CCF and the Sect are vastly different, with CCF focusing on arson and bombings, while the Sect evidently didn’t have bombmaking capabilities. Moreover, the Sect released its own public communiqués and had distinct claimed attacks (unlike typical secretive CCF statements), suggesting it had some independent identity. The main gap is that no definitive, unclassified proof exists of particular individuals overlapping; only forensic patterns and communications imply a link. Also, what is the strategic objective achieved by CCF, if there is any, to create and use the nihilist alias? Since the Sect appeared after the death of Alexis Grigoropoulos, they likely wanted to perpetuate and ramp up the terror against the Greek state or simply drive away attention from the CCF. However, this ambiguity means uncertainty remains. The final caveat in this hypothesis is that there is very limited reporting on the links found in 2015 by the Greek counterterrorism. Likelihood:   Medium-High.  Given the unusual evidence and the known practice of Greek anarchists sharing tactics and identities, this hypothesis has strong support. It explains the sudden disappearance: once CCF resumed bombings in 2010 after multiple members’ arrests in 2009, there was no need for the “Sect” name. Hypothesis 3: Leadership Elimination or Member Attrition Statement:  Key Sect members were killed, arrested on other charges, or otherwise left the movement, so the group effectively lost its nucleus. Supporting Evidence:  It’s conceivable that core individuals were quietly detained in CCF cases or died, but this implies overlap with Hypothesis 2, thus fluctuating this statement’s probability. The counterterror communications implicated at least one “Jason” linked to Sect identity. If he or others were incapacitated in later actions, that could explain the void. Counter-Evidence & Uncertainties:  Like Hypothesis 1, there is no public record of Sect members being killed or tried. The majority of Greek terrorist suspects around 2010 were identified via CCF and Revolutionary Struggle probes, not Sect-specific ones. If Sect members had been removed, authorities would likely have announced at least indirect links to known groups. But even in the 2015 CCF trials, the Sect itself rarely appeared. Also, if core members had fallen out, why did no one else take over under the Sect banner? The complete silence suggests not just leadership loss but a decision (or strategic irrelevance) to stop entirely. Thus, the evidence for attrition is minimal; it is an unproven scenario that, at best, overlaps with Hypothesis 2. Likelihood:   Low, Medium if linked to CCF.  Without concrete arrests or reported deaths, this remains hypothetical. It could be a factor if, for example, one or two “leadership” figures were proven to be caught, but there is no source confirming that. Many suspects charged in anarchist cases were anonymous or known only by ideology, not necessarily core Sect leaders. Therefore, while loss of personnel is possible, it is not strongly evidenced and would likely coincide with the alias explanation above. Works Cited (1) - Ed Vulliamy and Helena Smith, “Children of the Revolution,” The Guardian , July 5, 2017,   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/22/civil-unrest-athens . (2) - Europol. TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.  2011.   https://doi.org/10.2813/14705 (3) - Σέχτα Επαναστατών. «Προκήρυξη για την επίθεση στο Α.Τ. Κορυδαλλού». PDF. Newsbeast, July 20, 2010.   https://www.newsbeast.gr/files/1/2010/07/20/sexta_epanastatwn.pdf . (4) - Hellenic Republic (Greece). Ministry of Citizen Protection. “On the Investigation of the Death of Greek Journalist Sokratis Giolias: Response from the Greek Authorities.” Strasbourg, February 5, 2024. PDF. Council of Europe.   https://rm.coe.int/greece-reply-en-sokratis-golias-6february2023/1680ae6a7e (5) - Chantzi, Georgia. The Evolution of Terrorism in Greece from 1975 to 2009 . Research Paper no. 158. Athens: Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS), March 2012. PDF. Accessed March 1, 2026.   https://www.rieas.gr/images/rieas158a.pdf  ; Newsroom. “Police profile ‘Sect’ as nihilists.” eKathimerini.com , July 26, 2010.   https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/69461/police-profile-sect-as-nihilists/ (6) - Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996 - Greece.” United States Department of State, April 1, 1997. Refworld.   https://www.refworld.org/reference/annualreport/usdos/1997/en/37138 (7) - Christofer, Kat. “Athenian democracy in ruins.” The Guardian , December 8, 2008. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/08/greece  ; BBC News. “Officer given life for boy’s murder in Greek riot case.” October 11, 2010. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11513309 (8) - Dalakoglou, Dimitris, and Antonis Vradis. “Introduction.” In Revolt and Crisis in Greece: Between a Present Yet to Pass and a Future Still to Come , edited by Dimitris Dalakoglou and Antonis Vradis, 13–28. Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2011. (9) - Vasilaki, Rosa. “‘We Are an Image from the Future’: Reading Back the Athens 2008 Riots.” Acta Scientiarum. Education  39, no. 2 (April 17, 2017): 153–161. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://periodicos.uem.br/ojs/index.php/ActaSciEduc/article/view/34851 (10) - Κομνηνού, Έλλη. «Ανέλαβαν την ευθύνη οι “Πυρήνες της φωτιάς”». News 24/7 , October 31, 2009. Accessed March 1, 2026.   https://www.news247.gr/ellada/anelavan-tin-efthini-oi-pirines-tis-fotias/ (11) - Καρατράντος, Τριαντάφυλλος, and Παναγής Παναγιωτόπουλος. «Μετά τη βία των πολλών: Μορφολογικά και κοινωνικά στοιχεία για την πολιτική βία στην ύστερη Μεταπολίτευση και ειδικότερα στην περίοδο 2015-2019». In Το Πολιτικό Πορτραίτο της Ελλάδας II: Διακυβεύματα και Προκλήσεις , edited by Χριστίνα Βαρουξή, Μανίνα Κακεπάκη, Νίκος Σαρρής, Άγγελος Τραμουντάνης, and Χαράλαμπος Τσέκερης, 131–156. Athens: Εθνικό Κέντρο Κοινωνικών Ερευνών (ΕΚΚΕ), 2021. PDF.   https://www.ekke.gr/publication_files/meta-ti-via-ton-pollon-morfologika-kai-kinonika-stichia-gia-tin-politiki-via-stin-isteri-metapoliteusi-kai-idikotera-stin-periodo-2015-2019-1 (12) - C&P, Σέχτα Επαναστατών - Η ΠΡΟΚΥΡΗΞΗ. Athens Indymedia. “Post 985253.”   https://athens.indymedia.org/post/985253/  ; Σέχτα Επαναστατών. «Προκήρυξη για την επίθεση στο Α.Τ. Κορυδαλλού». PDF. Newsbeast, July 20, 2010.   https://www.newsbeast.gr/files/1/2010/07/20/sexta_epanastatwn.pdf . ; … Προκήρυξη Σέχτας. Athens Indymedia. “Post 1195938.”   https://athens.indymedia.org/post/1195938/  ; Aλληλεγγυη στους ενοπλους ανταρτες. Προκυρηξη ΣΕΧΤΑΣ ΕΠΑΝΑΣΤΑΤΩΝ για Νεκταριο Σαββα, Athens Indymedia. “Post 1195926.”   https://athens.indymedia.org/post/1195926/ (13) - Smith, Helena. “Greece will be a war zone, Sect of Revolutionaries warns tourists.” The Guardian , July 31, 2010.   https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/01/greece-war-zone-revolutionaries-tourists (14) - Committee to Protect Journalists. “Sokratis Giolias.” CPJ Data: Journalists Killed .   https://cpj.org/data/people/sokratis-giolias/ (15) - Kakissis, Joanna. “The New Guerrilla Group Threatening Greece.” TIME , August 8, 2010.   https://time.com/archive/6950636/the-new-guerrilla-group-threatening-greece/ (16) - Newsbeast. «Λύθηκε το μυστήριο με το οπλοστάσιο της Σέχτας». August 4, 2010. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://www.newsbeast.gr/greece/arthro/26695/luthike-to-mustirio-me-to-oplostasio-tis-sehtas . (17) - U.S. Department of State. “Department of State’s Designation of The Sect of Revolutionaries.” Press statement, February 24, 2011.   https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/157060.htm (18) - Kyriakidou, Dina. “Gunmen kill Greek anti-terrorist policeman.” Reuters , June 17, 2009.   https://www.reuters.com/article/world/gunmen-kill-greek-anti-terrorist-policeman-idUSTRE55G0RS/ (19) - Committee to Protect Journalists. “Sokratis Giolias.” CPJ Data: Journalists Killed .   https://cpj.org/data/people/sokratis-giolias/ (20a) - Ralli, Theodora. Violent Extremism in Greece: A Comparative Analysis of the Violence of the Two Extremes . European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation (A/Y 2013–2014), Masaryk University, 2014. PDF.   https://repository.gchumanrights.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b4936602-32f8-4811-88a3-fa1122c2484d/content (20b) - Παναγιωτίδης, Θοδωρής. «Η σχέση Πυρήνων – Σέχτας, ο ρόλος του Ιάσονα, οι αγγελιοφόροι και το οπλουργείο των φυλακών». News 24/7 , March 1, 2015. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://www.news247.gr/ellada/i-sxesi-pirinon-sextas-o-rolos-tou-iasona-oi-angelioforoi-kai-to-oplourgeio-ton-filakon/ (21) - Committee to Protect Journalists. “Sokratis Giolias.” CPJ Data: Journalists Killed .   https://cpj.org/data/people/sokratis-giolias/ (22) - Proto Thema. «Μας έλεγε ότι θα τον σκοτώσει ο Τριανταφυλλόπουλος και θα το κάνουν να φανεί ότι είναι η “ΣΕΧΤΑ”». Proto Thema , March 30, 2014.   https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/365952/suglonizei-i-katathesi-tis-suzugou-tou-giolia/ (23) - de Zeeuw, Jasmijn, Jules Swinkels, and Jos Bartman. Impunity in Europe: Uninvestigated Murder of Greek Journalist Sokratis Giolias . A Safer World for the Truth report. Amsterdam: Free Press Unlimited, 2023. PDF.   https://elefantmedia.b-cdn.net/aswftt/SWFTT_rapport_engels_print.pdf (24) - Newsbeast. «Λύθηκε το μυστήριο με το οπλοστάσιο της Σέχτας». August 4, 2010. Accessed March 2, 2026.   https://www.newsbeast.gr/greece/arthro/26695/luthike-to-mustirio-me-to-oplostasio-tis-sehtas .

Insurgency Overview Weichan Auka Mapu (WAM), which means “fight of the rebel territory” in Mapudungun (the Mapuche language), is a militant Mapuche insurgency organization in Chile. It currently operates in the Southern regions of Biobío, Arauco and Los Ríos where they have been active since around 2011 (1) . The group's objective is the emancipation of the Mapuche people, henceforth classifying them as actors in the wider Mapuche Conflict (2) . They are characterized by their incendiary attacks, acts of sabotage, their use of explosives, and their violent approach to their political struggle. History, Foundations, & Ideology Even though the Mapuche Conflict – in its current geopolitical state – can be traced back to the 19th century (2) , the level of organization and the approaches of the actors involved have become more radical. The WAM is a very modern group, as its establishment took place after the Mapuche prisoners’ hunger strikes in 2010 (1) . Although the WAM is usually believed to be a splinter group of the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM) (1)(3) , there is no confirmation of this coming from either group. In 2022, the congress of Chile declared the WAM – alongside other Mapuche groups – to be classified as a terrorist organization. The group has been linked to the killing of another Mapuche comunero in a territorial dispute in 2022. (4) This led to a police operation in 2024, which concluded with seven alleged members arrested and one dead, along with one non-fatal police casualty. (5) In 2026, the alleged leader of WAM was arrested and is currently awaiting trial. (6) The WAM is characterized for being a very decentralized group (1) as there is no known leader or public spokesperson for the organization. There is also very little accessible information on the WAM (1) , which makes its ideology more ambiguous than other Mapuche groups – such as the CAM which has a formally-compiled ideological framework. However, one can extrapolate ideas from their public messages to understand their motivations. The WAM defines themselves as a revolutionary group (6) and defines capitalism as the common enemy of the Mapuche people (7) . They establish that, in their territory, the capitalist system is embodied by the different active enterprises that can be found, such as the forestry industry, the mining industry, the power plants, and the latifundia (large ranches) (7)(8) . Because of these factors, the group centers its attacks on these industries. These attacks are a form of direct action that – according to the WAM – is their way of gaining effective territorial control in order to make it a space where the Mapuche people are allowed to subsist under their own agenda (7) . Despite these convictions, the WAM also renounces any kind of connection to what they determine as occidental ideologies, which includes social democracy, marxism, or even anarchism (9) . In more political terms, the WAM is against the Chilean state and they denounce formal Chilean politics and political groups, particularly the far-right and the center-left as these parties – according to the group – are mere puppets of the economic elite (6) . They also criticize the historical role of the Chilean armed and police forces because of their past corruption cases and the acts of violence they enacted against the Chilean population; these institutions, according to the WAM, are the “guard dogs” of the elite (6) . Approach to Resistance As previously stated, the approaches of the WAM revolve around forms of direct action. In this regard, they operate similarly to other Mapuche organizations such as the CAM where their main focus is the sabotage of infrastructure which belongs to the different industries that they consider to be enemies. WAM’s direct action has resulted in over 30 instances of sabotage in 2016 (9) . Although these attacks may vary substantially, they are mainly incendiary and they target machinery which belongs to industries (10) . They also attack the infrastructure of latifundia by burning cabins, dining rooms, cellars and chapels (11) and have stolen vehicles during their attacks (12) . The group has also engaged in incendiary attacks against churches (3) . Alliances & Relations While the WAM does indeed operate in the same territory as other Mapuche militant groups, there is no evidence of interference nor intertwining in each other's actions. Nonetheless, the CAM has criticized some of the attacks made by the WAM in the past, notably the incendiary attacks on churches. This was because – according to the CAM – they damage the legitimacy of their cause (3) . In various public statements, the group has also condemned criminal actions which are not in line with the political objectives of the WAM. These condemnations are often formulated by the WAM in a way which emphasizes that these actions are opportunist components which wrongly utilize the Mapuche name to seek personal advantage, which in turn hinders the Mapuche movement’s credibility. They define those responsible for such acts as political exploiters, “fight” merchants, or even individuals with warlord tendencies (6)(7) . Works Cited (Chicago-style) (1) - “Weichan Auka Mapu: que se sabe de la “hermetica” organización armada investigada por la fiscalía de la araucanía,” The Clinic, november 5, 2021. https://www.theclinic.cl/2021/11/05/weichan-auka-mapu-que-se-sabe-de-la-agrupacion-armada/ (2) - Balbontin-Gallo, Cristobal. “El conflicto mapuche como lucha por el reconocimiento: La necesidad de una nueva clave de lectura,” Izquierdas 49, (February, 2020): 330-340. (3) - Segovia, Pablo, Fernanda Osorio, Mariana Aillon and Oscar Basulto. “La construcción discursiva del acontecimiento “quema de iglesias” en el marco del conflicto mapuche: una mirada desde el análisis del discurso.” Boletín de Filología 2, (2019) 319-149. (4) - Juan Castillo and Rodrigo Aguilera. “Por homicidio de comunero en 2022: qué se sabe del operativo para desarticular agrupación Weichán Auka Mapu en la región del Biobío”. 12-09-2024. https://www.adnradio.cl/2024/09/12/por-homicidio-de-comunero-en-2022-que-se-sabe-del-operativo-para-desarticular-agrupacion-weichan-auka-mapu-en-la-region-del-biobio/ (5) - Javiera Rodríguez. “Un fallecido y un PDI baleado deja operativo contra Weichán Auka Mapu en el Biobío” 12-09-2024. https://www.meganoticias.cl/nacional/458718-pdi-baleado-un-muerto-operativo-biobio-a-la-wam-homicidio-comunero-brk-12-09-2024.html (6) - Juan Castillo and Matías Gallegos. “Detienen a líder de la Weichán Auka Mapu (WAM) acusado por homicidio de comunero mapuche en 2022”. 17-02-2026. (7) - “[Comunicado] Weichan auka mapu reafirma compromiso revolucionario en acciones de sabotaje a intereses capitalistas” November 4, 2021. https://radiokurruf.org/2021/11/04/comunicado-weichan-auka-mapu-reafirma-compromiso-revolucionario-en-acciones-de-sabotaje-a-intereses-capitalistas/ (8) - “Nación Mapuche. A través de un comunicado público la WAM (wichan auka mapu-lucha por el territorio) niega tener participación en el crimen del comunero mapuche asesinado a tiros en el sur, la semana pasada.” May 15, 2022. https://www.resumenlatinoamericano.org/2022/05/15/nacion-mapuche-a-traves-de-un-comunicado-publico-la-wam-weichan-auka-mapu-lucha-por-el-territorio-niega-tener-participacion-en-el-crimen-del-comunero-mapuche-asesinado-a-tiros-en-tirua-sur-la-sem/ (9) - [Comunicado] “Weichan auka mapu reivindica dos sabotajes a faenas de monocultivo forestal en tolten y carahue.” December 2, 2021. https://radiokurruf.org/2021/12/02/comunicado-weichan-auka-mapu-reivindica-dos-sabotajes-a-faenas-de-monocultivo-forestal-en-tolten-y-carahue/ (10) - “Grupo en resistencia Weichan Auka Mapu reivindica más de treinta acciones de sabotaje” Resumen. April 21, 2016. https://resumen.cl/articulos/grupo-en-resistencia-weichan-auka-mapu-reivindica-mas-de-treinta-acciones-de-sabotaje (11) - Valenzuela, Paola. “Weichan Auka Mapu se adjudica ataque incendiario perpetrado en forestal de Lebu.” Radio Biobio. November 7, 2022. https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/nacional/region-del-bio-bio/2022/11/07/weichan-auka-mapu-se-adjudica-ataque-incendiario-perpetrado-en-forestal-de-lebu.shtml (12) - Zamorano, Carlos and Sofia Roblero. “Organización Weichan Auka Mapu se adjudica ataque incendiario a instalaciones de fundo en Panguipulli” La Tercera. July 30, 2022. https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/weichan-auka-mapu-se-adjudica-ataque-incendiario-a-instalaciones-de-fundo-en-panguipulli/DONRUPWLBZDHFMSH6SJAZQ2ERY/ Additional Resources

Introduction & History The dismantling of Greece’s primary, far-left terrorist organisation 17 November (17N) didn’t demoralise successors; rather, it created a power vacuum that new urban guerrilla groups attempted to fill and an upsurge in, and intensification of, revolutionary violence.  (1) The case examined in this article, the currently inactive Revolutionary Struggle (RS), were the first to pick up the baton of violence from 17N before the latter’s trial had come to an end in 2003. (2)  They stayed active until 2014. Their first manifesto was published in the Greek satirical outlet “To Pontiki” in 2004, in which they condemned the optics and ethics of 17N’s trial, described the world as having entered a new, post 9/11, “global war” era, and condemned globalisation as it promotes social exclusion and poverty. (3)  As such, their motives have been cited as largely ideological, best described as attempting to promote social revolution in Greece and beyond. As an anarchist, non-hierarchical organisation, key members include Nikos Maziotis, Panagiota (Pola) Roupa and Kostas Gournas. The RS ran an urban guerrilla campaign since 2003, using bombings and shootings against the Greek state and economic targets, including a 2009 Athens Stock Exchange bombing and a 2009 shooting that wounded a policeman. They also hit high-profile international symbols, most notably firing a rocket-propelled grenade at the U.S. Embassy in Athens in January 2007 and carried out three different attacks on Citibank in Athens. During Greece’s austerity era, they claimed a large car bomb targeting the Bank of Greece (and the IMF office housed there) in April 2014, presenting it as an anti-austerity escalation and proof they were still active.  A break in the investigations came in March 2010, when a suspected member, Lambros Foundas, was killed by police during an attempted car theft. Investigators then used evidence from his devices to identify suspects. In April 2010, Greek counter-terrorism police carried out raids that arrested core suspects, uncovered forged IDs and located a major weapons & explosives cache (including an RPG-7) tied to RS operations. Two principal fugitives were caught later: Nikos Maziotis after a central Athens shootout in July 2014, and Pola Roupa in January 2017, arrested in a small apartment where she was hiding with her child. Her arrest was the final nail in the coffin of RS’s activities. (4) Timeline of Actions Greek Terrorism in the Context of the State An important caveat when examining terrorism in Greece is the state’s perception of it and the influence said perception exerts. Greece has a legacy favouring the victors (the right) and discriminating against the vanquished (the left) since the post-WW2 Greek Civil War. This discrimination was enforced through what became known as the ‘paraconstitution’, a set of emergency laws (modelled on US anti-Communist legislation) and political control techniques (used extensively in America during the Truman–McCarthy era) aimed at the political and economic exclusion of the Greek left and the consolidation of the anti-communist state. (5) The terrorist organisation 17N (17 th  of November / 17 Νοέμβρη) had targeted the Greek state since the fall of the Junta and the beginning of the Metapolitefsi era in 1975 (Greece’s transition from a 7-year authoritarian rule to a multi-party democracy). So, far-left extremism ended up being the reason the state adopted a coherent counterterrorism legal framework. 17N operated from 1975 to 2001, murdered over 20 high-profile individuals, positioned themselves as vanguards of the working class, while being fanatically nationalistic, anti-Greek establishment, anti-Junta, anti-American, anti-Turkey and anti-NATO; they were committed to removing US bases from Greek soil, the Turkish military presence from Cyprus, and to severing Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union. (6)  The target audience of their terror was evidently the Greek state, while they sought to win public support. Their arrest left a gap that the Revolutionary Struggle (RS), the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire (CCF) and the Group of Revolutionary Fighters (GLF) attempted to fill with similar anti-West ideology, but with limited success due to inter-group disagreements.  (7) These far-left groups are accurately classified as homegrown terrorism and targeted under Greece’s law L.2928/2001 (a year before 17N’s arrest) and are also subject to 187A of the penal code.  (8) Under Greek penal code, “The mens rea  element of a terrorist activity requires that the act is committed in such a way, to such an extent or under such conditions, that it is possible to seriously harm a country or an international organization, along with the purpose of seriously intimidating a population or illegally forcing a public authority or an international organization to perform or to abstain from performing an action or with the purpose of seriously harming or destroying the fundamental constitutional, political, and economic structures of a country or of an international organization.” (9)  Consistently, the Greek far-left extremists have not been treated as entities above the law. In contrast, far-right extremist organisations and the Greek state are found to coincide. Until the murder of far-left musician Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn members in 2013 (a far-right, Nazi organisation), the Greek judiciary system, cited as being the crux of the issue, was found to not only avoid prosecuting far-right extremists but also reinforce and propagate their ideology.  (10) Additionally, in 2012, over 50% of the Greek police force voted for Golden Dawn.  (11) The Greek security apparatus has been cited, by both reports and numerous Greek officials, to, on the one hand, conduct defiance, indiscipline, arbitrariness and abuse of authority, and on the other, activate a form of fraternal solidarity when criminal behaviour is practised. (12)  During 2016-2020, the period of gradual criminalisation of Golden Dawn, Greece experienced much more far-right violence than any other country in Western Europe, with the least amount of “lone-actors”, and serious acts of violence were directed mostly against migrants and refugees, or against political opponents. (13)  As such, the Greek state is co-existing with a deep-state of far-right extremists, that operate above the law and are favoured by a judicial system that reinforces their ideology and enforces terrorism laws only against what is perceived as far-left organisations. The above indicates a highly likely binary bias in the Greek state’s perception of terrorism; Motives are prone to be bundled up under the same umbrella of adjacent far-left communities, often linked to the country’s web of social and economic problems, and ideological nuances or disagreements between members may be disregarded. Europol’s TE-SAT (2010) reads that “Left-wing terrorist groups, such as Epanastatikos Agonas (RS), seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist left-wing model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist.” […] “Not all Member States distinguish between activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the same chapter of this report.”  (14) Academic work on Greek counterterrorism argues that terrorism was belatedly securitised: the Greek state’s prior “erroneous belief” that domestic terrorism was not a direct security threat delayed decisive action, while later securitisation enabled arrests and policy shifts. (15)  Further analyses of Greek political violence emphasise that stereotypes, especially treating terrorism as mere criminality and as an “aberration”, have been politically convenient, avoiding deeper engagement with grievances, state violence, or socio-political context.  (16) As such, RS’s labelling by the Greek state encourages a de-contextualised categorisation that uses lineage simplifications (offshoot/splinter), rather than careful differentiation between Marxist-Leninist traditions mixed with nationalism (17N), anarchist-insurrectionist currents (CCF), and RS’s own hybridised anti-imperialist framing. Objectives & Ideology The initial manifesto of RS had a broader, international scope, while their later declarations appear to narrow into the domestic context.  (17) The following is an attempt to distil the first RS manifesto and its subsequent 2006-2009 declarations in the same satirical outlet into seven central ideological themes. (18)  There was no consistent theme of nationalism or national interest found, in contrast to 17N’s manifesto. The Global-War Era : The US’s “war on terrorism” is framed as a war by a transnational political & economic elite to enforce a neoliberal “New World Order.” The RS linked the era to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Israel & Palestine wars, the NATO strategy, and several expanded post 9-11 “anti-terror” laws. Poverty & Exclusion in the age of Globalisation : The manifesto argues that globalisation and IMF policies create mass poverty, social exclusion, and instability, claiming the ruling response is increased coercion and surveillance, coordinated through NATO and EU policing, and judicial cooperation through Europol, Eurojust, etc. Greece’s role in imperial wars and security architecture : It claims the Greek state participates materially, through bases, airspace, logistics, and deployments. It highlights the Olympics-era security in 2004 as part of a broader international security project. An overall “counter-revolutionary” reading of Greek history : The RS presented modern Greek state-building as one rooted in the suppression of popular social revolutionary aims (which is a strongly ideological reinterpretation of 1821 and later eras). Anti-terror laws framing as a blurring weapon : It warns that definitions of “terrorism” expand to include sympathisers and support networks, threatening solidarity politics. In the Greek society context, solidarity politics involve any amalgam of far left and/or anarchist sympathisers who may comprise adjacent ideological communities, participate in overlapping activities such as rallies, but are not insurgents or terrorists. Positioning of the Revolutionary Struggle Organisation : The manifesto tries to frame the RS as a continuation of armed resistance in a new era (“post-17N”, which in turn implies a power vacuum ought to be filled), albeit sporadically, with a global anti-imperialist framing. Call to Revolution & Offensive Action : The RS explicitly rejects peaceful solutions as illusions. It calls for direct attacks on institutions of capitalism and state power and for shifting fear “into the system.” It finally presents armed struggle as part of raising consciousness and creating conditions for a broader revolutionary conflict. Political & Military Capabilities Continuing the tradition of 17N, the RS had the organisation of a small, clandestine, urban & guerrilla warfare unit, deploying a small group of dedicated militants. Naturally organised through each militant’s skillset, the RS had a dedicated guerrilla member, Maziotis, and a dedicated ideologue member, his partner Pola Roupa. (19)  “Roupa,” a high-level security source in Athens, said: “talks the revolutionary talk as evidenced from her regular online posts on Athens Indymedia, but it was Maziotis who walked the walk. It was his fanatical determination to remain relevant, to raise the stakes, it was his ambition for the group to stand alongside 17N in the Greek pantheon of great revolutionary forces that kept RS going.” (20) The same author later echoes: Roupa may be the group’s chief ideologue, talking the revolutionary talk as evidenced from her regular posts, but it was Maziotis who walked the guerrilla walk. (21) Operationally, the group demonstrated capacity for (1) sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IED) timing intended to target first responders, (2) small-arms ambushes, and (3) heavier weapon use, including an RPG-7 attack on the U.S. Embassy, possibly inspired by 17N’s second period in the 1980s, which saw the introduction of bombs and explosives. (22)  Police raids associated with the 2010 crackdown reportedly recovered a substantial weapons cache, including the RPG-7 believed linked to the 2007 embassy attack, consistent with an urban safehouse strategy. (23) Alleged arms-market links  An EU Parliament research briefing notes “rumours” that RS and CCF purchased weapons from Albanian organised crime groups, explicitly cautioning that there was “no hard evidence” of convergence in that discussion.  (24) Such material is best treated at the hypothesis level. Modus Operandi: The Operational Cycle First, the organisation would select a symbol that matched its stated ideological objectives outlined in the previous section. Second, they’d attack the symbol in a high-profile manner that aimed to attract as much attention as possible. Third, they claimed responsibility for their actions, to seize control of the narrative and manage publicity, through extended ideological texts. Lastly, between attacks, they’d reinforce their previous statements, claiming continuity and status in the “Greek armed resistance lineage”. For example, in September 2003, they chose the Evelpidon courthouse, symbolically tied to the state’s coercive & judicial apparatus and timed the attack alongside the ongoing 17N trial. They carried out a highly visible attack that Kassimeris describes as intended to hit responding police, forcing attention onto the group.  (25) From there, they repeatedly picked Western symbols and struck them in ways designed for maximum visibility, most famously the rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy (2007) and later the car bomb at the Athens Stock Exchange (2009), then followed by issuing claims and framing texts to control interpretation and justify escalation.  (26) The propaganda step is structural: after early attacks they circulated long manifesto-style communiqués (e.g., “New World Order or the Terrorism International”), and during their attempted resurgence they paired the 2014 Bank of Greece car-bombing with a lengthy declaration, explicitly threatening the “IMF/ECB/EU troika,” reinforcing the idea that messaging and status-building were part of the operation. (27) Relations, Alliances, and Possible State Bias 17N and RS RS’s debut and early communication strategy tracked the 17N “media ritual” of long ideological texts and claims of responsibility. Contemporary analyses describe RS as “pick[ing] up the baton” in the post-17N period, and several institutional descriptions added RS to lists in language suggesting a “splinter” or “offshoot.” (28)  However, the link between 17N and RS is strongest in style, framing and symbolism rather than in documentary-proven organisational continuity. Both 17N and RS were secretive, but 17N was a far-left, nationalist organisation, which had Alexandros Giotopoulos as a de facto leader and Dimitris Koufontinas as a primary recruiter and operational leader. The RS lacks any mention of substantial patriotism or nationalism and functioned in an anarchical manner, streamlined with their ideology. In practice, RS was treated by authorities and media as the most serious domestic threat “since” 17N, reinforcing the succession narrative even when reporting simultaneously stressed domestic and local organisation. Embeddedness in Anarchism RS repeatedly used sympathetic or anti‑establishment publication channels, most notably To Pontiki (for claims and political texts) and later anarchist web platforms (Athens Indymedia). Reuters reporting on the 2014 car bomb claim located RS’s statement on an “anti‑establishment website,” illustrating a persistent relationship with movement‑adjacent media infrastructures rather than a formal political wing.  (29) In this Greek context, cooperation often takes the form of shared prisoner support, propaganda amplification, or logistics via personal networks, rather than durable inter‑group mergers. Operational Cooperation with CCF  The clearest open-source indication of operational convergence is the 2016 attempted helicopter escape aimed at freeing Maziotis as well as “other political prisoners.” Reporting in  Kathimerini  and  eKathimerini  describes Roupa’s own account on Indymedia that the plan was political, encompassed additional prisoners, and that she would not have hired a large helicopter if she intended only to free her partner.  (30) Separate  Kathimerini  reporting further states that Roupa later acknowledged allocating robbery proceeds toward organising an escape plan that included members of CCF held at Korydallos.  (31) These accounts point to opportunistic, prison-based coalitions: alliances driven by likely shared prisoner identity, collective campaigns, and common antagonism to high-security prisons, rather than by a strategic and unified operational programme. Relations with other Greek armed groups Europol’s TE-SAT reporting situates RS among multiple left-wing & anarchist organisations active in the late 2000s (e.g., Sect of Revolutionaries and OPLA). Notably, TE-SAT 2010 records that a 2009 murder by the Sect of Revolutionaries targeted a police officer guarding a witness in a case “against Epanastatikos Agonas,” (RS). The report reads “Sekta Epanastaton appeared for the first time in 2009 and claimed responsibility for an attack on 16 June 2009, in which a police officer was killed while on duty guarding the house of a witness involved in an investigation against Epanastatikos Agonas. The latter claimed responsibility for an attack on police officers on duty at the Ministry of Culture in Athens in January 2009. The attackers opened fire and threw a hand grenade, seriously injuring one officer. (32)  Indicating an ecosystem where groups’ activities intersected through investigations, retaliation narratives, and competition for “armed struggle” status. This illustrates how state investigations can create indirect relational ties: one group’s targets and motives may be shaped by another group’s legal exposure. Specifically, a mainstream Greek outlet reported that Koufontinas (17N) and Maziotis shared the same cell in Domokos prison and that Maziotis joined a hunger strike “in support” of Koufontinas. The report states Maziotis “was until recently” one of Koufontinas’ cellmates. (33)  Co-authored protest letters have also been published. A Greek news report states Koufontinas (17N) and Gournas (former RS member) jointly sent a letter condemning “high-security prisons,” characterising them as “Greek Guantánamo.” (34) Greek media reported that Maziotis was attacked by fellow inmates and stabbed in Korydallos, prompting an official preliminary inquiry by the Justice Ministry’s anti-crime policy secretary. In the initial reporting of the incident, Maziotis referred to his assailants as Albanians, and he was saved by Turkish and Kurdish inmates.  (35) After this, CCF members, brothers Tsakalotos, accused him in a joint statement released from prison, of “informant behaviour”, as he was “photographing” the assailants by mentioning their ethnicity, thus going against the prison code and providing the Greek state with vital information. The brothers made further references to his megalomania and bruised ego, mentioning his need for psychiatric help, but refused to elaborate further.  (36) Their assessment is parallel to the high-level security officials, who stated that it is Maziotis’ drive to remain relevant that is the fuel of RS. As such, any attribution of RS motives to ideology is fickle, since the RS lacks the ideological spine of 17N and CCF, and Maziotis is at odds with the rest of the “far-left” community the Greek state uses as a blanket term.  Current Status Open sources strongly support the assessment that RS is presently inactive as an organisation with a coherent operational capability. Since their core members got arrested, there have been no widely accepted, credible claims of RS attacks after the mid‑2010s, and institutional reporting focuses on other anarchist/left‑wing cells rather than RS. Europol TE‑SAT 2025 describes Greece’s 2024 left‑wing/anarchist arrests and incidents in terms of newly established cells and contemporary propaganda themes, with no indication that RS itself is operationally active. (37) Pola Roupa : eKathimerini reports that Roupa received conditional release on 17 November 2023 (mother of an underage child), with her sentence reduced in earlier proceedings related to the 2014 Bank of Greece bombing case. (38) Nikos Maziotis : Greek mainstream reporting ( in.gr ) documents repeated parole denials (sixth rejection reported in winter 2025), including quoted reasoning referencing “lack of moral improvement” and continued political self‑identification. (39) Residual capability: Legacy arsenals Even if RS is inactive, legacy material and know-how can persist in milieus. In November 2024, eKathimerini reported the discovery of a long‑rented arms cache (rented since 2008) that police believed could be linked to groups active in the late 2000s and early 2010s, explicitly naming RS, CCF and others as possible historical referents. (40)  Therefore, successor groups (or unaffiliated actors) are more likely to hoard old, dormant stockpiles and use them in future actions, rather than RS reconstituting as an organisation. Successor‑group Dynamics Reuters reporting in April 2025 on a previously unknown urban guerrilla group noted Greek police were examining the claim “without ruling out links with groups active in the past.”  (41) This reflects (a) a continuing “scene” from which new terrorist cells can emerge; and (b) the established, state-sponsored attributional habit of treating new incidents as potentially genealogically connected to older organisations such as RS, with all the biases this conceptualisation involves. Works Cited (1) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment.” (2015) (2) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists: The Revolutionary Struggle.” (2011) (3) - Athens Indymedia, “Post 635625,” accessed February 16, 2026, https://athens.indymedia.org/post/635625/ . (4) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s Ulrike Meinhof: Pola Roupa and the Revolutionary Struggle.” (2019) (5) - Minas Samatas, “Greek McCarthyism: A Comparative Assessment of Greek Post–Civil War Repressive Anticommunism and the U.S. Truman–McCarthy Era,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 13, nos. 3–4 (Fall–Winter 1986): 5–75, accessed February 17, 2026, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Greek-McCarthyism%3A-A-Comparative-Assessment-of-War-Samatas/951c45abaff529c5384cf00e3b337a13739d5cd1 . and George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism,” International Affairs 89, no. 1 (January 2013): 131–142, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12008 . (6) - Kassimeris, “Europe’s Last Red Terrorists: The Revolutionary Organization 17 November, 1975-2000.” (2001) (7) - Kassimeris, (2015) (8) - Banoutsos, “ANTI-TERROR LEGISLATION IN GREECE.” (2007), (9) - Chainoglou, “Counterterrorism Policy and Legislation in Greece.” (2017) (10) - Dimitris Christopoulos, Dimitris Kousouris, Dimosthenis Papadatos-Anagnostopoulos, Clio Papapantoleon, and Alexandros Sakelariou, Mapping Ultra-Right Extremism, Xenophobia and Racism within the Greek State Apparatus, ed. Dimitris Christopoulos (Brussels: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, March 2014), PDF, accessed February 16, 2026, https://rosalux.nyc/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/rightwing_a4_web16.pdf . (11) - Β. Γ. Λαμπρόπουλος, “Άνω του 50% των αστυνομικών ψήφισε Χρυσή Αυγή!,” Το Βήμα, May 26, 2014, https://www.tovima.gr/2014/05/26/society/anw-toy-50-twn-astynomikwn-psifise-xrysi-aygi/ . (12) - Christopoulos et al., Mapping Ultra-Right Extremism, p. 26-27. (13) - Jupskås and Fielitz, “Far-Right Violence in Greece in Comparative Perspective.” (2022) (14) - Europol, TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report  (The Hague: European Police Office, 2010), https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2010_1.pdf . (15) - Karyotis, “Securitization of Greek Terrorism and Arrest of the `Revolutionary Organization November 17’.” (16) - George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism.” (2013), p. 136-137 (17) - Georgia Chantzi, The Evolution of Terrorism in Greece: From 1975 to 2009, Research Paper no. 158 (Athens: Research Institute for European and American Studies [RIEAS], March 2012), PDF https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/139892/rieas158.pdf . (18) - Athens Indymedia, “Post 635625”, https://athens.indymedia.org/post/635625/ (19) - Το Ποντίκι Web, “«Ο αγώνας συνεχίζεται»-Πολιτικό μανιφέστο από Ρούπα-Μαζιώτη ενώπιον του Εφετείου,” Το Ποντίκι ( topontiki.gr ), January 17, 2017, https://www.topontiki.gr/2017/01/17/ο-αγώνας-συνεχίζεται-πολιτικό-μανι/ . (20) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s Terrorism Problem: A Reassessment.” (2015) (21) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s Ulrike Meinhof: Pola Roupa and the Revolutionary Struggle.” (2019) (22) - Sotirios Karampampas, “How Has the Phenomenon of Revolutionary Groups Been Resilient in Greece? A Relational Study of Two Contentious Episodes (1965–2002)” (PhD diss., University of Sheffield, December 2017), https://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/21916/1/How%20Has%20the%20Phenomenon%20of%20Revolutionary%20Groups%20Been%20Resilient%20in%20Greece%20-%20S%20Karampampas.pdf . (23) - Newsroom, “Group’s Weapons Cache Found,” Kathimerini (eKathimerini), April 21, 2010, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/68301/group-s-weapons-cache-found/ . (24) - European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Europe’s Crime-Terror Nexus: Links between Terrorist and Organised Crime Groups in the European Union  (Brussels: European Parliament, 2012), [page number], https://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201211/20121127ATT56707/20121127ATT56707EN.pdf . (25) - Kassimeris, “Greece’s New Generation of Terrorists: The Revolutionary Struggle.” (2011) (26) - Karolos Grohmann, “Suspected Greek Militants Fire Rocket at U.S. Embassy,” Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uk/suspected-greek-militants-fire-rocket-at-us-embassy-idUSL12417386/ . and Reuters, “Greek Leftist Guerrillas Claim U.S. Embassy Attack,” Reuters, August 9, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-attack/greek-leftist-guerrillas-claim-u-s-embassy-attack-idUSL2438467920070124/ . (27) - Reuters, “Guerrilla Group Says It Carried Out Greek Central Bank Bombing,” Reuters, April 25, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/guerrilla-group-says-it-carried-out-greek-central-bank-bombing-idUSBREA3O1DC/ . (28) - George Kassimeris, “Greece: The Persistence of Political Terrorism,” (2013) (29) - Reuters, “Guerrilla Group Says It Carried Out Greek Central Bank Bombing,” (2014) (30) - Newsroom, “Fugitive Terrorist Describes Failed Prison Break” (2016) (31) - Newsroom, “Αποφυλακίστηκε Η Πόλα Ρούπα.” (2023) (32) - Europol, TE-SAT 2010: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report  (The Hague: European Police Office, 2010), https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/tesat2010_1.pdf . (33) - "Κουφοντίνας: απεργία πείνας από συγκρατούμενους του για συμπαράσταση" [Koufontinas: Hunger strike by his fellow inmates in solidarity], Antenna.gr , January 27, 2021, https://www.antenna.gr/Society/article/4/593672/koyfontinas-apergia-peinas-apo-sygkratoymenoys-toy-gia-symparastasi . (34) - TheTOC Team, "Επιστολή Κουφοντίνα - Γουρνά με αιχμές για ελληνικά... Γκουαντάναμο" [Letter from Koufontinas - Gournas with barbs about Greek... Guantanamo], TheTOC , March 28, 2014, https://www.thetoc.gr/koinwnia/article/epistoli-koufontina-gourna-me-aixmes-gia-ellinika-gkouantanamo . (35) - LiFO Newsroom, "Κρατούμενοι μαχαίρωσαν τον Μαζιώτη στο κελί του στον Κορυδαλλό - Προκαταρκτική εξέταση," LiFO , December 22, 2017, https://www.lifo.gr/now/greece/kratoymenoi-mahairosan-ton-mazioti-sto-keli-toy-ston-korydallo-prokatarktiki-exetasi . (36) - Gerasimos Tsakalos and Christos Tsakalos, "ΣΠΦ κατά Μαζιώτη: «Μεγαλομανής και καταδότης»," The Press Project , December 23, 2017, https://thepressproject.gr/spf-kata-mazioti-megalomanis-kai-katadotis . (37) - Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2025  (The Hague: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2025), https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EU_TE-SAT_2025.pdf . (38) - Newsroom, “Αποφυλακίστηκε Η Πόλα Ρούπα.” (2023) (39) - Μαλλιαρού, “Νίκος Μαζιώτης: Απορρίφθηκε Για Έκτη Φορά Το Αίτημα Αποφυλάκισης Υπό Όρους – Η Επιστολή Του Από Τις Φυλακές Δομοκού.” (40) - Souliotis, “Arms Bust Linked to Past Guerrilla Groups.” (November 21, 2024) https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1254022/arms-bust-linked-to-past-guerrilla-groups/ (41) - "Greek Urban Guerrilla Group Claims Attack on Hellenic Train," Reuters , April 14, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/greek-urban-guerrilla-group-claims-attack-hellenic-train-2025-04-14/ .

Insurgency Overview The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is one of the many ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) engaged in the ongoing Myanmar civil war. Primarily active in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the group was formed in 2013 by its leader, Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, in reaction to the widespread persecution of the Rohingya people (1) . The ARSA is aligned with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s ruling military junta, along with the Four Brothers Alliance, made up of the ARSA and other Rohingya EAOs (2) . The group aims to achieve self-determination for the Rohingya people through separatism, and despite declaring itself as secular, it has been accused of Islamist and Jihadist practices (3) . Currently, its leadership is based out of Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia (4) . While many of the EAOs involved in the civil war are well armed and have a formal paramilitary structure, the ARSA is distinct in that it is a poorly equipped informal militia. Due to its limited capacity for conventional tactics commonly used by other EAOs, its attacks are characterised by guerrilla warfare. The ARSA has been accused of various atrocities and war crimes, as well as enforcing traditional Islamic practices through force (3) . History & Foundations The Rohingya people, who hail from Rakhine State and practice Islam, are one of the world’s largest stateless people and face extreme persecution in Myanmar. Since the independence of Myanmar, then known as Burma, from the British Empire in 1948, the Rohingya have been deprived of their rights and subjected to numerous atrocities. In 1978, the ruling military junta confiscated the identification cards of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya and expelled them to Bangladesh. They were eventually allowed to return, but were subsequently considered Bangladeshi. The Rohingya became stateless in 1982 after a citizenship law was passed that recognised Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities. However, the Rohingya were left off this list. This paved the way for further persecution, with many cases of ethnic cleansing, pogroms, religious persecution, sexual violence, forced labour, and forced displacement in the following decades. This precipitated a refugee crisis in which most of the Rohingya population has been displaced (1) . There are long-lasting ethnic tensions in Rakhine State between the Rohingya, the majority in the north of the region, and the Buddhist Rakhine people. They came to a head in 2012 during a series of riots in response to the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman, allegedly perpetrated by Rohingya youth. Over the course of the riots, roughly 200 people were killed, and over 100,000 Rohingya were forcefully displaced (5) . In reaction to the riots, Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a Pakistan-born Rohingya imam, drew on the heightened tensions caused by the riots to begin recruiting for an armed group known as Harakah al-Yaqin. This group later became the ARSA (3) . Jununi spent the next three years recruiting and training members ahead of the launch of its armed campaign in 2016. The first major action of its campaign were raids on three police posts in October of that year. The ARSA looted weapons and equipment and killed nine police officers in the process. In response, the Tatmadaw furthered its persecution of the Rohingya, regardless of their affiliation with the ARSA, forcing another 90,000 Rohingya into displacement. Officials labelled the ARSA as terrorists and claimed that it was affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, an allegation that the ARSA denies (1) . These attacks coincided with the formation of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, an international commission led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The commission was established to produce a report analysing the human rights of both the Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine in the region. All parties involved expected that the release of the report would heavily condemn the conditions of the Rohingya and put international pressure on the Tatmadaw and government to curtail human rights abuses. This was understood by the Rakhine people to constitute interference in their local affairs (3) . Harakah al-Yaqin was renamed to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in March 2017. More violence came that year when, expecting incoming international attention from the report, the ARSA preemptively attacked military and police facilities. The ARSA believed that the Tatmadaw cracked down on the Rohingya once again ahead of the report, so the organisation thought to get ahead of the military by launching its own offensive. The ARSA attacked over 20 police posts and an army base in the Maungdaw area in the western corner of Rakhine State on August 25. During the operation, 12 members of the police and Tatmadaw were killed, while the ARSA lost 77 insurgents (6) . Simultaneously, the ARSA carried out the Kha Maung Seik massacre, in which Hindus in nearby villages were taken hostage and killed. There were 99 victims. The Tatmadaw responded with an operation attempting to root out the ARSA in the region, in the process assaulting many civilians not affiliated with the group. This prompted 700,000 Rohingya to flee the country (7) . After two years of sporadic attacks, the ARSA regrouped in 2020 in Maungdaw. The timing was advantageous for the ARSA, as in February 2021, the Tatmadaw would launch a coup d'état against the democratically elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The country soon after erupted into a civil war between the military, the government-in-exile, known as the National Unity Government (NUG), and its paramilitary branch, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), with allied EAOs on both sides. The ARSA found itself stuck in the middle, primarily fighting against the Tatmadaw and the NUG-aligned Arakan Army. In November of that year, renewed clashes between the ARSA and Tatmadaw broke out in Maungdaw (8) . Meanwhile, Rohingya human rights activist Mohib Ullah was assassinated by the ARSA in the Kutupalong refugee camp. The camp, located in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, is the largest refugee camp in the world, and most of its population of nearly 700,000 are Rohingya. The ARSA has a presence in Kutupalong and other camps like it in the region. Ullah led the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, which the ARSA saw as a threat to its power and thus had him killed, as alleged by Bangladeshi law enforcement (5) . In 2022, Bangladeshi police cracked down on the ARSA, arresting over 800 individuals connected to the group. Three of those individuals were high-ranking members arrested in a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar. These were Abu Bakkar, an ARSA camp leader, Syedul Amin, a gun runner, and Nur Mohammad, a chairman of the group’s fatwa committee (9) . In early 2023, the ARSA clashed with the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), a rival group, in the Konarpara Refugee Camp near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. The RSO attacked an ARSA meeting, and a gunfight broke out, killing one RSO man (10) . The ARSA allegedly killed Kutupalong refugee camp warden Mohammad Ebadullah on July 6, 2023, as he was collecting witnesses to testify to an International Criminal Court prosecutor. More clashes between the ARSA and RSO immediately followed, with six combatants killed the following day (11) . The ARSA failed to advance into AA territory in the Mayu mountains of northern Rakhine state later that month. In return, the AA seized an ARSA outpost (12) . As tensions between the ARSA and the AA rose, the ARSA began to collaborate with the Tatmadaw. The ARSA has been reported to force young men to join the Tatmadaw (2) . In March 2025, Bangladeshi counterterrorism officers arrested leader Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi along with nine others affiliated with the ARSA near the capital Dhaka, seizing a significant amount of money in the process. Jununi was charged with murder, illegal entry, sabotage, and militant activities (13) . Maulana Borhan, the ARSA’s chief spokesperson, took charge following Jununi’s arrest (5) . Objectives & Ideology According to the ARSA, the organisation’s primary goal is to defend the persecuted Rohingya and restore their basic rights that have been taken away by Myanmar’s government. While the ARSA claims to be secular and not affiliated with foreign Islamist groups and finance networks, this claim has been disputed by law enforcement officials in Myanmar and Bangladesh (3) . Furthermore, it has been known to enforce traditional Islamic values and practices through force, going as far as to forcefully convert Hindu captives in at least one instance (7) . However, there is little evidence to suggest international funding, especially given the group’s limited access to sophisticated weapons and equipment. Framing the Rohingya as Islamist terrorists is also a tactic that has long been used by Myanmar government officials to spread fear of the Rohingya and delegitimise their political goals (1, 4) . Political & Military Capabilities The ARSA does not control significant amounts of territory and instead acts from clandestine camps in rural areas. Therefore, it does not have a role in any political administration, unlike other EAOs. It is particularly present in the Maungdaw region of western Rakhine State, as well as in refugee camps in Bangladesh with a significant Rohingya population, such as Kutupalong and Konarpara. In these camps they do hold some power as one faction vying for power in a chaotic environment. These camps also serve as recruiting grounds for the ARSA. ARSA members are very poorly armed. While the organisation has access to some firearms, some of which have been captured from the Tatmadaw and other targets, fighters have been known to often use melee weapons such as swords and machetes. As of March 2024, the ARSA is estimated to have 5,000 fighters in its ranks (5) . Approach to Resistance Because the ARSA does not have the means to hold territory and fight a conventional war in comparison to its state and non-state opponents, it opts instead for guerilla tactics that allow its fighters to attack their targets and quickly retreat before its opponents have a chance to mount a counter-attack. This is seen in the cross-border attacks the ARSA employs, where its fighters will attack a target in Rakhine State before crossing back to Bangladesh, where they are sheltered by sympathetic locals. The ARSA is also known to force civilians to participate in their attacks in order to bolster their numbers (3) . While many of Myanmar’s ethnic nationalist movements have gained legitimate political representation despite their militancy and even degrees of sovereignty, such as in Wa State, the Rohingya have been deprived of any role in the country’s government. This has been one driving factor in the rise in militancy within the larger Rohingya political movement. The ARSA is alleged to have committed a number of atrocities and human rights abuses, including the Kha Maung Seik massacre and forced conversions. According to the United Nations, the ARSA has recruited 150 child soldiers in conjunction with the Tatmadaw (14) . Relations & Alliances In early 2025, the Four Brothers Alliance was formed. Comprising the ARSA, the RSO, the Arakan Rohingya Army, and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, the Alliance is a coalition of former rival organisations that have united to achieve their common goals of Rohingya self-determination and countering the Arakan Army. The Alliance is alleged to have ties with the Tatmadaw and to enforce conscription in Rohingya-populated refugee camps (2) . The ARSA has had a very contradictory relationship with the Tatmadaw. While the two were extremely hostile until 2023, and the ARSA initially aligned itself with the exiled National Unity Government following the outbreak of the civil war, the ARSA formed an alliance with the Tatmadaw following increased clashes between the ARSA and the AA (8) . The AA is one of the largest and most powerful factions fighting against the Tatmadaw in the civil war and poses a major threat to both the ARSA and the Tatmadaw. Despite their past hostility to one another and the Tatmadaw’s major role in the persecution of Rohingya, this is a strategic alliance, as the AA has come to control much of Rakhine State, including the western region where the ARSA’s actions are concentrated (8) . The AA has also targeted the Rohingya under the guise of affiliation with the ARSA and other Rohingya militant groups. This has led to the death and displacement of thousands of Rohingya, further exacerbating the crisis (15) . With its presence in refugee camps within Bangladesh and attacks across the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, the ARSA is a major problem for Bangladeshi security forces. Bangladesh hosts over a million Rohingya refugees and is bearing the brunt of the humanitarian crisis. While Bangladeshi security forces have not engaged in combat with the ARSA, they have instituted several crackdowns on the ARSA and arrested many leading members (9) . Bibliography (1) Lee, R. (2021). Myanmar’s Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA): An Analysis of a New Muslim Militant Group and its Strategic Communications. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15 (6), 61-75. https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-04/Article%204_12.pdf   (2) Rahman, S. (2025, February 16). Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan   (3) Lintner, B. (2017, September 20). The truth behind Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgency. Asia Times . https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/truth-behind-myanmars-rohingya-insurgency/   (4) Tarabay, J. (2017, December 6). Who are Myanmar’s militants? Five questions about ARSA. CNN . https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/12/asia/arsa-rohingya-militants-who-are-they/index.html   (5) Bhattacharya, B. (2025, April 4). Bangladesh: ARSA And Change Of Reign. Eurasia Review . https://www.eurasiareview.com/04042025-bangladesh-arsa-and-change-of-reign-analysis/   (6) Geneva Academy. (2017, December). Myanmar: A Battle For Recognition . https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Myanmar%20A%20Battle%20for%20Recognition.pdf   (7) Amnesty International. (2018, May 22). Myanmar: New evidence reveals Rohingya armed group massacred scores in Rakhine State . https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state/   (8) Lipes, J. (2022, January 18). An outlawed group resurfaces, raising new fears of clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-01182022191002.html   (9) Barua, S. (2022, July 19). Bangladesh police arrest ‘most wanted’ ARSA member at Rohingya camp. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bangladesh-arsa-07192022064545.html   (10) Rahman, A. (2023, January 18). Rohingya settlement on Bangladesh-Myanmar border torched amid fighting. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingaycampfighting-01182023153549.html   (11) Rahman, S. (2023, July 8). Seven Rohingya Refugees Killed in Violence in Bangladesh. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/seven-rohingya-refugees-killed-in-violence-in-bangladesh-/7172474.html   (12) The Irrawaddy. (2023, July 22). Rakhine State Clash Reported Between AA and Rohingya Militants. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rakhine-state-clash-reported-between-aa-and-rohingya-militants.html    (13) MacSwan, A. (2025, March 19). Bangladesh arrests leader of Rohingya insurgent group on criminal charges. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-arrests-leader-rohingya-insurgent-group-criminal-charges-2025-03-19/   (14) United Nations General Assembly Security Council. (2025, June 17). Children and armed conflict.   https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247   (15) International Crisis Group. (2024, August 27). Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State . https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/339-breaking-away-battle-myanmars-rakhine-state

Insurgency Overview The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) is an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) active in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The organisation, composed of Rohingya Muslims, was founded in 1982 with the goal of establishing rights and autonomy for the Rohingya people. It declared a ceasefire in 1998 before resuming its armed campaign in 2021 following the start of the ongoing Myanmar civil war (1) . Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the RSO led a campaign against the Myanmar government as the persecution and displacement of the Rohingya rose (2) . The RSO is currently fighting alongside the military, known as the Tatmadaw, along with other allied Rohingya EAOs, against the Arakan Army (AA), an EAO allied to the exiled National Unity Government (3) . It is also an important force within Bangladesh’s Rohingya-populated refugee camps, where the RSO and other Rohingya EAOs hold significant power and fight for control. It is estimated that the RSO currently has between 3000 and 5000 members (4) . History & Foundations The Rohingya have faced persecution and displacement since Myanmar, then known as Burma, became independent in 1948. Following independence, the Rohingya were considered foreigners and denied citizenship, which led to instances of ethnic cleansing. In response, the Rohingya began to form political and militant organisations to ensure their self-determination, which the government reacted to by launching counterinsurgencies in the 1950s. In 1962, General Ne Win seized power in a military coup and established the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Upon seizing power, Ne Win and the Tatmadaw began to crack down on Rohingya political organisations (2) . 1964 saw the establishment of the Rohingya Independence Front, a political organisation seeking to create an independent Rohingya state. The group was renamed and restructured multiple times, becoming the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1973. The following year, the Tatmadaw launched Operation Dragon King, with the goal of registering citizens in what is now Rakhine State. However, the Tatmadaw displaced many Rohingya during the operation, resulting in further ethnic cleansing. Over 200,000 Rohingya were forced to flee the country during the operation, creating a humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Bangladesh. Members of organisations such as the RPF were targeted for arrest, leading to tensions within the group (2) . In 1982, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation split off from the RPF. Made up of the RPF’s most hardline Islamist members and led by secretary general Muhammad Yunus, the RSO rose to prominence as the main Rohingya militant organisation and established ties to Islamist groups in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India, and Malaysia. It was able to source an arsenal of Chinese-produced arms from Thai arms dealers and set up training camps in southeastern Bangladesh, where many Rohingya refugees had fled to from Myanmar (2) . This build up along the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border prompted the Tatmadaw to launch Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation in 1991, an offensive against the RSO. In the process, soldiers also sought to expel Rohingya civilians labelled as foreigners, a common label incorrectly placed on Rohingya. The RSO remained uninhibited, and over 250,000 Rohingya were displaced due to the operation. Additionally, the Tatmadaw accidentally crossed the border and attacked a Bangladeshi military outpost, harming relations between the two countries (2) . In April 1994, nine bombs targeting government buildings went off in Maungdaw township. Although no one was killed, the Tatmadaw blamed the bombings on the RSO. However, an investigation by the Human Rights Watch alleged that while the RSO had a plan to cross the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border and plant bombs in the township, the unit sent on the bombing mission was caught and killed by the Tatmadaw’s Border Guard Force, with 30 RSO fatalities. This led to a pause in ongoing repatriations of Rohingya refugees while the Tatmadaw interrogated, tortured, and disappeared Rohingya people in Maungdaw township, accused of being affiliated with the RSO (5) . In late 1998, the RSO merged with the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front to create the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, a political organisation advocating for the rights of the Rohingya. It did have an armed wing, the Rohingya National Army, that waged a brief insurgency in Myanmar. This merger, however, effectively saw the dissolution of the RSO (2). In its wake, the RSO left a power vacuum within the Rohingya political sphere and created room for a new militant organisation to take its place. In 2013, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was formed. The group launched its armed campaign against the Tatmadaw in 2016, leading to renewed violence in Rohingya-populated regions in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw retaliated against the ARSA with indiscriminate violence and the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya villages, resulting in over 700,000 Rohingya fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh (6) . In 2021, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup d’état and established a military junta, known as the State Administration Council. Mass anti-junta protests broke out soon after, which were received with violent crackdowns from the Tatmadaw (7) . EAOs across the country increased their own operations in response to the unrest, culminating in the ongoing Myanmar civil war. One of these EAOs was the RSO, which rearmed itself shortly after the coup (8) . This time, the RSO was supported by Bangladesh, whose security forces sought to apply pressure against the Arakan Army, an EAO made up of the predominantly Buddhist Rakhine people and the strongest armed group in Rakhine State (4) . The AA has allegedly carried out atrocities against Rohingya, such as sectarian killings and village burnings. Currently, the AA controls the vast majority of Rakhine State (9) . The RSO’s first operation after its reformation was an assault on a Tatmadaw post in March 2021, killing 22 soldiers. In a statement following the raid, the RSO claimed that it would continue its attacks until they achieved the “freedom of Rakhine” and repatriation of all Rohingya refugees (10) . Meanwhile, the RSO and the ARSA began to vie for power in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and in western Rakhine State. Maungdaw Township was a particularly significant region, long being a hotbed of sectarian violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists (8) . Control of refugee camps is strategically important for both organisations as it allows them to launch offensives into Myanmar as well as control extortion rackets for cross-border trade. The ARSA’s reputation as alleged criminals with a practice of human rights abuses led to some Rohingya taking the side of the RSO over the ARSA (11) . January 2023 saw the first instance of open clashes between the RSO and the ARSA when the RSO attacked an ARSA meeting in the Konarpara Refugee Camp, near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. One RSO man was killed and the RSO offensive on the area, known as “no man’s land,” led to the clearing of the camps (11, 12) . More fighting between the RSO and the ARSA happened in July 2023 after the ARSA allegedly killed the warden of Kutupalong refugee camp for bringing forth witnesses to an International Criminal Court prosecutor. Clashes between the two groups followed, killing six (13) . In February 2024, the AA and RSO allegedly partook in a joint offensive to drive the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) out of a border post located in Dhekibuniya, a village in Rakhine State that it had captured from Myanmar’s Border Guard Police. The ARA were then driven out of Myanmar to Bangladesh by the RSO and AA (14) . In May 2024, the RSO was accused of abducting and forcibly conscripting Rohingya from refugee camps to fight for the Tatmadaw. An RSO spokesperson claimed that they were only taking individuals who had already been trained by the RSO, which some of the families of those abducted denied (15) . The Four Brothers Alliance was formed in early 2025. Made up of the RSO, ARSA, ARA, and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, another Rohingya Islamist insurgent group, the alliance formed amongst former rivals to counter the dominant AA by fighting alongside the Tatmadaw (16) . Objectives & Ideology The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation advocates first and foremost for Rohingya self-determination. While it is nominally an Islamist group and has been accused of having ties with Al-Qaeda and other hardline foreign Islamist organisations in the past, the group’s goals are not necessarily religious (2) . The RSO claims it strives for a system that allows the Rohingya, as well as the country’s other religious and ethnic minorities, autonomy within the existing state of Myanmar. It is not a separatist organisation and, in principle, seeks to help reestablish democracy in the country. Specifically, the RSO believes in the creation of a Rohingya-majority autonomous region in northern Rakhine State. It also hopes to achieve the enfranchisement of the Rohingya people, prioritizing rights to religious and cultural freedom, education, employment and resources, political participation, and repatriation of refugees (1) . Despite its claims to support the end of the military junta and the reestablishment of a civilian government, the RSO continues to collaborate with the Tatmadaw. While the two former rivals’ relationship is contradictory, the most significant player in Rakhine State at the moment is their common enemy, the Arakan Army. This may have persuaded the RSO to put aside some of their political goals in order to root out the AA, who are seen as posing an existential threat to the Rohingya (17) . Political & Military Capabilities For the Rohingya ethnic armed organisations, control of refugee camps in Bangladesh is very important. Besides their strong military position along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, the camps also serve as prime recruiting grounds and allow the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and other groups to exert political control over the Rohingya diaspora (11). Bangladeshi authorities have been seen working in collaboration with the RSO within refugee camps, giving the organisation legitimacy (17) . Maintaining a positive opinion amongst the camp’s occupants is also important for the RSO. For this reason, the RSO attempts to present the image of an organised, highly trained, and well-armed fighting force (11) . It is structured as a paramilitary organisation with cadres in various refugee camps and a central leadership. While initially following its rearmament the RSO was viewed positively by some within the Rohingya diaspora due to the ARSA’s reputation for thuggery in refugee camps, the diaspora has recently become more critical of its presence in the camps due to its allegiances and participation in forced recruitment on behalf of the Tatmadaw (15) . The RSO has also been alleged to recruit child soldiers and perform extrajudicial killings, further damaging its reputation (17, 18) . Approach to Resistance Although the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation is not one of Myanmar’s largest or strongest EAOs, with an estimated 3000 to 5000 members, it has been able to effectively utilize its various strategic advantages (4) . A tactic often used by the RSO is to launch offensives into Myanmar from refugee camps in Bangladesh before retreating back into them, where its forces blend in with the local populace and cannot be followed by the Arakan Army, or formerly the Tatmadaw, who have a hostile relationship with Bangladesh. These strikes attack the western flank of AA’s territory, forcing it to divert attention away from the Tatmadaw to its east. Similar to other EAOs active in the civil war, the RSO is typically seen using common light arms such as AK-pattern rifles. While this equipment is not as advanced as what the Tatmadaw and the larger EAOs have access to, these arms are well-suited to the organisation’s fast-moving style of guerrilla warfare and the jungle-filled, mountainous geography of Rakhine State (11) . Relations & Alliances Currently, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’s main opponent is the Arakan Army. The AA has been accused of carrying out numerous atrocities against the Rohingya, and it is seen as a significant threat by them. The AA controls and administers most of Rakhine State, making it difficult for the RSO or other Rohingya EAOs to establish a foothold in Myanmar. This also creates a perceived need for groups like the RSO, as there is no presence within Myanmar itself looking out for the Rohingya , given the Tatmadaw and the ARSA’s disregard for their human rights. However, the RSO allegedly approached the AA to form an alliance prior to the establishment of the Four Brothers Alliance, and the two groups did collaborate on an operation against the RSO’s current allies, the Arakan Rohingya Army, in February 2024 (3, 14) . The Alliance was formed by groups that were previously opposed to one another. However, with the AA’s dominance of Rakhine State and the warming of relations between Rohingya EAOs and the Tatmadaw, the rivals came together in order to fight against the stronger AA (16) . While there is much ideological overlap between the Alliance’s members, there are some key differences. The RSO has claimed that the difference between itself and the ARSA is that while the ARSA is made up of ill-equipped thugs, the RSO is a highly trained military force (11) . The groups’ power struggles within refugee camps and collaboration with the junta has also caused strain with the civilian Rohingya population. While the RSO’s current agreement with the Tatmadaw comes after a long period of conflict between the two, it is also a marriage of convenience, as the RSO’s ability to perform guerrilla offensives into AA territory proves to be a thorn in the side of the Army, one of the largest and strongest forces the Tatmadaw is up against in the Civil War. Prior to the formation of the Four Brothers Alliance, the RSO had an informal truce with the Tatmadaw (3) . Bangladesh has been dealing with the Rohingya crisis for decades and houses many large refugee camps populated by Rohingya, hosting over a million refugees (4) . While the conflicts in these camps between Rohingya political groups have been a security issue for Bangladesh, the country has allegedly backed the RSO in order to contain the AA, and its law enforcement agencies have worked with the RSO in refugee camps to control the ARSA (6, 17) . Another motivation for Bangladeshi officials to back the RSO is the repatriation of displaced Rohingya that the organisation hopes to achieve, which would alleviate the refugee crisis in Bangladesh (4) . Bibliography (1) Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (2022). Manifesto of RSO . https://rsomedia.org/manifesto-of-rso/   (2) Lintner, B. (2001). Bangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation. South Asia Terrorism Portal . https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/Article1.htm (3) Ghoshal, D. (2024, September 6). On Myanmar’s frontline, Rohingya fighters and junta face a common enemy. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-frontline-rohingya-fighters-junta-face-common-enemy-2024-09-06/ (4) Ghoshal, D. and McPherson, P. (2024, November 25). In world’s largest refugee camps, Rohingya mobilise to fight in Myanmar. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/worlds-largest-refugee-camps-rohingya-mobilise-fight-myanmar-2024-11-25/   (5) Human Rights Watch (1996, September 1). Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?   https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/1996/en/21956   (6) Bhattacharya, S. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army. Sri Lanka Guardian . https://slguardian.org/bangladesh-change-of-reign-in-arakan-army/   (7) Lipes, J. (2022, January 18). An outlawed group resurfaces, raising new fears of clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-01182022191002.html   (8) The Irrawaddy (2021, September 20). Rohingya Armed Groups Active Again in Western Myanmar. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-armed-groups-active-again-in-western-myanmar.html#google_vignette (9) Mizzima (2024, February 10). RSO denounces Arakan Army and junta accusations, affirms Rohingya rights. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/10/7035   (10) Alam, S. (2021, March 30). Rohingya militants said to kill 22 Myanmar troops. Anadolu Agency . https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/rohingya-militants-said-to-kill-22-myanmar-troops/2192747   (11) Ahasan, N. (2023, February 2). In Bangladesh’s borderland with Myanmar, 2 Rohingya militant groups fight for dominance. Benar News . https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/rival-groups-02022023135725.html   (12) Smith, B. (2023, 11 December). Competing armed groups pose new threat to Rohingya in Bangladesh . International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/rohingya   (13) Rahman, S. (2023, July 8). Seven Rohingya Refugees Killed in Violence in Bangladesh. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/seven-rohingya-refugees-killed-in-violence-in-bangladesh-/7172474.html   (14) Antu, G. M. (2024, February 10). Bangladeshis fret over unconfirmed return of Rohingya militant Nabi Hossain amid Myanmar conflict. BD News . https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/6vxbpgnzrl   (15) Rahman, S. (2024, May 17). Rohingya families torn apart by conscription. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/346776/rohingya-families-torn-apart-by-conscription   (16) Rahman, S. (2025, February 16). Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan   (17) Fortify Rights (2025, March). “I May Be Killed Any Moment”: Killings, Abductions, Torture, and Other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh. https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/I%20May%20Be%20Killed%20Any%20Moment%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report%20(ENG).pdf   (18) United Nations General Assembly Security Council (2025, June 17). Children and armed conflict.   https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247

Introduction Yet another movement fomented by the notorious neo-Nazi Tom Metzger, White Aryan Resistance (WAR) capitalised on the rise of racist skinhead culture to quickly garner infamy amongst far-right networks. With activity largely consisting of the distribution of racist ideas using various forms of media, including a television series broadcast across local access cable networks, WAR acted as a conduit and central hub for radicalising young skinheads into racial violence. This radicalising process led to tragedy in November 1988, after three WAR-associated skinheads beat Mulugeta Seraw, an Ethiopian student, to death. This led to the incarceration of the murderers and a lawsuit being levelled against WAR by the Southern Poverty Law Centre on behalf of Seraw’s family. This lawsuit found Metzger at least partially culpable for Seraw’s death and resulted in a $12.5 million fine against Metzger’s estate, essentially gutting WAR. Despite this catastrophic blow against WAR, Metzger continued to use the framework of the movement as a mouthpiece for his racism until his death on the 4th of November, 2020, due to Parkinson's disease. History & Foundations Whilst WAR rapidly gained notoriety throughout the 80s, its founder, Tom Metzger, had already earned a reputation as one of the leaders of racially based hatred in the US. A former member of the anti-communist Minutemen paramilitary group, Metzger joined the KKK in 1975 and was quickly anointed as the grand dragon of the California Knights of the KKK (aka KKKK) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Metzger also had a particular affinity for recruiting younger radicals. Known as the "godfather of the racist skinhead scene" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) , Metzger regularly took young men under his wing and further radicalised them towards racism and neo-Nazism. For example, in 1979, Greg Withrow, a teenager from Northern California, generated controversy through his creation of the "White Students Union" at his high school. Metzger quickly got in contact with Withrow and developed a working relationship with the teenager, with the White Student's Union eventually becoming the Aryan Youth Movement (WAR's youth group) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  Despite this concerted effort to further his career in the racist networks of the US, in 1980, Metzger and the leader of the KKK, David Duke, disagreed, leading to Metzger's separation from the group (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Deciding to take a more traditional tack, Metzger instead ran for the US Congress Democratic primary and surprisingly won, with 33,000 or 27% of the votes; however, he lost badly to the Republican candidate in the general election after being disavowed by the Democratic Party (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Despite this initial loss, in the long term, his run in the primaries solidified him as a key figure in the far right.  Following his loss in the primaries, Metzger moved to leverage his newfound popular support and formed the White American Political Association, intending to push "pro-white" (white supremacist) political candidates. With this new backing, Metzger again attempted to run in the Democratic primary in 1982, but this time lost badly, leading to the ex-KKKK grand dragon returning to non-conventional political approaches (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  Moving away from mainstream politics, Metzger renamed the White American Political Association to the White Aryan Resistance, aka WAR. Using local access cable television, WAR quickly began broadcasting Metzger's racist TV show "Race and Reason", as well as disseminating WAR's monthly tabloid newspaper (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR also ran a telephone hotline which disseminated racist information, and an electronic bulletin board to aid skinheads in finding and communicating with other skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  In September 1986, the Race and Reason TV broadcast garnered controversy after it aired an episode featuring an interview with Richard Barrett, a Mississippi lawyer (Turner, 1986) . In the episode, Barrett espoused many openly racist ideas, even suggesting the return of racial segregation and separation. Due to legal restraints, the broadcast could not be pulled. Instead, the local access channel then ran a 90-minute-long call-in session following the episode's airing, where viewers could express their opinions on the episode's content (Turner, 1986) . This led to 39 of the 40 callers protesting the episode's airing.  With WAR officially founded, its real-world activity began to increase. From 1987 to 1988, WAR members carried out a campaign of harassment against the Arizona Anti-Defamation League and a series of synagogues in a similar era (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) . Synagogues were also targeted with nazi/anti-semitic graffiti, egging, and a toy hand grenade was planted in a mailbox. 1987 also saw the growth of WAR in Las Vegas, and the eventual formation of a Las Vegas chapter (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . Metzger's proclivity for recruiting younger members also continued, with teenage WAR Skinheads, led by Dave Mazella, attending a KKK ceremony in Modesto (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) .  1988 saw WAR gain further notoriety both in the public eye and amongst law enforcement circles. Early in the year, an informant notified the FBI that WAR Skinheads were planning a "clean-up week" in San Diego starting around the first of August (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . This "clean-up week" was supposed to consist of the mass slaughter of all minorities and "unwanted persons", but of course never went ahead. Shortly after this supposed "clean up week" was supposed to go ahead, on the 4th of November, John Metzger (the son of Thomas Metzger) made an appearance on a Geraldo Rivera's talk show titled "Teen Hatemongers" where he represented WAR (New York Times, 1988) . After Metzger insulted a black guest, calling him an "Uncle Tom", a fight broke out on stage, leading to Rivera's nose being broken.  1988 also saw Metzger and his son organise the first hate music festival titled 'Aryan Fest', with the event being advertised to skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . This festival, based in Oklahoma, led to Metzger and WAR gaining increased notoriety, with Metzger being invited to speak at numerous rallies and concerts afterwards. During this time, Metzger had taken to leading a group of skinheads on a tour around numerous US talk shows. Through time spent together on this impromptu tour, Dave Mazzella became close with Metzger, leading to his promotion to vice-president of the Aryan Youth Movement (WAR's youth section) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  Unfortunately, this hateful bond led to bloody tragedy. Following Metzger getting word that skinheads in the north west were rapidly developing in strength and activity (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) , the WAR leader sent Mazzella on a trip to Portland to contact a collection of skins known as the East Side White Pride (ESWP) group (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Mazzella was given a letter from Metzger introducing himself, and Mazzella was instructed to arrange a phone call between Metzger and members of ESWP (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  Three weeks after Mazzella arrived in Portland, on the 12th of November, a skinhead from ESWP called Ken Mieske, and two others, murdered Mulugeta Seraw, beating the Ethiopian college student and father to death (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . In court, the three skinheads pled guilty to murder (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) and openly admitted they were followers of WAR (London, 1990) .  Whilst the skinheads who had committed the murder were placed in prison, WAR/Metzger went relatively unscathed by the tragic events they had clearly had a hand in perpetrating. WAR was allowed to continue operating relatively unobstructed until October 1990, when the SPLC and the Anti-Defamation League conducted a civil lawsuit against WAR for the murder of Mulugeta Seraw on behalf of his family (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . More specifically, Metzger was sued for inciting the attack through his promotion of violence against persons of colour (London, 1990), with these attitudes clearly spread to other WAR members, considering that following the murder, the first person Ken Mieske called was John Metzger (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  A jury agreed that Metzger was culpable, and a $12.5 million verdict was levelled against Metzger and WAR (London, 1990) . Metzger lost his house, truck, and tools, and was forced to make monthly payments to Seraw's estate for 20 years, with WAR becoming bankrupt and essentially collapsing (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . The courts openly stated that the considerable monetary amount that WAR was charged had the objective of sending a message to the wider organised hate community (London, 1990) .  Despite this heavy blow to WAR's activities, Metzger continued to use the shell of the organisation as a mouthpiece for his hateful views (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . In January 1992, skinhead members of the Rhode Island WAR sent letters to at least 10 stores in the area, threatening to destroy stores that stocked 'Jungle Fever', and that the KKK would light burning crosses in front of the stores which failed to remove their stock of the film (The Associated Press, 1992) .  Despite this attempted resurgence, law enforcement bodies continued to suppress WAR's activities. On the 29th of August 1994, 18-year-old Richard Camps from Sacramento, California, and an apparent WAR follower, was found guilty of committing a series of firebombings (Reuters, 1994) . These firebombings targeted the home of Jimmie-Yee, a Chinese-American Sacramento City Council Member, and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Whilst Camps was convicted of both of these attacks, the jury was deadlocked on his involvement in the firebombing of the Sacramento office of the National Association for the Advancement of coloured people, a local synagogue, and the Japanese American League (Reuters, 1994) .  By this point, WAR had been all but dissolved; however, in 2009, Metzger became implicated in a federal indictment (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Dennis Mahon and Deniel Mahon were arrested after, in 2004, the twin brothers sent a mail bomb to the Scottsdale Office of Diversity and Dialogue, leading to three people being injured. In the indictment, it was claimed that the Mahonss had acted on behalf of WAR to "promote racial discord", with Metzger having known the brothers since the 80s ( https://www.splcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/indictment.pdf_ ) . The twin's connection to WAR was further exemplified by the fact that a few months before the bombing, Dennis Mahon had left a voicemail at the Diversity office stating that he was " Dennis Mahon of the White Aryan Resistance of Arizona" and that “The White Aryan Resistance is growing in Scottsdale. There's a few white people who are standing up. Take care.” ( https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-10273/12-10273-2015-07-20.html ) .  This voicemail instigated an undercover investigation into the twins by the FBI. Dennis Mahon actually tried to have the evidence from this undercover investigation thrown out, citing entrapment through the use of an attractive young woman as a honeypot ( https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914afeeadd7b0493474fe37 ) . This young woman told the twins that she knew of a child molester who was abusing a family member, and that she wanted to do something about it, to get the twins to show her how to commit acts of violence/revenge. However, Mahon showed this undercover informant how to build and plant bombs without being caught, and the twins themselves travelled to gun shows to buy components for bomb building ( https://www.splcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/indictment.pdf_ ) . Due to these independent acts, including providing the informant with books on guerrilla resistance and racist ideology, attempts to have the undercover evidence thrown out were denied ( https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914afeeadd7b0493474fe37 ) . On the 24th of February 2012, Dennis Mahon was convicted of conspiracy, distribution of information about explosives, and using explosives to attack a building and was sentenced to 40 years in prison, whilst Daniel Mahon was acquitted on a single count of conspiracy (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Court documents show that the ATF thought that the bomb used by the Mahons was very similar in design to those illustrated in literature sold by Metzger's website. Metzger continued running the WAR website until he died on the 4th of November, 2020, of Parkinson's disease (León, 2020).  Objectives & Ideology WAR's core ideology was inherently violent/accelerationist, with WAR's FBI files all being marked "armed and extremely dangerous" (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . For example, a 1990 WAR telephone answering service message stated, “We will put blood on the streets like you’ve never seen. And advocate more violence than both world wars put together" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR's primary objectives were the overthrow and collapse of the US government and the extermination of blacks and jews (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . More generally, WAR aimed to create chaos through the generation of fear and the feeling of government ineptitude throughout the wider population, leading to citizens arming themselves and eventually turning on one another in a racially motivated civil war (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  In fact, WAR's violent and (attempted) anti-authoritarian rhetoric was an active effort to capture the first wave of racist skins that came about in the mid-80s. Metzger harnessed the Skinhead movement as a tool to perpetrate WAR's ideology, a pioneering move as previously skinheads hadn't been taken seriously by older racist leaders due to their unpredictability (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . For WAR, Skinheads were both the reason behind the group's violent ideology and the foot soldiers who would carry said ideology out.  Of course, WAR also held massively racist attitudes. According to Metzger, “Each WAR associate serves the idea that what’s good for the White European Race is the highest virtue. Whatever is bad for the White European Race is the ultimate Evil" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . These white supremacist ideas seeped into WAR's perspective on essentially every social issue, including abortion rights, which WAR opposed due to their apparent responsibility for the death of a generation of white babies (Turner, 1986) . As with all neo-Nazi groups, white supremacism often went hand in hand with anti-semitism. For example, WAR's TV series, Race and Reason, regularly touched on the idea of deporting jews (Turner, 1986) . WAR followers also regularly preached the "final solution" to Jews, being their extermination, with such sentiments being a common component of conversations between the group's members (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  Military/Political Abilities WAR and Metzger himself were considered pioneers in racist activism. Metzger was one of the first heads of the white power movement to notice the importance of music and concerts as tools for the recruitment of young people (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR's use of local access cable television and the WAR tabloid was similarly innovative, allowing Metzger to spread his ideas across the US even after the organisation had largely collapsed (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  In fact, WAR's activity was so notable that it was considered a priority for FBI investigations. In the group's FBI files, WAR are described as extremely dangerous with unlimited access to weapons and ammunition and a considerable pool of skinhead groups from which to draw manpower (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) .  Approach to Resistance WAR's self-titled tabloid was self-described as "the most racist newspaper on earth", and featured badly drawn racist and anti-semitic cartoons and articles (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . The newspaper also featured the Aryan Youth Movement's newsletter in an effort to capture a younger audience, especially skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). These younger recruits were to be used as the "shock troops of the coming revolution" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) , with these recruits being in turn tasked with the distribution of WAR pamphlets and posters at their local high schools and colleges (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . These recruitment tactics were a key component of Mazella's activity with the skinheads in Portland, who eventually went on to murder Mulugeta Seraw (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  The use of local access television broadcasts for the distribution of propaganda was another method largely pioneered by Metzger (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . In tandem with this tabloid was Metzger's TV series "Race and Reason", at its peak airing in 62 cities in 21 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025). Episodes of "Race and Reason" were around 30 minutes long and featured interviews with ideologically relevant figures, filmed in a studio in Fullerton, California, that was legally required to offer such services to those who ask for them (Turner, 1986) .  Local access cable stations had to allow for local programming as a requirement. Metzger and, eventually, many other racist leaders were able to take advantage of this open gap and broadcast their own shows (Turner, 1986) . For example, in Idaho, the Pocatello Human Relations Council was unable to block the Race and Reason broadcast because the agreement between the city and the cable company in the area forbade the exclusive use of the public access channel for advertising or pornography. This left a required gap that "Race and Reason" could exploit to be aired (Turner, 1986) . Generally, cable franchises were required to provide a channel for public access, in some cases even requiring free maintenance of local production facilities, as derived from the 1972 Federal Communications Commission on cable TV. Despite this strong central hub of information and propaganda/recruitment, WAR took on a loose/cell-based structure (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . There was no official members list, no initiation process and no uniforms, a relatively novel feature of the organisation for its time (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Following the lawsuit levelled at Metzger over the murder of Seraw, and the wider collapse/infiltration of far-right organisations by law enforcement, WAR began to promote the idea of leaderless resistance (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . At a 2004 skinhead rally at which Metzger was a speaker, the WAR leader said, “Don’t operate like a battleship. Operate like a Nazi submarine! Use your periscope! We have to infiltrate! Infiltrate the military! Infiltrate your local governments! Infiltrate your school board! Infiltrate law enforcement!” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . Metzger doubled down on this stance following his implication in the actions of the Mahon brothers, stating that “Membership organisations are fraught with leaks and agents" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  International Relations & Alliances WAR developed extensive ties to racist, primarily skinhead, groups across the US. As noted throughout this article, Metzger made particularly close ties with racist youth groups in an attempt to recruit their members into WAR's ranks. These youth groups would often be encouraged to produce their own racist literature, with a particular emphasis on violent action encouraged within this literature (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  American Front, a skinhead group, was a particularly close relation to WAR. The first skinhead group to develop factions in multiple states, Metzger quickly reached out to the group's leaders and founded a working relationship (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . Whilst WAR was US-based, some international support was offered from Arab groups. This support was turned down due to the belief that the Aryan race must defeat its struggle without the support of others (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) . Bibliography Federal Bureau of Investigation (1988). https://vault.fbi.gov/white-aryan-resistance/White%20Aryan%20Resistance%20Part%2001%20%28Final%29/view León, C. de (2020). Tom Metzger, Notorious White Supremacist, Dies at 82. The New York Times . [online] 13 Nov. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/tom-metzger-dead.html  [Accessed 17 Feb. 2021]. London, R. (1990). Sending a $12.5 Million Message to a Hate Group. New York Times , [online] 26 Oct., p.20. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/26/news/sending-a-12.5-million-message-to-a-hate-group.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. New York Times (1988). Geraldo Rivera’s Nose Broken In Scuffle on His Talk Show. [online] 4 Nov., p.39. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/nyregion/geraldo-rivera-s-nose-broken-in-scuffle-on-his-talk-show.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. New York Times (1990). Assets of White Supremacist Are Target of Legal Maneuver. [online] 25 Dec., p.8. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/25/us/assets-of-white-supremacist-are-target-of-legal-maneuver.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Reuters (1994). Man Convicted Of 2 Bombings Tied to Racism . [online] Nytimes.com . Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/31/us/man-convicted-of-2-bombings-tied-to-racism.html#  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2006). Former Klansmen Tom Metzger and Bill Riccio Encourage Skinheads to Cooperate . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/reports/former-klansmen-tom-metzger-and-bill-riccio-encourage-skinheads-cooperate/  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2025). Tom Metzger . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/tom-metzger/  [Accessed 28 Oct. 2025]. The Associate Press (1992). ‘Jungle Fever’ Brings Threats To Rhode Island Video Stores. The New York Times . [online] 11 Jan. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/11/us/jungle-fever-brings-threats-to-rhode-island-video-stores.html . Turner, W. (1986). EXTREMIST FINDS CABLE TV IS FORUM FOR RIGHT-WING VIEWS. [online] 7 Oct., p.23. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/07/us/extremist-finds-cable-tv-is-forum-for-right-wing-views.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025].

Introduction Whilst their activity was largely restricted to Rome and its suburbs, Militia represents an interesting example of far-right urban activity. Even during the group’s peak, Militia took on the form of a secretive sect, as opposed to a solid group or organisation, making use of stochastic graffiti/banner actions and the distribution of ideological literature. These actions generally promoted an accelerationist stance, as well as anti-semitic conspiracy theories and holocaust denialism.  This accelerationism was never allowed to develop into political violence, however, as the Italian police eventually arrested and imprisoned the network’s core members, including its founder and infamous neo-nazi Maurizio Boccacci, in January 2015. However, this lack of violent action was not due to a lack of intent. During raids on a martial arts gym Militia had been using as a base of operations, numerous weapons were found.  History & Foundations Now around 68 years old, Maurizio Boccaci, the group's founder, had a long career of right-wing extremism before founding Militia in 2008 (Luigi, 2008) . A resident of Albano Laziale, Maurizio primarily gained his infamy in Rome, 1984, following his formation of the far-right "Western Political Movement" (Viviano, 2011) . Whilst this group, and many of Boccaci's previous projects, were eventually disbanded following pressures from law enforcement (Viviano, 2011), extensive investigations into Boccaci never seemed to be able to make charges stick until his involvement in Militia (Fabio, 2010) .  Militia's initial activity began in 2008, opening with an extended campaign of banners and graffiti targeting Italian politicians (Luigi, 2008) . These acts of vandalism noted the group's particular disdain for Lamberto Gianni due to his support of Israel, with slogans commonly taking on an antisemitic nature.  This strategy of sustained campaigns of harassment continued into 2009. This time targeting Roman Jewish communities, Militia engaged in acts of vandalism and harassment regularly up until 2011 (Viviano, 2011) . Throughout this period, these attacks seemed to increase in frequency and intensity, leading to a Police raid on a Primo Carnera gym in the Roman Vigne Nuove district. This gym had been used by Militia as a base of operations, with the raid finding machetes, baseball bats, graffiti and postering supplies, banners, extreme right literature, computer equipment and an Israeli uniform (Fabio, 2010) .   Despite this pushback from law enforcement, Militia continued its harassment of the Jewish community. These actions drew further attention from law enforcement, and on December 14th, 2011, members of Militia were arrested for terror/race crime offences, primarily the attempted dissemination of these ideas, including the group's leader, Boccaci (Viviano, 2011) . In total, five members were arrested, with 11 others being investigated, including a 15-year-old (Ghosh, 2011) . Those who were not arrested were still subject to a search of their residence (Redazione Online, 2025) . The offences levelled against Militia included the plotting of several terror attacks against Rome's Jewish community president Riccardo Pacifici, the city's mayor Gianni Alemanno, Chamber of Deputies Gianfranco Fini, and the Italian president (Gruber, 2011) . The group had also made threats against George Bush (Ghosh, 2011) .  These raids came shortly after a far-right supporter committed a mass killing in the city of Florence (Ghosh, 2011) . It is unclear if the two events were linked; however, a key reason for Militia's arrest was due to the group's inherently accelerationist objective of fomenting a revolutionary war, and the group's efforts to spread this ideology (Ghosh, 2011) .  This string of arrests seems to have largely neutered Militia's activities. The group gained media attention again in August 2014 after it carried out a large-scale postering campaign (Oster, 2015) . Similar to their initial activity, the campaign took on a largely anti-semitic form, encouraging the boycotting of Jewish-owned businesses throughout Rome.  Militia's final blow seems to have come on January 15th 2015, following the sentencing of six of its members, including its founder Boccacci, who were imprisoned for their anti-semitic/racist activities (Oster, 2015) . Members were also charged with crimes relating to attempts to reconstitute the Italian Fascist party.  Whilst possibly unrelated, in November 2019, Italian authorities raided a network of neo-Nazis who were utilising a closed group chat titled "Miltia" (AFP, 2019) . Raids on 19 suspects linked to the group recovered weapons, flags, and far-right literature, and evidence that the group had been working alongside other violent neo-Nazi groups such as Combat 18 and New Social Order (AFP, 2019) .  Objectives & Ideology Militia primarily ascribes to a neo-Nazi/white supremacist ideology, with the group regularly pushing the idea of racial purity/supremacy (Redazione Online, 2025) . During acts of vandalism, Militia regularly made use of nazi symbology, with Boccacci openly stating that he admired the actions of Adolf Hitler (Viviano, 2011) .  Ironically, Militia seems to also hold holocaust denialist attitudes. A banner used during the group's 2008 harassment actions read: "The Holocaust, the biggest lie in history" (Luigi, 2008) . Conversely, as is typically seen in fascist ideology due to an inherent need for the enemy to be viewed as both pathetically weak and an existential threat, Boccacci also sees the Jewish population as an enemy of the interests of the white race due to their "spoiling" of the plans of Hitler (Viviano, 2011) .  To achieve the objectives of a racially pure/white population free of jews, Militia took on an accelerationist/violent position. In the eyes of Militia, such a state can only be achieved through violent revolution and the collapse of modern society/the current order (Gruber, 2011) . Because of this violent worldview, Militia has very little time for conventional political engagement, instead pushing an extreme and violent solution to what it deems the problem of immigration and race mixing ( Rusi.org , 2025) . In one interview, Boccacci even described himself as an "uncompromising fascist soldier." Military/Political Abilities Whilst Boccacci has been a part of the far-right for decades, he is seemingly more dedicated to his ideology than to his alliances or political power. For example, despite Rome's (at the time) mayor, Gianni Alemanno, and Chamber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini, having roots in neo-fascist movements, their shift towards support for Israel warranted attack from Militia between 2008 and 2011 (Viviano, 2011) .  Despite this, at times restricting adherence to ideological purity, Boccacci's extended career in the far right allowed for the exploitation of a range of connections to gather support. According to police investigations, the gym used by Militia as a base of operations played host to members from numerous Italian regions (Lombardi, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Lazio) (Fabio, 2010) . Considering Militia's small operational area, this widespread membership, including the group's considerable membership size of around 100 activists ( Rusi.org , 2025) , led to a notable output of activity during the group's short existence.  Approach to Resistance Militia's primary activity consisted of graffiti/vandalism and the use of banners. These banners were made extensive use of during the group's campaigns against Gianni Alemanno's support of Israel (Viviano, 2011) . These acts of vandalism weren't just an attack on physical structures, but were also often used to spread Militia's violent and racist ideology through various slogans related to immigration, the holocaust, and minority communities (Luigi, 2008) .  The group's ideology was also spread through the dissemination of the bi-monthly magazine titled "Insurrection" (Redazione Online, 2025) . This magazine promoted violent, insurrectionary, and accelerationist ideas and actions. Whilst not exclusively circulated amongst Militia members, "Insurrection" was identified during raids by law enforcement as a key radicalising component amongst the group's members (Redazione Online, 2025) .  Whilst no violence has been openly attributed to Militia, the group clearly made preparations/plans for such activities. Evidence of such preparation is clear even outside of Militia's violent rhetoric. From the group's stockpile of weapons found in its operations base (Fabio, 2010) to the planned bomb attack against Riccardo Pacifici (the head of Rome's Jewish community) (Ghosh, 2011) , Militia showed intentions of materialising its objective of violent resistance.  Interestingly, during the group's use of banners in 2008, Militia did disavow one banner which referred to the massacre of immigrants in Castelvolturno in September 2007 (Luigi, 2008) . However, it is unclear whether this disavowal was due to a genuine disinterest in the celebration of such events or due to the exceptionally bad publicity that such celebrations would bring the group.  International Relations & Alliances Due to Miltia's small membership and operational area (largely restricted to Rome and its bordering neighbourhoods), the group seemed to operate largely independently from other far-right movements. Despite this, it is fair to assume that Boccacci's longstanding career in the far-right managed to equip him with contacts that allowed the group to sustain its membership despite its small recruitment pool (Viviano, 2011) .  A possible explanation for Militia's isolationist nature is the group's violent ideological stance. Whilst far-right groups tend to have a generally aggressive/violent stance on the issues they concern themselves with, Militia sported a particularly militant stance in comparison to other Italian right-wing groups at the time (Ghosh, 2011) . This exceptionally aggressive perspective, combined with the attention from law enforcement that this perspective garnered the group, may be a component of Militia's disconnection from other organisations.   Bibliography AFP, (2019). Italian police bust armed neo-Nazi group after nationwide sweeps . [online] Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/italian-police-bust-armed-neo-nazi-group-after-nationwide-sweeps/  [Accessed 17 Oct. 2025]. Fabio Di, C. (2010). Escalation against the Jews Four militants of Militia . [online] Il TEMPO. Available at: http://www.iltempo.it/roma/cronaca_locale/roma/2010/05/22/1161603-escalation_contro_ebrei.shtml  [Accessed 13 Oct. 2025]. Ghosh, P.R. (2011). Italian Police Arrest Extreme Rightists; No Clear Link to Florence Massacre . [online] International Business Times. Available at: https://www.ibtimes.com/italian-police-arrest-extreme-rightists-no-clear-link-florence-massacre-383394  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Gruber, R.E. (2011). Five arrested in Rome for plotting against Jewish community . [online] JTA. Available at: https://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/12/14/3090732/five-arrested-in-rome-for-plotting-against-jewish-community  [Accessed 14 Oct. 2025]. Luigi, M. (2008). Anti-Semitic banners of ‘Militia’ denounced the ultra Maurizio Boccacci . [online] la Repubblica ROMA. Available at: http://roma.repubblica.it/dettaglio/striscioni-antisemiti-di-militia-denunciato-l%C2%B4ultra-maurizio-boccacci/1544964  [Accessed 15 Oct. 2025]. Oster, M. (2015). Italian neo-Nazis convicted for racist, anti-Semitic activites - St. Louis Jewish Light . [online] St. Louis Jewish Light. Available at: https://stljewishlight.org/world-news/italian-neo-nazis-convicted-for-racist-anti-semitic-activites/  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Redazione Online (2025). Blitz dei Ros contro Militia: 5 arresti Volevano ?guerra rivoluzionaria?  [online] Corriere della Sera Roma. Available at: https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/11_dicembre_14/arresti-estrema-destra-1902528099816.shtml  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Rusi.org . (2025). Not Welcome Here: The Resurgence Of Far-Right Wing Extremism In Europe . [online] Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/not-welcome-here-resurgence-far-right-wing-extremism-europe  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. VIVIANO, F. (2011). Operazione contro l’estrema destraIn carcere Boccacci e altri 4 di Militia . [online] la Repubblica. Available at: https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/12/14/news/arrestati_esponenti_militia-26584050/  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025].

Introduction & Overview Vanguard America was a far-right, white supremacist/neo-Nazi organisation largely active between 2016 and 2017. Founded by ex-Marine Dillon Ulysses Hopper, Vanguard America began attending rallies and conducting flyering activities across US college campuses in 2016.  Utilising its clean aesthetic and more politically palatable approach to far-right politics, Vanguard America quickly amassed a considerable membership base of young white men. This led to increased activity and attendance numbers at rallies, culminating in the "Unite the Right" rally on August 12, 2017. This rally, and its tragic events, led to not only the crumbling of Vanguard America's leadership but the splintering of its followers in general.  Whilst Hopper attempted to resuscitate Vanguard America following the events of August 2017, he was inevitably unsuccessful, leading to the group fading from the public eye by the summer of 2018.  VA Logo History & Foundations Born from the infamous neo-fascist Iron March forums (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) , Vanguard America (VA) was initially led by Dillon Ulysses Hopper (ADL, 2017). Originally from New Mexico (ADL, 2017) , Hopper joined the Marine Corps in 2005 following his graduation from high school, later retiring as a staff sergeant (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  According to Hopper, VA was founded in California, 2015 (ADL, 2017) . However, it was not until 2016 that the group's activities were noticed. VA conducted the posting of racist/white supremacist flyers across US universities, targeting racially diverse universities in particular, and following Trump's election, the group became far more brazen with these actions (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  These propagandist actions saw an increase in VA activity and membership across Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas and Washington between November 2016 and April 2017 (ADL, 2017) . It is in 2016 that VA's leader, Dillon Hopper, is promoted to staff sergeant (Beckett and Swaine, 2017). However, by January 2017, Hopper retired from the Marine Corps (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Whilst not stated by Hopper, it is safe to assume his departure from the military was motivated by the desire to further pursue his racist objectives through the VA. The group's activity continued into 2017, with two synagogues in Shreveport, Louisiana, reporting antisemitic VA stickers on their property (ADL, 2017) . VA also began to expand its ties to neo-nazi movements by attending white supremacist rallies in Pikeville, Kentucky. These events were organised by the neo-Nazi network "Nationalist Front", of which VA became a member following the rally (ADL, 2017) . VA's neo-Nazi links grew further as members attended a speech by Richard Spencer at Auburn University, Alabama, on the 18th of April, shortly followed by attending a National Front rally on the 29th, and a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 13th (ADL, 2017) . This increased activity and consequent visibility led to some negative media attention following the murder of a black Maryland university student. Richard Collins III was stabbed to death by another white Maryland student who was found to be a member of the far-right Facebook group "Alt-Reich Nation" (BBC, 2017) . Whilst the murder was never fully linked to VA, the group received flak due to their flyering activities on the Maryland campus (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Despite this stumbling block, VA's influence spread internationally in June through the foundation of its British contingent, Vanguard Britannia. This new chapter, although small, applied the same "patriotic" and racist approach to UK politics (Child and Poulter, 2017) . Back in the US, VA members attended an anti-Islam march in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the 10th of June (ADL, 2017) . On the same day, in Houston, Texas, VA members protested alongside other white supremacist movements against the removal of the Sam Houston monument (ADL, 2017) .  VA's activity in this period continued to increase, with several dozen VA members attending the "Texas is Ours" rally in Austin on June 17th (ADL, 2017) . At this rally, Hopper spoke alongside Thomas Rousseau, the leader of the Texas VA chapter. At the time Rousseau was only 18 (Schaeffer and Zimmermann, 2019) . Following the event, Hopper complained that Rousseau had misled the rally organisers into believing that Rousseau was VA's leader (ADL, 2017) . According to Hopper, Rousseau's lengthy speech further implied that he was the leader, creating further confusion regarding which of the two was, in fact, VA's leader (ADL, 2017) . Hopper's paranoia was found to be legitimate on June 20th when Rousseau began a takeover of VA's online platforms (ADL, 2017) . Having previously ascertained control of VA's social media accounts/platforms under the guise of security precautions, Rousseau removed Hopper's access to all said platforms.  Thomas Rousseau - [ Image source ] Whilst the group's leadership was in turmoil, its chapters continued their political actions. Throughout July, Vanguard Britannia flyers begin appearing in Arbroath, Scotland, as well as Eastleigh and Winchester, in Hampshire, England (Child and Poulter, 2017) . The Holocaust memorial in Lakewood, New Jersey, was vandalised with an anti-semitic VA banner on the 2nd of July, followed by simultaneous vandalism actions on July 16th in Austin, Texas (ADL, 2017) .  VA's peak levels of media attention followed their involvement in the white supremacist "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on the 12th of August. Led by Rousseau and with Hopper notably missing, VA members attended the rally (ADL, 2017) and participated in violent clashes with counter-protestors (Cullen, 2017) . These clashes culminated when a right-wing protestor drove his car into a large group of counter-protestors, killing Heather Heyer, a 32-year-old paralegal, and injuring countless others (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  Not only had VA assisted the event's organiser, Jason Kessler, in its execution (Barrouquere, 2018), but the attacker, James Alex Fields, had been a part of the rally's VA contingent (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) . Despite photos/video emerging of Fields standing/marching with VA members and carrying a shield marked with the group's logo (ADL, 2017), VA made a statement on social media denying a link between the group and Fields (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  VA members at Charlottesville - [ Image source ] According to VA, shields were handed out to anyone who asked for one, and nobody with Field's name had ever applied for membership (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) ; however, this does not explain why Field's was wearing the group's uniform of khaki pants and a white polo shirt (Cullen, 2017) . Whilst publicly the group distanced themselves from Field's actions, on the 14th of August, Rousseau posted on the group's Discord server that “The statement never said that what he did was wrong, just clarified that he wasn’t a member. People aren’t buying it anyways.”  (Vanguard American/Vanguard America Reading and Research/Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025|Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) Rousseau's observation that the public wasn't "buying it" was highly accurate, with VA receiving major critical public attention. However, whilst the Unite the Right contingent of VA was led by Rousseau, Hopper was the one to garner most of the public backlash due to his perceived leadership of the group up until this point (ADL, 2017) . This pressure led to the group splintering and going underground (ADL, 2017) . Vanguard Britannia also separated itself from the remaining chapters of VA, which had not been dissolved following the rally. The British contingent stated the separation was due to leadership clashes, and not because of the rally, instead claiming the events in Charlottesville had been a false flag attack (Child and Poulter, 2017) .  Following the "Unite the Right" rally, both Hopper and Rousseau distanced themselves from the events and VA in general. Hopper decided to remain absent and distant from the group for the time being, allowing Rousseau to take uncontested control of its activities (ADL, 2017) . Rousseau seized on this opportunity, rebranding the group's website to promote Patriot Front (his new, less visibly extreme, political project) on the 30th of August (Vanguard American/Vanguard America Reading and Research/Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025|Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Many VA members followed Rousseau over to Patriot Front, with a large number having marched alongside Rousseau during the Unite the Right rally (ADL, 2017) .  Now largely gutted, VA continued its activity in October, with just 7 members attending a Nationalist Front rally in Shelbyville (ADL, 2017) . On the 13th, a synagogue in Rome, Georgia, was vandalised with a VA flier reading "America will bathe in the light of the black sun! The tide of Jewish Globalism wanes." (ADL, 2017) . This anti-semitic/racist activity continued stochastically in December at Toledo University, Ohio, and the Southern Methodist University campus, Texas (Murphy, 2017) . On the 18th, VA's Twitter account was banned as a part of a wider crackdown on hate-based accounts (Luckerson, 2017) .  Further fracturing took hold of VA in January 2018. Following infighting and accusations of incompetent leadership, VA members, notably from Texas and Tennessee, assisted in the formation of the National Socialist Legion (ADL, 2017) . This group, according to a 4chan post in March 2018, aims to create homesteads across the country ready for the future white revolt and secession. This almost entirely crippled the group's ability to carry out political actions. VA's death threats consisted of a banner reading "Feminists deserve the rope" being hung on an overpass during the Women's March in Providence, Rhode Island, on the 20th of January and VA fliers being posted at the Casa Guanajuato Community Center on the 3rd of March (ADL, 2017) . Objectives & Ideology VA members follow a strict ideology of traditionalism, white supremacy, and, in many cases, neo-Nazism. VA believes that America should be a white ethnostate, openly opposes multiculturalism, and believes that the white race should be in control of the US (ADL, 2017). The group's slogan, "blood and soil", implies that white blood has a link with American soil, with the phrase being popularised by Nazi party followers as "Blud und Boden" (Murphy, et al., 2017) . VA seems to believe that America was founded and built on white blood and culture, viewing other cultures and races as incompatible with those originating from the white race.  An Alternative VA flag featuring a black sun/sonnenrad - [ Image source ] Whilst having always resided within the right-wing space, VA's activity and collaborative efforts gradually moved further into the neo-Nazi space, especially as Rousseau increased his control over the group (ADL, 2017) . However, VA was rarely brazen with their promotion of these ideas, instead often making use of sanitised dog whistles. The group's website reads: “The mission of Vanguard America is the preservation and progression of our people, culture, values, and future in the US." (Buncombe, 2017) , a statement rather reminiscent of the neo-Nazi 14 words slogan. The welcome message of the group's website also parrots ideas clearly derived from replacement theory: "Our people are subjugated while an endless tide of incompatible foreigners floods this nation every year" (Cullen, 2017) .  VA's white supremacism goes beyond slogans such as "the glory of the Aryan nation must be recaptured” (ADL, 2017) and into its membership requirements, with all applicants having to be at least 80% white (Cullen, 2017) . Members must also be employed, not smoke or drink, and not have hand or neck tattoos (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . Obese men were also excluded from membership (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) , as well as criminals and those with addictions (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . Predictably, VA also exhibits extensive homophobia and transphobia (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) .  Whilst slightly coy about its neo-Nazi views, VA openly associates itself with fascism. Francisco Rivera, spokesperson for the VA Virginia branch, said that "Fascist is an accurate term" for the group at a speech in May 2017 (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . The group's general ideology paints a clearly fascistic picture, as does the group's strict adherence to its uniform, khaki pants and a white polo top, and its wider iconography/branding. VA's flag features an eagle carrying a fasces. The fasces is an authoritarian symbol taken from Italian politics (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017 1) , often being carried by an eagle in depictions on the uniforms of Nazi and Mussolini followers.  Military/Political Abilities VA's peak activity occurred during the 2016-2017 school year (ADL, 2017) . During this time, at the National Front rally attended by VA in April 2017, Hopper claimed that the organisation had 200 members across 20 states (ADL, 2017) . Whilst the group managed to garner a widespread following, its infamy largely seems to have come from associations with various controversies as opposed to concrete political progress.  Regardless of this, VA's visibility was certainly an impressive achievement. The ADL (2017) recorded 32 incidents of flyering across Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Washington during the 2016-2017 school year. This activity decreased, but was still notable, during the 2017-2018 school year with 14 incidents recorded across Arizona, Tennessee, Texas, and Massachusetts. Approach to Resistance VA's activities were largely designed to target young white men around college age, hence the group's consistent targeting of US universities with flyers, posters, and stickers (ADL, 2017) . The messaging of these promotional materials often consisted of existential subjects designed to imply that the future of young white men was being threatened by the existence of multiculturalism. At one point, Hopper openly stated that the "future is about the youth", and for that reason, the group's primary membership was between 18 and 24 years old (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  A VA Sticker Engagement with this demographic was maintained through the curation of a slick image/brand for the organisation. There was a very clear effort to maintain the clean image of the organisation whilst simultaneously promoting violent views (Cullen, 2017) . One VA event organiser stated that  “We also uphold standards of dress and grooming and physical fitness because our ideology is one of strength and purity and self-improvement” (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Whilst VA denies that it promotes violence (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) , its militant rhetoric and involvement in events such as the "Unite the Right" rally indicate otherwise. This approach to politics is unsurprising considering the group's roots in the Iron March forums. The page gained infamy due to the numerous violent extremist groups it had spawned before its dissolution (Cullen, 2017) .  Had he not retired, Hopper's promotion to staff sergeant in October 2016 meant he was to be in charge of the training of prospective Marine officers. However, it seems that the VA leader prioritised training the group's members over his fellow corpsmen. Hopper stated in a speech to fellow Nazis at a rally in Pikeville, Kentucky, that he had made efforts to implement the lessons he had learned from his time in the military to harden the group (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) , resulting in the group taking on a paramilitary element. Despite Hopper's involvement with the Marines, he has stated that members had to end their contracts with the military before having anything to do with VA "for their safety." (Snow, 2019) .  In open carry states, VA members would regularly attend activities openly carrying firearms, and making use of military style uniforms, movements, and rest positions (ADL, 2017) . The majority of said activities consisted of rallies and group meetings. Through these frequent and relatively heavily attended events, VA became pioneers/figureheads for street demonstrations by the far right (Cullen, 2017). VA used rallies/meetings as not just a show of strength, but also as a recruitment tool due to their visual spectacle (ADL, 2017) . International Relations & Alliances VA's primary association during its activity was with the aforementioned Nationalist Front. This coalition of neo-nazi/neo-confederate groups consisted of the National Socialist Movement, Traditionalist Worker's Party, the League of the South, and Vanguard America (Buncombe, 2017) . Through collaborative efforts, the Nationalist Front organised rallies across the US to spread far-right propaganda and platform white supremacist figureheads.  Bibliography ADL (2017). Vanguard America | ADL . [online] Available at: https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/vanguard-america . [Accessed 22nd November 2025] Barrouquere, Brett. (2018). Neo-Nazi sympathizer James Alex Fields Jr., faces jury over deadly actions, decision at ‘Unite the Right’ . [online] Southern Poverty Law Center. Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/neo-nazi-sympathizer-james-alex-fields-jr-faces-jury-over-deadly-actions-decision-unite/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] BBC (2017). ‘Alt-Reich’ member charged in fatal stabbing of black student.  (2017). BBC News. [online] 22 May. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40002567 . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Beckett, Lois; Swaine, Jon; (2017). Leader of neo-Nazi group linked to Charlottesville attack was a US Marine . [Online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/charlottesville-attack-vanguard-america-james-fields-dillon-hopper  [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Buncombe, A. (2017). Neo-Nazis at Tennessee rallies drowned out by hundreds of counter-protesters | The Independent . [online] The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/tennessee-neonazi-rally-white-lives-matter-supremacist-murfreesboro-shelbyville-a8024931.html . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Childs, S. and Poulter, J. (2017). Nazi Group Linked to Charlottesville Attack Has a UK Chapter . [online] VICE. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/nazi-group-linked-to-charlottesville-attack-has-a-uk-chapter/  [Accessed 23 Nov. 2025]. Cullen. (2017) Vanguard America, group Charlottesville driver James Fields Jr. marched with, has increasingly become a neo-Nazi voice . [Online] Available at: http://www.nydailynews.com/amp/news/national/vanguard-america-increasingly-neo-nazi-voice-article-1.3408117  [Accessed 22 Nov. 2025] Luckerson, Victor (2017). Twitter Cracks Down on Hate-Mongerers . [online] The Ringer. Available at: https://www.theringer.com/2017/12/18/tech/twitter-bans-hate-groups  [Accessed 23 Nov. 2025]. Moyer, Justin William; Beyer, Lindsey. (2017) Vanguard America, a white supremacist group, denies Charlottesville ramming suspect was a member . [Online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/vanguard-america-a-white-supremacist-group-denies-charlottesville-attacker-was-a-member/2017/08/15/2ec897c6-810e-11e7-8072-73e1718c524d_story.html  [Accessed 22nd Nov. 2025] Murphy, Paul (2017) American Nazis post bigoted flyers on SMU campus . [Online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/04/us/american-nazis-post-flyers-trnd  [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Murphy, Zoeann; Larimer, Sarah; Siegel, Rachel; Chason, Rachel (August 18, 2017). Walker, Victoria M. (ed.). Deconstructing the symbols and slogans spotted in Charlottesville.  [Online] Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-videos/  [Accessed, 23 Nov. 2025] Schaeffer, Carol and Zimmermann, Fritz (2019). They Are Racist; Some of Them Have Guns. Inside the White Supremacist Group Hiding in Plain Sight . [online] ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/they-are-racist-some-of-them-have-guns-inside-the-white-supremacist-group-hiding-in-plain-sight . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Snow, Shaw. (2019). The neo-Nazi boot: Inside one Marine’s descent into extremism . [online] Marine Corps Times. Available at: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/09/04/the-neo-nazi-boot-inside-one-marines-descent-into-extremism/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017). Alleged Charlottesville Driver Who Killed One Rallied With Alt-Right Vanguard America Group . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/alleged-charlottesville-driver-who-killed-one-rallied-alt-right-vanguard-america-group/  [Accessed 22 Nov. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017 1). Flags and Symbols at ‘Unite The Right’ rally in Charlottesville | Southern Poverty Law Center . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/flags-and-other-symbols-used-far-right-groups-charlottesville/ . Southern Poverty Law Center. (2025). Thomas Rousseau . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/thomas-rousseau/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025]

Introduction The Haqqani network is an Afghan Islamic fundamentalist group that has participated in multiple conflicts in Afghanistan, and they have also been implicated in providing support to terror networks in Pakistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. The organisation was established in the 1970s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, from whom the group gets its name. Haqqani was an ethnic Pashtun belonging to a wealthy family of the Zadran tribe based in Loya Paktia, which is made up of the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. (Yol et al, 2024, p559) Map of Loya Paktia, shown in yellow – [ image source ] The group has an extensive military history. It participated in the mujahideen resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war, the subsequent Afghan civil wars and the insurgency resulting from the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. It is considered a “semi-autonomous” group within the Taliban, united under their brand but operating independently (Peters, 2012, p10) . Members of the Haqqani family have participated in both the current and previous Taliban governments, and the group has strong links to al-Qaeda and Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI (ABC News, 2021) .   History & Foundations The Haqqani network has its roots in the 1970s, when Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew the Afghan monarchy led by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Daoud suppressed Islamists who opposed his regime due to the dismantling of the previous multi-party system in favour of a one-party state (Barfield, 2010, p170) . Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had previously studied at Dar‐ul‐Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akhora Khattak, Pakistan, an institution notorious for producing jihadists, fled to Pakistan with other Islamists to train to overthrow Daoud’s regime with support from the ISI (Peters, 2012, p14) . These militants then took part in the failed 1975 Panjshir Valley Uprising, with Jalaluddin leading an attack that resulted in the deaths of twelve members of Daoud’s administration. This attack helped to cement his reputation as a jihadist leader (Rutting, 2009, p64-65) . By 1979, Jalaluddin had become a trusted commander within Hezb-i Islami Khalis, a mujahideen resistance group. He and his network of supporters were granted operational independence in southeastern Afghanistan (Edwards, 2002, p275) .   Jalaluddin Haqqani – [ image source ] When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), it marked a watershed moment for the Haqqani network. Afghanistan became a focal point for both Islamists and global powers involved in the Cold War. Billions of dollars of support funds were covertly funnelled by the ISI, CIA and Gulf States into Afghanistan to be sent to mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet occupation (Galster, 2001) . Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group participated in the resistance, receiving millions of dollars of support both in terms of weapons, training and funds, and innovated the nature of jihadism by recruiting foreign fighters – something other mujahideen factions did not consistently do (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p60) . This innovation was a precursor to what is now infamously known as ‘Global Jihadism’ (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p20) . Jalaluddin’s appeal for foreign fighters was first recorded four years before Abdullah Azzam’s declaration, which is usually credited for birthing global jihad; Jalaluddin gave an interview in which he spoke of “the Muslim duty to offer himself for the jihad” (Haqqani, 1980) . Many training camps for Islamic militants were established throughout Haqqani-controlled Loya Paktia (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p66) . The geographic positioning of the Haqqani network’s power base, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, aided the funnelling of aid and foreign fighters into the group. The Brigadier General of the ISI at the time, Mohammad Yousaf, acknowledged that 60% of their supplies were routed through the Haqqani network stronghold of Loya Paktia, with a third going directly through Haqqani’s headquarters in Zhawara (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p9) . Khost Province was of particular strategic importance, as it contained many smuggling routes into Pakistan and other parts of Afghanistan. The influx of foreign aid and foreign fighters enabled the Haqqani network to consolidate its power and influence. They helped provide Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group with the tools to effectively fight against the Soviet forces, most famously this included Stinger missiles, which were used to contest Soviet air superiority (Snow, 2013) . He became a favoured commander for the CIA to support and a “militant folk hero” for many Islamist activists (Coll, 2004, p124-165) . Jalaluddin’s influence and geographic location meant he became a key intermediary for sending resources to other mujahideen fighters, aiding the development of close relations between his group and various actors (EFSAS, 2022) .  It was during this time that the Haqqani network started to foster close relationships with Osama Bin Laden, who later co-founded al-Qaeda. Additionally, Haqqani developed ties to Kashmiri jihadists during this period, who utilised the safe haven provided by Haqqani-controlled territory to establish training camps. It was reported that fighters from Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, a Kashmiri jihadist group, were running camps in Khost province as early as the 1980s, and in 1991 Jalaluddin admitted to providing the militants with training (Ruttig, 2009, p87-88) . After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the communist government led by the PDPA quickly collapsed to the mujahideen fighters. The first city to fall was Khost in 1991, in an operation spearheaded by Jalaluddin and his group (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p82) . Jalaluddin was later appointed Justice Minister of the newly established Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992. After the breakdown of the newly established state and the outbreak of the Second Afghan Civil War, Jalaluddin’s group refrained from attempting to seize overall power, opting instead to consolidate their regional power. In a 1994 letter sent by al-Qaeda member Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi (1994) , he refers to “the governor of Khost, who is from the Haqqani organisation” This is the first recorded instance that the Haqqani network is referred to as an autonomous organisation and provides evidence of the group cementing its power in the Loya Paktia region. The group later defected to the Taliban in 1995 after Jalaluddin pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omar, and they assisted them in their takeover of the country (Ruttig, 2009, p70) . The new relationship between the Haqqani network and the Taliban meant that they preserved their regional autonomy while simultaneously recognising Taliban authority over Afghanistan. Under the Taliban’s newly established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin was appointed Minister for Tribal and Frontier Affairs in 1998. This position was largely symbolic, as Jalaluddin and his group still maintained their autonomy from the Taliban, evident in the inability of the Taliban to fulfil Pakistani extradition requests of fugitives training in Haqqani-run camps (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p107) . After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings by al-Qaeda, Haqqani-run training camps in Loya Paktia were hit by U.S. strikes for harbouring foreign jihadists, particularly members of al-Qaeda (FBIS, 2004, p150) . The strikes caused tensions between elements of the mainstream Taliban, who opposed al-Qaeda and global jihadism, and the Haqqanis, who provided a haven for foreign jihadists. During this time, they grew closer to al-Qaeda, acting as a “nexus” between the group and the mainstream Taliban. Following the September 11 attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the U.S.-led coalition, the Haqqani network joined the Taliban insurgency against the coalition and grew even closer to al-Qaeda. The group was implicated in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency lasting from 2001 until 2021, such as the 2008 Serena Hotel attack and the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul (Sarkar, 2025) . Another notable attack involving the Haqqani network was the May 2017 Kabul bombing, the deadliest attack to take place in the city, which resulted in the deaths of over 150 people (Westcott, 2017) . The group was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. in 2012. During the post-9/11 period, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s son, gradually took over the group due to his father’s illness; he officially became its leader in 2018 after years of speculation about his father’s death (Sayed et Clarke, 2021) . Sirajuddin was also appointed deputy leader of the Taliban in 2015, a position he still holds today (Kumar Sen, 2015) . Sirajuddin Haqqani – [ image source ] The withdrawal of coalition forces in August 2021 allowed the Taliban to regain power and re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Haqqani network was reportedly given control over security operations in Kabul the day they took power (Dettmer, 2021) . As deputy leader of the Taliban, Sirajuddin subsequently became the second most powerful figure in Afghanistan, and he was appointed to the country’s interior ministry as the Interior Minister (BBC, 2021) . Presently, the Haqqani network has continued to assist the Taliban in governing Afghanistan, and in August 2025, it was announced that the U.S. had lifted bounties placed on Sirajuddin and his relatives, Abdul Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani (Associated Press, 2025) .   Objectives & Ideology Similar to the mainstream Taliban, the Haqqani network adheres to Salafist principles. Salafism is an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam that advocates for a return to the traditions of the earliest generations of Muslims; as a result, the group advocates for the strict implementation of Sharia law in territory under its control. The Haqqani network, as well as the mainstream Taliban, also follow the Deobandi school of thought (Lurie, 2020, p2) . The Deobandi school grew out of South Asia in 1867, originating in the Dar ul-Ulum madrasa in Deoband, India. According to Deobandi thought, Muslim societies have experienced stunted development due to their deviation from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and have been corrupted by Western influences. Consequently, the Haqqani network’s objectives have been primarily focused on driving foreign influence out of Afghanistan, first the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan war and later the Americans in the post-9/11 period. The Haqqani network has also at times displayed sympathy for global jihadist ideologies, similar to those of groups like al-Qaeda. This is demonstrated in the group’s closeness to al-Qaeda and its ex-leader Osama Bin Laden, and their willingness to provide sanctuary to them (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p42) . However, this affinity can be attributed to pragmatism rather than being ideology, as unlike al-Qaeda, which pursues global objectives, the Haqqani network has a regional focus, reflected in its roots in tribal networks (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) .   Military & Political Abilities Militarily, the Haqqani network is a formidable force in Afghanistan, being described by U.S. military commanders as “the most resilient enemy network” fighting against coalition forces (Partlow, 2011) . A 2020 estimate of the Haqqani network’s strength concluded that the group comprises around 10,000 militants, accounting for roughly 20% of the Taliban’s forces overall (Ahmad, 2020) . The significant military strength of the Haqqani network is evident in its involvement in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency against coalition forces, such as the December 2009 bombing against the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman, which resulted in the deaths of seven intelligence officers and was described as “one of the most lethal strikes against the agency in decades” (Lurie, 2020, p5) . The threat posed by the Haqqani network in the post-9/11 period is heightened by its extreme violence relative to other militant organisations operating in the region, most notably through their use of indiscriminate suicide bombings. While the specific types of weaponry the group has access to are unknown, data on Haqqani-attributed incidents between 1970 and 2013 show that 64% of attacks involved explosives, 29% involved firearms, 1% involved chemicals, and the remaining 6% are of unknown origin (Romaniuk et Webb, 2016, p181) . The capabilities of the group are aided by the network of local tribes and transnational jihadist supporters it has cultivated. By developing relationships with other actors, such as al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan’s ISI, the group has been able to extend its operational outreach beyond its traditional strongholds in Loya Paktia (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) . Additionally, the Haqqani network has developed significant streams of income to finance their operations. Historically, the group was financed by donations from foreign actors, particularly the CIA, the Gulf states, and Pakistan. While Pakistan remains a sponsor of the group, they have also developed independent sources of income through a wide range of licit and illicit activities, leading some to describe it as a “mafia-type network” (Peters, 2012, p39-51) . These activities range from legal front companies, particularly in construction and import-export, to extortion and smuggling of precursor chemicals used in heroin production.   Approach to Resistance The Haqqani network’s approach to resistance can be defined by two key strategies, the first being their adoption of suicide bombings to carry out attacks. The group is credited with being the pioneers of suicide bombings in Afghanistan, and the use of foreign bombers has been a key feature of this strategy (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) . Haqqani network bombings are often orchestrated against high-profile targets that maximise casualties. This strategy can be seen in numerous attacks attributed to the group, for instance, the 2008 Indian embassy bombing. The second key strategy utilised by the Haqqani network is its flexibility in collaborating with a wide range of different actors. In addition to extending its operational outreach, as mentioned in the previous section, this strategy has allowed the group to build its power by creating new opportunities for recruitment and procurement.   International Relations & Alliances The Haqqani network has cultivated a wide range of relationships and alliances throughout its history, most notably its integration into the Taliban, as described in earlier sections. However, the group’s relationships with other actors go far beyond just the Taliban, and Pakistan’s ISI has also been a crucial partner. For decades , Pakistan has faced allegations of funding and coordinating the Haqqani network’s activities, and in 2011, they were described by U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen as a “veritable arm” of the ISI (BBC, 2011) . The relationship between the ISI and the Haqqani network has been a mutually beneficial one. From the perspective of the Haqqani network, they receive large amounts of money and weapons from the ISI, which also provides the group with training, intelligence, and sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Waldman, 2010) . From Pakistan’s perspective, its relationship with the Haqqani network has allowed them to project their influence in the region. The 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, carried out by the Haqqani network, is one example of the group acting in the interest of the ISI. Additionally, the Haqqani network has historically provided material and ideological support to militants fighting against India in the Kashmir region, such as by hosting them in their training camps, which is another way the Haqqani network has operated in favour of Pakistani interests (Kaura, 2021) . The Haqqani network has also developed close relationships with other jihadist networks, such as al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The relationship between the Haqqani network and numerous other jihadist networks is historical, going back to the 1980s when training camps for foreign fighters were established in Haqqani territory. For the Haqqani network, this is an important relationship; it has helped “diversify the resource mobilisation networks” that it has access to (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p47) . By developing these relationships, it has provided the group with a new source of militants from which it can draw its power, reducing its dependence on other actors. For groups such as al-Qaeda and the TTP, the relationship is beneficial as they are provided with sanctuary in Haqqani territory, where they can train and plan. Ultimately, the relationships and alliances the Haqqani network has developed are of the utmost importance to building its power. These relationships have placed the group into a “nexus position”, allowing it to gain leverage over other actors (Brown et Rassler, 2011) . For example, the group’s relationship with the TTP, which is engaged in a small-scale insurgency against the Pakistani state, has allowed them to gain influence with the ISI. Bibliography ABC News. (2021) Taliban appoint members of Haqqani terrorist network in senior Afghan government roles . Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-10/taliban-appoint-haqqani-network-members-in-senior-afghan-roles/100442918 . Ahmad, J. (2020) The Taliban’s emerging tactical terror alliances . Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/international/502358-the-talibans-emerging-tactical-terror-alliances/ . Al-Sharqi, A. (1994) Abu `Ata’ Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan . Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/abu-ata-al-sharqi-reports-from-afghanistan-original-language-2/ . Associated Press. (2025) The US lifts bounties on senior Taliban officials, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, says Kabul . Available at: https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-taliban-haqqani-us-bounty-a9f5434850d78f15f81f72222c14b894 . Barfield, T. (2010) Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History . Princeton: Princeton University Press. BBC. (2011) US Admiral: 'Haqqani is veritable arm of Pakistan's ISI' . Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-15026909 . BBC. (2021) Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government . Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750 . Brown, V. and Rassler, D. (2011) The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida . Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-haqqani-nexus-and-the-evolution-of-al-qaida/ . Brown, V. and Rassler, D. (2013) Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 . London: C. Hurst & Co. Coll, S. (2004) Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 . New York: Penguin Press. Dettmer, J. (2021) Hardline Haqqani Network Put in Charge of Kabul Security . Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_hardline-haqqani-network-put-charge-kabul-security/6209747.html . Edwards, D. (2002) Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad . Los Angeles: University of California Press. EFSAS. (2022) The Haqqani Network: A brief profile .   Available at: https://www.efsas.org/publications/articles-by-efsas/the-haqqani-network-a-brief-profile/ . FBIS. (2004) Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004 . Available at: https://irp.fas.org/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf . Galster, S. (2001) Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990 . Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html .   Haqqani, J. (1980) Jalaluddin Haqqani interview with Sami ‘Abd al-Muttalib . Interviewed by Sami ‘Abd al-Muttalib. Al-Ittihad . 11 June. Kaura, V. (2021) The Haqqani Network and India’s Afghan Dilemma . Available at: https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-haqqani-network-and-indias-afghan-dilemma/ . Kumar Sen, A. (2015) In Afghanistan, the Taliban Has a New Leader, But it’s His Deputy Who is Raising Eyebrows . Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-afghanistan-the-taliban-has-a-new-leader-but-it-s-his-deputy-who-is-raising-eyebrows/ . Lurie, D. (2020) The Haqqani Network: The Shadow Group Supporting the Taliban’s Operations . Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26605 . Mapping Militants Project. (2018) Haqqani Network . Available at: https://mappingmilitants.org/node/386 . Partlow, J. (2011) Haqqani insurgent group proves resilient foe in Afghan war . Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/haqqani-insurgent-group-proves-resilient-foe-in-afghan-war/2011/05/27/AG0wfKEH_story.html . Peters, G. (2012) Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry . Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05621 . Romaniuk, S. Webb, S. (2016) ‘The Haqqani Network: Keeping Insurgency in the Family’, in Romaniuk, S. Webb, S. (eds.) Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Modern War . Boca Raton: CRC Press, pp. 175-190. Ruttig, T. (2009) ‘Loya Paktia’s Insurgency: The Haqqani Network as an Autonomous Entity’, in Giustozzi, A. (ed.) Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan field . New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 57-88. Sarkar, S. (2025) Who Is Sirajuddin Haqqani, Mastermind Behind Kabul Indian Embassy Attack, Gifted Reprieve By Trump?  Available at: https://www.news18.com/world/who-is-sirajuddin-haqqani-mastermind-behind-kabul-indian-embassy-attack-gifted-reprieve-by-trump-9273268.html . Sayed, A. Clarke, C. (2021) With Haqqanis at the Helm, the Taliban Will Grow Even More Extreme . Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/04/haqqani-network-taliban-relationship-afghanistan-pakistan-terrorism/ . Snow, M. (2013) American Frankenstein: The Haqqani Revival . 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Introduction The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), also known as Jami’ah Ikhwan Muslimin , Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen , or the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers, is a global Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928. Often seen as the first mainstream Islamist organisation and the precursor of modern Islamism, the MB has influenced countless offshoots, from political parties like Ennahda in Tunisia to transnational militant actors such as Al-Qaeda. According to academic Peter Mandaville, all contemporary Islamist groups “owe a debt to the project Hasan al-Banna initiated in 1928”. (1) The MB positions itself as a non-violent movement focused on the re-Islamisation of society through grassroots reforms. At the height of its power, it briefly led Egypt following the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, but has since been outlawed and/or designated a terrorist group in many countries, including its country of origin. Known for their adaptability and organisational resilience, the group has survived long periods in exile, remaining active—primarily operating out of Türkiye and London—despite its current Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment since 2013. History & Foundations The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a middle-class schoolteacher from Mahmuddiyah, a small town in Northern Egypt. Growing up during the height of British rule over Egypt, as the Ottoman Empire’s presence declined, al-Banna was witness to Egypt’s increasing westernisation and secularisation under British influence. While working in the Suez Canal town of Ismailiyah, where stark inequalities separated local Egyptians and British settlers, al-Banna began writing in frustration about the need for re-Islamisation. (2)  He started teaching informal classes about Islam to students in local mosques and coffeehouses that eventually attracted parents and residents. (3)  Heavily influenced by the glory of the Ottoman Empire, al-Banna sought to oppose British influence in Egypt and remind Muslims of the primacy and singularity of their Islamic identity. He encouraged all Muslims to implement Islam in every aspect of their life, believing that individual change was the best way to restore a true Islamic society. Al-Banna’s vision centred on two primary goals: The liberation of the entire Muslim world from foreign domination The establishment of an Islamic state in the Muslim world to implement the laws and social system of Islam (4) He intended to achieve this by educating the next generation of Muslims in the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam. Hassan al-Banna - [ Image source ] By the 1930s, al-Banna’s movement had grown from small meetings in Ismailiyah to a national network of schools, hospitals, and welfare charities. The newly formed Muslim Brotherhood recruited heavily in universities, encouraging students to take the messages back to their villages. This, alongside an intricate organisational structure with an emphasis on local leadership, allowed the MB to grow rapidly. By the 1940s, the MB had expanded internationally; Egyptian scholars were travelling across the Arab world, Brothers were sent to Palestine to support the 1936 uprisings and the 1948 war (5) , and offshoots were formed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. As the organisation grew, members created a paramilitary wing, the Secret Apparatus ( Nizam al-Khass ), which carried out strategic bombings and assassinations, culminating in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Fahmy al-Nuqrayshi in 1948.  (6)  In 1949, al-Banna was assassinated in a counter-attack by the Egyptian secret services. (7) Al-Banna was crucial to the organisation, and so fuelled by anger at his death, the MB allied with the Free Officers movement—a group of revolutionaries in the Egyptian Armed Forces—to overthrow the reigning King Farouk. Though a seemingly unlikely pairing—an Islamist group and a nationalist group—both had “dedicated themselves to anti-colonialism and reformation of Arab and Muslim society”. (8)  Leading this movement was the future president, General Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood two years before al-Banna’s death. (9) Nasser had worked closely with Brotherhood member and infamous ideologue in the making, Sayyid Qutb, with whom he shared a vision for post-monarchist Egypt. (10) Yet once Farouk was overthrown and Nasser became president in 1952, he turned on the MB, seeing them as a rival to his power. An attempted assassination on Nasser’s life by a fringe MB member in 1954 (11)  cemented their mutual hostility, and shortly thereafter, Nasser began a period of mass incarceration that characterised his regime during the 1950s and 1960s. High-ranking leaders, including Hassan al-Hudaybi (the Supreme Guide) and Sayyid Qutb, were jailed alongside thousands of members, while others fled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, preventing large-scale mobilisation during this time. In prison, Qutb wrote some of his most influential and popular works, including Milestones , where he declared that most of the Muslim world was living in Jahiliyyah (the era of pre-Islamic ignorance) for not ruling by Shari’a (God’s law), saying of those who support secular laws, “This is not Islam, and they are not Muslims.” (12)  Al-Hudaybi attempted to consolidate his authority over the group by publishing works countering Qutb’s ideology, but was unable to prevent more radical offshoots from forming. Eventually, in 1966, Nasser executed Qutb for his role in an alleged plot to assassinate him. (13)  Nonetheless, Qutb’s works remained influential. Following Nasser’s death in 1970, President Anwar Sadat eased restrictions on the MB after 20 years of repression, freeing members on the condition they renounce violence. Both sides made steps towards normalisation, and the MB helped Sadat counter the remaining Nasserists by drumming up support from conservatives and Islamists. This enabled the Brotherhood to regain influence, particularly on university campuses, and rebuild public trust. However, by the late ‘70s and ‘80s, Sadat’s increasingly authoritarian rule and peace treaties with Israel had spurred the growth of Islamic extremism. Several Qutbist Brotherhood members who graduated from university at the time would later form splinter groups that would ultimately become Hamas , Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda. When Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981, he appealed to moderate Islamists within the MB, allowing them to maintain a presence in university campuses, charitable spaces and mosques. (14)  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the MB grew in size, and more members began pushing for political involvement, even spawning a reformist wing. The reformists pushed for multi-party democracy, while conservatives prioritised religious outreach ( da’wah ). (15)   Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak - [ Image source ] Mubarak’s 30-year presidency saw active political involvement by the MB, with many Brotherhood-affiliated candidates standing in elections, from student unions to the national parliament. (16)  By also focusing on local action and social services, the MB earned political legitimacy from Egyptian society, something the state under Mubarak’s government was struggling to achieve. (17)  Fearing their potential influence, Mubarak soon began reimprisoning members after years of mollifying them. By the 2005 parliamentary elections, independent MB members (the MB was still outlawed) formed the largest opposition bloc, leading to further crackdowns and the outlawing of all religious parties. Following the 2010 elections, which were widely hailed as fraudulent, the MB lost all but one of its seats (18) , setting the stage for the Arab Spring revolts against government corruption, which would take place in 2011. When protests against the Mubarak regime first broke out in 2011, mirroring large-scale anti-authoritarian demonstrations across the Arab world, Brotherhood leaders were initially cautious of supporting them for fear of repercussions; however, younger members pushed for support. (19)  The MB quickly harnessed the public political momentum after Mubarak’s ousting, forming its own political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, which would win Egypt’s first democratic elections in 2012, electing Mohamed Morsi to the Egyptian presidency. Similar Islamist victories occurred in Tunisia and Morocco, both by offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood—Ennahda and the Justice and Development Party, respectively. However, once in government, the Brotherhood was unready for the political power it had amassed, falling into the familiar trap of authoritarianism. Morsi declared himself immune from judicial review and enshrined Islamic texts as the basis for legislation, despite running on a platform of social justice and anti-establishmentarianism. (20) Mass protests on Morsi’s first anniversary in office prompted the army to suspend the constitution and arrest him, with army General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi taking over. The bloody aftermath—later known as the Raba massacre—during which over 1,000 counter-protestors were killed (21)  remains a defining trauma for the MB. To this day, the MB asserts that Morsi (who died in 2019) is Egypt’s rightful, democratically elected leader. Since then, under al-Sisi’s presidency, the MB has faced its greatest repression yet owing to an army-led crackdown. Despite its designation as a terrorist organisation and the imprisonment of its Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie, the MB continues to operate mainly in exile, relying on support from Türkiye and Qatar. However, it has struggled to regain the influence or legitimacy it enjoyed before 2013. Thousands protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square following the deposition of Mohamed Morsi - Source: Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images Objectives & Ideology “Islam is the solution”   The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamist socio-political organisation that bases its principles on the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah (the traditions and actions of Muhammad), emphasising the implementation of Shari’a. As put by al-Banna:  “Islam is a comprehensive system that deals with all aspects of life. It is a state and country or a government and a nation. It is moral character and the power of compassion and justice. It is a culture and law or science and judiciary, it is matter and wealth or earning and richness, it is jihad and call or army and ideal, as it is a truthful doctrine and worship.” (22) The MB seeks to bring about Islamic governance under Shari’a law, stressing that Islam is a way of life beyond personal faith. This is often described as political Islam—a term rejected by the Brotherhood, who claim it creates false connotations that Islam is being co-opted for political power. The MB has undergone numerous ideological changes during its long history and produced several famous ideologues now seen as progenitors of the modern Islamist movement’s various strands. (23) Hassan al-Banna was the group’s first and most influential ideologue. An anti-colonial pan-Islamist, he was heavily influenced by stories of the Ottoman Empire’s reach and influence. Despite living and dying under British rule, al-Banna rejected Western ideals, including secularism and Egyptian nationalism, though he maintained that nationalism was compatible with Islamic ideals. Al-Banna sought to create a true Islamic society from the bottom up, prioritising people living their lives as good Muslims, using education and social structures as tools to bring people back into the Islamic fold. (24) This strategy persisted into the 1960s and 1970s, before a shift in ideology spearheaded by Sayyid Qutb started favouring a more fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur’an. Qutbism is still seen as one of the most significant ideological influences behind modern Salafi-Jihadism, with Qutb often described as the ideological architect behind al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other Islamist groups. (25)  During his time in Nasser’s prisons, Qutb’s focus drifted from anti-imperialism to a different view of Islam. He argued that Islam did not just proscribe defensive war, but that jihad was an existential fight against apostasy, including apostate regimes. This popularised the concept of takfirism ,   or designating other Muslims as apostates, thereby making them legitimate targets for violence under Shari’a law. While many Egyptians rejected this view, it encouraged many Brotherhood members (26)  to adopt violent, offensive Islamism, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, (27)  who would go on to lead al-Qaeda, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would found the Islamic State. (28) Although Qutb was never a formal leader of the Brotherhood, he was highly influential, and after his death, leaders attempted to steer members away from Qutb’s more radical school of thought. One prominent figure that followed, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, emerged as the unofficial ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood  (29)  but declined opportunities for leadership twice. (30)  Citing al-Banna as his main influence, al-Qaradawi built a large following from his base in Qatar, where he had fled after his imprisonment under Nasser. While he rejected Qutb’s extremism and defended aspects of international law, he controversially issued decrees permitting suicide attacks on Israel, including against civilian targets. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, as the MB became increasingly politically engaged, it shifted its focus to political reform and began officially condemning the rise of Islamic extremist groups. This bore fruit in the form of Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi’s election to the presidency in 2012 and his attempts to implement Islamic governance in Egypt. Since the al-Sisi-led coup against Morsi in 2013, the MB has returned to resisting political repression and to reaffirming al-Banna’s original vision, albeit cleaving into two ideological camps: those who still see hope in political change and those disillusioned with the Egyptian government. This internal division has made any political headway difficult, and the failure to achieve lasting change after the 2011 uprisings has disenchanted many younger members. Despite these challenges, the MB supposedly remains committed to non-violence. The Brotherhood’s official website continues to emphasise the holistic approach of the MB in the political, social, economic, and educational spheres, and stresses the importance of the “reunification” of the Muslim world. (31)  Since the October 7th attacks by Hamas / AQB , Palestinian Islamic Jihad , the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , and others on Israel, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza (and attacks on Hamas and its regional allies in Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah  in Lebanon, HTS  in Syria, and the Houthis  in Yemen), calls for a greater unified Muslim community have been stressed. (32)  Ultimately, it is the breadth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologies that has enabled the group’s longevity, even if such diversity produces internal divides. (33) Political & Military Capabilities Following its fall from the height of its political power in 2013, the MB suffered from significantly reduced capacity, owing to the dissolution of the Freedom and Justice Party in 2014, and the exile of the MB from Egypt. Subsequent terrorist designations from surrounding Arab states have made it further difficult for the group to operate freely. Though the group still has bases in Türkiye and London (with limited presence in Qatar), these are largely under-the-radar, and the group has no official political presence in either country. Additionally, recent diplomatic normalisation between Türkiye and Egypt has led to the closing of Brotherhood TV channels broadcasting from Istanbul and harsher restrictions on citizenship for Brotherhood members. (34)  Similarly, improved diplomatic relations between the US, EU and Egypt have triggered greater scrutiny of the MB, making open movement more difficult amidst fear of proscription. It is the group’s complex internal organisational structure that has allowed it to survive for so many years. Defined by regular elections and an elaborate pyramid-style hierarchy of numerous cells, messages seamlessly pass from leadership to the rank-and-file. Recruitment has historically targeted middle-class, politically conscious university students who often take the group’s message from cities back to more rural areas. This focus on recruitment has built a strong base at the bottom of the pyramid, ensuring a steady flow of new members without constant direction from the top. The network is tightly interconnected, creating community and loyalty. New enlistees start as  muhibb  (lovers) while their commitment is tested. If they pass, they join 6–7 others in an  usra  (family), the bottom rung of the system. Five families form a  shu’uba  (division), and 3–4 divisions make a  mantiqa  (district). Members progress to  mu’ayyad (supporters), who can pray, preach, and recruit, but not vote, followed by  muntazib  (affiliates), and  muntazir  (organisers), who must memorise the Qur’an and form their own usras. Only after completing these steps do members become  akh-amil (working brothers), with voting rights and eligibility for leadership. (35) Pyramid Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood - Source: Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics, Khalil al-Alani At the top of the pyramid, ensuring political transparency, there are administrative regional officers, a legislative branch (the Shura Council), an executive guidance bureau with four-year terms, and a Supreme Guide voted in by the Shura Council. In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced major internal political turmoil driven by the loss of key leaders through imprisonment or death. After Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment in 2013, Mohamed Ezzat was unanimously voted in as acting Guide until his arrest in Cairo in 2020. London-based Ibrahim Mounir was then elected as acting Guide, but his restructuring efforts clashed with Istanbul-based leaders, prompting a failed coup attempt in 2022. (36)   The Istanbul faction broke away thereafter, electing Mahmoud Hussein, the only remaining member of the old General Council, known for his work in finance and media, as their Guide. (37) The London-based faction continued to recognise Mounir until he died in 2022, after which his favoured successor, Salah Abdel Haq, famed for his focus on reunification and addressing the membership crisis, replaced him. The London faction views itself as more legitimate due to its legal operation, while the Istanbul faction claims to be truer to the MB’s original mission by remaining based in the Arab world. Such divisions were once unthinkable for a movement famed for its internal cohesion, but political setbacks have deepened. The death in 2022 of Qatar-based ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a key figure in spreading the Brotherhood’s message to mass audiences, significantly weakened the group’s global influence. Leadership instability has led to “crisis promotions” of younger members and difficulty retaining a disillusioned membership. (38)  Ultimately, the group’s capacity to act as a large-scale political force in exile is now severely limited. The Muslim Brotherhood does not currently have a military wing. Historically, sometime between 1938–1940, the MB did form the Nizam al-Khass (Special Apparatus) as a counter-offensive to British colonialism, with members receiving varying levels of paramilitary training and carrying out attacks against British bases (39) — it was a smaller cell of the Nizam al-Khass that attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954 (40) — however, the military wing was largely stamped out in the imprisonment that followed the assassination attempt, and by the 1970s, violence had been completely disavowed. Following Morsi’s ousting, some younger members pushed for armed resistance, leading to a year of deadly clashes with Egyptian security forces. However, this was never supported by the older leadership, who remembered the repression resulting from the violence during Nasser's time, and the brutal crackdown against the Syrian Brotherhood in 1982, limiting the scope of violent resistance by young Brotherhood members. Approach to Resistance The Muslim Brotherhood pledges to maintain its commitment to peaceful tactics and its opposition to violence as a means of political action. It continues to actively distance itself from radical Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and has reverted to societal, community-based change initiatives. However, the MB’s approach to resistance is largely dictated by where it can and cannot operate. A movement in exile, it now relies on digital communications from Istanbul and London to keep its dwindling membership base in Egypt alive. This has precipitated a strategic shift towards the Internet as the primary method and medium of organisation and activism, with the MB posting regular messages on its websites Ikhwan Web (English) and Ikhwan Online (Arabic) . Due to leadership splits, two versions of IkhwanWeb exist, each releasing its own press statements and messaging. The Arabic and English sites offer notably different content, with the English site targeting outsiders with a more moderate tone, and the Arabic site aimed at members, offering more conservative advice on religious guidance and daily life. (41)  The leadership divides are also visible in the different factions’ approaches to resistance. London-based Abdel Haq favours a more diplomatic approach to regaining power in Egypt and is willing to consider rapprochement with al-Sisi in exchange for an operation, whereas Istanbul’s Hussein is vehemently opposed to reconciliation. (42) In Europe, the MB has prioritised slow, societal expansion and integration into communities, running schools, corner stores, and community centres. In 2025, two French civil servants authored a controversial state-ordered report declaring that the MB runs 139 places of worship, over 280 social organisations, and 815 Qur’anic schools within France. (43)  The MB attempted a similar expansion in the UK via the creation and co-option of Muslim cultural, social and charitable organisations. (44)  Yusuf al-Qaradawi expressed the aim of these projects as the creation of a “small society within the larger society [the West].” International Relations & Alliances Alliances The Muslim Brotherhood maintains affiliates in several countries. Although most started as branches of the Egyptian movement, they now largely operate on their own and are simply linked ideologically. Syria Once the largest offshoot, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was all but crushed after the 1982 Hama massacre, where thousands of members were killed in a crackdown by Hafiz al-Assad. Since the overthrow of the Assad regime in 2024, there has been a modest resurgence of the SMB under the government’s new leadership by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) . (45) Jordan In May 2025, the Jordanian government officially outlawed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood following allegations of members’ involvement in a terror plot threatening national security. (46)  The group has not been formally recognised since 2015, but for decades had continued to function as a non-revolutionary loyal opposition. Its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, remains active, recently winning 31 of 138 seats in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Though the group had previously boycotted elections, it has been politically revived by the war in Gaza. (47)   Palestine Emerging during the First Intifada in 1987, Hamas  began as a militant offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, whose networks had been established as far back as the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when Egyptian Brothers were sent to fight there. (48)  The two groups no longer have formal ties, with both favouring different tactics; however, having long made an exception for violence in the Palestinian context, the MB has released multiple statements in support of Hamas following the October 7th attacks and subsequent war in Gaza. (49) International Relations The MB maintains key allies and adversaries across the globe, receiving funding primarily from Türkiye and Qatar. Qatar Qatar has long held a strategic partnership with the Brotherhood. Ideologically aligned with the state’s Wahhabi beliefs, Qatar has historically been a primary funder of the MB, and has supported the group in numerous other ways, including through TV slots for preaching on its state-sponsored channel Al-Jazeera. This fuelled a blockade by the Arab Quartet (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) until Qatar scaled back open support for the MB, expelling some senior members and toning down messaging on Al-Jazeera following Saudi-led normalisation talks, though still maintaining discreet funding. (50) Türkiye Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been another ardent defender of the MB. Erdoğan, who was himself linked to the movement in the past, vocally opposed the ousting of Morsi, hosted exiled Brothers, and supported Qatar during the blockade. Yet, in recent years, he too has reduced his support, instead pursuing rapprochement with Egypt. Even so, Istanbul remains a key base for the MB, and Erdoğan continues to maintain ties to garner strategic influence amongst Muslim communities. (51)   Saudi Arabia In the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was a firm ally of the MB, welcoming exiles fleeing Nasser’s repression and giving many teaching positions at universities, shaping the kingdom’s own Islamic school of thought. Over time, however, tensions emerged, particularly with the rise of Salafi-Jihadist movements. The Gulf War marked the first major rupture, when offshoots demanded political reform and the removal of American troops. The aftermath of 9/11 caused even greater strain, with external American pressure to clamp down on extremism. The final straw was the Arab Spring; the Brotherhood was seen as a destabilising, anti-monarchy force, and the Kingdom formally designated them a terrorist organisation in 2014, becoming the first state in the region to do so. The West In the West, the Muslim Brotherhood has never been formally designated a terrorist organisation, and in much of Europe, it has been allowed to operate freely as a civil society group. It has, however, remained under scrutiny, with a formal inquiry by the UK government in 2015 and a similar report in France in 2025. In the United States, where the Brotherhood once had sympathetic support from Barack Obama (52) , it faces harsher scrutiny under Donald Trump, with US officials once again pushing for proscription, with the group only narrowly avoiding designation following a congressional subcommittee during Trump’s first term. (53)  Bibliography Mandaville, Peter. Global Political Islam . Routledge, 2008. Mura, Andrea. “A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan Al-Banna,” Journal of Political Ideologies  17, no. 1 (February 2012): 61–85. doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2012.644986 . 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