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Introduction & Overview The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) is a far-right volunteer unit fighting on the Ukrainian side of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite their siding with Ukraine, the unit largely specialises in the recruitment, training, and deployment of Russian nationals who disagree with the current Putin regime in their homeland.  Gaining notoriety for their incursions into Russian territory in the Spring of 2023, the RDK has developed from a small group of volunteer fighters to a well-armed and motivated fighting force, possibly having been incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition to front-line fighting, the RDK also make use of guerrilla/clandestine operations on Russian soil, encouraging arson attacks and the disruption of logistical railways.   Ideologically, the RDK ascribe to general far-right "traditionalist" attitudes, often encompassing homophobia, white supremacism, and neo-nazism. Said attitudes are frequently promoted through the group's telegram channel, as well as through the "White Rex" clothing line owned by the group's founder, notorious white supremacist and ex-MMA fighter Denis Nikitin.  Denis Nikitin alongside RDK fighters - [ Image source ] History & Foundations Whilst the RDK was officially founded in August of 2022 (Satanovskii, 2023) , many fighters who would end up fighting under the group had been participating in the Donbas war since 2014 (Talmazan, 2023) . Initially, the unit had just 5 members (Dettmer, 2024) ; however, it was only a short time before RDK's recruitment efforts reaped their rewards. Amongst these new recruits were some interesting characters, one such example being Alexei Levkin. Creator of the Neo-Nazi community Wotanjugend (Meduza, 2023) and the lead singer of national socialist black metal group M8l8th (DOXA, 2023) , Levkin is held in high regard in the Eastern European far-right scene and has expressed support for neo-Nazi mass killer Anders Breivik (Meduza, 2023) .  RDK's leader, Denis Kaputsin, is an equally interesting individual. Operating under the pseudonym Denis "WhiteRex" Nikitin (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , Kaputsin is in his 30s and originally hails from Moscow (Claus, 2017) . In 2001, Nikitin moved to Germany with his family, quickly becoming involved in the local Neo-Nazi scene (DOXA, 2023) . As with many militant far-right individuals/groups, Nikitin also had extensive involvement in football hooliganism (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , and such activity, in combination with his Neo-Nazi ties, led to the revocation of Nikitin's German residence permit (DOXA, 2023) .  A keen MMA practitioner (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , Nikitin used his newfound exile as an opportunity to travel and become involved in the European far-right "active club" scene (Claus, 2017) . Through his involvement in this network of active clubs, Nikitin began his own lifestyle/MMA brand, "WhiteRex". Nikitin then used this brand to hold events for far-right community members, as well as producing Neo-Nazi influenced merchandise (Claus, 2017) . These events allowed Nikitin to generate a reputation and gain respect from leaders in the scene, quickly developing an extensive network of contacts across Europe (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , even being asked to attend a far-right training camp in the UK as a coach (Claus, 2017) .  Now, despite these ties to Neo-Nazism, Nikitin strangely denies following such beliefs (Hewson, 2023) . However, the reasons behind such claims become clear with a little digging. Ironically, Nikitin's family originally moved to Germany as Jewish contingent refugees, with the family being treated as a special case due to their Jewish origin (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . Regardless of this inherent contradiction, Nikitin moved to Ukraine in 2017 in order to begin his participation in the Donbas conflict (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Shortly after the initial foundation of RDK and its opening activity in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the group quickly gained support from other units with a similarly largely Russian composition (Хвиля, 2022) . On the 31st of August, 2022, the former deputy of the Russian Federation and leader of the Freedom of Russia Legion (Mallinder, 2023) , Ilya Ponomarev, made an announcement on social media stating that a declaration of cooperation between the "Russian Volunteer Corps", the Legion "Freedom of Russia" and the "National Republican Army" ( Facebook ) . Supposedly signed in the Kyiv region, the declaration called for the coordination of forces between the groups, and the adoption of a new symbol alongside the foundation of a political centre to best represent the group's new joint objectives/ideological stance (Гречаная, 2022) .  Despite this statement, RDK ardently denied signing any such declaration ( https://t.me/russvolcorps/118 ) . According to the group's telegram channel, RDK attended the event, but were unaware that they would be asked to sign any declaration, and refused to do so, expecting a press conference with the military associations of the Russian people. Nikitin has stated that ideological differences led to rifts between the groups, primarily due to efforts to convince RDK to accept black/trans volunteers (Dettmer, 2024) .  Whilst the RDK had been involved in military activity from early 2022, such as being used to guard Snake Island following its recapture ( https://t.me/russvolcorps/313 ) , the group's real activity began in 2023. On the second of March, RDK conducted an incursion into the Russian border city of Bryansk (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . Russian media responded to the incident with accusations of attacks against civilians, alleging that two adults were killed and an 11-year-old boy was injured; however, such accusations were later denied by civilians in the area (Meduza, 2023 1) . Whilst misconceptions around this attack are rife (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023) , geolocatable videos from RDK confirm that the incursion did in fact take place ( https://t.me/milinfolive/97542 / https://t.me/russvolcorps/424 ) , with some believing that the attack was in fact a false flag designed to generate justification for the Russian invasion (Blann, 2023) .  This operation, in combination with a foiled plot orchestrated by Nikitin to kill Orthodox media magnate Konstantin Malofeyev (The Moscow Times, 2023) , led to Nikitin being added to the interior ministry's wanted list on the 26th of March ( https://t.me/tass_agency/185764 ) . Again, it is worth noting that there is no real proof of any such plot existing, and it could very well be an attempt to discourage Russians, who often follow orthodox Christianity, from joining the RDK following the incursion on the 2nd of March.  RDK's activity in Russian territory continued in May. On the 24th, RDK began shelling positions in the Russian region of Belgorod (Satanovskii, 2023) . Collaborating with the Freedom of Russia Legion, RDK claims to have then manoeuvred to take control of a 40km strip along the Russian-Ukrainian border (Perelman, 2023) . Despite efforts to hold this territory, the Ukrainian forces were pushed back to the border after a few days of fighting; however, the groups continued their periodic raids into the region (Hewson, 2023) . Again, Russia responded to these operations with allegations of attacks on civilians, claiming that 12 people were wounded (Al Jazeera, 2023) .  The RDK Logo/Flag - [ Image source ] These periodic raids continued into June, primarily being conducted in the Shekino ( https://t.me/rvc_army/581 ) and Novaya Tavolzhanka ( https://t.me/rvc_army/573 ) areas. These areas were held for at least a week ( https://t.me/rvc_army/591 ) but were again eventually abandoned. Despite this eventual retreat, the RDK had sent their message, forcing Russia to secure its borders in the area. On the 11th of November 2023, the RDK was designated as a terror organisation by the FSB (FSB, 2024) .  Judging by the RDK's social media channels, the group seems to have continued its participation with military operations in the east of Ukraine, refraining from further incursions until 2024. On the 12th of March, RDK, alongside the Freedom of Russia Legion and Siberian Battalion, launched the largest yet cross-border attack into Kursk and Belgorod (Dettmer, 2024) .  Nikitin, alongside various RDK fighters - [ Image source ] Objectives & Ideology Unlike most nationalist groups participating in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the RDK are both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. The RDK's core objective is to create a Russia that can live in peace with its surrounding countries, whilst respecting Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty (Satanovskii, 2023) . NIkitin has openly described himself as a "Russian nationalist", although he feels that Russian nationalism has taken a wrong turn somewhere in the past (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) .  A key component of this proposed "wrong turn" is Putin himself. The Russian president is a regular target of criticism amongst RDK circles (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . In the eyes of RDK, Putin is a traitor waging a fraternal war to please his oligarch babysitters (Dettmer, 2024) . This fraternal war, in combination with increased immigration rates caused by imperialistic attitudes in the Kremlin, is supposedly leading to the loss/muddying of ethnic Russian blood (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) .  RDK seeks to address these "concerns" through the creation of a Russian ethnostate consisting of regions that were a part of the 1991 Russian Federation (DOXA, 2023) . Should this solution be implemented, the RDK has stated that it is content with any additional regions leaving the federation and gaining independence (Satanovskii, 2023) . These views are an escalation from the far-right/traditionalist views that the group commonly promotes (Hewson, 2023) and into the territory of neo-Nazi conspiracy theories such as "The Great Replacement" ( https://t.me/rvc_army/554 ) .  Such extremist ideologies can also be found in the group's stockastic anti-Semitism, with Nikitin criticising Zelensky or being a jew who promotes "the worst of liberal values" (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) whilst also stating that he has no problem with jews (Hewson, 2023) . Further examples can be found in Nikitin's clothing brand "White Rex", which commonly sells designs featuring black sun symbols (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , or even through fighters on the front line, with some conducting Hitler salutes during combat ( https://t.me/rvc_army/81 ) . Despite these more militant elements of the RDK, there is a surprising amount of diversity amongst their ranks. Some volunteers identify as liberal or left-wing, turning a blind eye to secure a chance to fight against Putin (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Similarly, some fighters may not fully align themselves with RDK's overarching objectives, but are short on options due to the few units on the Ukrainian side accepting Russians (DOXA, 2023) .  Military/Political Abilities Whilst not a huge force, the RDK is the largest of the Russian volunteer units, including the Freedom of Russia legion, with claims of around 2000 fighters being involved in the March 2024 raids into Russian territory (Dettmer, 2024) . However, the veracity of such numbers is dubious, with fighters in 2023 claiming that RDK numbered between 150 (Satanovskii, 2023) and 200 (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) fighters.  Despite the RDK's numerical ambiguity, their equipment is rather impressive for a volunteer group. By 2024, RDK had gained access to its own vehicles, mortars, artillery, HMGS and small arms, even founding a base of operations and clear-cut recruitment process (Dettmer, 2024) . Whilst many volunteer groups have access to such equipment, the quality/age of such equipment is often questionable. RDK, on the other hand, has managed to equip at least some of its fighters with thermal sights ( https://t.me/rvc_army/97 ) and has even posted on social media implying that they are either in possession of or have access to an M142 HIMARS ( https://t.me/rvc_army/268 ) .  Additionally, the RDK make use of armoured vehicles such as Maxx Pro MRAPs ( https://t.me/rvc_army/527 ) and even scavenged enemy vehicles, such as a BTR-82A that was captured during the group's raids in the Belgorod region ( https://t.me/rvc_army/518 ) . Whilst initially damaged, eventually the vehicle was repaired using monetary donations generated through the group's social media channels ( https://t.me/rvc_army/552 ) .  RDK fighters alongside a captured BTR82-A, with one soldier equipped with some form of thermal/night vision scope. - [ Image source ] RDK's connection/collaboration with the Ukrainian Armed Forces is unclear, with UA officials being purposefully vague about how the two forces interact (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023) . According to Nikitin, the RDK's formation was encouraged by the UAF, but was not sponsored through equipment or financial support (Al Jazeera, 2023) . It is largely the opinion of the UAF that the RDK is independent of Ukraine, but also has every right to take up arms against a tyrant/dictator (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) .  However, the ties between the RDK and the UAF seem to have grown closer. Once fighters enter Ukraine, they are put through a polygraph test by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine before they are authorised to join the RDK (Hewson, 2023) . This assistance with recruitment can also be found in accusations that Ukrainian military members worked with the Civil Council in Poland (a political recruitment body assisting the RDK) to prepare papers and contracts for foreign fighters (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Similarly, fighters have claimed that they receive a wage directly from the UAF (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , and in 2024, it was claimed that the UAF vets the RDK's operational plans and provides logistical support for the group's activities (Dettmer, 2024) .  Despite this increasing closeness, the UAF openly disavow RDK's operations within Russian territory. Initially, the UAF outright condemned the activities of the RDK on Russian soil, stating that they were an independent body from Ukrainian forces (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . However, as the conflict in Ukraine has developed, the RDK has stated that whilst they now officially fight as a component of UA forces, once they enter Russian territory, they are simply Russian citizens who have taken up arms (Dettmer, 2024) .  Approach to Resistance Whilst RDK has fought in a standard battleline capacity for the majority of the war in Ukraine, its notable actions have largely taken on a diversionary/sabotage capacity ( https://t.me/rvc_army/680 ) . For example, the primary aim of RDK's March 2023 incursion into Russian territory was stated to be diversionary, drawing Russian troops away from the frontlines in the east (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . In addition to frustrating Russia's efforts to fight on one front in the East, these attacks also demonstrate to Russian civilians the government's failure to secure its own borders, despite Putin's posturing to indicate otherwise (Pigni, 2023) . These attitudes of diversion/sabotage are also encouraged outside of the frontlines. Russian nationals who wish to join RDK are instructed to first participate in disruptive activities on Russian soil ( https://t.me/rvc_army/194 ) .  These activities are primarily suggested to be the use of Molotov cocktails in arson attacks, and the disruption of logistical railway lines in an attempt to sabotage the Russian military industrial complex ( https://t.me/rvc_army/186 ) .  Generally, operations on Russian soil aim to whip up anger against Putin and support for RDK's activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , often using graffiti as a promotional tool ( https://t.me/rvc_army/211 ) , in order to collapse the Russian state from within (Hewson, 2023) . Due to these objectives, RDK's existence is at odds with the existence of the current Russian state (DOXA, 2023) , and therefore, the group views its fight as existential and civil war as inevitable (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . Due to this, violent resistance is seen as the primary tool with which RDK can fight the Russian state (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . RDK seems to take its role/fight seriously, operating in a fairly organised and structured capacity, with clear efforts made to generate a supporting logistical network for its activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . Within the RDK, there are numerous units/roles, including medics and drone operators, with all recruits receiving 2 months of basic training (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . The group even has a "Free Cossack" detachment made of Cossacks from the Kuban and Don regions (Bondarenko, 2024) and a unit dedicated to the use of OSINT in an attempt to track Russian activity ( https://t.me/rvc_army/377 ) .  The flag of the “Free Cossacks” RDK Unit - [ Image source ] In terms of recruitment efforts, the RDK seems to have generated its own pipeline (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . First, potential recruits become involved in the active club/hooligan/NSBM in their area. Eventually, the individual may come across the White Rex MMA brand, or the NSBM band M8L8TH, and through their connections to the group, the individual would eventually learn of RDK. Finally, if the individual is already predisposed to such activities, the RDK will radicalise the recruit and offer them a chance to fight on the front lines should they show such potential. This pipeline seems highly effective at recruiting ideologically driven and dedicated fighters, with RDK membership seeming far more "hardcore" than those fighting with similar groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion (Talmazan, 2023) . ​ International Relations & Alliances The RDK's ties to the Azov Brigade are relatively unclear. Whilst the RDK was formed outside of Azov, many of its initial members were existing fighters under the Azov Brigade, and had been fighting in the Donbas since 2013 (Pigni, 2023) . Interestingly, the RDK's first post on their Telegram channel is in fact a memorandum to an Azov fighter ( https://t.me/rvc_army/42 ) .  These initial ties seem to have been continued, with the RDK working alongside Azov units on the front lines, as can be seen through extensive videos posted by he group on their Telegram channel. The following video, depicting international recruits being welcomed into the RDK, also hints towards continued connections between the two factions ( https://t.me/rvc_army/661 ) . In the video, as recruits get onto their transport, they shake hands with their instructor. The handshake, where both individuals grip each other's forearms, is largely associated with Azov fighters.  As noted earlier, the RDK also has links to the Polish political party "Civic Council". Founded in Warsaw and led by Anastasia Sergeyeva (ex-head of the Poland-based "For a Free Russia" association), the Civic Council is a centre-right party which works internationally to provide support to similarly driven groups (Satanovskii, 2023) . The Civic Council, of which the RDK was an official component (Satanovskii, 2023) , operated to actively funnel volunteers to the RDK (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . However, on the 6th of June 2023, due to unspecified ideological differences, the Civic Council announced that it would be cutting ties with the RDK ( https://t.me/civiccouncil/245 ) .  Works Cited (1) - Al Jazeera (2023). Leader of anti-Putin force says expect more Russian border raids . [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/russian-leader-of-anti-putin-force-says-expect-more-border-raids   (2) - Blann. (2023). Russia claims Ukraine crossborder sabotage raid; Kyiv denies . [online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-apartment-building-d2b8fc376956d2bedc44d3a0d711f260 . (3) - Bondarenko. (2024). Приехали с Кубани и вступили в РДК: российские казаки воюют на стороне ВСУ под Авдеевкой . [online] ФОКУС. Available at: https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/625719-priehali-s-kubani-i-vstupili-v-rdk-rossijskie-kazaki-voyuyut-na-storone-vsu-pod-avdeevkoj   (4) - Claus. (2017). Neonazis und illegale Kämpfe: Wie sich deutsche und russische Hooligans vernetzen . [online] VICE. Available at: https://www.vice.com/de/article/neonazis-und-illegale-kampfe-wie-sich-deutsche-und-russische-hooligans-vernetzen/ (5) - Demyanik. (2022). Российская оппозиция начинает вооруженное сопротивление Путину: подписано декларацию . [online] ГЛАВКОМ. Available at: https://glavcom.ua/ru/news/mozhovoj-tsentr-sverzhenija-rezhima-putina-budet-dejstvovat-v-ukraine-872092.html   (6) - Dettmer. (2024). Ukraine embraces far-right russian ‘bad guy’ to take the battle to putin . [online] Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-the-ukraine-war/ . (7) - Diehl,, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens. (2019). Rechtsextremer Kampfsportler: Der Neonazi-Krieger . [online] Spiegel.de . Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/rechtsextremer-kampfsportler-der-neonazi-krieger-aus-moskau-a-1253163.html (8) - Dixon, R., Ebel, F. and Ilyushina, M. (2023). Kremlin accuses Ukraine of violent attack in western Russia . [online] The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/02/bryansk-russia-attack-ukraine-saboteurs/   (9) - DOXA. (2023). ‘Мы — русские, и мы — не россияне’ . [online] DOXA. Available at: https://doxa.team/articles/rdk-profile (10) - FSB. (2024). Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими :: Федеральная Служба Безопасности . [online] Available at: http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm . (11) - Hewson. (2023). Inside the controversial group of Russian dissidents fighting with Ukraine against Putin . [online] Available at: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/inside-the-controversial-group-of-russian-dissidents-fighting-with-ukraine-against-putin   (12) - Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova. (2023). Who’s behind the attack on a Russian region bordering Ukraine? [online] AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-border-attacks-explainer-88af10d3895a203918f03ba32687b908 . (13) - Mallinder. (2023). Who is Ilya Ponomarev, the anti-war Russian renegade exiled in Ukraine?  [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/8/who-is-ilya-ponomarev-the-anti-war-russian-renegade-exiled-in-ukraine   (14) - Meduza. (2023). ‘Русский добровольческий корпус’ выпустил манифест под названием ‘Человек этнический’ — Meduza . [online] Available at: https://meduza.io/news/2023/05/29/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-vypustil-manifest-pod-nazvaniem-chelovek-etnicheskiy   (15) - Perelman. (2023). The Interview - Pro-Kyiv Russian group says it ‘didn’t lose a single soldier’ in cross-border raids on Belgorod . [online] France 24. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-interview/20230524-pro-ukraine-group-didn-t-lose-a-single-soldier-in-cross-border-raids-leader-says   (16) - Pigni. (2023). Explainer: Which Russian Far-Right Groups are Fighting in Ukraine?  [online] The Moscow Times. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/03/24/explainer-which-russian-far-right-groups-are-fighting-in-ukraine-a80543   (17) - Pikulicka-Wilczewska (2023). Insight: How Russians end up in a far-right militia fighting in Ukraine. Reuters . [online] 11 May. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russians-end-up-far-right-militia-fighting-ukraine-2023-05-11/ . (18) - Satanovskii (2023). Who are the Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine?  [online] dw.com . Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-the-russian-volunteers-fighting-for-ukraine/a-65722771   (19) - Talmazan. (2023). Who are the anti-Putin groups behind the dramatic raid into Russia?  [online] Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/belgorod-raid-russian-volunteer-corps-freedom-russia-legion-rcna86168 . (20) - The Moscow Times. (2023). Leader of Russian Volunteer Corps Placed on Interior Ministry Wanted List . [online] The Moscow Times. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/03/27/leader-of-russian-volunteer-corps-placed-on-interior-ministry-wanted-list-a80621 . (21) - Гречаная (2022). ‘Русский добровольческий корпус’, легион ‘Свобода России’ и "Национальная...  [online] Гордон | Gordon. Available at: https://gordonua.com/news/war/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-legion-svoboda-rossii-i-nacionalnaya-respublikanskaya-armiya-rf-podpisali-deklaraciyu-o-sotrudnichestve-1624002.html   (22) - Хвиля (2022). Илья Пономарев опубликовал ‘Ирпенскую декларацию’ российской оппозиции: "Вооруженное сопротивление путинс...  [online] hvylya.net . 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Introduction & Overview Efforts to solidify Misanthropic Divisions' true nature have been relatively unsuccessful. It seems as if, rather than a unit or clear structure of fighters (as is often assumed), Misanthropic Division is in reality a network/group to which any pro-Ukrainian combatant can claim membership as long as they follow the group's far-right ideology.  Founded in 2013, Misanthropic Division promotes far-right/neo-nazi ideology and provides both material and monetary support to units/groups which it deems to be in line with its own views. Gaining notoriety through their involvement in the 2014 Euromaidan protests alongside Right Sector, Misanthropic Division continued its praxis throughout the separatist conflict in the Donbas and the eventual Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  Whilst Misanthropic Divisions' foundations, and the majority of the group's activity, can be found in Ukraine, a key component of the group's efforts is international recruitment for Ukrainian volunteer groups. With close ties to the Azov Brigade, the Misanthropic Division uses cells across Europe to radicalise and recruit existing members of far-right communities into joining a range of international volunteer combatant groups.  History & Foundations Formed in 2013 ( https://t.me/c/1565564438/43654 ) , Misanthropic Division (henceforth referred to as MD) found its roots in the Kharkiv football hooligan scene (Sova Center, 2016) , a common trend amongst far-right groups. Initially, consisting of only 14 people (Sova Center, 2016) , MD made their first appearance in December of 2013 during the events of Ukraine's Euromaidan, operating as a component of the Right Sector (Ukraine's far-right party) (Reft and Light, 2016) . Of the 14 initial members of the groups, two individuals quickly developed prominence amongst MD's activities.  MD's primary founder is a man by the name of Dmytro Pavlov (Sova Center, 2016) . The apparent leader of MD, Pavlov, is originally from Belarus (Sova Center, 2016 1) , and has extensive ties to Eastern European neo-Nazi networks (an unsurprising fact in the light of Pavlov's nom de guerre; "Misanthropic Fuhrer") (Sova Center, 2016) . The other notable individual, Serhiy "People Hater" Lynnyk, was another key component MD's initial activities alongside the Right Sector (Sova Center, 2016) . Following MD's involvement in combat operations, Lynnyk fought alongside the Azov brigade and has since become a prominent propagandist for MD, posting about his combat experiences on the MD webpage/telegram (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Following its initial involvement in the Euromaidan, MD continued working alongside Right Sector. On the 15 of March, 2014, pro-Russian activists from the Oplot organisation attacked Ukrainian right-wing groups in the Kharkiv Right Sector office (Reft and Light, 2016) . Both sides of the clash were heavily armed, leading to the attack descending into a gunfight, resulting in the deaths of two pro-Russian activists. MD claimed responsibility for these deaths (Yudina, 2020) . Once officially founded, MD increased recruitment drives and began its participation in the Donbas war as a component of the Azov brigade (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Despite its infancy, MD's influence rapidly spread outside of Ukraine. Following the foundation of the Kyiv branch, other branches began to pop up across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017) . For example, a branch was founded in Switzerland by a man known as Bjorn Sigvald. A native of Geneva, Sigvald seemed to work closely with MD to organise and further recruit for the Swiss branch of the group, with some members being active members of the Swiss military (Renversé, 2020) .  This activity did not go unnoticed. On the 21st of March, 2015, Italian national Saverio Fontana, a prominent recruiter for MD, was spotted in Newcastle (UK) at a neo-Nazi rally where the MD banner was being displayed (FOIA Research, 2019) . Shortly following this, the UK branch of MD organised a protest outside of the US embassy in London, demanding the release of neo-Nazi Gary Yabrough from prison, and consequently leading to considerable scrutiny from both the press and law enforcement entities (Libcom, 2015) . MD's activity during this period also led to further pressure in the east, with Russia declaring the group as an extremist organisation on the 17th of July, banning their activity (euronews, 2021) .  MD continued their activity in both Ukraine and wider Europe, orchestrating and participating in various political actions alongside various other groups, such as the British National Party (Libcom, 2015) . In March 2016, MD claimed responsibility for the disruption of the Equality festival in Lviv due to its pro-LGBT nature. Around 200 individuals in sportswear and masks blocked the entrance into the event following a bomb threat, and as the event's attendees were evacuated, their vehicles were attacked with stones and metal bars (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Following this prominent action, MD announced that it would be ceasing activity; however, in August, the group announced that they would be resuming their operations (Sova Center, 2016) . This period of inactivity led to a curious development. In July 2016, confirmation of Russian citizens in MD activities came in the form of a criminal case opened by the Russian state. The case, opened against the group's leader (Pavlov) and two Russian nationals, led to the Russians being arrested and shipped to Moscow, with Pavlov remaining safe in Ukraine (Sova Center, 2016) .  MD's return from hiatus is marked by a reinsertion into the often asymmetrical zeitgeist of Ukraine's defence in the face of Russian invasion. On the 16th of October, 2016, Arsen "Motorola" Pavlov was killed by an explosion in the elevator shaft of his apartment block in Donetsk (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022) . The infamous leader of the 'Sparta' separatist battalion, Pavlov had previously openly admitted to war crimes, including a recorded phone call where the pro-Russian warlord claimed to have killed POWs (BBC, 2016) . Misanthropic Division quickly claimed responsibility for the assassination (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022) ; however, it's unclear how true this claim really is.  MD’s alternative flag/symbol - [ Source ] Misanthropic Division's connection to the attack was made using a video posted on a small YouTube channel ( https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2xD70pZt9R8Xq0K5tLkieg ) . In the video, four masked men claim that they would next target Igor Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko, leaders of separatist groups in the Donbas, in a continued campaign of assassinations (BBC, 2016) . Silhouetting the armed huddle of supposed MD fighters are the banners of both Misanthropic Division and Phoenix Division, an MD splinter group (Украинская правда, 2016) . The video was quickly picked up by and distributed across Russian media (Romanyuk, 2016) .  However, Misanthropic Divisions' official channels refuted any involvement with the death of Pavlov (BBC, 2016) . Instead, MD claimed that a member of the Chernihiv rifle battalion, as well as Phoenix Division, by the name of Dim Kravtsov was the original creator of the video (Romanyuk, 2016) . It seems that, based on Facebook posts in far-right circles, this confusion was down to infighting between MD and Phoenix Division (Romanyuk, 2016) . In reality, Pavlov's death probably had nothing to do with MD. According to reports to the BBC, an ethnic Abkhaz commander fell out with Pavlov before his death and may have been the real culprit (BBC, 2016) . Despite these reports, Phoenix division reposted the video on its own channels, reiterating its supposed veracity, and prompting MD to threaten the sub-group online (Romanyuk, 2016) .  Whilst MD's activity in the Donbas has continued with the 2022 Russian invasion, the group has largely folded into Azov and disavows militant actions (MMP, 2022) . However, MD has also continued its actions in the West of Ukraine. For example, on June 23rd, 2018, a group of young men, later claiming to be a part of the MD-linked group "Sober and angry youth", attacked a Roma settlement in Lviv, stabbing one man to death and injuring three others (including a 10-year-old boy) (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025) . The group's primary modern activity consists of fundraising through merchandise sales on the Walknvt and Runic Storm webstore (MMP, 2022) .  The Runic Storm website, where Misanthropic Division merchandise can be purchased - [ Source ] Objectives & Ideology As can be assumed by the group's name, MD carries a firmly nihilistic worldview (MMP, 2022) . Operating off of semi-Nietzschean ideas, MD believes that the modern world is meaningless and that a return to nature and primitivism is essential (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . This interest in nature/primitivism is further exemplified by MD's unique brand of Germanic neo-paganism, Slavic neo-paganism and neo-Nazi ideology (Sova Center, 2016) . Viewing such ideologies as a key component of their ancestral heritage, MD posture in a way which rejects modern society and instead calls for a return to ancient belief systems which place increased value on naturalism (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Interestingly, MD's neo-Nazi/National Socialist beliefs seem to contradict their attitudes towards primitivism almost inherently. Whilst MD seems to take an almost anarcho-primitivist perspective towards the ideal lifestyle a follower should lead, the group is simultaneously supportive of strong centralised state power (Reft and Light, 2016) and the use of eugenics to purge society of "weakness, defects, and ugliness" to achieve the "Ubermensch" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Similarly, MD carries extensive white supremacist attitudes. As mentioned earlier, the idea of "blood"/ancestry is extremely important to MD (Reft and Light, 2016), with the group stating that its core political objective is the preservation of "white Europe" (Sova Center, 2016) and "European culture and identity" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . This objective is sought to be achieved in part through the complete cessation of all non-European immigration into Ukraine (Reft and Light, 2016) as well as the defence of Ukraine and Europe from "Asiatic hordes" (as was stated by the group in the wake of a French MD volunteer fighter being killed in the Donbas) (Harp, 2022) . These perspectives on immigration are also ingrained into MD's recruitment process, only accepting European/Eurodescendant men (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) as well as holding reservations against Chechens or Crimean Tatars joining Right Sector (Reft and Light, 2016) . Despite the clear contradiction between naturalistic beliefs and ideas such as eugenics or ethno-nationalism, MD makes no efforts to hide its extreme-right convictions. MD members can regularly be seen conducting nazi salutes, donning swastikas, and reciting racist idioms (BBC, 2016) . The group's flag features two Totenkopf symbols, with the Phoenix Division flag featuring a red Schwarze Sonne-style bird (Reft and Light, 2016) . These views are expressed through the group's telegram channel in tandem with a range of commonly associated beliefs such as anti-communism, traditionalism, homophobia, sexism, and anti-semitism (MD TELEGRAM) .  As with many far-right militant groups, MD is also a proponent of Siege culture and accelerationism. For example, the leader of MD's German branch stated that reading Charles Mason's "Siege" was a considerable component of his radicalisation (Biermann, 2021) . The accelerationist solutions proposed by Mason can also be seen throughout MD's communications online, believing that the white race must destroy the current system in order to rise from the ashes (Sova Center, 2016) , with these beliefs forming into the misanthropy around which the group has centred its branding (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Military/Political Abilities In reality, MD's military/political abilities remain unclear. Due to the group's constantly shifting nature, its various splinter groups/units, and sprawling web of cells which seem to operate semi-autonomously, even MD's central hub seems to be slightly confused in relation to its own actions (as evidenced by the infighting caused by Phoenix Division's supposed assassination of 'Pavlov" in 2016).  Whilst in 2016 the Ukrainian branch of MD claimed to have around 50 members, there is no real way of verifying this information (Reft and Light, 2016) . Additionally, it seems that the nature of existing 'active' members of MD is unclear. Some may claim to be members of MD due to their simple purchase of the group's merchandise and adherence to their ideological perspective, whilst others may claim membership through active participation in combat activities on the front lines of Ukraine.  This wide bracket of 'membership' seems to have worked in MD's favour, allowing the group to organise protests across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017) , recruit volunteer combatants (Collins, 2017) , and then generate monetary support for said fighters (particularly those within Azov) (MMP, 2022) . Despite this wide range of activity, MD has largely toned down its "extracurricular" activities, instead further incorporating into the Azov brigade and operating as a more regular support/recruitment hub (Biermann, 2021) .  Members of the German Volunteer Corps with an alternative version of MD’s flag - [ Source ] Approach to Resistance MD's key role in the fight against the Russian invasion is that of recruitment. Operating as a worldwide front and recruitment network for Azov and its sub-units, MD makes use of members both in Ukraine and throughout Europe to recruit fighters at home and abroad (Harp, 2022) . These recruitment drives are primarily conducted using existing networks created by the national socialist black metal scene throughout Europe (Belltower, 2020) . For example, the Swiss branch of MD travelled with French neo-Nazi black metal group Peste Noire to deliver supplies to fighters in Kyiv (Renversé, 2020) .  However, these recruitment efforts did not stop at the borders of Europe. Notorious MD recruiter, Italian national, and ex-Azov fighter Saverio Fontana was also spotted in Brazil, apparently staying there for 10 months (Martins, 2016) . During raids later conducted by Brazilian authorities, connections were found between far-right groups in Brazil and Misanthropic Division, with Fontana apparently travelling city to city on a tour of recruitment with promises of pay and military training (Deutschlandfunk, 2017) . The group's efforts to recruit fighters also continue digitally, with users in the group's Telegram chat regularly recommending that other users join volunteer units in Ukraine (primarily Azov's international brigade) (MD TELEGRAM) .  Due to Misanthropic Division's paramilitary/irregular activities, the group also utilises a highly decentralised/cell-based structure. MD does not seem to have a clear/rigid leadership structure despite efforts to bring such a structure to light (Yudina, 2020) . In fact, MD's true nature is unclear. It seems like, as opposed to a unit or clear structure of fighters, MD is a network/clique that anyone can claim to be a part of as long as they promote the group's binding ideology (Harp, 2022) . Sukhov claims that Misanthropic Division began as an informal organisation of neo-nazi Russian fighters who were on Ukraine's side and became a component of Azov (Sukhov, 2015) . However, Roussinos claims that MD is a group of Western volunteers fighting alongside Azov (Roussinos, 2022) . The reality is most likely a combination of both ideas, with the group recruiting anyone willing to take on the MD mantle and fight for Ukraine/a white Europe.  Regardless of its true nature, Misanthropic Division has spread far and wide, with branches known to be active in at least 19 countries (Sova Center, 2016) , such as Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Germany, Spain, the USA (Reft and Light, 2016), the Czech Republic, and Portugal (Yudina, 2020) . This network of cells allows MD to not only generate humanitarian support for its fighters in Ukraine (Renversé, 2020) but also to instil its violent approach to resistance into an unknown number of foreign actors. In fact, the MD's approach to resistance is almost entirely centred around violence. Recruiters explicitly search for those with a desire to fight and go to war, and incite those unwilling to fight to carry out crimes such as armed robbery to support the group's activities (Biermann, 2021) . This is unsurprising considering the group operates under the slogan "Kill for Odin" (Redaktion, 2019) .  These extremist activities are not only encouraged but actively rewarded by those in charge of MD's online presence. Telegram subscribers are rewarded for carrying out hate crimes through the offer of free MD merchandise [ https://t.me/c/1565564438/38379 ] or through outright "bounties" that are placed on targets such as Russian soldiers [ https://t.me/mdchatmd/1084704 ] . Similarly, tattoos are seemingly treated as medals/ranks, with tattoo artists being sent to leading/prominent members in order for them to receive a tattoo of the group's logo (Biermann, 2021) as a reward for their dedication to the movement.  International Relations & Alliances Whilst there is a clear connection between MD and Azov, its true extent is unclear (Harp, 2022) . With extensive references/connections to Azov from the very inception of the group's Telegram channel (MD TELEGRAM) , in 2015, MD published a manifesto in which it pledged "immediate support" for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) Azov has also stated that, during its early days, Azov gained at least partial funding through the sale of merchandise using advertisements on the MD Instagram and Facebook pages (MMP, 2022) . This support primarily consists of recruitment efforts (Biermann, 2021) as well as the embedding of fighters identifying as MD members within the Azov battalion (Reft and Light, 2016). However, whilst linked to Azov, geolocated posts/images of MD members and MD fighter death announcements don't line up with Azov's movements enough to show that said fighters are under the control of Azov as a single unit (Harp, 2022) .  Similar to Azov, MD has had links to Right Sektor since its inception. With MD's founding members beginning their political careers as members of Right Sektor, the group has previously espoused similar levels of support for Right Sektor as that demonstrated for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . Despite this initial closeness, MD eventually disavowed Right Sektor due to its supposed "Jewish collaborationism" (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Additionally, MD has made connections with countless other political movements on both the national and international stage. Through collaboration with far-right groups such as National Action (UK) (Rawlinson, 2018) , Restrukt (Russia) (Reft and Light, 2016) , and NPD (Germany) (Redaktion, 2019) , MD has gained a relatively notable number of international volunteers whilst also fomenting violent unrest in the host states of these groups. MD has collaborated with Ukrainian groups such as the UPA and the Social Nationalist Assembly to gain similar national support for their activities (Reft and Light, 2016) . Interestingly, the Social Nationalist Assembly seems to be the only group with which MD is officially associated, and is also the party largely responsible for the creation of both the Right Sektor and the Azov brigade (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Works Cited. - BBC. (2016) ‘Motorola’: Ukraine rebels accuse Kiev over commander’s death.  [online] BBC News. 17 Oct. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37676607 . - Belltower News. (2020). Ukraine: Wie ein rechtsextremes Freiwilligenregiment mit Black Metal Nachwuchs rekrutiert . [online] Available at: https://www.belltower.news/ukraine-wie-ein-rechtsextremes-freiwilligenregiment-mit-black-metal-nachwuchs-rekrutiert-102385/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Biermann (2021). Fascism: The Brown Internationale . [Online]. Available at: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/fascism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english/seite-2  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Collins. (2017). Russian court sentences members of a neo-Nazi terror group also active in the UK – HOPE not hate . [online] HOPE not hate. Available at: https://hopenothate.org.uk/2017/06/22/russian-court-sentences-members-neo-nazi-group-also-active-uk/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Deutschlandfunk (2020). Ukraine-Krise - Brasilianische Neonazis kämpfen gegen pro-russische Rebellen . [online] Die Nachrichten. Available at: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/ukraine-krise-brasilianische-neonazis-kaempfen-gegen-pro-100.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - euronews. (2021). Factbox: Groups that Russia has declared extremist . [online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/06/us-russia-politics-navalny-extremism-factbox  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Faerseth. (2015). Ukraine’s far-right forces | Hate Speech International . [online] Hate Speech. Available at: https://www.hate-speech.org/ukraines-far-right-forces/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - FOIA Research. (2019). Misanthropic Division | FOIA Research . [online] Available at: https://www.foiaresearch.net/organization/misanthropic-division  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Harp (2022). Foreign Fighters in Ukraine Could Be a Time Bomb for Their Home Countries . [Online]. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2022/06/30/ukraine-azov-neo-nazi-foreign-fighter/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Human Rights in Ukraine. (2022). Russian mercenary who committed war crimes in Donbas receives special honour in Russia . [online] Available at: https://khpg.org//en/1608809646  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Libcom. (2015). Neo-Nazi groups to protest outside US embassy . [online] Available at: https://libcom.org/article/neo-nazi-groups-protest-outside-us-embassy  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH . [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH . [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025). Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2018  [Online] OHCHR. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraineMay-August2018_EN.docx  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Publico (2020). Publico: мост, связавший португальских и украинских неонацистов (Publico, Португалия) . [online] ИноСМИ. Available at: https://inosmi.ru/20200719/247777577.html  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Rawlinson. (2018). Neo-Nazi groups recruit Britons to fight in Ukraine . [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/neo-nazi-groups-recruit-britons-to-fight-in-ukraine  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Redaktion (2019). Kommunalwahlen 2019: NPD, rechte Tarnlisten und Einzelbewerber – SACHSEN-ANHALT RECHTSAUSSEN . [online] Lsa-rechtsaussen.net . Available at: https://lsa-rechtsaussen.net/kommunalwahlen-2019-npd-rechte-tarnlisten-und-einzelbewerber/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - REFT & LIGHT ❬2016❭ Misanthropic Division: A Neo-Nazi Movement from Ukraine and Russia. [Online]. Available at: https://reftlight.euromaidanpress.com/2016/09/30/misanthropic-division-a-neo-nazi-movement-from-ukraine-and-russia/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Renversé (2020). Björn Sigvald : le néo-nazi genevois parti combattre en Ukraine . [online] Renverse.co . Available at: https://renverse.co/infos-locales/article/bjorn-sigvald-le-neo-nazi-genevois-parti-combattre-en-ukraine-2739#nb10  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Romanyuk. (2016). Fake: Motorola Fascist Killer Video . [online] StopFake. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-motorola-fascist-killer-video/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Roussinos. (2022). The truth about Ukraine’s far-Right militias . [online] UnHerd. Available at: https://unherd.com/2022/06/the-truth-about-ukraines-nazi-militias/ . [Accessed 15 August 2025]. - Sova Center. (2016). Завершено расследование уголовного дела участников... / COBA . [online] Available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2017/03/d36501/  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Sukhov. (2015). Foreigners Who Fight And Die For Ukraine: Russians join Ukrainians to battle Kremlin in Donbas . [online] Kyiv Post. Available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/foreigners-who-fight-and-die-for-ukraine-russians-join-ukrainians-to-battle-kremlin-in-donbas-386999.html  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Tribune de Genève. (2017). Tamedia Publications romandes S.A.  [online] Available at: https://www.tdg.ch/des-soldats-sympathisants-d-un-reseau-neonazi-800021880473  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Ukraine Crusade (2015). 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL . [online] Available at: 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Yudina (2020) The New Exile Strategy of Russian Nationalists . [Online]. Available at: https://www.illiberalism.org/the-new-exile-strategy-of-russian-nationalists/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Украинская правда (2016). Люди, назвавшие себя убийцами ‘Моторолы’, записали обращение . [online] Украинская правда. Available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/10/17/7123860/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].

Introduction and Overview The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) (Thai: แนวร่วมประชาธิปไตยต่อต้านเผด็จการแห่งชาติ), also referred to as the Red Shirts, is a Thai movement that formed in opposition to the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which, despite the name, is a reactionary monarchist group associated with the Thai military, monarchy and judiciary (1). While the PAD no longer exists, the recent suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra under military pressure in June 2025 has led to a small resurgence of the UDD. The UDD is largely allied with the Pheu Thai Party, which was the party of Paetongtarn Shinawatra and a successor party to her father, Thaksin Shinawatra’s political party, who was also a prime minister of Thailand before being deposed by a military coup in 2006. In broad strokes, the military, monarchy and judiciary of Thailand can be seen as the opposition to the Pheu Thai Party and the UDD. These three pillars of Thai government all had roles in the 2006 coup and a later 2014 coup that would see the Pheu Thai Party banned, although it is now a legal political party again (1)(2). History & Foundations The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship was formed in 2006, following a military coup in Thailand (3). The UDD protested against both the coup and the constitution it ushered in. The protests were largely done by supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister who was ousted by the coup (3). During these protests, UDD supporters would wear red clothing, which garnered the nickname Red Shirts for the group. When elections were held again in 2007, allies of Shinawatra won power, which helped placate protestors. This pacification was short-lived, however, as in 2009 a series of protests held by groups in opposition to Shinawatra (these groups were pro-military and pro-monarchy, and wore yellow, hence known as the Yellow Shirts by many Thais) caused the pro-Shinawatra government to collapse. The collapse was also fostered by rulings made by the pro-monarchy judiciary.  The pro-Shinawatra government was replaced by a government led by prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. It was widely believed by both Shinawatra and protestors that general Prem Tinsulanonda was behind both the 2006 coup and the collapse of the government again in 2009, thus Vejjajiva was also seen as being complicit in the government collapse (4). One reason that Vejjajiva and Tinsulanonda were able to be criticized by Shinawatra and protestors is because Thailand has extremely stringent lèse-majesté laws, so criticizing the king (who was no doubt involved in the coups) would be impossible without legal repercussions. However the prime minister and generals do not share these same protections (4). The presence of the pro-monarchy protestors as well as what was seen as a corrupt judiciary that sided with the military and monarchy caused UDD protests to flare up again, and this time they would be much larger than what was seen before (3). For the second round of protests there was a much larger police presence, as well as the military. Red Shirts stormed the venue of a political summit in the resort town of Pattaya and attacked prime minister Vejjajiva’s car. Clashes in Bangkok, the capital, involved as many as 100,000 people and would leave two people dead and many more injured (3)(4). After the two deaths however, the organizers of the protests would end up calling off the rest of the protests, fearing more substantial loss of life due to the ever-increasing police and military presence at protests. One year on though, the protests would reach their most violent, and successful, heights. Beginning in March of 2010, fresh protests were called for, and tens of thousands would turn out once again in Bangkok. In April the first deaths would occur, after the military attempted to disperse the Red Shirts’ camps. At least four soldiers and 17 protestors were killed in this incident (3). Unlike in 2009 however, the protestors were not deterred by the violence, and Bangkok remained occupied by tens of thousands of protestors, now consolidated into one camp. One month later, the Thai military would once again launch a raid into the Red Shirts’ camp. This time, dozens of soldiers and protestors would be killed (3). However, the increasing protests and the fact that unlike ‘09, the UDD was not as deterred by violence would eventually lead to new elections being held in 2011. The Pheu Thai Party, allies to the UDD, would win in a landslide, with Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister, Yingluck, being elected as Thailand’s first female prime minister (3). She would eventually end up being ousted in yet another coup in 2014, led by the Yellow Shirts (5). In June 2025 when a member of the Shinawatra family, Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn, also a prime minister, would once again find themselves embroiled in conflict with the military, judiciary and monarchy. After a long-simmering border dispute that came to a head led to a Cambodian soldier being killed, Paetongtarn made a phone call to the Cambodian leader Hun Sen, in which she referred to Sen as “uncle” and was too conciliatory for her country’s opposition party’s liking. This led the Thai Constitutional Court to vote to suspend her (6). This decision led to a small resurgence of the Red Shirt movement, as hundreds of members would once again gather in Bangkok to support what they saw as heavy-handed intervention by conservative parts of the Thai government (7). Despite Paetongtarn’s attempts, conciliatory or otherwise, a brief war would break out between Cambodia and Thailand over the border. Paradoxically, Yellow Shirts, who before the war were calling Paetongtarn’s attempts to talk to Cambodia too conciliatory, now protested in Bangkok that she in fact started the war (6). Eventually, Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed from government by the Thai courts, however, there were not mass protests across the country in response to this decision. This could be a sign that Paetongtarn does not enjoy as widespread support as her father, or simply that the massive organizing power of the UDD has faded (9). Objectives & Ideology The UDD is best described as pro-democracy and anti-monarchy. While not all members might want the complete dissolution of the Thai monarchy, they can be said to at least want the military, judiciary, and monarchy to lose the ability to interfere so massively in Thai politics. If Paetongtarn Shinawatra ends up being removed as Prime Minister or another pro-monarchy coup takes place, she will be the third consecutive member of the Shinawatra family to be removed from power at the military’s behest. That the Shinawatra family takes center stage in the clash between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts leads many conservatives in Thailand to view the overall UDD movement as an extension of the Shinawatra family. While some members surely do fervently support the Shinawatras, to call the movement a complete extension of the Shinawatra family is at best an over-simplification and at worst an attempt by the Thai military and monarchy to brush aside legitimate grievances some Thai people have with their government. Thaksin Shinawatra was fairly populist and spearheaded programs such as free credit to Thailand’s rural poor during his time as prime minister (8). Actions like this led to him gaining immense support from Thailand’s lower class population. During the first coup in 2006, many of the Yellow Shirts who aided the military by protesting in Bangkok were urban, while a lot of the Red Shirts would eventually come from the rural population of Thailand (8). At its heart then, the UDD can be seen as an organizing force of Thailand’s rural poor, intrinsically pitted against the urban elite of the country. Military & Political Abilities The UDD has very little military power, besides sheer numbers. The protests of 2010 shut down the Thai capital of Bangkok for days and dozens were killed (8). However the first wave of protests in 2009 were brought to a halt after attacks from the military, showing that while the UDD can stomach losses sometimes, they will also stop activities in the face of military pressure other times.  While they might not possess military power, they wield immense political power. Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister Yunglick won the 2011 elections in a landslide in part due to her popularity with the UDD (3). The numbers of Red Shirt protestors that have turned out to support Paetongtarn Shinawatra, even nearly two decades after the founding of the UDD, speaks to the fact that many in the UDD are highly motivated (5,7). Approach to Resistance The Red Shirts broadly engage in peaceful protest, mainly gathering in large numbers in a publicly viewed place to communicate their frustrations through chanting and signs. Like any mass protest, there are elements of violence from time to time, but during the biggest protests it was generally the Red Shirt protestors themselves who bore the brunt of the violence by the police or military (8). International Relations & Alliances The Red Shirts, as a group that is focused on internal Thai politics, do not have any international backers. However, as far as alliances go, it can be said that the Red Shirt movement itself is one big alliance. As stated earlier, while many of the group consists of supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, there are other members who are simply against the military/monarchy/judicial establishment in Thailand and want a more democratic society, regardless of who is in power (3). It is arguably this diverse set of members that contributed to the mass protests of 2009-2011, as people from all over Thailand who were drawn to the ideals of democracy joined in. Works Cited: 1. https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0009343/ 2. https://thethaiger.com/news/bangkok/pheu-thai-hits-back-thaksin-no-puppet-master-just-an-adviser 3. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268 4. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5126671/Thai-protesters-bring-Bangkok-to-a-halt.html 5. https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/protesters-in-bangkok-demand-resignation-of-court-suspended-prime-minister-following-deadly-conflict/ 6. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9vrrj72xy7o 7. https://www.pattayamail.com/thailandnews/red-shirts-rally-at-pheu-thai-hq-urge-pm-paetongtarn-to-stay-the-course-no-dissolution-no-resignation-507271 8. https://theyonseijournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/THE-“RED-SHIRT”-MOVEMENT-PEASANT-POLITICS-IN-THAILAND.pdf 9. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/southeast-asia/thailand-pm-paetongtarn-shinawatra-removed-cambodia-conflict-b2816495.html

Introduction and Overview The Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP), Paraguayan People’s Army, is a relatively small Marxist-Leninist group that has been active since 2008 and has claimed responsibility for multiple kidnappings, bombings, armed robberies, and has also been accused of arson.  The Paraguayan government recognises the EPP as an armed criminal organisation that calls for students, farmers, the homeless, and other less fortunate individuals to join their revolution to overthrow the government and fight the wealthy landowners of Paraguay, whom they accuse of abusing the system and the people (1) . Despite the official recognition as a criminal organisation, officials within the Paraguayan government have referred to the EPP as a “terrorist organisation” in the past.  History and Foundations Although the EPP was not formally recognised until 2008, its roots date back to the 1990s. Some of its founding members were members of the Partido Patria Libre (PPL), or the Free Fatherland Party. Members of the PPL decided that a “clandestine militant wing” was necessary for the official political party (2) . However, due to splintering and changes in goals, those members left the PPL to create the EPP to fight against the parliamentary system and the wealthy landowners on their own terms. It was not until the early 2000s that the EPP began to take significant action. In 2005, the EPP kidnapped and later murdered Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of the former president of Paraguay. This would be just one of many kidnappings the EPP performed, although later kidnappings would be done to acquire funds through extortion (3) .   The 2010s saw a surge in EPP activities, including kidnappings, murders, bombings, and assaults on government positions in rural areas. In 2012, the EPP targeted a government-owned electricity transmission station with a bomb that did not cause any casualties; the Paraguayan government claims the blast did not interrupt operations. Another example of EPP actions includes the April 21st bombing and subsequent assault on a police station in 2013. In Azotey, Concepción, the EPP planted and detonated a bomb near a police patrol, resulting in one fatality and three wounded. After the bombing, the EPP staged an assault on the local police department. This attack resulted in the death of one militant and injured two police officers. These are just two examples of numerous attacks on the government throughout the 2010s. Objectives and Ideology  The EPP seeks to create or cause “agrarian reform from below.” In an official public notice, the EPP states,  “The peasantry must proceed with a massive occupation of large landed estates and that the occupants must be armed with whatever they can: shotguns, revolvers, rifles, machetes, slingshots, stones, etc” (1) .  In the same public notice, the EPP calls upon students, workers, the homeless, and other large public sectors to join the armed struggle with the peasantry against wealthy landowners whom the EPP deems “arrogant.” Due to these specific calls to arms against wealthy landowners and their advocacy for land reform, the EPP is often regarded as a Marxist-Leninist group. In a book authored by the leader of the EPP, Alcides Oviedo Britez, he refers to the members of the EPP as “Francoists.” He describes that the EPP is fighting to destroy the “democracy of the rich” and instead “build a serious and combative revolutionary people’s democracy” (4) . One of the first objectives stated in this book is to dismantle the current parliamentary system and replace it with a new, revolutionary system of “popular congresses” at every level of government, i.e., local, state, and federal. The book later describes other revolutionary objectives in crucial areas such as foreign relations, the judicial system, the economy, and the issue of agriculture.  Regarding foreign relations, the EPP states that the new system it wishes to implement will not grant asylum for those wishing to escape prosecution for political crimes. The EPP specifically names Mario Cossio, a former governor of Bolivia who sought asylum in Paraguay following accusations of corruption and dereliction of duty, as someone who would be turned over to the authorities of the country they are fleeing from. Following this description, the authors state, “Francoism is a friend of men and women who fight for a new, revolutionary, socialist world” (4) . The EPP seeks to create a provisional judiciary system to punish those who benefited from the current system, whom they label as “henchmen, torturers, informers, and counterrevolutionary war criminals” (4) . The book describes how the judges will be subject to popular will and that their positions can be removed as soon as the public deems necessary, as well as the fact that their salaries will not be higher than the legal minimum, stating “being an authority is a service, not a means of earning money” (4) . The economic goals of the EPP and its revolution are not too dissimilar from those of many Marxist/Leninist groups. The EPP seeks to prosecute those who have embezzled and or misappropriated public funds or have received illicit enrichment, with a special revolutionary tribunal that will have full investigative authority. The book states that those found guilty will be imprisoned for life and their assets seized. With the seized assets, the revolutionary government will reallocate the funds to various government projects such as childcare, healthcare, education, housing, and infrastructure, like passenger and freight transport. Furthermore, with the seized assets, the EPP states that privatising industrialisation programs will not be necessary (4) . The EPP states that the agrarian issue is one of Paraguay's most significant issues. The EPP states that the current government cannot be fixed due to its “unrestricted respect for private landed property.”   The EPP’s solution is to restrict the amount of land a “legal” person can own and redistribute the land to peasants and farmers who do not own or have minimal land to work. The mortgage payments that small landowners may still owe will be forgiven for up to 10 hectares. Lastly, the revolutionary government guarantees technical support for farmers in the form of providing seeds, tools, and fair pricing for products (4) .   Political and Military Abilities Due to its goals and lack of manpower, the EPP is not known to instigate large military-style operations. Instead, it relies on hit-and-run tactics, which are often used by smaller insurgency groups and those not as militarily powerful as the government. The Paraguayan government does not believe the EPP is a centralised group; instead, the group is decentralised and is estimated to have about 20-50 members according to the State Department of the United States (5) . Other estimates claim the group numbers roughly a dozen members. There are no reports of the EPP having any political representation in the Paraguayan government or having political allies within the government. Approaches to Resistance Since its founding, the EPP has been a militarised group focused on targeting government assets such as military and police outposts. The EPP has conducted armed robberies and kidnappings to hold victims for ransom as a means of financing its revolution. The EPP possesses small arms such as FN FALs and AK-47 rifles, and is capable of manufacturing improvised explosive devices (6) . The EPP is also known for using guerrilla tactics against police and military forces, most notably the use of anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices they call “cazabobos” (7) . The EPP is notorious for kidnapping ranchers, and more recently, Mennonites, to hold victims for ransom money. There are a few instances of the EPP holding hostages and demanding that food and or livestock be delivered to poorer areas of Paraguay in exchange for the hostages’ freedom.    The government of Paraguay created the Joint Task Force (FTC) to combat the EPP and other armed factions in 2013. This unit has been somewhat successful in killing or capturing leaders of the EPP, but has not entirely wiped out the group. Due to their leadership being captured or killed during government incursions, the EPP’s numbers dwindled to the aforementioned estimates of 20-50 members (8) .  Despite multiple operations and thousands of troops being deployed to find members of the EPP, the EPP remains alive but less active and severely diminished.  Relations and Alliances Although there has not been official confirmation, there are claims by Paraguayan officials and news outlets, such as Asunción, that the Colombian insurgent group FARC has provided training for members of the EPP. Similarly, the EPP has been accused of forming relations with Brazilian drug trafficking organizations such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command (3) . As reported by ABC Color, a spokesperson for the Paraguayan Joint Task Force (FTC) stated, “the traffickers provide the EPP with sufficient logistics, and in return, ‘the drug traffickers use the EPP’s ‘armed wing’” (9) . Despite these claims, there is little evidence to support them. InSight Crime argues that the Paraguayan government makes these claims on little more than circumstantial evidence and has done so after instances of drug-related violence against police (10) .  Works Cited (1) - Paraguayan People's Army. “Public Notice.” Cedema.org , 2 Nov. 2008, cedema.org/digital_items/2941 . (2) - Andrés Colmán Gutiérrez. (2013, August 21). Guerrilleros o terroristas: La historia de cómo nació el EPP . Última Hora. https://www.ultimahora.com/guerrilleros-o-terroristas-la-historia-como-nacio-el-epp-n715259 (3) - “The Paraguayan People’s Army: Latin America’s Enduring Insurgency.” Grey Dynamics , 15 Apr. 2021, greydynamics.com/the-paraguayan-peoples-army-latin-americas-enduring-insurgency/ . (4) - “Summary of the EPP Political Program.” Cedema.org , 14 Aug. 2011, cedema.org/digital_items/4582 . Alcides Oviedo Britez wrote the original piece. (5) - Paraguay . (n.d.). United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/paraguay/ (6) - ABC Color. (2013, August 26). Sospechan que narcos proveen armas al EPP . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/sospechan-que-narcos-proveen-armas-al-epp-610765.html (7) - ABC Color. (2014, July 9). The EPP is increasingly dangerous . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/editorial/el-epp-esta-cada-vez-mas-peligroso-1264232.html  Translated from Spanish to English. (8) - Ellis, R. E. (2024, July 2). Paraguay’s Security Challenges and the Government Response . Fiu.edu ; Florida International University. https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/news-events/the-policy-spotlight/2024/paraguays-security-challenges-and-the-government-response.html (9) - ABC Color. (2015, July 20). EPP, “brazo armado” de narcos . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/epp-brazo-armado-de-narcos-1389637.html (10) - Gagne, D. (2017, March 27). Paraguay Guerrillas Act as Narco-Gunmen: Officials . InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/paraguay-epp-guerrillas-armed-wing-drug-traffickers/

Insurgency Overview For decades, Brazil has been plagued by extensive crime syndicates thriving on the drug trade. The fight against the cartels has allowed for another kind of “grey zone” of organized groups to emerge, the so-called police militias. These groups originated as neighborhood watches largely formed by law enforcement officers protecting their own areas, but have grown massively and now control large swathes of cities like Rio de Janeiro. Their ties to political institutions and their strong law enforcement component shelter them from official reprisal even as they have grown into extensive racket-based armed gangs. History & Foundations Brazil’s recent political history has been troubled. Between the 1960s and the late 1980s, the county was under a brutal military dictatorship. In this context, in 1965 some police officers [RG1]  created the first “death squad” of Latin America in order to avenge a fallen officer [RG2]   (1).    The “Scuderie Le Cocq” death squad continued operating as a group until the early 2000s, while it and other death squads continued perpetrating brutal interrogations, extrajudicial killings, and even battles against anyone deemed to be an opponent of the state, a drug trafficker, or both (2). During this time, it has been estimated that such death squads killed at least 900 people (3). In line with other Latin American countries, Brazil went through a phase of democratisation in the 1980s; however, this did not result in the resolution of all institutional and cultural legacies of the dictatorship (4). This was exacerbated by the dramatic increase in drug trafficking and drug-related violence during the same time, which opened up spaces that the Brazilian state was unable to fill (5). Hence, the culture of violence in law enforcement not only remained unaddressed, but itself came to be considered a consequence of the dire circumstances of the explosion of drug crime, while the weak institutional framework created the necessary vacuum that self-organised policemen filled by creating “militias” (6). As the structure and culture of policing was not reformed after the dictatorship’s end, no reform in procedures took place, and the same methods carried over to a new generation of policemen (7). It is quite explanatory that even the original “Scuderie Le Cocq” death squad continued operating until 2004, when it was disbanded by Brazil’s Federal Court; it then reappeared as a “philantrophic association” in 2015 (8). These groups started establishing control of several urban areas throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, usually by entering neighbourhoods and promising residents to curb local crime and eliminate the threat of drug cartels (9). However, these groups gradually established their own protection rackets in the areas under their control, while also monopolising even basic services such as gas, TV, and taxis (10). Objectives & Ideology Militias are not inherently political groups, and so their political affiliation is at times not a primary driver of their activity or a foundational characteristic. However, it is important to note that their existence harks back to the era in which death squads emerged, i.e., in connection with a military dictatorship that saw political opponents as the prime enemy of the State (11). Over half of the original members of the “Scuderie Le Cocq” were even veterans of the police force of the Estado Novo, an earlier dictatorship that ruled Brazil between 1937 and 1945 based on a fascist model (12). Other death squads also operated during the military dictatorship era and were directly responsible for the killings and the disappearances of hundreds of people, including left-wing opposition activists (13). While death squads between the 1960s and 1980s had as their primary objective the elimination of threats to the dictatorial establishment (and as such, were essentially state-sanctioned), modern police militias are mainly driven by a quest for economic and political power in the extralegal spaces created by Brazilian state institutions’ weakness (14). Political & Military Abilities The militias have been slowly expanding and solidifying their power for decades, not only in a structural but also in a cultural sense. Their networks have expanded to include complicit politicians, city council members, and even state congressmen (15). These are not only individuals who are sympathetic or committed to a particular militia’s objectives, but they are increasingly former or current militia members, indicating a pattern of collusion between state authorities and these organisations that goes beyond occasional and individual cases (16). In some cases, colluded officials make use of federal programmes to create new revenue streams for the militias, e.g., by accessing federal funding for subsidised housing in order to build in areas under militia control and then dictate who is going to lodge in the new buildings, “tax” them, and so on (17). In this regard, some militias are able to constitute themselves as a parallel state-like entity, in which it is difficult or impossible to separate in what capacity acts are carried out by the same individuals—i.e., whether it is the state or the militia’s power that is being imposed (18). These political and institutional ties continue to feed into a gray area that makes prosecution difficult, something that is compounded by the predominating culture in law enforcement, whereby police are reluctant or incapable of understanding militias as entirely criminal entities (19). At the same time, the extended control that a militia holds over a certain territory creates not only a long-lasting shadow economy in the area, but also an electoral stronghold (20). Such ties are further cemented through the infiltration of every facet of local community life; militias are known to establish ties with local Christian churches and are able to integrate themselves and be present even in the religious sphere (21). The pervasiveness of these organisations cannot be understated, as they are now present in fifteen of Brazil’s federal states, and not even the country’s presidency has remained unsullied: former president Jair Bolsonaro and his family have been heavily implicated in militia activity (22, 23). In the aftermath of a local anti-militia politician’s murder in Rio de Janeiro, it has been revealed that the wife and daughter of a high-profile militiaman involved in the murder were on Jair Bolsonaro’s son’s political payroll, and were thus formally employed by the State (24). Jair Bolsonaro has always had a controversial history, and has been known to express public support for the death squads that operated under the dictatorship, but the revelation that one of assassins in the slaying of Marielle Franco (the local politician mentioned previously) lived in the same upscale gated community that Bolsonaro lives in, is evidence of the close ties that the former president has enjoyed with the militia underworld (25).   Bibliography 1. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil: The “Militia” Phenomenon and Contemporary Security Issues in Rio de Janeiro. In: Justice spatiale = Spatial justice, 8, 2015. pp. 15 2. Ibidem, pp. 16-17. 3. Fogel, B. & Richmond, A. R. Outsourcing Repression. In: Jacobin, 06.04.2019. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2019/06/colombia-paramilitaries-bolsonaro-militias-fascism 4. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil, cit. pp. 23 5. Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 18-19. 6. Ibidem, pp. 19-21. 7. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2: Specialists Describe Their History and Expansion Over Time. In: RioOnWatch, 18.04.2025. Available at: https://rioonwatch.org/?p=71202 8. Ibidem. 9. Phillips, D. 'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs. In: The Guardian, 12.07.2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/brazil-militia-paramilitary-wield-terror-seize-power-from-drug-gangs   10. Cfr.  Fogel, B. & Richmond, A. R. Outsourcing Repression. Cit. 11. Cfr. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2, Cit. 12. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil, cit. pp. 15. 13. Ibidem, pp. 16. 14. Ibidem, pp. 17. 15 Phillips, Dom. 'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs. In: The Guardian, 12.07.2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/brazil-militia-paramilitary-wield-terror-seize-power-from-drug-gangs 16. Ibidem. 17. Simões, M. “No Rio de Janeiro a milícia não é um poder paralelo. É o Estado”. In: Pública, 28.01.2019. Available at: https://apublica.org/2019/01/no-rio-de-janeiro-a-milicia-nao-e-um-poder-paralelo-e-o-estado/ 18. Ibidem. 19. Ibidem. 20. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2:, cit. 21. Ibidem. 22. Ibidem. 23. Greenwald, G. & Pougy, V. Video: As Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro Prepares to Meet Donald Trump, His Family’s Close Ties to Notorious Paramilitary Gangs Draw Scrutiny and Outrage. In: The Intercept, 18.03.2019. 24. Ibidem. 25. Ibidem.

Introduction & Overview KillNet is a Russian nationalist hacker group known for its use of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to target European infrastructure in support of Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Originating in 2022 through the advertisement of a DDoS tool-for-hire of the same name, KillNet rapidly gained notoriety through its persistent self-promotion following operations.  KillNet is a part of a wider network of pro-Russian hacker groups. These groups work to perpetuate the Kremlin's narrative at home through the perpetuation of propaganda as well as to hinder Western activity which threatens Russian interests. It is unclear whether this support is an attempt to gain political favour from followers/potential sponsors or due to direct involvement from government bodies. Regardless, KillNet no longer seems to be active, and even during its peak of activity, it did not cause any major/permanent damage with its activities.  History & Foundations The name "KILLNET" can originally be attributed to a DDoS tool offered to threat actors on the dark web (Mascellino, 2022) . However, in January 2022, a user called KillMilk advertised the tool in a Telegram channel of the same name (Intel 471, 2024) . This marks the beginning of KillNet as both a weapon and a movement. KillMilk is believed to have been an active hacker since the age of 14 and launched their first attack against a foreign nation in 2019 (Flashpoint, 2025) .  In December 2023, KillMilk took a step away from KILLNET, whilst maintaining close ties (Antoniuk, 2025) . This departure was due to the identity of KillMilk being exposed as Nikolai Nikolaevich Serafimov, a convicted ex-drug dealer with a taste for luxury automobiles ( Gazeta.ru , 2024) . It seems that, despite his lead position within the network, KillMilk was more of a marketing specialist than a technical genius, using his skills to recruit and coordinate other hackers to carry out operations.  On January 23, 2022, the KillNet tool was made available on a subscription basis, advertised on the Killnet Telegram channel. (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Following this, the KillNet Telegram channel quickly began discussing taking on the Anonymous hacking group, (Vedere Labs, 2022) . This shift in activity from a hacker-for-hire service towards autonomous, aggressive activity seems to increase (at least on the surface) in tandem with the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia's movements were accompanied by KillNet attacks against Lithuanian police departments, airports, and the government (Goodin, 2022) . Within the first 48 hours of the invasion, KillNet had also launched an avalanche of attacks against Ukrainian targets (Intel 471, 2024) .  An advertisement for the original KILLNET tool. March 2022 saw KillNet keep its momentum and ambition, declaring open war on Anonymous ( ModnyMishka ) and carrying out further attacks against European states (Vedere Labs, 2022) . On the 3rd of March Killnet took down the Ukrainain news source "Korrespondent" and the Ukrainian branch of Vodafone, with the group claiming that the objective of the attacks was to prevent the distribution of propaganda (Vedere Labs, 2022) . The 20th of March also saw the release of the second version of the KillNet tool, but its domain was taken down shortly after (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Killnet claims they took it down themselves, but earlier had complained that it was banned in Russia and Europe, and this seems to have prompted a definitive change in branding from a criminal network to a hacktivist group. On the 15th of April 2022, KillNet carried out what they viewed as an anti-fascist operation, attacking the German Federal MoD as well as several German airports, Gatwick airport in the UK, and 8 Polish airports (Vedere Labs, 2022) . The 28th of April saw attacks against the Czech Republic, specifically against the servers of news broadcasters ( expatz.cz , 2022) , and on the 29th, KillNet attacked a range of Romanian public institutions, knocking their websites offline for a few hours (Marica, 2022) . These attacks continued on the 30th, with KillNet threatening to attack up to 300 Romanian websites, including newspapers, major public institutions, hotels, boarding houses, booking sites and political parties, specifically those associated with the Government (Chirileasa, 2022) . With this increase in activity came the creation of KillNet Legion, KillNet's digitally militant arm of various smaller hacker groups, which are given individual objectives (Intel 471, 2024) .  The new KillNet Legion was quickly put to work, with the network carrying out DDoS attacks against Moldova in May 2022. Italy's police anti-cybercrime arm managed to foil KillNet's efforts to disrupt the Eurovision voting system on the 16th of May (Kitson, 2022) . This attack came in response to predictions that Ukraine would win the contest due to Russia's invasion, as well as Russia's consequent ban from the contest. On the same day, Killnet officially declared war on the US, UK, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, and Ukraine (ReliaQuest, 2025) . Italy came under further attack on the 19th of May, with KillNet launching attacks against the Italian superior council of the judiciary, its customs agency and its foreign affairs, education and cultural heritage ministries (David, 2022) . However, KillNet's rampant aggression and growing popularity within Russian nationalist/hacking circles would not remain unchecked. On the 21st of May, 5:20 PM, Anonymous declared war on KILLNET ( YourAnonOne ) Just a minute later, the same account claims that KillNet's website, killnet.ru , had been knocked out ( YourAnonOne ) . KillNet's activity also began to generate real-world repercussions, ending in a 23-year-old KillNet member being arrested for participating in attacks against Romania ( HHS.gov , 2023) .  Despite these setbacks, KillNet made good on its promise of war with Lithuania, carrying out various DDoS attacks against the state (Vail, 2022) . These attacks were seemingly in response to Lithuania's decision to block the transit of goods sanctioned by the European Union to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The primary target was the  Secure National Data Transfer Network, a core component of Lithuania's national cyber defence network designed to sustain an internet network during war or crisis (Goodin, 2022) . According to KillNet, the attacks were a testing ground for some new operational abilities (Flashpoint Intel Team, 2022) .  It is at this point that KillNet's activity begins to wind down. In July 2022, KillNet Legion was disbanded in order for Legion 2.0 to take its place in the future (Intel 471, 2024) . The group did manage to carry out an attack against Lockheed Martin in response to the company's provision of HIMARS systems to Ukraine (Yildrim, 2022) , as well as some DDoS operations against the websites of the Japanese government (Yildrim, 2022) . November saw a change of objective, with KillNet hacking Russia's biggest online drug market, publishing vendor information online (Yildrim, 2022) . KillNet also launched the Infinity Forum, an online space designed to create cooperation amongst pro-Kremlin hacker groups; however, by February 2023, KillMilk announced that the forum was being sold (Flashpoint, 2025) .  Late 2022/early 2023 saw the relative death throes of KillNet. Whilst in December 2022 and January 2023, KillNet attempted to shift its targeting towards medical organisations/services ( HHS.gov , 2023) , these operations failed to garner the previously achieved levels of support the group had received. This prompted a rebrand from 'KillNet' to 'Black Skills' in March 2023, shifting back from hacktivism to hacker-for-hire services as their main form of income (Flashpoint, 2025) . By April, the group announced they would be going back on this rebranding, calling it a mistake. Early December 2023 saw the retirement of KillMilk from KillNet (Antoniuk, 2025) . A threat actor called Deanon Club, a hacking group that had previously called KillNet 'clowns', took over KillNet, seemingly having created a bond during the groups' collaboration during their creation of the Infinity Forum (Antoniuk, 2025) .  Following this shift in leadership and failed rebranding, KillNet experienced considerable operational fragmentation. Whilst sporadic activity has been reported from the group, such as the claim in May 2025 that KillNet knocked out the Ukrainian drone counter-measure network ( MASH ) , on the whole, KillNet has remained relatively inactive.  A point of interest is Russia's and, consequently, KillNet's cyber-war relationship with France. Since WW2, France has actually been very cooperative with Russia compared to the rest of Europe. Because of this, many Russian nationalist hacker groups tend to leave France alone (Muncaster, 2022) . Therefore, whilst KillNet's attacks on European states have been extensive and widespread, France has, until recently, remained untouched.  This changed on the 31st of July when KillMilk stated on Telegram that KillNet would be targeting European states in response to supposed cyber attacks from said countries against Russia ( KillMilk ) . KillMilk states that the group will begin by attacking France using both ransomware and DDoS attacks. At the time of writing, no such attacks have been reported.  Objectives & Ideology Ideologically, KillNet is explicit in its pro-Russian nationalism. From the onset of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, KillNet has stated its support for Russia and has consequently had a general objective of attacking any states which attempt to support Ukraine (Lyons, 2022) . For example, Killnet has posted videos declaring support for the Russian state, encouraging the Russian people never to doubt their government (Vail, 2022) . KillNet has also stated that it only recruits Russian citizens; however, the veracity of this claim is dubious (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  (Russian propaganda posted and pushed by KILLNET reading: “Citizens of Ukraine! Surrender! Save your lives! You are being driven to certain death. Your president has rotten spiritually, morally, and mentally”.) - SOURCE Whether through attempts to gain political favour or through direct influence from the Kremlin, KillNet's activities tend to follow/reflect the news cycle in Russia (Flashpoint, 2025) . The goal of this symbiosis is to reinforce the Kremlin's domestic image in the cyber sphere. Through the execution of highly visible attacks, combined with extensive self-promotion of their activities, KillNet helps the Kremlin proxy-recruit nationalist hacker groups to carry out deniable operations in support of the state's interests. These groups then often target Western governments and agencies as they threaten Russian interests abroad (Vedere Labs, 2022) , as evidenced by the 27/6/22 KillNet attacks against Lithuania (Vail, 2022) . The nationalistic pursuits of KillNet seem to be the primary driver for their operational objectives; however, these objectives are not without a financial component. Whilst supposedly driven by their stance on Narcotics, KILLNET's attacks on dark net markets also seem to have had financial motives, with the group snatching crypto wallets in the process (Flashpoint, 2025) . Interestingly, KillNet is also associated with Solaris, a Russian darknet market. Around $50,000 was sent to KillNet from a Solaris-associated crypto wallet in October 2022 (TRMLabs, 2025) . KillNet then carried out attacks against Solaris' rival, RuTor. RuTor was then forced to pay $15,000 to KillNet to stop the attacks (TRMLabs, 2025) . The very foundations of the group are based on this premise of hackers-for-hire, with KillNet briefly returning to these roots during its rebrand as Black Skills (Flashpoint, 2025) . The original KILLNET DDoS tool charged $1350 a month for access (Mascellino, 2022) .  Military/Political Abilities In addition to ideological coordination with the government, KillNet also seems to coordinate its attack with the efforts of government/military bodies such as the FSB, GRU, SVR, and TsNIIKhM (Burgess, 2022) . Open collaboration isn't clear, however, KillNet activities tend to occur either in similar time frames, or in complement to cyber attacks more directly linked to the Russian state. However, compared to a lot of groups available to Russia, KILLNET is unsophisticated and unorganised (Avertium, 2022) . Whilst Russia is known for its disinformation approach, KillNet lies about deeds which can be easily disproven and seems to have a preoccupation with creating a reputation for itself.  A telegram message shared by KILLNET declaring that they will take actions to  support Russian military operations in Ukraine. ( https://t.me/WeAreKillnet_Channel/43 ) Senior members of KillNet possess expertise and experience in DDoS attacks, although most members use publicly available DDoS scripts and IP stressers (Intel 471, 2024) . Unsurprisingly, KillNet actors often use the DDoS tool of the same name. For $1350 a month, the tool gives an attacker the capacity for 500GB a second of DDoS spam (Mascellino, 2022) . The tool itself is supposedly comprised of a 700,000-node botnet which utilises blockchain technology (Intel 471, 2024) . The original Killnet software could perform Layer 3/4 or Layer 7 DDoS and included 15 computers (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  Whilst the group has been relatively successful in its activity using the KILLNET tool, is relatively structured in its operations, and possesses a wide range of personnel, it doesn't seem to develop its own tools outside of rare occurrences (Vedere Labs, 2022) . However, in addition to KILLNET, the group also occasionally uses DDoS tools such as CC-Attack, MDDoS, LOIC, KARMA, and Dummy, as well as the Crypto, DDG, and Instant IP Stressers (Intel 471, 2024) .  Approach to Resistance Distributed Denial of Service, or DDoS, attacks make up the vast majority of KillNet activity. Generally, KillNet targets vulnerable equipment inside a target country, enrols it into their botnets, and then uses that piece of equipment to launch DDoS attacks against a wider network ( Tylaz.net , 2022) . KillNet seems to have attempted to develop this strategy further through the KillNet Legion VERA 1.0 malware. This malware is supposed to assist in the creation of botnets; however, its full utility is unclear at the time of writing (Intel 471, 2024) .  Whilst KILLNET's DDoS attacks don't cause a massive amount of permanent damage, the outages they cause, combined with the targeting of key infrastructure, generate real-world effects on people's lives ( HHS.gov , 2023) . As seen with Killnet's threats against Romania, their attacks seem to want to hit a network of key pieces of infrastructure in order to cause panic/confusion and an infrastructural shutdown (Chirileasa, 2022) . The group seems to primarily target what they view as the military-industrial complex of the West, trying to disrupt production and target civilian personnel through the extraction of personal data, which could be used to further target them (Eich, 2022) . In order to target such a wide network, KillNet has also widened its attack vectors into ransomware, malware, spear phishing, and spoofing when necessary (Chirileasa, 2022) .  Backing/support for these operations is often generated through social media-based recruitment and self-promotion. Killnet uses Telegram and other social media, such as X to create material designed to recruit new members to their initiative. Through these avenues, they attempt to recruit pen testers, graphic designers, hackers, phishers, scammers, and DDoSers to support the Russian government and target those who oppose it ( Intel 471, 2024) . Financial support is also garnered here, with the group's Telegram channels directing people to crypto wallets for donations, and even to an OpenSea page where the group had created an NFT available for purchase (Intel 471, 2024) .  International Relations & Alliances KillNet is a part of a wider network of political hacktivists and hackers-for-hire fighting the cyber-war in support of Russia. This network features threat actors such as CoomingProject, Mummy Spider, Salty Spider, Scully Spider, Smokey Spider, Wizard Spider and the Xaknet Team (Lyons, 2022) . It is common for KillNet to work in collaboration with these other actors to carry out mutually beneficial operations. Xaknet has been a particularly close collaborator with the group, carrying out DDoS attacks alongside KillNet in March 2022 to target the central infrastructure of Western states (CISA, 2022) .  KillNet itself is more of a loose group of individuals in leadership positions, with these individuals (such as KillMilk) using social media channels to issue general orders/objectives to followers. However, the primary 'arm' of KillNet, which is used to carry out more specific and coordinated attacks, is known as the KillNet legion. Originally known as Cyber Special Forces Russian Federation, Legion is comprised of several groups “Jacky”, “Mirai”, “Impulse”, “DDOSGUNG”, “Sakurajima”, “Kratos”, “Rayd”, “Zarya”, “Vera”, and “Phoenix” (ReliaQuest, 2025). Set up to carry out DDoS attacks for KillNet, each of the six subdivisions under Legion has its own targets and objectives (Intel 471, 2024) . For example, on 11 May 2022, Sakurajima and Jacky were told to begin targeting German and Polish infrastructure, with no restriction on targets (ReliaQuest, 2025) .  Works Cited Antoniuk, D. (2025). Russian hacker group Killnet returns with new identity . [online] Therecord.media . Available at: https://therecord.media/russian-hacker-group-killnet-returns-with-new-identity [Accessed 7 Jun. 2025]. AVERTIUM, (2022). An In-Depth Look at Russian Threat Actor, Killnet . [online] Available at: https://www.avertium.com/resources/threat-reports/an-in-depth-look-at-russian-threat-actor-killnet . Burgess, C. (2022). New Five Eyes alert warns of Russian threats targeting critical infrastructure . [online] CSO Online. Available at: https://www.csoonline.com/article/572625/new-five-eyes-warns-of-russian-threats-targeting-critical-infrastructure.html Chirileasa (2022). Romania under cyberattack coming from Russia’s Killnet . [online] Romania Insider. Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-cyberattack-russia-killnet-2022 . Chirileasa (2022). Romania under cyberattack coming from Russia’s Killnet . [online] Romania Insider. Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-cyberattack-russia-killnet-2022 . David, B. (2022). Pro-Russian Hackers Hit Critical Government Websites in Italy . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/pro-russian-hackers-italy/ . David, B. (2022 1). Anonymous Declares Cyber-War on Pro-Russian Hacker Gang Killnet . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/anonymous-declares-war-on-killnet/ [Accessed 2 May 2025]. Eich, (2022). Killnet: Russian Hacktivists DDoS US Airports, Government Websites – Westoahu Cybersecurity . [online] Available at: https://westoahu.hawaii.edu/cyber/uncategorized/killnet-russian-hacktivists-ddos-us-airports-government-websites/ . expats.cz . (2022). Czech Television hit in another wave of cyber attacks . [online] Available at: https://www.expats.cz/czech-news/article/czech-television-hit-in-another-wave-of-cyber-attacks [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Flashpoint Intel Team (2022). Killnet, Kaliningrad, and Lithuania’s Transport Standoff With Russia . [online] Flashpoint. Available at: https://flashpoint.io/blog/killnet-kaliningrad-and-lithuanias-transport-standoff-with-russia/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. Flashpoint. (2025). Killnet: Inside the World’s Most Prominent Pro-Kremlin Hacktivist Collective . [online] Flashpoint. Available at: https://flashpoint.io/intelligence-101/killnet/ . Gazeta.ru . (2023). ‘От него устали, но боятся’: что известно о лидере хакерской группировки Killnet - Газета.Ru . [online] Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/tech/2023/11/21/17878753.shtml?updated [Accessed 7 Jun. 2025]. Goodin, D. (2022). Pro-Russia threat group Killnet is pummeling Lithuania with DDoS attacks . [online] Ars Technica. Available at: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/06/pro-russia-threat-group-killnet-is-pummeling-lithuania-with-ddos-attacks/ [Accessed 1 May 2025]. Groupsense, (2022). The Allies and Enemies of Killnet . [online] Groupsense.io . Available at: https://www.groupsense.io/resources/the-allies-and-enemies-of-killnet [Accessed 18 May 2025]. HHS.gov (2023). HC3: Analyst Note. [Online] Office of Information Security. Available at: https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/killnet-analyst-note.pdf . Intel 471. (2024). Why organizations should (and should not) worry about KillNet . [online] Available at: https://intel471.com/blog/killnet-xaknet-legion-ddos-attacks [Accessed 7 May 2025]. Kitson, N. (2022). Russian hackers declare war on 10 countries after failed Eurovision DDoS attack - TechCentral.ie . [online] TechCentral.ie . Available at: https://www.techcentral.ie/russian-hackers-declare-war-on-10-countries-after-failed-eurovision-ddos-attack/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Lyons, J. (2022). Five Eyes nations fear wave of Russian attacks against critical infrastructure . [online] Theregister.com . Available at: https://www.theregister.com/2022/04/21/five_eyes_russia/ [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Marica (2022). Romanian government websites targeted by cyberattacks . [online] Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/romania-state-websites-cyberattack-2022 . Mascellino, A. (2022). Pro-Russian Hacker Group Killnet Hits Critical Government Websites in Lithuania . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/killnet-hacks-lithuania-government/ . Muncaster, P. (2022). Italian Police Foil Pro-Russia Attacks on Eurovision . [online] Infosecurity Magazine. Available at: https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/italian-police-foil-prorussia/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. ReliaQuest. (2025). Killnet: The Hactivist Group That Started A Global Cyber War - ReliaQuest . [online] Available at: https://reliaquest.com/blog/killnet-the-hactivist-group-that-started-a-global-cyber-war/ [Accessed 7 May 2025]. TRMLabs (2025). Spotlight on KillNet: The Cybercriminal Group Raising Funds for Russia’s War in Ukraine | TRM Blog . [online] Available at: https://www.trmlabs.com/resources/blog/spotlight-on-killnet-the-cybercriminal-group-raising-funds-for-russias-war-in-ukraine [Accessed 18 May 2025]. Tylaz.net (2022). Killnet attacked several websites of state institutions in the Republic of Moldova (Online) Tylaz.net . Available at: https://www.tylaz.net/2022/05/01/killnet-attacked-several-websites-of-state-institutions-in-the-republic-of-moldova/ [Accessed 30 Apr.2025] Vail, E. (2023). Russia or Ukraine: Hacking groups take sides . [online] Therecord.media . Available at: https://therecord.media/russia-or-ukraine-hacking-groups-take-sides?msclkid=235244a7ba6611ec92f21c9bd3b8ee49 [Accessed 30 Apr. 2025]. Vedere Labs, (2022). Killnet Analysis of Attacks from a Prominent Pro-Russian Hacktivist Group. [Online] Forescout. Available at: https://www.forescout.com/resources/analysis-of-killnet-report/ . Yildirim, M. (2022). Dark Web Profile: Killnet - Russian Hacktivist Group - SOCRadar . [online] SOCRadar® Cyber Intelligence Inc. Available at: https://socradar.io/dark-web-profile-killnet-russian-hacktivist-group/ .

Introduction & Overview ENOT Corps was a Russian nationalist far-right private military contracting group. Gaining notoriety through participation in the Russian nationalist scene, ENOT quickly gained covert government support, which enabled its fighters to deploy to eastern Ukraine. A key component of Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, ENOT Corps remained in good standing with both the Kremlin and other far-right groups until 2018, when the group seems to have fallen out of favour with Moscow's political circles. This led to ENOT cutting ties with Kremlin-linked groups, resulting in the criminalisation of ENOT as an organisation and the consequent arrests of numerous fighters. By 2019, ENOT was formally shut down. Whilst numerous key members of the group are now in prison, one of the two primary founders, Igor Mangushev, was killed in 2023 in what looks to be a state-sanctioned execution in Russian-occupied Ukraine.  History & Foundations ENOT, which stands for "United Popular Communal Groups", was founded by an obscure and loose group of Russian nationalists. This group varies in their backgrounds but was united in their desire to mobilise other nationalists into fighting in conflicts involving Russia (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . However, over time, two key figures appeared. Roman Telenkevich, a 51-year-old Russian, was originally registered as an individual entrepreneur engaged in the trade of household electrical goods before his entry into military contracting through ENOT. Telenkevich had previously served in the Russian Air Force in the unit 93810 of the Air Force military transport aviation near Moscow (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Igor Mangushev, the other primary founder of the group, served as a Russian army captain before his activity with ENOT, and interestingly seemed to have continued his service in tandem with these "extra-curricular" activities (Kirby, 2023) .  Mangushev gained notoriety in 2009 for his founding and managing of the Light Russia nationalist group (Tumanov, 2015) . This group primarily conducted "anti-immigration" raids in collaboration with other far-right groups such as Alexey Khudyakov's "Shield of Moscow" (Vera Alperovich, 2016) . In 2010, Mangushev met Telenkevich, who at the time was running the Moscow branch of the People's Cathedral (Polukhina, 2019) . This marked the beginning of collaborative efforts which, by 2011, would result in the formal founding of ENOT Corps (Data Journalists, 2023) .  Even before their work as PMCs, ENOT had gained the attention of the FSB through their domestic activities on the nationalist scene (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . As with groups such as Rusich, RIM, Batman Battalion, and other volunteer pro-Russian paramilitaries, it seems that around this time, ENOT developed a symbiotic relationship with the Russian state security apparatus. Following this favourable development, ENOT's activity escalated in its severity.  2014 saw ENOT participating in the hybrid war being waged against eastern Ukraine. ENOT was present during the Euromaidan, fighting alongside the Berkut police against protestors (Radio Liberty, 2019) . The group also assisted in the seizure of Crimea (Coynash, 2020) , fighting alongside Cossacks and Berkut police during the early stages of the annexation (Polukhina, 2019) . With the seizure of Crimea, ENOT shifted its attention to the mainland, fighting alongside Russian separatists in the Donbas (Askew, 2023) . In 2015, it seems that the group continued its campaign in Ukraine, primarily fighting for the city of Debaltseve (Coynash, 2020) . This military activity was conducted under the guise of 'humanitarian' motivations; however, evidence points to ENOT operating in an almost exclusively combative capacity. Even on the rare occasions where ENOT did participate in the distribution of humanitarian aid in the area, in reality, this aid consisted of sights, bulletproof vests, and military equipment, which was then provided to pro-Russian separatists (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . ENOT fighters, and founder Roman Telenkevich, during the group’s time in the Donbas. https://ok.ru/video/306451649014 In addition to this frontline activity, 2015 saw ENOT expand its operations into new roles. It seems that ENOT was utilised by the Russian state to stomp out dissent amongst disgruntled or power-hungry separatist groups. In spring, ENOT was responsible for the purging of a Cossack formation following the formation challenging Igor Plotnitsky, leader of the LPR (Coynash, 2020) . In September, ENOT also began holding military training camps in Russian territories. During this time, the group ENOT held a training camp for 300 young Russians (13-14 years old) in the Moscow region (Coynash, 2020) . Alexei Milchakov and Jan Petrovsky from DShRG Rusich were valued instructors during this camp. Later, ENOT held another youth camp in Belarus. Yet again, the instructors were a rogues gallery of military officers, paramilitary fighters, and PMC operators, with the camp mustering such a turnout that the Belarusian authorities were concerned it could be an early military move from Russia (Goble, 2018) .  ENOT continued its activities for a few years, with the group continuing its occupation of Ukraine with decreased intensity and organising a youth camp in the Moscow region in 2017 (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . However, it seems that 2018 was the beginning of the end for ENOT. Initially, ENOT continued its operations in Ukraine, and even gained contracts in Syria as well as anti-migration/counter organised crime and drug trafficking work in Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh (Dyner, 2018) . However, whilst Telenkevich was awarded for his efforts in Crimea by Sergei Aksyonov (installed leader of occupied Crimea), it seems this supposed recognition of duty was a mark of ENOT meeting its expiry date regarding its usefulness to the Russian state (Polukhina, 2019) .  Later that year, Telenkevich fell into conflict with Alexander Borodai (Prime Minister of the DPR at the time), leading to ENOT leaving the Union of Donbas Volunteers (Coynash, 2020) . Following this, ENOT was rapidly labelled as a criminal organisation by the Russian state, with ENOT members beginning to be arrested. In August, the 'raccoon' kids training camp the group had been running in Siberia, was shut down under the pretence of child abuse and public anxiety (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . On the 7th of November, the FSB and local police arrested several members of ENOT (Goble, 2018) . ENOT's capabilities, gained through fighting in Ukraine and Syria, combined with its ultranationalist objectives that were rapidly drifting away from the interests of the Kremlin, led to the Russian state deciding to put down what was, from its perspective, a rabid dog. In 2019, ENOT was formally shut down (Askew, 2023) .  Whilst Russian security forces initially went after lower-hanging fruit, the founding/key members of the group were far from untouchable. In June 2021, Vladimir Morosoz, ENOTs' treasurer and ideologue, was sentenced to 10.5 years in a maximum security prison (BBC NEWS, 2021) . He is imprisoned on organised crime charges, including violent extortion. It seems ENOT had resorted to operating as a group of thugs to hire. Telenkevich was also sentenced to 13 years in prison in March of 2022 on similar charges (RFL, 2022) . Supposedly, Telenkevich, working alongside other ex-ENOT employees under the cover of contractors for the Russian security forces, regularly robbed smugglers they were supposed to arrest, taking a percentage of captured goods for themselves.   In February 2023, Igor Mangushev was killed. At the time, Mangushev was running an anti-drone squad in occupied Luhansk as part of the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine (Kirby, 2023) . The event took place in Russian-occupied Ukraine, with the killing seemingly conducted through an execution-style shot to the back of the head (Askew, 2023) , using a 9mm round at 45 degrees from the top of Mangushev's head (implying he was kneeling at the time of death) (Kirby, 2023) .  Objectives & Ideology ENOT was driven, at least ideologically, by imperialism and ultranationalism. The group viewed Ukraine as a part of Russia (Askew, 2023) . More specifically, Mangushev believed that Russia is less at war with Ukraine as a state and more as the idea of 'anti-Russia', and according to Mangushev, the defeat of this idea is essential regardless of how many Ukrainians have to die (Kirby, 2023) . These beliefs, as well as Mangushev's belief in a 'Russian World' (Tumanov, 2015) , can be seen throughout the group's social media output and real-world activities.  The photo used by ENOT corp on a website registering their organisation. On the left is the the flag of Novorossiya, traditionally donned/flown by far-right imperialist groups.  https://zoon.ru/msk/public_services/obschestvennye_organizatsii_enot_corp/ In addition to these nationalistic views, ENOT has also gained infamy for its proximity to Neo-Nazism and its ardent Christian Orthdoxy. Mangushev, and consequently ENOT, gained their foundations from the Neo-Nazi scene in Russia (Kirby, 2023) , and during training camps, attendees were often subjected to far-right/neo nazi propaganda seminars (Coynash, 2020) . ENOT has, at times, referred to itself as a 'Russian Orthodox community' (Goble, 2018) . The group's events are titled things such as "International Youth Military-Patriotic Collection in Glory of the Holy Prince Dmitry Donskoy" or "Military-Tactical Game of St. Archangel Michael" and at one of these events, a chaplain was present to bless attendees (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . This Christian influence was also present during the group's military activities, with the medals handed out to ENOT operators for efforts in the Donbas being in the shape of crucifixes (Coynash, 2020) . When they received their medals, fighters shouted, “I serve my fatherland, ENOT and the Orthodox Faith”. Military/Political Abilities During their peak period of operation, ENOT relied on receiving both contracts and support from businesses in the AOs they were deployed to monetarily support their operations (Askew, 2023) . Whilst not outright PMCs, during its time in the Donbas war, ENOT carried out voluntary humanitarian convoys and 'self-defence' skirmishes (Polukhina, 2019) . These activities were not contractually paid, but sponsors from the Donbas put a high price on humanitarian aid, earning ENOT a notable income.  Unfortunately, this system of financing is possibly why the group was dismantled and why Mangushev was killed. Unlike other PMCs that have managed to generate heavy business and political ties, ENOT did not manage to find this level of sponsorship and consequent political protection. This would not necessarily have been a problem for ENOT had the group not been as outwardly critical of the Russian government as they were of those in the West (Goble, 2018) .  Militarily, ENOT's primary tool was deniability. The group's obscure/loose command structure and proxy-financing through regional sponsors meant that its activities were difficult to track and were a key component of hybrid operations in eastern Ukraine (Goble, 2018) . This hybrid capability was exhibited during the annexation of Crimea, and was recognised by the Kremlin and awarded with a high degree of support (Coynash, 2020) . In the context of more conventional operations, ENOT managed to gain a considerable amount of equipment over the years through its military contracting work, with Mangushev claiming the group was ready "to do business" (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) .  Approach to Resistance ENOT's activities primarily fall into the category of private military contracting. Askew (2023) feels that these activities were a way to monetise the group's ideology. Through PMC work, ENOT was able to gain monetary support as well as further their objective of increasing Russian influence abroad and the resuscitation of the Russian Empire. Interestingly, ENOT always denied being a PMC group, and yet were open about their support for such activities (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Mangushev felt that PMCs were a valuable way to organise the separatist cause, championing the idea that separatist groups should become PMCs, or should be monitored by PMCs (Tumanov, 2015) .  The training camps held by ENOT also operated to further the group's ideological objectives. Through these camps, hundreds of young Russian people were exposed to far-right beliefs and trained in combat skills under the idea that these children would grow up to become the next generation of patriots (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) .  International Relations & Alliances Whilst the network of militant far-right groups in Russia is complex and overlapping, on a few occasions, the connections between these groups have become slightly less obscure. ENOT and Wagner troops regularly fought in similar theatres during the Donbas war, but the connection between the PMCs became much clearer when Mangushev collaborated with Prigozhin as a political strategist (Kirby, 2023) . Rusich, another PMC with very close ties to Wagner, also have close ties to ENOT through their participation in training camps as instructors (Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya, 2018) . Social media posts of these collaborative efforts between Rusich and ENOT seem to indicate a close working relationship between the groups.  Members of ENOT Corp, Rusich group, and the Russian Imperial Movement together at a training camp. Third from left, ENOT founder Roman Telenkevich. Fourth from left, Rusich founder Alexey Milchakov.  ENOT's connections to the Russian state are heavily obscured, yet can still be proven. More specifically, ENOT seems to have regularly operated as an asset for the Russian intelligence community, with there being heavy links between ENOT and the FSB and GRU (Coynash, 2020) . These links were so heavy that at times it seemed like the FSB/GRU were propping ENOT up by conducting key roles and training members of the PMC (Radio Liberty, 2019) . Two key players of the organisation, Denis Karaban (GRU), Alexander Mrishchuk and Anton Baryakshev (FSB), turned out to be intelligence assets/officers (Coynash, 2020) .  Works Cited Askew, J. (2023).Everyone is talking about Wagner. But who are Russia’s other mercenaries?[online] Yahoo News. Available at: https://uk.news.yahoo.com/everyone-talking-wagner-russias-other-050053244.html?guccounter=2  [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025]. BBC News (2021).Суд в Туапсе приговорил идеолога ЧВК ‘ЕНОТ’ к 10,5 годам колонии - BBC News Русская служба_. [online] BBC News Русская служба. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-57664017  [Accessed 13 May 2025]. Coynash, (2022). Russian military intelligence & FSB men reportedly led a unit involved in Crimea and Donbas invasion. [online] Human Rights in Ukraine. Available at: https://khpg.org/en/1577103087  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. Data Journalists. (2023).Private armies $100 billion business for the long arm of governments_. [online] Available at: https://www.datajournalists.co.uk/2023/09/03/private-armies-100-billion-business-for-the-long-arm-of-governments/?lang=en  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. Dyner, (2018) The Role of Private Military Contractors in Russian Foreign Policy [online] PISM. Available at: https://pism.pl/publications/The_Role_of_Private_Military_Contractors_in_Russian_Foreign_Policy . Goble (2018).Russian Nationalist Group, Acting as a Private Military Company, Worries Kremlin_. [online] The Jamestown Foundation. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/russian-nationalist-group-acting-as-a-private-military-company-worries-kremlin/ . Kirby, P. (2023). Notorious Russian nationalist Igor Mangushev shot dead in Ukraine.BBC  News_. [online] 8 Feb. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64566582 . NEWSru.com . (2017).Белорусские подростки приняли участие в сборах, проводившихся причастной к боям в Донбассе организацией_. [online] Available at: https://www.newsru.com/world/25sep2017/enotcorp.html  [Accessed 27 Jun. 2025]. Nikitin, Bogushevsky, and Volchinskaya (2018).ФСБ начала задерживать участников ЧВК E.N.O.T.[online] Daily Storm. Available at: https://dailystorm.ru/obschestvo/fsb-nachala-zaderzhivat-uchastnikov-chvk-e-n-o-t . Polukhina (2019).‘Еноты’ в клетке_. [online] Новая газета. Available at: https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/02/22/79661-enoty-v-kletke  [Accessed 10 May 2025]. Radio Liberty, (2019).Russian active-duty military fought against Ukraine in ranks of private military company: Media report - Euromaidan Press_. [online] Euromaidan Press. Available at: https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/12/19/russian-active-duty-intelligence-operatives-fought-in-donbas-in-ranks-of-a-private-militry-company-media-report/  [Accessed 17 May 2025]. RFE/RL (2022).Суд приговорил главу ЧВК ‘Е.Н.О.Т.’ к 13 годам колонии строгого режима_. [online] Радио Свобода. Available at: https://www.svoboda.org/a/sud-prigovoril-glavu-chvk-e-n-o-t-k-13-godam-kolonii-strogogo-rezhima/31766276.html  [Accessed 13 May 2025]. Tumanov (2015).Послевоенные действия_. [online] Коммерсантъ. Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2688561  [Accessed 11 May 2025]. Vera Alperovich. (2016).Transformation of the Russian Nationalist Movement:… / SOVA_. [online] Available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2016/08/d35252/  [Accessed 16 Jun. 2025].

Insurgency Overview The Army of God (AOG) is an anti-abortion underground terrorist group based in the United States that has been linked to bombings, kidnappings, and murder beginning in the 1980s. The AOG promotes violence in response to abortion and the use of biblical scripture as a means to justify their violent actions. The group’s members and operations are primarily based out of the East Coast of the United States. History & Foundations Anti-abortion violence began to increase after events such as Roe v. Wade  in 1973, as access to abortions increased and political discourse on the matter changed.  The exact date of formation of the AOG is not currently known. However, the first confirmed instance of the group taking part in anti-abortion violence occurred in 1982, when Dr. Hector Zevallos, who performed abortions, as well as his wife, were kidnapped by members of the AOG. They were later set free (9). The AOG has a website that included a manual detailing information about the group’s founding, motivations, and instructions on how to destroy “babykilling abortion mills.” However, the bulk of the manual remains missing due to claims that it is illegal to upload online (7). The AOG’s operations, or whether they remain active, are currently not known. The group began in the early 80s and seems to have halted activity in the 2000s, although an individual was arrested in 2018 for making bomb threats against clinics (10). Objectives & Ideology  The AOG believes in violence against doctors who specialize in performing abortions and other medical professionals involved with abortions, as they believe abortion is murder and claim those who carry out abortions are “baby killers.” Members tend to embrace right-wing politics. The AOG is also considered a religious extremist group. They cite passages from the Bible, particularly Genesis 9:6 (“Who so sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God he made he man”) or Mark 8:36 (“For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?”). These passages, along with a plethora of other scriptures and messages from the Bible, are used as a justification for the AOG’s actions. They view violence against abortion providers as “killing the killers” (7). The AOG formerly had a manual that was available online. Consisting of nine chapters, the first three are an intro and “special thanks” to various online users and real people. Chapters 4–6 detail instructions, and the remaining chapters serve as a call to arms to “stop the mass murder of infants.” The manual is said to have undergone three revisions (7), with the final one resulting from the FBI’s crackdown on the group around the mid-to-late 2000s, based on additions made to the manual section (7). People within or outside of the group who assault or murder abortion specialists were referred to as “heroes” on the website. Notable examples include Paul Hill, who murdered John Britton, a doctor who carried out abortions, in 1994; and Shelly Shannon, who shot George Tiller, another abortion provider, in 2009 (5).  Political & Military Abilities   The AOG does not have an armed or political wing in the traditional sense, operating more as a loose formation whose members often do not know one another. Past actions have shown they are capable of carrying out bombings, arson, and other forms of property damage.  Members are recruited through word of mouth or sharing the website/manual contents online or through physical copies.  Due to the leaderless structure and anonymous membership of the group, the total membership of the AOG is difficult to determine. Notable members include Eric Robert Rudolph, responsible for the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta; Donald Spitz, a spokesperson for the group; and Paul Jennings Hill, who murdered John Britton (1, 2). Approaches to Resistance   The bulk of the AOG’s approach to resistance comes in the form of violence, mainly bombings and other forms of property damage, but the group has also been responsible for murder, attempted murder, and kidnapping. Most of their attacks are against either medical institutions, such as Planned Parenthood, or individuals in the medical field.  The AOG does not have a formal leader and operates on an individual basis, with members often not knowing each other. This approach is sometimes known as “compartmentalization,” and it is done to make it more difficult for law enforcement to monitor them (2). Relations and Alliances Since the AOG operates as a mostly anonymous group, it is difficult to say if they directly work with anyone outside of their inner ranks. The AOG website mentions and gives thanks to people who aided their operations or otherwise provided favors to the website hosts (7).   Works Cited  Feminist Majority Foundation Blog, (2.25.1997) extremist “Army of God” group takes credit for Atlanta bombings, promises to attack again, United States https://feminist.org/news/extremist-army-of-god-group-takes-credit-for-atlanta-bombings-promises-to-attack-again/ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (publish date unknown) Terrorist Organization Profile Army of God, United States https://web.archive.org/web/20120623065521/http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data%5Fcollections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=28   Clarkson, Frederick (9.15.1998) Anti-abortion movement marches on after two decades of arson, bombs, and murder, SPLC, United States https://www.splcenter.org/resources/reports/anti-abortion-movement-marches-after-two-decades-arson-bombs-and-murder/   4.)Henderon, Alex (4.7.2015) 6 modern day Christian terrorist groups our media convenently ignores, Salon, United States  https://www.salon.com/2015/04/07/6_modern_day_christian_terrorist_groups_our_media_conveniently_ignores_partner/   5.) Associated Press (11.7.2018) Rachelle ‘Shelley’ Shannon, activist who shot abortion doctor George Tiller, released from prison Associated Press, United States https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/nov/7/rachelle-shelley-shannon-activist-who-shot-abortio/   6.) NY times (1.20.1985) 3 men charged in bombings of seven abortion facilities  NY Times, United States  https://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/20/us/3-men-charged-in-bombings-of-seven-abortion-facilities.html   7.) ArmyofGod.com (link removed due to gragic imagery)  8.) Jennifer, Jefferis (12.2011) Armed for Life: The Army of God and Anti-Abortion Terror in the United States, JSOTR, United States  https://www.jstor.org/stable/26298546?seq=1   9.) Sheppard, Nathan (8.21.1982) Abortion doctor and wife are freed, NY Times, United States  https://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/21/us/abortion-doctor-and-wife-are-freed.html   10.) Goudie, Chuck and Weidner, Ross (2.12.2018) Feds: Indiana man linked to "anti-abortion extremist organization" threatened clinic attacks, ABC & news, United States  https://abc7chicago.com/army-of-god-terrorism-domestic-anti-abortion/3049950/

Introduction & Overview The Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM, is a far-right ultranationalist and white supremacist political organisation, also possessing a paramilitary wing known as the Imperial Legion. Through its use of its ‘Partizan’ training camp, extensive transnational collaboration with other far-right organisations, and participation in numerous armed conflicts, RIM has gained notoriety for its network of fighters and political activists.  With the overall political objective of the restoration of the Russian monarchy and the implementation of Orthodox Christianity within Russia, RIM also holds intensely imperialist views. A component of these views is the fruition of the Novorossiya project, leading to RIM’s extensive involvement in the Donbas war, and eventually the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.  History & Foundations Originating in St Peterburg, RIM was founded in 2002 by Russian ultra-nationalist Stanislav Anatolyevich Vorobyev (Huetlin, 2017) . Whilst Vorobyev's influence within RIM is considerable, RIM's activity in the military sphere is greatly reliant on the activity of Denis Gariev. Acting as lead instructor and organiser of RIM's paramilitary arm known as the Imperial Legion (Potter, 2022) , Gariev is also the founder of the RIM training camp known as "Partizan" (BBC News, 2022) .  Following the foundation of RIM in 2002, the Imperial Legion was founded in 2008 in an effort to further mobilise the organisation's paramilitary objectives (Potter, 2022) . This shift into a more militant pragmatism eventually led to RIM being registered as a terror organisation by the Russian government in 2013 (BBC News, 2022) . However, despite this categorisation, in Spring 2014, Stanislav Vorobyov joined Russian military instructors on a trip to Crimea. The objective of said trip was to develop local "Novorossiya" resistance movements ( Zaks.ru , 2015) .   Simultaneously, Gariev began mobilising volunteers through the Partizan training camp to enable the deployment of groups of fighters to the Donbas (Roth, 2017) . This participation in the 2014 Donbas war led to RIM's first combat losses in the fight for Slavyansk (Demchenko, 2020) . Despite these losses, the Imperial Legion can be traced through social media analysis as fighting through Nikishino in late 2014, and in early 2015, participating in the battle for Novogrigorievka and Logvinovo, with additional losses taken in Debaltsevo (Demchenko, 2020) .  By mid-2015, many Imperial Legion members had stopped fighting in the Donbas due to feeling the conflict had been co-opted by governmental and oligarchic interests from Russia, Ukraine and the West (Roth, 2017) .  Following this withdrawal, RIM increased the frequency of its training camps; however, outside of these camps, the movement's political weight waned considerably (Roth, 2017) . Between 2015 and 2017, additional RIM fighters died in the Donbas, evidencing their continued, if decreased, participation in the conflict (Demchenko, 2020) . It seems that, during this time, the training efforts of the Partizan camp places greater emphasis on transnational activity. In 2017, three members of the Nordic Resistance Movement carried out a string of bombings in Norway (Butt and Byman, 2020) . Two of the three attackers, Viktor Melin and Anton Thulin, had attended the Partizan training camp, with their participation in the camp being cited by the case’s prosecuting attorney as a catalytic component of their radicalisation into carrying out the attacks (Huetlin, 2017) . 2019 saw the last known activity of the Imperial Legion in the Donbas war, with Imperial Legion fighters finally withdrawing from LPR and DPR units (Demchenko, 2020) . According to RIM's telegram channel, a total of 12 legionnaires were killed during the Donbas war ( Rus Imperia ) . Again, this full withdrawal from the Donbas did not mark the end of RIM's activity, and instead, a redistribution of its efforts into other theatres. For example, RIM fighters were deployed to Libya to aid the Russian support of the Libyan National Army of General Khalifa Haftar, with at least two legionnaires dying in the process (Demchenko, 2020) . In response to this increasingly transnational activity, on the 6th of April 2020, RIM was declared a terrorist organisation by the US government and placed under numerous sanctions, specifically due to the organisation's efforts to train neo-Nazis abroad (Pamuk, 2020) . In fact, RIM was the first white supremacist group to be officially labelled "Specially Designated Global Terrorists" by the US State Department (Morrell, 2023) .  Following a period of decreased activity, RIM resurged to prominence in tandem with the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. On February 24, 2022, the Telegram channel of the Partizan centre supported the invasion of Ukraine: "Do we welcome this war? Probably so! As an inevitable evil. Whether it will be able to resolve the issue of the civil war between the Russian people, which began 100 years ago, is doubtful." On March 8th, RIM's telegram states, "We decided to take part in the war with Ukraine." Finally, on the 29th of June, the Partisan training centre opened up again to train fighters for the war in Ukraine. This time, it is backed and sponsored by the Russian armed forces ( Rus Imperia ) .  Objectives & Ideology A message on RIM's telegram details a list of 7 requirements for those interested in joining the Imperial Legion/RIM ( Rus Imperia ) : Orthodox faith. Conservative views. (Remember, we are monarchists) Good physical shape. No bad habits. (alcohol-drugs,) Completion of a 5-day general course of special military training "Partisan". Completion of a 7-day training camp. Psychological test. This list hints towards a general outline for RIM's objectives and ideology, but in order for a full understanding of the group to be gained, a further exploration must be carried out. Firstly, RIM holds generally far-right views. With the objective of fighting against globalisation, multiculturalism, and liberalism (SFC, 2019) ; "the enemy" is considered to be the West, the LGBTQIA+ community, immigrants, and jews (Potter, 2022) . In this context, RIM claims to defend the traditional values of Western civilisation, values which the enemy is apparently making a concerted and coordinated effort to destroy (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  RIM's primary ideological belief is that of orthodox monarchism. RIM seeks to restore the Russian monarchy (Huetlin, 2017) , primarily through what is known as a 'Romanov Restoration', the restoration of the Romanov family who suffered a regicide in 1918, to the crown (SFC, 2019) . Through this restoration of a monarchy, RIM seeks to implement two pillars of authority: political power vested in the tsar and holy power vested in the Russian Orthodox Church (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) . This drive for political authority through holy power is further evidenced throughout RIM's ardent Christian orthodoxy (Roth, 2017) . The group's telegram channel regularly posts biblical excerpts, as well as information on the historical ties between the Russian orthodox church and Russia's imperial age (RIM Telegram, 19th April 2025) .  These monarchic views are also closely linked to RIM's neo-Nazi views. Throughout its activities, RIM regularly espouses antisemitism, racism, homophobia, anti-abortion, chauvinism, sexual violence, anti-law enforcement, and anti-government beliefs, with said beliefs being commonly collectively known as 'Siege culture' (Morrell, 2023) . Additionally, RIM has a general belief that there is a global cabal of Jewish oligarchs that perpetuates globalisation, leading to massive increases in foreign migration and the corruption of Western culture to unleash conflict and wars all over the world (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  RIM's participation in Siege culture is further exemplified by its accelerationist objectives. RIM views societal collapse as inevitable and aims to prepare the Russian people to take advantage of this existential event in order to bring the Russian empire back to its former glory (Castner, 2022) . Through this event of societal collapse, Gariev himself has expressed the desire to lead a last crusade to save traditional Christian values from an alliance of leftists, LGBTQIA+ community members, and immigrants that supposedly poses an existential threat (Potter, 2022) . The Russian Imperial Movement believes wholeheartedly that there is a full-scale war about to start against Western civilisation, and regardless of its involvement in various other events, one of RIM’s primary objectives is to ensure victory for Russia once this war has passed (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  Victory in this conflict, to RIM, takes form in the reinstatement of the Russian empire, specifically the idea of Novorossiya (Demchenko, 2020) . In fact, the Imperial Legion was created in order to protect the population of this hypothetical region ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Such imperial/ultra-nationalist ambitions can even be seen in the group's flag/logo, featuring the black-gold-white tricolour of the Tsarist Empire (Potter, 2022) . Through the recreation of the Russian empire and Novorossiya, the interests of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians would be privileged ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Ethnic Russians in particular would receive additional privilege, with RIM believing that Russia should control any state in which a considerable number of ethnic Russians reside (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) . This attitude particularly applies to Ukraine, with RIM viewing the state as a bastardised component of the Russian empire invented by the Soviets, and in many cases, its people are ethnically Russian (Roth, 2017) .  This perspective regarding Russian ethnicity also extends into the realm of white supremacy. RIM has claimed to be "fighting for the predominance of the white race" (Hume, 2020) , and seeks to create a mono-ethnic state led by a Russian autocratic monarchy (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . As is common with ethnonationalism, genocidal intent is hinted at thoroughly by the Russian Imperial Movement. Gariev has previously stated: “We see Ukrainian-ness as rabies. A person is sick. Either quarantine, liquidation, or he’ll infect everyone" (Roth, 2017) Gariev has also stated that all Ukrainian separatists must be liquidated (Potter, 2022) . However, this is an even more concerning statement than initially thought when it is taken into account the fact that, in the eyes of RIM, all Ukrainians are inherently separatist through their very existence. Military/Political Abilities Militarily, RIM operates in a grey area. Whilst the group might not be directly under the control of the Russian military, Denis Gariev wrote all of the recruits he trains for societal collapse/conflict "are already part of the active army," (BBC News, 2022) . Similarly, Ruslan Starodubov, a member of the Imperial Legion, has stated “We don’t receive any support, but at the same time, we aren’t hampered” (Roth, 2017) . During armed operations, the imperial legion has fought actively alongside official government forces in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, and was able to move up to 30 million rubles of weaponry and equipment to Ukrainian separatists during the Donbas war (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Finally, in the context of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Partisan centre now operates with the backing of the Russian armed forces ( Rus Imperia ) .  On the whole, the Kremlin does not directly support RIM, but it does nothing to combat the group’s violent activities, despite knowledge of their operations (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) . Whilst RIM opposes Putin in many ways, its activities as a conduit for terrorism in countries opposed to Russia seem to outweigh these issues in the risk-reward calculation made by the Kremlin (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Because of this benefit to Russia, the government turns a blind eye to both its criticisms and operations in a form of 'adversarial symbiosis' (Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke, 2020) .  Generally, RIM believes that Putin came to power through corrupt elites and oligarchs, and that he should step aside in order to give way to the tsar (Potter, 2022) . Gariev, in particular, has been an open critic of Putin in the past, viewing his government as corrupt and not doing enough to protect the interests of ethnic Russians (Roth, 2017) . Despite these criticisms, RIM agrees with Putin on several points, such as viewing the West and the LGBTQIA+ community as an enemy, and a commitment to traditional values (Potter, 2022) . There are also some clear connections between RIM and various politically or militarily powerful individuals. GRU Colonel V.V. Kvachkov has attended the Partizan centre numerous times in order to deliver lectures on various topics, including the execution of special military operations ( Rus Imperia and Rus Imperia ) . RIM has also worked with Rodina, a Russian extreme-right party founded in 2003 by Dmitry Rogozin. Rogozin served as Russia’s deputy prime minister from 2011 to 2018, overseeing the country’s defence industry (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) .  Approach to Violence The Russian imperial movement's primary objective, outside of its overarching political/military goals, is the creation and maintenance of an extremist network. RIM itself is a network, not just a movement, with each node comprised of smaller cells/groups/units of fighters and activists spread across various Russian cities, and in some cases, other countries ( Zaks.ru , 2015) . Gariev himself has boasted that: "We are the only organisation that maintains close and professional connections with right-wing extremist movements around the world" (Potter, 2022) A key component of this network is the foundation of the World National-Conservative Movement. This movement, founded between RIM and the Rodina party, aims to bring together far-right activists in opposition to liberalism, multiculturalism, and tolerance (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . Far-right extremist groups from up to 28 different countries attended the conference in 2015 (Counter Extremism Project, 2020) . This network is then used to share experiences of political and information warfare, as well as to share military training efforts between nodes/groups (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) .  Of course, this network operates in tandem with RIM's other primary activity: the provision of training camps/courses to those who are considered a part of their network. RIM consistently trains neo-nazis and white supremacists from across Europe and has also recruited individuals from European countries in order to further their ability to train others (Pamuk, 2020) . The training camps themselves involve education on artillery reconnaissance, close combat (Potter, 2022) , sapper skills, combat medicine ( Zaks.ru , 2015) , bomb making, assaulting (Counter Extremism Project, 2020), city fighting, high-altitude training, military topography, radio communications, and smoothbore weapons ( Rus imperia ) .  Whilst initially the camps were advertised as a means to train civilians for upcoming "global chaos" (Huetlin, 2017) , since the beginning of the Russian invasion into Ukraine, the training offered by the Partizan centre has advanced notably. The newest ad for the training camp details things like FPV drones, dealing with combat stress, shotgun training, and other advanced courses ( Rus imperia ) . This seems to indicate that the courses have shifted away from training civilians to be prepared for societal collapse, and instead offer the ability for volunteers to prepare for a conventional war. The flow of fighters through these camps has operated as both a means for RIM to fight towards its objectives, but also as a self-perpetuating recruitment tool, with the Imperial Legion's participation in various conflicts giving the movement additional 'street cred' (Hume, 2020) .   International Relations & Alliances RIM has extensive connections with a wide range of movements, groups, and even private entities. Many founding members of Wagner are also members of the Russian Imperialist Movement (Castner, 2022) , with legionnaires operating in Libya seemingly doing so under sub-contracts through Wagner (Demchenko, 2020) . Additionally, the founders of DShRG Ruisch, Milchakov and Petrovsky, both took part in the Partizan training camp before they created Rusich (Potter, 2022) .  Outside of military collaboration, RIM has developed its network through mutually beneficial events. One such example was Stanislav Vorobyov 2019 attendance of the "II Congress of European Monarchists" in Austria, organised by the "Black and Yellow Alliance", advocating for the revival of the Habsburg Empire from the independent states of Central and Eastern Europe (Demchenko, 2020) . Similarly, in 2017, a US sect of RIM held a meeting with the ultra-right neo-Nazi group known as Traditionalist Worker Party, which was disbanded in 2018 (Demchenko, 2020) . Of course, RIM's work with the Rodina party has been essential for the perpetuation of their political power, with their collaborative event, World National-Conservative Movement, being a regular meeting place for extremist and far-right groups from the US and Europe (Arsenault and Stabile, 2020) .   RIM also has heavy links with Matthew Heimbach, a notorious American white supremacist who has backed Hezbollah and the IRA and is the organiser of Unite the Right (SFC, 2019) . Similarly to RIM's ties with the Rodina Party, their connection with the Nordic Resistance Movement is an important one. The two groups' collaboration has led to a longstanding and close-knit relationship which has been utilised for mutually beneficial fundraising and recruitment objectives (Huetlin, 2017).  Works Cited Butt and Byman (2020). Right-wing Extremism: The Russian Connection. Survival , 62(2), pp.137–152. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1739960 . Counter Extremism Project. (2020). Russian Imperial Movement . [online] Counter Extremism. Available at: https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim . [Accessed 21 Apr. 2025]. Arsenault and Stabile. (2020). Confronting Russia’s Role in Transnational White Supremacist Extremism . [online] Just Security Available at: https://www.justsecurity.org/68420/confronting-russias-role-in-transnational-white-supremacist-extremism/ . [Accessed 17 Apr. 2025]. Ross, Hodgson, and Clarke. (2020). The Russian Imperial Movement and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement . [online] ICCT. Available at: https://icct.nl/publication/russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links-transnational-white-supremacist-extremist  [Accessed 14 Apr. 2025]. Morrell (2023). Mapping Extremist Discourse Communities on Telegram: The Case of the Russian Imperial Movement - GNET . [online] GNET. Available at: https://gnet-research.org/2023/09/18/mapping-extremist-discourse-communities-on-telegram-the-case-of-the-russian-imperial-movement/ . [Accessed 23 Apr. 2025]. Hume (2020). German Neo Nazis Are Getting Explosives Training at a White Supremacist Camp in Russia . [online] VIce. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/german-neo-nazis-are-getting-explosives-training-at-a-white-supremacist-camp-in-russia/  [Accessed 23 Apr. 2025]. Potter (2022). Russische Rechtsextreme im Ukraine-Krieg: Neonazis für Noworossija . [online] Bell Tower. Available at: https://www.belltower.news/ukraine-krieg-russische-rechtsextreme-im-kampf-gegen-kiew-136285/  [Accessed 12 Apr. 2025]. Demchenko (2020). Організація російських імперців стала терористичною. Як вона воювала в Україні (рос.) . [online] Радіо Свобода. Available at: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30538763.html  [Accessed 10 Apr. 2025]. Zaks.ru  (2015). Координатор тренировочной базы ополченцев: Ни один наш боец не видел ни одного представителя Интербригад . [online] Zaks.ru  Available at: https://www.zaks.ru/new/archive/view/135459 . [Accessed 15 Apr. 2025]. Humeyra Pamuk (2020). U.S. designates Russian ultra-nationalist group as terrorist organization. [online] Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us-designates-russian-ultra-nationalist-group-as-terrorist-organization-idUSKBN21O1UP/ . [Accessed 18 Apr. 2025]. The Soufan Center (2019). WHITE SUPREMACY EXTREMISM: The Transnational Rise of the Violent White Supremacist Movement [online] The Soufan Center. Available at: https://thesoufancenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Report-by-The-Soufan-Center-White-Supremacy-Extremism-The-Transnational-Rise-of-The-Violent-White-Supremacist-Movement.pdf . [Accessed 18 Apr. 2025]. Huetlin, J. (2017). Russian Extremists Are Training Right-Wing Terrorists From Western Europe . [online] The Daily Beast. 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Introduction & Overview Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group Rusich, abbreviated to DShRG Rusich, is a Russian neo-Nazi imperialist paramilitary group. Having participated in both the Donbas War and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as operating in Libya, Syria, and CAR, Rusich is a well-armed, trained, and organised unit of around 100 operators. Rusich aims to perpetuate Neo-Nazi and imperialist ideology through the creation of a network of similarly ideologically driven individuals and groups and the training and recruitment of further personnel to fight in various conflicts. Rusich has primarily concentrated its efforts in Ukraine, actively fighting in the Donbas with some fluctuations, since 2014.  In addition to these more traditional fascist views, Rusich has a particular taste for paganism and the idea of becoming modern Vikings. This outlook is presented through the use of various nordic runes also commonly associated with nazism and excessively violent treatment of both dead and captured enemy personnel. Rusich's tactics can be described as 'in-field terrorism', with the group having a habit of posting images/videos of their activities, especially in the cases of the execution of war crimes and brutality.  History & Foundations The origins of DShRG Rusich can be traced back to 2011, when its founders, Alexey Milchakov and Yan Petrovsky, met in St Petersburg (Meduza, 2017 and Pigni, 2017) . Bonding over their love for weaponry, and similar nationalistic political affiliations, the two become close friends (Meduza, 2017) . However, before their collaborative activities in the form of Rusich, both Milchakov and Petrovsky had independently developed infamous reputations. Milchakov was originally, and is supposedly still, a member of the VDV (a key feeder branch for Wagner recruits) (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) , specifically the Pskov Airborne Division (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . DShRG Rusich leader Alexey Milchakov shouldering an RPG In 2012, Milchakov gained internet fame after cutting the head off of a puppy and eating it, all whilst nazi flags hung in the background. Milchakov posted the video of the act himself, adding to his existing social media gallery of fascist symbols and quotations (Verny, 2014) . Petrovsky, on the other hand, whilst a Russian national from Ikrustk, moved to Norway in his teens. Whilst there, he developed a keen interest in nationalism and the idea that the Norwegian and Russian people had close genetic ties which were being muddied by Liberalism and uncontrolled immigration (Meduza, 2017) . After finishing university, Petrovsky began working in a Norwegian tattoo studio. However, this was not just any normal studio. The studio, True Metal Tattoo studio in Oslo, is a known meeting place for eastern European Neo-nazis, and during a police raid in 2010, military equipment, fake documents, and weapons were found leading to the arrest of its employees (Meduza, 2017) . Petrovsky was found to be innocent of involvement in the procurement of said illicit material. Unfortunately, this incident seems to have acted as a catalyst for some very real extremist activity, leading to his return to Russia.  Following their development of a close friendship, Milchakov and Petrovsky became deeply involved in the nationalist scene in St Petersburg [[Pigni, 2017]]. Following the beginning of the Donbas war, the pair decided to mobilise. Together, they participated in the "Partizan" paramilitary training camp run by the Russian Imperial Movement (Potter, 2022) . Both of them then volunteered as part of a 'humanitarian convoy' organised by the Aid Coordination Center of Novorossiya (KTsPN), an offshoot of the Imperial Legion (Russian Imperial Movement's paramilitary arm), in June 2014 (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich) . The objective of this convoy was to run military equipment into Luhansk to support the LPR forces fighting in the area (Meduza, 2017) . These supplies were specifically delivered to Alexander Bednov's "Batman" battalion and Alexey Mozgovoy's "Prizrak" Brigade (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)) . Once in Ukraine, Milchakov and Petrovsky officially founded Diversionary Guerilla Reconnaissance Group Rusich under Bednov's "Batman" battalion (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . The group quickly began recruiting from the underground nationalist scene across numerous Russian cities, primarily St Petersburg and Moscow (Galeotti, 2022) . Alexey Milchakov near Luhansk, Eastern Ukraine With Rusich officially founded, the group got to work. Operating as a sabotage and assault reconnaissance unit Rusich acted as members of the Union of Donbas Volunteers through the application of regular and irregular tactics to support both the LPR and DPR forces in theatre (Kozhurin, 2022) . In Luhansk, Rusich worked as a sabotage group behind enemy lines and in Donetsk the unit fought in a more conventional capacity as part of the positional battle between Belokamenka and Novolaspa (Pigni, 2017) . A notable incident involving Rusich was the ambush of the Aidar 24th separate assault battalion, gaining notoriety due to gory photos of the aftermath being posted online. On the 5th of September 2014, Rusich managed to ambush the Ukrainian Aidar battalion near Schastya, Luhansk, killing dozens of Ukrainian soldiers in the process and leaving their vehicles destroyed (Kozhurin, 2022) .  On the 1st of January, 2015, Bednov was killed in an ambush rumoured to have been carried out by Russian forces in response to his decreased willingness to remain under Kremlin control (Sheldon, 2021) . Occurring near the city of Lutugino, the ambush also led to the death of a few escort fighters attributed to Rusich, with the ambush itself seemingly organised by contingents of the Wagner group (Korotkov, 2017) . Following this, Rusich briefly reorganised under the Prizrak brigade from March 2015 onwards (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . However, by September 2015, angered by the death of Bednov, Rusich withdrew from the Donbas entirely, claiming they couldn't continue fighting as they weren't sure whose interests they were presenting (Pigni, 2017) .  Following their departure from the Donbas theatre, Rusich redeployed across numerous countries under the pretence of private military contracting as a component of the Wagner group's web of sub-contractors. Shortly after their retreat from Luhansk, Rusich took part in the Russian offensive against ISIS to retake the Syrian city of Palmyra, however, their social media posts demonstrate a wider footprint spreading from Palmyra to Al Kawm (Sheldon, 2021) . Their involvement in Syria seems to have been sustained up until 2021 (Kozhurin, 2022) . More specifically, their social media indicates a primary objective consisting of the capture and defence of the al-Shaer gas fields, the same gas fields where Wagner-linked Russian security forces recorded themselves torturing and killing Hamdi Bouta in April 2017 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . These gas fields are of heavy interest to the Kremlin, with a large amount of Russian-financed oil and gas infrastructure having been set up in the Palmyra area (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . It seems that Rusich's activity in the area is simply a continuation of the long-standing Russian backing of the Syrian regime to sustain control of these resources [[Kozhurin, 2022]]. Simultaneously, posts from Rusich's telegram evidence activity in the Central African Republic https://t.me/dshrg2/3065 and Libya https://t.me/dshrg2/3054 .  Rusich then returned to Ukraine as a part of Russia's invasion in 2022. Operating as a part of the Union of Donbas Volunteers, the Rusich group headed for Kharkiv in an irregular capacity (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . Whilst a German intelligence report posits that Rusich was in Ukraine from April 2022 (Kozhurin, 2022) , an analysis of their social media from the time shows that the group had plans to be in Kharkiv from October 2021 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . In fact, images posted by the Rusich Instagram account show the group participating in training exercises on armoured vehicles as early as January 5th, 2021 (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . The comments on these posts indicate that, even at this early stage, the group knew that it was going to be targeting Kharkiv. With this in mind, it seems that Rusich was used in a vanguard capacity to attack enemy forces behind their lines, similar to their operations during the Donbas war.  Objectives & Ideology A key component of Rusich's identity is ardent neo-nazism (Kozhurin, 2022) . The group's social media is a veritable smorgasbord of nazi symbolism such as tyr runes and the number 88 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) , however, of particular prevalence are the Valknut and kolovrat/'black sun' runes (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Appearing in both primary variations of their logo/symbol, these runes are a continuation of the groups seeming obsession with Nordic symbology, a common trend amongst neo-nazi circles (Smid and Smidova, 2021) . This infatuation with Nordic culture seems to be an attempt to present the group as modern Vikings (Galeotti, 2022) . This has led to the use of the Icelandic/nordic language during social media posts https://t.me/dshrg2/2820 , the posting of ancient Norse poems (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) , and fighters pretending to be Nordic volunteer fighters through posing for photos with Norwegian flags or claiming to be Norwegian, Swedish, or Icelandic in interviews (Sheldon, 2021) .  DShRG fighters with a valknut flag Amongst these more esoteric references to neo-nazi culture, more blatant displays of white nationalist fascism can be found throughout the group's social media postings. Rusich regularly posts photos of its members conducting Roman salutes https://t.me/dshrg2/2895 as well as making references to the KKK, white power, and racial holy war movements https://t.me/dshrg2/2579 . Additionally, in a video published in 2022, Milchakov openly admitted to being a nazi, stating, “I'm not going to go deep and say, I’m a nationalist, a patriot, an imperialist, and so forth. I’ll say it outright: I’m a Nazi” (Kozhurin, 2022) .   Rusich's particular brand of neo-nazism is also more imperialistic than that traditionally seen in extremist groups (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) . The group regularly makes references to historical/imperial Russia, even down to the group's name. "Rusich" could very well be a reference to the mythic Medieval fortress, or "sich", of "Rus". Rus is a term for the pre-imperial confederation of Norse peoples who hailed originally from Sweden and settled the territory that lies between the Baltic and the Black Sea (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . This works closely with Petrovsky's outspoken view that Russian and Norwegian people have close genetic ties, ties which not all individuals can realise and which must be defended (Meduza, 2017) . Rusich also seems to have a particular hatred for post-Soviet states, especially Ukraine, for separating from wider Russia and, in the eyes of Rusich, dividing the population and muddying its gene pool (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . In the words of Petrovsky, "Our ideology unites, we are fighting for the reunification of the Slavs, the reunification of Northern Europe." (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) .  Rusich's 'real world' activity also impresses an idea of neo-nazi Russian imperialism. During a training camp for young Russians at the Svarog centre, Milchakov was pictured holding the flag of Imperial Russia https://t.me/dshrg2/2039 . This flag is also featured in the group's primary emblem (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Even the very foundations of the group, whilst largely composed of nationalistic motivations, hinged on participation within a group promoting the idea of 'Novorossiya', the name used for the Russian empire towards the end of its era (Laruelle, 2015) . Rusich's hatred for Ukrainians and the idea that the country should reintegrate into the Russian Federation can also be seen through the group's treatment of enemy wounded. Following their ambush against the Aidar battalion, a wounded Ukrainian soldier was forced to speak Russian whilst being interrogated, all whilst being further brutalised (Aseev, at al., 2018) .  Alexey Milchakov on 5 September after the Aidar Battalion ambush Whilst Rusich is an active participant in armed conflicts across numerous states, the group's social media output presents a clear objective in of itself. Milchakov has claimed that Rusich is far from just a combat team but instead a group of friends united by a common idea (Korotkov, 2017) . This idea is clearly articulated through the group's utilisation of its substantial social media following to garner support for individuals and groups who follow similar nationalistic ideologies (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . In this sense, Rusich has created a digital network of neo-nazi, imperialist, and nationalist individuals/groups which it supports both ideologically and monetarily through the sale of various forms of branded merchandise.  Military/Political Abilities The Rusich group's political and military ties/abilities are rather peculiar and often contradictory. Despite being an independent private/voluntary group, Rusich very clearly has at least some form of government backing. Through social media analysis, it's clear Rusich has had clear access to government facilities, vehicles, and aircraft for training and staging operations (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . Additionally, Milchakov seems to be more valuable to the Kremlin than other private contractors. Milchakov was one of the few Wagner/Private contractors not to be arrested upon their return from Syria following the exposure of the war crimes carried out by Russian forces in the area (Rondeaux, 2020 (Rusich)) .   Interestingly, despite this clear government support, Rusich is simultaneously unafraid of openly criticising or encouraging the opposition of, government decisions. Through their social media channels, Rusich has called for the execution of prisoners and told its followers to lie about the number of captured/wounded in order to get away with doing so, despite explicit orders from the Kremlin to capture surrendering enemy troops (Townsend, 2022) . Rusich has also openly insulted the Russian command personnel for both their decisions on the battlefield https://t.me/dshrg2/3071 and for their apparent character https://t.me/dshrg2/2529 . Of course, all of these incidents must be considered in the context that Rusich actively retreated from the Donbas theatre due to feelings of betrayal by their own government following the death of Bednov at the hands of Russian troops (Meduza, 2017) . DShRG Rusich fighters with an NSV heavy machine gun In terms of military ability, Rusich may be a small unit, but it's capabilities are substantial. Utilising irregular tactics, Rusich leverages its membership of around 100 fighters (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) to carry out special operations-style missions to disrupt enemy activity. These operations are further facilitated by the wide range of arms available to the group. From extensive access to standard Russian/Soviet small arms, to the use of more specialised equipment such as precision rifles and even advanced UAVs such as Lancet loitering munitions, the Rusich group telegram channel presents a broad catalogue of the group's weaponry and equipment (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Through the use of extensive training activities, (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) , the group also seems to have developed advanced tactics, weaponising niche/advanced technology/equipment such as cell signal jammers during their operations https://t.me/dshrg2/2996 .  These findings combine to paint the picture of a well-trained, ideological, highly driven, well-backed/equipped, and militarily/politically active group specialising in special operations style manoeuvres. Approach to Action The Rusich group works in a primarily irregular capacity, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and ambushes against enemy troops, often behind enemy lines. These tactics were leveraged extensively by the group during the Donbas war (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) . Of particular note is the ambush on the Aidar battalion (Rudenko, 2015) . The specific choice to execute the ambush on the day when the conflict's ceasefire was supposed to be implemented and the use of Ukrainian flags by Rusich to lull the enemy into a false sense of security demonstrates an underhanded and outright criminal approach to warfare (BBC News, 2022 (Rusich)) .  Complimenting this irregular approach to operations is Rusich's armoury of unconventional/specialist equipment. From cellular jammers  https://t.me/dshrg2/3015 to RPG-distributed mines https://t.me/dshrg2/2714 , Rusich makes use of a wide range of equipment in order to carry out specialist operations and to widen its spectrum of capabilities. Additionally, the Rusich group is able to modify equipment in order to further develop their capabilities https://t.me/dshrg2/3015 .  Rusich fighters with an ORSIS T-5000 sniper rifle and a late model SVD ‘Dragunov’ Whilst irregular warfare is the broad bracket under which Rusich's operations would fall, their activities can only be described more specifically as "in-field terrorism". The group's brutal treatment of captured or wounded enemies, in combination with their habit of posting intimate details of said treatment on social media, operates to strike fear into the enemy/local population and to garner the group a rather formidable reputation as ardent war criminals (Gonta, 2015) . Examples of such behaviour include the beheading of enemy bodies (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) , the mutilation of captured enemy soldiers (Gonta, 2015) , and the torture of prisoners and additional extortion of their families in exchange for their release (Townsend, 2022) . In response to Bellingcat's accusations of warcrimes against the group, Rusich responded; “the acts depicted do not constitute a war crime because a) we’re not military and b) we were happy to do it.”. International Relations & Alliances Due to Rusich's apparent objective of creating a network of similarly ideologically motivated individuals/groups, its ties to said individuals/groups are extensive, to say the least. Petrovsky himself has close ties with Soldiers of Odin, a far-right anti-immigration group originally founded in Finland, having participated in their street patrols to 'maintain law and order' around Norway in 2016 (Meduza, 2017) . Rusich, on the whole, regularly provides promotion and raises support for Russian anti-immigration activists through its telegram channel (Rusich Telegram April 2nd 2025) . Militarily, the Rusich group have a range of ties with both government and volunteer/private units. In the context of private bodies, Rusich has close links to Wagner, seemingly operating as a sub-contracting unit in Syria and Ukraine (Sheldon, 2021 and Kozhurin, 2022) , as well as ENOT group, having fought alongside the PMC during the Donbas war (NewsRU, 2017) . In 2016, ENOT and Rusich held a collaborative youth camp which trained Belarusian children in military skills [[Sheldon, 2021]], with this same camp used again in 2022 (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . Rusich has also held youth camps with the support of the private tactical medicine centre known as "Svarog Center", taking photographs with the young men there holding imperialist flags https://t.me/dshrg2/2039 . Outside of these private forces, many Rusich fighters are either active or ex-members of the VDV (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) and GROM (Gonta, 2015) . Milchakov spent time in early 2014 training sabotage detachments of the Pskov airborne division (Gonta, 2015) , most likely to assist Rusich's own guerilla warfare efforts in the Donbas war. These specialised arms of the Russian military seemingly provide a steady stream of highly trained and nationalistic/ideologically dedicated operatives ready for Rusich's recruitment efforts. There also seem to be strangely close ties between Rusich and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (EMERCOM), with the group having regularly used their firing range during training (Rondeaux, Dalton, and Deer, 2022) .  Rusich also has extensive experience collaborating with other volunteer groups. Rusich's collaboration with the Batman Brigade was a key component of the unit's contribution to Russian efforts in the Donbas (Korotkov, 2017) . In the early days of the Donbas war, Rusich also fought alongside the ultra-nationalist group known as the Sparta Battalion (Sheldon, 2022 (Rusich)) . 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Introduction & Overview Colectivos are armed, far-left paramilitary groups that reside in Venezuela’s poorest neighbourhoods and slums. Loyal to the Venezuelan government and the Bolivarian Revolution, they act mainly as government enforcers to maintain order and suppress dissent. Numbered in the hundreds, members of Colectivos are armed, funded directly by the government, and are usually seen travelling on motorcycles in large groups. History & Foundations The Colectivos emerged during a period of armed leftist rebellions against the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt in the 1960s. Some of these groups, like the Tupamaros (named after the former Uruguayan group with the same name), conducted bank robberies and engaged in car theft to fund their activities. Decades later, in 1998, they publicly endorsed Hugo Chavez’s candidacy for presidency (Infobae, 2017a) . Following his election a year later, most of these groups gave up their armed struggle and decided to support the new socialist government (Newman, 2019) . Chavez took advantage of this trend and decided to fund, organize, and arm these groups to protect his revolution and broader political ambitions. Later, these groups came to be referred to as the Bolivarian Circles, which were part of political groups set up by Chavez to garner grassroots support. During the events preceding the April 2002 coup that saw Chavez temporarily removed from power, the groups proved their loyalty to him and his government by engaging in violent acts against anti-government protestors participating in mass worker strikes. During the protests, members of the Bolivarian Circles shot at protestors that were marching towards the presidential palace and later exchanged fire with police officers. The incident resulted in 19 deaths and over a hundred injuries. After the incident, Chavez’s government began to refer to the groups as “Colectivos'' ('collectives' in English) and began the process of legitimisation by including these groups in the political process on a local level (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . This process included the covert arming of the groups with decommissioned and confiscated handguns from military bases by the director of Venezuela’s national intelligence agency (Briceño, 2019) . Following this explicit support and 'normalisation', political attacks grew rampant and violence grew steadily. In 2003, a Colectivo by the name of Coordinadora Simón Bolívar aided the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation (a communist guerrilla group) in a series of coordinated bombing attacks targeting the Spanish and Colombian embassies in Caracas (Medina, 2003) . Years later, in 2008, Colectivos once again participated in a series of coordinated bombings, this time targeting the headquarters of Venezuela’s largest business union, Fedecámaras. The perpetrator, an active member of the Metropolitan Police Department, was the sole victim of the bombing after one of his explosives detonated prematurely. Further blame was placed on a Colectivo called Frente Guerrillero Venceremos, following the discovery of pamphlets belonging to the group at the scene (El Universo, 2008) . A few weeks before this attack, another Colectivo attempted to blow up the George Washington statue in Caracas. The bomb detonated, but only caused minor damage (Infobae, 2017b) . In 2009, several canisters of tear gas were fired at the Vatican’s diplomatic headquarters by a Colectivo in response to them offering asylum to Nixon Moreno, an anti-government protestor accused of attempting to rape a police officer. Colectivo La Piedrita claimed responsibility, leaving pamphlets outside the building accusing the Catholic Church of treason against the Venezuelan people (CNN, 2009) . That same year, the group raided and tear gassed the headquarters of Globovision, a prominent television news network accused by Chavez of inciting violence and conspiring against his government (Reuters, 2009) . Despite the government's support for the Colectivos, this attack drew strong condemnation, leading them to imprison the leader of the group, Lina Ron, for three months. Following the incident, the U.S. embassy in Venezuela suggested to the American government that Lina Ron be added to a list of suspected terrorists for her involvement in the attack (Semana, 2011) . More recently, in 2017, colectivos stormed the National Assembly building armed with firearms and attacked opposition legislators with teargas and pipes, injuring 7 (Ramírez & Rawlins, 2017) . Today, there are hundreds of different Colectivos around the country, with some of the largest and most prominent ones being based in the capital city of Caracas (Infobae, 2017a) . In fact, in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood alone, there are reportedly over 46 different Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Some of the most prominent groups include La Piedrita, Alexis Vive, Los Tupamaros, and la Coordinadora Simón Bolívar. Objectives & Ideology Colectivos are known to be relatively homogeneous ideologically, with all of them uniformly endorsing the current government of Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution. Ideologies may vary on a smaller scale, with different forms or approaches to leftism, but the two major tenets of their beliefs are Bolivarianism (a mix of nationalistic and socialist ideals named after Simon Bolivar) and Chavismo (the socialist ideology of Hugo Chavez). Despite their strong support for the Venezuelan government, some Colectivos reportedly have ill-feelings towards Nicolas Maduro, Chavez’s hand-picked predecessor following his death in 2013. This stems from a variety of issues that include reduced funding, perceived government hostility towards the groups, and the belief that Maduro has corrupted Chavez’s revolution and led the country to deteriorate. Nonetheless, the groups remain loyal to the revolution and government because they prefer it over the pro-capitalist opposition government. However, it is reported that the government has lost control of many of these groups as they refuse to answer to them, instead opting to defend the revolution and government independently and on their own terms. Overall, the group's main objectives are to 'protect' (as they view it) Venezuela from foreign intervention and to uphold Chavez’s legacy and revolution. On the local level, the groups serve as security in certain neighbourhoods and are known to conduct a wide array of community service. Among these are after-school programs, sports events, and drug rehabilitation programs (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . This is notably the case following Chavez’s dissolution of the Metropolitan Police in 2011, as security in certain neighborhoods was turned over to the Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . To this day, police rarely enter or patrol these areas, often allowing the groups to govern themselves. One of these neighbourhoods is the 23 de Enero neighbourhood in Caracas, which is regarded as a hotbed for the armed groups. Here, Colectivos impose roadblocks to tax vehicles, controlling movement into the neighbourhood while also reportedly imposing protection taxes on residents. The groups also claim to combat crime, regularly executing drug dealers and thieves (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . However, despite the groups' alleged involvement in fighting crime and curbing the local drug trade, Colectivos have long been accused of trafficking both drugs and weapons, as well as participating in organized crime, a claim that has been reinforced by locals and investigative journalists alike (Briceño, 2019) (Infobae, 2020) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The Colectivos are also used by the government to help administer social programs, ultimately deciding who gets government assistance in certain neighbourhoods. However, the groups have often been accused of stealing medicine and food rations from these programs to sell on the black market. They have also been accused of using aid programs to discriminate politically, with residents of one neighborhood complaining that Colectivos would threaten to shoot and refuse to give food to those who spoke negatively about the government (Transparencia Venezuela, 2019) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The groups also reportedly provide intelligence and surveillance for the government (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) and patrol polling stations during election seasons, often engaging in threats and violence against voters. These incidents of voter intimidation are not uncommon. In 2021, Colectivos conducted a drive-by shooting on a voting center, killing a young man and injuring two others (Infobae, 2021) . That same day, Colectivos threatened voters and fired their weapons in the air at another voting center close to the site of the first shooting (Monitoreamos, 2021b) . On the national level, the groups are used by the government to stifle dissent, often targeting anti-government protests and members of the opposition. Maduro has publicly called on the groups to maintain order before, most notably during the 2019 electricity blackouts where he asked them to participate in “active resistance”, presumably against saboteurs and rioters (Diario las Américas , 2019) . Colectivos often work as security for public officials, serving as bodyguards for local politicians pertaining to the ruling PSUV party (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) (Gurney, 2014) (Kobelinsky, 2017) . It is also not uncommon for Colectivo members to hold positions in government, especially on the local level. One colectivo group, the ‘Tupamaros’, allegedly had close ties with the former mayor of Caracas, Juan Barreto, who ended up appointing a leader of the group as the city's deputy director of public safety (Gurney, 2014) . Approach to Resistance As previously stated, Colectivos regularly engage in political intimidation, often threatening opposition politicians and their supporters. This is regularly done by sending death threats to protestors to prevent them from taking the streets (Barráez, 2019) . Colectivos are also widely known for disrupting and sabotaging anti-government protests, something which they have admitted they are paid by the government to do (Voz de América, 2018) . The violence caused at these protests is large and indiscriminate, often coming through the form of shooting at protestors. During anti-government protests in 2014, for example, the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) reported that Colectivos were responsible for at least 437 violent attacks on protestors in the first quarter of the year, with most cases resulting in gunshot wounds. One of these attacks resulted in the murder of Genesis Carmona, a young college student and beauty pageant queen. The shooting led to widespread controversy around the country and - despite the government blaming it on the protestors - footage showed government supporters firing a barrage of shots at marchers seconds before Carmona was hit (La Vanguardia, 2014) . Three years later, during widespread anti-government protests that gripped the country, Colectivos killed 27 protestors and engaged in kidnapping and arbitrary arrests, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Following these incidents, the European Parliament asked the Venezuelan government to “immediately disarm and dissolve all uncontrolled armed pro-government groups and end their impunity" (European Parliament, 2014) . Venezuela's National Assembly followed suit a few years later, declaring their actions as “state terrorism” (Europa Press, 2019) . In 2018, the groups once again made national headlines after they shot at interim President Juan Guiado and his supporters at an opposition rally. The armed men later attacked journalists and stole one of the cars used to transport Guiado and his aides (Meléndez, 2020) (Reuters, 2020) . Two years later, in 2021, the Colectivos were believed to be behind an assault on the campaign center of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), a coalition of opposition parties, that left a legislator badly beaten (Monitoreamos, 2021a) . In 2022, several female students reported that Colectivos had grabbed them and ripped their fingernails out during protests at the University of the Andes in Merida state. The protests had been surrounding Diosdado Cabello’s visit to the university, a high ranking Venezuelan politician and one of Maduro’s closest associates (NTN24, 2022) . This attack was not an isolated incident, however, as Colectivos have repeatedly targeted university students in the past. Seven years prior, colectivos stormed the same university, firing shots at students and assaulting them (Diario las Américas, 2015) . While the Colectivos' attacks on anti-government protests are fairly common, their repression of workers on strike such as teachers and doctors has also been well documented. In 2016, Colectivos assaulted and kidnapped doctors who were protesting the dismissal of three of their colleagues for accepting medicinal donations from opposition politicians (Lozada, 2016) . Additionally, in 2023, Colectivos threatened and shot at teachers who were protesting for better salaries around the country (NTN24, 2023) (Barráez, 2019) . Their attacks on journalists have also been widely reported, notably in 2020 when Colectivos assaulted and robbed journalists covering the arrival of opposition leader Juan Guaido outside of the Simon Bolivar International Airport, near Caracas. Journalists present at the airport reported that police watched the incident take place, but did not intervene (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020) . Prior to that, in 2012, Colectivos shot up an opposition rally being attended by presidential candidate Henrique Caprilles and then proceeded to attack and rob several journalists at gunpoint (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012) . In 2021, men and women allegedly pertaining to local Colectivos were caught on video touring an occupied apartment building accompanied by officials from the Ministry of Housing. According to building residents, they were attempting to break into empty apartments with the intention of occupying them (800Noticias, 2021) . InSight Crime reports that these instances of illegal seizures of property are not uncommon, as many buildings and businesses that were temporarily shut down due to COVID around Venezuela were later occupied by Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2021) . UPDATES: During Venezuela's October 2023 opposition primaries, a voting center was teargassed (Meza, 2023) , and another was threatened, prompting officials to change locations (Alcalde, 2023) . The armed theft of electoral material was also reported at another voting center (Maduradas, 2023) . Colectivos were suspected to be responsible. Numerous unconfirmed videos of colectivos harassing voters around the country, some with firearms, have spread throughout social media. In February 2024, Colectivos blocked roads in the Petare neighbourhood of Caracas to demand that Police release detained members of the group that had been arrested on a variety of criminal charges. Armed with firearms, Colectivo members forced bus drivers to park their buses diagonally on the road, blocking the flow of traffic. They also threatened a garbage truck into emptying its contents, which they lit on fire, in front of the police station (Hernández, 2024). In July 2024, during Venezuela's presidential election day, several reports of Colectivos around the country attacking voting centers arose. In Táchira, a man was pronounced dead after a shooting outside of a voting center reportedly carried out by Colectivos (El Nuevo Siglo, 2024) . It was also reported that Colectivos assaulted several people and stole a media outlet's camera at a voting center in a school in Caracas (Hernández, 2024) . Dozens of other unconfirmed reports have since spread through social media platforms such as Telegram and X, showing masked men on motorcycles driving past voting centers and allegedly assaulting electoral witnesses. Following the release of election results declaring Maduro as the winner, mass protests erupted claiming electoral fraud. Reports of rampant mass violence by Colectivos in these protests were widespread and well documented. Videos of weapon-clad Colectivo members threatening protestors have gone viral, and reports of several beatings and shooting deaths have also been reported (Lozano, 2024) . In January 2025, in the days during and leading up to Maduro's controversial re-inauguration on the 10th, Colectivos were seen mobilising around the country to counter the expected presence of protestors. Colectivo leaders ordered mass mobilization, with many seen accompanying state security forces near expected anti-government rally spots. The president of a Colectivo in Apure state for example, ordered mandatory mobilization for all group members on the 10th, offering 10 liters of fuel per member and claiming that it was a direct order from President Maduro to "mobilize 10,000 motorcycles" in the region (Barráez, 2025) . Despite this however, there were reports of discontent among Colectivos with many groups having abandoned the government and refusing calls to mobilize. These reports stemmed from the absence of several Colectivos in meetings regarding mobilization efforts on the presdiential inauguration date, with only three of the dozens of groups in Caracas attending (Barráez, 2025) . Military Capabilities The colectivos are known to be extremely well armed and possess a variety of weapons, many of which they flaunt at protests and on social media. On top of their access to rifles such as FALs, AKs, and AR-15s, they are also known to be in possession of other firearms such as shotguns, submachine guns and handguns, as well as tear gas and grenades. The groups obtain these weapons through funds provided by the government, on the black market, or from working security for government officials (Gurney, 2014) . It is also not uncommon to see them openly brandish and carry firearms in day to day life, despite firearm ownership being illegal and punishable by up to 20 years in Venezuela (Infobae, 2017a) (BBC, 2014) . Moreover, it is important to note that, while not all Colectivos are armed equally or have access to the same firepower, most are at the minimum equipped with pistols (Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela, 2019) . Political Alliances & Opposition Venezuela’s Colectivos have been heavily influenced by Iran’s civilian Basij paramilitary force. In 2009, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, and then-Iranian defence minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, visited president Hugo Chavez in Caracas. Allegedly, Naqdi, who would later become the commander of the Basij, served as an advisor aiding in the training of Venezuela's own civilian militias, the Colectivos (Humire, 2015) . The groups have maintained somewhat close ties with Venezuelan security forces, with many members having received prior training from police (Torres & Casey, 2017) . Colectivos can often be seen working alongside law enforcement to conduct raids and provide security (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) . The most notable occurrence of this was when colectivo members participated in the 2018 operation to kill rebel commander Oscar Perez alongside Venezuelan troops and state security forces (Fiorella & Leroy, 2018) . One Colectivo, called ‘Tres Raíces’, even has several of its members serving in the country’s National Intelligence Service and local police. This has often allowed them to evade justice and prosecution for murders and kidnappings that members of the group have been linked to (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Due to these close ties with the government and national security forces, the groups are able to operate with impunity. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, police once left a protest when Colectivos arrived and refused to help those that the group attacked. The British Embassy in Caracas also reported that the members of the group are rarely arrested for breaking the law, and if they are, they are almost immediately let go (Transparencia Venezuela, 2020) . In 2018, members of the Colectivo ‘La Piedrita’ participated in military exercises alongside Venezuelan troops. They openly brandished firearms and their leader, Valentin Santana, met with several government officials and high ranking members of the military, despite having two active arrest warrants for homicide (Meléndez, 2018) . Despite this, however, the relationship between Colectivos and police is not always positive, and clashes between them have occurred on more than one instance, often due to animosity between both groups over who holds rightful authority. This stems from the fact that security forces are barred from entering certain neighborhoods by Colectivos, instead being forced to cooperate with them in order to enter these areas. In 2014, a gunfight between Venezuelan police and members of the Colectivos ‘5 de Marzo’ and ‘Escudo de la Revolución’ resulted in five dead Colectivo members (Pachico, 2014) . That same year, security forces killed the leader of the ‘5 de Marzo’ Colectivo, who happened to be a former police officer (Rísquez, 2018) . The Colectivos are also known to sometimes clash with each other over territory and drug routes (Infobae, 2017a) . In 2008, it was revealed that several Colectivos from Caracas had been in contact with the FARC, a communist guerrilla group based in Colombia, and had received training from them (Stone, 2011) . In regards to the group's funding, the government's initial payments to the Colectivos came through the form of slush funds and direct payment from politicians to members of the group. Nowadays, Colectivos are often paid with food and supplies rather than money (Gurney, 2014) . While most Colectivos were originally reliant on this government funding, budget cuts have meant that many groups have had to rely on other means to obtain funds, both through legal and illegal means (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . One Colectivo, for instance, runs an official bodyguard service while others run casinos and various small businesses (Rísquez, 2018) . The groups are also known to control illegal gold mines around the country and allegedly tax miners and local communities (Rendon et al., 2020) . Drug and weapons trafficking is also common, from which a sizable portion of their income is believed to derive from (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Works cited (APA-style) 800Noticias. (2021, January 9). +video: Colectivos Intentaron Invadir un edificio en el recreo . https://800noticias.com/video-colectivos-intentaron-invadir-un-edificio-en-el-recreo Alcalde, C. (2023, October 23). 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Quiénes son y cómo operan los colectivos chavistas, El Grupo de Choque de Nicolás Maduro . infobae. https://www.infobae.com/america/venezuela/2017/04/23/domingo-quienes-son-y-como-operan-los-colectivos-chavistas-el-grupo-de-choque-de-nicolas-maduro/?outputType=amp-type La Vanguardia. (2014, February 20). Muere la miss Herida de Bala en las protestas de venezuela . https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20140219/54402350627/confirman-muerte-de-reina-de-belleza-herida-de-bala-en-protestas-en-venezuela.html?facet=amp Lozano, D. (2024, July 30). Al Menos 12 muertos en Venezuela por la represi . ELMUNDO. https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2024/07/30/66a81395e85eceeb188b459c.html Lozada, M. (2016, October 17). Colectivos golpean a médicos durante protesta en hospital central de Maracay . Efecto Cocuyo. https://efectococuyo.com/salud/colectivos-golpean-a-medicos-durante-protesta-en-hospital-central-de-maracay/ Maduradas. (2023, October 22). 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Insurgency Overview The Arakan Army (AA), also known as the Arakha Army, is an ethnic armed organization (EAO) based in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Formed in 2009 and led by General Twan Mrat Naing, the Army is predominantly made up of ethnic Rakhine. As a member of the government-aligned Northern Alliance, it has played a major role in the ongoing Myanmar Civil War and is one of the country’s largest EAOs with over 15,000 troops. It controls the entirety of the Rakhine State along the country’s western coast and parts of Chin State to its north. Along with its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), the Army seeks self-determination for the Rakhine people by increasing federal autonomy within Myanmar. It has been accused of atrocities and war crimes, particularly against Rohingya Muslims, who are a minority in Rakhine State (1) . AA troops capturing the Tatmadaw’s Western Regional Military Command in September 2024. History & Foundations Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, Myanmar has been a hotbed for various insurgent groups and ethnic armed organizations, groups formed by the country’s numerous ethnic minorities to fight for increased sovereignty. In 1962, General Ne Win established an oppressive military dictatorship that would rule the country in various forms until 2011. Secessionist sentiment began to grow amongst the Rakhine people living in what was then known as Arakan State, one of the poorest regions in Myanmar, as they watched other EAOs wage low-level insurgencies during this period. They began to form their own EAOs, including the Arakan Liberation Party and the Arakan Independence Army. In 1989, the junta changed place names across the country to replace those created by the British. Burma was renamed Myanmar and Arakan State was renamed Rakhine (2) . On April 10, 2009, the Arakan Army was formed. Initially based out of the northern Kachin State, the Army created a headquarters and began to train its forces with the help of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). It started out with a mere 27 soldiers (2) . Its first combat engagement was in 2011 when fighting between the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, and the KIA, a regional EAO, broke out over control of key territory where the government planned to build hydroelectric dams. The Arakan Army took up arms alongside the KIA. Earlier that year, the military junta was dissolved and a civilian government took its place. Led by former Tatmadaw general Thein Sein, the government began to gradually implement reforms and increase freedoms (3) . Eventually, the Army was able to relocate to Rakhine State in 2014 and began its own campaign against the Tatmadaw a year later. By this point, it had expanded to 1,500 troops (4) . In 2016, it formed the Northern Alliance, along with the KIA and several other EAOs, as a coalition to fight against the Tatmadaw. From 2015 to 2018, the AA engaged the Tatmadaw in a series of intermittent clashes in northern Rakhine State and neighboring Chin State (5) . In January 2019, the AA attacked several police posts near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. During the raids, the Army killed 13 police officers and captured two border posts. The Tatmadaw responded with increased deployments and operations against the AA in the area (6) . What followed over the next two years was the most intense period of fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA up until that point. While the AA continued to attack Tatmadaw and police outposts, the military carried out regular strikes on AA positions. The conflict resulted in the displacement of thousands of civilians (7) . During the conflict, the AA and two other members of the Northern Alliance, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance was formed because, at the time, the KIA was in peace talks with the government while the rest of the Northern Alliance continued their fight (5) . In November 2020, the Tatmadaw and the AA brokered a ceasefire once the Army had managed to solidify control of most of northern Rakhine State and began to autonomously administer the area without the presence of the central government (8) . In February 2021, after a decade of democracy, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by then-leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the year, discontent began to rise. The junta brutally cracked down on protesters, empowering EAOs and the exiled civilian government to take up arms against the Tatmadaw. By the end of 2021, the country was embroiled in an all-out civil war. The existing ceasefire between the AA and the Tatmadaw soon fell apart and renewed fighting began in July 2022 after the Tatmadaw ordered an airstrike on an AA base in Karen State, killing six AA soldiers (9) . This time, however, things were different. The Tatmadaw was in a tough position, being under attack from numerous EAOs and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed forces of the exiled civilian National Unity Government. Despite the AA’s hostile relationship with the previous government, it found itself in a de facto alliance with the PDF. After a few months of fighting in the familiar northern Rakhine State and southwestern Chin State, the AA and Tatmadaw came to yet another tedious and short-lived ceasefire in November 2022 (1) . This ceasefire was broken with the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023, a joint operation carried out by the Northern Alliance along with several other EAOs and paramilitaries. The operation was the Alliance’s most coordinated offensive to date, starting with attacks on Tatmadaw positions in Kachin and Shan state along the Myanmar-China border, in which the AA participated. The AA started its own offensive in Rakhine State the next month, leaving the Tatmadaw overextended (10) . Junta forces responded with indiscriminate strikes on rebel-controlled areas. In May 2024, the Tatmadaw and allied militias massacred 76 villagers alleged to have ties to the AA in the village of Byian Phyu. Before being killed, many were tortured and raped while Tatmadaw forces burnt down most of the village (11) . Throughout 2024, the Army launched its first major offensives in the southern portion of the state. The AA captured the Tatmadaw’s Western Command headquarters, its major military headquarters for the region, after four months of fighting. This was a major blow for the junta (12) . By December 2024, the AA had consolidated control of the entirety of mainland Rakhine State, while its allies in Operation 1027 had also seen major territorial gains. In early 2025, the AA extended its operations into neighboring regions, capturing multiple junta bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady. These actions have positioned the AA as a dominant force in western Myanmar, seriously threatening the Tatmadaw’s authority (14) . Meanwhile, the AA were fighting a very different enemy. The Rohingya are an ethnic group who are also predominantly from Rakhine State, where they are a majority in the northern region where the Army’s power is concentrated. The Rohingya have long been an extremely persecuted minority in Myanmar. They are not granted citizenship, thus making them a stateless people, and their rights are heavily restricted (14) . Sectarian violence between the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhine exploded in 2016 after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) began its insurgency against the Tatmadaw. Following its attacks on border posts, the Tatmadaw began to indiscriminately attack Rohingya villages. Many human rights violations were committed by the military, such as the destruction of households, rapes, extrajudicial killings, and other acts of violence that have left hundreds of thousands of Rohingya displaced (15) . In recent years, the AA has committed numerous atrocities against Rohingya civilians under the justification of alleged ties to insurgent groups such as the ARSA, who the AA alleges have collaborated with the junta (16) . The Army is alleged to have killed thousands of Rohingya and displaced many more. Dozens of Rohingya villages were burned down by the AA in 2024 (17) . In one incident in August 2024, over 150 Rohingya were killed by AA drone and artillery strikes while fleeing the war near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, which the AA denies (18) . March 2025 ARSA engagement against the AA. Objectives & Ideology Besides seeking Arakan sovereignty, the Arakan Army is not particularly ideologically motivated. The Army is not secessionist; it seeks to obtain more autonomy for Rakhine State within Myanmar. It calls this ideology “the Way of the Rakhita.” Similar to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), it has begun to set up its own administration and public works in Rakhine State. While the AA has been successful in capturing and controlling a large swath of territory, it is unclear whether it could maintain a semi-autonomous state in the absence of conflict (2) . Early in its existence, the AA espoused Rakhine nationalism, but it has changed its tune in recent years. While the Army is largely made of ethnic Rakhine and exists to further their interests, it uses the name Arakan instead of Rakhine to represent all of the people living in Rakhine State, formerly known as Arakan State, instead of just the Rakhine (19) . This differentiates the AA from other EAOs, as many are explicitly nationalist and fight along ethnic lines. That being said, the AA’s complicated relationship with Rakhine’s Rohingya population calls their claims of tolerance into question. While the organization alleges to have begun a process of reconciliation with the Rohingya, many are skeptical of its intentions, given past atrocities (20) . Political & Military Capabilities The Arakan Army controls tens of thousands of square kilometers in and around Rakhine State and has managed to administer its territory independently of the central government since 2020. This is done through the ULA. Before the conflict, Rakhine State had a population of over three million, most of whom are ethnically Rakhine with a significant Rohingya minority (8) . Along with the KIA and the UWSA, the AA is one of the largest EAOs operating in Myanmar. While it claims to have over 30,000 troops, the real number is likely between 15,000 to 20,000 (21, 22) . Many of its soldiers are young men in their 20s, though it has recruited many women as well (7) . The Army is well-trained and heavily armed, receiving training and equipment from other more seasoned EAOs such as the KIA and the UWSA. It has acquired small arms such as various AK-pattern rifles from its allies and captured larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles, from the Tatmadaw (23) . AA troops smoking in a muddy trench. Approach to Resistance The Army employs a mix of guerrilla warfare and conventional assaults against the Tatmadaw. Initially relying on hit-and-run tactics and ambushes in periodic skirmishes, it has transitioned to prolonged sieges and urban warfare, successfully capturing many towns and military bases. Over the course of the ongoing civil war, the AA has managed to take control of trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw. It has leveraged strategic ceasefires and alliances to its advantage, allowing it to consolidate its power and coordinate large-scale offensives (1) . Multi-front attacks like Operation 1027 have been effective because while the AA and its allies fight from their strongholds, the Tatmadaw is stretched far across the country (10) . The AA has been accused of numerous war crimes against Rohingya civilians and Tatmadaw soldiers. In its defense, the group claims that these are the actions of individual soldiers and are not ordered by the Army’s leadership (4) . Relations & Alliances The AA has received support from the neighbouring Indian and Chinese governments, with the intention of protecting these countries’ significant investments in Myanmar. Indian government officials allegedly met with AA leaders in late 2024, despite the past targeting of Indian infrastructure projects in Myanmar including roads and ports (24) . Meanwhile, China has allegedly supplied the AA with arms, a claim that Chinese officials deny (23) . Part of the stated goal of Operation 1027 has been to root out illegal gambling operations and scam centres along the China-Myanmar border. Typically, China has not allowed significant military action from EAOs along its border, but because of the benefit to Chinese security, it is alleged that the operation has received approval from Chinese officials (10) . On the other hand, the AA’s relationship with Bangladesh, which its territory borders, is much more strained. While both parties have expressed their intentions to maintain positive diplomatic relations, AA troops have attacked Bangladesh border guards (25) . The displacement of Rohingya who have largely fled to Bangladesh has also put stress on the relationship (21) . The AA has forged connections with other EAOs involved in the civil war, most notably as a part of the Three Brotherhood and Northern Alliances. While not formally aligned with the National Unity Government, the two organizations have found themselves in a de facto alliance against the Tatmadaw, and the portions of their territories that border each other have been peaceful. Recently, the NUG and AA have begun to normalize their relations (26) . The AA has also received material support from the UWSA, which is not directly active in the civil war. The AA seeks to establish a similar arrangement to the self-administered zone controlled by the UWSA in Wa State (5) . Meanwhile, the AA has intermittently clashed with Rohingya insurgent groups. It claims that Rohingya insurgent groups, including the ARSA, RSO, and Arakan Rohingya Army, fight alongside the Tatmadaw. The conflict between the groups has fueled the anti-Rohingya violence perpetuated by the AA (20) . Works Cited (1) Hlaing, K. H. (2023, April 21). Understanding the Arakan Army. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2023/understanding-the-arakan-army/ (2) Linn, K. (2019, February 28). ‘Way of Rakhita’: dream or nightmare? Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/way-of-rakhita-dream-or-nightmare/# (3) Human Rights Watch (2012, March 20). “Untold Miseries”: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/03/20/untold-miseries/wartime-abuses-and-forced-displacement-burmas-kachin-state (4) Mathieson, D. (2017, June 11). Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2017/06/shadowy-rebels-extend-myanmars-wars/ (5) Bynum, E. (2020, February 12). Dueling Ceasefires: Myanmar’s Conflict Landscape in 2019. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. https://acleddata.com/2020/02/12/dueling-ceasefires-myanmars-conflict-landscape-in-2019/ (6) The Irrawaddy (2019, January 8). President Convenes Top-Level Security Meeting in Wake of AA Attacks. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/president-convenes-top-level-security-meeting-wake-aa-attacks.html (7) Anonymous (2020, November 18). Why more women are joining Myanmar’s Arakan Army insurgency. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/18/myanmar-women-army-arakan-rakhine-female-soldiers-peace (8) Bhattacharyya, R. (2024, December 28). 5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/5-factors-that-catapulted-arakan-army-to-unprecedented-success-against-the-myanmar-military/ (9) Hlaing, K. H. (2022, October 3). Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Return to War on the Military. United States Institute for Peace. https://web.archive.org/web/20231129000026/https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/insurgents-myanmars-rakhine-state-return-war-military (10) Head, J. and Luo, L. (2023, November 9). A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67305690 (11) Wei, B. (2024, June 4). Arakan Army: Myanmar Junta Killed 76 in Village Massacre. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arakan-army-myanmar-junta-killed-76-in-village-massacre.html (12) The Guardian (2024, December 21). 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Myanmar: Armies Target Ethnic Rohingya, Rakhine. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/12/myanmar-armies-target-ethnic-rohingya-rakhine (18) Peck, G. (2024, August 10). Ethnic armed group suspected of deadly attack in Myanmar on Rohingya trying to flee fighting. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/rohingya-rakhine-maungdaw-bangladesh-refugees-edb7b9df01ae4c20795c9c149c9bbcc0?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share (19) Narinjara News (2024, April 12). Rebranding Arakan Army to represent all people in Rakhine State: AA spokesperson. https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/66195139a777fb8405e3315b (20) Bhattacharyta, R. (2024, October 30). Rohingya Community Is Divided Over Arakan Army’s Plan for ‘Inclusive Administration’. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/rohingya-community-is-divided-over-arakan-armys-plan-for-inclusive-administration/ (21) Davis, A. (2024, February 1). Myanmar junta in a make-or-break Rakhine fight. 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