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Insurgency Overview The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) is one of the many ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) engaged in the ongoing Myanmar civil war. Primarily active in western Myanmar’s Rakhine State, the group was formed in 2013 by its leader, Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, in reaction to the widespread persecution of the Rohingya people (1) . The ARSA is aligned with the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s ruling military junta, along with the Four Brothers Alliance, made up of the ARSA and other Rohingya EAOs (2) . The group aims to achieve self-determination for the Rohingya people through separatism, and despite declaring itself as secular, it has been accused of Islamist and Jihadist practices (3) . Currently, its leadership is based out of Bangladesh and Saudi Arabia (4) . While many of the EAOs involved in the civil war are well armed and have a formal paramilitary structure, the ARSA is distinct in that it is a poorly equipped informal militia. Due to its limited capacity for conventional tactics commonly used by other EAOs, its attacks are characterised by guerrilla warfare. The ARSA has been accused of various atrocities and war crimes, as well as enforcing traditional Islamic practices through force (3) . History & Foundations The Rohingya people, who hail from Rakhine State and practice Islam, are one of the world’s largest stateless people and face extreme persecution in Myanmar. Since the independence of Myanmar, then known as Burma, from the British Empire in 1948, the Rohingya have been deprived of their rights and subjected to numerous atrocities. In 1978, the ruling military junta confiscated the identification cards of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya and expelled them to Bangladesh. They were eventually allowed to return, but were subsequently considered Bangladeshi. The Rohingya became stateless in 1982 after a citizenship law was passed that recognised Myanmar’s many ethnic minorities. However, the Rohingya were left off this list. This paved the way for further persecution, with many cases of ethnic cleansing, pogroms, religious persecution, sexual violence, forced labour, and forced displacement in the following decades. This precipitated a refugee crisis in which most of the Rohingya population has been displaced (1) . There are long-lasting ethnic tensions in Rakhine State between the Rohingya, the majority in the north of the region, and the Buddhist Rakhine people. They came to a head in 2012 during a series of riots in response to the rape and murder of a Rakhine woman, allegedly perpetrated by Rohingya youth. Over the course of the riots, roughly 200 people were killed, and over 100,000 Rohingya were forcefully displaced (5) . In reaction to the riots, Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi, a Pakistan-born Rohingya imam, drew on the heightened tensions caused by the riots to begin recruiting for an armed group known as Harakah al-Yaqin. This group later became the ARSA (3) . Jununi spent the next three years recruiting and training members ahead of the launch of its armed campaign in 2016. The first major action of its campaign were raids on three police posts in October of that year. The ARSA looted weapons and equipment and killed nine police officers in the process. In response, the Tatmadaw furthered its persecution of the Rohingya, regardless of their affiliation with the ARSA, forcing another 90,000 Rohingya into displacement. Officials labelled the ARSA as terrorists and claimed that it was affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, an allegation that the ARSA denies (1) . These attacks coincided with the formation of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, an international commission led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The commission was established to produce a report analysing the human rights of both the Rohingya and Buddhist Rakhine in the region. All parties involved expected that the release of the report would heavily condemn the conditions of the Rohingya and put international pressure on the Tatmadaw and government to curtail human rights abuses. This was understood by the Rakhine people to constitute interference in their local affairs (3) . Harakah al-Yaqin was renamed to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in March 2017. More violence came that year when, expecting incoming international attention from the report, the ARSA preemptively attacked military and police facilities. The ARSA believed that the Tatmadaw cracked down on the Rohingya once again ahead of the report, so the organisation thought to get ahead of the military by launching its own offensive. The ARSA attacked over 20 police posts and an army base in the Maungdaw area in the western corner of Rakhine State on August 25. During the operation, 12 members of the police and Tatmadaw were killed, while the ARSA lost 77 insurgents (6) . Simultaneously, the ARSA carried out the Kha Maung Seik massacre, in which Hindus in nearby villages were taken hostage and killed. There were 99 victims. The Tatmadaw responded with an operation attempting to root out the ARSA in the region, in the process assaulting many civilians not affiliated with the group. This prompted 700,000 Rohingya to flee the country (7) . After two years of sporadic attacks, the ARSA regrouped in 2020 in Maungdaw. The timing was advantageous for the ARSA, as in February 2021, the Tatmadaw would launch a coup d'état against the democratically elected civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. The country soon after erupted into a civil war between the military, the government-in-exile, known as the National Unity Government (NUG), and its paramilitary branch, the People’s Defence Force (PDF), with allied EAOs on both sides. The ARSA found itself stuck in the middle, primarily fighting against the Tatmadaw and the NUG-aligned Arakan Army. In November of that year, renewed clashes between the ARSA and Tatmadaw broke out in Maungdaw (8) . Meanwhile, Rohingya human rights activist Mohib Ullah was assassinated by the ARSA in the Kutupalong refugee camp. The camp, located in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, is the largest refugee camp in the world, and most of its population of nearly 700,000 are Rohingya. The ARSA has a presence in Kutupalong and other camps like it in the region. Ullah led the Arakan Rohingya Society for Peace and Human Rights, which the ARSA saw as a threat to its power and thus had him killed, as alleged by Bangladeshi law enforcement (5) . In 2022, Bangladeshi police cracked down on the ARSA, arresting over 800 individuals connected to the group. Three of those individuals were high-ranking members arrested in a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar. These were Abu Bakkar, an ARSA camp leader, Syedul Amin, a gun runner, and Nur Mohammad, a chairman of the group’s fatwa committee (9) . In early 2023, the ARSA clashed with the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), a rival group, in the Konarpara Refugee Camp near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. The RSO attacked an ARSA meeting, and a gunfight broke out, killing one RSO man (10) . The ARSA allegedly killed Kutupalong refugee camp warden Mohammad Ebadullah on July 6, 2023, as he was collecting witnesses to testify to an International Criminal Court prosecutor. More clashes between the ARSA and RSO immediately followed, with six combatants killed the following day (11) . The ARSA failed to advance into AA territory in the Mayu mountains of northern Rakhine state later that month. In return, the AA seized an ARSA outpost (12) . As tensions between the ARSA and the AA rose, the ARSA began to collaborate with the Tatmadaw. The ARSA has been reported to force young men to join the Tatmadaw (2) . In March 2025, Bangladeshi counterterrorism officers arrested leader Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi along with nine others affiliated with the ARSA near the capital Dhaka, seizing a significant amount of money in the process. Jununi was charged with murder, illegal entry, sabotage, and militant activities (13) . Maulana Borhan, the ARSA’s chief spokesperson, took charge following Jununi’s arrest (5) . Objectives & Ideology According to the ARSA, the organisation’s primary goal is to defend the persecuted Rohingya and restore their basic rights that have been taken away by Myanmar’s government. While the ARSA claims to be secular and not affiliated with foreign Islamist groups and finance networks, this claim has been disputed by law enforcement officials in Myanmar and Bangladesh (3) . Furthermore, it has been known to enforce traditional Islamic values and practices through force, going as far as to forcefully convert Hindu captives in at least one instance (7) . However, there is little evidence to suggest international funding, especially given the group’s limited access to sophisticated weapons and equipment. Framing the Rohingya as Islamist terrorists is also a tactic that has long been used by Myanmar government officials to spread fear of the Rohingya and delegitimise their political goals (1, 4) . Political & Military Capabilities The ARSA does not control significant amounts of territory and instead acts from clandestine camps in rural areas. Therefore, it does not have a role in any political administration, unlike other EAOs. It is particularly present in the Maungdaw region of western Rakhine State, as well as in refugee camps in Bangladesh with a significant Rohingya population, such as Kutupalong and Konarpara. In these camps they do hold some power as one faction vying for power in a chaotic environment. These camps also serve as recruiting grounds for the ARSA. ARSA members are very poorly armed. While the organisation has access to some firearms, some of which have been captured from the Tatmadaw and other targets, fighters have been known to often use melee weapons such as swords and machetes. As of March 2024, the ARSA is estimated to have 5,000 fighters in its ranks (5) . Approach to Resistance Because the ARSA does not have the means to hold territory and fight a conventional war in comparison to its state and non-state opponents, it opts instead for guerilla tactics that allow its fighters to attack their targets and quickly retreat before its opponents have a chance to mount a counter-attack. This is seen in the cross-border attacks the ARSA employs, where its fighters will attack a target in Rakhine State before crossing back to Bangladesh, where they are sheltered by sympathetic locals. The ARSA is also known to force civilians to participate in their attacks in order to bolster their numbers (3) . While many of Myanmar’s ethnic nationalist movements have gained legitimate political representation despite their militancy and even degrees of sovereignty, such as in Wa State, the Rohingya have been deprived of any role in the country’s government. This has been one driving factor in the rise in militancy within the larger Rohingya political movement. The ARSA is alleged to have committed a number of atrocities and human rights abuses, including the Kha Maung Seik massacre and forced conversions. According to the United Nations, the ARSA has recruited 150 child soldiers in conjunction with the Tatmadaw (14) . Relations & Alliances In early 2025, the Four Brothers Alliance was formed. Comprising the ARSA, the RSO, the Arakan Rohingya Army, and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, the Alliance is a coalition of former rival organisations that have united to achieve their common goals of Rohingya self-determination and countering the Arakan Army. The Alliance is alleged to have ties with the Tatmadaw and to enforce conscription in Rohingya-populated refugee camps (2) . The ARSA has had a very contradictory relationship with the Tatmadaw. While the two were extremely hostile until 2023, and the ARSA initially aligned itself with the exiled National Unity Government following the outbreak of the civil war, the ARSA formed an alliance with the Tatmadaw following increased clashes between the ARSA and the AA (8) . The AA is one of the largest and most powerful factions fighting against the Tatmadaw in the civil war and poses a major threat to both the ARSA and the Tatmadaw. Despite their past hostility to one another and the Tatmadaw’s major role in the persecution of Rohingya, this is a strategic alliance, as the AA has come to control much of Rakhine State, including the western region where the ARSA’s actions are concentrated (8) . The AA has also targeted the Rohingya under the guise of affiliation with the ARSA and other Rohingya militant groups. This has led to the death and displacement of thousands of Rohingya, further exacerbating the crisis (15) . With its presence in refugee camps within Bangladesh and attacks across the Bangladesh-Myanmar border, the ARSA is a major problem for Bangladeshi security forces. Bangladesh hosts over a million Rohingya refugees and is bearing the brunt of the humanitarian crisis. While Bangladeshi security forces have not engaged in combat with the ARSA, they have instituted several crackdowns on the ARSA and arrested many leading members (9) . Bibliography (1) Lee, R. (2021). Myanmar’s Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA): An Analysis of a New Muslim Militant Group and its Strategic Communications. Perspectives on Terrorism, 15 (6), 61-75. https://pt.icct.nl/sites/default/files/2023-04/Article%204_12.pdf   (2) Rahman, S. (2025, February 16). Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan   (3) Lintner, B. (2017, September 20). The truth behind Myanmar’s Rohingya insurgency. Asia Times . https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/truth-behind-myanmars-rohingya-insurgency/   (4) Tarabay, J. (2017, December 6). Who are Myanmar’s militants? Five questions about ARSA. CNN . https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/12/asia/arsa-rohingya-militants-who-are-they/index.html   (5) Bhattacharya, B. (2025, April 4). Bangladesh: ARSA And Change Of Reign. Eurasia Review . https://www.eurasiareview.com/04042025-bangladesh-arsa-and-change-of-reign-analysis/   (6) Geneva Academy. (2017, December). Myanmar: A Battle For Recognition . https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Myanmar%20A%20Battle%20for%20Recognition.pdf   (7) Amnesty International. (2018, May 22). Myanmar: New evidence reveals Rohingya armed group massacred scores in Rakhine State . https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evidence-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state/   (8) Lipes, J. (2022, January 18). An outlawed group resurfaces, raising new fears of clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-01182022191002.html   (9) Barua, S. (2022, July 19). Bangladesh police arrest ‘most wanted’ ARSA member at Rohingya camp. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/bangladesh-arsa-07192022064545.html   (10) Rahman, A. (2023, January 18). Rohingya settlement on Bangladesh-Myanmar border torched amid fighting. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/rohingaycampfighting-01182023153549.html   (11) Rahman, S. (2023, July 8). Seven Rohingya Refugees Killed in Violence in Bangladesh. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/seven-rohingya-refugees-killed-in-violence-in-bangladesh-/7172474.html   (12) The Irrawaddy. (2023, July 22). Rakhine State Clash Reported Between AA and Rohingya Militants. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rakhine-state-clash-reported-between-aa-and-rohingya-militants.html    (13) MacSwan, A. (2025, March 19). Bangladesh arrests leader of Rohingya insurgent group on criminal charges. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-arrests-leader-rohingya-insurgent-group-criminal-charges-2025-03-19/   (14) United Nations General Assembly Security Council. (2025, June 17). Children and armed conflict.   https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247   (15) International Crisis Group. (2024, August 27). Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State . https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/339-breaking-away-battle-myanmars-rakhine-state

Insurgency Overview The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) is an ethnic armed organisation (EAO) active in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The organisation, composed of Rohingya Muslims, was founded in 1982 with the goal of establishing rights and autonomy for the Rohingya people. It declared a ceasefire in 1998 before resuming its armed campaign in 2021 following the start of the ongoing Myanmar civil war (1) . Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the RSO led a campaign against the Myanmar government as the persecution and displacement of the Rohingya rose (2) . The RSO is currently fighting alongside the military, known as the Tatmadaw, along with other allied Rohingya EAOs, against the Arakan Army (AA), an EAO allied to the exiled National Unity Government (3) . It is also an important force within Bangladesh’s Rohingya-populated refugee camps, where the RSO and other Rohingya EAOs hold significant power and fight for control. It is estimated that the RSO currently has between 3000 and 5000 members (4) . History & Foundations The Rohingya have faced persecution and displacement since Myanmar, then known as Burma, became independent in 1948. Following independence, the Rohingya were considered foreigners and denied citizenship, which led to instances of ethnic cleansing. In response, the Rohingya began to form political and militant organisations to ensure their self-determination, which the government reacted to by launching counterinsurgencies in the 1950s. In 1962, General Ne Win seized power in a military coup and established the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. Upon seizing power, Ne Win and the Tatmadaw began to crack down on Rohingya political organisations (2) . 1964 saw the establishment of the Rohingya Independence Front, a political organisation seeking to create an independent Rohingya state. The group was renamed and restructured multiple times, becoming the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1973. The following year, the Tatmadaw launched Operation Dragon King, with the goal of registering citizens in what is now Rakhine State. However, the Tatmadaw displaced many Rohingya during the operation, resulting in further ethnic cleansing. Over 200,000 Rohingya were forced to flee the country during the operation, creating a humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Bangladesh. Members of organisations such as the RPF were targeted for arrest, leading to tensions within the group (2) . In 1982, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation split off from the RPF. Made up of the RPF’s most hardline Islamist members and led by secretary general Muhammad Yunus, the RSO rose to prominence as the main Rohingya militant organisation and established ties to Islamist groups in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, India, and Malaysia. It was able to source an arsenal of Chinese-produced arms from Thai arms dealers and set up training camps in southeastern Bangladesh, where many Rohingya refugees had fled to from Myanmar (2) . This build up along the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border prompted the Tatmadaw to launch Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation in 1991, an offensive against the RSO. In the process, soldiers also sought to expel Rohingya civilians labelled as foreigners, a common label incorrectly placed on Rohingya. The RSO remained uninhibited, and over 250,000 Rohingya were displaced due to the operation. Additionally, the Tatmadaw accidentally crossed the border and attacked a Bangladeshi military outpost, harming relations between the two countries (2) . In April 1994, nine bombs targeting government buildings went off in Maungdaw township. Although no one was killed, the Tatmadaw blamed the bombings on the RSO. However, an investigation by the Human Rights Watch alleged that while the RSO had a plan to cross the Myanmar-Bangladeshi border and plant bombs in the township, the unit sent on the bombing mission was caught and killed by the Tatmadaw’s Border Guard Force, with 30 RSO fatalities. This led to a pause in ongoing repatriations of Rohingya refugees while the Tatmadaw interrogated, tortured, and disappeared Rohingya people in Maungdaw township, accused of being affiliated with the RSO (5) . In late 1998, the RSO merged with the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front to create the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation, a political organisation advocating for the rights of the Rohingya. It did have an armed wing, the Rohingya National Army, that waged a brief insurgency in Myanmar. This merger, however, effectively saw the dissolution of the RSO (2). In its wake, the RSO left a power vacuum within the Rohingya political sphere and created room for a new militant organisation to take its place. In 2013, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) was formed. The group launched its armed campaign against the Tatmadaw in 2016, leading to renewed violence in Rohingya-populated regions in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw retaliated against the ARSA with indiscriminate violence and the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya villages, resulting in over 700,000 Rohingya fleeing Myanmar to Bangladesh (6) . In 2021, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by Aung San Suu Kyi in a coup d’état and established a military junta, known as the State Administration Council. Mass anti-junta protests broke out soon after, which were received with violent crackdowns from the Tatmadaw (7) . EAOs across the country increased their own operations in response to the unrest, culminating in the ongoing Myanmar civil war. One of these EAOs was the RSO, which rearmed itself shortly after the coup (8) . This time, the RSO was supported by Bangladesh, whose security forces sought to apply pressure against the Arakan Army, an EAO made up of the predominantly Buddhist Rakhine people and the strongest armed group in Rakhine State (4) . The AA has allegedly carried out atrocities against Rohingya, such as sectarian killings and village burnings. Currently, the AA controls the vast majority of Rakhine State (9) . The RSO’s first operation after its reformation was an assault on a Tatmadaw post in March 2021, killing 22 soldiers. In a statement following the raid, the RSO claimed that it would continue its attacks until they achieved the “freedom of Rakhine” and repatriation of all Rohingya refugees (10) . Meanwhile, the RSO and the ARSA began to vie for power in Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh and in western Rakhine State. Maungdaw Township was a particularly significant region, long being a hotbed of sectarian violence between Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists (8) . Control of refugee camps is strategically important for both organisations as it allows them to launch offensives into Myanmar as well as control extortion rackets for cross-border trade. The ARSA’s reputation as alleged criminals with a practice of human rights abuses led to some Rohingya taking the side of the RSO over the ARSA (11) . January 2023 saw the first instance of open clashes between the RSO and the ARSA when the RSO attacked an ARSA meeting in the Konarpara Refugee Camp, near Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh. One RSO man was killed and the RSO offensive on the area, known as “no man’s land,” led to the clearing of the camps (11, 12) . More fighting between the RSO and the ARSA happened in July 2023 after the ARSA allegedly killed the warden of Kutupalong refugee camp for bringing forth witnesses to an International Criminal Court prosecutor. Clashes between the two groups followed, killing six (13) . In February 2024, the AA and RSO allegedly partook in a joint offensive to drive the Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA) out of a border post located in Dhekibuniya, a village in Rakhine State that it had captured from Myanmar’s Border Guard Police. The ARA were then driven out of Myanmar to Bangladesh by the RSO and AA (14) . In May 2024, the RSO was accused of abducting and forcibly conscripting Rohingya from refugee camps to fight for the Tatmadaw. An RSO spokesperson claimed that they were only taking individuals who had already been trained by the RSO, which some of the families of those abducted denied (15) . The Four Brothers Alliance was formed in early 2025. Made up of the RSO, ARSA, ARA, and the Rohingya Islami Mahaz, another Rohingya Islamist insurgent group, the alliance formed amongst former rivals to counter the dominant AA by fighting alongside the Tatmadaw (16) . Objectives & Ideology The Rohingya Solidarity Organisation advocates first and foremost for Rohingya self-determination. While it is nominally an Islamist group and has been accused of having ties with Al-Qaeda and other hardline foreign Islamist organisations in the past, the group’s goals are not necessarily religious (2) . The RSO claims it strives for a system that allows the Rohingya, as well as the country’s other religious and ethnic minorities, autonomy within the existing state of Myanmar. It is not a separatist organisation and, in principle, seeks to help reestablish democracy in the country. Specifically, the RSO believes in the creation of a Rohingya-majority autonomous region in northern Rakhine State. It also hopes to achieve the enfranchisement of the Rohingya people, prioritizing rights to religious and cultural freedom, education, employment and resources, political participation, and repatriation of refugees (1) . Despite its claims to support the end of the military junta and the reestablishment of a civilian government, the RSO continues to collaborate with the Tatmadaw. While the two former rivals’ relationship is contradictory, the most significant player in Rakhine State at the moment is their common enemy, the Arakan Army. This may have persuaded the RSO to put aside some of their political goals in order to root out the AA, who are seen as posing an existential threat to the Rohingya (17) . Political & Military Capabilities For the Rohingya ethnic armed organisations, control of refugee camps in Bangladesh is very important. Besides their strong military position along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, the camps also serve as prime recruiting grounds and allow the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation and other groups to exert political control over the Rohingya diaspora (11). Bangladeshi authorities have been seen working in collaboration with the RSO within refugee camps, giving the organisation legitimacy (17) . Maintaining a positive opinion amongst the camp’s occupants is also important for the RSO. For this reason, the RSO attempts to present the image of an organised, highly trained, and well-armed fighting force (11) . It is structured as a paramilitary organisation with cadres in various refugee camps and a central leadership. While initially following its rearmament the RSO was viewed positively by some within the Rohingya diaspora due to the ARSA’s reputation for thuggery in refugee camps, the diaspora has recently become more critical of its presence in the camps due to its allegiances and participation in forced recruitment on behalf of the Tatmadaw (15) . The RSO has also been alleged to recruit child soldiers and perform extrajudicial killings, further damaging its reputation (17, 18) . Approach to Resistance Although the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation is not one of Myanmar’s largest or strongest EAOs, with an estimated 3000 to 5000 members, it has been able to effectively utilize its various strategic advantages (4) . A tactic often used by the RSO is to launch offensives into Myanmar from refugee camps in Bangladesh before retreating back into them, where its forces blend in with the local populace and cannot be followed by the Arakan Army, or formerly the Tatmadaw, who have a hostile relationship with Bangladesh. These strikes attack the western flank of AA’s territory, forcing it to divert attention away from the Tatmadaw to its east. Similar to other EAOs active in the civil war, the RSO is typically seen using common light arms such as AK-pattern rifles. While this equipment is not as advanced as what the Tatmadaw and the larger EAOs have access to, these arms are well-suited to the organisation’s fast-moving style of guerrilla warfare and the jungle-filled, mountainous geography of Rakhine State (11) . Relations & Alliances Currently, the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation’s main opponent is the Arakan Army. The AA has been accused of carrying out numerous atrocities against the Rohingya, and it is seen as a significant threat by them. The AA controls and administers most of Rakhine State, making it difficult for the RSO or other Rohingya EAOs to establish a foothold in Myanmar. This also creates a perceived need for groups like the RSO, as there is no presence within Myanmar itself looking out for the Rohingya , given the Tatmadaw and the ARSA’s disregard for their human rights. However, the RSO allegedly approached the AA to form an alliance prior to the establishment of the Four Brothers Alliance, and the two groups did collaborate on an operation against the RSO’s current allies, the Arakan Rohingya Army, in February 2024 (3, 14) . The Alliance was formed by groups that were previously opposed to one another. However, with the AA’s dominance of Rakhine State and the warming of relations between Rohingya EAOs and the Tatmadaw, the rivals came together in order to fight against the stronger AA (16) . While there is much ideological overlap between the Alliance’s members, there are some key differences. The RSO has claimed that the difference between itself and the ARSA is that while the ARSA is made up of ill-equipped thugs, the RSO is a highly trained military force (11) . The groups’ power struggles within refugee camps and collaboration with the junta has also caused strain with the civilian Rohingya population. While the RSO’s current agreement with the Tatmadaw comes after a long period of conflict between the two, it is also a marriage of convenience, as the RSO’s ability to perform guerrilla offensives into AA territory proves to be a thorn in the side of the Army, one of the largest and strongest forces the Tatmadaw is up against in the Civil War. Prior to the formation of the Four Brothers Alliance, the RSO had an informal truce with the Tatmadaw (3) . Bangladesh has been dealing with the Rohingya crisis for decades and houses many large refugee camps populated by Rohingya, hosting over a million refugees (4) . While the conflicts in these camps between Rohingya political groups have been a security issue for Bangladesh, the country has allegedly backed the RSO in order to contain the AA, and its law enforcement agencies have worked with the RSO in refugee camps to control the ARSA (6, 17) . Another motivation for Bangladeshi officials to back the RSO is the repatriation of displaced Rohingya that the organisation hopes to achieve, which would alleviate the refugee crisis in Bangladesh (4) . Bibliography (1) Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (2022). Manifesto of RSO . https://rsomedia.org/manifesto-of-rso/   (2) Lintner, B. (2001). Bangladesh: Extremist Islamist Consolidation. South Asia Terrorism Portal . https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume14/Article1.htm (3) Ghoshal, D. (2024, September 6). On Myanmar’s frontline, Rohingya fighters and junta face a common enemy. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmars-frontline-rohingya-fighters-junta-face-common-enemy-2024-09-06/ (4) Ghoshal, D. and McPherson, P. (2024, November 25). In world’s largest refugee camps, Rohingya mobilise to fight in Myanmar. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/worlds-largest-refugee-camps-rohingya-mobilise-fight-myanmar-2024-11-25/   (5) Human Rights Watch (1996, September 1). Burma: The Rohingya Muslims: Ending a Cycle of Exodus?   https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/1996/en/21956   (6) Bhattacharya, S. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army. Sri Lanka Guardian . https://slguardian.org/bangladesh-change-of-reign-in-arakan-army/   (7) Lipes, J. (2022, January 18). An outlawed group resurfaces, raising new fears of clashes in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Radio Free Asia . https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/arsa-01182022191002.html   (8) The Irrawaddy (2021, September 20). Rohingya Armed Groups Active Again in Western Myanmar. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rohingya-armed-groups-active-again-in-western-myanmar.html#google_vignette (9) Mizzima (2024, February 10). RSO denounces Arakan Army and junta accusations, affirms Rohingya rights. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/10/7035   (10) Alam, S. (2021, March 30). Rohingya militants said to kill 22 Myanmar troops. Anadolu Agency . https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/rohingya-militants-said-to-kill-22-myanmar-troops/2192747   (11) Ahasan, N. (2023, February 2). In Bangladesh’s borderland with Myanmar, 2 Rohingya militant groups fight for dominance. Benar News . https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/rival-groups-02022023135725.html   (12) Smith, B. (2023, 11 December). Competing armed groups pose new threat to Rohingya in Bangladesh . International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://myanmar.iiss.org/analysis/rohingya   (13) Rahman, S. (2023, July 8). Seven Rohingya Refugees Killed in Violence in Bangladesh. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/seven-rohingya-refugees-killed-in-violence-in-bangladesh-/7172474.html   (14) Antu, G. M. (2024, February 10). Bangladeshis fret over unconfirmed return of Rohingya militant Nabi Hossain amid Myanmar conflict. BD News . https://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/6vxbpgnzrl   (15) Rahman, S. (2024, May 17). Rohingya families torn apart by conscription. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/346776/rohingya-families-torn-apart-by-conscription   (16) Rahman, S. (2025, February 16). Dil Mohammed: The smuggler shaping a war in Arakan. Dhaka Tribune . https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/south-asia/373800/dil-mohammed-the-smuggler-shaping-a-war-in-arakan   (17) Fortify Rights (2025, March). “I May Be Killed Any Moment”: Killings, Abductions, Torture, and Other Serious Violations by Rohingya Militant Groups in Bangladesh. https://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/I%20May%20Be%20Killed%20Any%20Moment%20-%20Fortify%20Rights%20Report%20(ENG).pdf   (18) United Nations General Assembly Security Council (2025, June 17). Children and armed conflict.   https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/247

Introduction Yet another movement fomented by the notorious neo-Nazi Tom Metzger, White Aryan Resistance (WAR) capitalised on the rise of racist skinhead culture to quickly garner infamy amongst far-right networks. With activity largely consisting of the distribution of racist ideas using various forms of media, including a television series broadcast across local access cable networks, WAR acted as a conduit and central hub for radicalising young skinheads into racial violence. This radicalising process led to tragedy in November 1988, after three WAR-associated skinheads beat Mulugeta Seraw, an Ethiopian student, to death. This led to the incarceration of the murderers and a lawsuit being levelled against WAR by the Southern Poverty Law Centre on behalf of Seraw’s family. This lawsuit found Metzger at least partially culpable for Seraw’s death and resulted in a $12.5 million fine against Metzger’s estate, essentially gutting WAR. Despite this catastrophic blow against WAR, Metzger continued to use the framework of the movement as a mouthpiece for his racism until his death on the 4th of November, 2020, due to Parkinson's disease. History & Foundations Whilst WAR rapidly gained notoriety throughout the 80s, its founder, Tom Metzger, had already earned a reputation as one of the leaders of racially based hatred in the US. A former member of the anti-communist Minutemen paramilitary group, Metzger joined the KKK in 1975 and was quickly anointed as the grand dragon of the California Knights of the KKK (aka KKKK) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Metzger also had a particular affinity for recruiting younger radicals. Known as the "godfather of the racist skinhead scene" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) , Metzger regularly took young men under his wing and further radicalised them towards racism and neo-Nazism. For example, in 1979, Greg Withrow, a teenager from Northern California, generated controversy through his creation of the "White Students Union" at his high school. Metzger quickly got in contact with Withrow and developed a working relationship with the teenager, with the White Student's Union eventually becoming the Aryan Youth Movement (WAR's youth group) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  Despite this concerted effort to further his career in the racist networks of the US, in 1980, Metzger and the leader of the KKK, David Duke, disagreed, leading to Metzger's separation from the group (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Deciding to take a more traditional tack, Metzger instead ran for the US Congress Democratic primary and surprisingly won, with 33,000 or 27% of the votes; however, he lost badly to the Republican candidate in the general election after being disavowed by the Democratic Party (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Despite this initial loss, in the long term, his run in the primaries solidified him as a key figure in the far right.  Following his loss in the primaries, Metzger moved to leverage his newfound popular support and formed the White American Political Association, intending to push "pro-white" (white supremacist) political candidates. With this new backing, Metzger again attempted to run in the Democratic primary in 1982, but this time lost badly, leading to the ex-KKKK grand dragon returning to non-conventional political approaches (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  Moving away from mainstream politics, Metzger renamed the White American Political Association to the White Aryan Resistance, aka WAR. Using local access cable television, WAR quickly began broadcasting Metzger's racist TV show "Race and Reason", as well as disseminating WAR's monthly tabloid newspaper (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR also ran a telephone hotline which disseminated racist information, and an electronic bulletin board to aid skinheads in finding and communicating with other skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  In September 1986, the Race and Reason TV broadcast garnered controversy after it aired an episode featuring an interview with Richard Barrett, a Mississippi lawyer (Turner, 1986) . In the episode, Barrett espoused many openly racist ideas, even suggesting the return of racial segregation and separation. Due to legal restraints, the broadcast could not be pulled. Instead, the local access channel then ran a 90-minute-long call-in session following the episode's airing, where viewers could express their opinions on the episode's content (Turner, 1986) . This led to 39 of the 40 callers protesting the episode's airing.  With WAR officially founded, its real-world activity began to increase. From 1987 to 1988, WAR members carried out a campaign of harassment against the Arizona Anti-Defamation League and a series of synagogues in a similar era (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) . Synagogues were also targeted with nazi/anti-semitic graffiti, egging, and a toy hand grenade was planted in a mailbox. 1987 also saw the growth of WAR in Las Vegas, and the eventual formation of a Las Vegas chapter (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . Metzger's proclivity for recruiting younger members also continued, with teenage WAR Skinheads, led by Dave Mazella, attending a KKK ceremony in Modesto (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) .  1988 saw WAR gain further notoriety both in the public eye and amongst law enforcement circles. Early in the year, an informant notified the FBI that WAR Skinheads were planning a "clean-up week" in San Diego starting around the first of August (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . This "clean-up week" was supposed to consist of the mass slaughter of all minorities and "unwanted persons", but of course never went ahead. Shortly after this supposed "clean up week" was supposed to go ahead, on the 4th of November, John Metzger (the son of Thomas Metzger) made an appearance on a Geraldo Rivera's talk show titled "Teen Hatemongers" where he represented WAR (New York Times, 1988) . After Metzger insulted a black guest, calling him an "Uncle Tom", a fight broke out on stage, leading to Rivera's nose being broken.  1988 also saw Metzger and his son organise the first hate music festival titled 'Aryan Fest', with the event being advertised to skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . This festival, based in Oklahoma, led to Metzger and WAR gaining increased notoriety, with Metzger being invited to speak at numerous rallies and concerts afterwards. During this time, Metzger had taken to leading a group of skinheads on a tour around numerous US talk shows. Through time spent together on this impromptu tour, Dave Mazzella became close with Metzger, leading to his promotion to vice-president of the Aryan Youth Movement (WAR's youth section) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  Unfortunately, this hateful bond led to bloody tragedy. Following Metzger getting word that skinheads in the north west were rapidly developing in strength and activity (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) , the WAR leader sent Mazzella on a trip to Portland to contact a collection of skins known as the East Side White Pride (ESWP) group (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Mazzella was given a letter from Metzger introducing himself, and Mazzella was instructed to arrange a phone call between Metzger and members of ESWP (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  Three weeks after Mazzella arrived in Portland, on the 12th of November, a skinhead from ESWP called Ken Mieske, and two others, murdered Mulugeta Seraw, beating the Ethiopian college student and father to death (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . In court, the three skinheads pled guilty to murder (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) and openly admitted they were followers of WAR (London, 1990) .  Whilst the skinheads who had committed the murder were placed in prison, WAR/Metzger went relatively unscathed by the tragic events they had clearly had a hand in perpetrating. WAR was allowed to continue operating relatively unobstructed until October 1990, when the SPLC and the Anti-Defamation League conducted a civil lawsuit against WAR for the murder of Mulugeta Seraw on behalf of his family (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . More specifically, Metzger was sued for inciting the attack through his promotion of violence against persons of colour (London, 1990), with these attitudes clearly spread to other WAR members, considering that following the murder, the first person Ken Mieske called was John Metzger (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  A jury agreed that Metzger was culpable, and a $12.5 million verdict was levelled against Metzger and WAR (London, 1990) . Metzger lost his house, truck, and tools, and was forced to make monthly payments to Seraw's estate for 20 years, with WAR becoming bankrupt and essentially collapsing (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . The courts openly stated that the considerable monetary amount that WAR was charged had the objective of sending a message to the wider organised hate community (London, 1990) .  Despite this heavy blow to WAR's activities, Metzger continued to use the shell of the organisation as a mouthpiece for his hateful views (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . In January 1992, skinhead members of the Rhode Island WAR sent letters to at least 10 stores in the area, threatening to destroy stores that stocked 'Jungle Fever', and that the KKK would light burning crosses in front of the stores which failed to remove their stock of the film (The Associated Press, 1992) .  Despite this attempted resurgence, law enforcement bodies continued to suppress WAR's activities. On the 29th of August 1994, 18-year-old Richard Camps from Sacramento, California, and an apparent WAR follower, was found guilty of committing a series of firebombings (Reuters, 1994) . These firebombings targeted the home of Jimmie-Yee, a Chinese-American Sacramento City Council Member, and the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Whilst Camps was convicted of both of these attacks, the jury was deadlocked on his involvement in the firebombing of the Sacramento office of the National Association for the Advancement of coloured people, a local synagogue, and the Japanese American League (Reuters, 1994) .  By this point, WAR had been all but dissolved; however, in 2009, Metzger became implicated in a federal indictment (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Dennis Mahon and Deniel Mahon were arrested after, in 2004, the twin brothers sent a mail bomb to the Scottsdale Office of Diversity and Dialogue, leading to three people being injured. In the indictment, it was claimed that the Mahonss had acted on behalf of WAR to "promote racial discord", with Metzger having known the brothers since the 80s ( https://www.splcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/indictment.pdf_ ) . The twin's connection to WAR was further exemplified by the fact that a few months before the bombing, Dennis Mahon had left a voicemail at the Diversity office stating that he was " Dennis Mahon of the White Aryan Resistance of Arizona" and that “The White Aryan Resistance is growing in Scottsdale. There's a few white people who are standing up. Take care.” ( https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/12-10273/12-10273-2015-07-20.html ) .  This voicemail instigated an undercover investigation into the twins by the FBI. Dennis Mahon actually tried to have the evidence from this undercover investigation thrown out, citing entrapment through the use of an attractive young woman as a honeypot ( https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914afeeadd7b0493474fe37 ) . This young woman told the twins that she knew of a child molester who was abusing a family member, and that she wanted to do something about it, to get the twins to show her how to commit acts of violence/revenge. However, Mahon showed this undercover informant how to build and plant bombs without being caught, and the twins themselves travelled to gun shows to buy components for bomb building ( https://www.splcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/indictment.pdf_ ) . Due to these independent acts, including providing the informant with books on guerrilla resistance and racist ideology, attempts to have the undercover evidence thrown out were denied ( https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914afeeadd7b0493474fe37 ) . On the 24th of February 2012, Dennis Mahon was convicted of conspiracy, distribution of information about explosives, and using explosives to attack a building and was sentenced to 40 years in prison, whilst Daniel Mahon was acquitted on a single count of conspiracy (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Court documents show that the ATF thought that the bomb used by the Mahons was very similar in design to those illustrated in literature sold by Metzger's website. Metzger continued running the WAR website until he died on the 4th of November, 2020, of Parkinson's disease (León, 2020).  Objectives & Ideology WAR's core ideology was inherently violent/accelerationist, with WAR's FBI files all being marked "armed and extremely dangerous" (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . For example, a 1990 WAR telephone answering service message stated, “We will put blood on the streets like you’ve never seen. And advocate more violence than both world wars put together" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR's primary objectives were the overthrow and collapse of the US government and the extermination of blacks and jews (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . More generally, WAR aimed to create chaos through the generation of fear and the feeling of government ineptitude throughout the wider population, leading to citizens arming themselves and eventually turning on one another in a racially motivated civil war (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  In fact, WAR's violent and (attempted) anti-authoritarian rhetoric was an active effort to capture the first wave of racist skins that came about in the mid-80s. Metzger harnessed the Skinhead movement as a tool to perpetrate WAR's ideology, a pioneering move as previously skinheads hadn't been taken seriously by older racist leaders due to their unpredictability (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . For WAR, Skinheads were both the reason behind the group's violent ideology and the foot soldiers who would carry said ideology out.  Of course, WAR also held massively racist attitudes. According to Metzger, “Each WAR associate serves the idea that what’s good for the White European Race is the highest virtue. Whatever is bad for the White European Race is the ultimate Evil" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . These white supremacist ideas seeped into WAR's perspective on essentially every social issue, including abortion rights, which WAR opposed due to their apparent responsibility for the death of a generation of white babies (Turner, 1986) . As with all neo-Nazi groups, white supremacism often went hand in hand with anti-semitism. For example, WAR's TV series, Race and Reason, regularly touched on the idea of deporting jews (Turner, 1986) . WAR followers also regularly preached the "final solution" to Jews, being their extermination, with such sentiments being a common component of conversations between the group's members (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  Military/Political Abilities WAR and Metzger himself were considered pioneers in racist activism. Metzger was one of the first heads of the white power movement to notice the importance of music and concerts as tools for the recruitment of young people (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . WAR's use of local access cable television and the WAR tabloid was similarly innovative, allowing Metzger to spread his ideas across the US even after the organisation had largely collapsed (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  In fact, WAR's activity was so notable that it was considered a priority for FBI investigations. In the group's FBI files, WAR are described as extremely dangerous with unlimited access to weapons and ammunition and a considerable pool of skinhead groups from which to draw manpower (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) .  Approach to Resistance WAR's self-titled tabloid was self-described as "the most racist newspaper on earth", and featured badly drawn racist and anti-semitic cartoons and articles (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . The newspaper also featured the Aryan Youth Movement's newsletter in an effort to capture a younger audience, especially skinheads (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). These younger recruits were to be used as the "shock troops of the coming revolution" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) , with these recruits being in turn tasked with the distribution of WAR pamphlets and posters at their local high schools and colleges (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . These recruitment tactics were a key component of Mazella's activity with the skinheads in Portland, who eventually went on to murder Mulugeta Seraw (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) .  The use of local access television broadcasts for the distribution of propaganda was another method largely pioneered by Metzger (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . In tandem with this tabloid was Metzger's TV series "Race and Reason", at its peak airing in 62 cities in 21 states (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025). Episodes of "Race and Reason" were around 30 minutes long and featured interviews with ideologically relevant figures, filmed in a studio in Fullerton, California, that was legally required to offer such services to those who ask for them (Turner, 1986) .  Local access cable stations had to allow for local programming as a requirement. Metzger and, eventually, many other racist leaders were able to take advantage of this open gap and broadcast their own shows (Turner, 1986) . For example, in Idaho, the Pocatello Human Relations Council was unable to block the Race and Reason broadcast because the agreement between the city and the cable company in the area forbade the exclusive use of the public access channel for advertising or pornography. This left a required gap that "Race and Reason" could exploit to be aired (Turner, 1986) . Generally, cable franchises were required to provide a channel for public access, in some cases even requiring free maintenance of local production facilities, as derived from the 1972 Federal Communications Commission on cable TV. Despite this strong central hub of information and propaganda/recruitment, WAR took on a loose/cell-based structure (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 1988) . There was no official members list, no initiation process and no uniforms, a relatively novel feature of the organisation for its time (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Following the lawsuit levelled at Metzger over the murder of Seraw, and the wider collapse/infiltration of far-right organisations by law enforcement, WAR began to promote the idea of leaderless resistance (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . At a 2004 skinhead rally at which Metzger was a speaker, the WAR leader said, “Don’t operate like a battleship. Operate like a Nazi submarine! Use your periscope! We have to infiltrate! Infiltrate the military! Infiltrate your local governments! Infiltrate your school board! Infiltrate law enforcement!” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . Metzger doubled down on this stance following his implication in the actions of the Mahon brothers, stating that “Membership organisations are fraught with leaks and agents" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) .  International Relations & Alliances WAR developed extensive ties to racist, primarily skinhead, groups across the US. As noted throughout this article, Metzger made particularly close ties with racist youth groups in an attempt to recruit their members into WAR's ranks. These youth groups would often be encouraged to produce their own racist literature, with a particular emphasis on violent action encouraged within this literature (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) .  American Front, a skinhead group, was a particularly close relation to WAR. The first skinhead group to develop factions in multiple states, Metzger quickly reached out to the group's leaders and founded a working relationship (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) . Whilst WAR was US-based, some international support was offered from Arab groups. This support was turned down due to the belief that the Aryan race must defeat its struggle without the support of others (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1988) . Bibliography Federal Bureau of Investigation (1988). https://vault.fbi.gov/white-aryan-resistance/White%20Aryan%20Resistance%20Part%2001%20%28Final%29/view León, C. de (2020). Tom Metzger, Notorious White Supremacist, Dies at 82. The New York Times . [online] 13 Nov. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/12/us/tom-metzger-dead.html  [Accessed 17 Feb. 2021]. London, R. (1990). Sending a $12.5 Million Message to a Hate Group. New York Times , [online] 26 Oct., p.20. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/26/news/sending-a-12.5-million-message-to-a-hate-group.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. New York Times (1988). Geraldo Rivera’s Nose Broken In Scuffle on His Talk Show. [online] 4 Nov., p.39. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/04/nyregion/geraldo-rivera-s-nose-broken-in-scuffle-on-his-talk-show.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. New York Times (1990). Assets of White Supremacist Are Target of Legal Maneuver. [online] 25 Dec., p.8. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/25/us/assets-of-white-supremacist-are-target-of-legal-maneuver.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Reuters (1994). Man Convicted Of 2 Bombings Tied to Racism . [online] Nytimes.com . Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/31/us/man-convicted-of-2-bombings-tied-to-racism.html#  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2006). Former Klansmen Tom Metzger and Bill Riccio Encourage Skinheads to Cooperate . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/reports/former-klansmen-tom-metzger-and-bill-riccio-encourage-skinheads-cooperate/  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2025). Tom Metzger . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/tom-metzger/  [Accessed 28 Oct. 2025]. The Associate Press (1992). ‘Jungle Fever’ Brings Threats To Rhode Island Video Stores. The New York Times . [online] 11 Jan. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/11/us/jungle-fever-brings-threats-to-rhode-island-video-stores.html . Turner, W. (1986). EXTREMIST FINDS CABLE TV IS FORUM FOR RIGHT-WING VIEWS. [online] 7 Oct., p.23. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/07/us/extremist-finds-cable-tv-is-forum-for-right-wing-views.html  [Accessed 29 Oct. 2025].

Introduction Whilst their activity was largely restricted to Rome and its suburbs, Militia represents an interesting example of far-right urban activity. Even during the group’s peak, Militia took on the form of a secretive sect, as opposed to a solid group or organisation, making use of stochastic graffiti/banner actions and the distribution of ideological literature. These actions generally promoted an accelerationist stance, as well as anti-semitic conspiracy theories and holocaust denialism.  This accelerationism was never allowed to develop into political violence, however, as the Italian police eventually arrested and imprisoned the network’s core members, including its founder and infamous neo-nazi Maurizio Boccacci, in January 2015. However, this lack of violent action was not due to a lack of intent. During raids on a martial arts gym Militia had been using as a base of operations, numerous weapons were found.  History & Foundations Now around 68 years old, Maurizio Boccaci, the group's founder, had a long career of right-wing extremism before founding Militia in 2008 (Luigi, 2008) . A resident of Albano Laziale, Maurizio primarily gained his infamy in Rome, 1984, following his formation of the far-right "Western Political Movement" (Viviano, 2011) . Whilst this group, and many of Boccaci's previous projects, were eventually disbanded following pressures from law enforcement (Viviano, 2011), extensive investigations into Boccaci never seemed to be able to make charges stick until his involvement in Militia (Fabio, 2010) .  Militia's initial activity began in 2008, opening with an extended campaign of banners and graffiti targeting Italian politicians (Luigi, 2008) . These acts of vandalism noted the group's particular disdain for Lamberto Gianni due to his support of Israel, with slogans commonly taking on an antisemitic nature.  This strategy of sustained campaigns of harassment continued into 2009. This time targeting Roman Jewish communities, Militia engaged in acts of vandalism and harassment regularly up until 2011 (Viviano, 2011) . Throughout this period, these attacks seemed to increase in frequency and intensity, leading to a Police raid on a Primo Carnera gym in the Roman Vigne Nuove district. This gym had been used by Militia as a base of operations, with the raid finding machetes, baseball bats, graffiti and postering supplies, banners, extreme right literature, computer equipment and an Israeli uniform (Fabio, 2010) .   Despite this pushback from law enforcement, Militia continued its harassment of the Jewish community. These actions drew further attention from law enforcement, and on December 14th, 2011, members of Militia were arrested for terror/race crime offences, primarily the attempted dissemination of these ideas, including the group's leader, Boccaci (Viviano, 2011) . In total, five members were arrested, with 11 others being investigated, including a 15-year-old (Ghosh, 2011) . Those who were not arrested were still subject to a search of their residence (Redazione Online, 2025) . The offences levelled against Militia included the plotting of several terror attacks against Rome's Jewish community president Riccardo Pacifici, the city's mayor Gianni Alemanno, Chamber of Deputies Gianfranco Fini, and the Italian president (Gruber, 2011) . The group had also made threats against George Bush (Ghosh, 2011) .  These raids came shortly after a far-right supporter committed a mass killing in the city of Florence (Ghosh, 2011) . It is unclear if the two events were linked; however, a key reason for Militia's arrest was due to the group's inherently accelerationist objective of fomenting a revolutionary war, and the group's efforts to spread this ideology (Ghosh, 2011) .  This string of arrests seems to have largely neutered Militia's activities. The group gained media attention again in August 2014 after it carried out a large-scale postering campaign (Oster, 2015) . Similar to their initial activity, the campaign took on a largely anti-semitic form, encouraging the boycotting of Jewish-owned businesses throughout Rome.  Militia's final blow seems to have come on January 15th 2015, following the sentencing of six of its members, including its founder Boccacci, who were imprisoned for their anti-semitic/racist activities (Oster, 2015) . Members were also charged with crimes relating to attempts to reconstitute the Italian Fascist party.  Whilst possibly unrelated, in November 2019, Italian authorities raided a network of neo-Nazis who were utilising a closed group chat titled "Miltia" (AFP, 2019) . Raids on 19 suspects linked to the group recovered weapons, flags, and far-right literature, and evidence that the group had been working alongside other violent neo-Nazi groups such as Combat 18 and New Social Order (AFP, 2019) .  Objectives & Ideology Militia primarily ascribes to a neo-Nazi/white supremacist ideology, with the group regularly pushing the idea of racial purity/supremacy (Redazione Online, 2025) . During acts of vandalism, Militia regularly made use of nazi symbology, with Boccacci openly stating that he admired the actions of Adolf Hitler (Viviano, 2011) .  Ironically, Militia seems to also hold holocaust denialist attitudes. A banner used during the group's 2008 harassment actions read: "The Holocaust, the biggest lie in history" (Luigi, 2008) . Conversely, as is typically seen in fascist ideology due to an inherent need for the enemy to be viewed as both pathetically weak and an existential threat, Boccacci also sees the Jewish population as an enemy of the interests of the white race due to their "spoiling" of the plans of Hitler (Viviano, 2011) .  To achieve the objectives of a racially pure/white population free of jews, Militia took on an accelerationist/violent position. In the eyes of Militia, such a state can only be achieved through violent revolution and the collapse of modern society/the current order (Gruber, 2011) . Because of this violent worldview, Militia has very little time for conventional political engagement, instead pushing an extreme and violent solution to what it deems the problem of immigration and race mixing ( Rusi.org , 2025) . In one interview, Boccacci even described himself as an "uncompromising fascist soldier." Military/Political Abilities Whilst Boccacci has been a part of the far-right for decades, he is seemingly more dedicated to his ideology than to his alliances or political power. For example, despite Rome's (at the time) mayor, Gianni Alemanno, and Chamber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini, having roots in neo-fascist movements, their shift towards support for Israel warranted attack from Militia between 2008 and 2011 (Viviano, 2011) .  Despite this, at times restricting adherence to ideological purity, Boccacci's extended career in the far right allowed for the exploitation of a range of connections to gather support. According to police investigations, the gym used by Militia as a base of operations played host to members from numerous Italian regions (Lombardi, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Lazio) (Fabio, 2010) . Considering Militia's small operational area, this widespread membership, including the group's considerable membership size of around 100 activists ( Rusi.org , 2025) , led to a notable output of activity during the group's short existence.  Approach to Resistance Militia's primary activity consisted of graffiti/vandalism and the use of banners. These banners were made extensive use of during the group's campaigns against Gianni Alemanno's support of Israel (Viviano, 2011) . These acts of vandalism weren't just an attack on physical structures, but were also often used to spread Militia's violent and racist ideology through various slogans related to immigration, the holocaust, and minority communities (Luigi, 2008) .  The group's ideology was also spread through the dissemination of the bi-monthly magazine titled "Insurrection" (Redazione Online, 2025) . This magazine promoted violent, insurrectionary, and accelerationist ideas and actions. Whilst not exclusively circulated amongst Militia members, "Insurrection" was identified during raids by law enforcement as a key radicalising component amongst the group's members (Redazione Online, 2025) .  Whilst no violence has been openly attributed to Militia, the group clearly made preparations/plans for such activities. Evidence of such preparation is clear even outside of Militia's violent rhetoric. From the group's stockpile of weapons found in its operations base (Fabio, 2010) to the planned bomb attack against Riccardo Pacifici (the head of Rome's Jewish community) (Ghosh, 2011) , Militia showed intentions of materialising its objective of violent resistance.  Interestingly, during the group's use of banners in 2008, Militia did disavow one banner which referred to the massacre of immigrants in Castelvolturno in September 2007 (Luigi, 2008) . However, it is unclear whether this disavowal was due to a genuine disinterest in the celebration of such events or due to the exceptionally bad publicity that such celebrations would bring the group.  International Relations & Alliances Due to Miltia's small membership and operational area (largely restricted to Rome and its bordering neighbourhoods), the group seemed to operate largely independently from other far-right movements. Despite this, it is fair to assume that Boccacci's longstanding career in the far-right managed to equip him with contacts that allowed the group to sustain its membership despite its small recruitment pool (Viviano, 2011) .  A possible explanation for Militia's isolationist nature is the group's violent ideological stance. Whilst far-right groups tend to have a generally aggressive/violent stance on the issues they concern themselves with, Militia sported a particularly militant stance in comparison to other Italian right-wing groups at the time (Ghosh, 2011) . This exceptionally aggressive perspective, combined with the attention from law enforcement that this perspective garnered the group, may be a component of Militia's disconnection from other organisations.   Bibliography AFP, (2019). Italian police bust armed neo-Nazi group after nationwide sweeps . [online] Available at: https://www.timesofisrael.com/italian-police-bust-armed-neo-nazi-group-after-nationwide-sweeps/  [Accessed 17 Oct. 2025]. Fabio Di, C. (2010). Escalation against the Jews Four militants of Militia . [online] Il TEMPO. Available at: http://www.iltempo.it/roma/cronaca_locale/roma/2010/05/22/1161603-escalation_contro_ebrei.shtml  [Accessed 13 Oct. 2025]. Ghosh, P.R. (2011). Italian Police Arrest Extreme Rightists; No Clear Link to Florence Massacre . [online] International Business Times. Available at: https://www.ibtimes.com/italian-police-arrest-extreme-rightists-no-clear-link-florence-massacre-383394  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Gruber, R.E. (2011). Five arrested in Rome for plotting against Jewish community . [online] JTA. Available at: https://www.jta.org/news/article/2011/12/14/3090732/five-arrested-in-rome-for-plotting-against-jewish-community  [Accessed 14 Oct. 2025]. Luigi, M. (2008). Anti-Semitic banners of ‘Militia’ denounced the ultra Maurizio Boccacci . [online] la Repubblica ROMA. Available at: http://roma.repubblica.it/dettaglio/striscioni-antisemiti-di-militia-denunciato-l%C2%B4ultra-maurizio-boccacci/1544964  [Accessed 15 Oct. 2025]. Oster, M. (2015). Italian neo-Nazis convicted for racist, anti-Semitic activites - St. Louis Jewish Light . [online] St. Louis Jewish Light. Available at: https://stljewishlight.org/world-news/italian-neo-nazis-convicted-for-racist-anti-semitic-activites/  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Redazione Online (2025). Blitz dei Ros contro Militia: 5 arresti Volevano ?guerra rivoluzionaria?  [online] Corriere della Sera Roma. Available at: https://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/11_dicembre_14/arresti-estrema-destra-1902528099816.shtml  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. Rusi.org . (2025). Not Welcome Here: The Resurgence Of Far-Right Wing Extremism In Europe . [online] Available at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/not-welcome-here-resurgence-far-right-wing-extremism-europe  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025]. VIVIANO, F. (2011). Operazione contro l’estrema destraIn carcere Boccacci e altri 4 di Militia . [online] la Repubblica. Available at: https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2011/12/14/news/arrestati_esponenti_militia-26584050/  [Accessed 16 Oct. 2025].

Introduction & Overview Vanguard America was a far-right, white supremacist/neo-Nazi organisation largely active between 2016 and 2017. Founded by ex-Marine Dillon Ulysses Hopper, Vanguard America began attending rallies and conducting flyering activities across US college campuses in 2016.  Utilising its clean aesthetic and more politically palatable approach to far-right politics, Vanguard America quickly amassed a considerable membership base of young white men. This led to increased activity and attendance numbers at rallies, culminating in the "Unite the Right" rally on August 12, 2017. This rally, and its tragic events, led to not only the crumbling of Vanguard America's leadership but the splintering of its followers in general.  Whilst Hopper attempted to resuscitate Vanguard America following the events of August 2017, he was inevitably unsuccessful, leading to the group fading from the public eye by the summer of 2018.  VA Logo History & Foundations Born from the infamous neo-fascist Iron March forums (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) , Vanguard America (VA) was initially led by Dillon Ulysses Hopper (ADL, 2017). Originally from New Mexico (ADL, 2017) , Hopper joined the Marine Corps in 2005 following his graduation from high school, later retiring as a staff sergeant (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  According to Hopper, VA was founded in California, 2015 (ADL, 2017) . However, it was not until 2016 that the group's activities were noticed. VA conducted the posting of racist/white supremacist flyers across US universities, targeting racially diverse universities in particular, and following Trump's election, the group became far more brazen with these actions (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  These propagandist actions saw an increase in VA activity and membership across Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas and Washington between November 2016 and April 2017 (ADL, 2017) . It is in 2016 that VA's leader, Dillon Hopper, is promoted to staff sergeant (Beckett and Swaine, 2017). However, by January 2017, Hopper retired from the Marine Corps (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Whilst not stated by Hopper, it is safe to assume his departure from the military was motivated by the desire to further pursue his racist objectives through the VA. The group's activity continued into 2017, with two synagogues in Shreveport, Louisiana, reporting antisemitic VA stickers on their property (ADL, 2017) . VA also began to expand its ties to neo-nazi movements by attending white supremacist rallies in Pikeville, Kentucky. These events were organised by the neo-Nazi network "Nationalist Front", of which VA became a member following the rally (ADL, 2017) . VA's neo-Nazi links grew further as members attended a speech by Richard Spencer at Auburn University, Alabama, on the 18th of April, shortly followed by attending a National Front rally on the 29th, and a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on May 13th (ADL, 2017) . This increased activity and consequent visibility led to some negative media attention following the murder of a black Maryland university student. Richard Collins III was stabbed to death by another white Maryland student who was found to be a member of the far-right Facebook group "Alt-Reich Nation" (BBC, 2017) . Whilst the murder was never fully linked to VA, the group received flak due to their flyering activities on the Maryland campus (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Despite this stumbling block, VA's influence spread internationally in June through the foundation of its British contingent, Vanguard Britannia. This new chapter, although small, applied the same "patriotic" and racist approach to UK politics (Child and Poulter, 2017) . Back in the US, VA members attended an anti-Islam march in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the 10th of June (ADL, 2017) . On the same day, in Houston, Texas, VA members protested alongside other white supremacist movements against the removal of the Sam Houston monument (ADL, 2017) .  VA's activity in this period continued to increase, with several dozen VA members attending the "Texas is Ours" rally in Austin on June 17th (ADL, 2017) . At this rally, Hopper spoke alongside Thomas Rousseau, the leader of the Texas VA chapter. At the time Rousseau was only 18 (Schaeffer and Zimmermann, 2019) . Following the event, Hopper complained that Rousseau had misled the rally organisers into believing that Rousseau was VA's leader (ADL, 2017) . According to Hopper, Rousseau's lengthy speech further implied that he was the leader, creating further confusion regarding which of the two was, in fact, VA's leader (ADL, 2017) . Hopper's paranoia was found to be legitimate on June 20th when Rousseau began a takeover of VA's online platforms (ADL, 2017) . Having previously ascertained control of VA's social media accounts/platforms under the guise of security precautions, Rousseau removed Hopper's access to all said platforms.  Thomas Rousseau - [ Image source ] Whilst the group's leadership was in turmoil, its chapters continued their political actions. Throughout July, Vanguard Britannia flyers begin appearing in Arbroath, Scotland, as well as Eastleigh and Winchester, in Hampshire, England (Child and Poulter, 2017) . The Holocaust memorial in Lakewood, New Jersey, was vandalised with an anti-semitic VA banner on the 2nd of July, followed by simultaneous vandalism actions on July 16th in Austin, Texas (ADL, 2017) .  VA's peak levels of media attention followed their involvement in the white supremacist "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, on the 12th of August. Led by Rousseau and with Hopper notably missing, VA members attended the rally (ADL, 2017) and participated in violent clashes with counter-protestors (Cullen, 2017) . These clashes culminated when a right-wing protestor drove his car into a large group of counter-protestors, killing Heather Heyer, a 32-year-old paralegal, and injuring countless others (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  Not only had VA assisted the event's organiser, Jason Kessler, in its execution (Barrouquere, 2018), but the attacker, James Alex Fields, had been a part of the rally's VA contingent (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) . Despite photos/video emerging of Fields standing/marching with VA members and carrying a shield marked with the group's logo (ADL, 2017), VA made a statement on social media denying a link between the group and Fields (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017) .  VA members at Charlottesville - [ Image source ] According to VA, shields were handed out to anyone who asked for one, and nobody with Field's name had ever applied for membership (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) ; however, this does not explain why Field's was wearing the group's uniform of khaki pants and a white polo shirt (Cullen, 2017) . Whilst publicly the group distanced themselves from Field's actions, on the 14th of August, Rousseau posted on the group's Discord server that “The statement never said that what he did was wrong, just clarified that he wasn’t a member. People aren’t buying it anyways.”  (Vanguard American/Vanguard America Reading and Research/Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025|Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) Rousseau's observation that the public wasn't "buying it" was highly accurate, with VA receiving major critical public attention. However, whilst the Unite the Right contingent of VA was led by Rousseau, Hopper was the one to garner most of the public backlash due to his perceived leadership of the group up until this point (ADL, 2017) . This pressure led to the group splintering and going underground (ADL, 2017) . Vanguard Britannia also separated itself from the remaining chapters of VA, which had not been dissolved following the rally. The British contingent stated the separation was due to leadership clashes, and not because of the rally, instead claiming the events in Charlottesville had been a false flag attack (Child and Poulter, 2017) .  Following the "Unite the Right" rally, both Hopper and Rousseau distanced themselves from the events and VA in general. Hopper decided to remain absent and distant from the group for the time being, allowing Rousseau to take uncontested control of its activities (ADL, 2017) . Rousseau seized on this opportunity, rebranding the group's website to promote Patriot Front (his new, less visibly extreme, political project) on the 30th of August (Vanguard American/Vanguard America Reading and Research/Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025|Southern Poverty Law Center, 2025) . Many VA members followed Rousseau over to Patriot Front, with a large number having marched alongside Rousseau during the Unite the Right rally (ADL, 2017) .  Now largely gutted, VA continued its activity in October, with just 7 members attending a Nationalist Front rally in Shelbyville (ADL, 2017) . On the 13th, a synagogue in Rome, Georgia, was vandalised with a VA flier reading "America will bathe in the light of the black sun! The tide of Jewish Globalism wanes." (ADL, 2017) . This anti-semitic/racist activity continued stochastically in December at Toledo University, Ohio, and the Southern Methodist University campus, Texas (Murphy, 2017) . On the 18th, VA's Twitter account was banned as a part of a wider crackdown on hate-based accounts (Luckerson, 2017) .  Further fracturing took hold of VA in January 2018. Following infighting and accusations of incompetent leadership, VA members, notably from Texas and Tennessee, assisted in the formation of the National Socialist Legion (ADL, 2017) . This group, according to a 4chan post in March 2018, aims to create homesteads across the country ready for the future white revolt and secession. This almost entirely crippled the group's ability to carry out political actions. VA's death threats consisted of a banner reading "Feminists deserve the rope" being hung on an overpass during the Women's March in Providence, Rhode Island, on the 20th of January and VA fliers being posted at the Casa Guanajuato Community Center on the 3rd of March (ADL, 2017) . Objectives & Ideology VA members follow a strict ideology of traditionalism, white supremacy, and, in many cases, neo-Nazism. VA believes that America should be a white ethnostate, openly opposes multiculturalism, and believes that the white race should be in control of the US (ADL, 2017). The group's slogan, "blood and soil", implies that white blood has a link with American soil, with the phrase being popularised by Nazi party followers as "Blud und Boden" (Murphy, et al., 2017) . VA seems to believe that America was founded and built on white blood and culture, viewing other cultures and races as incompatible with those originating from the white race.  An Alternative VA flag featuring a black sun/sonnenrad - [ Image source ] Whilst having always resided within the right-wing space, VA's activity and collaborative efforts gradually moved further into the neo-Nazi space, especially as Rousseau increased his control over the group (ADL, 2017) . However, VA was rarely brazen with their promotion of these ideas, instead often making use of sanitised dog whistles. The group's website reads: “The mission of Vanguard America is the preservation and progression of our people, culture, values, and future in the US." (Buncombe, 2017) , a statement rather reminiscent of the neo-Nazi 14 words slogan. The welcome message of the group's website also parrots ideas clearly derived from replacement theory: "Our people are subjugated while an endless tide of incompatible foreigners floods this nation every year" (Cullen, 2017) .  VA's white supremacism goes beyond slogans such as "the glory of the Aryan nation must be recaptured” (ADL, 2017) and into its membership requirements, with all applicants having to be at least 80% white (Cullen, 2017) . Members must also be employed, not smoke or drink, and not have hand or neck tattoos (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . Obese men were also excluded from membership (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) , as well as criminals and those with addictions (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . Predictably, VA also exhibits extensive homophobia and transphobia (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) .  Whilst slightly coy about its neo-Nazi views, VA openly associates itself with fascism. Francisco Rivera, spokesperson for the VA Virginia branch, said that "Fascist is an accurate term" for the group at a speech in May 2017 (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) . The group's general ideology paints a clearly fascistic picture, as does the group's strict adherence to its uniform, khaki pants and a white polo top, and its wider iconography/branding. VA's flag features an eagle carrying a fasces. The fasces is an authoritarian symbol taken from Italian politics (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2017 1) , often being carried by an eagle in depictions on the uniforms of Nazi and Mussolini followers.  Military/Political Abilities VA's peak activity occurred during the 2016-2017 school year (ADL, 2017) . During this time, at the National Front rally attended by VA in April 2017, Hopper claimed that the organisation had 200 members across 20 states (ADL, 2017) . Whilst the group managed to garner a widespread following, its infamy largely seems to have come from associations with various controversies as opposed to concrete political progress.  Regardless of this, VA's visibility was certainly an impressive achievement. The ADL (2017) recorded 32 incidents of flyering across Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Texas, Virginia and Washington during the 2016-2017 school year. This activity decreased, but was still notable, during the 2017-2018 school year with 14 incidents recorded across Arizona, Tennessee, Texas, and Massachusetts. Approach to Resistance VA's activities were largely designed to target young white men around college age, hence the group's consistent targeting of US universities with flyers, posters, and stickers (ADL, 2017) . The messaging of these promotional materials often consisted of existential subjects designed to imply that the future of young white men was being threatened by the existence of multiculturalism. At one point, Hopper openly stated that the "future is about the youth", and for that reason, the group's primary membership was between 18 and 24 years old (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  A VA Sticker Engagement with this demographic was maintained through the curation of a slick image/brand for the organisation. There was a very clear effort to maintain the clean image of the organisation whilst simultaneously promoting violent views (Cullen, 2017) . One VA event organiser stated that  “We also uphold standards of dress and grooming and physical fitness because our ideology is one of strength and purity and self-improvement” (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) .  Whilst VA denies that it promotes violence (Moyer and Beyer, 2017) , its militant rhetoric and involvement in events such as the "Unite the Right" rally indicate otherwise. This approach to politics is unsurprising considering the group's roots in the Iron March forums. The page gained infamy due to the numerous violent extremist groups it had spawned before its dissolution (Cullen, 2017) .  Had he not retired, Hopper's promotion to staff sergeant in October 2016 meant he was to be in charge of the training of prospective Marine officers. However, it seems that the VA leader prioritised training the group's members over his fellow corpsmen. Hopper stated in a speech to fellow Nazis at a rally in Pikeville, Kentucky, that he had made efforts to implement the lessons he had learned from his time in the military to harden the group (Beckett and Swaine, 2017) , resulting in the group taking on a paramilitary element. Despite Hopper's involvement with the Marines, he has stated that members had to end their contracts with the military before having anything to do with VA "for their safety." (Snow, 2019) .  In open carry states, VA members would regularly attend activities openly carrying firearms, and making use of military style uniforms, movements, and rest positions (ADL, 2017) . The majority of said activities consisted of rallies and group meetings. Through these frequent and relatively heavily attended events, VA became pioneers/figureheads for street demonstrations by the far right (Cullen, 2017). VA used rallies/meetings as not just a show of strength, but also as a recruitment tool due to their visual spectacle (ADL, 2017) . International Relations & Alliances VA's primary association during its activity was with the aforementioned Nationalist Front. This coalition of neo-nazi/neo-confederate groups consisted of the National Socialist Movement, Traditionalist Worker's Party, the League of the South, and Vanguard America (Buncombe, 2017) . Through collaborative efforts, the Nationalist Front organised rallies across the US to spread far-right propaganda and platform white supremacist figureheads.  Bibliography ADL (2017). Vanguard America | ADL . [online] Available at: https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/vanguard-america . [Accessed 22nd November 2025] Barrouquere, Brett. (2018). Neo-Nazi sympathizer James Alex Fields Jr., faces jury over deadly actions, decision at ‘Unite the Right’ . [online] Southern Poverty Law Center. Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/neo-nazi-sympathizer-james-alex-fields-jr-faces-jury-over-deadly-actions-decision-unite/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] BBC (2017). ‘Alt-Reich’ member charged in fatal stabbing of black student.  (2017). BBC News. [online] 22 May. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-40002567 . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Beckett, Lois; Swaine, Jon; (2017). Leader of neo-Nazi group linked to Charlottesville attack was a US Marine . [Online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/14/charlottesville-attack-vanguard-america-james-fields-dillon-hopper  [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Buncombe, A. (2017). Neo-Nazis at Tennessee rallies drowned out by hundreds of counter-protesters | The Independent . [online] The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/tennessee-neonazi-rally-white-lives-matter-supremacist-murfreesboro-shelbyville-a8024931.html . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Childs, S. and Poulter, J. (2017). Nazi Group Linked to Charlottesville Attack Has a UK Chapter . [online] VICE. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/nazi-group-linked-to-charlottesville-attack-has-a-uk-chapter/  [Accessed 23 Nov. 2025]. Cullen. (2017) Vanguard America, group Charlottesville driver James Fields Jr. marched with, has increasingly become a neo-Nazi voice . [Online] Available at: http://www.nydailynews.com/amp/news/national/vanguard-america-increasingly-neo-nazi-voice-article-1.3408117  [Accessed 22 Nov. 2025] Luckerson, Victor (2017). Twitter Cracks Down on Hate-Mongerers . [online] The Ringer. Available at: https://www.theringer.com/2017/12/18/tech/twitter-bans-hate-groups  [Accessed 23 Nov. 2025]. Moyer, Justin William; Beyer, Lindsey. (2017) Vanguard America, a white supremacist group, denies Charlottesville ramming suspect was a member . [Online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/vanguard-america-a-white-supremacist-group-denies-charlottesville-attacker-was-a-member/2017/08/15/2ec897c6-810e-11e7-8072-73e1718c524d_story.html  [Accessed 22nd Nov. 2025] Murphy, Paul (2017) American Nazis post bigoted flyers on SMU campus . [Online] CNN. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/04/us/american-nazis-post-flyers-trnd  [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Murphy, Zoeann; Larimer, Sarah; Siegel, Rachel; Chason, Rachel (August 18, 2017). Walker, Victoria M. (ed.). Deconstructing the symbols and slogans spotted in Charlottesville.  [Online] Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/local/charlottesville-videos/  [Accessed, 23 Nov. 2025] Schaeffer, Carol and Zimmermann, Fritz (2019). They Are Racist; Some of Them Have Guns. Inside the White Supremacist Group Hiding in Plain Sight . [online] ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/they-are-racist-some-of-them-have-guns-inside-the-white-supremacist-group-hiding-in-plain-sight . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Snow, Shaw. (2019). The neo-Nazi boot: Inside one Marine’s descent into extremism . [online] Marine Corps Times. Available at: https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2019/09/04/the-neo-nazi-boot-inside-one-marines-descent-into-extremism/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025] Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017). Alleged Charlottesville Driver Who Killed One Rallied With Alt-Right Vanguard America Group . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/alleged-charlottesville-driver-who-killed-one-rallied-alt-right-vanguard-america-group/  [Accessed 22 Nov. 2025]. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2017 1). Flags and Symbols at ‘Unite The Right’ rally in Charlottesville | Southern Poverty Law Center . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/flags-and-other-symbols-used-far-right-groups-charlottesville/ . Southern Poverty Law Center. (2025). Thomas Rousseau . [online] Available at: https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/thomas-rousseau/ . [Accessed 23rd Nov. 2025]

Introduction The Haqqani network is an Afghan Islamic fundamentalist group that has participated in multiple conflicts in Afghanistan, and they have also been implicated in providing support to terror networks in Pakistan and Indian-controlled Kashmir. The organisation was established in the 1970s by Jalaluddin Haqqani, from whom the group gets its name. Haqqani was an ethnic Pashtun belonging to a wealthy family of the Zadran tribe based in Loya Paktia, which is made up of the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika. (Yol et al, 2024, p559) Map of Loya Paktia, shown in yellow – [ image source ] The group has an extensive military history. It participated in the mujahideen resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war, the subsequent Afghan civil wars and the insurgency resulting from the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. It is considered a “semi-autonomous” group within the Taliban, united under their brand but operating independently (Peters, 2012, p10) . Members of the Haqqani family have participated in both the current and previous Taliban governments, and the group has strong links to al-Qaeda and Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI (ABC News, 2021) .   History & Foundations The Haqqani network has its roots in the 1970s, when Mohammad Daoud Khan overthrew the Afghan monarchy led by King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Daoud suppressed Islamists who opposed his regime due to the dismantling of the previous multi-party system in favour of a one-party state (Barfield, 2010, p170) . Jalaluddin Haqqani, who had previously studied at Dar‐ul‐Uloom Haqqania madrassa in Akhora Khattak, Pakistan, an institution notorious for producing jihadists, fled to Pakistan with other Islamists to train to overthrow Daoud’s regime with support from the ISI (Peters, 2012, p14) . These militants then took part in the failed 1975 Panjshir Valley Uprising, with Jalaluddin leading an attack that resulted in the deaths of twelve members of Daoud’s administration. This attack helped to cement his reputation as a jihadist leader (Rutting, 2009, p64-65) . By 1979, Jalaluddin had become a trusted commander within Hezb-i Islami Khalis, a mujahideen resistance group. He and his network of supporters were granted operational independence in southeastern Afghanistan (Edwards, 2002, p275) .   Jalaluddin Haqqani – [ image source ] When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to support the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), it marked a watershed moment for the Haqqani network. Afghanistan became a focal point for both Islamists and global powers involved in the Cold War. Billions of dollars of support funds were covertly funnelled by the ISI, CIA and Gulf States into Afghanistan to be sent to mujahideen fighters resisting the Soviet occupation (Galster, 2001) . Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group participated in the resistance, receiving millions of dollars of support both in terms of weapons, training and funds, and innovated the nature of jihadism by recruiting foreign fighters – something other mujahideen factions did not consistently do (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p60) . This innovation was a precursor to what is now infamously known as ‘Global Jihadism’ (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p20) . Jalaluddin’s appeal for foreign fighters was first recorded four years before Abdullah Azzam’s declaration, which is usually credited for birthing global jihad; Jalaluddin gave an interview in which he spoke of “the Muslim duty to offer himself for the jihad” (Haqqani, 1980) . Many training camps for Islamic militants were established throughout Haqqani-controlled Loya Paktia (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p66) . The geographic positioning of the Haqqani network’s power base, along the Afghan-Pakistan border, aided the funnelling of aid and foreign fighters into the group. The Brigadier General of the ISI at the time, Mohammad Yousaf, acknowledged that 60% of their supplies were routed through the Haqqani network stronghold of Loya Paktia, with a third going directly through Haqqani’s headquarters in Zhawara (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p9) . Khost Province was of particular strategic importance, as it contained many smuggling routes into Pakistan and other parts of Afghanistan. The influx of foreign aid and foreign fighters enabled the Haqqani network to consolidate its power and influence. They helped provide Jalaluddin Haqqani and his group with the tools to effectively fight against the Soviet forces, most famously this included Stinger missiles, which were used to contest Soviet air superiority (Snow, 2013) . He became a favoured commander for the CIA to support and a “militant folk hero” for many Islamist activists (Coll, 2004, p124-165) . Jalaluddin’s influence and geographic location meant he became a key intermediary for sending resources to other mujahideen fighters, aiding the development of close relations between his group and various actors (EFSAS, 2022) .  It was during this time that the Haqqani network started to foster close relationships with Osama Bin Laden, who later co-founded al-Qaeda. Additionally, Haqqani developed ties to Kashmiri jihadists during this period, who utilised the safe haven provided by Haqqani-controlled territory to establish training camps. It was reported that fighters from Harkat-ul-Mujahidin, a Kashmiri jihadist group, were running camps in Khost province as early as the 1980s, and in 1991 Jalaluddin admitted to providing the militants with training (Ruttig, 2009, p87-88) . After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the communist government led by the PDPA quickly collapsed to the mujahideen fighters. The first city to fall was Khost in 1991, in an operation spearheaded by Jalaluddin and his group (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p82) . Jalaluddin was later appointed Justice Minister of the newly established Islamic State of Afghanistan in 1992. After the breakdown of the newly established state and the outbreak of the Second Afghan Civil War, Jalaluddin’s group refrained from attempting to seize overall power, opting instead to consolidate their regional power. In a 1994 letter sent by al-Qaeda member Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi (1994) , he refers to “the governor of Khost, who is from the Haqqani organisation” This is the first recorded instance that the Haqqani network is referred to as an autonomous organisation and provides evidence of the group cementing its power in the Loya Paktia region. The group later defected to the Taliban in 1995 after Jalaluddin pledged his allegiance to Mullah Omar, and they assisted them in their takeover of the country (Ruttig, 2009, p70) . The new relationship between the Haqqani network and the Taliban meant that they preserved their regional autonomy while simultaneously recognising Taliban authority over Afghanistan. Under the Taliban’s newly established Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin was appointed Minister for Tribal and Frontier Affairs in 1998. This position was largely symbolic, as Jalaluddin and his group still maintained their autonomy from the Taliban, evident in the inability of the Taliban to fulfil Pakistani extradition requests of fugitives training in Haqqani-run camps (Brown et Rassler, 2013, p107) . After the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings by al-Qaeda, Haqqani-run training camps in Loya Paktia were hit by U.S. strikes for harbouring foreign jihadists, particularly members of al-Qaeda (FBIS, 2004, p150) . The strikes caused tensions between elements of the mainstream Taliban, who opposed al-Qaeda and global jihadism, and the Haqqanis, who provided a haven for foreign jihadists. During this time, they grew closer to al-Qaeda, acting as a “nexus” between the group and the mainstream Taliban. Following the September 11 attacks orchestrated by al-Qaeda and the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the U.S.-led coalition, the Haqqani network joined the Taliban insurgency against the coalition and grew even closer to al-Qaeda. The group was implicated in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency lasting from 2001 until 2021, such as the 2008 Serena Hotel attack and the 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul (Sarkar, 2025) . Another notable attack involving the Haqqani network was the May 2017 Kabul bombing, the deadliest attack to take place in the city, which resulted in the deaths of over 150 people (Westcott, 2017) . The group was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. in 2012. During the post-9/11 period, Sirajuddin Haqqani, Jalaluddin’s son, gradually took over the group due to his father’s illness; he officially became its leader in 2018 after years of speculation about his father’s death (Sayed et Clarke, 2021) . Sirajuddin was also appointed deputy leader of the Taliban in 2015, a position he still holds today (Kumar Sen, 2015) . Sirajuddin Haqqani – [ image source ] The withdrawal of coalition forces in August 2021 allowed the Taliban to regain power and re-establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Haqqani network was reportedly given control over security operations in Kabul the day they took power (Dettmer, 2021) . As deputy leader of the Taliban, Sirajuddin subsequently became the second most powerful figure in Afghanistan, and he was appointed to the country’s interior ministry as the Interior Minister (BBC, 2021) . Presently, the Haqqani network has continued to assist the Taliban in governing Afghanistan, and in August 2025, it was announced that the U.S. had lifted bounties placed on Sirajuddin and his relatives, Abdul Aziz Haqqani and Yahya Haqqani (Associated Press, 2025) .   Objectives & Ideology Similar to the mainstream Taliban, the Haqqani network adheres to Salafist principles. Salafism is an extreme interpretation of Sunni Islam that advocates for a return to the traditions of the earliest generations of Muslims; as a result, the group advocates for the strict implementation of Sharia law in territory under its control. The Haqqani network, as well as the mainstream Taliban, also follow the Deobandi school of thought (Lurie, 2020, p2) . The Deobandi school grew out of South Asia in 1867, originating in the Dar ul-Ulum madrasa in Deoband, India. According to Deobandi thought, Muslim societies have experienced stunted development due to their deviation from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and have been corrupted by Western influences. Consequently, the Haqqani network’s objectives have been primarily focused on driving foreign influence out of Afghanistan, first the Soviets during the Soviet-Afghan war and later the Americans in the post-9/11 period. The Haqqani network has also at times displayed sympathy for global jihadist ideologies, similar to those of groups like al-Qaeda. This is demonstrated in the group’s closeness to al-Qaeda and its ex-leader Osama Bin Laden, and their willingness to provide sanctuary to them (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p42) . However, this affinity can be attributed to pragmatism rather than being ideology, as unlike al-Qaeda, which pursues global objectives, the Haqqani network has a regional focus, reflected in its roots in tribal networks (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) .   Military & Political Abilities Militarily, the Haqqani network is a formidable force in Afghanistan, being described by U.S. military commanders as “the most resilient enemy network” fighting against coalition forces (Partlow, 2011) . A 2020 estimate of the Haqqani network’s strength concluded that the group comprises around 10,000 militants, accounting for roughly 20% of the Taliban’s forces overall (Ahmad, 2020) . The significant military strength of the Haqqani network is evident in its involvement in numerous high-profile attacks during the insurgency against coalition forces, such as the December 2009 bombing against the CIA’s Forward Operating Base Chapman, which resulted in the deaths of seven intelligence officers and was described as “one of the most lethal strikes against the agency in decades” (Lurie, 2020, p5) . The threat posed by the Haqqani network in the post-9/11 period is heightened by its extreme violence relative to other militant organisations operating in the region, most notably through their use of indiscriminate suicide bombings. While the specific types of weaponry the group has access to are unknown, data on Haqqani-attributed incidents between 1970 and 2013 show that 64% of attacks involved explosives, 29% involved firearms, 1% involved chemicals, and the remaining 6% are of unknown origin (Romaniuk et Webb, 2016, p181) . The capabilities of the group are aided by the network of local tribes and transnational jihadist supporters it has cultivated. By developing relationships with other actors, such as al-Qaeda, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Pakistan’s ISI, the group has been able to extend its operational outreach beyond its traditional strongholds in Loya Paktia (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) . Additionally, the Haqqani network has developed significant streams of income to finance their operations. Historically, the group was financed by donations from foreign actors, particularly the CIA, the Gulf states, and Pakistan. While Pakistan remains a sponsor of the group, they have also developed independent sources of income through a wide range of licit and illicit activities, leading some to describe it as a “mafia-type network” (Peters, 2012, p39-51) . These activities range from legal front companies, particularly in construction and import-export, to extortion and smuggling of precursor chemicals used in heroin production.   Approach to Resistance The Haqqani network’s approach to resistance can be defined by two key strategies, the first being their adoption of suicide bombings to carry out attacks. The group is credited with being the pioneers of suicide bombings in Afghanistan, and the use of foreign bombers has been a key feature of this strategy (Mapping Militants Project, 2018) . Haqqani network bombings are often orchestrated against high-profile targets that maximise casualties. This strategy can be seen in numerous attacks attributed to the group, for instance, the 2008 Indian embassy bombing. The second key strategy utilised by the Haqqani network is its flexibility in collaborating with a wide range of different actors. In addition to extending its operational outreach, as mentioned in the previous section, this strategy has allowed the group to build its power by creating new opportunities for recruitment and procurement.   International Relations & Alliances The Haqqani network has cultivated a wide range of relationships and alliances throughout its history, most notably its integration into the Taliban, as described in earlier sections. However, the group’s relationships with other actors go far beyond just the Taliban, and Pakistan’s ISI has also been a crucial partner. For decades , Pakistan has faced allegations of funding and coordinating the Haqqani network’s activities, and in 2011, they were described by U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen as a “veritable arm” of the ISI (BBC, 2011) . The relationship between the ISI and the Haqqani network has been a mutually beneficial one. From the perspective of the Haqqani network, they receive large amounts of money and weapons from the ISI, which also provides the group with training, intelligence, and sanctuary in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Waldman, 2010) . From Pakistan’s perspective, its relationship with the Haqqani network has allowed them to project their influence in the region. The 2008 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, carried out by the Haqqani network, is one example of the group acting in the interest of the ISI. Additionally, the Haqqani network has historically provided material and ideological support to militants fighting against India in the Kashmir region, such as by hosting them in their training camps, which is another way the Haqqani network has operated in favour of Pakistani interests (Kaura, 2021) . The Haqqani network has also developed close relationships with other jihadist networks, such as al-Qaeda and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The relationship between the Haqqani network and numerous other jihadist networks is historical, going back to the 1980s when training camps for foreign fighters were established in Haqqani territory. For the Haqqani network, this is an important relationship; it has helped “diversify the resource mobilisation networks” that it has access to (Brown et Rassler, 2011, p47) . By developing these relationships, it has provided the group with a new source of militants from which it can draw its power, reducing its dependence on other actors. For groups such as al-Qaeda and the TTP, the relationship is beneficial as they are provided with sanctuary in Haqqani territory, where they can train and plan. Ultimately, the relationships and alliances the Haqqani network has developed are of the utmost importance to building its power. These relationships have placed the group into a “nexus position”, allowing it to gain leverage over other actors (Brown et Rassler, 2011) . For example, the group’s relationship with the TTP, which is engaged in a small-scale insurgency against the Pakistani state, has allowed them to gain influence with the ISI. Bibliography ABC News. (2021) Taliban appoint members of Haqqani terrorist network in senior Afghan government roles . Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-09-10/taliban-appoint-haqqani-network-members-in-senior-afghan-roles/100442918 . Ahmad, J. (2020) The Taliban’s emerging tactical terror alliances . Available at: https://thehill.com/opinion/international/502358-the-talibans-emerging-tactical-terror-alliances/ . Al-Sharqi, A. (1994) Abu `Ata’ Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan . Available at: https://ctc.westpoint.edu/harmony-program/abu-ata-al-sharqi-reports-from-afghanistan-original-language-2/ . Associated Press. (2025) The US lifts bounties on senior Taliban officials, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, says Kabul . 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(2021) Hardline Haqqani Network Put in Charge of Kabul Security . Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/south-central-asia_hardline-haqqani-network-put-charge-kabul-security/6209747.html . Edwards, D. (2002) Before Taliban: Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad . Los Angeles: University of California Press. EFSAS. (2022) The Haqqani Network: A brief profile .   Available at: https://www.efsas.org/publications/articles-by-efsas/the-haqqani-network-a-brief-profile/ . FBIS. (2004) Compilation of Usama Bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004 . Available at: https://irp.fas.org/world/para/ubl-fbis.pdf . Galster, S. (2001) Afghanistan: The Making of U.S. Policy, 1973-1990 . Available at: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html .   Haqqani, J. (1980) Jalaluddin Haqqani interview with Sami ‘Abd al-Muttalib . Interviewed by Sami ‘Abd al-Muttalib. Al-Ittihad . 11 June. Kaura, V. (2021) The Haqqani Network and India’s Afghan Dilemma . Available at: https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/papers/the-haqqani-network-and-indias-afghan-dilemma/ . Kumar Sen, A. (2015) In Afghanistan, the Taliban Has a New Leader, But it’s His Deputy Who is Raising Eyebrows . Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-afghanistan-the-taliban-has-a-new-leader-but-it-s-his-deputy-who-is-raising-eyebrows/ . Lurie, D. (2020) The Haqqani Network: The Shadow Group Supporting the Taliban’s Operations . Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26605 . Mapping Militants Project. (2018) Haqqani Network . Available at: https://mappingmilitants.org/node/386 . Partlow, J. (2011) Haqqani insurgent group proves resilient foe in Afghan war . Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/haqqani-insurgent-group-proves-resilient-foe-in-afghan-war/2011/05/27/AG0wfKEH_story.html . Peters, G. (2012) Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry . Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep05621 . 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Introduction The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), also known as Jami’ah Ikhwan Muslimin , Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen , or the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers, is a global Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt in 1928. Often seen as the first mainstream Islamist organisation and the precursor of modern Islamism, the MB has influenced countless offshoots, from political parties like Ennahda in Tunisia to transnational militant actors such as Al-Qaeda. According to academic Peter Mandaville, all contemporary Islamist groups “owe a debt to the project Hasan al-Banna initiated in 1928”. (1) The MB positions itself as a non-violent movement focused on the re-Islamisation of society through grassroots reforms. At the height of its power, it briefly led Egypt following the Arab Spring in the early 2010s, but has since been outlawed and/or designated a terrorist group in many countries, including its country of origin. Known for their adaptability and organisational resilience, the group has survived long periods in exile, remaining active—primarily operating out of Türkiye and London—despite its current Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment since 2013. History & Foundations The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, a middle-class schoolteacher from Mahmuddiyah, a small town in Northern Egypt. Growing up during the height of British rule over Egypt, as the Ottoman Empire’s presence declined, al-Banna was witness to Egypt’s increasing westernisation and secularisation under British influence. While working in the Suez Canal town of Ismailiyah, where stark inequalities separated local Egyptians and British settlers, al-Banna began writing in frustration about the need for re-Islamisation. (2)  He started teaching informal classes about Islam to students in local mosques and coffeehouses that eventually attracted parents and residents. (3)  Heavily influenced by the glory of the Ottoman Empire, al-Banna sought to oppose British influence in Egypt and remind Muslims of the primacy and singularity of their Islamic identity. He encouraged all Muslims to implement Islam in every aspect of their life, believing that individual change was the best way to restore a true Islamic society. Al-Banna’s vision centred on two primary goals: The liberation of the entire Muslim world from foreign domination The establishment of an Islamic state in the Muslim world to implement the laws and social system of Islam (4) He intended to achieve this by educating the next generation of Muslims in the ‘correct’ interpretation of Islam. Hassan al-Banna - [ Image source ] By the 1930s, al-Banna’s movement had grown from small meetings in Ismailiyah to a national network of schools, hospitals, and welfare charities. The newly formed Muslim Brotherhood recruited heavily in universities, encouraging students to take the messages back to their villages. This, alongside an intricate organisational structure with an emphasis on local leadership, allowed the MB to grow rapidly. By the 1940s, the MB had expanded internationally; Egyptian scholars were travelling across the Arab world, Brothers were sent to Palestine to support the 1936 uprisings and the 1948 war (5) , and offshoots were formed in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. As the organisation grew, members created a paramilitary wing, the Secret Apparatus ( Nizam al-Khass ), which carried out strategic bombings and assassinations, culminating in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Fahmy al-Nuqrayshi in 1948.  (6)  In 1949, al-Banna was assassinated in a counter-attack by the Egyptian secret services. (7) Al-Banna was crucial to the organisation, and so fuelled by anger at his death, the MB allied with the Free Officers movement—a group of revolutionaries in the Egyptian Armed Forces—to overthrow the reigning King Farouk. Though a seemingly unlikely pairing—an Islamist group and a nationalist group—both had “dedicated themselves to anti-colonialism and reformation of Arab and Muslim society”. (8)  Leading this movement was the future president, General Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood two years before al-Banna’s death. (9) Nasser had worked closely with Brotherhood member and infamous ideologue in the making, Sayyid Qutb, with whom he shared a vision for post-monarchist Egypt. (10) Yet once Farouk was overthrown and Nasser became president in 1952, he turned on the MB, seeing them as a rival to his power. An attempted assassination on Nasser’s life by a fringe MB member in 1954 (11)  cemented their mutual hostility, and shortly thereafter, Nasser began a period of mass incarceration that characterised his regime during the 1950s and 1960s. High-ranking leaders, including Hassan al-Hudaybi (the Supreme Guide) and Sayyid Qutb, were jailed alongside thousands of members, while others fled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia, preventing large-scale mobilisation during this time. In prison, Qutb wrote some of his most influential and popular works, including Milestones , where he declared that most of the Muslim world was living in Jahiliyyah (the era of pre-Islamic ignorance) for not ruling by Shari’a (God’s law), saying of those who support secular laws, “This is not Islam, and they are not Muslims.” (12)  Al-Hudaybi attempted to consolidate his authority over the group by publishing works countering Qutb’s ideology, but was unable to prevent more radical offshoots from forming. Eventually, in 1966, Nasser executed Qutb for his role in an alleged plot to assassinate him. (13)  Nonetheless, Qutb’s works remained influential. Following Nasser’s death in 1970, President Anwar Sadat eased restrictions on the MB after 20 years of repression, freeing members on the condition they renounce violence. Both sides made steps towards normalisation, and the MB helped Sadat counter the remaining Nasserists by drumming up support from conservatives and Islamists. This enabled the Brotherhood to regain influence, particularly on university campuses, and rebuild public trust. However, by the late ‘70s and ‘80s, Sadat’s increasingly authoritarian rule and peace treaties with Israel had spurred the growth of Islamic extremism. Several Qutbist Brotherhood members who graduated from university at the time would later form splinter groups that would ultimately become Hamas , Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda. When Hosni Mubarak took office in 1981, he appealed to moderate Islamists within the MB, allowing them to maintain a presence in university campuses, charitable spaces and mosques. (14)  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the MB grew in size, and more members began pushing for political involvement, even spawning a reformist wing. The reformists pushed for multi-party democracy, while conservatives prioritised religious outreach ( da’wah ). (15)   Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak - [ Image source ] Mubarak’s 30-year presidency saw active political involvement by the MB, with many Brotherhood-affiliated candidates standing in elections, from student unions to the national parliament. (16)  By also focusing on local action and social services, the MB earned political legitimacy from Egyptian society, something the state under Mubarak’s government was struggling to achieve. (17)  Fearing their potential influence, Mubarak soon began reimprisoning members after years of mollifying them. By the 2005 parliamentary elections, independent MB members (the MB was still outlawed) formed the largest opposition bloc, leading to further crackdowns and the outlawing of all religious parties. Following the 2010 elections, which were widely hailed as fraudulent, the MB lost all but one of its seats (18) , setting the stage for the Arab Spring revolts against government corruption, which would take place in 2011. When protests against the Mubarak regime first broke out in 2011, mirroring large-scale anti-authoritarian demonstrations across the Arab world, Brotherhood leaders were initially cautious of supporting them for fear of repercussions; however, younger members pushed for support. (19)  The MB quickly harnessed the public political momentum after Mubarak’s ousting, forming its own political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, which would win Egypt’s first democratic elections in 2012, electing Mohamed Morsi to the Egyptian presidency. Similar Islamist victories occurred in Tunisia and Morocco, both by offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood—Ennahda and the Justice and Development Party, respectively. However, once in government, the Brotherhood was unready for the political power it had amassed, falling into the familiar trap of authoritarianism. Morsi declared himself immune from judicial review and enshrined Islamic texts as the basis for legislation, despite running on a platform of social justice and anti-establishmentarianism. (20) Mass protests on Morsi’s first anniversary in office prompted the army to suspend the constitution and arrest him, with army General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi taking over. The bloody aftermath—later known as the Raba massacre—during which over 1,000 counter-protestors were killed (21)  remains a defining trauma for the MB. To this day, the MB asserts that Morsi (who died in 2019) is Egypt’s rightful, democratically elected leader. Since then, under al-Sisi’s presidency, the MB has faced its greatest repression yet owing to an army-led crackdown. Despite its designation as a terrorist organisation and the imprisonment of its Supreme Guide, Mohamed Badie, the MB continues to operate mainly in exile, relying on support from Türkiye and Qatar. However, it has struggled to regain the influence or legitimacy it enjoyed before 2013. Thousands protest in Cairo’s Tahrir Square following the deposition of Mohamed Morsi - Source: Mahmud Hams/AFP via Getty Images Objectives & Ideology “Islam is the solution”   The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni Islamist socio-political organisation that bases its principles on the Holy Qur’an and the Sunnah (the traditions and actions of Muhammad), emphasising the implementation of Shari’a. As put by al-Banna:  “Islam is a comprehensive system that deals with all aspects of life. It is a state and country or a government and a nation. It is moral character and the power of compassion and justice. It is a culture and law or science and judiciary, it is matter and wealth or earning and richness, it is jihad and call or army and ideal, as it is a truthful doctrine and worship.” (22) The MB seeks to bring about Islamic governance under Shari’a law, stressing that Islam is a way of life beyond personal faith. This is often described as political Islam—a term rejected by the Brotherhood, who claim it creates false connotations that Islam is being co-opted for political power. The MB has undergone numerous ideological changes during its long history and produced several famous ideologues now seen as progenitors of the modern Islamist movement’s various strands. (23) Hassan al-Banna was the group’s first and most influential ideologue. An anti-colonial pan-Islamist, he was heavily influenced by stories of the Ottoman Empire’s reach and influence. Despite living and dying under British rule, al-Banna rejected Western ideals, including secularism and Egyptian nationalism, though he maintained that nationalism was compatible with Islamic ideals. Al-Banna sought to create a true Islamic society from the bottom up, prioritising people living their lives as good Muslims, using education and social structures as tools to bring people back into the Islamic fold. (24) This strategy persisted into the 1960s and 1970s, before a shift in ideology spearheaded by Sayyid Qutb started favouring a more fundamentalist interpretation of the Qur’an. Qutbism is still seen as one of the most significant ideological influences behind modern Salafi-Jihadism, with Qutb often described as the ideological architect behind al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other Islamist groups. (25)  During his time in Nasser’s prisons, Qutb’s focus drifted from anti-imperialism to a different view of Islam. He argued that Islam did not just proscribe defensive war, but that jihad was an existential fight against apostasy, including apostate regimes. This popularised the concept of takfirism ,   or designating other Muslims as apostates, thereby making them legitimate targets for violence under Shari’a law. While many Egyptians rejected this view, it encouraged many Brotherhood members (26)  to adopt violent, offensive Islamism, including Ayman al-Zawahiri, (27)  who would go on to lead al-Qaeda, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who would found the Islamic State. (28) Although Qutb was never a formal leader of the Brotherhood, he was highly influential, and after his death, leaders attempted to steer members away from Qutb’s more radical school of thought. One prominent figure that followed, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, emerged as the unofficial ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood  (29)  but declined opportunities for leadership twice. (30)  Citing al-Banna as his main influence, al-Qaradawi built a large following from his base in Qatar, where he had fled after his imprisonment under Nasser. While he rejected Qutb’s extremism and defended aspects of international law, he controversially issued decrees permitting suicide attacks on Israel, including against civilian targets. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, as the MB became increasingly politically engaged, it shifted its focus to political reform and began officially condemning the rise of Islamic extremist groups. This bore fruit in the form of Brotherhood member Mohamed Morsi’s election to the presidency in 2012 and his attempts to implement Islamic governance in Egypt. Since the al-Sisi-led coup against Morsi in 2013, the MB has returned to resisting political repression and to reaffirming al-Banna’s original vision, albeit cleaving into two ideological camps: those who still see hope in political change and those disillusioned with the Egyptian government. This internal division has made any political headway difficult, and the failure to achieve lasting change after the 2011 uprisings has disenchanted many younger members. Despite these challenges, the MB supposedly remains committed to non-violence. The Brotherhood’s official website continues to emphasise the holistic approach of the MB in the political, social, economic, and educational spheres, and stresses the importance of the “reunification” of the Muslim world. (31)  Since the October 7th attacks by Hamas / AQB , Palestinian Islamic Jihad , the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine , and others on Israel, and Israel’s subsequent war in Gaza (and attacks on Hamas and its regional allies in Qatar, Iran, Hezbollah  in Lebanon, HTS  in Syria, and the Houthis  in Yemen), calls for a greater unified Muslim community have been stressed. (32)  Ultimately, it is the breadth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideologies that has enabled the group’s longevity, even if such diversity produces internal divides. (33) Political & Military Capabilities Following its fall from the height of its political power in 2013, the MB suffered from significantly reduced capacity, owing to the dissolution of the Freedom and Justice Party in 2014, and the exile of the MB from Egypt. Subsequent terrorist designations from surrounding Arab states have made it further difficult for the group to operate freely. Though the group still has bases in Türkiye and London (with limited presence in Qatar), these are largely under-the-radar, and the group has no official political presence in either country. Additionally, recent diplomatic normalisation between Türkiye and Egypt has led to the closing of Brotherhood TV channels broadcasting from Istanbul and harsher restrictions on citizenship for Brotherhood members. (34)  Similarly, improved diplomatic relations between the US, EU and Egypt have triggered greater scrutiny of the MB, making open movement more difficult amidst fear of proscription. It is the group’s complex internal organisational structure that has allowed it to survive for so many years. Defined by regular elections and an elaborate pyramid-style hierarchy of numerous cells, messages seamlessly pass from leadership to the rank-and-file. Recruitment has historically targeted middle-class, politically conscious university students who often take the group’s message from cities back to more rural areas. This focus on recruitment has built a strong base at the bottom of the pyramid, ensuring a steady flow of new members without constant direction from the top. The network is tightly interconnected, creating community and loyalty. New enlistees start as  muhibb  (lovers) while their commitment is tested. If they pass, they join 6–7 others in an  usra  (family), the bottom rung of the system. Five families form a  shu’uba  (division), and 3–4 divisions make a  mantiqa  (district). Members progress to  mu’ayyad (supporters), who can pray, preach, and recruit, but not vote, followed by  muntazib  (affiliates), and  muntazir  (organisers), who must memorise the Qur’an and form their own usras. Only after completing these steps do members become  akh-amil (working brothers), with voting rights and eligibility for leadership. (35) Pyramid Structure of the Muslim Brotherhood - Source: Inside the Muslim Brotherhood: Religion, Identity, and Politics, Khalil al-Alani At the top of the pyramid, ensuring political transparency, there are administrative regional officers, a legislative branch (the Shura Council), an executive guidance bureau with four-year terms, and a Supreme Guide voted in by the Shura Council. In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has faced major internal political turmoil driven by the loss of key leaders through imprisonment or death. After Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie’s imprisonment in 2013, Mohamed Ezzat was unanimously voted in as acting Guide until his arrest in Cairo in 2020. London-based Ibrahim Mounir was then elected as acting Guide, but his restructuring efforts clashed with Istanbul-based leaders, prompting a failed coup attempt in 2022. (36)   The Istanbul faction broke away thereafter, electing Mahmoud Hussein, the only remaining member of the old General Council, known for his work in finance and media, as their Guide. (37) The London-based faction continued to recognise Mounir until he died in 2022, after which his favoured successor, Salah Abdel Haq, famed for his focus on reunification and addressing the membership crisis, replaced him. The London faction views itself as more legitimate due to its legal operation, while the Istanbul faction claims to be truer to the MB’s original mission by remaining based in the Arab world. Such divisions were once unthinkable for a movement famed for its internal cohesion, but political setbacks have deepened. The death in 2022 of Qatar-based ideologue Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a key figure in spreading the Brotherhood’s message to mass audiences, significantly weakened the group’s global influence. Leadership instability has led to “crisis promotions” of younger members and difficulty retaining a disillusioned membership. (38)  Ultimately, the group’s capacity to act as a large-scale political force in exile is now severely limited. The Muslim Brotherhood does not currently have a military wing. Historically, sometime between 1938–1940, the MB did form the Nizam al-Khass (Special Apparatus) as a counter-offensive to British colonialism, with members receiving varying levels of paramilitary training and carrying out attacks against British bases (39) — it was a smaller cell of the Nizam al-Khass that attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954 (40) — however, the military wing was largely stamped out in the imprisonment that followed the assassination attempt, and by the 1970s, violence had been completely disavowed. Following Morsi’s ousting, some younger members pushed for armed resistance, leading to a year of deadly clashes with Egyptian security forces. However, this was never supported by the older leadership, who remembered the repression resulting from the violence during Nasser's time, and the brutal crackdown against the Syrian Brotherhood in 1982, limiting the scope of violent resistance by young Brotherhood members. Approach to Resistance The Muslim Brotherhood pledges to maintain its commitment to peaceful tactics and its opposition to violence as a means of political action. It continues to actively distance itself from radical Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and has reverted to societal, community-based change initiatives. However, the MB’s approach to resistance is largely dictated by where it can and cannot operate. A movement in exile, it now relies on digital communications from Istanbul and London to keep its dwindling membership base in Egypt alive. This has precipitated a strategic shift towards the Internet as the primary method and medium of organisation and activism, with the MB posting regular messages on its websites Ikhwan Web (English) and Ikhwan Online (Arabic) . Due to leadership splits, two versions of IkhwanWeb exist, each releasing its own press statements and messaging. The Arabic and English sites offer notably different content, with the English site targeting outsiders with a more moderate tone, and the Arabic site aimed at members, offering more conservative advice on religious guidance and daily life. (41)  The leadership divides are also visible in the different factions’ approaches to resistance. London-based Abdel Haq favours a more diplomatic approach to regaining power in Egypt and is willing to consider rapprochement with al-Sisi in exchange for an operation, whereas Istanbul’s Hussein is vehemently opposed to reconciliation. (42) In Europe, the MB has prioritised slow, societal expansion and integration into communities, running schools, corner stores, and community centres. In 2025, two French civil servants authored a controversial state-ordered report declaring that the MB runs 139 places of worship, over 280 social organisations, and 815 Qur’anic schools within France. (43)  The MB attempted a similar expansion in the UK via the creation and co-option of Muslim cultural, social and charitable organisations. (44)  Yusuf al-Qaradawi expressed the aim of these projects as the creation of a “small society within the larger society [the West].” International Relations & Alliances Alliances The Muslim Brotherhood maintains affiliates in several countries. Although most started as branches of the Egyptian movement, they now largely operate on their own and are simply linked ideologically. Syria Once the largest offshoot, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) was all but crushed after the 1982 Hama massacre, where thousands of members were killed in a crackdown by Hafiz al-Assad. Since the overthrow of the Assad regime in 2024, there has been a modest resurgence of the SMB under the government’s new leadership by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) . (45) Jordan In May 2025, the Jordanian government officially outlawed the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood following allegations of members’ involvement in a terror plot threatening national security. (46)  The group has not been formally recognised since 2015, but for decades had continued to function as a non-revolutionary loyal opposition. Its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, remains active, recently winning 31 of 138 seats in the 2024 parliamentary elections. Though the group had previously boycotted elections, it has been politically revived by the war in Gaza. (47)   Palestine Emerging during the First Intifada in 1987, Hamas  began as a militant offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, whose networks had been established as far back as the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, when Egyptian Brothers were sent to fight there. (48)  The two groups no longer have formal ties, with both favouring different tactics; however, having long made an exception for violence in the Palestinian context, the MB has released multiple statements in support of Hamas following the October 7th attacks and subsequent war in Gaza. (49) International Relations The MB maintains key allies and adversaries across the globe, receiving funding primarily from Türkiye and Qatar. Qatar Qatar has long held a strategic partnership with the Brotherhood. Ideologically aligned with the state’s Wahhabi beliefs, Qatar has historically been a primary funder of the MB, and has supported the group in numerous other ways, including through TV slots for preaching on its state-sponsored channel Al-Jazeera. This fuelled a blockade by the Arab Quartet (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) until Qatar scaled back open support for the MB, expelling some senior members and toning down messaging on Al-Jazeera following Saudi-led normalisation talks, though still maintaining discreet funding. (50) Türkiye Türkiye, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has been another ardent defender of the MB. Erdoğan, who was himself linked to the movement in the past, vocally opposed the ousting of Morsi, hosted exiled Brothers, and supported Qatar during the blockade. Yet, in recent years, he too has reduced his support, instead pursuing rapprochement with Egypt. Even so, Istanbul remains a key base for the MB, and Erdoğan continues to maintain ties to garner strategic influence amongst Muslim communities. (51)   Saudi Arabia In the 1950s, Saudi Arabia was a firm ally of the MB, welcoming exiles fleeing Nasser’s repression and giving many teaching positions at universities, shaping the kingdom’s own Islamic school of thought. Over time, however, tensions emerged, particularly with the rise of Salafi-Jihadist movements. The Gulf War marked the first major rupture, when offshoots demanded political reform and the removal of American troops. The aftermath of 9/11 caused even greater strain, with external American pressure to clamp down on extremism. The final straw was the Arab Spring; the Brotherhood was seen as a destabilising, anti-monarchy force, and the Kingdom formally designated them a terrorist organisation in 2014, becoming the first state in the region to do so. The West In the West, the Muslim Brotherhood has never been formally designated a terrorist organisation, and in much of Europe, it has been allowed to operate freely as a civil society group. It has, however, remained under scrutiny, with a formal inquiry by the UK government in 2015 and a similar report in France in 2025. In the United States, where the Brotherhood once had sympathetic support from Barack Obama (52) , it faces harsher scrutiny under Donald Trump, with US officials once again pushing for proscription, with the group only narrowly avoiding designation following a congressional subcommittee during Trump’s first term. (53)  Bibliography Mandaville, Peter. Global Political Islam . Routledge, 2008. Mura, Andrea. “A Genealogical Inquiry into Early Islamism: The Discourse of Hasan Al-Banna,” Journal of Political Ideologies  17, no. 1 (February 2012): 61–85. doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2012.644986 . Mitchell, Richard P. “Hasan Al-Banna and the Founding of the Society of the Muslim Brothers,” in The Society Of The Muslim Brothers . Oxford University Press, 1993, 1–11. doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195084375.003.0001 . Ikhwan Web. “Hasan Al-Banna and his Political Thought of Islamic Brotherhood,” Ikhwan Web , May 13, 2008. ikhwanweb.com/hasan-al-banna-and-his-politic/ . Lagervall, Rickard. “The Muslim Brotherhood,” in Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements , ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carol M. Cusack. Brill, 2021, 73–85. doi.org/10.1163/9789004435544_006 . Ibid. Counter Extremism Project. “Hassan Al-Banna,” Counter Extremism Project . counterextremism.com/extremists/hassan-al-banna . Gerges, Fawaz A. Making the Arab World: Nasser, Qutb, and the Clash that Shaped the Middle East . Princeton University Press, 2018, 6. Hamid, Shadi. “Muslim Brothers: The Rivalry That Shaped Modern Egypt,” Foreign Affairs , August 15, 2018. foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2018-08-14/muslim-brothers# . Ibid.  Doty, Robert C. “NASSER ESCAPES ATTEMPT on LIFE; Assassin, Who Fires 8 Shots, Is Held -- Egypt’s Police See Moslem Brotherhood Tie,” The New York Times , October 27, 1954. nytimes.com/1954/10/27/archives/nasser-escapes-attempt-on-life-assassin-who-fires-8-shots-is-held.html . Counter Extremism Project. “Qutb: In His Own Words,” Counter Extremism Project , 2015. counterextremism.com/blog/qutb-his-own-words . Calvert, John. “The Afterlife of Sayyid Qutb,” Foreign Policy , March 14, 2024. foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/15/the-afterlife-of-sayyid-qutb/ . Al-Awadi, Hesham. “Mubarak and the Islamists: Why Did the ‘Honeymoon’ End?,” The Middle East Journal  59, no. 1 (January 1, 2005): 1–19. doi.org/10.3751/194034605783996934 . 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Brill, 2021, 73–85. doi.org/10.1163/9789004435544_006 . BBC News. “Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi: A turbulent presidency cut short,” BBC News , June 17, 2019. bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18371427 . Human Rights Watch. “Egypt: Rab’a Massacre Reverberates 10 Years Later,” Human Rights Watch , August 14, 2023. hrw.org/news/2023/08/14/egypt-raba-massacre-reverberates-10-years-later . Al-Abdin, A.Z. “The Political Thought Of Ḥasan Al-Bannā,” Islamic Studies  28, no. 3 (1989): 219–34. jstor.org/stable/20839955 . Ikhwan Web. “The Principles of the Muslim Brotherhood,” Ikhwan Web , February 1, 2010. ikhwanweb.com/the-principles-of-the-muslim-b/ . Ibid. Toth, James. Sayyid Qutb: The Life and Legacy of a Radical Islamic Intellectual . Oxford University Press, 2013. El Sharkawy, Mostafa. “Soldiers of God: The Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Democracy,” Yale Review of International Studies , November 16, 2021. yris.yira.org/essays/soldiers-of-god-the-muslim-brotherhood-and-egyptian-democracy/ . Lagervall, Rickard. “The Muslim Brotherhood,” in Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements , ed. Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carol M. Cusack. Brill, 2021, 73–85. doi.org/10.1163/9789004435544_006 . McCants, William. “The Believer: How Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi Became Leader of the Islamic State,” The Brookings Institution , April 29, 2014. csweb.brookings.edu/content/research/essays/2015/thebeliever.html . Counter Extremism Project. “Yusuf Al-Qaradawi,” Counter Extremism Project , 2022. counterextremism.com/extremists/yusuf-al-qaradawi . Al Jazeera. “Al-Qaradawi turns down top Brotherhood post,” Al Jazeera , January 12, 2004. aljazeera.com/news/2004/1/12/al-qaradawi-turns-down-top-brotherhood-post . Ikhwan Web. “The Muslim Brotherhood: The Solid Core and the Beacon of Hope,” Ikhwan Web , March 27, 2024. ikhwanweb.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-the-solid-core-and-the-beacon-of-hope/ . Ikhwan Site. “Muslim Brotherhood - About Us,” Ikhwan Site . ikhwan.site//en/about . Ibrahim, Ahmed. “What does the future hold for the Muslim Brotherhood?,” Al Jazeera , August 14, 2023. aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/the-future-of-the-muslim-brotherhood . Kenez, Levent. “Turkey assures Muslim Brotherhood that rapprochement with Egypt will not affect them,” Nordic Monitor , February 21, 2024. nordicmonitor.com/2024/02/turkey-assures-muslim-brotherhood-that-rapprochement-with-egypt-will-not-affect-them/ . Ikhwan Web. “Muslim Brotherhood: Structure & Spread,” Ikhwan Web , June 13, 2007. ikhwanweb.com/muslim-brotherhood%3A-structure/ . Fulco, Carmen and Abdelgawad, Doha S. “A Movement in Exile: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s Survival Action Frames in the Post-Coup Era (2013–2023),” Journal of North African Studies  30, no. 3 (July 7, 2024): 1–32. doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2024.2369092 . Ibid. Ibrahim, Ahmed. “What does the future hold for the Muslim Brotherhood?,” Al Jazeera , August 14, 2023. aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/14/the-future-of-the-muslim-brotherhood . El Zalaf, Ahmed Abou. “The Special Apparatus (Al-Niẓām Al-Khāṣṣ): The Rise of Nationalist Militancy in the Ranks of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” Religions  13, no. 1 (January 14, 2022): 77. doi.org/10.3390/rel13010077 . Ashour, Omar. “Myths and realities: The Muslim Brothers and armed activism,” Al Jazeera , August 12, 2014. aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/12/myths-and-realities-the-muslim-brothers-and-armed-activism . D'Urbano, Paolo. Ikhwan Web: Digital Activism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood , PhD thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2012. doi.org/10.25501/SOAS.00016815 . General Secretariat of the Muslim Brotherhood. “بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم ,” Facebook , September 16, 2024. facebook.com/General.Secretariat28/posts/pfbid02otkR8L5Kn5pwcUYgaoeThEigxFiaACzouy57qVTXAUhRXc2D3fvjuB9GDecEsm1l . Schofield, Hugh. “French report warns of Islamist ‘entryism’ as risk to national cohesion,” BBC News , May 21, 2025. bbc.co.uk/news/articles/ckgnnelvz0do . Counter Extremism Project. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Britain: Analysis of Recent Sanctions,” Counter Extremism Project , January 13, 2025. counterextremism.com/blog/muslim-brotherhood-britain-analysis-recent-sanctions . Ozugurlu, Muza. “Return of the Ikhwan: Erdogan reboots the Muslim Brotherhood in West Asia,” The Cradle , April 24, 2025. thecradle.co/articles/return-of-the-ikhwan-erdogan-reboots-the-muslim-brotherhood-in-west-asia . Gritten, David. “Jordan says 16 arrested over foiled rocket and drone attack plots,” BBC News , April 15, 2025. bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cpwzywjwgvyo . Quilliam, Neil. “Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop,” Chatham House , February 5, 2025. chathamhouse.org/2025/05/jordans-ban-muslim-brotherhood-no-surprise-comes-against-dangerous-backdrop . ISPI. “Forged in Palestinian Nationalism and Militant Pragmatism: Hamas’ Islamism Explained,” ISPI , March 20, 2025. ispionline.it/en/publication/forged-in-palestinian-nationalism-and-militant-pragmatism-hamas-islamism-explained-203299 . Ikhwan Web. “The Steadfastness of ‘Sinwar’… and the Will of the Palestinian People Will Not Be Broken!,” Ikhwan Web , October 18, 2024. ikhwanweb.com/the-steadfastness-of-sinwar-and-the-will-of-the-palestinian-people-will-not-be-broken/ . Moore, Sam. “An Analysis of Qatari Connections to Illicit Terror Financing and the Resulting Foreign Policy Implications,” The International Affairs Review , December 31, 2024. iar-gwu.org/print-archive/an-analysis-of-qatari-connections-to-illicit-terror-financing-and-the-resulting-foreign-policy-implications . Kenez, Levent. “Erdogan still maintains close ties with Muslim Brotherhood despite rapprochement with Sisi,” Nordic Monitor , September 20, 2024. nordicmonitor.com/2024/09/erdogan-still-maintains-close-ties-with-muslim-brotherhood-despite-rapprochement-with-sisi/ . Adraoui, Mohamed-Ali. “The Obama administration and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab Revolutions. Taming political Islam?,” International Politics  56, (May 4, 2018): 551–567. doi.org/10.1057/s41311-018-0151-3 . U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on House Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, 115th Cong., 2nd sess., 2018, 115–90. congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108532/text .

Introduction & Overview The Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) is a far-right volunteer unit fighting on the Ukrainian side of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war. Despite their siding with Ukraine, the unit largely specialises in the recruitment, training, and deployment of Russian nationals who disagree with the current Putin regime in their homeland.  Gaining notoriety for their incursions into Russian territory in the Spring of 2023, the RDK has developed from a small group of volunteer fighters to a well-armed and motivated fighting force, possibly having been incorporated into the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition to front-line fighting, the RDK also make use of guerrilla/clandestine operations on Russian soil, encouraging arson attacks and the disruption of logistical railways.   Ideologically, the RDK ascribe to general far-right "traditionalist" attitudes, often encompassing homophobia, white supremacism, and neo-nazism. Said attitudes are frequently promoted through the group's telegram channel, as well as through the "White Rex" clothing line owned by the group's founder, notorious white supremacist and ex-MMA fighter Denis Nikitin.  Denis Nikitin alongside RDK fighters - [ Image source ] History & Foundations Whilst the RDK was officially founded in August of 2022 (Satanovskii, 2023) , many fighters who would end up fighting under the group had been participating in the Donbas war since 2014 (Talmazan, 2023) . Initially, the unit had just 5 members (Dettmer, 2024) ; however, it was only a short time before RDK's recruitment efforts reaped their rewards. Amongst these new recruits were some interesting characters, one such example being Alexei Levkin. Creator of the Neo-Nazi community Wotanjugend (Meduza, 2023) and the lead singer of national socialist black metal group M8l8th (DOXA, 2023) , Levkin is held in high regard in the Eastern European far-right scene and has expressed support for neo-Nazi mass killer Anders Breivik (Meduza, 2023) .  RDK's leader, Denis Kaputsin, is an equally interesting individual. Operating under the pseudonym Denis "WhiteRex" Nikitin (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , Kaputsin is in his 30s and originally hails from Moscow (Claus, 2017) . In 2001, Nikitin moved to Germany with his family, quickly becoming involved in the local Neo-Nazi scene (DOXA, 2023) . As with many militant far-right individuals/groups, Nikitin also had extensive involvement in football hooliganism (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , and such activity, in combination with his Neo-Nazi ties, led to the revocation of Nikitin's German residence permit (DOXA, 2023) .  A keen MMA practitioner (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , Nikitin used his newfound exile as an opportunity to travel and become involved in the European far-right "active club" scene (Claus, 2017) . Through his involvement in this network of active clubs, Nikitin began his own lifestyle/MMA brand, "WhiteRex". Nikitin then used this brand to hold events for far-right community members, as well as producing Neo-Nazi influenced merchandise (Claus, 2017) . These events allowed Nikitin to generate a reputation and gain respect from leaders in the scene, quickly developing an extensive network of contacts across Europe (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , even being asked to attend a far-right training camp in the UK as a coach (Claus, 2017) .  Now, despite these ties to Neo-Nazism, Nikitin strangely denies following such beliefs (Hewson, 2023) . However, the reasons behind such claims become clear with a little digging. Ironically, Nikitin's family originally moved to Germany as Jewish contingent refugees, with the family being treated as a special case due to their Jewish origin (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . Regardless of this inherent contradiction, Nikitin moved to Ukraine in 2017 in order to begin his participation in the Donbas conflict (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Shortly after the initial foundation of RDK and its opening activity in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the group quickly gained support from other units with a similarly largely Russian composition (Хвиля, 2022) . On the 31st of August, 2022, the former deputy of the Russian Federation and leader of the Freedom of Russia Legion (Mallinder, 2023) , Ilya Ponomarev, made an announcement on social media stating that a declaration of cooperation between the "Russian Volunteer Corps", the Legion "Freedom of Russia" and the "National Republican Army" ( Facebook ) . Supposedly signed in the Kyiv region, the declaration called for the coordination of forces between the groups, and the adoption of a new symbol alongside the foundation of a political centre to best represent the group's new joint objectives/ideological stance (Гречаная, 2022) .  Despite this statement, RDK ardently denied signing any such declaration ( https://t.me/russvolcorps/118 ) . According to the group's telegram channel, RDK attended the event, but were unaware that they would be asked to sign any declaration, and refused to do so, expecting a press conference with the military associations of the Russian people. Nikitin has stated that ideological differences led to rifts between the groups, primarily due to efforts to convince RDK to accept black/trans volunteers (Dettmer, 2024) .  Whilst the RDK had been involved in military activity from early 2022, such as being used to guard Snake Island following its recapture ( https://t.me/russvolcorps/313 ) , the group's real activity began in 2023. On the second of March, RDK conducted an incursion into the Russian border city of Bryansk (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . Russian media responded to the incident with accusations of attacks against civilians, alleging that two adults were killed and an 11-year-old boy was injured; however, such accusations were later denied by civilians in the area (Meduza, 2023 1) . Whilst misconceptions around this attack are rife (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023) , geolocatable videos from RDK confirm that the incursion did in fact take place ( https://t.me/milinfolive/97542 / https://t.me/russvolcorps/424 ) , with some believing that the attack was in fact a false flag designed to generate justification for the Russian invasion (Blann, 2023) .  This operation, in combination with a foiled plot orchestrated by Nikitin to kill Orthodox media magnate Konstantin Malofeyev (The Moscow Times, 2023) , led to Nikitin being added to the interior ministry's wanted list on the 26th of March ( https://t.me/tass_agency/185764 ) . Again, it is worth noting that there is no real proof of any such plot existing, and it could very well be an attempt to discourage Russians, who often follow orthodox Christianity, from joining the RDK following the incursion on the 2nd of March.  RDK's activity in Russian territory continued in May. On the 24th, RDK began shelling positions in the Russian region of Belgorod (Satanovskii, 2023) . Collaborating with the Freedom of Russia Legion, RDK claims to have then manoeuvred to take control of a 40km strip along the Russian-Ukrainian border (Perelman, 2023) . Despite efforts to hold this territory, the Ukrainian forces were pushed back to the border after a few days of fighting; however, the groups continued their periodic raids into the region (Hewson, 2023) . Again, Russia responded to these operations with allegations of attacks on civilians, claiming that 12 people were wounded (Al Jazeera, 2023) .  The RDK Logo/Flag - [ Image source ] These periodic raids continued into June, primarily being conducted in the Shekino ( https://t.me/rvc_army/581 ) and Novaya Tavolzhanka ( https://t.me/rvc_army/573 ) areas. These areas were held for at least a week ( https://t.me/rvc_army/591 ) but were again eventually abandoned. Despite this eventual retreat, the RDK had sent their message, forcing Russia to secure its borders in the area. On the 11th of November 2023, the RDK was designated as a terror organisation by the FSB (FSB, 2024) .  Judging by the RDK's social media channels, the group seems to have continued its participation with military operations in the east of Ukraine, refraining from further incursions until 2024. On the 12th of March, RDK, alongside the Freedom of Russia Legion and Siberian Battalion, launched the largest yet cross-border attack into Kursk and Belgorod (Dettmer, 2024) .  Nikitin, alongside various RDK fighters - [ Image source ] Objectives & Ideology Unlike most nationalist groups participating in the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war, the RDK are both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. The RDK's core objective is to create a Russia that can live in peace with its surrounding countries, whilst respecting Ukrainian and Belarusian sovereignty (Satanovskii, 2023) . NIkitin has openly described himself as a "Russian nationalist", although he feels that Russian nationalism has taken a wrong turn somewhere in the past (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) .  A key component of this proposed "wrong turn" is Putin himself. The Russian president is a regular target of criticism amongst RDK circles (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . In the eyes of RDK, Putin is a traitor waging a fraternal war to please his oligarch babysitters (Dettmer, 2024) . This fraternal war, in combination with increased immigration rates caused by imperialistic attitudes in the Kremlin, is supposedly leading to the loss/muddying of ethnic Russian blood (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) .  RDK seeks to address these "concerns" through the creation of a Russian ethnostate consisting of regions that were a part of the 1991 Russian Federation (DOXA, 2023) . Should this solution be implemented, the RDK has stated that it is content with any additional regions leaving the federation and gaining independence (Satanovskii, 2023) . These views are an escalation from the far-right/traditionalist views that the group commonly promotes (Hewson, 2023) and into the territory of neo-Nazi conspiracy theories such as "The Great Replacement" ( https://t.me/rvc_army/554 ) .  Such extremist ideologies can also be found in the group's stockastic anti-Semitism, with Nikitin criticising Zelensky or being a jew who promotes "the worst of liberal values" (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) whilst also stating that he has no problem with jews (Hewson, 2023) . Further examples can be found in Nikitin's clothing brand "White Rex", which commonly sells designs featuring black sun symbols (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , or even through fighters on the front line, with some conducting Hitler salutes during combat ( https://t.me/rvc_army/81 ) . Despite these more militant elements of the RDK, there is a surprising amount of diversity amongst their ranks. Some volunteers identify as liberal or left-wing, turning a blind eye to secure a chance to fight against Putin (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Similarly, some fighters may not fully align themselves with RDK's overarching objectives, but are short on options due to the few units on the Ukrainian side accepting Russians (DOXA, 2023) .  Military/Political Abilities Whilst not a huge force, the RDK is the largest of the Russian volunteer units, including the Freedom of Russia legion, with claims of around 2000 fighters being involved in the March 2024 raids into Russian territory (Dettmer, 2024) . However, the veracity of such numbers is dubious, with fighters in 2023 claiming that RDK numbered between 150 (Satanovskii, 2023) and 200 (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) fighters.  Despite the RDK's numerical ambiguity, their equipment is rather impressive for a volunteer group. By 2024, RDK had gained access to its own vehicles, mortars, artillery, HMGS and small arms, even founding a base of operations and clear-cut recruitment process (Dettmer, 2024) . Whilst many volunteer groups have access to such equipment, the quality/age of such equipment is often questionable. RDK, on the other hand, has managed to equip at least some of its fighters with thermal sights ( https://t.me/rvc_army/97 ) and has even posted on social media implying that they are either in possession of or have access to an M142 HIMARS ( https://t.me/rvc_army/268 ) .  Additionally, the RDK make use of armoured vehicles such as Maxx Pro MRAPs ( https://t.me/rvc_army/527 ) and even scavenged enemy vehicles, such as a BTR-82A that was captured during the group's raids in the Belgorod region ( https://t.me/rvc_army/518 ) . Whilst initially damaged, eventually the vehicle was repaired using monetary donations generated through the group's social media channels ( https://t.me/rvc_army/552 ) .  RDK fighters alongside a captured BTR82-A, with one soldier equipped with some form of thermal/night vision scope. - [ Image source ] RDK's connection/collaboration with the Ukrainian Armed Forces is unclear, with UA officials being purposefully vague about how the two forces interact (Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova, 2023) . According to Nikitin, the RDK's formation was encouraged by the UAF, but was not sponsored through equipment or financial support (Al Jazeera, 2023) . It is largely the opinion of the UAF that the RDK is independent of Ukraine, but also has every right to take up arms against a tyrant/dictator (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) .  However, the ties between the RDK and the UAF seem to have grown closer. Once fighters enter Ukraine, they are put through a polygraph test by the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine before they are authorised to join the RDK (Hewson, 2023) . This assistance with recruitment can also be found in accusations that Ukrainian military members worked with the Civil Council in Poland (a political recruitment body assisting the RDK) to prepare papers and contracts for foreign fighters (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . Similarly, fighters have claimed that they receive a wage directly from the UAF (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) , and in 2024, it was claimed that the UAF vets the RDK's operational plans and provides logistical support for the group's activities (Dettmer, 2024) .  Despite this increasing closeness, the UAF openly disavow RDK's operations within Russian territory. Initially, the UAF outright condemned the activities of the RDK on Russian soil, stating that they were an independent body from Ukrainian forces (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . However, as the conflict in Ukraine has developed, the RDK has stated that whilst they now officially fight as a component of UA forces, once they enter Russian territory, they are simply Russian citizens who have taken up arms (Dettmer, 2024) .  Approach to Resistance Whilst RDK has fought in a standard battleline capacity for the majority of the war in Ukraine, its notable actions have largely taken on a diversionary/sabotage capacity ( https://t.me/rvc_army/680 ) . For example, the primary aim of RDK's March 2023 incursion into Russian territory was stated to be diversionary, drawing Russian troops away from the frontlines in the east (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . In addition to frustrating Russia's efforts to fight on one front in the East, these attacks also demonstrate to Russian civilians the government's failure to secure its own borders, despite Putin's posturing to indicate otherwise (Pigni, 2023) . These attitudes of diversion/sabotage are also encouraged outside of the frontlines. Russian nationals who wish to join RDK are instructed to first participate in disruptive activities on Russian soil ( https://t.me/rvc_army/194 ) .  These activities are primarily suggested to be the use of Molotov cocktails in arson attacks, and the disruption of logistical railway lines in an attempt to sabotage the Russian military industrial complex ( https://t.me/rvc_army/186 ) .  Generally, operations on Russian soil aim to whip up anger against Putin and support for RDK's activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) , often using graffiti as a promotional tool ( https://t.me/rvc_army/211 ) , in order to collapse the Russian state from within (Hewson, 2023) . Due to these objectives, RDK's existence is at odds with the existence of the current Russian state (DOXA, 2023) , and therefore, the group views its fight as existential and civil war as inevitable (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . Due to this, violent resistance is seen as the primary tool with which RDK can fight the Russian state (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . RDK seems to take its role/fight seriously, operating in a fairly organised and structured capacity, with clear efforts made to generate a supporting logistical network for its activities (Dixon, Ebel, and Ilyushina, 2023) . Within the RDK, there are numerous units/roles, including medics and drone operators, with all recruits receiving 2 months of basic training (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . The group even has a "Free Cossack" detachment made of Cossacks from the Kuban and Don regions (Bondarenko, 2024) and a unit dedicated to the use of OSINT in an attempt to track Russian activity ( https://t.me/rvc_army/377 ) .  The flag of the “Free Cossacks” RDK Unit - [ Image source ] In terms of recruitment efforts, the RDK seems to have generated its own pipeline (Diehl, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens, 2023) . First, potential recruits become involved in the active club/hooligan/NSBM in their area. Eventually, the individual may come across the White Rex MMA brand, or the NSBM band M8L8TH, and through their connections to the group, the individual would eventually learn of RDK. Finally, if the individual is already predisposed to such activities, the RDK will radicalise the recruit and offer them a chance to fight on the front lines should they show such potential. This pipeline seems highly effective at recruiting ideologically driven and dedicated fighters, with RDK membership seeming far more "hardcore" than those fighting with similar groups such as the Freedom of Russia Legion (Talmazan, 2023) . ​ International Relations & Alliances The RDK's ties to the Azov Brigade are relatively unclear. Whilst the RDK was formed outside of Azov, many of its initial members were existing fighters under the Azov Brigade, and had been fighting in the Donbas since 2013 (Pigni, 2023) . Interestingly, the RDK's first post on their Telegram channel is in fact a memorandum to an Azov fighter ( https://t.me/rvc_army/42 ) .  These initial ties seem to have been continued, with the RDK working alongside Azov units on the front lines, as can be seen through extensive videos posted by he group on their Telegram channel. The following video, depicting international recruits being welcomed into the RDK, also hints towards continued connections between the two factions ( https://t.me/rvc_army/661 ) . In the video, as recruits get onto their transport, they shake hands with their instructor. The handshake, where both individuals grip each other's forearms, is largely associated with Azov fighters.  As noted earlier, the RDK also has links to the Polish political party "Civic Council". Founded in Warsaw and led by Anastasia Sergeyeva (ex-head of the Poland-based "For a Free Russia" association), the Civic Council is a centre-right party which works internationally to provide support to similarly driven groups (Satanovskii, 2023) . The Civic Council, of which the RDK was an official component (Satanovskii, 2023) , operated to actively funnel volunteers to the RDK (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2023) . However, on the 6th of June 2023, due to unspecified ideological differences, the Civic Council announced that it would be cutting ties with the RDK ( https://t.me/civiccouncil/245 ) .  Works Cited (1) - Al Jazeera (2023). Leader of anti-Putin force says expect more Russian border raids . [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/25/russian-leader-of-anti-putin-force-says-expect-more-border-raids   (2) - Blann. (2023). Russia claims Ukraine crossborder sabotage raid; Kyiv denies . [online] Available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missile-strike-apartment-building-d2b8fc376956d2bedc44d3a0d711f260 . (3) - Bondarenko. (2024). Приехали с Кубани и вступили в РДК: российские казаки воюют на стороне ВСУ под Авдеевкой . [online] ФОКУС. Available at: https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/625719-priehali-s-kubani-i-vstupili-v-rdk-rossijskie-kazaki-voyuyut-na-storone-vsu-pod-avdeevkoj   (4) - Claus. (2017). Neonazis und illegale Kämpfe: Wie sich deutsche und russische Hooligans vernetzen . [online] VICE. Available at: https://www.vice.com/de/article/neonazis-und-illegale-kampfe-wie-sich-deutsche-und-russische-hooligans-vernetzen/ (5) - Demyanik. (2022). Российская оппозиция начинает вооруженное сопротивление Путину: подписано декларацию . [online] ГЛАВКОМ. Available at: https://glavcom.ua/ru/news/mozhovoj-tsentr-sverzhenija-rezhima-putina-budet-dejstvovat-v-ukraine-872092.html   (6) - Dettmer. (2024). Ukraine embraces far-right russian ‘bad guy’ to take the battle to putin . [online] Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-of-the-ukraine-war/ . (7) - Diehl,, Holscher, Lehberger, and Siemens. (2019). Rechtsextremer Kampfsportler: Der Neonazi-Krieger . [online] Spiegel.de . Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/rechtsextremer-kampfsportler-der-neonazi-krieger-aus-moskau-a-1253163.html (8) - Dixon, R., Ebel, F. and Ilyushina, M. (2023). Kremlin accuses Ukraine of violent attack in western Russia . [online] The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/03/02/bryansk-russia-attack-ukraine-saboteurs/   (9) - DOXA. (2023). ‘Мы — русские, и мы — не россияне’ . [online] DOXA. Available at: https://doxa.team/articles/rdk-profile (10) - FSB. (2024). Единый федеральный список организаций, в том числе иностранных и международных организаций, признанных в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации террористическими :: Федеральная Служба Безопасности . [online] Available at: http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/npd/terror.htm . (11) - Hewson. (2023). Inside the controversial group of Russian dissidents fighting with Ukraine against Putin . [online] Available at: https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/inside-the-controversial-group-of-russian-dissidents-fighting-with-ukraine-against-putin   (12) - Litvinova, Karmanau, and Arhirova. (2023). Who’s behind the attack on a Russian region bordering Ukraine? [online] AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-border-attacks-explainer-88af10d3895a203918f03ba32687b908 . (13) - Mallinder. (2023). Who is Ilya Ponomarev, the anti-war Russian renegade exiled in Ukraine?  [online] Al Jazeera. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/8/who-is-ilya-ponomarev-the-anti-war-russian-renegade-exiled-in-ukraine   (14) - Meduza. (2023). ‘Русский добровольческий корпус’ выпустил манифест под названием ‘Человек этнический’ — Meduza . [online] Available at: https://meduza.io/news/2023/05/29/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-vypustil-manifest-pod-nazvaniem-chelovek-etnicheskiy   (15) - Perelman. (2023). The Interview - Pro-Kyiv Russian group says it ‘didn’t lose a single soldier’ in cross-border raids on Belgorod . [online] France 24. Available at: https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-interview/20230524-pro-ukraine-group-didn-t-lose-a-single-soldier-in-cross-border-raids-leader-says   (16) - Pigni. (2023). Explainer: Which Russian Far-Right Groups are Fighting in Ukraine?  [online] The Moscow Times. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/03/24/explainer-which-russian-far-right-groups-are-fighting-in-ukraine-a80543   (17) - Pikulicka-Wilczewska (2023). Insight: How Russians end up in a far-right militia fighting in Ukraine. Reuters . [online] 11 May. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-russians-end-up-far-right-militia-fighting-ukraine-2023-05-11/ . (18) - Satanovskii (2023). Who are the Russian volunteers fighting for Ukraine?  [online] dw.com . Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/who-are-the-russian-volunteers-fighting-for-ukraine/a-65722771   (19) - Talmazan. (2023). Who are the anti-Putin groups behind the dramatic raid into Russia?  [online] Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/belgorod-raid-russian-volunteer-corps-freedom-russia-legion-rcna86168 . (20) - The Moscow Times. (2023). Leader of Russian Volunteer Corps Placed on Interior Ministry Wanted List . [online] The Moscow Times. Available at: https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/03/27/leader-of-russian-volunteer-corps-placed-on-interior-ministry-wanted-list-a80621 . (21) - Гречаная (2022). ‘Русский добровольческий корпус’, легион ‘Свобода России’ и "Национальная...  [online] Гордон | Gordon. Available at: https://gordonua.com/news/war/russkiy-dobrovolcheskiy-korpus-legion-svoboda-rossii-i-nacionalnaya-respublikanskaya-armiya-rf-podpisali-deklaraciyu-o-sotrudnichestve-1624002.html   (22) - Хвиля (2022). Илья Пономарев опубликовал ‘Ирпенскую декларацию’ российской оппозиции: "Вооруженное сопротивление путинс...  [online] hvylya.net . Available at: https://hvylya.net/news/258492-ilya-ponomarev-opublikoval-irpenskuyu-deklaraciyu-rossiyskoy-oppozicii-vooruzhennoe-soprotivlenie-putinskomu-fashizmu#google_vignette   (23) - Шевченко (2024). ‘Пустили под откос поезд с ценным грузом’: бойцы РДК устроили диверсию на территории РФ . [online] ФОКУС. Available at: https://focus.ua/voennye-novosti/622001-pustili-pod-otkos-poezd-s-cennym-gruzom-bojcy-rdk-ustroili-diversiyu-na-territorii-rf#goog_rewarded

Introduction & Overview Efforts to solidify Misanthropic Divisions' true nature have been relatively unsuccessful. It seems as if, rather than a unit or clear structure of fighters (as is often assumed), Misanthropic Division is in reality a network/group to which any pro-Ukrainian combatant can claim membership as long as they follow the group's far-right ideology.  Founded in 2013, Misanthropic Division promotes far-right/neo-nazi ideology and provides both material and monetary support to units/groups which it deems to be in line with its own views. Gaining notoriety through their involvement in the 2014 Euromaidan protests alongside Right Sector, Misanthropic Division continued its praxis throughout the separatist conflict in the Donbas and the eventual Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.  Whilst Misanthropic Divisions' foundations, and the majority of the group's activity, can be found in Ukraine, a key component of the group's efforts is international recruitment for Ukrainian volunteer groups. With close ties to the Azov Brigade, the Misanthropic Division uses cells across Europe to radicalise and recruit existing members of far-right communities into joining a range of international volunteer combatant groups.  History & Foundations Formed in 2013 ( https://t.me/c/1565564438/43654 ) , Misanthropic Division (henceforth referred to as MD) found its roots in the Kharkiv football hooligan scene (Sova Center, 2016) , a common trend amongst far-right groups. Initially, consisting of only 14 people (Sova Center, 2016) , MD made their first appearance in December of 2013 during the events of Ukraine's Euromaidan, operating as a component of the Right Sector (Ukraine's far-right party) (Reft and Light, 2016) . Of the 14 initial members of the groups, two individuals quickly developed prominence amongst MD's activities.  MD's primary founder is a man by the name of Dmytro Pavlov (Sova Center, 2016) . The apparent leader of MD, Pavlov, is originally from Belarus (Sova Center, 2016 1) , and has extensive ties to Eastern European neo-Nazi networks (an unsurprising fact in the light of Pavlov's nom de guerre; "Misanthropic Fuhrer") (Sova Center, 2016) . The other notable individual, Serhiy "People Hater" Lynnyk, was another key component MD's initial activities alongside the Right Sector (Sova Center, 2016) . Following MD's involvement in combat operations, Lynnyk fought alongside the Azov brigade and has since become a prominent propagandist for MD, posting about his combat experiences on the MD webpage/telegram (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Following its initial involvement in the Euromaidan, MD continued working alongside Right Sector. On the 15 of March, 2014, pro-Russian activists from the Oplot organisation attacked Ukrainian right-wing groups in the Kharkiv Right Sector office (Reft and Light, 2016) . Both sides of the clash were heavily armed, leading to the attack descending into a gunfight, resulting in the deaths of two pro-Russian activists. MD claimed responsibility for these deaths (Yudina, 2020) . Once officially founded, MD increased recruitment drives and began its participation in the Donbas war as a component of the Azov brigade (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Despite its infancy, MD's influence rapidly spread outside of Ukraine. Following the foundation of the Kyiv branch, other branches began to pop up across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017) . For example, a branch was founded in Switzerland by a man known as Bjorn Sigvald. A native of Geneva, Sigvald seemed to work closely with MD to organise and further recruit for the Swiss branch of the group, with some members being active members of the Swiss military (Renversé, 2020) .  This activity did not go unnoticed. On the 21st of March, 2015, Italian national Saverio Fontana, a prominent recruiter for MD, was spotted in Newcastle (UK) at a neo-Nazi rally where the MD banner was being displayed (FOIA Research, 2019) . Shortly following this, the UK branch of MD organised a protest outside of the US embassy in London, demanding the release of neo-Nazi Gary Yabrough from prison, and consequently leading to considerable scrutiny from both the press and law enforcement entities (Libcom, 2015) . MD's activity during this period also led to further pressure in the east, with Russia declaring the group as an extremist organisation on the 17th of July, banning their activity (euronews, 2021) .  MD continued their activity in both Ukraine and wider Europe, orchestrating and participating in various political actions alongside various other groups, such as the British National Party (Libcom, 2015) . In March 2016, MD claimed responsibility for the disruption of the Equality festival in Lviv due to its pro-LGBT nature. Around 200 individuals in sportswear and masks blocked the entrance into the event following a bomb threat, and as the event's attendees were evacuated, their vehicles were attacked with stones and metal bars (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Following this prominent action, MD announced that it would be ceasing activity; however, in August, the group announced that they would be resuming their operations (Sova Center, 2016) . This period of inactivity led to a curious development. In July 2016, confirmation of Russian citizens in MD activities came in the form of a criminal case opened by the Russian state. The case, opened against the group's leader (Pavlov) and two Russian nationals, led to the Russians being arrested and shipped to Moscow, with Pavlov remaining safe in Ukraine (Sova Center, 2016) .  MD's return from hiatus is marked by a reinsertion into the often asymmetrical zeitgeist of Ukraine's defence in the face of Russian invasion. On the 16th of October, 2016, Arsen "Motorola" Pavlov was killed by an explosion in the elevator shaft of his apartment block in Donetsk (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022) . The infamous leader of the 'Sparta' separatist battalion, Pavlov had previously openly admitted to war crimes, including a recorded phone call where the pro-Russian warlord claimed to have killed POWs (BBC, 2016) . Misanthropic Division quickly claimed responsibility for the assassination (Human Rights in Ukraine, 2022) ; however, it's unclear how true this claim really is.  MD’s alternative flag/symbol - [ Source ] Misanthropic Division's connection to the attack was made using a video posted on a small YouTube channel ( https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC2xD70pZt9R8Xq0K5tLkieg ) . In the video, four masked men claim that they would next target Igor Plotnitsky and Alexander Zakharchenko, leaders of separatist groups in the Donbas, in a continued campaign of assassinations (BBC, 2016) . Silhouetting the armed huddle of supposed MD fighters are the banners of both Misanthropic Division and Phoenix Division, an MD splinter group (Украинская правда, 2016) . The video was quickly picked up by and distributed across Russian media (Romanyuk, 2016) .  However, Misanthropic Divisions' official channels refuted any involvement with the death of Pavlov (BBC, 2016) . Instead, MD claimed that a member of the Chernihiv rifle battalion, as well as Phoenix Division, by the name of Dim Kravtsov was the original creator of the video (Romanyuk, 2016) . It seems that, based on Facebook posts in far-right circles, this confusion was down to infighting between MD and Phoenix Division (Romanyuk, 2016) . In reality, Pavlov's death probably had nothing to do with MD. According to reports to the BBC, an ethnic Abkhaz commander fell out with Pavlov before his death and may have been the real culprit (BBC, 2016) . Despite these reports, Phoenix division reposted the video on its own channels, reiterating its supposed veracity, and prompting MD to threaten the sub-group online (Romanyuk, 2016) .  Whilst MD's activity in the Donbas has continued with the 2022 Russian invasion, the group has largely folded into Azov and disavows militant actions (MMP, 2022) . However, MD has also continued its actions in the West of Ukraine. For example, on June 23rd, 2018, a group of young men, later claiming to be a part of the MD-linked group "Sober and angry youth", attacked a Roma settlement in Lviv, stabbing one man to death and injuring three others (including a 10-year-old boy) (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025) . The group's primary modern activity consists of fundraising through merchandise sales on the Walknvt and Runic Storm webstore (MMP, 2022) .  The Runic Storm website, where Misanthropic Division merchandise can be purchased - [ Source ] Objectives & Ideology As can be assumed by the group's name, MD carries a firmly nihilistic worldview (MMP, 2022) . Operating off of semi-Nietzschean ideas, MD believes that the modern world is meaningless and that a return to nature and primitivism is essential (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . This interest in nature/primitivism is further exemplified by MD's unique brand of Germanic neo-paganism, Slavic neo-paganism and neo-Nazi ideology (Sova Center, 2016) . Viewing such ideologies as a key component of their ancestral heritage, MD posture in a way which rejects modern society and instead calls for a return to ancient belief systems which place increased value on naturalism (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Interestingly, MD's neo-Nazi/National Socialist beliefs seem to contradict their attitudes towards primitivism almost inherently. Whilst MD seems to take an almost anarcho-primitivist perspective towards the ideal lifestyle a follower should lead, the group is simultaneously supportive of strong centralised state power (Reft and Light, 2016) and the use of eugenics to purge society of "weakness, defects, and ugliness" to achieve the "Ubermensch" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Similarly, MD carries extensive white supremacist attitudes. As mentioned earlier, the idea of "blood"/ancestry is extremely important to MD (Reft and Light, 2016), with the group stating that its core political objective is the preservation of "white Europe" (Sova Center, 2016) and "European culture and identity" (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . This objective is sought to be achieved in part through the complete cessation of all non-European immigration into Ukraine (Reft and Light, 2016) as well as the defence of Ukraine and Europe from "Asiatic hordes" (as was stated by the group in the wake of a French MD volunteer fighter being killed in the Donbas) (Harp, 2022) . These perspectives on immigration are also ingrained into MD's recruitment process, only accepting European/Eurodescendant men (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) as well as holding reservations against Chechens or Crimean Tatars joining Right Sector (Reft and Light, 2016) . Despite the clear contradiction between naturalistic beliefs and ideas such as eugenics or ethno-nationalism, MD makes no efforts to hide its extreme-right convictions. MD members can regularly be seen conducting nazi salutes, donning swastikas, and reciting racist idioms (BBC, 2016) . The group's flag features two Totenkopf symbols, with the Phoenix Division flag featuring a red Schwarze Sonne-style bird (Reft and Light, 2016) . These views are expressed through the group's telegram channel in tandem with a range of commonly associated beliefs such as anti-communism, traditionalism, homophobia, sexism, and anti-semitism (MD TELEGRAM) .  As with many far-right militant groups, MD is also a proponent of Siege culture and accelerationism. For example, the leader of MD's German branch stated that reading Charles Mason's "Siege" was a considerable component of his radicalisation (Biermann, 2021) . The accelerationist solutions proposed by Mason can also be seen throughout MD's communications online, believing that the white race must destroy the current system in order to rise from the ashes (Sova Center, 2016) , with these beliefs forming into the misanthropy around which the group has centred its branding (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) .  Military/Political Abilities In reality, MD's military/political abilities remain unclear. Due to the group's constantly shifting nature, its various splinter groups/units, and sprawling web of cells which seem to operate semi-autonomously, even MD's central hub seems to be slightly confused in relation to its own actions (as evidenced by the infighting caused by Phoenix Division's supposed assassination of 'Pavlov" in 2016).  Whilst in 2016 the Ukrainian branch of MD claimed to have around 50 members, there is no real way of verifying this information (Reft and Light, 2016) . Additionally, it seems that the nature of existing 'active' members of MD is unclear. Some may claim to be members of MD due to their simple purchase of the group's merchandise and adherence to their ideological perspective, whilst others may claim membership through active participation in combat activities on the front lines of Ukraine.  This wide bracket of 'membership' seems to have worked in MD's favour, allowing the group to organise protests across Europe (Tribune de Genève, 2017) , recruit volunteer combatants (Collins, 2017) , and then generate monetary support for said fighters (particularly those within Azov) (MMP, 2022) . Despite this wide range of activity, MD has largely toned down its "extracurricular" activities, instead further incorporating into the Azov brigade and operating as a more regular support/recruitment hub (Biermann, 2021) .  Members of the German Volunteer Corps with an alternative version of MD’s flag - [ Source ] Approach to Resistance MD's key role in the fight against the Russian invasion is that of recruitment. Operating as a worldwide front and recruitment network for Azov and its sub-units, MD makes use of members both in Ukraine and throughout Europe to recruit fighters at home and abroad (Harp, 2022) . These recruitment drives are primarily conducted using existing networks created by the national socialist black metal scene throughout Europe (Belltower, 2020) . For example, the Swiss branch of MD travelled with French neo-Nazi black metal group Peste Noire to deliver supplies to fighters in Kyiv (Renversé, 2020) .  However, these recruitment efforts did not stop at the borders of Europe. Notorious MD recruiter, Italian national, and ex-Azov fighter Saverio Fontana was also spotted in Brazil, apparently staying there for 10 months (Martins, 2016) . During raids later conducted by Brazilian authorities, connections were found between far-right groups in Brazil and Misanthropic Division, with Fontana apparently travelling city to city on a tour of recruitment with promises of pay and military training (Deutschlandfunk, 2017) . The group's efforts to recruit fighters also continue digitally, with users in the group's Telegram chat regularly recommending that other users join volunteer units in Ukraine (primarily Azov's international brigade) (MD TELEGRAM) .  Due to Misanthropic Division's paramilitary/irregular activities, the group also utilises a highly decentralised/cell-based structure. MD does not seem to have a clear/rigid leadership structure despite efforts to bring such a structure to light (Yudina, 2020) . In fact, MD's true nature is unclear. It seems like, as opposed to a unit or clear structure of fighters, MD is a network/clique that anyone can claim to be a part of as long as they promote the group's binding ideology (Harp, 2022) . Sukhov claims that Misanthropic Division began as an informal organisation of neo-nazi Russian fighters who were on Ukraine's side and became a component of Azov (Sukhov, 2015) . However, Roussinos claims that MD is a group of Western volunteers fighting alongside Azov (Roussinos, 2022) . The reality is most likely a combination of both ideas, with the group recruiting anyone willing to take on the MD mantle and fight for Ukraine/a white Europe.  Regardless of its true nature, Misanthropic Division has spread far and wide, with branches known to be active in at least 19 countries (Sova Center, 2016) , such as Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Germany, Spain, the USA (Reft and Light, 2016), the Czech Republic, and Portugal (Yudina, 2020) . This network of cells allows MD to not only generate humanitarian support for its fighters in Ukraine (Renversé, 2020) but also to instil its violent approach to resistance into an unknown number of foreign actors. In fact, the MD's approach to resistance is almost entirely centred around violence. Recruiters explicitly search for those with a desire to fight and go to war, and incite those unwilling to fight to carry out crimes such as armed robbery to support the group's activities (Biermann, 2021) . This is unsurprising considering the group operates under the slogan "Kill for Odin" (Redaktion, 2019) .  These extremist activities are not only encouraged but actively rewarded by those in charge of MD's online presence. Telegram subscribers are rewarded for carrying out hate crimes through the offer of free MD merchandise [ https://t.me/c/1565564438/38379 ] or through outright "bounties" that are placed on targets such as Russian soldiers [ https://t.me/mdchatmd/1084704 ] . Similarly, tattoos are seemingly treated as medals/ranks, with tattoo artists being sent to leading/prominent members in order for them to receive a tattoo of the group's logo (Biermann, 2021) as a reward for their dedication to the movement.  International Relations & Alliances Whilst there is a clear connection between MD and Azov, its true extent is unclear (Harp, 2022) . With extensive references/connections to Azov from the very inception of the group's Telegram channel (MD TELEGRAM) , in 2015, MD published a manifesto in which it pledged "immediate support" for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) Azov has also stated that, during its early days, Azov gained at least partial funding through the sale of merchandise using advertisements on the MD Instagram and Facebook pages (MMP, 2022) . This support primarily consists of recruitment efforts (Biermann, 2021) as well as the embedding of fighters identifying as MD members within the Azov battalion (Reft and Light, 2016). However, whilst linked to Azov, geolocated posts/images of MD members and MD fighter death announcements don't line up with Azov's movements enough to show that said fighters are under the control of Azov as a single unit (Harp, 2022) .  Similar to Azov, MD has had links to Right Sektor since its inception. With MD's founding members beginning their political careers as members of Right Sektor, the group has previously espoused similar levels of support for Right Sektor as that demonstrated for Azov (Ukraine Crusade, 2015) . Despite this initial closeness, MD eventually disavowed Right Sektor due to its supposed "Jewish collaborationism" (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Additionally, MD has made connections with countless other political movements on both the national and international stage. Through collaboration with far-right groups such as National Action (UK) (Rawlinson, 2018) , Restrukt (Russia) (Reft and Light, 2016) , and NPD (Germany) (Redaktion, 2019) , MD has gained a relatively notable number of international volunteers whilst also fomenting violent unrest in the host states of these groups. MD has collaborated with Ukrainian groups such as the UPA and the Social Nationalist Assembly to gain similar national support for their activities (Reft and Light, 2016) . Interestingly, the Social Nationalist Assembly seems to be the only group with which MD is officially associated, and is also the party largely responsible for the creation of both the Right Sektor and the Azov brigade (Reft and Light, 2016) .  Works Cited. - BBC. (2016) ‘Motorola’: Ukraine rebels accuse Kiev over commander’s death.  [online] BBC News. 17 Oct. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-37676607 . - Belltower News. (2020). Ukraine: Wie ein rechtsextremes Freiwilligenregiment mit Black Metal Nachwuchs rekrutiert . [online] Available at: https://www.belltower.news/ukraine-wie-ein-rechtsextremes-freiwilligenregiment-mit-black-metal-nachwuchs-rekrutiert-102385/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Biermann (2021). Fascism: The Brown Internationale . [Online]. Available at: https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2021-02/fascism-international-right-wing-extremism-neo-nazis-english/seite-2  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Collins. (2017). Russian court sentences members of a neo-Nazi terror group also active in the UK – HOPE not hate . [online] HOPE not hate. Available at: https://hopenothate.org.uk/2017/06/22/russian-court-sentences-members-neo-nazi-group-also-active-uk/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Deutschlandfunk (2020). Ukraine-Krise - Brasilianische Neonazis kämpfen gegen pro-russische Rebellen . [online] Die Nachrichten. Available at: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/ukraine-krise-brasilianische-neonazis-kaempfen-gegen-pro-100.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - euronews. (2021). Factbox: Groups that Russia has declared extremist . [online] Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2021/05/06/us-russia-politics-navalny-extremism-factbox  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Faerseth. (2015). Ukraine’s far-right forces | Hate Speech International . [online] Hate Speech. Available at: https://www.hate-speech.org/ukraines-far-right-forces/  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - FOIA Research. (2019). Misanthropic Division | FOIA Research . [online] Available at: https://www.foiaresearch.net/organization/misanthropic-division  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Harp (2022). Foreign Fighters in Ukraine Could Be a Time Bomb for Their Home Countries . [Online]. Available at: https://theintercept.com/2022/06/30/ukraine-azov-neo-nazi-foreign-fighter/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Human Rights in Ukraine. (2022). Russian mercenary who committed war crimes in Donbas receives special honour in Russia . [online] Available at: https://khpg.org//en/1608809646  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Libcom. (2015). Neo-Nazi groups to protest outside US embassy . [online] Available at: https://libcom.org/article/neo-nazi-groups-protest-outside-us-embassy  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH . [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Martins. (2016). Polícia investiga movimento armado que recrutou neonazistas gaúchos para lutar na Ucrânia | GZH . [online] GZH. Available at: https://gauchazh.clicrbs.com.br/seguranca/noticia/2016/12/policia-investiga-movimento-armado-que-recrutou-neonazistas-gauchos-para-lutar-na-ucrania-8661153.html  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2025). Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15 August 2018  [Online] OHCHR. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/ReportUkraineMay-August2018_EN.docx  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Publico (2020). Publico: мост, связавший португальских и украинских неонацистов (Publico, Португалия) . [online] ИноСМИ. Available at: https://inosmi.ru/20200719/247777577.html  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Rawlinson. (2018). Neo-Nazi groups recruit Britons to fight in Ukraine . [online] The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/neo-nazi-groups-recruit-britons-to-fight-in-ukraine  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Redaktion (2019). Kommunalwahlen 2019: NPD, rechte Tarnlisten und Einzelbewerber – SACHSEN-ANHALT RECHTSAUSSEN . [online] Lsa-rechtsaussen.net . Available at: https://lsa-rechtsaussen.net/kommunalwahlen-2019-npd-rechte-tarnlisten-und-einzelbewerber/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - REFT & LIGHT ❬2016❭ Misanthropic Division: A Neo-Nazi Movement from Ukraine and Russia. [Online]. Available at: https://reftlight.euromaidanpress.com/2016/09/30/misanthropic-division-a-neo-nazi-movement-from-ukraine-and-russia/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Renversé (2020). Björn Sigvald : le néo-nazi genevois parti combattre en Ukraine . [online] Renverse.co . Available at: https://renverse.co/infos-locales/article/bjorn-sigvald-le-neo-nazi-genevois-parti-combattre-en-ukraine-2739#nb10  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Romanyuk. (2016). Fake: Motorola Fascist Killer Video . [online] StopFake. Available at: https://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-motorola-fascist-killer-video/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Roussinos. (2022). The truth about Ukraine’s far-Right militias . [online] UnHerd. Available at: https://unherd.com/2022/06/the-truth-about-ukraines-nazi-militias/ . [Accessed 15 August 2025]. - Sova Center. (2016). Завершено расследование уголовного дела участников... / COBA . [online] Available at: https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/news/counteraction/2017/03/d36501/  [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Sukhov. (2015). Foreigners Who Fight And Die For Ukraine: Russians join Ukrainians to battle Kremlin in Donbas . [online] Kyiv Post. Available at: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/foreigners-who-fight-and-die-for-ukraine-russians-join-ukrainians-to-battle-kremlin-in-donbas-386999.html  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025]. - Tribune de Genève. (2017). Tamedia Publications romandes S.A.  [online] Available at: https://www.tdg.ch/des-soldats-sympathisants-d-un-reseau-neonazi-800021880473  [Accessed 18 Aug. 2025]. - Ukraine Crusade (2015). 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL . [online] Available at: 14 THE POINTS OF MISANTHROPIC DIVISION INTERNATIONAL [Accessed 17 Aug. 2025]. - Yudina (2020) The New Exile Strategy of Russian Nationalists . [Online]. Available at: https://www.illiberalism.org/the-new-exile-strategy-of-russian-nationalists/  [Accessed 13 August 2025]. - Украинская правда (2016). Люди, назвавшие себя убийцами ‘Моторолы’, записали обращение . [online] Украинская правда. Available at: https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/10/17/7123860/  [Accessed 15 Aug. 2025].

Introduction and Overview The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) (Thai: แนวร่วมประชาธิปไตยต่อต้านเผด็จการแห่งชาติ), also referred to as the Red Shirts, is a Thai movement that formed in opposition to the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) which, despite the name, is a reactionary monarchist group associated with the Thai military, monarchy and judiciary (1). While the PAD no longer exists, the recent suspension of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra under military pressure in June 2025 has led to a small resurgence of the UDD. The UDD is largely allied with the Pheu Thai Party, which was the party of Paetongtarn Shinawatra and a successor party to her father, Thaksin Shinawatra’s political party, who was also a prime minister of Thailand before being deposed by a military coup in 2006. In broad strokes, the military, monarchy and judiciary of Thailand can be seen as the opposition to the Pheu Thai Party and the UDD. These three pillars of Thai government all had roles in the 2006 coup and a later 2014 coup that would see the Pheu Thai Party banned, although it is now a legal political party again (1)(2). History & Foundations The United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship was formed in 2006, following a military coup in Thailand (3). The UDD protested against both the coup and the constitution it ushered in. The protests were largely done by supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister who was ousted by the coup (3). During these protests, UDD supporters would wear red clothing, which garnered the nickname Red Shirts for the group. When elections were held again in 2007, allies of Shinawatra won power, which helped placate protestors. This pacification was short-lived, however, as in 2009 a series of protests held by groups in opposition to Shinawatra (these groups were pro-military and pro-monarchy, and wore yellow, hence known as the Yellow Shirts by many Thais) caused the pro-Shinawatra government to collapse. The collapse was also fostered by rulings made by the pro-monarchy judiciary.  The pro-Shinawatra government was replaced by a government led by prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva. It was widely believed by both Shinawatra and protestors that general Prem Tinsulanonda was behind both the 2006 coup and the collapse of the government again in 2009, thus Vejjajiva was also seen as being complicit in the government collapse (4). One reason that Vejjajiva and Tinsulanonda were able to be criticized by Shinawatra and protestors is because Thailand has extremely stringent lèse-majesté laws, so criticizing the king (who was no doubt involved in the coups) would be impossible without legal repercussions. However the prime minister and generals do not share these same protections (4). The presence of the pro-monarchy protestors as well as what was seen as a corrupt judiciary that sided with the military and monarchy caused UDD protests to flare up again, and this time they would be much larger than what was seen before (3). For the second round of protests there was a much larger police presence, as well as the military. Red Shirts stormed the venue of a political summit in the resort town of Pattaya and attacked prime minister Vejjajiva’s car. Clashes in Bangkok, the capital, involved as many as 100,000 people and would leave two people dead and many more injured (3)(4). After the two deaths however, the organizers of the protests would end up calling off the rest of the protests, fearing more substantial loss of life due to the ever-increasing police and military presence at protests. One year on though, the protests would reach their most violent, and successful, heights. Beginning in March of 2010, fresh protests were called for, and tens of thousands would turn out once again in Bangkok. In April the first deaths would occur, after the military attempted to disperse the Red Shirts’ camps. At least four soldiers and 17 protestors were killed in this incident (3). Unlike in 2009 however, the protestors were not deterred by the violence, and Bangkok remained occupied by tens of thousands of protestors, now consolidated into one camp. One month later, the Thai military would once again launch a raid into the Red Shirts’ camp. This time, dozens of soldiers and protestors would be killed (3). However, the increasing protests and the fact that unlike ‘09, the UDD was not as deterred by violence would eventually lead to new elections being held in 2011. The Pheu Thai Party, allies to the UDD, would win in a landslide, with Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister, Yingluck, being elected as Thailand’s first female prime minister (3). She would eventually end up being ousted in yet another coup in 2014, led by the Yellow Shirts (5). In June 2025 when a member of the Shinawatra family, Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn, also a prime minister, would once again find themselves embroiled in conflict with the military, judiciary and monarchy. After a long-simmering border dispute that came to a head led to a Cambodian soldier being killed, Paetongtarn made a phone call to the Cambodian leader Hun Sen, in which she referred to Sen as “uncle” and was too conciliatory for her country’s opposition party’s liking. This led the Thai Constitutional Court to vote to suspend her (6). This decision led to a small resurgence of the Red Shirt movement, as hundreds of members would once again gather in Bangkok to support what they saw as heavy-handed intervention by conservative parts of the Thai government (7). Despite Paetongtarn’s attempts, conciliatory or otherwise, a brief war would break out between Cambodia and Thailand over the border. Paradoxically, Yellow Shirts, who before the war were calling Paetongtarn’s attempts to talk to Cambodia too conciliatory, now protested in Bangkok that she in fact started the war (6). Eventually, Paetongtarn Shinawatra was removed from government by the Thai courts, however, there were not mass protests across the country in response to this decision. This could be a sign that Paetongtarn does not enjoy as widespread support as her father, or simply that the massive organizing power of the UDD has faded (9). Objectives & Ideology The UDD is best described as pro-democracy and anti-monarchy. While not all members might want the complete dissolution of the Thai monarchy, they can be said to at least want the military, judiciary, and monarchy to lose the ability to interfere so massively in Thai politics. If Paetongtarn Shinawatra ends up being removed as Prime Minister or another pro-monarchy coup takes place, she will be the third consecutive member of the Shinawatra family to be removed from power at the military’s behest. That the Shinawatra family takes center stage in the clash between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts leads many conservatives in Thailand to view the overall UDD movement as an extension of the Shinawatra family. While some members surely do fervently support the Shinawatras, to call the movement a complete extension of the Shinawatra family is at best an over-simplification and at worst an attempt by the Thai military and monarchy to brush aside legitimate grievances some Thai people have with their government. Thaksin Shinawatra was fairly populist and spearheaded programs such as free credit to Thailand’s rural poor during his time as prime minister (8). Actions like this led to him gaining immense support from Thailand’s lower class population. During the first coup in 2006, many of the Yellow Shirts who aided the military by protesting in Bangkok were urban, while a lot of the Red Shirts would eventually come from the rural population of Thailand (8). At its heart then, the UDD can be seen as an organizing force of Thailand’s rural poor, intrinsically pitted against the urban elite of the country. Military & Political Abilities The UDD has very little military power, besides sheer numbers. The protests of 2010 shut down the Thai capital of Bangkok for days and dozens were killed (8). However the first wave of protests in 2009 were brought to a halt after attacks from the military, showing that while the UDD can stomach losses sometimes, they will also stop activities in the face of military pressure other times.  While they might not possess military power, they wield immense political power. Thaksin Shinawatra’s sister Yunglick won the 2011 elections in a landslide in part due to her popularity with the UDD (3). The numbers of Red Shirt protestors that have turned out to support Paetongtarn Shinawatra, even nearly two decades after the founding of the UDD, speaks to the fact that many in the UDD are highly motivated (5,7). Approach to Resistance The Red Shirts broadly engage in peaceful protest, mainly gathering in large numbers in a publicly viewed place to communicate their frustrations through chanting and signs. Like any mass protest, there are elements of violence from time to time, but during the biggest protests it was generally the Red Shirt protestors themselves who bore the brunt of the violence by the police or military (8). International Relations & Alliances The Red Shirts, as a group that is focused on internal Thai politics, do not have any international backers. However, as far as alliances go, it can be said that the Red Shirt movement itself is one big alliance. As stated earlier, while many of the group consists of supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, there are other members who are simply against the military/monarchy/judicial establishment in Thailand and want a more democratic society, regardless of who is in power (3). It is arguably this diverse set of members that contributed to the mass protests of 2009-2011, as people from all over Thailand who were drawn to the ideals of democracy joined in. Works Cited: 1. https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0009343/ 2. https://thethaiger.com/news/bangkok/pheu-thai-hits-back-thaksin-no-puppet-master-just-an-adviser 3. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13294268 4. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5126671/Thai-protesters-bring-Bangkok-to-a-halt.html 5. https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/protesters-in-bangkok-demand-resignation-of-court-suspended-prime-minister-following-deadly-conflict/ 6. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9vrrj72xy7o 7. https://www.pattayamail.com/thailandnews/red-shirts-rally-at-pheu-thai-hq-urge-pm-paetongtarn-to-stay-the-course-no-dissolution-no-resignation-507271 8. https://theyonseijournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/THE-“RED-SHIRT”-MOVEMENT-PEASANT-POLITICS-IN-THAILAND.pdf 9. https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/southeast-asia/thailand-pm-paetongtarn-shinawatra-removed-cambodia-conflict-b2816495.html

Introduction and Overview The Ejército del Pueblo Paraguayo (EPP), Paraguayan People’s Army, is a relatively small Marxist-Leninist group that has been active since 2008 and has claimed responsibility for multiple kidnappings, bombings, armed robberies, and has also been accused of arson.  The Paraguayan government recognises the EPP as an armed criminal organisation that calls for students, farmers, the homeless, and other less fortunate individuals to join their revolution to overthrow the government and fight the wealthy landowners of Paraguay, whom they accuse of abusing the system and the people (1) . Despite the official recognition as a criminal organisation, officials within the Paraguayan government have referred to the EPP as a “terrorist organisation” in the past.  History and Foundations Although the EPP was not formally recognised until 2008, its roots date back to the 1990s. Some of its founding members were members of the Partido Patria Libre (PPL), or the Free Fatherland Party. Members of the PPL decided that a “clandestine militant wing” was necessary for the official political party (2) . However, due to splintering and changes in goals, those members left the PPL to create the EPP to fight against the parliamentary system and the wealthy landowners on their own terms. It was not until the early 2000s that the EPP began to take significant action. In 2005, the EPP kidnapped and later murdered Cecilia Cubas, the daughter of the former president of Paraguay. This would be just one of many kidnappings the EPP performed, although later kidnappings would be done to acquire funds through extortion (3) .   The 2010s saw a surge in EPP activities, including kidnappings, murders, bombings, and assaults on government positions in rural areas. In 2012, the EPP targeted a government-owned electricity transmission station with a bomb that did not cause any casualties; the Paraguayan government claims the blast did not interrupt operations. Another example of EPP actions includes the April 21st bombing and subsequent assault on a police station in 2013. In Azotey, Concepción, the EPP planted and detonated a bomb near a police patrol, resulting in one fatality and three wounded. After the bombing, the EPP staged an assault on the local police department. This attack resulted in the death of one militant and injured two police officers. These are just two examples of numerous attacks on the government throughout the 2010s. Objectives and Ideology  The EPP seeks to create or cause “agrarian reform from below.” In an official public notice, the EPP states,  “The peasantry must proceed with a massive occupation of large landed estates and that the occupants must be armed with whatever they can: shotguns, revolvers, rifles, machetes, slingshots, stones, etc” (1) .  In the same public notice, the EPP calls upon students, workers, the homeless, and other large public sectors to join the armed struggle with the peasantry against wealthy landowners whom the EPP deems “arrogant.” Due to these specific calls to arms against wealthy landowners and their advocacy for land reform, the EPP is often regarded as a Marxist-Leninist group. In a book authored by the leader of the EPP, Alcides Oviedo Britez, he refers to the members of the EPP as “Francoists.” He describes that the EPP is fighting to destroy the “democracy of the rich” and instead “build a serious and combative revolutionary people’s democracy” (4) . One of the first objectives stated in this book is to dismantle the current parliamentary system and replace it with a new, revolutionary system of “popular congresses” at every level of government, i.e., local, state, and federal. The book later describes other revolutionary objectives in crucial areas such as foreign relations, the judicial system, the economy, and the issue of agriculture.  Regarding foreign relations, the EPP states that the new system it wishes to implement will not grant asylum for those wishing to escape prosecution for political crimes. The EPP specifically names Mario Cossio, a former governor of Bolivia who sought asylum in Paraguay following accusations of corruption and dereliction of duty, as someone who would be turned over to the authorities of the country they are fleeing from. Following this description, the authors state, “Francoism is a friend of men and women who fight for a new, revolutionary, socialist world” (4) . The EPP seeks to create a provisional judiciary system to punish those who benefited from the current system, whom they label as “henchmen, torturers, informers, and counterrevolutionary war criminals” (4) . The book describes how the judges will be subject to popular will and that their positions can be removed as soon as the public deems necessary, as well as the fact that their salaries will not be higher than the legal minimum, stating “being an authority is a service, not a means of earning money” (4) . The economic goals of the EPP and its revolution are not too dissimilar from those of many Marxist/Leninist groups. The EPP seeks to prosecute those who have embezzled and or misappropriated public funds or have received illicit enrichment, with a special revolutionary tribunal that will have full investigative authority. The book states that those found guilty will be imprisoned for life and their assets seized. With the seized assets, the revolutionary government will reallocate the funds to various government projects such as childcare, healthcare, education, housing, and infrastructure, like passenger and freight transport. Furthermore, with the seized assets, the EPP states that privatising industrialisation programs will not be necessary (4) . The EPP states that the agrarian issue is one of Paraguay's most significant issues. The EPP states that the current government cannot be fixed due to its “unrestricted respect for private landed property.”   The EPP’s solution is to restrict the amount of land a “legal” person can own and redistribute the land to peasants and farmers who do not own or have minimal land to work. The mortgage payments that small landowners may still owe will be forgiven for up to 10 hectares. Lastly, the revolutionary government guarantees technical support for farmers in the form of providing seeds, tools, and fair pricing for products (4) .   Political and Military Abilities Due to its goals and lack of manpower, the EPP is not known to instigate large military-style operations. Instead, it relies on hit-and-run tactics, which are often used by smaller insurgency groups and those not as militarily powerful as the government. The Paraguayan government does not believe the EPP is a centralised group; instead, the group is decentralised and is estimated to have about 20-50 members according to the State Department of the United States (5) . Other estimates claim the group numbers roughly a dozen members. There are no reports of the EPP having any political representation in the Paraguayan government or having political allies within the government. Approaches to Resistance Since its founding, the EPP has been a militarised group focused on targeting government assets such as military and police outposts. The EPP has conducted armed robberies and kidnappings to hold victims for ransom as a means of financing its revolution. The EPP possesses small arms such as FN FALs and AK-47 rifles, and is capable of manufacturing improvised explosive devices (6) . The EPP is also known for using guerrilla tactics against police and military forces, most notably the use of anti-personnel mines and improvised explosive devices they call “cazabobos” (7) . The EPP is notorious for kidnapping ranchers, and more recently, Mennonites, to hold victims for ransom money. There are a few instances of the EPP holding hostages and demanding that food and or livestock be delivered to poorer areas of Paraguay in exchange for the hostages’ freedom.    The government of Paraguay created the Joint Task Force (FTC) to combat the EPP and other armed factions in 2013. This unit has been somewhat successful in killing or capturing leaders of the EPP, but has not entirely wiped out the group. Due to their leadership being captured or killed during government incursions, the EPP’s numbers dwindled to the aforementioned estimates of 20-50 members (8) .  Despite multiple operations and thousands of troops being deployed to find members of the EPP, the EPP remains alive but less active and severely diminished.  Relations and Alliances Although there has not been official confirmation, there are claims by Paraguayan officials and news outlets, such as Asunción, that the Colombian insurgent group FARC has provided training for members of the EPP. Similarly, the EPP has been accused of forming relations with Brazilian drug trafficking organizations such as the First Capital Command (PCC) and the Red Command (3) . As reported by ABC Color, a spokesperson for the Paraguayan Joint Task Force (FTC) stated, “the traffickers provide the EPP with sufficient logistics, and in return, ‘the drug traffickers use the EPP’s ‘armed wing’” (9) . Despite these claims, there is little evidence to support them. InSight Crime argues that the Paraguayan government makes these claims on little more than circumstantial evidence and has done so after instances of drug-related violence against police (10) .  Works Cited (1) - Paraguayan People's Army. “Public Notice.” Cedema.org , 2 Nov. 2008, cedema.org/digital_items/2941 . (2) - Andrés Colmán Gutiérrez. (2013, August 21). Guerrilleros o terroristas: La historia de cómo nació el EPP . Última Hora. https://www.ultimahora.com/guerrilleros-o-terroristas-la-historia-como-nacio-el-epp-n715259 (3) - “The Paraguayan People’s Army: Latin America’s Enduring Insurgency.” Grey Dynamics , 15 Apr. 2021, greydynamics.com/the-paraguayan-peoples-army-latin-americas-enduring-insurgency/ . (4) - “Summary of the EPP Political Program.” Cedema.org , 14 Aug. 2011, cedema.org/digital_items/4582 . Alcides Oviedo Britez wrote the original piece. (5) - Paraguay . (n.d.). United States Department of State. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/paraguay/ (6) - ABC Color. (2013, August 26). Sospechan que narcos proveen armas al EPP . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/politica/sospechan-que-narcos-proveen-armas-al-epp-610765.html (7) - ABC Color. (2014, July 9). The EPP is increasingly dangerous . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/edicion-impresa/editorial/el-epp-esta-cada-vez-mas-peligroso-1264232.html  Translated from Spanish to English. (8) - Ellis, R. E. (2024, July 2). Paraguay’s Security Challenges and the Government Response . Fiu.edu ; Florida International University. https://gordoninstitute.fiu.edu/news-events/the-policy-spotlight/2024/paraguays-security-challenges-and-the-government-response.html (9) - ABC Color. (2015, July 20). EPP, “brazo armado” de narcos . Abc.com.py ; ABC Color. https://www.abc.com.py/nacionales/epp-brazo-armado-de-narcos-1389637.html (10) - Gagne, D. (2017, March 27). Paraguay Guerrillas Act as Narco-Gunmen: Officials . InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/paraguay-epp-guerrillas-armed-wing-drug-traffickers/

Insurgency Overview For decades, Brazil has been plagued by extensive crime syndicates thriving on the drug trade. The fight against the cartels has allowed for another kind of “grey zone” of organized groups to emerge, the so-called police militias. These groups originated as neighborhood watches largely formed by law enforcement officers protecting their own areas, but have grown massively and now control large swathes of cities like Rio de Janeiro. Their ties to political institutions and their strong law enforcement component shelter them from official reprisal even as they have grown into extensive racket-based armed gangs. History & Foundations Brazil’s recent political history has been troubled. Between the 1960s and the late 1980s, the county was under a brutal military dictatorship. In this context, in 1965 some police officers [RG1]  created the first “death squad” of Latin America in order to avenge a fallen officer [RG2]   (1).    The “Scuderie Le Cocq” death squad continued operating as a group until the early 2000s, while it and other death squads continued perpetrating brutal interrogations, extrajudicial killings, and even battles against anyone deemed to be an opponent of the state, a drug trafficker, or both (2). During this time, it has been estimated that such death squads killed at least 900 people (3). In line with other Latin American countries, Brazil went through a phase of democratisation in the 1980s; however, this did not result in the resolution of all institutional and cultural legacies of the dictatorship (4). This was exacerbated by the dramatic increase in drug trafficking and drug-related violence during the same time, which opened up spaces that the Brazilian state was unable to fill (5). Hence, the culture of violence in law enforcement not only remained unaddressed, but itself came to be considered a consequence of the dire circumstances of the explosion of drug crime, while the weak institutional framework created the necessary vacuum that self-organised policemen filled by creating “militias” (6). As the structure and culture of policing was not reformed after the dictatorship’s end, no reform in procedures took place, and the same methods carried over to a new generation of policemen (7). It is quite explanatory that even the original “Scuderie Le Cocq” death squad continued operating until 2004, when it was disbanded by Brazil’s Federal Court; it then reappeared as a “philantrophic association” in 2015 (8). These groups started establishing control of several urban areas throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, usually by entering neighbourhoods and promising residents to curb local crime and eliminate the threat of drug cartels (9). However, these groups gradually established their own protection rackets in the areas under their control, while also monopolising even basic services such as gas, TV, and taxis (10). Objectives & Ideology Militias are not inherently political groups, and so their political affiliation is at times not a primary driver of their activity or a foundational characteristic. However, it is important to note that their existence harks back to the era in which death squads emerged, i.e., in connection with a military dictatorship that saw political opponents as the prime enemy of the State (11). Over half of the original members of the “Scuderie Le Cocq” were even veterans of the police force of the Estado Novo, an earlier dictatorship that ruled Brazil between 1937 and 1945 based on a fascist model (12). Other death squads also operated during the military dictatorship era and were directly responsible for the killings and the disappearances of hundreds of people, including left-wing opposition activists (13). While death squads between the 1960s and 1980s had as their primary objective the elimination of threats to the dictatorial establishment (and as such, were essentially state-sanctioned), modern police militias are mainly driven by a quest for economic and political power in the extralegal spaces created by Brazilian state institutions’ weakness (14). Political & Military Abilities The militias have been slowly expanding and solidifying their power for decades, not only in a structural but also in a cultural sense. Their networks have expanded to include complicit politicians, city council members, and even state congressmen (15). These are not only individuals who are sympathetic or committed to a particular militia’s objectives, but they are increasingly former or current militia members, indicating a pattern of collusion between state authorities and these organisations that goes beyond occasional and individual cases (16). In some cases, colluded officials make use of federal programmes to create new revenue streams for the militias, e.g., by accessing federal funding for subsidised housing in order to build in areas under militia control and then dictate who is going to lodge in the new buildings, “tax” them, and so on (17). In this regard, some militias are able to constitute themselves as a parallel state-like entity, in which it is difficult or impossible to separate in what capacity acts are carried out by the same individuals—i.e., whether it is the state or the militia’s power that is being imposed (18). These political and institutional ties continue to feed into a gray area that makes prosecution difficult, something that is compounded by the predominating culture in law enforcement, whereby police are reluctant or incapable of understanding militias as entirely criminal entities (19). At the same time, the extended control that a militia holds over a certain territory creates not only a long-lasting shadow economy in the area, but also an electoral stronghold (20). Such ties are further cemented through the infiltration of every facet of local community life; militias are known to establish ties with local Christian churches and are able to integrate themselves and be present even in the religious sphere (21). The pervasiveness of these organisations cannot be understated, as they are now present in fifteen of Brazil’s federal states, and not even the country’s presidency has remained unsullied: former president Jair Bolsonaro and his family have been heavily implicated in militia activity (22, 23). In the aftermath of a local anti-militia politician’s murder in Rio de Janeiro, it has been revealed that the wife and daughter of a high-profile militiaman involved in the murder were on Jair Bolsonaro’s son’s political payroll, and were thus formally employed by the State (24). Jair Bolsonaro has always had a controversial history, and has been known to express public support for the death squads that operated under the dictatorship, but the revelation that one of assassins in the slaying of Marielle Franco (the local politician mentioned previously) lived in the same upscale gated community that Bolsonaro lives in, is evidence of the close ties that the former president has enjoyed with the militia underworld (25).   Bibliography 1. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil: The “Militia” Phenomenon and Contemporary Security Issues in Rio de Janeiro. In: Justice spatiale = Spatial justice, 8, 2015. pp. 15 2. Ibidem, pp. 16-17. 3. Fogel, B. & Richmond, A. R. Outsourcing Repression. In: Jacobin, 06.04.2019. Available at: https://jacobin.com/2019/06/colombia-paramilitaries-bolsonaro-militias-fascism 4. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil, cit. pp. 23 5. Cfr. Ibidem, pp. 18-19. 6. Ibidem, pp. 19-21. 7. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2: Specialists Describe Their History and Expansion Over Time. In: RioOnWatch, 18.04.2025. Available at: https://rioonwatch.org/?p=71202 8. Ibidem. 9. Phillips, D. 'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs. In: The Guardian, 12.07.2018. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/brazil-militia-paramilitary-wield-terror-seize-power-from-drug-gangs   10. Cfr.  Fogel, B. & Richmond, A. R. Outsourcing Repression. Cit. 11. Cfr. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2, Cit. 12. Araujo de Paula, L.  The “Grey Zones” of Democracy in Brazil, cit. pp. 15. 13. Ibidem, pp. 16. 14. Ibidem, pp. 17. 15 Phillips, Dom. 'Lesser evil': how Brazil's militias wield terror to seize power from gangs. In: The Guardian, 12.07.2017. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/brazil-militia-paramilitary-wield-terror-seize-power-from-drug-gangs 16. Ibidem. 17. Simões, M. “No Rio de Janeiro a milícia não é um poder paralelo. É o Estado”. In: Pública, 28.01.2019. Available at: https://apublica.org/2019/01/no-rio-de-janeiro-a-milicia-nao-e-um-poder-paralelo-e-o-estado/ 18. Ibidem. 19. Ibidem. 20. Lima. T. Rio de Janeiro’s Militias and State Power, Part 2:, cit. 21. Ibidem. 22. Ibidem. 23. Greenwald, G. & Pougy, V. Video: As Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro Prepares to Meet Donald Trump, His Family’s Close Ties to Notorious Paramilitary Gangs Draw Scrutiny and Outrage. In: The Intercept, 18.03.2019. 24. Ibidem. 25. Ibidem.